G.R. No. 148862.

August 11, 2005

RUBIN TAD-Y y BABOR, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24162
1 

affirming, on appeal, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49,
2 

in People v. Rubin Tad-y, et al., Criminal Case No. 98-19401. The RTC ruling had affirmed the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Criminal Case No. 57216 finding the
petitioner guilty of direct bribery.

The Antecedents

Engineer Rubin Tad-y, Structural Analyst and Engineer Nestor Velez, Building Inspector, both of the
Office of the City Engineer (OCE), Bacolod City, were charged with direct bribery under Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code in an Information filed on July 26, 1995 with the MTCC of Bacolod City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 57216. The accusatory portion of the Information for direct bribery
reads:

That on or about the 24th day of July 1995, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, public officers, being then engineers at the
City Engineer’s Office, Bacolod City, with corrupt intent and motivated with pecuniary interest for
themselves, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and accept marked
money in the amount of Four Thousand (₱4,000.00) Pesos from Julio Encabo, electrical contractor
and duly-authorized representative of Mildred Wong, offended party and owner of Atrium Building
located at Gonzaga Street, Bacolod City, in an entrapment operation conducted by the PNP Criminal
Investigation Service Command at Andre’s Bakeshop, Bacolod City, which amount was earlier
solicited by said accused from the offended party in exchange for the signing/approval of permit for
building occupancy of the building owned by the offended party, the signing/approval of said building
permit is in connection with the performance of the official duties of said accused as engineers in the
Office of the City Engineer, Bacolod City, in violation of the aforementioned law.

Acts contrary to law. 3

Velez and Tad-y were also charged with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019 in an 4 

Information filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 17186. This case was raffled to
Branch 44 of the RTC of Bacolod City.

The Case for the People 5

The prosecution presented Julio Encabo, a licensed master electrician and electrical contractor, who
testified that Mildred Wong contracted his services for the construction of her 6-storey Atrium
building along Gonzaga Street, in front of the Central Market in Bacolod City. On February 16, 1994,
6 

the Office of the City Engineer/Building Official issued Building Permit No. 0694509798 for the 7 

construction of the building. The construction of the building was finished by April 25, 1995.
8
Between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. of even date, Encabo arrived at the OCE to arrange the conduct of final
building inspections, and, thereafter, the signing of the corresponding certificates. Rene Cornel, Jose
Sotecinal, Ephraim Hechanova, Jose Mari Sales, Mateo Tuvida and Rubin Tad-y, were the OCE
officers-in-charge of the various aspects of the building construction. If all went well, the Building
9 

Official would then sign the certificate of occupancy, conformably with the provisions of the National
Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096).

Encabo had the certificates of final inspection and occupancy form typed by an OCE secretary.
However, Tad-y, Encabo’s compadre, approached the latter and dissuaded him from processing the
certificates of final inspection and occupancy on the building since he (Tad-y) was the one
responsible for it; also, Mildred Wong still had an unpaid balance of ₱4,000.00 for his services.
When Encabo told Tad-y that collecting the amount from Wong would be problematic, Tad-y replied,
"[It’s] up [to] you."

Shortly thereafter, some of the officers at the OCE, including Tad-y and Tuvida, conducted their final
inspection of the building. During the first week of May 1995, Encabo and Tad-y had an altercation
and in his anger, Tad-y squeezed Encabo’s neck in the presence of the latter’s wife. Thus, the 10 

relations between Tad-y and Encabo became strained.

In the meantime, other officers of the OCE made their respective final inspections during the months
of May to June 1995, and signed the respective certificates of final inspection for the building. Tad-y
did not make his final inspection, and refused to do so unless the money he had demanded was
given to him. Encabo even sought the aid of the City Mayor but did not tell the latter that Tad-y was
11 

demanding money because he did not want to place the latter in a bad light.

Nonetheless, on July 6, 1995, Encabo reported the matter to the Criminal Investigation Section (CIS)
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Bacolod City, and signed a complaint sheet against Tad-y
12 

for extortion. Police officer Alexander Muñoz was then ordered to conduct an investigation on the
complaint.

Muñoz decided to conduct entrapment operations against Tad-y. He asked Encabo to procure
₱4,000.00, consisting of forty (40) pieces of ₱100.00 bills for the purpose. Encabo complied. Muñoz
13 

listed the serial numbers of the bills and placed his initials "AM" on the right lower corner of each
bill. The PNP Crime Laboratory in Bacolod City applied ultraviolet powder on the bills. The money
14  15 

was placed in a white envelope, and the envelope was turned over to Encabo for the
16 

entrapment. The police officers and Encabo had agreed that the police officers would position
17 

themselves within the vicinity of the Andre’s Bakeshop, and after giving the envelope to Tad-y,
Encabo would place his eyeglasses in front of his shirt collar to indicate that Tad-y had already
received the money. 18

After two aborted attempts, Encabo informed Muñoz by telephone that he and Tad-y would inspect
19 

the building at about 3:00 p.m. on July 24, 1995, and that Tad-y would sign the certificate of final
inspection afterwards. Police officers Eriberto Castañeda and Muñoz, along with civilian agents,
20 

proceeded to Gonzaga Street and positioned themselves as planned. 21

Encabo and Tad-y, accompanied by OCE building inspector Engr. Nestor Velez, arrived at the
building at about 5:00 p.m. on July 24, 1995. Encabo brought with him the envelope containing the
22 

forty ₱100.00 bills and the certificate of final inspection bearing the signatures of all the other OCE
officers concerned, which Tad-y was to sign after the inspection of the building. Tad-y was then
wearing his orange OCE bowling team t-shirt. Encabo and Tad-y inspected the building together for
about ten to twenty minutes. Velez, on his own, made a separate inspection of the building. After the
inspection, Encabo, Tad-y and Velez agreed to have a snack and proceeded to the Andre’s
Bakeshop at the ground floor of the Atrium Building along Gonzaga Street. Velez and Tad-y walked
23 

side by side while Encabo followed. By then, Muñoz, Castañeda and the other police officers were
24 

already in the vicinity to await Encabo’s signal.

Inside the bakeshop, Encabo brought out the certificate of final inspection, which Tad-y forthwith
signed. Encabo then gave the envelope containing the forty ₱100.00 bills to Tad-y. The latter asked
25 

Encabo, "What is it for?" Encabo replied that it was the money Tad-y had been waiting for. Tad-y 26 

opened the envelope and saw its contents. He asked Encabo if it was dangerous for him to receive
27 

the envelope, and the latter answered that it was not. Instead of putting the envelope in his pocket,
28 

Tad-y handed the same to Velez under the table. Velez asked Tad-y what it was, and Tad-y told
Velez to just keep it. Thereafter, Tad-y and Velez, followed by Encabo, exited from the bakeshop.
29 

Encabo then removed his eyeglasses and placed it on his shirt collar, the signal that Tad-y had
received the money. The police officers then accosted Velez and Tad-y, and asked the latter where
30 

the white envelope was. Tad-y denied that he received the envelope. Encabo told the police officers
that Velez had the envelope. When asked where the envelope was, Velez brought it out from the
31 

right pocket of his pants. Muñoz told Velez to open the envelope and inspected its contents. Velez
32 

did as he was told, and saw that the envelope contained ₱100.00 bills. Tad-y and Velez were 33 

arrested and brought to the CIS Headquarters, PNP Crime Laboratory. Tad-y’s shirt was turned
34 

over by the accosting officers. Castañeda also turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory the white
envelope and its contents, with a request for the PNP Crime Laboratory to test Velez and Tad-y for
35 

ultraviolet powder and the latter’s shirt to be tested. 36

Forensic Chemist Rea Villavicencio conducted the examination and prepared an Initial Laboratory
Report, stating that Rubin B. Tad-y was positive for the presence of yellow ultraviolet powder on his
37 

right arm. Villavicencio, likewise, prepared a sketch depicting the body of Tad-y, and showing that
38 

his right forearm was positive for ultraviolet powder.

On cross-examination, Encabo admitted that Velez was not aware of everything. 39

Edgar Occeña, the Chief of the Inspection Division, later affixed his signature on the certificate of
final inspection bearing Tad-y’s signature. The City Building Official approved and issued the
40 

certificate of occupancy on July 27, 1995. 41

The Case for the Accused Tad-y

Accused Tad-y denied demanding and receiving ₱4,000.00 from Encabo in consideration for the
conduct of the building inspection, and his signature on the certificate of inspection and the
certificate of occupancy. He insists that under P.D. No. 1096, he is not authorized to sign and issue
a certificate of occupancy. He testified that in the afternoon of April 25, 1995, Encabo arrived at the
OCE requesting that the appropriate officials inspect the 6-storey Atrium building preparatory to the
issuance of a certificate of final inspection. The next day, he, Tuvida, Tordesillas, Baja and Danoy
42 

conducted the building inspection. They discovered that only four floors were completed. Encabo
43  44 

agreed to inspect the building at 3:00 p.m. of July 24, 1995, which, at Encabo’s request, was reset to
4:30 p.m. He and Engr. Velez conducted the inspection of the building on that day and found some
45 

defects in the construction of the building.

After the inspection, Tad-y left Velez and Encabo behind as he was going to a bowling tournament,
but, as he was crossing Gonzaga Street, Velez and Encabo called him and invited him to join them
for a snack at Andre’s Bakeshop. He agreed because he was hungry. He and Encabo were seated
46 

beside each other at the table in the bakeshop, while Velez was seated at the opposite side. While 47 

taking their snacks, Encabo brought out the certificate of final inspection bearing the signatures of
the other officers of the OCE who had inspected the building. Tad-y affixed his signature above his
typewritten name with the notation "see back page for structural requisites" at the dorsal portion of
the document. Appearing at the dorsal portion of the certificate is Tad-y’s handwritten notation:
"Please Post the Allowable Load on [conspicuous] places especially [in the] area to be used as
storage." Before then, he inquired from Encabo where the other requisite certificates of final
48 

inspection, plumbing, Fire Safety Inspection and logbook were, and Encabo replied that he brought
the requisite certificates with him gesturing to his portfolio. Encabo assured him that all the
requirements were in his portfolio. With Encabo’s assurance, he then affixed his signature in the
49 

certificate of final inspection.

50

Momentarily, Encabo told him that he had another document, and forthwith handed a white envelope
to him. Believing that the envelope contained the requisite certificate of final inspection signed by the
other officers in the OCE, he received the envelope and, without opening it, immediately handed it
over to Velez who would examine its contents. He then left the bakeshop with Velez ahead of him,
followed by Encabo. He was crossing Gonzaga Street on his way to the bowling tournament when
he was arrested by policemen, who asked him where the white envelope he had earlier received
from Encabo was. He told them that the envelope was with Velez. 51

Tad-y then saw Velez being held by a policeman, and that the envelope was already opened. A
policeman forced Velez to go near him. Another policeman forced him (Tad-y) to touch the envelope,
but he parried the arm of the policeman with his right forearm and refused to touch it. They were
52 

then brought to the PNP headquarters where they were tested for ultraviolet powder.

Encabo filed a complaint against him because on four (4) prior occasions, he refused to sign the
certificate of final inspection of a house owned by a certain Nelson Señores, as well as the
application for a building permit of Joey Yao, unless the latter paid a 100% surcharge for
deficiencies. Señores and Yao were the principals of Encabo. In the evening of April 25, 1995, after
53 

he, Tuvida, Baja and Tordesillas had their initial inspections of the building, they had dinner at the
Tasty Treat. When he was about to pay the bill for their food and drinks, Encabo insisted that he
would pay the said bill. This infuriated him, and he squeezed Encabo’s chin with his hand. 54

Jimmy Gonzales, a newspaper vendor, corroborated the testimony of the accused that someone
forced Velez to hand over the opened envelope to Tad-y, but that Tad-y parried the attempt and
55 

refused to receive the envelope. 56

Tad-y marked and offered in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial of
57 

September 25, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 17186.

The Case For the Accused Nestor Velez

Nestor Velez denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony of Tad-y and declared that he was
appointed as building inspector of the OCE only on March 16, 1995. When he and Tad-y inspected
58 

the building in the afternoon of July 24, 1995, they did so separately. After the inspection, Tad-y told
him and Encabo that he was going ahead because he was going to play bowling. When Encabo 59 

invited him and Tad-y for a snack, Tad-y reluctantly agreed. 60

Momentarily, Encabo brought out the certificate of final inspection and handed it to Tad-y for the
latter’s signature. However, Tad-y told Encabo that he would note the deficiencies of the building.
Tad-y then signed the certificate after being assured by Encabo that he had all the other certificates.
Tad-y gave Velez the envelope and told him to keep it because he was going to a bowling
game. Velez received the envelope and put it inside the right pocket of his pants, thinking that it
61 

contained the requisite final safety inspection certificate and other certificates. 62
On his way from the bakeshop, he and Tad-y were arrested by policemen. He opened the white
envelope as the policemen ordered, and saw money inside. He was forced to approach Tad-y, and
another policeman forced the latter to touch the money contained in the envelope. Tad-y resisted.

Edgar Occeña testified that he signed the original and duplicate copies of the certificate of final
inspection with the requisite certificates of the other officers appended thereto. The City
Engineer/City Building Official signed the Certificate of Occupancy on July 27, 1995. The original
copy of the certificate of final inspection and occupancy was then released to Wong, while the
duplicate was retained by the OCE. 63

Mateo Tuvida testified that he was the engineer in charge of the Mechanical Section of the OCE of
Bacolod City since February 1975. On April 25, 1995, he, Baja, Tad-y, Cornel and Yolando Ilog
64 

inspected the building at the Gonzaga side of the street and found that it was already complete but
that the structure along Cuadra Street was still incomplete. He found the mechanical aspect of the
building completed when he inspected it in the first week of June 1995. He then affixed his signature
65 

on the certificate of final inspection.

66

Venancio Baja testified that he had been in charge of the Electrical Division of the OCE since 1990.
He was the assistant of Jose Sotecinal, the Chief Electrical Engineer. He inspected the Atrium
building on April 25, 1995 and found it incomplete. He again inspected the building and found it in
accord with the plans. He then signed the certificate of final inspection only in the first week of June
1995.67

On September 28, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment convicting Tad-y of direct bribery defined and
penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Velez was acquitted of the charges.
The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Accused Engineer Nestor Velez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code on the ground that it is the finding of this Court that he was innocent of the
crime charged;

2. Accused Engineer Ruben Tad-y is hereby pronounced GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
of Violation of Paragraph 2 of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months, as minimum, to 3 years, as maximum, in the absence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and, to pay the fine in the amount of ₱8,000.00 pesos.

3. Accused Ruben Tad-y, in case of his insolvency to pay the fine, shall suffer a subsidiary penalty of
imprisonment at the rate of one day for each 8 pesos and shall remain in confinement until his fine is
satisfied. However, his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the
sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of day shall
be counted against the prisoner, in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code; and

4. Accused Ruben Tad-y is also hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of special temporary
disqualification and is hereby ordered to be deprived of his right to hold office and employment in the
City Engineer’s Office, as well as for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or
during the term of his sentence in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 210, in relation to Article
31, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED. 68

The MTC gave full credence and probative weight to Encabo’s testimony, ruling that Tad-y
demanded and received ₱4,000.00 from Encabo on July 24, 1995 in consideration for his signing a
certificate of occupancy. It further ruled that the accused signed the said certificate on the said date.

