The Education Reform and Management Series

Vol. II . No.1 .1999

The Politics of Education Reform:

Bolstering the Supply and Demand; Overcoming Institutional Blocks

Javier Corrales 22549

EDUCAT)ON
T H E W 0 A I D 8 A N K
The Politics of Education Reform:
Bolstering the Supply and Demand; Overcoming Institutional Blocks

JavierCorrales

The Education Reform and Management Series

Vol. II. No. 1 1999
Table of Contents

Page

AbouttheAuthor
............................................................ III

Acknowledgements
............................................................ V

Executive
Summary
............................................................ VIl

Introduction
............................................................. 1
Part1.TheObstacles
to EducationReform
................................................... 3

ThreeImpediments
to Reform
......................................... ................... 4

Concentrated
Costs,DiffusedBenefits
.................................................. 4

LessPowerfulandLowIncidenceof PolicyEntrepreneurship 7
in Education.

Education
Reformvs. EconomicReform
.................................................... 7
Implication
1: Instability
andShortTenureat the MinistryLevel........................ 9
Implication
2: DifferentBargaining PowerbetweenMinisters 11
andTeachers' Unions........................................................................

Decentralization:
TheMixedandInsincereMotivesof States
..................... 12
Part2. Overcoming
Obstacles
to Reform
....................................................... 15

FourStrategies
for Overcoming
PoliticalObstacles
....................................... 17

ReformType............................................................ 18

Bolstering
theSupplySide............................................................ 23

Bolstering
theDemandfor Reform........... ........................................... 28

Neutralizing
ReformOpponents;
Overcoming
Institutional
Obstacles
........... 33
Conclusion
............................................................ 41

AppendixI ............................................................ 43

References
............................................................ 47

l
About the Author

JavierCorrales obtained his Ph.D.in political

sciencein 1996fromHarvardUniversity, wherehe
specializedincomparative andintemational politicsof LatinAmerica.Hecurrently teachespolitical
scienceatAmherstCollegeinAmherst, Massachusetts. Hisareasofinterestinclude thepoliticsof
policyreformindeveloping countries.Mr.Corrales hasconducted extensive
fieldresearchin Latin
America andpublished variousarticles onthepoliticsof economic reform.Heiscurrentlywritinga
bookon theconnections amongrulingparties,pressuregroupsandeconomic reforms.He has
beena visitingprofessor at the Instituto
de Estudios Superiores de Administraci6n
in Caracas,
Venezuela, avisitingresearcher attheInstituto
Torcuato di Tellain BuenosAires,Argentina,anda
consultantfortheHarvardInstitute forIntemational Development. Hismostrecentworkfocuses
onthepoliticsof socialsectorreform.

Illl
Acknowledgements

Numerous individualsprovidedassistance,guidanceand feedback.PatrickSupanc,Barbara

BrunsandYasuhiko Matsudo provided invaluable
support.I alsoamgratefulto SueBerryman,
MerileeGrindle,PhilipKeefer,DanMorrow,JoanNelson,JeffreyPuryear,Femando Reimers,
GaryTheisenandMichaelDrabble fortheircomments.AmandaEnayati editedandformattedthe
text,anddesigned thecover.Thispaperalsobenefitedfromfeedbackprovided bytheparticipants
in theworkshoponovercoming political
obstacles
toeducabon reform,sponsoredbytheEducation
ReformandManagement teamof theWorldBank,Washington, DC,on April7, 1999.I remain
exclusively
responsibleforanyerrors.

V
Executive Summary

Thispaperexplores thepolitical
conditions thatmayenhance or hindertheadoptionof education
reforms.It doesnotofferdefinite,statistically
testedconclusions.
Instead,
thispaperreliesonex-
istingstudiesof reformadoptionto extracthypotheses thatseemapplicable in somecasesand
testablein others.Thispapershouldbereadmoreasa reviewof theliterature anda guidetofu-
tureresearch thanasan endorsement ofspecificrecommendations.

At theoutset,it is arguedthatthepolitical conditions for theadoption ofquality-oriented

education
reformsremainunfavorable, despitea newimpetusin favorof reform.Qualityreformsproduce
concentratedcostsanddistributed benefits,leadingto the riseof strongvetogroups(e.g.,teach-
ers'unions,bureaucrats anduniversity students).Often,thesevetogroupsare highlyorganized,
resourceful
andwellconnected to political
parties,
therebymagnifying theircapacity
to contestthe
reforms.Beneficiaries of education reformdo exist,buttheytendto be lessorganized andmoti-
vatedthan reformopponents. A commonanbdote to theseproblems-policy entrepreneurs-is
theoretically
possible, butstil lesslikelydueto shortcomings in thesystemof incentves andpenal-
tiesthatgovemments faceintheareaofeducatonreform.

