Case no.

ROMEO T. CALUZOR,  vs.DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO et al.

Facts:

Lorenzo Llanillo (Lorenzo) owned the parcel of land (land) in Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan, The petitioner averred that
Lorenzo took him into the land as a tenant in 1970. The petitioner and his family were allowed to build a makeshift shanty
in the subject land to effectively till the land. Even after the death of Lorenzo, the petitioner continued giving a share of his
produce to Ricardo Martin (Ricardo), Lorenzo’s overseer.

In 1990, respondent Deogracias , the son of Lorenzo, offered to pay the petitioner P17,000.00/hectare of the cultivated
land in exchange for turning his tillage over to Deogracias. However, Deogracias did not pay the petitioner. Instead, He, and
persons acting under his orders forcibly ejected the petitioner and his family by levelling their shanty and plantation with
the use of a bulldozer.

The efforts of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council to conciliate failed; hence the petitioner instituted this case against
Deogracias in the PARAD in Malolos, Bulacan, demanding the payment of disturbance compensation. He amended his
complaint to implead Moldex Realty Corporation (Moldex) as an additional defendant. He prayed for the restoration of his
possession of the tilled land, and the payment of disturbance compensation. In his answer, 3 Deogracias denied that any
tenancy relationship between him and the petitioner existed.Meanwhile, the Secretary of the DAR granted the application
for the conversion of the land from agricultural to residential and commercial uses filed by Deogarcias, through Moldex as
his attorney-in-fact.

PARAD dismissed the complaint of the petitioner. Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB),10 which, reversed the PARAD. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the DARAB and reinstated the PARAD’s
decision.

Issues

1. Whether the petition for certiorari was an improper remedy?

2. Whether CA had gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction?

3. Whether tenancy relationship exist?

4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to disturbance compensation?

Held:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court declare to be correct the respondents’ position that the petitioner should have appealed
in due course by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of bringing the special civil action for certiorari.
The remedies of appeal and certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the special civil action for certiorari, being an
extraordinary remedy, is available only if there is no appeal, or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.18 In certiorari, only errors of jurisdiction are to be addressed by the higher court, such that
a review of the facts and evidence is not done; but, in appeal, the superior court corrects errors of judgment, and
in so doing reviews issues of fact and law to cure errors in the appreciation and evaluation of the
evidence.19 Based on such distinctions, certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.

2. No. It is not amiss to point out that the settled meaning of grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all
in contemplation of law.20 In that regard, the abuse of discretion must be shown to be patent and gross in order for
the act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion. 21 Yet, none of such categories
characterized the act of the CA. It appears that the CA cited the conversion order not to deny his claim of being the
tenant but only to accent the land conversion as a fact. Indeed, as the CA found, he presented nothing to
substantiate his claim of having been the tenant of Leonardo. Under the circumstances, the CA did not act either
arbitrarily or whimsically.
 3. No. Being the party alleging the existence of the tenancy relationship, the petitioner carried the burden of proving
the allegation of his tenancy. 27 In establishing the tenancy relationship, therefore, independent evidence, not self-
serving statements, should prove, among others, the consent of the landowner to the relationship, and the sharing
of harvests.29The third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy were not shown to be presented in this
case.Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be
done away with by conjectures.For implied tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential requisites of
tenancy must be present.

4. NO. If tenanted land is converted pursuant to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No.
6389, the dispossessed tenant is entitled to the payment of disturbance compensation.Yet, the query has to be
answered in the negative because the petitioner was not entitled to disturbance compensation because he was not
the de jure tenant of the landowner.It is timely to remind that any claim for disturbance compensation to be
validly made by a de jure tenant must meet the procedural and substantive conditions listed in Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 3844,

Case no. 6

BIENVENIDO T. BUADA et. al vs. CEMENT CENTER, INC.

FACTS:

Petitioners Bienvenido T. Buada,et.al were tenant-farmers cultivating three parcels of agricultural land owned by
respondent Cement Center, Inc.6

On March 13, 1998, respondent filed a Complaint 7 for Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and Damages against
petitioners with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region 1 in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. It claimed
that, petitioners entered into a Compromise Agreement with respondent whereby the former, for and in consideration of
the sum of ₱3,000.00 each, voluntarily surrendered their respective landholdings. However, despite respondent’s repeated
demands, petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings.

In their Answer,8 petitioners alleged that their consent to the Compromise Agreement was obtained through fraud, deceit,
and misrepresentation and claimed that, respondent induced them to sign a Compromise Agreement by representing that
the subject landholdings are no longer viable for agricultural purposes. Petitoner also alleged that respondent assured
them that they would only apply for the conversion of the land and that they would have to surrender the land only upon
the approval of said application and that thereafter, they will be paid a disturbance compensation of ₱3,000.00 each and
respondent also promised to hire them to work on the project that was planned for the converted land. But, should the
application for conversion be denied, petitioners will continue to be tenants and could later become beneficiaries under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

The Regional Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of the tenant-farmers.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to DARAB which rendered its Decision denying the appeal and the assailed decision was
affirmed

Respondent thereafter filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA found the appeal meritorious and rendered its
Decision that the instant Petition is GRANTED.