Tad-y appealed the decision to the RTC, which rendered judgment on September 13, 1999,
affirming the decision of the MTC with modification as to the penalty imposed. The fallo of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed except for the modifications that the
accused Ruben Tad-y y Babor’s sentence should consist of an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty- one (21) days
of Prision Correccional, as maximum, and for him to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED. 69

The RTC denied Tad-y’s motion for reconsideration. However, the RTC agreed with Tad-y’s
contention that what the latter signed was a certificate of final inspection and not a certificate of
occupancy.

In a parallel development, the RTC rendered judgment on May 18, 2001 in Criminal Case No.
17186, acquitting Tad-y and Velez of the charge. 70

The accused, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review of the decision of the RTC. The CA
rendered judgment on February 2, 2001 affirming the RTC decision in toto. Upon the denial of the
71 

motion for reconsideration of the said decision, the petitioner filed his petition for review
on certiorari with this Court.

The threshold issue raised by the petitioner is factual – whether the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt for direct bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner avers that under the Information, and as held by the courts a quo, he was charged
with direct bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, for
soliciting and receiving ₱4,000.00 on July 24, 1995 from Mildred Wong, through Encabo, in
consideration for his signing/approval of the certificate of occupancy of the Atrium Building, and that
he signed said certificate on said date.

The petitioner maintains that he did not sign a certificate of occupancy. He posits that a certificate of
occupancy is signed by the city building official, and that he has nothing to do with the execution of
such certificate. Hence, he is not criminally liable for direct bribery, one of the essential elements for
the crime being that the act which he agreed to do or execute is connected to the performance of his
official duties.

The petitioner assails the credibility and probative weight of Encabo’s testimony. He avers that
Encabo had an axe to grind against him because, on prior occasions, he had denied the applications
for building permit filed by his principals due to structural deficiencies in the buildings.

The petitioner further insists that he did not demand, nor could have demanded the amount of
₱4,000.00 on April 25, 1995, or thereafter, because as of the said date, the Atrium building had not
yet been completed. The petitioner avers that Encabo’s claim that he demanded ₱4,000.00 for the
signing the certificate of final inspection is belied by the fact that he indicated the deficiencies of the
building at the dorsal portion of the certificate. It was only in the first week of June 1995 that Baja
and Tuvida made their final inspection and signed the certificate of final inspection. Even Encabo
72 

admitted that the petitioner refused to sign the said certificate because as of July 24, 1995, there had
been no final inspection of the building, and not because he was demanding ₱4,000.00 from
Encabo.

The petitioner posits that the case for the prosecution was enfeebled by its failure to adduce in
evidence the certificate of final inspection he signed on July 24, 1995. It adduced in evidence only
the certificate of final inspection bearing all the signatures of the officers in the OCE, except his. He
73 

claims that the respondent failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he knew of the contents of
the white envelope. He, in fact, believed that the envelope contained the requisite certificates of
inspection. Moreover, he did not open the envelope and instead passed it over to Velez for
verification, as he was on his way to a bowling game.

The petitioner further contends that the respondent even failed to adduce in evidence the white
envelope he received from Encabo, or prove that the said white envelope was what he actually
received from Encabo. He posits that there is no probable cause for his and Velez’s warrantless
arrest; hence, any evidence confiscated by the policemen from them is inadmissible in evidence.

The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that it adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the petitioner’s guilt for direct bribery. It insists that the petitioner failed
to prove that Encabo had any ulterior motive to falsely charge and testify against him. The OSG
points that the testimony of Encabo is honest and straightforward; hence, entitled to full probative
weight. It is hard to believe, the OSG avers, that the petitioner would accept the envelope without
knowing its contents. The petitioner demanded and received from Encabo the ₱4,000.00 contained
in a white envelope in consideration of his signing the certificate of occupancy.

The OSG avers that the petitioner’s signing of the certificate of occupancy was his duty as the
engineer in charge of the structural design in the City Engineer’s Office of Bacolod City. The OSG
notes that the petitioner was found positive for ultraviolet powder.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of fact may be raised in this Court on a
petition for review on certiorari. The reason is that the Court is not a trier of facts. However, the rule
is subject to several exceptions. The Court may delve into and resolve factual issues in those cases
where the findings of the trial court and the CA are absurd, contrary to the evidence on record,
impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a misappreciation of facts. 74

In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the MTC, the RTC and the CA, on the
substantial matters at hand, are absurd and arbitrary, and contrary to the evidence on record.

Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 210. Direct Bribery. – Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the
penalty of prison mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than three times
the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same
shall have been committed.

If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the
preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of
such gift.

If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from
doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not less than
three times the value of the gift.

In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty
of special temporary disqualification.

The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors,
arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public
duties.

Direct bribery has the following essential elements:

1. the offender is a public officer;

2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to
committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do;
and

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties. 75

The prosecution is mandated to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the essential elements of the
felony and that the petitioner is the perpetrator thereof. 76

Official duties include any action authorized. It is sufficient if the officer has the official power, ability
or apparent ability to bring about or contribute to the desired end. The acts referred to in the law,
which the offender agrees to perform or execute, must be ultimately related to or linked with the
performance of his official duties. It is sufficient if his actions, affected by the payment of the bribe,
are parts of any established procedure consistent with the authority of the government
agency. However, where the act is entirely outside of the official functions of the officer to whom the
77 

money is offered, the offense is not bribery. 78

The agreement between the public officer and the bribe-giver may be express or implied. Such
agreement may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Proof of such an agreement may
rest upon relevant and competent circumstantial evidence. To hold, otherwise, would allow the
culprit to escape liability with winks and nods even when the evidence as a whole proves that there
has been a meeting of the minds to exchange official duties for money. 79

It is not necessary that the money is received by the offender before or at the time he agreed to
perform or execute an act. It is sufficient if he received the money afterwards in pursuance of a prior
arrangement or agreement. 80

Indisputably, the petitioner is a public officer under Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code. There is
81 

no allegation in the Information that the issuance of the certificate of occupancy is a crime or is
unjust.

The Court agrees with the petitioner’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

The MTC convicted the petitioner of direct bribery on its finding that the petitioner demanded
₱4,000.00 from Wong, through Encabo, in consideration of signing a certificate of occupancy, and
that on July 24, 1995, the petitioner received the said amount from Encabo and signed the said
certificate for the Atrium building. The CA affirmed the said findings of the MTC in its decision, thus:

All the elements above are present in the case at bench. Petitioner Ruben Tad-y was an employee
at the City Engineer’s Office of Bacolod City. That petitioner-accused accepted the amount of
₱4,000.00 which he demanded from Julio Encabo, a representative of Mildred Wong who will secure
a certificate of occupancy for the building of the latter and handed it over to his subordinate Nestor
Velez, petitioner’s co-accused, on April 24, 1995 at Andre Bakeshop. And in consideration of the
amount thus given, petitioner would sign the certificate of occupancy, which is his duty as engineer
in charge of structural designs at the City Engineer’s Office of Bacolod City. It must be added that
petitioner signed the certificate of occupancy, the original of which was kept at the records section of
the City Engineer’s Office, after receiving the envelope containing ₱4,000.00. … 82

However, there is no iota of competent and credible evidence to support these findings. There is no
evidence on record that the petitioner and Encabo met on April 24, 1995. In fact, it was only on April
25, 1995 that Encabo arrived at the OCE to make arrangements for the final inspection of the
building by the officers concerned, the signing of the certificate of inspection by said officers, and the
signing of the certificate of occupancy by the building official.

There is also no dispute that what was signed by the petitioner, on July 24, 1995, following his final
inspection of the building, was the certificate of final inspection and not a certificate of occupancy of
the building. Thus, Encabo testified:

Q- But in (sic) July 24, 1995 when you mentioned that they inspected again the building?

A- Yes, Sir.

Q- And after inspection you went down to Andre Bakeshop which is the ground floor of the Atrium
Building. What happened there at Andre Bakeshop?

A- I gave him the papers and let him sign the necessary papers.

Q- What necessary papers are you referring to?

A- This certificate of Final Inspection where he is the one who never affixed his signature.
Q- When you gave the Certificate of Final Inspection, he signed it?

A- Yes, Sir. 83

It was only on July 27, 1995, after the petitioner had signed the certificate of final inspection on July
24, 1995, that the city building official approved and issued the certificate of occupancy for the
building.
84

There is also no credible evidence on record that the petitioner demanded ₱4,000.00 from Wong,
through Encabo, in exchange for the signing of the certificate of occupancy. Indeed, it is incredible
that the petitioner would demand the said amount as a precondition to his signing a certificate,
considering that, under Section 309 of P.D. No. 1096, the authority to sign said certificate is vested
85 

specifically on the building official, and not on the petitioner:

Section 309. Certificate of Occupancy

No building or structure shall be used or occupied and no change in the existing use or occupancy
classification of a building or structure or portion thereof shall be made until the Building Official has
issued a Certificate of Occupancy therefor as provided in this Code.

A Certificate of Occupancy shall be issued by the Building Official within thirty (30) days if after final
inspection and submittal of a Certificate of Completion referred to in the preceding section, it is found
that the building or structure complies with the provisions of this Code.

The Certificate of Occupancy shall be posted or displayed in a conspicuous place on the premises
and shall not be removed except upon order of the Building Official.

The non-issuance, suspension and revocation of Certificates of Occupancy and the procedure for
appeal therefrom shall be governed in so far as applicable, by the provisions of Section 306 and 307
of this Code. 86

Calibrating the testimony of Encabo, the prosecution sought to prove that the petitioner agreed to
conduct a final inspection of the building and sign a certificate of final inspection upon the receipt of
₱4,000.00.

However, the testimony of Encabo is not entitled to full probative weight since it is evasive and
chameleonic, enfeebled by frontal inconsistencies on substantial matters which the trial court and
the CA ignored.

In the court a quo, Encabo testified, on direct examination, that on April 25, 1995, the petitioner
dissuaded him from following up and seeing the approval for the certificate of occupancy because
Wong failed to pay the ₱4,000.00, the balance due for the petitioner’s services in securing the
building permit. However, Encabo also claimed that the petitioner agreed to conduct a final
inspection of the building and sign a certificate of final inspection if the money was given to the latter.
When he testified in Criminal Case No. 17186, Encabo declared that the petitioner refused to sign a
certificate of inspection on April 25, 1995 unless the ₱4,000.00 he demanded was paid. However,87 

Encabo gave a completely different story to the CIS when he gave his sworn statement; he claimed
that, on April 25, 1995, the petitioner demanded ₱4,000.00 in consideration for his signature on the
certificate of occupancy.88
When he testified in Criminal Case No. 17186, Encabo admitted that the petitioner did not demand
₱4,000.00 as a precondition to his final inspection of the building and his signing of the certificate of
final inspection. The petitioner refused to sign a certificate of final inspection for the sole reason that
he had not yet conducted the required final inspection.

Atty. Sorbito:

On April 25, 1995, when you went there accused Ruben Tad-y refused to sign?

WITNESS:

Yes, Sir.

ATTY. SORBITO:

You mean to say Mr. Encabo that even without final inspection any of the signatories to the
occupancy permit can affixed (sic) their signatures without inspection?

WITNESS:

They have to inspect.

ATTY. SORBITO:

So when Ruben Tad-y refused to sign the permit on April 25, 1995, its because there was no final
inspection made yet?

WITNESS:

Yes, Sir.

ATTY. SORBITO:

It is not because there was no money or ₱4,000.00?

WITNESS:

No, Sir.

ATTY. SORBITO:

In short, Ruben Tad-y did not ask for anything because only there in (sic) no inspection was (sic)
made?

WITNESS:

Yes, Sir. 89

Encabo could not have asked the petitioner or any of the officers in the OCE for that matter to sign
the certificate of occupancy because only the building official has the authority to sign the same.
Moreover, the city building official could not have signed the certificate because no final inspection of
the building had been conducted, and no certificate of final inspection had been signed by the OCE
officers.

Encabo’s claim that the petitioner agreed to make a final inspection of the building if he was paid
₱4,000.00 is belied by his testimony in the court a quo, that, during the second week of May 1995,
the petitioner and the other officers of the OCE conducted an inspection of the building. Encabo did
90 

not give any centavo to the petitioner on that occasion. However, the petitioner and Encabo had a
quarrel in the course of which the petitioner tried, in anger, to squeeze Encabo’s neck. As testified
91 

to by the petitioner, Encabo insisted on paying for the food and drinks consumed by him and the
other OCE officers after their inspection of the building, despite the petitioner’s insistence that he
should pay for the bill:

Q You have also mentioned about that incident whether you were antagonized by Mr. Encabo which
you said you have squeezed his chain (sic) with your hands, where was that establishment?

A At the second floor of Tasty Treat at Araneta Street, Bacolod City.

Q And you were drinking beer with Mr. Encabo during that time?

A When I arrived they were already drinking.

Q And you also started to drink beer?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And how many bottles have you consumed, if you can still recall?

A Two bottles.

Q And it was even Mr. Encabo who paid the bill for the drinking spree?

ATTY. SORBITO:

Misleading, your Honor.

COURT:

Who pay (sic) for the bills?

A That is (sic)where the trouble began because after I have consumed two (2) bottles of beer, he
asked the bills with the intention of paying it because there is among the group are (sic) my relatives
and it was my purpose to pay. 92

Encabo testified that he sought the help of the City Mayor for the petitioner to conduct the final
inspection of the building, but did not inform the Mayor that the petitioner had demanded ₱4,000.00
in consideration for his inspection of the building. He claimed that the petitioner was
his compadre and he did not want to put him in a bad light:

ATTY. SERFINO:
Q- When you went to the City Mayor, you are yet thinking that you will go to the CIS?

A- I have already reported that.

Q- What is your reason of not telling the mayor that Ruben Tad-y demanded money?

A- Being the government employee and he is my kumpare, I do not want to cause very bad
occasion. 93

Encabo projected himself as solicitous and protective of the petitioner’s well-being and the
maintenance of the community’s regard to his compadre, the petitioner. However, when asked why
he had to complain to the CIS and thus placed the petitioner in jeopardy for prosecution of an
offense, Encabo replied that he did so because the petitioner had mauled him:

Q Now, you have already gone to the CIS, as you said, is it not?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And, you have already reported to the CIS that supposed demand from you?

A Well, he is (sic) trying to maul me.94

What is so disconcerting is that Encabo claimed that even months after the city building official had
already issued the certificate of occupancy to Wong on July 27, 1995, the petitioner still conducted
inspections of the building, along with the other officers, in September and October 1995:

Q So, you are now certain you have not inspected the building and several other officials of the City
Engineer’s Office in the afternoon of April 25, 1995, when you went to the office?

A We do the inspection together with the accused and others during and after April 25 and October
1995.

Q Please answer me, you are definitely sure that it was on April 25, 1995?

A Yes, the inspection.

Q When you said yes, it was not on that date?

A The date is (sic) April 25, 1995 is not exactly the date of inspection.

Q In what month after April 25, 1995 when you inspected the building but prior to October 25, 1995?