Successfulreformadoptonisthuscontingent onaddressing thefollowingpoliticalhurdles:1)con-

centration
of costsona fewactors;2) lowincidence of policyentrepreneurship (i.e.,shortcomings
in thesupplysideof reform);3) politicaldisengagement of potentialbeneficiaries(i.e.,shortcom-
ingsinthedemandside);and4) political advantages of cost-bearinggroups.Thispaperdiscusses
varioushypotheses, oftenraisedexplicitlyor indirectly
byexistngstudies,aboutwaysto address
eachof thesehurdles.Thesearesummarized in TableI. Thediscussion of eachhypothesis be-
ginswitha briefstatement aboutwhy,at leastin theory,the proposed hypothesis mighthavea
causalimpacton thechancesof reformadoption.Next,examples fromoneor morecasesare
providedto illustrate
theviabilityof the hypothesis.Finally,caveatsaboutthevalidityof thehy-
potheses arepresented.

ViI
 Changesin Reformn
Type:

* Combiningaccesselementswithqualityreform
Corollary:Politicalcompensation
of thoseadverselyaffectedby reformmaybe moreimportantthanmaterialcompen-
sation
* Followingan incrementalratherthanall-encompassing approach
* Packaging educationreformswithothertypeof reforms(of thestateorthe economy)

Effortsto Bolsterthe Supply Side:

* Entrustingeducabonreformsto ministrieswithlowtumoverrates
* Increasinglinkswiththeoutsideworldor globaleconomy
* Creatingindependent pro-reformadvisorycouncils

Effortsto Bolsterthe DemandSide:

* Launching massiveinformation disseminationcampaigns

* Involvingpotentialbeneficiaries
in reformdesignandevaluabon
* In casesof decentralization,
grantinggreaterfinancialautonomyto localentites

InstitutionalSetting Determinantsof SocietalCooperationwith Reforms:

* Teachers'union(or anycost-bearing group)linkswithoppositonpoliticalpartieshindergovemment-union

cooperaton
Corollary:Improvingexecutive-legislative
relationsonthe issueof educationreformmoderatesunionopposition.
* Internalunionfragmentatonhindersunion-govemment cooperabon; extemalunionfragmentation
diminishes
the
powerof unions
* Preempting strategiccoalitionsbetweencost-bearinggroupsand othersocietalactors

Vill
Introduction

Thereis widespreadconsensus worldwidethat improving the performance

of educationsys-
temsis necessaryto advancesocioeconomic development, reduceinequality,
enhancethe
economiccompetitivenessof nationsand possiblyfortifygovemmental institutions.Never-
theless,meaningfuleducationreformsoftenfail to get approvedor implemented, mostlyfor
politicalreasons.

Whatare someof thesepoliticalobstacles?Thispapersummarizesrecentscholarship on

the politicalhurdlesthateducationreformstendto encounter.It also identifiestheoretically
informedhypotheses basedon recentsuccessesandfailuresof reform.,

Thepaperis dividedintotwo parts. Part1 discussestheprevalence of politicalimpediments

to reform,despiterecentincreasein domesticand international pressureurgingeducation
reform. Part2 showsthatin a significantnumberof cases,therehasbeensuccessful adop-
tion of educationreforms,suggesting thatpoliticalobstaclesare not insurmountable. It also
discusseshypotheses aboutthe politicalconditionsunderwhicheducationreformsare more
likelyto be approved.The mainargumentof this paperis that reformsare morelikelyto
flourishif the followingpoliticalobstaclesare addressed:1) concentration of costanddiffu-
sionof benefits;2) deficientministerialcommitment levels(i.e.,bolsteringthesupplyside);3)
insufficientsocietaldemandfor reform(i.e.,bolstering the demandside);and4) institutional
featuresthatmagnifythepowerofvetogroups.

1 Forpurposes ofthispaper,
success isdefinedinpolitical
(rather
thantechnical)
terms,
i.e.,whether
there-
formsbecome politically
accepted,following
eitherlegislative
approval
oranexplicitpactamong recognized
actors.Thisdefinition
expresses
littleabout
whether thereformsachieve
theirintended
educational
objectives,
e.g.,improving
studentandteacher performances.

1
The Obstacles to Education Reform

In the 1990s,educationreformhasemergedas a seeminglytop-prioritypoliticalissuein

bothdeveloped
anddevelopingcountres.Improvingthequalityof educationhasbecome
associated
with two highlycherishedgoalsof modemstates. First improvingthe quality
of educationis increasingly
seenas a sourceof intemationaleconomiccompetitiveness.
In a globaleconomy,
countriescompetewithoneanotherfor markets,foreigninvestment,
technological
development
and hostingof multinationals
(see Strange1992). A highly
educatedworkforceis deemedto conferanedgein thiseconomiccompetition.

