Ignacio vs.

Director of Lands continue to be part of the public domain, not available for
108 Phil 335, 1960 private appropriation or ownership.

FACTS:
Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land
(mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal. Later, Ignacio
amended his application by alleging that he owned the parcel applied
for by RIGHT OF ACCRETION.
4) Ignacio said that he had acquired the parcel of land through
acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over ten
years. BUT the land of the public domain is not subject to
ordinary prescription.

Ignacio:
He had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees,
and that his possession had been continuous, adverse and public for a
period of 20 years until the possession was distributed by oppositor
Valeriano.

It is not disputed that the subject land adjoins a parcel owned by

Ignacio which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a
free patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in
question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest.

OPPOSITIONS
Director of Lands:
a) Claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public
domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his
predecessor- in-interest possessed sufficient title.
b) Petitioner not acquired it either by composition title from the
Spanish government or by possessory information title under
the royal decree of February 13, 1894;
c) That he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26,
1894.

The Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore

land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed
part of the public domain.

Valeriano:
Alleged that he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted
him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and
approved by the President.

CFI: In favor of the Director of Lands. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:
WON the subject land is owned by Ignacio?

HELD:
NO.

1) Ignacio contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of

accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by action of
the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code
(Article 366, Old Civil Code). But, it is clearly inapplicable
because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of
rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by
action of the Manila Bay.

2) Then, Ignacio contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of

Waters are not applicable because they refer to accretions
formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered
as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is a part of
the sea. In the case of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, that such land
formed by the action of the sea is property of the State.

3) Ignacio argues that granting that the land in question formed

part of the public domain, having been gained from the sea, the
trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary
for any public use or purpose, and therefore, became disposable
and available for private ownership. But the Court said, until a
formal declaration on the part of the Government, through
the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect
that the land in question is no longer needed for coast
guard service, for public use or for special industries, they
 Heirs of Emiliano Navarro vs. IAC land and the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but
GR. No. 68166, Feb. 12, 1997 Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which states that
lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused
FACTS: by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain.
Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for Foreshore Lease covering a
tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. This application Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.
was denied.

Subsequently, Emiliano Navarro, filed a Fishpond Application with

the Bureau of Fisheries covering foreshore land also in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan. The Bureau of Fisheries gave due course to his
application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the
property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for
fishpond purposes.

1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and

confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan. Pascual claimed that this land is an ACCRETION to his
property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and
covered by an OCT. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay
River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern
side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan
River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby
depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an
accretion thereon.

OPPOSITION
Director of Lands:
Represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, stated that neither
Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to
the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain
and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.

RTC: Rendered judgment finding the subject property to be

foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the
subject of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the respondent
court reversed the findings of the RTC.

NAVARRO’S CONTENTION
Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always
been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of
Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the
subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau
of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that he
had already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.

PASCUAL’S CONTENTION
Pascual claimed that the land was formed through accretion. He
claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.

ISSUE:
WON the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea be
registered in favor of the petitioner?

HELD:
NO.

Under Article 457 of the Civil Code, accretion, as a mode of

acquiring property, requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
1) That the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible;
2) That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
3) That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
bank of the river.

In the case at bar, the land claimed by Pascual and his Heirs is not
adjacent to the rivers of Talisay and Bulacan. The accretion formed
at said portion of appellants' titled land was not caused by the current
of the two rivers but by the action of the Manila Bay into which the
rivers empty. The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the
river bank may be registered while the accretion of land along
the sea always belongs to the State and cannot be a subject of
private acquisition. Moreover, Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore
 Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood
and Veneer Co. Inc.
GR. No. 73002, Dec. 29, 1986
FACTS:
This case started when ACME Plywood, sought to register 5 parcels
of land. The Director of Land opposes the registration.
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members
of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
Possession of the Infiels over the land dates back before the
Philippines was discovered by Magellan
Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872
granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes
on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain.
already converted to private land. And there is no prohibition
whether in the 1935 or 1973 Constitution on the acquisition of
private corporations over private lands. The 1973 Constitution and
the present 1987 Constitution only gives a prohibition on private
corporations in their acquiring lands of the public domain,
meaning your agricultural lands.
Now the INFIELS in the evidence that was presented by Acme
proved that the INFIELS were already in possession since time
immemorial, even before Magellan discovered the Philippines. So
even before the Spaniards discovered the Philippines, it was already
private property. So if the land has already been converted to private
land, then the private corporation may own that land because there is
no prohibition on the acquisition of a private corporation on private
lands.