A It was October or September, somewhat like that. That September or October I cannot pinpoint
the exact date because I don’t have the record of that. 95

It is incredible that the petitioner and the other officers would continue with their inspections of the
building even months after the issuance of the certificate of occupancy, and when the petitioner had
already been charged with direct bribery in the MTC. Indeed, on September 21, 1995, Encabo was
already testifying in Criminal Case No. 17186 for the prosecution against the petitioner.
The prosecution cannot find solace in the entrapment operations conducted by the CIS and the
aftermath thereof.

First. The petitioner brought along Engineer Nestor Velez, a building inspector in the OCE, on his
final inspection of the building after which they had a snack with Encabo. If, as claimed by Encabo,
the petitioner expected to receive ₱4,000.00 from him, as bribe, it would be contrary to human
experience to bring another person along (in this case, Velez) to witness the receipt of the envelope
containing the money. Moreover, the Andre Bakeshop is a public place where people enter to make
purchases. Indeed, this Court in Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan, declared –
96 

However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano were present around the table in
the canteen with the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to the
petitioner. There were other persons in the premises like the PC agents whose identities petitioner
possibly did not know. Under the circumstances and in such a public place it is not probable that
petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. If the
petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner
would not have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated she did not see
the alleged passing of the money. She could not have seen the money as it was passed on under
the table or when, as petitioner said, it was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up. What Mrs.
Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to leave the canteen, two (2) men approached
petitioner, one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, "What are you trying
to do to me?" The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty conscience.

Second. The petitioner walked ahead of Velez and Encabo out of the Atrium building after the final
inspection, and was on his way to the bowling tournament. However, he joined Encabo and Velez for
a snack only because Encabo had invited him. Such behavior on the part of the petitioner is
inconsistent with one who expected to receive ₱4,000.00 from Encabo after his final inspection of
the building.

Third. When Encabo handed the envelope to the petitioner, the latter inquired what the envelope
was for. The petitioner opened the envelope in full view of Velez and saw its contents. He handed
the envelope to Velez instead of putting it into his pocket, even after Encabo had assured the
petitioner that it was not dangerous for the latter to receive it. It is incredible that, as claimed by
Encabo, the petitioner handed over the envelope to Velez under the table.

Such facts and circumstances show that the petitioner had no intention to accept the money and
consider it his own; they negate the prosecution’s contention that the petitioner demanded and
expected to receive ₱4,000.00 as bribe money. Indeed, this Court ruled in Formilleza –

The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is
that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift material consideration. There must be
a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as
his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same.
Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such
acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been
committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by
simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other property.97

The foregoing ruling of this Court applies not only to charges of indirect bribery but also to direct
bribery. The respondent’s contention that the petitioner handed the envelope to Velez under the
table is belied by the testimonies of the petitioner and Velez.
Fourth. The police officers even forced the petitioner to incriminate himself by forcing him to touch
the contents of the envelope, but the petitioner managed to parry the attempt with his right arm.
Thus, Velez testified:

Q What happened outside the bakeshop?

A When we went out of the Atrium building, because we plan to left (sic) the place separately or to
part ways.

Q You mean to say that Engr. Tad-y was going to his own direction and you to another direction and
Mr. Encabo to a different direction?

A Yes.

Q Were you able to do that?

A When I was already at the middle of Gonzaga Street, somebody took hold of my arm, almost my
shoulder.

Q Then what happened?

A I was shocked or surprised, somebody took hold of my arm.

Q Did he say anything?

A When I turned my head, he told me that I am (sic) under arrest.

Q What else?

A After hearing that, I asked him what sins (sic) have we committed?

Q What did he say?

A He was trying to search on my trousers.

Q Did he show any warrant or authority for him to do that?

A Never.

Q No warrant of arrest or search warrant?

A No.

Q So, what did he find in your trousers?

A While he was searching me, I was asking him, what money and he asked me, "where is that
envelope you received", while he was holding me, it’s in your pocket, get it. So, I get (sic) it because
he was holding me in my hand and at the same time squeezing it.

Q What arm?
A At first, it was my left hand that he was searching, he was able to took (sic) hold of my right arm as
it is used to be the one to pick the particular envelope.

Q So, how actually sure were you, when you get (sic) the envelope from your pocket?

A It appears that myself because he was doing it by squeezing my hand.

COURT:

Q About what part of your pocket?

COURT INTERPRETER:

At this juncture, the witness is pointing at the right side of his pocket.

ATTY. SERFINO:

Q And after you have (sic) involuntarily taken that envelope from your pocket, what did they do?

A When he was squeezing my hand, I was able to get the money and they brought me to Engr. Tad-
y.

Q How far was Engr. Tad-y when they brought you there?

A Maybe ten to fifteen meters.

Q And when you were already near Engr. Tad-y, did you notice what was happening to Engr. Tad-y?

A When I was there going toward Engr. Tad-y, I saw one person holding his hands.

Q When you were near him, what happened next?

A When I was near Engr. Tad-y, they let me open that particular envelope.

Q Who was handling that particular envelope towards Engr. Tad-y?

A It’s myself holding it while he was holding me towards Engr. Tad-y.

Q You mean the very hand he was holding, squeezing, it’s also the hand holding the envelope?

A Yes.

Q Was it [the] left or right hand?

A At first left, when he pulled me it was already his right hand.

Q What happened when you were near Engr. Tad-y?

A When I have already opened the envelope and when they saw the content of that envelope, the
money, they try (sic) to pull that so that Engr. Tad-y will receive the money from me.

Q How did you open that envelope in that stage, was it already opened or did you have to exert
some efforts to open?

A I opened it because it was closed.

Q Did Engr. Tad-y received (sic), take hold of that money?

A When he found out that the content is money, he did not hold it.

Q What did he do?

A He tried not to receive it but he was forced by one arresting officer.

Q What else took place at that stage on that day?

A When they were not able to force Engr. Tad-y to take hold of the money, they tried to stop a taxi. 98

The testimony of the petitioner on this matter reads:

Q Now, what happened after you saw that there was another person holding your co-accused?

A They were searching him in order to have the white envelope out.

Q So, did you see any envelope after that?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How did you see it or how did you happen to see it?

A Because he let Mr. Velez open his pocket and have it left opened.

Q And then what happened?

A When the said envelope was already opened he hold (sic) Mr. Velez and pulled Mr. Velez towards
me.

Q Were they able to come near you?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, while your co-accused was already near you, what transpired among you?

A A person of small size holding the hands of Mr. Velez holding the white envelope because he
wants that I will hold the white envelope.

Q Go ahead.
A It was already opened and he wanted me to hold the white envelope.

Q When you were still inside the bakeshop, will you please inform the Hon. Court if the envelope
was already opened or not?

A Not yet.

Q The prosecution witness, Julio Encabo here testified that inside the bakeshop, after he handed to
you the envelope, you opened it and peeped inside the envelope, is this true?

A It is a big lie.

Q Why do you say that it is a big lie?

A It will be subject of the evidence in the Police Laboratory. It was only shown that there was
fluorescent powder.

(Witness, at this juncture is pointing to his right arm.)

Q You are referring to Exhibit "4-A"?

A Yes, Sir.

ATTY. SERFINO:

I would like to manifest, your Honor that on Exhibit "4", there is nothing there that indicates that there
was any powder marks in the hands of this accused.

Q Now, what else happened when your co-accused was already near you?

A They tried to let the hands of Nestor come towards me but I was trying to move away.

Q On the basis of what you saw, if you know what was the reason that (sic) they were trying to let
you hold the envelope?

ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR CENTENO:

Asking for a conclusion, your Honor.

COURT:

Sustained.

COURT:

Reform.

ATTY. SERFINO:

Q From that stage, what else happened?

A Since they cannot do the thing of letting the hands of Nestor Velez go near me, it was the person
who picked the white envelope and tried to give it to me, but I was trying to parry it. (Witness is
pointing to his right forearm.)

Q Thereafter, what happened?

A (Witness, at this juncture is trying to hold the left hand at his waist.) I do not know whether it was a
camera or a gun.

Q What else happened?

He said to me, "relax ka lang, you might be fell (sic) down."

Q Was he a Tagalog?

A I do not know but he speak (sic) in Tagalog.

Q How did that incident in front of that street came to close?

A I stayed calm but I was afraid of them.

Q After you relaxed because of your fear, is there anything else that took place?

A They stopped a taxi and then pulled me to ride in the taxi together with the co-accused, Nestor
Velez.99

The testimonies of Velez and the petitioner were corroborated by the Initial Laboratory Report of
Forensic Chemist Rea Villavicencio that the petitioner’s right arm tested positive for ultraviolet
powder. The Report and Sketch drawn by Villavicencio did not show that any of the fingers of the
petitioner were positive for ultraviolet powder.

In sum then, the Court rules that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of petitioner Rubin Tad-y of
the crime charged. Consequently, the Petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the Information.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 147578-85             January 28, 2008

ROLANDO L. BALDERAMA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, respondents.

x------------------------------------------x

G.R. Nos. 147598-605             January 28, 2008

ROLANDO D. NAGAL, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, private respondent
and
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, public respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Joint Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan dated
November 17, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20669, 20670, 20672, 20674, 20675, 20676, 20677, and
20678; and its Resolution dated March 20, 2001.

Rolando L. Balderama, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 147578-85, and Rolando D. Nagal, petitioner in G.R.
Nos. 147598-605, were employed with the Land Transportation Commission (LTO) assigned to the
Field Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services. Juan S. Armamento, respondent in both
cases, operates a taxi business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units.

Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport discriminate against
passengers and would transport them to their destinations only on a "contract" basis, the LTO
created a team to look into the veracity of the complaints. Petitioners in these cases were members
of the team, popularly known as "Flying Squad," together with Cipriano L. Lubrica and Cresencio de
Jesus.

On July 14, 1992, the team flagged down for inspection an "SJ Taxi" owned by respondent. The
team impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective. However, upon inspection and
testing by the LTO Inspection Division, the results showed that contrary to the report of the team, the
meter waiting time mechanism of the vehicle was not defective and was functioning normally. The
vehicle was released to respondent.

On December 2, 1992, respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle,
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, 2 against herein petitioners as well as Lubrica and de
Jesus. He alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting
"protection money" from him. On February 15, 1992, they went to his office and proposed they would
not apprehend his drivers and impound his vehicles for violations of LTO rules, provided he gives
them the amount of P400.00 every 15th and 30th day of the month. They agreed to the reduced
amount of P300.00. On the same day, he started giving them P300.00 and from then on, every
15th and 30th day of the month until June 15, 1992. Thereafter, he failed to give them the agreed
amount because his business was not doing well.

Eventually, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan nine (9) Informations for
violations of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code3 against petitioners and the other members of the
team, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 20669-20677. All the Informations were identically worded,
except the date of the commission of the crimes. For brevity, we reproduce the Information in
Criminal Case No. 20669 as sample, thus:

Criminal Case No. 20669

That on or about February 15, 1992 or for sometime prior thereto in Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused all
public officers, being all employees of the Land transportation Office assigned with the Field
Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services, committing the offense in relation to their
office and taking advantage of their position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously solicit, demand and receive from Juan Armamento, a taxicab operator, the
amount of P300.00 in consideration for the said accused refraining from performing their
official duty of conducting inspections on the taxicab units being operated by said Juan
Armamento to determine any possible violation of LTO rules and regulations, thereby
causing Juan Armamento and the public service damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

They were also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 20678, reads:

That on or about July 14, 1992 or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, all accused public officers,
being employees of the Land transportation Office, assigned with the Field Enforcement
Division, Law Enforcement Services, while in the discharge of their official administrative
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to Juan
Armamento, a taxicab operator, through evident bad faith by apprehending and impounding
one (1) unit of his taxicab with Plate No. PKD-726 for alleged violation of LTO rules and
regulations, in that, its meter is defective (waiting time not functioning), which was later on
established to be not true, thereby depriving said Juan Armamento of the use of his taxicab
unit for about three (3) days and to realize income thereon for the same period, as well as
incur unnecessary expenses in effecting the release of his impounded unit from the
impounding area of the LTO.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on June 30, 1994, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. The
cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Prior thereto, they were suspended pendente lite from the
service for a period of ninety (90) days.

On March 5, 1999, accused de Jesus died. The cases against him were dismissed. The hearing
proceeded against petitioners and Lubrica.

In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan found petitioners and Lubrica guilty of
direct bribery in seven (7) of the nine (9) Informations filed against them and were sentenced in each
count "to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 years and 2 months, as minimum, to
5 years, 4 months and 20 days, as maximum, within the range of prision correccional, and to suffer
the penalty of special temporary disqualification." They were further ordered to pay a fine of P300.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and "to restitute the amount of P300.00 as
alleged in the Informations." They were acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 20671 and 20673 for
failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioners and Lubrica were also convicted in Criminal Case No. 20678 for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as maximum. They were also disqualified
perpetually from holding public office and were ordered to indemnify the respondent the amount
of P1,500.00, representing his lost income for the 3-day period that the taxi cab remained in the LTO
impounding unit.

Petitioners and Lubrica filed separate motions for reconsideration arguing that they were not yet
grouped as a team on February 15, 1992, hence, there could be no conspiracy. While the motion
was pending resolution, both petitioners filed separate motions for new trial based on an affidavit
dated December 22, 2000 executed by respondent recanting his previous testimony and pointing to
Lubrica and de Jesus as the only culprits.

On March 20, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration and the motions for
new trial. In denying the motions for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan ruled:

Anent the second argument, the Supreme Court has made these pronouncements:

Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, as it may be shown by acts and
circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common
design, or may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetuated. (see People v. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 785; People v. Tingson, 47 SCRA
243; People v. Alonso, 73 SCRA 484).

Thus, for failure of the accused to controvert prosecution’s evidence that all four of them
went to the office of the private complainant on February 15, 1992 and offered him to refrain
from subjecting his taxi units to apprehension for notation of LTO rules, provided that he
comes across with the amount of P400.00 (later reduced to P300.00) to be delivered twice a
month and it was accused Nagal who received the P300.00 on April 30, 1992, Balderama on
May 30, in the presence of de Jesus, Lubrica on February 15, February 28 together with
Nagal, March 30 and June 15, and that in fact, Manimtim witnessed the incident which
occurred on May 15 and February 15, 1992 and saw Balderama and de Jesus waiting in the
mobile car together with Nagal, this Court’s finding of conspiracy holds.

In denying the motions for new trial, the Sandiganbayan held:

 Retraction of testimonies previously given in Court are viewed with disfavor. As a general
rule, a motion for new trial will not be granted if based on an affidavit of a witness where the
effect is to free the appellant from participation in the commission of the crime. The
recantation made by the private complainant after the conviction of the accused is unreliable
and deserves scant consideration.

In the case of People v. Soria, 262 SCRA 739, the Supreme Court declared:

Indeed, it would be dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the Court of
justice simply because the witness later changed his mind for one reason or another,
for such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and will place the investigation of
truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. It bears stressing that a testimony in
court is made under conditions calculated to discourage and forestall falsehood.

Both petitioners filed with this Court separate petitions for review on certiorari, both arguing that the
Sandiganbayan erred: (1) in finding that they are guilty of the offenses charged; (2) in holding that
petitioners and their co-accused acted in conspiracy; and (3) in disregarding the recantation made
by respondent.

