Analysis
January 27, 2011
Summary: With less than six
months left before nationwide
parliamentary polls, Erdoğan has
struck an overtly, indeed aggres-
sively conservative stance. The
prime minister’s election strategy
clearly targets the 58 percent of
the electorate that said “yes” to
the constitutional changes that
were put to a referendum on
September 12. The 42 percent
who said “no” feels unnerved by
Erdoğan’s lurch not only towards
religious conservatism but
towards nationalism as well. The
trouble for Erdoğan’s detractors,
as ever, is that the opposition
remains weak and divided. What
will Erdoğan do with a third term?
Will his slide towards conserva-
tism persist? Or will his prag-
matic side prevail? Is his lurch
towards Islam mere politicking or
does it convey a deeply ingrained
ideology? The answer is, both.
The question of just where Turkey
is heading under Erdoğan will be
best answered by the new consti-
tution he has vowed to deliver.
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Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Lurch towards
Islam: An Electioneering Tactic or
His True Face Revealed?
by Amberin Zaman
“Bismillahirahmanirahim (In the
Name of Allah the All Compas-
sionate and the Merciful).” With these
words Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan launched into an
electrifying speech during a recent
ceremony in Kuwait to present him
with the “Outstanding Personality
in the Muslim World” award. The
audience of mainly Muslim scholars
clapped hard as he railed against Israel
and its treatment of the Palestinians.
Among them sat Bulent Yildirim,
the chairman of the Turkish aid
charity that had led the ill-fated Mavi
Marmara flotilla. “In strawberry fields,
in schools, in playgrounds in hospitals,
be they children, women, the elderly,
you [Israel] brutally kill people and we
are meant not to see not to hear this.
Really?” Erdoğan asked. “Everyone
may approve by remaining silent. But
we will not remain silent…of this you
can be sure,” he cried to a fresh burst of
applause.
Erdoğan capped the ceremony by
donning an Arab gown and bran-
dishing a silver dagger as he stood
alongside women in black chadors.
The affair offered fresh evidence of
Erdoğan’s growing stature among
millions of Muslims disaffected with
their largely corrupt and authoritarian
leaders. It also provided ammuni-
tion for those who claim that under
Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Devel-
opment (AKP) party, Turkey is
moving away from the west. At home,
Erdoğan’s embrace of Muslim soli-
darity — he recently claimed that “We
[Muslims] can be self sufficient”— has
raised new questions about where he
wants to lead Turkey.
I was among a clutch of journalists
travelling with Erdoğan to Kuwait,
and I asked him whether he was “the
new leader of the Muslim world?” He
smiled and replied, “I have no such
pretensions.” Until recently, my ques-
tion would have spurred an angry
rebuttal. Today, with the once omnipo-
tent Turkish army in retreat, Erdoğan
appears to have struck a comfortable
balance between his Muslim identity
and Turkey’s strategic alliance with the
west. He can, he believes, have the best
of both worlds.
Thus, while agreeing to NATO plans to
erect a nuclear defense missile shield
over Europe that takes aim at Iran, he
flits through the Middle East forging
Analysis
new friendships and lucrative business deals. “Anyone who
ignores the religious sentiments of our society can never
hope to win an election, not solidly,” opined a leading
Turkish contractor who was among the 400 or so busi-
nessman travelling with the prime minister.
Opinion polls confirm that view. This may help to explain
why with less than six months left before nationwide
parliamentary polls, Erdoğan has struck an overtly,
indeed aggressively conservative stance. He has ordered
the destruction of a giant monument dedicated to peace
between Turks and Armenians that was built in Kars, a
gritty northeastern city on the edge of Armenia. “It’s a
freak,” he told us. His objections were not purely aesthetic.
The prime minister’s ire stemmed primarily from the fact
that it was within close proximity of the tomb of a 10th
century Islamic scholar. Erdoğan also informed us that with
divorce rates rising in Turkey, he was going to incorpo-
rate “guarantees for the integrity of the family” in the new
constitution he has pledged to write following the elections.
He did not elaborate, but it could mean that divorce laws
will be toughened or that he may even be thinking about
reviving his earlier calls for criminalizing adultery. Erdoğan
also hinted that bans on the Islamic-style headscarf in
state institutions might be eased, just as they have been in
universities nationwide.
With the once omnipotent Turkish
army in retreat, Erdoğan appears
to have struck a comfortable
balance between his Muslim
identity and Turkey’s strategic
alliance with the west.
Meanwhile, a draconian bylaw issued last May by the
Alcohol and Tobacco Market Regulatory Authority came
into force on January 7. This severely restricts the use of
alcoholic products in advertising and in the sponsorship of
2
cultural and sports events. Additionally, it raises the age of
consumption from 18 to 24 at public gatherings. The bylaw
comes on top of staggering value added taxes that were
slapped on alcoholic beverages when the AKP first came to
power in 2002. Erdoğan has shrugged off charges that his
true aim is to ban booze altogether. “They drink until they
wheeze and sneeze and we say nothing,” he declared in the
Turkish parliament. Bulent Arinc, the influential deputy
prime minister, was equally dismissive: “Life isn’t just about
sex and booze,” he said.
All of this goes down well with Erdoğan’s conservative base.
The prime minister’s election strategy clearly targets the
58 percent of the electorate that said “yes” to the constitu-
tional changes that were put to a referendum on September
12. The referendum had boiled down to a contest between
those who support AKP and the 42 percent of the elec-
torate who don’t. It is this 42 percent that feels unnerved by
Erdoğan’s lurch not only towards religious conservatism but
towards nationalism as well.
The Istanbul-based liberal intelligentsia, who until recently
were counted among AKP’s most zealous advocates, is
expressing qualms as well. Ahmet Altan, the editor-in-chief
of the liberal daily Taraf newspaper, which has reserved
much of its pages to deconstructing the Turkish army, is
among them. In a blistering editorial, he attacked Erdoğan
over his calls to destroy the Kars statue. Erdoğan responded
by slapping a TL 50,000 libel case against Altan.
The trouble for Erdoğan’s detractors, as ever, is that the
opposition remains weak and divided. Kemal Kilicda-
roglu, the newly anointed leader of the main opposition
pro-secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) has failed
to capture the public’s imagination. Low on charisma and
fresh ideas, he has yet to make a tangible dent in Erdoğan’s
armor. He remains timid on the Kurdish problem. And his
grasp of foreign policy is uncertain. A new team of advi-
sors, including Turkey’s former ambassador to Washington,
Faruk Logoglu, could alter this. Attacking Erdoğan over his
rupture with Israel makes perfect sense. But then, it is no
vote winner.
Opinion polls continue to show the AKP set to return to
a third term. The question is, what will Erdoğan do with
this mandate? Will his slide towards conservatism persist?
Analysis