Second,highqualityeducationhasbecomesynonymous withself-sustained
domesticde-
velopment,notjust intemational
competitiveness.
Sincethe 1970s,the mantraof educa-
tionspecialists
has beenthat improvingeducationis a necessaryprecondition
for higher
livingstandards.However,govemments
seldomlistened.Instead,theytreatededucation
moreas a socialrightor entitlementwhichtheyprovideto citizensdependingon theex-
tent of theirsocialcommitment,fiscalresources,or inclination
to usethe educational
sys-
temas a mechanism
of politicalco-optation.Today,thisattitudeis changing.Ratherthan
viewingeducation
onlya socialobligationof the state,govemments
havebegunto seeit
as a necessarycatalystfor developmentIn 1993,the WorldBankconcludedthat a cru-
cialfactorin the economicsuccessof EastAsia fromthe 1970sto the 1990swas invest-
mentin humancapital,especiallythroughwell-targeted
educationalinvestments.Many
govemments
arefinallytakingthisconclusion
seriously.

In addifionto thisgrowingconsensuson the link betweeneducationreformand the eco-

nomicinterestsof nations,extemalpressurefor educationreformreacheda newhighin
the 1990s. Multilaterallendinginstitutionsnow customarily
includeeducationreformas
partof their packageof economicand statereformns
(Camoy1995). Educationreformis
considereda fundamental
axis of the "secondstage"of reforms,i.e.,the nextstepafter
achievingeconomicstabilizatonand liberalizaton(seeWorldBank1996:123-131;
Naim
1995)2In LatinAmerica,for instance,Puryear(1997)identifiesan arrayof extemalforces

2
SeealsoGinsburg(1991:12-20) fora discussionof howwoddsystem
pressureseiffer haveen-
couraged
or siflededucation
reformefforts.

3
The Politics of Education Reforn

pushingfor reform:the need to compete in a global economy;the availabilityof new ideas

about the negativeeconomiceffects of inefficienteducation;and the greater salience of
intemational institutions such as development banks, bilateral aid agencies, non-
govemmental organizations(NGOs) and consulting firms. In the 1998 Summit of the
Americas,where all heads of state and govemmentof theWestem Hemispheregathered,
improvementof educationemergedas the top agenda item.

Finally,education has become a top priority for both the political right and left in many
countries. Advocates of market economicsconcede that education, which promises to
make labor markets more competitive,remains a legitimatearea for state action. Advo-
cates of state involvementin the economy value educationalreformas an opportunityto
produce progressiveresults. Althoughtheir views on strategy differ-the politicalright a d-
vocates greater school choicewhereas the politicalleft supports more inclusionarystate
intervention (see Plank and Boyd 1994)-there is universalconsensus on the need to
make schools moreaccountable.

In sum, education reform in the 1990s has enjoyeda new impetus in policy circles, both
domesticallyand intemationally,and across differentideologies.

Three lmpeiment to Reform

Despite this renewed impetus,approvingand implementingeducationreforms remain as

politicallydifficultas ever. Politicalobstaclescontinueto paralyzeand distortwell-devised
reform initiatives. To graspthe probabilityof educationreform adoption,it is imperativeto
understandthree commonobstacles.

Conentrated Costs, Diffused Benefits

A useful startingpoint for studyingthe politicaldifficultiesassociatedwith educationreform

is a cost-benefitanalysis. Scholarsargue that when the costs of a particularpolicy fall d i-
rectly and intensely on specific interest groups, and its benefits are too diffuse, policy
adoption is politicallydifficult. For instance,Wilson (1973), using Olsonian logic, argues
that policiesvary accordingto the extent to which their costs and benefitsare either dis-
tributed or concentrated(Table1). The more a policy generates concentratedcosts, i.e.,
when the costs are limitedto a small numberof citizensor organizedgroups, the moredif-
ficult the adopton. This is because negatively affected interest groups have a much
stronger incentive to block the reformsthan beneficiarieshave to support them. For ex-

4
 Part One

ample, imposingincreasedsafety standardson automobilesproducesenormousconcen-

trated costs on automobile makers, whereas the benefits are diffuse, i.e., spread over
many citizensand organizabons.Consequently,the politics surroundingthis policy option
will featurean oversupplyof veto groups and an under-supplyof reformdemanders.

Table 1: Policy Type, According to Costs and Benefits

DistributedCosts ConcentratedCosts
DistributedBenefits Raisingtaxesto fund social security Safetyrequirementson automobiles
Qualityeducationrefofns
Concentrated Grant subsidiesto farmers Allowing a few (rather than all) airlines the right
Benefts Accesseducationrefonms to service a particularmarket

Educationreforms can be analyzed usingWilson's (1973) matrix. Generally,two broad

types of educationalreformsexist: access reformsand quality reforms. Access reforms
call for increasing the availabilityof educationalprograms and opportunities.These re-
forms normally involve investment to increase the numbers of schools, classrooms,
teachers,teachers'salariesand teachingsupplies. Access reformsare commonlyunder-
stood as expandingthe coverage of the education system. In this paper, however, "ac-
cess reforms"are construedmore broadly,as any time additionalresourcesare invested
in the education system so that the "reforms" produce gains for some or all partiesand
lossesfor very few actors,if any.