On January 4, 2003, Lubrica likewise filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In our
Decision dated February 26, 2007, we denied his petition for being late. Our Decision became final
and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on April 20, 2007.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the guilt of the accused, now petitioners, in these cases
has been proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given
in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the
exercise of his functions as a public officer.4

The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly established that
the accused demanded and received P300.00 as "protection money" from respondent on several
dates. As against the prosecution’s evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi and denial,
the weakest of defenses.

Anent Criminal Case No. 20678, to hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with
the former; (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his
or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury
to any party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.5 The Sandiganbayan found
that petitioners and Lubrica participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of
the taxi unit of respondent, causing him undue injury.6

Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding
and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established exceptions,
among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4)
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and, 6) the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record.7 We found none of these
exceptions in the present cases.

Petitioners’ prayer for complete acquittal on the strength of respondent’s affidavit of recantation fails
to impress us.

A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation.8 The Court looks
with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of
desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only
scant attention.9 The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured
from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is
exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated. 10 Only when
there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as
to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld. 11 As
found by the Sandiganbayan, "(t)here is indubitably nothing in the affidavit which creates doubts on
the guilt of accused Balderama and Nagal."

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated

November 17, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20669, 20670, 20672, 20674, 20675, 20676, 20677 and
20678 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155574             November 20, 2006

TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to
set aside and nullify the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan dated 6 May 2002 which convicted
petitioner Timoteo A. Garcia of 56 counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in Criminal Cases Nos.
24042 to 24098 (except 24078), and its Resolution2 dated 2 October 2002 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.

The instant case stemmed from the Complaint of Maria Lourdes Miranda against petitioner, then
Regional Director, Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region X, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa,
employees of the same office, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for their
alleged frequent borrowing of motor vehicles from Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation
(Company). Finding probable cause for violation thereof, Graft Investigation Officer II Gay Maggie F.
Balajadia-Violan recommended that petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa be indicted for
violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.

On 14 August 1997, 57 Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner, Gilbert G.
Nabo and Nery Tagupa for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The
Information in Criminal Case No. 24042 reads:

That on or about the period covering January 9, 1993 to January 10, 1993 or sometime prior thereto,
in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, GILBERT G. NABO and NERY TAGUPA, being then public officers or
employees of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Cagayan de Oro City, taking advantage of their
respective official positions, and conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and
with intent to gain personal use or benefit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
borrow One (1) unit Asian Automotive Center’s Service Vehicle – Fiera Blue KBK-732, in good
running condition, spare tire, tools from Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, which is engaged in the
business of vehicle assembly and dealership in Cagayan de Oro City, knowing that said corporation
regularly transacts with the accused’s LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the
reporting of its engine and chassis numbers as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer’s report
and other similar transactions which require the prior approval and/or intervention of the said
accused Regional Director and employees and/or their said LTO office in Cagayan de Oro City, to
the damage and prejudice of and undue injury to said Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, including
complainant Maria Lourdes Miranda.3

The fifty-six other Informations are similarly worded except for the alleged dates of commission of
the offense, and the types/descriptions of the vehicles allegedly borrowed by them. The pertinent
data in the other informations are as follows:

---------

On 22 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued orders for the arrest of the three accused 5 and for
the holding of their departure from the country.6 On 6 October 1997, petitioner posted a consolidated
surety bond for his provisional liberty.7

In a resolution dated 3 July 1998, the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. 24078 was
granted.8

On 17 August 1998, when arraigned, petitioner and accused Tagupa, assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded "not guilty" to the charges.9 Accused Nabo remains at large.

On 15 October 1998, pre-trial was concluded.10 Thereafter, trial ensued.

The evidence of the prosecution, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, are as follows:

ESTANISLAO BARRETE YUNGAO (hereinafter, "Yungao") declared that he was employed as the
driver and liaison officer of the Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation (hereinafter, "the
Company"), an establishment engaged in the assembly of motor vehicles, during the period covering
the years 1991 to 1995. As such, Yungao had to officially report to the Land Transportation Office
("LTO") of Cagayan de Oro City all the engine and chassis numbers prior to the assembly of any
motor vehicle. In the process, the Company had to secure from the LTO a Conduct Permit after a
motor vehicle has been completely assembled, for purposes of carrying out the necessary road
testing of the vehicle concerned. After the said road testing and prior to its eventual sale/disposition,
the vehicle has to be first properly registered with the LTO. Accused Garcia, in his capacity as the
Director of the LTO of Cagayan de Oro City, during all times relevant to the instant cases, was the
approving authority on the aforesaid reportorial requirements and the signatory of the said Conduct
Permits.

By reason thereof, Yungao knew accused Garcia since January of 1991. Yungao would always
personally talk to accused Garcia regarding the issuance of the required Conduct Permit for any
newly assembled vehicle. Yungao would secure from accused Garcia as many as 30 to 40 of such
permits in a year.

In the process, accused Garcia would regularly summon Yungao to his office to tell him to inform
either Aurora or Alonzo Chiong, the owners of the Company, that he (accused Garcia) would borrow
a motor vehicle for purposes of visiting his farm. When Yungao could not be contacted, accused
Garcia would personally call up the Company and talk to the owners thereof to borrow the vehicle.
Accused Garcia confided to Yungao that he could not utilize the assigned government vehicle for his
own personal use during Saturdays and Sundays. It was for this reason that he had to borrow
vehicles from the Chiongs to enable him to visit his farm.

Yungao maintained that accused Garcia had been regularly borrowing motor vehicles from the
Chiongs during the period covering January of 1993 up to and until November of 1994. Accused
Garcia would always ask his representative to take the Company’s vehicle on a Saturday morning.
However, Yungao never reported for work on Saturdays; thus, he was not the one who actually
released the borrowed motor vehicles to the representative of accused Garcia. Nonetheless, Yungao
would be aware of the fact that accused Garcia borrowed the vehicles requested because, for every
such instance, a corresponding delivery receipt is issued, which is placed on top of his table for him
to place in the Company’s record files on the following working day. The numerous delivery receipts
would show and indicate the actual number of times accused Garcia had borrowed vehicles from the
Company.

Finally, Yungao identified the affidavit which he executed in connection with the subject cases.

On cross-examination, Yungao testified that it was his duty to keep the permits relating to the road
testing of the motor vehicles assembled by the Company. These permits were secured by him from
accused Garcia before the vehicles were eventually put on display or presented to potential buyers.
Although there was a Regulation Officer at the LTO before whom the request for the issuance of a
Conduct Permit is to be presented, Yungao was often told to go straight up to the room of accused
Garcia so that the latter could personally sign the said permit. It was only when accused Garcia is
absent or is not in office that the papers submitted to the LTO were attended to by his assistant.

Yungao testified that accused Garcia would always make his request to borrow the Company’s
motor vehicle verbally and on a Friday. However, Yungao admitted that he was not very familiar with
the signature of accused Garcia, and that the latter’s signature did not appear in any of the delivery
receipts.

During all these years, Yungao could only recall one (1) instance when accused Garcia failed to
approve the Company’s request, and this was a request for an extension of the usual "5-day road
test" period granted to the Company. Nonetheless, the Company found the said disapproval to be
acceptable and proper.

On questions propounded by the Court, Yungao testified that the names and signatures of the
persons who actually received the Company’s vehicles were reflected on the faces of the delivery
receipts. However, Yungao does not recognize the signatures appearing on the said delivery
receipts, including those purportedly of accused Tagupa, because Yungao was not present when the
vehicles were taken.

The prosecution had intended to present another witness in the person of Ms. Ma. Lourdes V.
Miranda (hereinafter, "Miranda"), who was present at the time Yungao testified. Prior to her
presentation, however, the parties agreed to enter into stipulations and admissions. Thus, it was
stipulated that Miranda was the mother of a child named Jane, who was run over and killed in a
vehicular accident; that the driver of the ill-fated motor vehicle was accused Nabo; that Miranda,
thereafter, successfully traced the said vehicle and eventually discovered the existence of numerous
delivery receipts in the files and possession of the Company; and that said discovery led to the
institution of the subject criminal cases against herein accused. As a result of such admissions and
stipulations, the proposed testimony of Miranda was, thereafter, dispensed with.

AURORA J. CHIONG (hereinafter, "Chiong") declared that she is the Vice-President and General
Manager of the Company, a business establishment engaged in the assembly of motor vehicles. In
the process, the Company has to submit a Dealer’s Report to the LTO prior to the assembly of a
motor vehicle. After the assembly is completed, the Company has to secure a permit from the LTO
for purposes of conducting the necessary road testing of the newly assembled motor vehicle.

In 1993, accused Garcia was the Regional Director of the LTO in Cagayan de Oro City. He was the
officer who approves the needed Conduction Permit of newly assembled motor vehicles. He was
also the LTO officer who approves and signs the Company’s annual LTO Accreditation Certificate.

Chiong recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and that he would need a vehicle to transport
water thereto. For this purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow from the Company a motor
vehicle, either by asking from Chiong directly through telephone calls or through Yungao, her Liaison
Officer. Everytime accused Garcia would borrow a motor vehicle, the Company would issue a
delivery receipt for such purpose, which has to be signed by the person whom accused Garcia
would send to pick up the motor vehicle. Chiong was usually the company officer who signed the
delivery receipt for the release of the borrowed motor vehicle to the representative of accused
Garcia. When she was not in office, she would authorize her personnel to place [their] initials on top
of her name. On several occasions, Chiong had seen accused Nabo affixing his signature on the
delivery receipt before taking out the borrowed motor vehicles. Chiong was very sure that the driver
who picked up the motor vehicle from the Company was the personnel of accused Garcia because
the latter would always call her up first before sending his representative to get a vehicle. Chiong
was likewise very familiar with the voice of accused Garcia because she had been dealing with him
for a long period of time already, and all the while she had always maintained a cordial relationship
with him.

On questions propounded by the Court, Chiong testified that accused Garcia would ask his driver to
get a vehicle on a Saturday at around 6:30 o’clock in the morning. He would return it in the late
afternoon of the same day. There was only one instance when accused Garcia returned the motor
vehicle on the day after, and this was the time when the said vehicle had figured in a vehicular
accident which resulted in the death of a certain Jane, the daughter of Miranda. Chiong was not the
complainant in the said vehicular accident case because she could not afford to offend or antagonize
accused Garcia, and she had always considered the lending of motor vehicles to accused Garcia as
a public relation thing.

Chiong clarified that the subject motor vehicles occasionally borrowed by accused Garcia were all
company service cars and not newly assembled vehicles. Finally, she testified that she gets irritated
whenever accused Garcia would ask for a vehicle at a time when she herself would also need it.
However, under the circumstances, she had to give in to his request.11

For the defense, petitioner took the witness stand, while accused Tagupa did not present any
evidence.

Petitioner testified that he was the Regional Director of the 10th Regional Office of the LTO from
August, 1987 to December, 1994. He downright denied borrowing any motor vehicle from the
Company arguing that his signatures never appeared in the Delivery Receipts 12 submitted by the
prosecution.13 He admitted, though, that the Company has been continually transacting business
with his office properly and officially, and has not, even for a single instance, violated any rules with
respect to assembly of motor vehicles, and that there was no reason for the owners of the Company
to harbor any ill-feelings against him.14 He further admitted that he had known Atty. Aurora Chiong,
Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, even before he became Regional Director
when he was still the Chief of the Operations Division.15 He added that employees of the LTO are
used to borrowing vehicles from their friends and that this practice has been going on prior to his
being Regional Director. He claimed he repeatedly warned his subordinates about the illegality of the
same but they merely turned a deaf ear.16 Lastly, he said his driver, accused Nabo, had, on several
occasions, driven motor vehicles and visited him at his farm, and that he rode with him in going
home without allegedly knowing that the vehicles driven by Nabo were merely borrowed from his
(Nabo) friends.17

On 6 May 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting petitioner of fifty-
six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Accused Tagupa was
acquitted, while the cases against accused Nabo, who remained at large, were archived. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused TIMOTEO A GARCIA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of fifty-six (56) counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Accordingly, said accused is hereby
sentenced to: (i) in each case, suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for a period of six
(6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) month, as maximum; (ii)
suffer all accessory penalties consequent thereto; and (iii) pay the costs.

With respect to accused NERY TAGUPA, by reason of the total lack of any evidence against him, he
is hereby ACQUITED.

As for accused Gilbert G. Nabo, considering that he remained at large and jurisdiction over his
person had yet to be acquired, let the case as against him be achieved.18

Petitioner is now before us assigning as errors the following:

1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF

SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 WERE PRESENT IN CRIM. CASES NOS.
24042 TO 24098 (EXCEPT 24078) AND IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY
OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION THEREOF;

2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF FATALLY DEFECTIVE
INFORMATIONS WHEREIN THE FACTS CHARGED NEVER CONSTITUTED AN
OFFENSE;

3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS
INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT (EVEN FOR A SINGLE COUNT);

4. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED AND IN THE PROCESS VIOLATED THE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN IT
SUPPLIED THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WITH
ASSUMPTIONS WHICH WERE NOT AT ALL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD;

5. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED WHEN IT OBSERVED DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF

JUSTICE BY ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER’S CO-ACCUSED TAGUPA AND
CONVICTING THE HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN THE SAME REASONING SHOULD
HAVE LED ALSO TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER.
In any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that every essential ingredient of the crime charged must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to
be presumed innocent.19 To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b)20 of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, the prosecution has the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the offender is a
public officer; (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share a percentage, or a benefit (3)
on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the
government; (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to
intervene.21

Petitioner maintains that not all the elements of Section 3(b) have been established by the
prosecution. Petitioner focuses primarily on the fourth element. He argues that the prosecution failed
to show the specific transactions of the Company with the LTO of Cagayan de Oro that petitioner
approved and/or intervened in so that he could borrow from, or be lent by, the Company a vehicle.
Inasmuch as he was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b)
for allegedly borrowing the Company’s vehicle fifty-six times, the Sandiganbayan, he stresses,
should have at least pointed out what these transactions were. This, petitioner claims, the
Sandiganbayan failed to show with certainty in its decision. Petitioner adds that the prosecution did
not even attempt to introduce evidence to show what contract or transaction was pending before the
LTO over which petitioner had the right to intervene being the Regional Director when, at the period
stated in all the fifty-six informations, he borrowed a vehicle.

We agree with petitioner that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of the fourth
element.  It is very clear from Section 3(b) that the requesting or receiving of any gift, present, share,
1âwphi1

percentage, or benefit must be in connection with "a contract or transaction"22 wherein the public
officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution did
not specify what transactions the Company had with the LTO that petitioner intervened in when he
allegedly borrowed the vehicles from the Company. It is insufficient that petitioner admitted that the
Company has continually transacted with his office. What is required is that the transaction involved
should at least be described with particularity and proven. To establish the existence of the fourth
element, the relation of the fact of requesting and/or receiving, and that of the transaction involved
must be clearly shown. This, the prosecution failed to do. The prosecution’s allegation that the
Company regularly transacts with petitioner’s LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in
the reporting of its engine and chassis numbers, as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer’s
report, and other similar transactions, will not suffice. This general statement failed to show the link
between the 56 alleged borrowings with their corresponding transactions.

Failing to prove one of the other elements of the crime charged, we find no need to discuss the
presence or absence of the elements.

