TIBAJIA vs CA - G.R. No.

100290

NORBERTO TIBAJIA, JR. and CARMEN TIBAJIA vs. CA and EDEN TAN
G.R. No. 100290          June 4, 1993

A suit for collection of sum of money was ruled in favor of Eden Tan and against the spouses Norberto Jr. and
Carmen Tibajia. After the decision was made final, Tan filed a motion for execution and levied upon the garnished
funds which were deposited by the spouses with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The spouses,
however, delivered to the deputy sheriff the total money judgment in the form of Cashier’s Check (P262,750) and
Cash (P135,733.70). Tan refused the payment and insisted upon the garnished funds to satisfy the judgment
obligation. The spouses filed a motion to lift the writ of execution on the ground that the judgment debt had
already been paid. The motion was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses have satisfied the judgment obligation after the delivery of the cashier’s check
and cash to the deputy sheriff.

HELD: A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor
(Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals; Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court). The court is not, by decision, sanctioning the use of a check for the payment of obligations over the
objection of the creditor (Fortunado vs. Court of Appeals).
Thursday, January 10, 2013

TIBAJIA vs CA Case Digest

SPOUSES TIBAJIA v. COURT OF APPEALS and EDEN TAN 

G. R. No. 100290, June 4, 1993 

FACTS: A suit of collection of sum of money was filed by Eden Tan against the spouses. A writ of attachment was
issued, the Deputy Sheriff filed a return stating that a deposit made by Tibajia in the amount of P442,750 in
another case, had been garnished by him. RTC ruled in favor of Eden Tan and ordered the spouses to pay her an
amount in excess of P3,000,000. Court of Appeals modified the decision by reducing the amount for damages.
Tibajia Spouses delivered to Sheriff Bolima the total money judgment of P398483.70. Tan refused to accept the
payment and insisted that the garnished funds be withdrawn to satisfy the judgment obligation. 

ISSUE: Whether or not payment by means of check is considered payment in legal tender 

RULING: The ruling applies the statutory provisions which lay down the rule that a check is not legal tender and
that a creditor may validly refuse payment by check, whether it be a manager’s check, cashier’s or personal check.
The decision of the court of Appeals is affirmed. 

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Tibajia Jr. v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 100290. June 4, 1993]

24MAR

FACTS
Tibajia spouses delivered to Sheriff the total money judgment in cashier’s check and cash.Private respondent, Eden
Tan, refused to accept the payment made by the Tibajia spouses and instead insisted that the garnished funds
deposited with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila be withdrawn to satisfy the judgment
obligation. Tibajias filed a motion to lift the writ of execution on the ground that the judgment debt had already
been paid. The motion was denied.

ISSUE
Whether or not payment by means of cashier’s check is considered payment in legal tender.

RULING
NO. A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment
of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. A check is not
legal tender and that a creditor may validly refuse payment by check, whether it be a manager’s, cashier’s or
personal check. The Supreme Court stressed that, “We are not, by this decision, sanctioning the use of a check for
the payment of obligations over the objection of the creditor.”

Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-49188. January 30, 1990]

24MAR

FACTS
Amelia Tan was found to have been wronged by Philippine Air Lines (PAL). She filed her complaint in 1967. After
ten (10) years of protracted litigation in the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals, Ms. Tan won her case.
Almost twenty-two (22) years later, Ms. Tan has not seen a centavo of what the courts have solemnly declared as
rightfully hers. Through absolutely no fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been deprived of what, technically, she should
have been paid from the start, before 1967, without need of her going to court to enforce her rights. And all
because PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name. Petitioner PAL filed a petition for review on
certiorari the decision of Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari against the order of the Court of
First Instance (CFI) which issued an alias writ of execution against them. Petitioner alleged that the payment in
check had already been effected to the absconding sheriff, satisfying the judgment.
ISSUE
Whether or not payment by check to the sheriff extinguished the judgment debt.

 
 
RULING
NO.  The payment made by the petitioner to the absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal tender but in checks.
The checks were not payable to Amelia Tan or Able Printing Press but to the absconding sheriff.In the absence of
an agreement, either express or implied, payment means the discharge of a debt or obligation in money and unless
the parties so agree, a debtor has no rights, except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash as
medium of payment of his debt. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner’s checks, in the
case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt. The check as a negotiable instrument is
only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as
payment. A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere
delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and
remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized (Art. 1249, Civil Code, par. 3).