Qualityreforms, on the other hand, involveeffortsto improve the efficiencyof investedre-

sources,with the goal of improvingthe academic performanceof students, increasing
teacher productivity, reducing student drop-out or repetition rates, achieving optimum
teacher/student ratios, penalizing teachers' inadequate performance, granting greater
autonomyto school boards,etc. (see Worid Bank 1995;Savedoff 1998). The definitionof
"quality reforms"used in this paper impliesreal or perceivedlossesfor some stakeholders,
in sharpcontrast to access reforms(asdefinedhere) in which partiesmostlygain.

In Wilson's (1973) matrix, access reformsexemplify policies that generate concentrated

benefitsand diffused costs,and qualityreformsare the mirror image. The beneficiariesof
access reforms include enrolled students and parents, teachers and teachers' unions,
constructioncompaniestbuildersand bureaucratswhose budgets increase. At the same
bme, the costs of access reforms are spread across a wide group (taxpayers). Quality
reforms,on the other hand,generate diffusedbenefitsand concentratedcosts. Societyat

5
The Politics of EducationReform

large and incumbentpoliticiansdraw some benefits (e.g., a more educated society), but
these benefitsare too general, spread across a large number of actors, and mostlyper-
cepbble in the long term. On their own, beneficiariesare unlikely to tum into powerful
championsfor reform. In additon, beneficiarieswho are better positoned to make political
demands-the middle sectors3 -often have exit possibilities,such as private schoolsand
privatetutoring,which lessentheir propensityto demandreforms.4

Cost-bearers,on the other hand, create huge stirs. They include unions that lose privi-
legesand non-accountability;bureaucratsinthe centralgovemmentwho give up decision-
making authority;students(especiallyat the universitylevel) who lose subsidies or free
services; providersof schoolsuppliesand textbookswho lose contracts as a result of cur-
riculum reforms; educabonofficialswho must accept the embarrassmentassociatedwith
recognizingfailingsin the system; politicalpartfeswho might lose the capacityto disburse
patronagethroughthe educationalsystem; and the local elite who will confront new local
rivals as a result of decentralization(see Crouch and Healey 1997:1-3).Almost by defini-
ton, systemic reforms such as the decentralizabonof educabonentail distributingcosts
and reallocatingpoweramong these groups (see Kemmerer1994).

Moreover,those who may be adversely affected by educabon reforms-potential "los-

ers"-are usuallypoliticallycompetentto combatproposed reforms. Teachers'unions,for
instance,tend to be highly centralizedand well organized,which allows them to resolve
collectiveaction problemsmoreeasily.In addition,they oftenoperate in a monopsony(i.e.,
they face a single employer-the central govemment)and thus a single contract (Haus-
mann 1994:179). Teachers'unions thus have a strong allure. Teachersare more likely
than workers in othersectors to join a union,which magnifiesthe politicalpower of teac h-
ers' unions.

In sum, Wilson's (1973) cost-benefit/interestgroup analysis points to several political

problems. Qualityreformsgenerateconcentratedlosers,who are likely to organizeeffec-
tively to block reforms. While beneficiariesexist, they have fewer incentives to mount a
sufficientystrongdemandfor reformto defeatthe campaignsof potentiallosers.

3 In the 1950sand 1960s, modemization theoristsarguedthat the middlesectorswerebetterposi-

tonedthanothersectorsof societyto placedemands on govemments; theyhadbothmaterialincen-
tivesand politicalresources.In the 1980s and 1990s,middlesectorsprovedto be serioussocietal
challengersof austeritymeasures (Nelson1990).

41 amgratefulto Yasuhiko
Matsudafor bringingthisto myattention.

6
 Part One

Less Powerful and Low Incidence of Policy Enrpreneurship in Education

A common solution to the problems associatedwith policiesthat produce concentrated

costs and diffusedbenefitsis what Wilson (1986) labels"policyentrepreneurs."Theseare
actors, usuallyat the cabinet level or with close links to the president,who find a way of
pullingtogether a legislativemajorityon behalf of interestsnot well representedin gov-
emnment.Policy entrepreneurs"dramatizean issue,galvanizepublicopinion,and mobilize
congressional support' for policies that would not otherwise be approved (Wilson
1986:440).

