Choke points are narrow international waterways where three

characteristics are present. The waterway should be narrow and

capable of being closed off to both commercial and military
snipping. There should be no readily available maritime route to
utilize in the event of closure. Finally, the choke point should be
of considerable significance to at least several States. This
article identifies seven “primary” choke points which seem to
satisfy these criteria.
These are Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz, the Danish and
Turkish Straits, and the Suez and Panama Canals. It also
identifies eleven “secondary” choke points, where at least one
of the required characteristics is missing. The eleven include
Dover, Bering and Magellan Straits, as well as Malacca-Singapore
and a number of others in the Western Pacific.
Turning to a consideration of the status of choke points in a
Post-Cold War era, the article notes four basic assumptions: (1)
the intense military rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union will be reduced in coming years; (2) for many
countries marine-related environmental concerns may be
increasing considerably; (3) as the Cold War recedes, regional
contests and confrontations will grow more intense; and (4) the
overall densities of water-borne traffic will undergo change as
the relative economic growth of regional centers changes. The
article then considers the potential impact of these trends on
the future role of choke points.
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Noun 1.
chokepoint - a narrowing that reduces the flow
through a channel
bottleneck, constriction
narrowing - an instance of becoming narrow
 2.
chokepoint - a point of congestion or blockage; "the
bridge is always a chokepoint at rush hour"
point - the precise location of something; a spatially
limited location; "she walked to a point where she
could survey the whole street"

The Persian Gulf ( 26°54'17.00"N, 51°32'51.00"E), also known as the Arabian Gulf, is a 989
kilometer-long inland sea that separates Iran from the Arabian Peninsula. The name derives from
the fact that the great Achaemenid Empire in the sixth century B.C.E. had its center of power in
the province of Fars (Pars/ Persis) in the southwestern region of the Iranian plateau. Its western
end is marked by the major river delta of the Arvand/Shatt al-Arab River, which carries the
waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris. At the eastern end, is the Strait of Hormuz. Located
between Oman and Iran, the Persian Gulf is just 55 kilometers wide.

Satellite image of the Persian Gulf (Source:NOAA Environmental Visualization

Program)

Countries with a coastline on the Persian Gulf, called the Persian Gulf States or the Gulf States,
are (clockwise, from the north): Iran (Persia), United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar on a
peninsula off the Saudi coast, Bahrain on an island, and Kuwait and Iraq in the northwest. There
have been, and continue to be, significant territorial disputes between Persian Gulf countries.
Besides the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and before that the Iran-Iraq War from
1980 to 1988, another important dispute is between the UAE and Iran over ownership of three
islands -- Abu Musa, Greater Tunb Island, and Lesser Tunb Island, all strategically located in the
Strait of Hormuz. The three islands were effectively occupied by Iranian troops in 1992. In 1995,
the Iranian Foreign Ministry claimed that the islands were "an inseparable part of Iran." Iran
rejected a 1996 proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for the dispute to be resolved
by the International Court of Justice, an option supported by the UAE. On December 31, 2001,
the GCC issued a statement reiterating its support for the UAE's sovereignty over Abu Musa and
the Tunbs, declared Iran's claims on the islands as "null and void," and backed "all measures...by
the UAE to regain sovereignty on its three islands peacefully."

Today the Gulf is one of the most strategic waterways in the world due to its importance in world
oil transportation. It contains 715 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, representing over half
(57%) of the world's oil reserves, and 2,462 Tcf (trillion cubic feet) of natural gas reserves (45%
of the world total). Persian Gulf countries maintain about one-third of the world’s productive oil
capacity.