The appellate court found the Compromise Agreement executed by the parties to be valid. Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

1. Whether the Supreme Court is a trier of facts

 2. whether the Compromise Agreement constitute the "voluntary surrender" contemplated by law..

3. Whteher the alleged voluntary surrender of petitioners of their tenancy rights for the sum of ₱3,000.00 each could
constitute as "voluntary surrender" within the contemplation of law.

HELD:

1. No. Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding with, and are not reviewable by us unless the case falls under
any of the recognized exceptions. One of the exceptions is when the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those
of the trial court13 or quasi-judicial agency. In this case, the findings of fact of the CA and the DARAB are
conflicting, thus we are compelled to take a look at the factual milieu of this case.

2. No. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require any court
authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own volition. 15 To protect the tenant's right to security of
tenure, voluntary surrender, as contemplated by law, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent
evidence. The tenant's intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere
implication. Otherwise, the right of a tenant farmer to security of tenure becomes an illusory one. 16 Moreover, RA
3844 provides that the voluntary surrender of the landholding by an agricultural lessee should be due to
circumstances more advantageous to him and his family. 17 The Compromise Agreement did not constitute the
"voluntary surrender" contemplated by law.

3. No. A perusal of the subject Compromise Agreement reveals that the parties considered the amount of
₱3,000.00 together with the income from a single cropping as comprising the disturbance compensation
package, Petitioners, however, assail the disturbance compensation package provided in the Compromise
Agreement as insufficient and contrary to Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 2004. Despite the above
contentions of petitioners, respondent failed to present evidence to show that the disturbance compensation
package corresponds with the compensation required by the said Administrative Order. Neither was there any
showing that said disturbance compensation is not less than five times the average annual gross value of the
harvest on petitioners’ actual landholdings during the preceding five calendar years.

Case no. 7

EUFROCINA NIEVES vs. ERNESTO DULDULAO et.al, 

Facts

Petitioner is the owner of a piece of agricultural rice land at Dulong Bayan, Quezon, Nueva Ecija (subject land). Ernesto
and Felipe (respondents) are tenants and cultivators of the subject land 6 who are obligated to each pay leasehold rentals of
45 cavans of palay for each cropping season. Claiming that Ernesto and Felipe failed to pay their leasehold rentals since
1985 , petitioner filed a petition on March 8, 2006 before the DARAB Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD), seeking
the ejectment of respondents from the subject land for non-payment of rentals. 9

Prior to the filing of the case, a mediation was conducted before the Office of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer and
Legal Division where respondents admitted being in default in the payment of leasehold rentals, and promised to pay the
same. Subsequently, however, in his answer to the petition, Ernesto claimed that he merely inherited a portion of the back
leasehold rentals from his deceased father, Eugenio Duldulao, but proposed to pay the arrearages in four (4) installments
beginning the dayatan cropping season in May 2006. 11 On the other hand, Felipe denied incurring any back leasehold
rentals, but at the same time proposed to pay whatever there may be in six (6) installments, also beginning the dayatan
cropping season in May 2006. 12 Both respondents manifested their lack of intention to renege on their obligations to pay
the leasehold rentals due, explaining that the supervening calamities, such as the flashfloods and typhoons that affected
the area prevented them from complying.13

PARAD declared that the tenancy relations between the parties had been severed by respondents’ failure to pay their back
leasehold rentals, thereby ordering them to vacate the subject land and fulfill their rent obligations.

With respect to Ernesto, the PARAD did not find merit in his claim that the obligation of his father for back leasehold
rentals, amounting to 446 cavans of palay, had been extinguished by his death.
As for Felipe, the PARAD found that his unpaid leasehold rentals had accumulated to 327 cavans of palay, and that his
refusal to pay was willful and deliberate, warranting his ejectment from the subject land. 16

Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the case on appeal.

the DARAB issued a Decision19 affirming the findings of the PARAD.

Unperturbed, respondents elevated the matter to the CA.

the CA granted respondents’ petition for review, thereby reversing the ruling of the DARAB terminating the tenancy
relations of the parties.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA .hence this petition.

Issue

1. whether the CA correctly reversed the DARAB’s ruling ejecting respondents from the subject land.

2. Whether general legislation must prevail over special legislation?

3. Whether cases covering an agricultural lessee’s non-payment of leasehold rentals should be examined under the
parameters of item 6, Section 36 of RA 3844 and not in item 2

Held:

1. NO. Agricultural lessees, being entitled to security of tenure, may be ejected from their landholding only on the
grounds provided by law. These grounds — the existence of which is to be proven by the agricultural lessor in a
particular case — are enumerated in Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3844, otherwise known as the
“Agricultural Land Reform Code.” In this case, it was established that the agricultural lessees willfully and
deliberately failed to pay the lease rentals when they fell due, which is one of the grounds for dispossession of
their landholding as provided in said provision of law.