In the 1990s, governmentshave appointedpowerful ministersof finance eager to wage

difficultpolitcal battles on behalfof unpopulareconomicreforms, often known as "techno-
pols." (Dominguez1997; Williamsonand Haggard 1994). How likely is it that comparable
policy entrepreneurswill emerge in the educationsector? The evidenceso far indicates:
not likely. Reformczars are not as common in educationas they are in economics. Even
when they do emerge,their powersare not as sweeping. This is becausethe rise of pol-
icy entrepreneursdepends on governmentcommitment,which, despite the new drive to-
wards education reform, continues to falter.5 As Part 1 shows, govemments pursuing
education reforms simply do not face sufficient incentives to persevere with quality re-
forms,or high enoughpenaties for abandoningtheir commitment.

Educatfon
Reformvs.EconomicReform

In the last 20 years, many developingcountries have adopted politicallydifficultma rket-

orientedand structuraladjustmentreforms. Why have countriesbeen more willingto a b-
sorb the politicalcosts of economicreformsthan of educationreforms? Part of the answer
is that quality educationreforms, unlike macroeconomicadjustments,do not provideim-
mediate,tangible poliffcalgains to govemments. Vvhencountriesaddress serious mac-
roeconomicproblems(e.g.,high inflation),the resultsare often visiblewithin months,thus
permittingpoliticiansto capitalizeon these accomplishmentsin the near term. In contrast,

S Therearenotableexceptons.Inthemid-1980s,
Jordan'sKingHusseinbecamedirectlyinvolvedin
hiscountry'seducationreform,evenentnusting theCrownPrnceas the principaloverseerof quality
reforms(Berryman1997).In NewZealand,the PrimeMinister(Lange)tookoverthe education min-
istryand appointeda reformspecialist(Ballard)to leadthe implementation (Perris1997). In El Sal-
vador,by invitingpresidential
candidates to participate in variousfora to discussthe reformns,reform
advocates succeeded in makingeducationreforma primaryissuein the 1994presidential elections
(Reimers1997a).In Brazil,in orderto signalgovemmental commitment, PauloRenatoSouza,the
Ministerof Educationduringthefirstadministration of FemandoHenriqueCardoso(1994-1998), be-
camethe first cabinetmemberto be re-appointed duringCardoso'ssecondadministrabon (1998-
2002).

7
The Politics of Education Refom

many benefitsof improvededucationare imperceptiblein the short term. Incumbentpoli-

ticians are more likely to wage political battles that offer immediaterather than long-term
politicalrewards(see Geddes 1994). As such,they are more likelyto devote attentionto
macroeconomicadjustmentthan to education. This gap betweenthe immediateelectoral
concemsof politiciansand the long-termresults of educationreform underminesgovern-
ment commitmentto the issue of education.

Moreover,many govemrnments
traditionallyrelied on educationalsystems as mechanisms
for politicalco-optation. Teachingpositions are often treated as a form of employmentof
last resort, very often in compensationfor some type of politicalfavor. Mexico is a good
example. Followingthe 1968 massacre of students, the Mexican govemmentattempted
to alleviatestudentdiscontentby launchinga massiveexpansionof the educationsector.6
Duringthe "lost decade' of the 1980s,as standardsof livingdeclined,the govemment al-
most doubled the membershipin the main teachers'union,the SindicatoNacionalde Tra-
bajadoresde la Educaci6n(SNTE),from 548,355members in 1978to close to 1 million in
1989 (see Torres1991). There is no questionthat the expansionof educationin Mexico in
the 1970s-which covered all three levels,not just the universitysystem-was a response
to unmetdemand. In 1978,for instance,approximately3 millionchildrenlackedaccess to
primary schools. However,it is difficultto deny that with this expansionof spending and
union size the state intended to score political points among the urban middle class, a
sector in which the ruling party was deemedto be losing electoralsteam. This unioniza-
ton allowedthe govemmentto sheltersegmentsof the populationfrom the impactof eco-
nomic adversity. Qualityeducationreformsjeopardizethe capacityof govemmentsto use
the bureaucracyfor these types of politicalpurposes.

Moreover,although extemal pressuresfor education reform are at an all-time high, they

are still weaker than pressuresfor economicreform. This is becausethere are no hard
and immediatesanctioningmechanismsfor non-compliance. For instance, multilateral
institutionsextend credit contingenton achievementof macroeconomicand fiscal objec-
tives, thus pressuringgovemmentsto perseverein economicreforms. In addition,erosion
of macroeconomicfundamentalscan triggercapitaloutflows-a type of intemationalsanc-
tion for unsoundeconomicpolicy. It is difficultto find similar sanctionsfor non-deliveryof

6The NationalAutonomousUniversityof Mexico(UNAM)was enlarged:full-timeprofessorsin-

creasedfrom5,770in 1970to 30,000in 1980;thestudentbodygrewby 78.3percentin 1972-1985;
andtheacademicstaffgrewby 159.1percent.In addition,SNTE,themainteachers'union,became
oneof thelargestbureaucracies
inthecountry,gatheringthebulkof therank-and-file membership in
the Federabonof StateEmployees,whichin tum is linkedto the popularsectorof the rulingparty
(seeTorres1991).