Oil flows out of the region through several of oil transit chokepoints. Chokepoints are critically
important to world oil trade because so much oil passes through them, yet they are narrow and
theoretically could be blocked -- at least temporarily. In addition, chokepoints are susceptible to
pirate attacks and shipping accidents in their narrow channels. The vast majority (about 90%) of
oil exported from the Persian Gulf transited by tanker through the Strait of Hormuz, located
between Oman and Iran. The Strait consists of 2-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound
tanker traffic, as well as a 2-mile wide buffer zone. Oil heading westwards by tanker from the
Persian Gulf towards the Suez Canal or Sumed pipeline must pass through the Bab al-Mandab.
Located between Djibouti and Eritrea in Africa, and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, the Bab
al-Mandab connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. After passing
through the Bab al-Mandab, oil en route from the Persian Gulf to Europe must pass either
through the Suez Canal or the Sumed Pipeline complex in Egypt. Both of these routes connect
the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea.

The Persian Gulf region was the center of two conflicts involving Iraq and U.S.-led coalitions in
the late 20th and early 21st century. The First Persian Gulf War (Jan.– Feb., 1991) was an armed
conflict between Iraq and a coalition of 32 nations including the United States, Britain, Egypt,
France, and Saudi Arabia. It was a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990; Iraq then
annexed Kuwait, which it had long claimed. The Second Persian Gulf War, also known as the
Iraq War (Mar.–Apr., 2003) was a largely U.S.-British invasion of Iraq.

Further reading

• Persian Gulf online

• Persian Gulf, The Encyclopaedia of the Orient

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) identifies six straits and canals as world
oil transit chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Suez Canal, Bosporus, Bab el-
Mandab, and the Panama Canal. Given that tanker traffic accounts for nearly two thirds of the
world's trade in oil, the security of shipping is of paramount importance. These six chokepoints
are defined by their geographically constrained waterways and the high volume of oil tanker
traffic. These bottlenecks are of critical importance to the shipping of oil and are, at least
theoretically, highly susceptible to acts of piracy and shipping accidents.

The Strait of Malacca is widely considered the most vulnerable chokepoint, although it is
perhaps the easiest to circumvent in the event of a disruption. The Strait is a narrow stretch of
water nearly 500 miles long separating the Malaysian Peninsula and the Indonesian island of
Sumatra. Approximately 12 million barrels of oil are shipped through this narrow
thoroughfare each day. At its narrowest point, in Phillips Channel in the Singapore Strait, the
channel is roughly 1.5 miles wide. Malacca is not only narrow, but also quite shallow - less than
22 meters in some spots. Dangers include collision, accidents, grounding (due to the shallow sea
floor) and piracy. Over 50,000 vessels transit Malacca each year, probably because it is the
shortest (and therefore cheapest) shipping route between Japan, South Korea, China and the oil
fields of the Middle East. The nearby Straits of Makassar and Lombok provide alternate routes at
a marginal cost increase — not the preferred routes during peacetime, but possible routes that
would require little increase in cost during a disruption. In the event of a very severe disruption,
ships could transit to East Asia by traveling all the way around Australia, remaining in the open
ocean and adding only a few days of transit time.[i]

The Suez Canal and the Sumed pipeline connect the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. Some
4.2 million barrels of oil transit the area each day with the bulk of product moving northbound
from Saudi Arabia via the pipeline. Closure of the canal would divert tanker traffic around the
Cape of Good Hope, substantially increasing transit time and driving up costs. The Suez Canal
was blocked and closed between 1967 and 1975 due to regional conflict.

The Bosporus is a 17-mile long strait dividing Asia from Europe and connecting the Black and
Mediterranean Seas. Roughly 3.1 million barrels of oil flow through the Bosporus each day.
The Bosporus is less than a half-mile wide at its narrowest point and is one of the busiest and
most difficult thruways to navigate. Weather and shipping accidents, not necessarily conflict or
terrorism, are the primary concerns in this chokepoint.

The Bab el-Mandab (or Mandab Strait) connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Roughly
three million barrels of oil flow through this waterway each day. Closure of the waterway would
prevent tanker traffic bound from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal, primarily
impairing exports to Europe. It was near this location that a small boat attacked the M/V
Limburg, a French VLCC, in October of 2002.