For all of Erdoğan’s outbursts

Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist

of authoritarianism, Turkey is, Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and
also writes a column twice a week for the mass circulation Turkish
daily Haberturk.
generally speaking, a more
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democratic kind of place.
Or will his pragmatic side prevail? Is his lurch towards
Islam mere politicking or does it convey a deeply ingrained
ideology? The answer is, both. Whether framed as a threat
(by the secularists) or as a victim (by the conservative right)
religion has long been a staple of politicians in Turkey. But
there are several factors that set Erdoğan apart. He came
to power promising change. He delivered it. The Turkish
economy is thriving as never before. The country’s inter-
national clout is greater than ever before. And for all of
Erdoğan’s outbursts of authoritarianism, Turkey is, generally
speaking, a more democratic kind of place.
Erdoğan has a healthy sense of just how crucial Turkey’s
strategic ties with the west and, above all, with the United
States are. U.S. diplomatic cables that were recently
published on the Wikileaks website reveal that between
2002 and 2006, during AKP’s first four years in power,
Turkey allowed the United States to use the Incirlik airbase
in southern Turkey to transport “terrorism suspects” as part
of its “extraordinary renditions” program. In other words,
just as Erdoğan was mourning “martyred” Sunni resistance
fighters in Fallujah, U.S. intelligence officers were carting off
Muslim detainees with Turkey’s blessings.
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The question of just where Turkey is heading under

Erdoğan will be best answered by the new constitution
he has vowed to deliver in his third term. If, as he claims,
it institutionalizes democracy on par with Europe then
the best check on him will come from this new constitu-
tion. The danger, though, is that the debate on the new
constitution may degenerate, as it did in the run up to the
September 12 referendum, into a slanging match between
the AKP and its detractors, and that once again the public
fails to concentrate on the substance of the proposed
changes. In the present climate, there is little doubt as to
who would win this contest: AKP.