8
 Part One

qualityeducation.Loanconditionality
is seldomstipulated
on the basisof stringenteduca-
tionreformaccomplishments.
Investorsandlendersdo notleavea country,at leastin the
shortand mediumterm,simplybecausegovernments
postponetheirpromiseto enhance
education.

Thisis not to say thatgovemments

faceno incentives
to adopta pro-reformagenda.On
the contrary,a pro-reform
discoursescorespopularitypointsfor govemrnments,
particularly
todaywheneducationreformenjoysso muchprestige. Statesthushavea lot to gainby
.appearing to implement'qualityeducationalreforms(Weiler1994:45;Ginsburget al.
1991).Andwhilesomeministers
of educationhavebeenableto capitalize
on theirreform
7 the costsof faltering
achievements, on thatcommitment-orof deliveringlessthanwas
promised-isnot as highas in otherareasof reform. Theresultis oftenemptyrhetoric;
loftyreformgoalsareannounced
butthereis littlecommitment
to implementabon.

Implication1: InstabilityandShortTenureat theMinistryLevel

Evidenceof weakpolicyentrepreneurship
in the areaof educationmaybe foundin the
hightumoverratesin ministriesof education.Becauseheadsof govemmentaredisin-
clinedto engagein educationreformbattes,theywill usethe ministryof educationfor aI-
temativepoliticalpurposes:to rewardpoliticalsupporters,to "park"politicalallieswhom
theywishto promote,to compensate
oppositionparties,etc. The resultis hightumover
ratesin ministerial
positons(seeChart1). Appendix1 liststhe ministersof education
and
ministersof economy/financefrom 21 countriesin variousregionsof the world that
launchededucationreformin the 1980sand 1990s,and that are mentionedthroughout
thispaper.Someof thesereformsadvancedpolitically
(Argentina,
Australia,
Chile,El Sal-
vador,Jordan,Indonesia,Mexico,NewZealand,Romania,SouthKorea,Spainand Uru-
guay),whileothersstumbled(Colombia,
Liberia,Pakistan,PapuaNewGuinea,Peru,P o-
land,SouthAfrica,Venezuela
andZimbabwe),
as discussedlaterin thepaper.

7For instance,
theMexican President,
Emesto Zedillo(1994-2000),
advanced
politically
afterserving
as theminister
of education
underPresident CarlosSalinasde Gortari
(1988-1994).Thecurrent
presidental
candidate
oftherulingcoalibon
in Chile,Ricardo
Lagos,
wasalsominister
ofeducationin
theearly1990s.

9
The Politics of EducationReform

Chart 1: Ministers of Education and Finance

Average Tenure in Office, 1978-1998

Argentina

Australia_

Chile _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _

Colorbiet_

El Salvador_
Indornsis
Jordan

Ubeds
Mexico _
| NowZrmtand
Pakisttn' _ _|Finance
PapuaN4w GaLir | Education

Pord _
Romxania
SoLthAfrics
SouLhKora"
Spain -
Thadand
Uruguay
Veneuea |
Zimb * uumu -

o 1 2 3 4 5 6

CasesExperiencingGreaterPolitical
Setbacks
in QualityEducatonReformn
in the 1990s.
Source:Appendix1'.

Threeobservationsemerge:

* There is a high tumoverrate in the ministriesof education;in most cases, the average
tenure in officeis less than 2.5 years.

* In most cases, the averagetenure in office is lowerfor ministersof educationthan for

ministersof finance.

* Most exceptionsto the above correlatewith qualityrefomnsin education(e.g.,Argen-

tina, El Salvador,New Zealand,Romaniaand South Korea).

These resultsare inconclusivegiven the samplesize. However,they are compatiblewith

the argumentthat, despite the new impetusfor educationreform, shortcomingsare com-
mon in the supply side in general and in comparison with the macroeconomicpolicy do-
main in particular. (The extentto which the highertumover rate is a significantindepend-
ent variableof deep reformis a morecomplicatedissue discussed later in this paper.)

10
 Part One

Implication2: DiferentBargainingPowerbetweenMinistersand Teachers'

Unions

The weakness in the supply side has implicatons: it diminishes the govemment'sbar-
gaining power and its capacity to counterbalancereform opponents. This becomes evi-
dent by comparingthe incentivesand constraintsfacing politicianswho head ministriesof
educabonwith those of politcians who head teachers' unions. High ministerialtumover
means that education ministers,even those who would like to initiate sound quality re-
forms, have relativelyshorterterms of office (Hausmann 1994). Insofar as ministersex-
pect shortertenuresand quick movesto alternativepoliticalposts, theyare less inclinedto
perseverewith costly and unpopular reforms, preferringconflict avoidance solutionsin-
stead. One result is a preferencefor yieldingto pressuresfrom below.