The Panama Canal connects the Pacific Ocean with the Caribbean Sea. Approximately a half
million barrels of oil transit the canal each day. Oil traffic is limited to smaller tankers
(Panamax) due to narrow lock sizes. Most traffic through the canal is destined for the United
States, although little of this traffic is crude oil.
In military strategy, a choke point (or chokepoint) is a geographical feature on land such as a
valley, defile or a bridge, or at sea such as a strait which an armed force is forced to pass,
sometimes on a substantially narrower front, and therefore greatly decreasing its combat power,
in order to reach its objective. A choke point would allow a numerically inferior defending force
to successfully prevent a larger opponent because the attacker would not be able to bring his
superior numbers to bear.

Historical examples
Some historical examples of the tactical use of choke points are King Leonidas's defense of the
Pass of Thermopylae during an invasion led by Xerxes I of Persia and the Battle of Agincourt,
where Henry V of England decisively defeated the French when they were forced to attack his
smaller army through a narrow gap in the Agincourt Woods. It was the suitability of the
Caribbean as a chokepoint that attracted pirates and buccaneers during the 17th century. The
Spanish treasure fleets leaving the Americas would need to pass this way in order to pick up the
strong, prevailing, westerly winds that would take them back to Spain.

The most important naval choke points were first identified by John Fisher in his defense of
continued British colonialism (important colonies in parentheses):[1]

• Hormuz Strait between Oman and Iran at the entrance to the Persian Gulf
(UAE)
• Strait of Malacca between Singapore and Indonesia
• Bab-el-Mandeb passage from the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea (Yemen and
Socotra)
• Panama Canal and the Panama Pipeline connecting the Pacific and Atlantic
Oceans (British Honduras)
• Suez Canal and the Sumed Pipeline connecting the Red Sea and
Mediterranean Sea (Egypt)
• The Turkish Straits/Bosporus linking the Black Sea (and oil coming from the
Caspian Sea region) to the Mediterranean (Cyprus)
• The Strait of Gibraltar (Gibraltar)
• Cape Horn (Falklands)
• The Cape of Good Hope (South Africa)

[edit] Royal Navy choke points

In the 18th, 19th and early 20th Centuries, the sheer size of the Royal Navy meant they had
control over much the world's oceans and seas. Choke points were of huge importance to the
British Empire, which often used them to control trade in British colonies and, to a lesser extent,
for defense. Choke points have also been a source of tension, notably the during Suez Crisis.
Post-British Empire, the Royal Navy still deems its choke points as strategically vital. Indeed,
the importance of choke points were first recognised by British Admiral John Fisher.[1]

Major British choke points today:

• The English Channel

• GIUK Gap
• Strait of Gibraltar

These choke points carry significant strategic importance for the Royal Navy to this day. The
GIUK gap is particularly important to the Royal Navy, as any attempt by northern European
forces to break into the open Atlantic would have to do so either through the heavily defended
English Channel which is also the world's busiest shipping lane or through one of the exits on
either side of Iceland. When also considering British control over the strategic fortress of
Gibraltar at the entrance to the Mediterranean, Spain (northern coast), France (Atlantic coast)
and Portugal are the only mainland European nations that have direct access to the Atlantic
ocean in a way that cannot be easily blocked at a choke point by the Royal Navy. The GIUK gap
was also a strategically important part of the Cold War as the Royal Navy were given the
responsibility of keeping an eye on Soviet submarines trying to break into the open Atlantic.

[edit] Importance
Choke points remain a prominent issue today in the global economy and shipments of goods,
particularly oil. Twenty percent of the world's oil is shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, which
has seen previous conflicts such as the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by American missiles in
1988. The Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline carry 4.5 million barrels a day. The canal was closed
for eight years after the Six Day War in 1967. In many instances, alternate routes are non-
existent or unpractical. For example, an alternate to the Suez/Sumed route required an additional
6000 miles around to Cape of Good Hope.[2] The Royal Navy also deem their choke points to the
Atlantic as strategically important to this day.