The next question to be resolved is: Can petitioner be convicted of any other crime (i.e., Direct
Bribery or Indirect Bribery) charged in the informations?

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 21023 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given
in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the
exercise of his functions as a public officer.24 Thus, the acts constituting direct bribery are: (1) by
agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties; (2) by accepting a gift
in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duty; or (3) by agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something
which is his official duty to do, in consideration of any gift or promise.25

In the case under consideration, there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution showing
that petitioner committed any of the three acts constituting direct bribery. The two prosecution
witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner asking for something in exchange for his
performance of, or abstaining to perform, an act in connection with his official duty. In fact, Atty.
Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, testified that the Company
complied with all the requirements of the LTO without asking for any intervention from petitioner or
from anybody else from said office.26 From the evidence on record, petitioner cannot likewise be
convicted of Direct Bribery.

Can petitioner be found guilty of Indirect Bribery?

Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his
office. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 27 of the Revised Penal
Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. In
the case at bar, was the prosecution able to show that petitioner indeed accepted a gift from the
Company? The alleged borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be considered as
the gift in contemplation of the law. To prove that petitioner borrowed a vehicle from the Company
for 56 times, the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts 28 allegedly signed by
petitioner’s representative whom the latter would send to pick up the vehicle.

The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly borrowed and
received the vehicles subject matter of the 56 informations. The prosecution claims that petitioner
received the vehicles via his representatives to whom the vehicles were released. The prosecution
relies heavily on the delivery receipts. We, however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently
prove that petitioner received the vehicles considering that his signatures do not appear therein. In
addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner’s representatives who picked up the
vehicles. The acquittal of one of the accused (Nery Tagupa) who allegedly received the vehicles
from the Company further strengthens this argument. If the identity of the person who allegedly
picked up the vehicle on behalf of the petitioner is uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it
was petitioner who received the vehicles in the end.

Factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference
made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want
of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record. 29 In the case before us, we are constrained
to apply the exception rather than the rule. We find that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that
petitioners actually received the vehicles through his representatives is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise, and conjectures, and not supported by evidence on record. The certainty of
petitioner’s receipt of the vehicle for his alleged personal use was not substantiated.

WHEREFORE, all the above considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 24042 to 24077 and 24079 to 24098
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For insufficiency of evidence, the petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the informations. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 142369-70             April 13, 2007

JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,* Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review1 assails the June 18, 1999 decision2 of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos.
004-005 affirming3 the omnibus decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City,
Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9482-83 finding petitioner Juanito T. Merencillo guilty of violating
Section 3(b) of RA 30195 and Article 2106 of the Revised Penal Code.

The information charging petitioner for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 in Criminal Case No.
9482 read:

That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then a public official
connected with the Bureau of Internal Revenue as its Group Supervising Examiner, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal gain, directly demand and extort
from a certain Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in connection, in consideration and in exchange for the release of
the certification of her payment of the capital gains tax for the land purchased by the Ramasola
[Superstudio] Inc. from one Catherine Corpuz Enerio, a transaction wherein the aforesaid accused
has to intervene in his official capacity, and to which the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar
reluctantly agreed but upon prior consultation with the military authorities particularly the elements of
the 702nd Criminal Investigation Command [CIC] who set up the accused for a possible entrapment
resulting to (sic) his being caught in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) but consisting only of four (4) marked one
hundred peso bills and the rest all bogus (paper) monies, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in particular and the public and the government in general in
the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019.7

On the other hand, the information for direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 9483 charged:

That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995 in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then a public official
connected with the performance of official duty as its Group Supervising Examiner, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal gain, demand, extort and agree
to perform an act constituting a crime, an act which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, that is – that the certification for payment of the capital gains tax relative to the land
purchased by the Ramasola Superstudio Incorporated from Catherine Corpus Enerio be released by
him only upon payment of an additional under the table transaction in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency, which Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar
reluctantly agreed, but upon prior consultation with the military authorities particularly the elements
of the 702nd Criminal [Investigation] Command (CIC) who set up the accused for a possible
entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly
containing the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) but, consisting only of four (4)
marked one hundred pesos bills and the rest all bogus (paper) monies, an act performed by the
accused in his official capacity as Group Supervising Examiner of the BIR, to the damage and
prejudice of Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in particular and the public and the government in
general in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines.8

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. Thereafter trial ensued and the cases
were tried jointly.

The Facts Established By The Prosecution

In the morning of September 13, 1995, Lucit Estillore went to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
office in Tagbilaran City to ask for the computation of taxes due on the sale of real property to
Ramasola Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a certificate authorizing registration (CAR).9 At the BIR
office, she was entertained by revenue examiner Lourdes Fuentes who computed the documentary
stamp tax (₱37,500) and capital gains tax (₱125,000) due on the transaction. The computation was
approved by petitioner in his capacity as group supervisor. Estillore paid the taxes in the bank and
returned to apply for a CAR. She submitted the application together with relevant documents to
Fuentes for processing. Fuentes prepared the revenue audit reports and submitted them together
with the application for the CAR to petitioner for preliminary approval. [The application was to be
forwarded thereafter to the Revenue District Officer (RDO) for final approval.] Fuentes advised
Estillore that the CAR would be released after seven days.

At around 10:00 a.m. of the same day, private complainant Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar 10 (Cesar)
received a call from Estillore. She was told that petitioner wanted to see her "for some negotiation."
She proceeded to petitioner’s office where the latter demanded ₱20,000 in exchange for the
approval of the CAR. Cesar replied that she needed to confer with her two brothers who were her
business associates.

The following day, on September 14, 1995, Cesar received a call from petitioner who was following
up his demand. Later that day, Cesar received another call from petitioner who told her that she
could get the CAR after four or five days.
Cesar was able to return to the BIR only on September 20, 1995. When petitioner saw her, he
repeated his demand for ₱20,000 although the CAR had in fact been signed by RDO Galahad
Balagon the day before, on September 19, 1995, and was therefore ready for release. On Cesar’s
inquiry, the releasing clerk, Susan Cabangon, informed Cesar that she (Cabangon) was still waiting
for petitioner’s go signal to release the document.

On September 22, 1995, Cesar visited RDO Balagon and complained about petitioner’s refusal to
release the CAR unless his demand was met. RDO Balagon assured Cesar that he would look into
her complaint. Subsequently, Cesar received a call from petitioner informing her that she could get
the CAR but reminded her of his demand. He told her that he was willing to accept a lesser amount.
It was at this point that Cesar decided to report the matter to the authorities. She sought the help of
the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Bohol, Senior Superintendent
Dionaid Baraguer.

The following day, Sr. Supt. Baraguer referred Cesar’s complaint to the chief of police of Tagbilaran
City who coordinated with Cesar for the entrapment of petitioner. Cesar was instructed to prepare
two bundles of bogus money by putting a one-hundred peso bill on each side of each of the two
bundles to make it appear that the two bundles amounted to ₱10,000 each or a total of ₱20,000.
After the serial numbers of the four one-hundred peso bills were recorded, the entrapment was set
for September 28, 1995.

On the appointed day, Cesar called petitioner and pleaded for the release of the CAR as well as for
the reduction of petitioner’s demand. Petitioner cautiously told Cesar not to talk about the matter on
the phone and asked her to see him instead. Cesar went to petitioner’s office with the two bundles of
bogus money inside a white envelope.

Petitioner was entertaining a lady visitor when Cesar arrived. The members of the PNP entrapment
team were already in petitioner’s office posing as civilians. On seeing Cesar, petitioner handed the
CAR to her and, as she was signing the acknowledgment for the release of the CAR, he informed
her that he was going down to the second floor. Cesar took this as a cue for her to follow.

As petitioner left his office, he held the door open for Cesar to follow. On reaching the third floor
lobby, petitioner uttered "Here only." Cesar handed the envelope containing the two bundles of
marked money to petitioner who, upon receiving it, asked "Why is this thick?" Before Cesar could
answer, a member of the PNP entrapment team photographed petitioner holding the envelope.
Petitioner panicked, hid the envelope behind his back and turned towards the window at the back of
the BIR building. On seeing that the window was closed, he turned around towards the open window
facing the street. He threw the envelope towards the window but it hit the ceiling instead, bounced
and fell to the first floor of the BIR building. 11 The PNP entrapment team then introduced themselves
to petitioner and invited him to go with them to their headquarters.

Charges were filed against petitioner. During the trial, petitioner’s evidence consisted of nothing
more than a general denial of the charges against him. He claimed that he never asked for money
and that the allegations of demand for money existed only in Cesar’s mind after she was told that
there was a misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had to be paid. He was surprised
when policemen suddenly arrested him as soon as Cesar handed him a white envelope the contents
of which he suspected to be money.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Juanito T. Merencillo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation, defined and penalized by Section 3(b)
of [RA] 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for eight (8) years and one (1) month as minimum
to fifteen (15) years as maximum, there being aggravating circumstances considered under Section
3(e) and Section (f) of [RA] 3019 in relation to Article 14(1) and (11) of the [RPC] in the sense that
the offender have taken advantage of his public position, and that the crime was committed in
consideration of a price or promise, without any mitigating or extenuating circumstances to neutralize
or offset any of the aggravating circumstances, with perpetual disqualification from public office, and
the Court further finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct
participation, for the crime of Direct Bribery defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day
as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum and a fine of Sixty Thousand
(₱60,000.00) Pesos, all as mandated by law. The accused Juanito T. Merencillo likewise is ordered
to indemnify private complainant [Cesar] to pay moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos. Costs shall also be taxed
against the accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12

Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied
the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification reducing the penalty of imprisonment for
violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 to an indeterminate sentence of six years and one month
of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as maximum.13 Thus, this petition.

Petitioner basically raises two points: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to believe his evidence over
that of the prosecution’s and (2) the Sandiganbayan’s failure to recognize that he was placed in
double jeopardy.

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for affirming the RTC decision and disregarding his evidence.
He claims that, had the RTC and the Sandiganbayan not ignored the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses,14 he would have been acquitted. He also asserts that he
was placed twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and
for direct bribery.

Petitioner is wrong.

Trial Court’s Evaluation of Evidence Will Not Be Disturbed

Both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses (that
petitioner demanded and received money from private complainant Cesar for the release of the
CAR) sufficient and credible enough to sustain conviction.

This notwithstanding, petitioner now asks this Court to review the entire evidence anew, re-evaluate
the credibility of witnesses and make another factual determination of the case – a course of action
clearly improper given the nature of the instant petition. 15 Questions of fact cannot generally be
raised for the consideration of this Court.

The calibration of evidence and the relative weight thereof belongs to the appellate court. 16 Its
findings and conclusions cannot be set aside by this Court unless there is no evidence on record to
support them.17 In this case, however, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan, affirming the factual
findings of the RTC, were amply supported by evidence and the conclusions therein were not
against the law and jurisprudence. There is no reason to disturb the congruent findings of the trial
and appellate courts.
Moreover, findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy the respect
of appellate courts because trial courts have the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor of
witnesses as they testify.18 In the absence of any arbitrariness in the trial court’s findings and
evaluation of evidence tending to show that it overlooked certain material facts and circumstances,
its findings and evaluation of evidence should be respected on review.19 The presiding judge of the
trial court had the opportunity to actually observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses on the
witness stand on direct examination by the prosecution, cross-examination by the defense as well as
during clarificatory questioning by the trial judge himself.20 Between the trial judge and this Court, the
former was concededly in a better position to determine whether or not a witness was telling the
truth.21 Based on the records, we find no reason to disagree with the trial court’s assessment and to
discredit the prosecution’s witnesses.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the RTC and the Sandiganbayan considered the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Both courts, however, ruled that the
inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did not detract from the truth of the prosecution’s
testimonial evidence. We agree.

Witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in each and every detail.
Differences in the recollection of the event are inevitable and inconsequential variances are
commonly regarded as signs of truth instead of falsehood. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony. 22 In fact, such minor
flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony for they guard against memorized falsities.23

Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s
evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty.24 The test is whether the testimonies agree
on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with
each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. 25 Thus, inconsistencies and
discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be successfully
invoked as grounds for acquittal.26

The RTC and the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner
were neither material nor relevant to the elements of the offenses for which he was charged. For
instance, whether or not it was petitioner himself who handed the CAR to private respondent was
immaterial. The fact was that petitioner demanded and received money in consideration for the
issuance of the CAR.

Petitioner Was Not Placed In Double Jeopardy

Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement:

Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following [acts] shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised
Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged
with a felony under the Revised Penal Code.27 There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged
simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.28 The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit
it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 29 An offense charged
necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter.30

A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is
neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses.

Section 3(b) of RA 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for
himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.

xxx xxx xxx

The elements of the crime penalized under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 are:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit;

(3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person;

(4) the request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with the
government and

(5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection with a
contract or transaction has the right to intervene.31

On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;

(3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with
a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does
 not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it
is his official duty to do and

(4) the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.32

Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct
bribery. While they have common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are
included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or
demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section
3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct
bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or
transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene
under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a)
performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a
crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do.

Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave
rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance
between the elements of the offenses charged. 33 The constitutional protection against double
jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one.34

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18, 1999 decision of the Sandiganbayan in
A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 158694-96               March 13, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
TEOFILO G. PANTALEON, JR. and JAIME F. VALLEJOS, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this appeal the February 4, 2003 decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
25861-631 finding the appellants Teofilo G. Pantaleon, Jr. (Pantaleon) and Jaime F. Vallejos
(Vallejos), former Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of
Castillejos, Zambales, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 217, in relation
with Articles 48 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan sentenced the appellants
to suffer the penalties of reclusion perpetua and perpetual special disqualification for each count,
and ordered them to pay a fine in the amounts of ₱166,242.72, ₱154,634.27, and ₱90,464.21,
respectively, and to pay the costs.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

This case originated from the joint affidavit-complaints filed by Vice Mayor Wilma D. Billman (Vice
Mayor Billman); Councilors Reynaldo V. Misa (Reynaldo), Dionisio F. Abinsay (Dionisio), Resty D.
Viloria (Resty), Ramon J. Tamoria (Ramon), Aurelio M. Fastidio (Aurelio), Enrique C. Clarin
(Enrique), and Raymundo V. Navarro (Raymundo), dated December 18, 1998; and Rodolfo J.
Navalta (Rodolfo) dated December 22, 1998, before the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
Zambales, for malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, against the
appellants, Ken Swan Tiu, and Engineer Rainier J. Ramos (Engr. Ramos).

The joint affidavit-complaints alleged that the appellants, Ken Swan Tiu, and Engr. Ramos conspired
to illegally disburse and misappropriate the public funds of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales
in the amounts of ₱166,242.72 (under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-328), ₱154,634.27
(under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-349), and ₱90,464.21 (under Disbursement Voucher
No. 101-9804-415), by falsifying the supporting documents relating to three (3) fictitious or "ghost"
construction projects, namely: (a) the upgrading of barangay roads in Barangays Looc, Nagbayan,
Magsaysay, and San Pablo; (b) the upgrading of barangay roads in Barangays Looc proper-
Casagatan, Nagbayan proper-Angeles, and San Pablo-Sitio San Isidro; and (c) the construction of
market stalls at the public market of Castillejos.