2. No. The Supreme Court ruled that it is a long-standing rule in statutory construction that general legislation must
give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable - lex specialis derogat generali. 38 In other words, where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed therefor should
prevail.39 

3. yes, the Court so holds that cases covering an agricultural lessee’s non-payment of leasehold rentals should be
examined under the parameters of item 6, Section 36 of RA 3844 and not under item 2 of the same provision
which applies to other violations of the agricultural leasehold contract or the provisions of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, excluding the failure to pay rent. In these latter cases, substantial compliance may – as above-
explained – be raised as a defense against dispossession.

Case no. 8

URBANO F. ESTRELLA,  vs.PRISCILLA P. FRANCISCO,

Facts:

Lope Cristobal (Cristobal) was the owner of a parcel of agricultural riceland (subject landholding) in Cacarong

Matanda, Pandi,Bulacan, Estrella was the registered agricultural tenant-lessee of the subject landholding.

On September 22, 1997, Cristobal sold the subject landholding to respondent Priscilla Francisco ( Francisco) without
notifying Estrella.

Upon discovering the sale, Estrella sent Cristobal a demand letter dated March 31, 1998, for the return of the subject
landholding.5 He also sent Francisco a similar demand letter but neither Cristobal nor Francisco responded to Estrella’s
demands.6
On February 12, 2001, Estrella filed a complaint 7 against Cristobal and Francisco for legal redemption, recovery, and
maintenance of peaceful possession before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). 

Estrella alleged that the sale between Cristobal and Francisco was made secretly and in bad faith, in violation of Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code (the Code).

Cristobal did not file an answer while Francisco denied all the allegations in the complaint except for the fact of the sale.
Francisco claimed that she was an innocent purchaser in good faith .On June 23, 2002, the PARAD rendered its decision
recognizing Estrella’s right of redemption. 11 The PARAD found that neither Cristobal nor Francisco notified Estrella in
writing of the sale. In the absence of such notice, an agricultural lessee has a right to redeem the landholding from the
buyer pursuant to Section 12 of the Code.12

Francisco appealed the PARAD’s decision to the DARAB

On February 23, 2009, the DARAB reversed the PARAD’s decision and denied Estrella the right of redemption.

Estrella moved for reconsideration but the DARAB denied the motion.

On September 30, 2011, Estrella filed a motion before the CA to declare himself as a pauper litigant and manifested his
intention to file a petition for review of the DARAB’s decision. 14 .

On October 17, 2011, Estrella filed a petition for review15 of the DARAB’s decision before the CA.

On November 28, 2012, the CA dismissed Estrella’s petition for review for failure to show any reversible error in the
DARAB’s decision.

On May 9, 2013, Estrella filed his Motion for Reconsideration arguing that his right of redemption had not yet prescribed
because he was not given written notice of the sale to Francisco. 22

On May 30, 2013, the CA denied Estrella’s motions for extension of time, citing the rule that the reglementary period to file
a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. 23 The CA likewise denied Estrella’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, the present recourse to this Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether agricultural tenant’s right of redemption over the landholding cannot prescribe when neither the lessor-
seller nor the buyer has given him written notice of the sale.

2. Whether Estrella timely exercised his right of redemption

3. Whether Estrella validly exercise his right to redeem the property

RULING

1. Yes. Section 12 expressly states that the 180-day period must be reckoned from written notice of sale. If the
agricultural lessee was never notified in writing of the sale of the landholding, there is yet no prescription period
to speak of.43

2. Yes, Section 12 expressly states that the 180-day period must be reckoned from  written notice of sale. If the
agricultural lessee was never notified in writing of the sale of the landholding, there is yet no prescription period
to speak of.43As the vendee, respondent Francisco had the express duty to serve written notice on Estrella, the
agricultural lessee, and on the DAR. Her failure to discharge this legal duty prevented the commencement of the
180-day redemption period. Francisco only gave written notice of the sale in her answer 44 before the PARAD
wherein she admitted the fact of the sale. 45 Thus, Estrella timely exercised his right of redemption. To hold
otherwise would allow Francisco to profit from her own neglect to perform a legally mandated duty.

3. NO. despite the timely filing of the redemption suit, Estrella did not validly exercise his right to redeem the
property. The situation becomes worse when, as shown by the evidence in this case, the redemptioner has no
funds and must apply for them to the Land Authority, which, in turn, must depend on the availability of funds from
the Land Bank. It then becomes practically certain that the landowner will not be able to realize the value of his
property for an indefinite time beyond the two years redemption period. In the present case, Estrella manifested
his willingness to pay the redemption price but failed to tender payment or consign it with the PARAD when he
filed his complaint. To be sure, a tenant’s failure to tender payment or consign it in court upon filing the
redemption suit is not necessarily fatal; he can still cure the defect and complete his act of redemption by
consigning his payment with the court within the remaining prescriptive period. Unfortunately, even after the
lapse of the 240 days (the 60-day freeze period and the 180-day redemption period), there was neither tender nor
judicial consignation of the redemption price. Even though Estrella repeatedly manifested his willingness to
consign the redemption price, he never actually did.