[edit] Other uses

"Chokepoint" is synonymous with "bottleneck". In network security, the firewall between a local
network and the Internet is considered a choke point because any attacker would have to come
through that channel, which would be guarded carefully. In graph theory and network analysis, a
chokepoint is any node in a network with a high centrality.

[edit] See also

• Strategic geography
 • Sea lines of communication
• String of Pearls (China)

[edit] References
1. ^ a b Breverton, Terry (2010). Breverton's Nautical Curiosities. 21 Bloomsbury
Square, London: Quercus Publishing PLC. p. 169. ISBN 978-1-84724-776-6.
2. ^
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html

"Chokepoint: Definition from Answers.com." Answers.com: Wiki Q&A combined with free
online dictionary, thesaurus, and encyclopedias. Web. 01 Mar. 2010.
<http://www.answers.com/topic/choke-point>.

Seacoast Fortification - Third System

In 1816, the Board on Fortifications was established under

the leadership of a French fortification expert of the
Napoleonic Wars, Simon Bernard, to advise on defense
policy and recommend modem projects in the light of
recent wartime lessons. Sometimes called the Bernard
Board, the establishment of this body of officers marked
the nation's first permanent institution devoted to codifying
a strategic doctrine and building the infrastructure of a
unified defense network.
The system of fortifications that evolved from the work of
the Board of Engineers in the period from 1816 to 1860
was the most comprehensive, most uniform, and most
advanced the nation had yet had. The third system
rationally assigned priorities for a work program to fortify
numerous strategic sites. This program is best
represented by large brick or stone forts with multiple tiers
of gun batteries, in some cases three and four tiers high,
built on promontories and on islands at choke points to
important harbor entrances. It was among the principal
forts of the Third System, however, that some of the most
spectacular harbor defense structures to come out of any
era of military architecture wereto be found. Included by
virtue of their role in the Civil War were certainly some of
the most famous — Sumter, Pulaski, Monroe, Pickens,
Morgan and Jackson.
How completely this board studied the military needs of
the country can be appreciated only by reading the reports
it made at different times during its existence. They are
interesting. They cover not only the military history of the
period but also contain important data on the development
of the country, beginning at a time when the population of
the United States was only about 8,000,000 and ending in
the 1860's when a population of over 31,000,000 had
been reached. First and foremost, the entire coastline was
studied; each harbor of importance, both for naval and
commercial traffic, was considered in the utmost detail.
Next, the means of manning each fortification in time of
war was planned; each fort was designed to carry a
peace-time garrison for its maintenance, with the method
arranged for by which it could be fully garrisoned in time of
war.
Fort Monroe, for example, was to contain a peace-time
garrison of 600 men; in war-time its garrison was to be
increased to 2,625; when first designed its armament was
to consist of 380 guns of various types, but was later
enlarged to contain 412 guns. Fort Pulaski was to be
garrisoned in time of peace by one company (about 300
men), but in time of war it was to contain 800 men and 150
guns. Fort Morgan, Alabama, was to contain in time of
peace one company, but in time of war, 700 men.
The next problem was to provide communications
between the various defensive posts in dependent of
naval support. To do this roads had to be built, and the
following system was recommended: "The interior
communications desired by the government were
macadamized roads; one from Washington City, along the
Atlantic coast to New Orleans; another between the same
points, but running by the way of Knoxville; another from
New Orleans, by way of Tennessee and Kentucky, to
Buffalo and Lake Brie; and a fourth from Cumberland to
St. Louis." These, with ordinary roads of the country, it
was believed would facilitate adequately the inland
transportation of troops and supplies in the event of war,
taking care of both the land fortifications and naval depots
on the several water frontiers.
From the technical standpoint, this large group of massive,
vertical-walled forts represented the general embodiment