The affidavit-complaints further alleged that the disbursement vouchers were not signed by the
municipal accountant and budget officer; that the Sangguniang Bayan did not adopt a resolution
authorizing Pantaleon to enter into a contract with La Paz Construction and/or Ken Swan Tiu; and
that no projects were actually undertaken by the Municipality of Castillejos.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) recommended the filing of an Information for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against the appellants and
Ken Swan Tiu, and the dismissal of the complaint against Engr. Ramos.2

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon approved the Joint Resolution of the OSP, with the
modification that the complaint against Ken Swan Tiu be dismissed for lack of probable cause. 3 The
Office of the Ombudsman approved the Review Action of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon.4

The Office of the Ombudsman filed on March 10, 2000 three (3) separate Informations for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against the appellants
before the Sandiganbayan. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25861-63.
Criminal Case Nos. 25861-62 refer to the disbursement of public funds in the upgrading of various
roads in the Municipality of Castillejos, while Criminal Case No. 25863 concerns the disbursement of
funds for the construction of market stalls at the Castillejos Public Market. The accusatory portions of
these Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 25861

That on or about 5 January 1998 and 20 February 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Castillejos, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor
and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, both of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales who by
reason of their said respective office, are accountable for public funds or properties, committing the
complex crime charged herein while in the performance of, in relation to and/or taking advantage of
their official positions and functions as such, and conspiring and confederating with one another, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take or misappropriate public funds
of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales under their charge and custody in the amount of
P166,242,72, Philippine currency, under the check dated 20 February 1998 intended for the
simulated disbursement and payment thereof in favor of La Paz Construction (LPC) relative to the
fictitious contract for the upgrading of the barangay roads in Barangay Looc, Nagbayan, Magsaysay
and San Pablo, Castillejos, Zambales; by means of falsifying the corresponding disbursement
voucher no. 101-9803-328, certificates of inspection and acceptance, contract between LPC and the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales, price quotation, purchase order, and LPC official receipt
number 000999 dated 5 January 1998, to falsely make it appear that LPC entered into, undertook
and completed the said contract and received the aforesaid amount as payment therefor from the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales, when in truth and in fact, LPC neither entered into, undertook
and completed the aforesaid contract nor received from the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales the
said sum of money or any part thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the Municipality of
Castillejos, Zambales and the public interest in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Criminal Case No. 25862

That on or about 23 February 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Castillejos, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, both public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Treasurer, respectively, both of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales who by reason of their said
respective office are accountable for public funds or properties, committing the complex crime
charged herein while in the performance of, in relation to and/or taking advantage of their official
positions and functions as such, and conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take or misappropriate public funds of the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales under their charge and custody in the amount of P154,634.27
Philippine currency, under the check dated 23 February 1998 intended for the simulated
disbursement and payment thereof in favor of La Paz Construction (LPC) relative to the fictitious
contract for the upgrading of the barangay roads in Barangay Looc proper-Casagatan, Nagbayan
proper-Angeles and San Pablo-Sitio Isidro, Castillejos, Zambales; by means of falsifying the
corresponding disbursement voucher no. 101-9803-349, certificates of inspection and acceptance,
contract between LPC and the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales, purchase order, and LPC
official receipt, to falsely make it appear that LPC entered into, undertook and completed the said
contract and received the aforesaid amount as payment therefor from the Municipality of Castillejos,
Zambales, when in truth and in fact, LPC neither entered into, undertook and completed the
aforesaid contract nor received from the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales the said sum of money
or any part thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales and the
public interest in the aforestated amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 25863

That on or about 20 March 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Castillejos, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, both public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Treasurer, respectively, both of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales who by reason of their said
respective office are accountable for public funds or properties, committing the complex crime
charged herein while in the performance of, in relation to and/or taking advantage of their official
positions and functions as such, and conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take or misappropriate public funds of the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales under their charge and custody in the amount of P90,464.21,
Philippine currency, under the check dated 20 March 1998 intended for the simulated disbursement
and payment thereof in favor of La Paz Construction (LPC) relative to the fictitious contract for the
construction of market stalls at the public market of Castillejos, Zambales, by means of falsifying the
corresponding disbursement voucher no. 101-9804-415, certificates of inspection and acceptance,
contract between LPC and the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales, price quotation, purchase order,
and LPC official receipt number 000995 dated 20 March 1998, to falsely make it appear that LPC
entered into, undertook and completed the said contract and received the aforesaid amount as
payment therefor from the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales, when in truth and in fact, LPC
neither entered into, undertook and completed the aforesaid contract nor received from the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales the said sum of money or any part thereof, to the damage and
prejudice of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales and the public interest in the aforestated
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges upon arraignment. The prosecution filed a motion to
suspend the accused pendente lite after their arraignment. 8 The Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
granted the motion and ordered the preventive suspension of the appellants for 90 days. 9 The
appellants filed a motion for reconsideration10 which the Sandiganbayan denied.11 The appellants
filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 145030, assailing the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions of August 16, 2000 and September 12, 2000, respectively. We denied
the petition for lack of merit.12

In the trial on the merits of Criminal Cases Nos. 25861-63 that followed, the prosecution presented
the following witnesses: Engr. Ramos, Aurelio, Nida Naman (Nida), Alberto Domingo (Alberto),
Engineer Eduardo Soliven (Engr. Soliven), Simeon Amor Viloria (Simeon), Ken Swan Tiu, Resty,
Vice Mayor Billman, Enrique, and Reynaldo. The appellants, Quirino Adolfo (Quirino), Ricardo
Abaya (Ricardo), Crisanta Ancheta (Crisanta), and John Baquilat (Baquilat) took the witness stand
for the defense.

Evidence for the Prosecution

Engr. Ramos testified that he was designated as acting municipal engineer of Castillejos, Zambales
by Pantaleon in January 1998; and that he prepared three (3) programs of work upon the
instructions of Vallejos. The first two (2) programs of work, dated January 5, 1998 and January 14,
1998, respectively, were for the upgrading of barangay roads; the third, also dated January 5, 1998,
was for the construction of market stalls. He confirmed that the three (3) signatures affixed in these
programs of work belonged to him, to Pantaleon, and to Vallejos, respectively; and declared that he
never implemented any of these projects. He later discovered that these projects had already been
implemented by the previous municipal engineer; hence, the programs of work and subsequent
disbursements were not really needed.13

On cross-examination, he stated that he was asked to prepare the programs of work in March 1998;
that he submitted the programs upon completion to Vallejos who told him that he (Vallejos) would
give them to Pantaleon for approval. He assumed the programs of work were disapproved because
nobody coordinated with him regarding their implementation.14

On re-direct examination, Engr. Ramos explained that Pantaleon and Vallejos instructed him to
place dates earlier than March 1998 in the three (3) programs of work, although he prepared them
only in March 1998.15

Aurelio, a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Castillejos, testified that the public market of
Castillejos was built after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991; and that it was renovated by Engr.
Clarin during the incumbency of former mayor Enrique Magsaysay. He declared that no market stall
was constructed in the public market in 1998 and 1999, and no upgrading, excavation, and back
filling of any barangay road likewise took place in 1998 in Castillejos. He added that no infrastructure
project could have been made in January 1998 because it was an election period.16

On cross-examination, Aurelio declared that he, together with other Sanggunian members,
examined the disbursement vouchers and other documents related to the projects covered by the
program of works after they learned that disbursements were made to La Paz Construction; that they
(Sanggunian members) filed a case before the Provincial Prosecutor of Olongapo City after
discovering that the purported transactions were anomalous. He stated that La Paz Construction
never entered into a contract with the Municipality of Castillejos as confirmed by its proprietor, Ken
Swan Lee Tiu. He added that the projects covered by the disbursement vouchers were not among
those included in the approved development plan for the years 1996 to 1998; and that, surprisingly,
the disbursement vouchers indicated that the funds used to cover these projects were charged from
the 20% development fund.17

Nida, the senior bookkeeper of Castillejos, testified that Pantaleon designated her as municipal
accountant in 1993, and that she occupied the position until July 1998; as a municipal accountant,
she reviewed documents for the preparation of vouchers. She recalled that she reviewed Voucher
Nos. 101-9804-415, 101-9803-328 and 101-9803-349 only after the indicated amounts had been
paid.

She explained that a voucher is certified by the local budget officer and by the municipal accountant,
and that without her signature, a voucher is defective for failure to comply with government auditing
and accounting rules and regulations. She also revealed that the following irregularities attended the
issuance of the vouchers:

(a) Martin Pagaduan (Pagaduan), the present municipal accountant, signed Voucher No.
101-9803-328 (Exh. "A") above her (Nida’s) name without her authority. Pagaduan was not
yet the municipal accountant at the time of the issuance of the voucher; he was only
designated as municipal accountant on January 1, 1999;

(b) Pagaduan also similarly signed some of the documents attached to Voucher No. 101-
9803-328, such as the purchase orders (Exh. "A-4 to A-6") and the request for obligation
allotment (Exh. "A-9");

(c) Vallejos wrote the voucher number and filled up the accounting entry of Disbursement
Voucher No. 101-9803-328 (Exh. "A"). She should have filled up these entries in her capacity
as municipal accountant. Some of the documents attached to Disbursement Voucher No.
101-9803-328 (Exh. "A"), such as the purchase request, purchase order, and request form,
were not the documents required by the rules;

(d) Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9803-349 (Exh. "B") and 101-9804-415 (Exh. "C") did
not bear her (Nida’s) signature. Their voucher numbers and accounting entries were written
and filled up by Vallejos. In addition, the request for obligation of allotment (Exh. "B-9"and
"C-5") attached to these disbursement vouchers were not signed by the municipal
accountant and by the budget officer;

(e) The contract agreement attached to Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-349 (Exh. "B")
was not notarized. No abstract of bids and authority to enter into a negotiated contract were
attached to the voucher; and

(f) The certificate of acceptance (Exh. "C-7"), attached to Disbursement Voucher No. 101-
9804-415 (Exh. "C"), was undated.

She reiterated that the vouchers were all approved by Pantaleon, although they did not pass through
her office for pre-audit. She likewise explained that the certification of the accountant and the budget
officer were necessary even if the funds were sourced from the development fund.18

Alberto testified that he had not seen any upgrading of roads in his area since he was elected
barangay captain of Looc, Castillejos, Zambales in 1997. He also admitted that he signed a
document before the Sangguniang Bayan attesting that Pantaleon did not have any project in his
barangay.19
Engr. Soliven, the Municipal Engineer of Castillejos, narrated that Pantaleon appointed him
municipal engineer on September 16, 1998 as replacement for Engr. Ramos. He stated that he did
not know if there were projects implemented in the various barangays of Castillejos because he was
not yet the municipal engineer when these projects were planned. He likewise maintained that he
never implemented these projects.20

Simeon, the Municipal Planning Coordinator of Castillejos, testified that he prepared comprehensive
plans and programs for the municipality, and that his tasks also included the formulation, integration
and coordination of different municipal projects. He stated that he prepared the municipal
development plans for the fiscal years 1997 and 1998, and these plans were approved by the
Sangguniang Bayan. He clarified that the municipal engineer can implement projects that are not
included in the municipal development plan.21

Ken Swan Tiu (also known as Sonny Tiu, Tiu Ken Swan and Ken Swan Lee Tiu), owner of the La
Paz Construction, admitted that he executed an affidavit dated January 14, 1999 stating that he did
not enter into any negotiated contract with the Municipality of Castillejos, and that his company never
received any payment from the municipality. He stated that the signatures in the vouchers were not
his, and reiterated that he did not have any transaction with the Municipality of Castillejos. He added
that he has no agent to collect or enter into transactions in his behalf.22

Resty, a former Sangguniang Kabataan President and incumbent municipal councilor, declared on
the witness stand that he is a resident of Barangay San Pablo, Castillejos, and that from 1998 to
2000, he did not see any road project for the upgrading, compacting or improvements of roads in his
barangay. He also stated that he was one of the complainants in the administrative case against the
appellants before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Further, he said that the vouchers for these
projects were not dated.23

Evidence for the Defense

Vallejos, testifying in his defense, narrated that he had been the municipal treasurer of Castillejos
since 1987; and that his principal duties were to collect taxes and disburse funds. He explained that
a disbursement voucher should first pass through the accounting office, then to the office of the
budget officer, and from there, to the office of the municipal mayor, before going to his office. He
confirmed that he is the last person to sign the voucher.

He clarified that after his office has prepared checks based on the forwarded vouchers, these
vouchers are returned to the accounting office for the creation of an accounting entry and for the
posting of the entry in the general and subsidiary ledgers. The accounting office then issues an
advice that the checks are ready for encashment.

He refuted the statement of Nida that the disbursement vouchers did not go through the accounting
office for pre-audit. He stated that the signature of the accountant did not appear in the three (3)
vouchers because Nida simply refused to sign it. He also insisted that the budget officer’s signature
likewise did not appear in the vouchers because she was always out of her office. He explained that
he paid the vouchers despite the absence of the accountant’s signature because the projects were
already completed and the sub-contractor was already demanding payment and was threatening to
sue him if he would not pay.

He further recalled that the vouchers were suspended after they were submitted to the Commission
on Audit (COA); he was given 90 days to complete the entries in the vouchers and produce the
supporting papers.24
On cross-examination, he reiterated that he signed the vouchers because the municipal accountant
and budget officer refused, without any valid or legal reason, to sign them.25

Quirino, the Barangay Captain of Nagbayan, Castillejos, Zambales, testified that he supervised
numerous projects in his barangay during the incumbency of Pantaleon; that from January to
February of 1998, he supervised the back filling and leveling of the roads in his barangay together
with a certain Eduardo Escobar and Kagawads Lorenzo and Corpuz. He admitted to signing an
affidavit dated July 2, 1999 stating that there were projects done in his barangay; he merely signed
the certification on December 10, 1998 (stating that there were no projects done by the
administration of Pantaleon in his area) because Kagawads Enrique Clarin and Reynaldo Misa were
his compadres.26

Ricardo declared on the witness stand that he was the barangay captain of Nagbayan from 1971 to
1986 and subsequently served as councilor for three (3) terms; that from 1996 to 1998, he saw that
there were back filling, grading, compacting and widening of roads in his area; and that it was
Pantaleon and Baquilat – as mayor and contractor, respectively – who caused the repair of these
roads.

On cross-examination, he admitted that Pantaleon employed him as a casual employee in 1999 and,
as such, had no authority to sign vouchers.27

Pantaleon, mayor of Castillejos, Zambales, testified that he had served as mayor for eight and a half
years before he was preventively suspended. He explained that a voucher originates from the
accounting office and then goes to the budget office; from there, it goes to him for his signature, and,
finally, to the treasurer for signature; he signed the vouchers and allowed the treasurer to pay the
amounts stated because the accountant and the budget officer were reluctant to sign; the signatures
of the accountant and budget officer were not important. He added that he approved the release of
the money because the treasurer told him that there was an appropriation in the approved annual
budget. He also insisted that the owner of La Paz Construction entered into a contact with the
municipality.