Teachers'unions, on the other hand, are often led by professionalpoliticianswho make

their careers in union activism. Compared to most ministers of education, leaders of
teachers' unions have longer "tenure"(see Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank 1996:257,
192-294).Moreover,leaders of teachers'unions tend to come from leftist parties,which
place a premium on challengingthe state. For a leftist leader, conductinga successful
fight against the state constitutesa positivecareer move, in sharp contrast with ministers
of education,for whom completingthe term in office in peace is an optimal career move.
Thus, labor leadershave incentivesto provoke conflict,whereaseducation ministersface
incentivesto avoid it.

Teachers'unionsalso have moreadvantagesin challengingthe state than unions in other

sectors. The weapon available to teachers' unions-strikes--is highly discriminating:K
createsenormouscosts for the government,the intendedtarget, but relativelyfew disrup-
tions to the rest of society. This contrastssharplywith strikesin other sectors such as uti-
ity services,health and transportabonsectors. For instance,when the workers of a utility
service,such as a water supplycompany,go on strike, they hurt the govemment,but also
society at large, which is indiscriminatelyinconveniencedby the lack of running water.
When nurses strike, they punish the government,but they also punish innocentpatients.
When transportationworkers strike, they also inconvenienceevery commuting citzen in
the country. However,when teachersgo on strike, the number of innocentcitizensincon-
venienced is minimal. Students stay at home, which is an inconveniencemainly for
householdsthat lack the capacityto supervisechildrenduring the day (and in developing
countries,where multple family membersoften residein the same dwelling,this might be

11
The Politfcsof EducationReform

a smallnumberof households).Thus,teachers'unionscanchallengethe govemment

for
8
a longtimewithlesschanceof losingpublicsupportthanstrikersin manyothersectors.
The magnetismand highlevelsof organization
of teachers'unions,theirdiscriminating
weaponagainstthe govemment(e.g.,strikes),togetherwith a unionleadership
witha re-
ducedtenurein office,careeraltematives
and no aversionto conflict,explaintheirpolitical
power.

Decentlizaonm The Mixed and Insincere Motivesof States

The likelihoodof manyqualityreformsto entailsomeform of decentralization

raisesa
involvesthe transferof decision-
wholenewset of politicaldifficulties.Decentralization
and useof resourcesfrom higherlevelsof
makingauthortyfor planning,management
govemment(centralauthorities)
to outeror lowertierssuchas provinces,municipalities,
localcouncilsand evenschoolboards(see Rondinelliet al. 1989;Rondinelli1981). Al-
thoughmany govemmentshaveembarkedon decentralization
projectssincethe late
1970s,theircommitments
to the presumedobjectives
of decentralization
is oftendubious.
for advancingdecentralization-redis-
AsWeiler(1990)shows,the threemainarguments
tributngpower,enhancing the efficiencyof publicservicesand improvingleaming-con-
flict directlywith the inherentinterestof statesto centralizeauthority.Thisclashbetween
the inherentinterestof statesandthe inherentgoalsof decentralization
complicates
the
politicsof reformadoptionthroughat leastthreemechanisms.

First,govemment commitmentto decentralization

is liableto be insincereor at leastmoti-
vated by the wrongreasons. Weilerarguesthat govemmentspursuedecentralization
mostlyfor "compensatory
legitimation,"
i.e., to regainlegitimacyamongthe electorate
wheneverthis legitimacyis faltering,and for "conflictavoidance,"i.e.,whenevercentral
govemmentsface heightenedconflictsthat they cannotresolve,and hence,seek to
transferthemto otherentities. Othersarguethat govemments
decentralizeonly when
theylackinformation
abouthowbestto allocateresources(e.g.,de Groot1988).Yetoth-
ersclaimthatgovemments pursuedecentralization
simplyto favoronepoliticalgroupover
another,leadingto unnecessary
intemalbickeringand incoherentpolicies(McGinnand
Street1986). Absenttheseconditions,
govemments loseinterestin decentralization
and
mayevenattemptto undercutor reversethe decentralization
process.

8For a similaranalysis,usingdifferingcost-impacts and bargainingpowersof affectedinterest

groupsto explainthe greaterextentof decentralization
in heakhthan educationin Venezuela,
see
Gonzaiez(1998).