and the fullest development of features which had
previously appeared in only a few and isolated instances,
i.e., structural durability, a high concentration of
armament, and enormous overall firepower. The forts
were armed by specialized seacoast artillery of relatively
standardized type: it was the beginning of standardized
armament systems for U.S. coast defense artillery. They
incorporated defensive innovations, such as improved
firing embrasures which allowed a great deal of lateral
traverse from a smaller, iron-shuttered opening. The sites
protected the nation's most vital naval bases, commercial
ports and strategic anchorages. When these installations
were completed the United States had a true system of
coast defense for the first time: it encompassed all three
coasts, and it was second to none in the world.
The tactical rationale behind this proposal (commonly
referred to as the Plan of 1850) was to guard chokepoints
with batteries close to water level in order to bring grazing
fire from opposite flanks to bear simultaneously on vessels
attempting to run past. Such fire was particularly effective
for two reasons. First, vessels could not hug the far shore
of a channel in order to increase their distance from the
defenses without bringing themselves nearer to fire from
the opposite direction. Second, grazing fire was more
accurate because flat trajectory fire, skipping along the
water surface, had only to be accurate in deflection and
not in range. Since attacking vessels obviously benefited
by exposing themselves to fire as briefly as possible, local
conditions encouraged a full speed dash with both the
strong incoming tide and the prevailing northwest winds
combining to boost effective speed past the defenses.
The outbreak of the Civil War and rapid technological
advances of the industrial revolution put the thirdsystem
fortifications to severe test. Their strategic locations placed
them in the forefront of numerous crucial battles of the
next four years, from the first guns at Fort Sumter, to the
siege of Fort Pulaski, the running of the guns at New
Orleans and Mobile Bay, and the stand at Fort Fisher.
Steam propulsion,ironclad warships, and rifled cannon
combined to spell finis to the predominance of thick
masonry wallsand expensive permanent fortifications in
lieu of more flexible, repairable and cheaper earthworks,
which, paradoxically, better absorbed the shock of
repeated hammering from large-caliber smoothbore and
rifled siege artillery.
The development of the coastal forts system relied heavily
on the efforts of both military and merchant shipping.
Construction alone entailed the movement of massive
amounts of materials and men, with the inevitable losses
that occur with bad weather and perilous navigation. At
Dry Tortugas National Park there are several documented
"construction" wrecks, and others are expected to be
located. This will probably prove to be the case in other
coastal system-related parks in the Southeast, such as
Fort Sumter National Monument and Fort Pulaski National
Monument, as well as Forts Pickens, McRae, and
Massachusetts in Gulf Islands National Seashore, where
construction and supply vessels wrecked or foundered.
Of the more than thirty forts of the third system, begun
after 1816, nearly all remain extant, and althougha number
have been partially altered by the superimposition of later
works, the majority in their originalform constitute the
oldest surviving body of major military structures in the
United States
See also: Piracy in the Strait of Malacca

Piracy in the strait has risen in recent years. There were about 25 attacks on vessels in 1994, 220
in 2000, and just over 150 in 2003 (one-third of the global total).[citation needed] After attacks rose
again in the first half of 2004, the Malaysian, Indonesian and Singaporean navies stepped up
their patrols of the area in July 2004. Subsequently, attacks on ships in the Strait of Malacca
dropped, to 79 in 2005 and 50 in 2006.[7]

There are 34 shipwrecks, some dating to the 1880s, in the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), the
channel for commercial ships. These pose a collision hazard in the narrow and shallow Strait.[8]

Yearly haze from the smoke of raging bush fires, limiting visibility.

Another risk is the yearly haze caused by raging bush fires in Sumatra. It can reduce visibility to
200 metres (660 ft), forcing ships to slow down in the busy strait. Ships longer than 350 metres
(1,150 ft) routinely use the strait