He maintained that he physically inspected the projects, and ordered the treasurer to pay because
the project in Nagbayan road had been completed. He revealed that he received a notice from the
Provincial Auditor stating that the disbursement of funds was irregular due to the lack of signatures
of the accountant and budget officer, and that the vouchers were subsequently suspended. He then
ordered the treasurer to rectify the deficiencies in the vouchers.28

On cross-examination, he admitted that the Sanggunian did not adopt a resolution authorizing him to
enter into a negotiated contract with La Paz Construction in the municipality’s behalf. He also stated
that the treasurer told him that the municipal accountant and budget officer asked for a commission
before signing the vouchers, but he did not confront them about the demanded commission because
he did not want to embarrass them. He admitted that he signed the vouchers despite the absence of
the signatures of the accountant and budget officer.

He also admitted that he entered into a contract with Baquilat without inquiring if Baquilat was
authorized by the La Paz Construction to enter into a contract with the municipality. He explained
that he gave more importance to the implementation of a project than to its documentation. Since the
compacting and leveling of the road were finished, he believed the municipal accountant and budget
officer would later sign the vouchers.

He confirmed that Baquilat had dealt with the municipality many times as the representative of La
Paz Construction, and he does not know why La Paz Construction would now deny its link with
Baquilat. He also stated that Baquilat, Aurelio, and the complainants have been his political
supporters, but they now hold personal grudges against him.29

Crisanta, a market vendor in Castillejos, testified that there were market stalls and drainage
constructed in 1998, although she did not know who constructed them.30

Baquilat declared on the witness stand that he put up a construction business in 1997 after resigning
from the Benguit Corporation; and that he had various contracts with the province of Zambales. He
recalled that he collected ₱400,000.00, more or less, from the municipality after completing
construction projects in 1997 and 1998. These projects included the upgrading of the roads in
Barangays Looc, Casagatan, Nagbayan, and San Pablo, as well as the repair of market stalls in
Castillejos. He stated that the authority given to him by Sonny Tiu, the owner of La Paz Construction,
to receive the money in behalf of La Paz Constructionwas merely verbal; contractors, as a usual
practice, rely on verbal authority. He added that his license as a contractor had been used many
times by other contractors even without his knowledge, and revealed that he had borrowed the
license of Sonny Tiu when he had a contract with the Municipality of Castillejos. He acted as a
subcontractor for the La Paz Construction, but failed to fully perform his duty as subcontractor
because he did not see Sonny Tiu again. He paid his taxes as a subcontractor, but not Sonny Tiu’s
percentage.31

On cross-examination, he admitted that he received payments through his secretary from the
municipality in behalf of La Paz Construction in 1998 to 1999; and that he received ₱400,000.00,
more or less, for the three (3) projects he did for the municipality.32

The Prosecution’s Rebuttal Evidence

The prosecution presented Vice Mayor Billman, Engr. Clarin, Reynaldo and Ken Swan Tiu as
rebuttal witnesses.

Vice Mayor Billman, the acting Municipal Mayor of Castillejos, testified that there was no upgrading
and improvement of roads in Barangay Nagbayan in 1998 when she was vice mayor.33

Engr. Clarin, an incumbent Municipal Councilor of Castillejos, denied that he forced Quirino to sign a
certification that there were no projects undertaken by the municipality.34

Reynaldo, testified that he was a municipal councilor in 1998; he admitted that Quirino was his friend
and compadre, but denied that he forced Quirino to sign any certification.35

Ken Swan Tiu, again testifying for the prosecution, denied that he: (a) lent his license as a contractor
to Baquilat; (b) entered into a contract with the Municipality of Castillejos; (c) entered into a
subcontracting agreement with Baquilat; and (d) lent official receipts issued to La Paz Construction
to Baquilat.36

On cross-examination, he stated that he had been a contractor since 1992, but never transacted
with the Municipality of Castillejos. He stated that La Paz Construction lost some receipts in 1994
during the flood; he discovered in 1999 that Baquilat had been using these receipts.37

After trial, the Sandiganbayan set the case for promulgation of decision on July 4, 2002, but later
moved the promulgation to August 1, 2002.
Pantaleon and Vallejos filed their separate motions to reopen trial with urgent motion to defer the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.38 The Sandiganbayan denied these motions.39 The
Sandiganbayan similarly denied the omnibus motion for reconsideration that followed.40

The appellants filed an omnibus motion seeking the reconsideration of the December 14, 2002
Resolution, but the Sandiganbayan denied this motion in its Resolution dated January 20, 2003. The
appellants later on questioned these resolutions through a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
with this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 156778-80. This Court, in our resolution dated February 17,
2003, dismissed the petition.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN RULING

The Sandiganbayan convicted the appellants of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 25861-
63. It held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, supported by the documentary
evidence, established all the elements of the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents under Article 217, in relation with Articles 171 and 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. It found unacceptable the testimonies of the appellants and characterized these as self-
serving. The dispositive portion of this decision (dated February 2, 2003) reads:

WHEREFORE, the accused, TEOFILO G. PANTALEON, JR., and JAIME F. VALLEJOS, are hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
THRU FALSIFICATION, in three counts, as defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to
Articles 48 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and each of said accused is hereby sentenced in
Criminal Case Nos. 25861, 25862, and 25863, respectively, to suffer three times the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine in the
amounts of P166,242.72, P154,634.27, and P90,464.21, respectively, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.41 [Emphasis in the original]

Post-Sandiganbayan Developments

and the Appeal

Vallejos moved on February 17, 2003 to reconsider the decision. 42 Pantaleon, for his part, moved on
February 18, 2003 for a new trial (with prayer to set aside judgment). 43 The Sandiganbayan denied
these motions for lack of merit.44

The records of the case were forwarded to this Court after the appellants filed their respective
notices of appeal. In our Resolution of September 13, 2004,45 we transferred the case to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition pursuant to People v. Mateo.46

The records disclose that Pantaleon was granted a conditional pardon on June 8, 2006. 47 Pantaleon
filed on June 20, 2006 with the CA an urgent motion to withdraw appeal. 48 The CA denied the motion
in its Resolution of July 7, 2006.49 CA Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Ronilla-Lontok thereafter
returned the entire records of the case to this Court reasoning out that the CA has no jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to Sec.1[b] and [c], Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.50 On September 24, 2007, this Court’s First Division issued a Resolution reinstating
the case in its docket.51

Pantaleon filed with this Court on November 19, 2007 an urgent motion to withdraw his appeal. 52 We
granted this motion in our Resolution of December 5, 2007,53 and issued the corresponding entry of
judgment on February 8, 2008.54 Thus, this Decision at this point relates solely to appellant Vallejos.
In the discussions that follow, however, we shall still refer to the parties as "appellants" because of
the linkages that exist between them as common perpetrators of the offenses charged.

In his brief, appellant Vallejos argued, among others, that the Sandiganbayan erred –

1. in convicting him of the crime charged despite merely occupying a salary grade (SG) 24
position;

2. in convicting him of the crime charged despite the absence of notice to restitute from the
Provincial Auditor of Zambales;

3. in convicting him of the crime charged despite merely acting ministerially on the
disbursement vouchers in question; and

4. in finding that a conspiracy existed between him and Pantaleon.

THE COURT’S RULING

We DENY the appeal for lack of merit.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property – Presumption of malversation. – Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or
shall, otherwise, be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:

xxxx

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is
more than 12,000 pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has
put such missing funds or property to personal uses.

The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code are the following:

(a) That the offender be a public officer.

 (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office.

(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.

(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.

Appellants are public officers

A public officer is defined in the Revised Penal Code as "any person who, by direct provision of the
law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or
in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or
class."55 Pantaleon and Vallejos were the municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively, of
the Municipality of Castillejos at the time of the crimes charged. In short, they were public officers
within the meaning of the term as defined above.

Appellants had the custody and control of funds

or property by reason of the duties of their office

As a required standard procedure, the signatures of the mayor and the treasurer are needed before
any disbursement of public funds can be made. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be
effected without their signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other
words, any disbursement and release of public funds require their approval. The appellants,
therefore, in their capacities as mayor and treasurer, had control and responsibility over the funds of
the Municipality of Castillejos.

The appellants were accountable for public funds

The funds for which malversation the appellants stand charged were sourced from the development
fund of the municipality. They were funds belonging to the municipality, for use by the municipality,
and were under the collective custody of the municipality’s officials who had to act together to
disburse the funds for their intended municipal use. The funds were therefore public funds for which
the appellants as mayor and municipal treasurer were accountable.

Vallejos, as municipal treasurer, was an accountable officer pursuant to Section 101(1) of P.D. No.
1445 which defines an accountable officer to be "every officer of any government agency whose
duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds or property shall be
accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law." Among the duties of
Vallejos as treasurer under Section 470(d)(2) of Republic Act No. 7160 is "to take custody and
exercise proper management of the funds of the local government unit concerned."

Pantaleon, as municipal mayor, was also accountable for the public funds by virtue of Section 340 of
the Local Government, which reads:

Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. — Any officer of the local
government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government
funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the
provisions of this title. Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of their duties, may
likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local government funds through their
participation in the use or application thereof.

In addition, municipal mayors, pursuant to the Local Government Code, are chief executives of their
respective municipalities. Under Section 102 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, he
is responsible for all government funds pertaining to the municipality:

Section 102. Primary and secondary responsibility. – (1) The head of any agency of the government
is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to
his agency.

The appellants appropriated, took, misappropriated

or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take the public funds

We note at the outset that no less than the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales, in its decision
of April 3, 2000, already made a finding that the projects subject of Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-
9803-328, 101-9803-349, and 101-9804-415 were never implemented in 1998.

This finding was corroborated by several witnesses during the trial. Engr. Ramos, in his testimony of
August 22, 2000 and speaking as the municipal engineer in charge of municipal constructions,
stated that the he never implemented the projects subject of the disbursement vouchers. To directly
quote from the records:

PROSECUTOR JACQUELYN ONGPAUCO-CORTEL

Q: Now, in your stay as acting municipal engineer in Castillejos, Zambales, what documents
did you prepare?

ENGR. RAMOS

A: I prepared three (3) programs of works, namely: the two (2) were up-grading of barangay
roads and the third one was the construction of the market stall.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, you mentioned of three (3) programs of works, now, showing to you
program of work dated January 5, 1998, is this the one you were referring to?

A: Yes, ma’am.

xxx

Q: Can you please state before this Honorable Court what is the purpose of this program of
work?

A: I was instructed to make that program of work but I never implemented those projects
anymore.

xxx

Q: Now, showing to you another program of work, Mr. Witness, dated January 14, 1998, is
this also a part of this program of work which you mentioned earlier?
A: Yes, ma’am.

xxx

Q: Can you state before this Honorable Court if this project was implemented?

A: Likewise, ma’am, I never did implement such project.

xxx

Q: Now, showing to you another program of work, Mr. Witness, dated January 5, 1998, is
this the part and parcel of what you have mentioned earlier?

A: Yes, ma’am.

xxx

Q: And can you state before this Honorable Court if the project was implemented in 1998 Mr.
witness?

A: No, ma’am.

xxx

Q: Going back to the sites of the projects Mr. Witness, did you actually see the sites of the
intended projects?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: What did you see?

A: They were already existing at that time.

Q: What do you mean by that Mr. Witness?

A: The municipal engineer did implement those projects before.

Q: When were these projects actually implemented Mr. Witness? Before?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: When?

A: As I’ve said, they were already existing before I made those programs of work.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NARCISO S. NARIO (Chairman)

Q: What were these projects that according to you were already existing? What are these
projects?
ENGR. RAMOS

A: The upgrading of the barangay roads, Your Honor.

Q: Upgrading of the barangay roads? What barangays are these?

A: Barangay Looc proper, Barangay Magsaysay and Barangay San Pablo.

Q: What else?

A: And the construction of the market stalls located in the public market.

Q: These projects were already existing?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR CORTEL

Q: Meaning to say, Mr. Witness, that before they applied, before the preparation of the
programs of works and disbursement of the amount as indicated thereon, the projects you
have mentioned are already existing?

ENGR. RAMOS

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And that there is no need for the preparation of this program of work and disbursement of
another money for that project?

A: Yes, ma’am.

xxx

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NARIO

Q: Now, it’s on the basis of this program of work that the disbursements, issue voucher, the
check and other relevant documents were paid because of this program of work that you
prepared?

A: Yes, Your Honor.56 [Emphasis ours]

Aurelio, a Sangguniang Bayan member, likewise testified that no construction work was
undertaken on various barangay roads and in the public market of Castillejos in 1998:

PROSECUTOR CORTEL

Q: But do you know if there is a construction of the market stall, public market done in 1998,
Mr. Witness?

AURELIO FASTIDIO
 A: None, ma’am.

Q: In 1999?

A: None, ma’am.

Q: Going to Voucher No. 101-9803-328 Mr. Witness for the upgrading, excavation, back
filling of barangay roads, Mr. Witness, do you know if there is upgrading, excavation and
back filling of certain barangay roads in your area?

A: None, ma’am.

Q: How many barangay roads do you have in that area, Mr. Witness?

A: We have many barangay roads, ma’am.

Q: And do you know if in 1998 there is the upgrading, excavation and back filling of many
barangay roads?

A: None, ma’am.

Q: Not even one, Mr. Witness.

A: Yes, ma’am.57 [Emphasis ours]

Alberto, the Barangay Captain of Looc, also declared on the witness stand during his September 7,
2000 testimony that no project was undertaken in his barangay during the tenure of Pantaleon.
Resty, a municipal councilor, likewise testified on September 12, 2000 that there was no upgrading,
compacting and leveling of roads in Barangay San Pablo in 1998.

Despite the non-existence of the projects covered by the three (3) disbursement vouchers, and
despite the fact that these vouchers never went through the accounting office and the office of the
local budget officer for pre-audit and certification, the appellants still signed them. We quote
Pantaleon’s admission in his January 31, 2001 testimony:

ATTY. RODOLFO REYNOSO

Q: Okay. An issue of pre-audit was brought when the accountant testified earlier that
allegedly you did not require them or you just signed the voucher without requiring the
budget officer or the accountant to affix their signatures, what can you say about that?

TEOFILO PANTALEON, JR.

A: I asked. When the treasurer came into my office, he asked me about the non-signatures
of the accountant and the budget officer, sir. So I called up their attention and they were
adamant, they were hesitant to sign. I called up again the treasurer why it is [sic] because
they were asking for a commission as per the treasurer said to me, Your Honor.

xxx
Q: In other words, Mr. Witness, after informing the accountant and the budget officer that
they have not signed the voucher, you already signed it even without their signature, did I get
you right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you allowed the treasurer to pay?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NARIO

Q: So despite the absence of the signatures of the accountant and the budget officer, you
went through signing these vouchers? (sic)

TEOFILO PANTALEON, JR.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

x x x58 [Emphasis ours]

Vallejos, in his testimony of October 18, 2000, likewise admitted signing the disbursement
vouchers:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO G. PALATTAO

Q: In other words, since you considered the refusal of the accountant to sign the vouchers as
accompanied by bad faith, you decided to ignore the requirement of her signature and you
allowed payment?

JAIME VALLEJOS

A: Yes, your Honor, because the sub-contractor threatened me for not paying the vouchers,
besides, that will cause injury to him.

xxx

Q: Mr. Witness, do you recall where were the funds coming from in paying the projects?