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M

worth of improvements

Ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was

duly recognized by the government.

OPPOSITION
Director of Lands:
a) The land is of public domain.
b) Corporations are prohibited by the 1973 Constitution (the
Constitution in effect that time) to lands of public domain
except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

ISSUE:
1) WON the land is already a private land.

2) WON the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by

private corporations or associations applies.

HELD:
1) YES

The land is already private land not only in right to a grant but by
operation of law. The SC further said that for the grant to be
honored by the court, it is not necessary that they have a certificate
of title, an application for registration is sufficient for the grant to be
honored.

“The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of

which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens Title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent”

“The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law”

2) NO

The SC held in this case that the constitutional prohibition does not
apply because the land was already a private land to which the
Infiels, who are members of the Dumagat Tribe, have a legal,
sufficient and transferrable title over the land on October 29, 1962
when ACME acquired it from them.

Since the land acquired by the private corporation is a private land to

begin with then ACME has a perfect right to make such acquisition.

The only limitation imposed to the corporations when the acquisition

was made was that they could not hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,0124 hectares.

The SC said that there is no need to dwell on the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution as contended by the Director of Land because the land is
 Republic vs. Iglesia ni Cristo and Manalo
GR. No. 180067, June 30, 2009

FACTS:
The subject of the case is a lot of the Currimao Cadastre located in
Ilocos Norte.

On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao

G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of
Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the
application were:
a) The sepia or tracing cloth of plan,
b) The technical description of subject lot,
c) The geodetic engineers certificate,
d) Tax declaration covering the subject lot, and
e) The september 7, 1970 deed of sale executed by bernardo
bandaguio in favor of inc.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),

entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of
Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to
INCs application.

Cadastral Court and Court of Appeals: Rendered in favor of INC.

ISSUE:
WON a judicial confirmation of imperfect title will prosper when the
subject property has been declared as alienable only after June 12,
1945?

HELD:
It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government, and it is indispensable that the persons claiming
title to a public land should show that their title was acquired
from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by
law.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has already
been declared alienable and disposable by the government on May
16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for
registration was filed by INC.

In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the

application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for the
period of possession is the actual possession of the property and
it is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be
already alienable and disposable at the time of the application
for registration of title is filed.

In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529

is that which was adopted in Naguit, the Court ruled that the more
reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title
is filed.

The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and
1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is
also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest,
Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way
before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the
subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and
occupation from Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and
from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC had been in the concept of
owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by
respondent’s witnesses.
 Susi vs. Razon No. 2874.
48 Phil 424
If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question
FACTS: by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain
A complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Director of Lands, praying for judgment: Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of
land; Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon,
b) Annulling the sale made by the director of lands in favor of the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and
c) Ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
Angela Razon.

The Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained

therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a
property of the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to
Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.

The CFI of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff

entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her.

The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac

sold the land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza. After having been in possession thereof for about
eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio
Garcia and Basilio Mendoza sold it to Valentin Susi.

Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already
paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of
the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which
he had paid the price of the property. The possession and
occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except
during the revolution, or disturbance, when Angela Razon
commenced an action in the CFI of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land.

Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in

question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of
Lands for the purchase thereof.

After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of

Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to
Angela Razon and issued the proper certificate of title to Angela
Razon.

Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question.

ISSUE:
Who is then the rightful owner of the land?

HELD::
SC in their decision favoured VALENTIN SUSI.

According to SC there is, the presumption juris et de jure established

in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of
an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter
VIII of said Act.

So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only
a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act