A: Yes, sir, there were two sources of fund, under the Engineering Office maintenance and
other operating expenses, roads and bridges maintenance, and 20% development funds.

xxx

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NICODEMO T. FERRER:

Q: A while ago, you said that this alleged sub-contractor encashed the checks issued to him,
can you show the encashment made by the contractor?
 A: It was in the bank, ma’am.

Q: Where is it now?

A: It was in the Land Bank, ma’am.

xxx

Q: You said that in the signing of the vouchers, you are the last signatory?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Meaning to say, all the signatories precedent to you must sign first before you sign?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Now, in these particular cases, the accountant and the budget officer did not affix their
signatures?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And despite that fact, you signed the disbursement vouchers?

A: Yes, ma’am.

x x x59 [Emphasis ours]

Significantly, the appellants did not deny that they allowed the release of the public funds, but
maintained that the money went to Baquilat as representative and/or subcontractor of La Paz
Construction. This was confirmed by Baquilat himself when he admitted, in his February 8, 2001
testimony, receipt of ₱400,00.00, more or less, from the Municipality of Castillejos for the three (3)
construction projects he allegedly did in 1998. However, Ken Swan Tiu, the owner of La Paz
Construction, vehemently denied that he contracted with the Municipality of Castillejos:

PROSECUTOR CORTEL

Q: Mr. Witness, in connection with these cases, do you remember having received payments
from the municipality of Castillejos, Zambales?

KEN SWAN TIU

A: No, I did not receive any single centavo from the government of Castillejos.

xxx

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to show to you vouchers which would indicate that the
claimant or the payee is La Paz Construction of San Marcelino, Zambales. Now, Mr. Witness
in Exhibit "A", Disbursement Voucher No. 101803-328, do you remember having received
the amount of One Hundred Sisty Six Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Two Pesos and
Seventy-Two Centavos (P166,242.72)?
(WITNESS GOING OVER THE VOUCHER SHOWN TO HIM BY THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR)

A: No, ma’am. I did not receive any.

Q: In Disbursement Voucher No. 1019803-349 wherein the payee is La Paz Construction

also of San Marcelino, Zambales, do you remember having received the amount of One
Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Twenty-Seven Centavos
(₱154,634.27)?

A: No, ma’am.

xxx

Q: Now, Exhibit "A" Mr. Witness I would like to point to you a portion wherein the recipient
appears to be La Paz Construction, San Marcelino, Zambales in the amount of Two Hundred
Forty-Two Pesos [sic]. Do you know whose signature that is appearing on top of the
typewritten name of La Paz Construction?

A: No, ma’am. I don’t recognize this signature and I don’t have any agent to collect this
amount.

xxx

Q: Now, what about in Exhibit "B" wherein the recipient appears to be La Paz Construction,
whose signature appears on top of the typewritten name of La Paz Construction?

A: Yes, ma’am. The same, I don’t recognize the signature and I don’t have any transaction
with the municipality of Castillejos.

Q: Now, in connection with Exhibit "C", there also appears a signature who was a recipient of
the amount of Ninety Thousand Four Hundred Sixty- Five and Twenty-One Centavos
(₱90,465.21), whose signature is that?

A: Yes, ma’am. The same, the signature I don’t recognize and I don’t have any agent or
collecting agent or any transaction with the officials of the municipality of Castillejos.

xxx

ATTY. REYNOSO

Q: So in other words, in all transactions from the very beginning that you have transacted
with the municipality, you are the only one who transacted with the municipality?

A: I don’t have any transaction with the Municipality of Castillejos.

Q: Even before this alleged incident took place?

A: I said I don’t have any, sir.

 xxx

Q: You said that you have not made any contract with the municipality, did I get you right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You are a witness charging the accused here of an alleged contract entered into between
the accused and your company and you deny did I get you right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So insofar as you are concerned, there was no contract between you and the
municipality?

A: Precisely.60 [Emphasis ours]

Ken Swan Tiu likewise testified that Baquilat was not in any way connected with the La Paz
Construction. We quote his June 7, 2001 testimony:

PROSECUTOR CORTEL

Q: Mr. Witness, in his (Baquilat’s) testimony in open court, he declared that you let him
borrow, you lent him your license as a Contractor, is that true, Mr. Witness?

KEN SWAN TIU

A: No, ma’am. We don’t have any agreement with that, and I am not lending my own
company, my license to them because they have their own company.

Q: Okay. Mr. Witness, he also declared in open court that you sub-contracted him in
connection with the projects undertaken by then Mayor Pantaleon in the Municipality of
Castillejos, what can you say to that?

A: No, Ma’am, I don’t have any construction with the government of the Municipality of
Castillejos, and sub-contracting, I don’t have this idea on my mind because I don’t enter in
this construction, Ma’am. (sic)

xxx

ATTY. MARK M. AVERILLA

Q: Is your testimony, Mr. Witness, therefore that you have not entered into a sub-
construction agreement with Mr. John Baquilat pertaining to that project in Castillejos,
Zambales?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Is it therefore your testimony that Mr. Witness that Mr. John Baquilat, who testified earlier
declaring in open court that you authorized him to use La Paz Construction as the entity to
enter into contract with the Municipality of Castillejos, that he was lying [sic]?
 A: Of course we don’t have any agreement on that, and I don’t have any contract…
(interruption)

Q: Yes, Sir, so you are saying that he was lying? Is that your testimony?

A: I don’t know, Sir, because I just encountered that there is a sub-contractor who came out.
Actually, in myself, I don’t have any construction here with the government of Castillejos.
How come there exists a sub-Contractor? [sic].

x x x61 [Emphasis ours]

These testimonies lead to no other conclusion than that the appellants had deliberately consented to
or permitted the taking of public funds by Baquilat despite the fact that (1) La Paz Construction never
entered into a contract with the Municipality of Castillejos; (2) Baquilat was not an agent,
representative or subcontractor of La Paz Construction; (3) the projects covered by the
disbursement vouchers in question never existed; and (4) the disbursement vouchers lacked the
requisite signatures of the municipal accountant and the local budget officer. In short, they resorted
to machinations and simulation of projects to draw funds out of the municipal coffers.

The circumstances established during trial and outlined below likewise show the anomalous
circumstances that attended the disbursement of the public funds.

Pantaleon himself admitted that he was not authorized by the Sanggunian to enter into a contract
with La Paz Construction; however, he and Vallejos requested Engr. Ramos to prepare three (3)
antedated programs of work that later served as basis for the issuance of the disbursement
vouchers. Aurelio also declared that the projects covered by the subject disbursement vouchers
were charged from the development fund of the municipality, although these projects were not
among those included in the approved projects for the years 1996 to 1998. Nida’s testimony on the
irregularities that attended the documents supporting the vouchers were never rebutted by the
defense. These irregularities were aptly summarized by the Sandiganbayan as follows:

a. All of the three disbursement vouchers were not signed by her;

b. As to the Disbursement Voucher No. 1019802-328, the box in which she did not sign as
municipal accountant, now bears the signature of Martin Pagaduan without her authority,
after the voucher was disallowed and returned by the Commission on Audit; Pagaduan was
not yet the Municipal Accountant as he was appointed only on January 1, 1999;

c. Required documents – authority to enter into negotiated contract, plans and specifications,
abstract of bids, notarized contracts – were not attached to the voucher;

d. Voucher number and accounting entries were written by accused Treasurer Vallejos, not
the then municipal accountant (Nida Naman);

e. Also signed by Martin Pagaduan without her authority as municipal treasurer are the three
purported Certificate of Canvass attached to the Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-328;

f. Official Receipt No. 000989 that appears to have been signed by John Baquilat to
acknowledge receipt of the amount covered by check no. 108952 indicated in Disbursement
Voucher No. 101-9803-349 is not filled up.62
Through the appellant’s explicit admissions, the witnesses’ testimonies, and the documentary
evidence submitted, the prosecution duly established the fourth element of the crime of
malversation. It is settled that a public officer is liable for malversation even if he does not use public
property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, if he allows another to take the funds, or
through abandonment or negligence, allow such taking.63 The felony may be committed, not only
through the misappropriation or the conversion of public funds or property to one’s personal use, but
also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate the funds. The felony may thus
be committed by dolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is
imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to negligence.64

Falsification was a necessary means

to commit the crime of malversation

Article 171, paragraphs (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. – The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate;

xxx

5. Altering true dates;

xxx

Falsification under paragraph 2 is committed when (a) the offender causes it to appear in a
document that a person or persons participated in an act or a proceeding; and (b) that such person
or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding. In the present case, both testimonial
and documentary evidence showed that Vallejos filled up the spaces for the voucher number and the
accounting entry of Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9803-328, 101-9803-349 and 10-9804-415.
These items were required to be filled up by Nida as the municipal accountant. Thus, Vallejos made
it appear that the municipal accountant participated in signing the disbursement vouchers.

The appellants were likewise guilty of falsification under paragraph 5 of Article 171. Engr. Ramos
testified that Pantaleon and Vallejos instructed him to place the dates January 5, 1998 on the first
and third programs of work, and January 14, 1998 on the second program of work, although he
prepared the programs only in March 1998. Thereafter, the appellants affixed their signatures on
these programs of work. The projects covered by these programs of work served as basis for the
issuance of the disbursement vouchers.

The presence of conspiracy

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy does not need to be proven by direct evidence and may
be inferred from the conduct – before, during, and after the commission of the crime – indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, as shown by
an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the crime.65

The burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy rests on the prosecution, but settled
jurisprudence holds that conspiracy may be proven other than by direct evidence. 66 In People v.
Pagalasan,67 the Court expounded on why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary:

After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies
are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a
co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.68

The prosecution’s evidence glaringly shows how the appellants acted in concert to facilitate the
illegal release of public funds. First, the appellants ordered the preparation of the programs of work,
with specific instructions to antedate the submitted programs. Second, they affixed their signatures
on the antedated programs of work. Third, the appellants signed the disbursement vouchers
covering the simulated projects despite knowledge of the absence of the signatures of the local
budget officer and the local accountant. Vallejos even filled up entries in the vouchers that were for
the municipal treasurer to fill up. Finally, the appellants affixed their signatures in the following
documents attached to the three (3) disbursement vouchers:

Supporting documents attached to Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9803-328

a. Purchase Request (Exh. "A-3");

b. Three Certificates of Canvass (Exh. "A-4 to A-6");

c. Purchase Order showing La Paz Construction as the winning bidder/contractor (Exh. "A-
7");

d. Certificate of Acceptance with regard to the services rendered by La Paz Construction

(Exh. "A-8"); and

e. Request for Obligation Allotment with La Paz Construction as payee (Exh. "A-9").

Supporting documents attached to Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9803-349

a. Purchase Request (Exh. "B-6");

b. Purchase Order showing La Paz Construction as the contractor (Exh. "B-7");

c. Request for Obligation Allotment with La Paz Construction as payee (Exh. "B-9"); and

d. Certificate of Acceptance with regard to the services rendered by La Paz Construction

(Exh. "B-8").
Supporting documents attached to Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9804-415

a. Request for Obligation Allotment with La Paz Construction as payee (Exh. "C-8");

b. Three Certificates of Canvass (Exh. "C-4 to C-5");

c. Purchase Order showing La Paz Construction as the contractor (Exh. "C-6");

d. Purchase Request (Exh. "C-2"); and

e. Certificate of Acceptance with regard to the services rendered by La Paz Construction

(Exh. "C-7").

The appellants’ combined acts therefore indubitably point to their joint purpose and design. Their
concerted actions clearly showed that conspiracy existed in their illegal release of public funds.

The appellant’s defenses

Vallejos’ contention that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him because he only occupies a
Salary Grade (SG) 24 position cannot shield him from the Sandiganbayan’s reach. The critical factor
in determining the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the position of his co-accused, the municipal
mayor, who occupies an SG 27 position. Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249, 69 if the position
of one or more of the accused is classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense.

Our ruling in Esquivel v. Ombudsman70 on this point is particularly instructive:

In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan, we
already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a
municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No.
8249 provides that it is only in cases where "none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher" that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended." Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade
of 27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor
Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse
of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No.
24778, involving both of them.71 [Underscoring and italics in the original] 1awphi1

Vallejos’ claim that it was his ministerial function to sign the disbursement vouchers also lacks merit.
Article 344 R.A. No. 7160 reads:

Sec. 344. Certification and Approval of Vouchers. – No money shall be disbursed unless the local
budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose,
the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the
availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the
head of the department or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity,
propriety, and legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly
recurring administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses
for light, water, telephone and telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such
as GSIS, SSS, LDP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of the DBM and others,
approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required
whenever local funds are disbursed.

xxxx

Thus, as a safeguard against unwarranted disbursements, certifications are required from: (a) the
local budget officer as to the existence and validity of the appropriation; (b) the local accountant as
to the legal obligation incurred by the appropriation; (c) the local treasurer as to the availability of
funds; and (d) the local department head as to the validity, propriety and legality of the claim against
the appropriation.72 Therefore, Vallejos, as municipal treasurer, could not authorize the release of the
funds without the requisite signatures of the municipal budget officer and the municipal accountant.

Vallejos also harps on the fact that the Provincial Auditor of Zambales did not issue a notice to
restitute the funds. We find this contention misleading. Pantaleon testified that the Provincial Auditor
issued a notice stating that the disbursement of the public funds was irregular. Thereafter, the three
(3) disbursement vouchers were suspended by the COA for deficiency in their supporting papers.
Under Section 15.2 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances, "a suspension which is
not settled within 90 days from receipt of the Notice of Suspension, or within such extended period
as may be authorized by the auditor concerned, shall become a disallowance."

According to Pantaleon, he instructed Vallejos to rectify the deficiencies in the vouchers and its
supporting documents; however, he admitted not knowing whether Vallejos complied with this
instruction. Vallejos, for his part, did not testify on whether or not he corrected and completed the
supporting documents. No proof exists in the record showing that the deficiencies were ever
rectified.

At any rate, demand under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code merely raises a prima
facie presumption that missing funds have been put to personal use. The demand itself, however, is
not an element of the crime of malversation. Even without a demand, malversation can still be
committed when, as in the present case, sufficient facts exist proving the crime.73

The Proper Penalty

Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua when the amount malversed is greater than ₱22,000.00. This
Article also imposes the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount
of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. Falsification by a public
officer or employee under Article 171, on the other hand, is punished by prision mayor and a fine not
to exceed ₱5,000.00.

Since appellant committed a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed
in its maximum period, pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This provision states:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

The Sandiganbayan, therefore, correctly imposed on the appellants the penalties of reclusion
perpetua and perpetual special disqualification for each count of malversation of public funds
through falsification of public documents, and the payment of fines of ₱166,242.72, ₱154,634.27,
and ₱90,464.21, respectively, representing the amounts malversed. The Indeterminate Sentence
Law finds no application since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty to which the Indeterminate
Sentence Law does not apply.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, we AFFIRM the February 4, 2003 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25861-63, insofar as it found appellant Jaime F. Vallejos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of the complex crime of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents, as defined and penalized under Article 217 in
relation with Articles 48 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

We make no pronouncement with respect to appellant Teofilo Pantaleon, Jr. whose withdrawal of
appeal has been previously granted by this Court.

Costs against appellant Vallejos.

SO ORDERED.