12
 Part One

Second, the commitmentof mid-levelbureaucrats,the very same actors in chargeof de-

centralizing,may be questionable. Decentralizationchallengesthe power and authorityof
these bureaucrats (Rondinelliet al. 1989). In addition,bureaucratsmay be a source of
inertia becausethe leadershipin bureaucraciesoften does not place a premiumon indi-
vidual initiative. Bureaucratsare expectedto follow orders and procedures,but they are
seldom rewarded for leaming,initiating reforms and solving problems (Berryman 1997).
For these reasons, professionalbureaucratsoften stand as formidable obstacles to re-
form.

Third, the falteringcommitmentof centralgovernmentactors, especiallymid-evel bureau-

crats, gives rise to an unexpectedpathologyin the implementationof decentraization:it
tums potentialbeneficiariessuch as local entities into adversariesof decentralizabon.Lo-
cal organs are often thought of as potental beneficiariesof decentralizabon,which frees
them from centralcontroland grantsthem new prerogatives (Bird and Wallich 1994:123).
However,local organs are not unambiguousbeneficiariesof decentralization.Evenwhen
carried out with the right intentions,decentralizaboncomes with stings attached and new
responsibilities(e.g., provisionof new services). Thus, local organs may be conditional,
rather than whole-hearted,supportersof decentralization;they welcome decentralization
providedthey obtain financial autonomyto carry out these new responsibilities(Bird and
Wallich1994).

Central bureaucratsare well positionedto exploitthe fragility of local-levelsupportfor de-

centralizabon.By denyinglocal organs financial resourcesand autonomy,they can easily
quell this support. Without financialautonomy,local organs lose interest in new responsi-
bilities,becomingopponentsratherthan demanders,of decentralizabon.

In Venezuelaand Colombiain the 1980s,and in Liberiaand Zimbabwe in the 1990s,cen-

tral bureaucratsbecame lethal reformadversariesby refusing to grant financial resources
to local organs, thereby destroying local-levelenthusiasmfor decentralizabon(see Han-
son 1989:44;Fiske 1996:18-19).In Zimbabwe,local councilsargued that without financial
autonomy,they would not accept the responsibilityof buildingnew schools. In Liberia,an
intemationallysupported planto devolve authorityto county and districtoffices also floun-
dered. Localorgans receivednew officesand staff, but they never receivedthe authorityto
hire, fire and transferteachers,nor to open, close or even certify schools. Moreimportant,
they receivedno operating budget or means to raise funds (Kemmerer 1994). In Vene-
zuela, while all govemmentsbetween1969 and 1988 proclaimeddecentralizationof edu-
cation, regional officials were never actually delegatedthe authority to manage budgets

13
The Politbcs of Education Reform

(Hanson1989). In Colombia,municipalitiesultimatelyopposeddecentralization,because
it would have entaileda greaterfinancial burden-the cost of providingeducation(Camoy
and Castro 1997).

14
Overcoming Obstacles to Reform

Themainproblemwiththeanalysisin Part1,whichis basedsolelyon cost-benefit

impact,
the powersand incidenceof policyentrepreneursand the mixed motivesof central
authorities,is that it overstatesits case:it over-predicts
reformparalysis.The empirical
evidencein the last20 yearscontradictsthispessimisticprediction.Numerouscasesof
qualityreformhavebeenapprovedand implementedthroughouttheworld. Table2 pro-
videsrecentexamples.Whilenoneof the citedcasesis completeor perfect,and some
entailmore meaningfulreformsthan others,all entailsignificantchangesin the overall
structureof theeducation
sectorthatchallengedvestedinterests
of crucialpoliticalactors.

Table2: Examplesof RelativelySuccessfulImplementationof Quality-basedEducation Reforms

Argentina Thegovemment decentralized

the basiceducation
system.Provinces andthe mu-
(1991-present) nicipalityof BuenosAirestookover responsibility
for schools,leadingto a ministry
"withoutschools."Spending on basiceducatonwasre-structured:in 1988,the gov-
emmentspent0.63percentof the GDP,andthe provinces spent1.78percent.By
1993thefigureschanged to0.05and2.30percent, respectively.
Thegovemment also
introduced curriculum
revisions,
extendedcompulsory schoolingfrom7 to 10 years
andcreatednewteststo measure studentacademicattainment
(seeGarciade Fanelli
1997).
Australia Reformsmadethe education systemmoremarketoriented(e.g.,privateuniversities
(1987-mid wereestablished).In someprovinces, publicschoolsreceivedsite-based
manage-
1990s) ment,schoolsandprincipals becamemoreaccountable, fundingfollowedstudents,
the sizeand authority
of the centralbureaucracy
was reduced,and schoolcouncils
andprincipals
gainedmoreauthority (seePascoeandPascoe1997).
Chile A majorefficiency-oriented
reform(includingdeepdecentralization, schoolautonomy,
(1990-present) student-based fundingand subsidized privateschools),initiatedin 1981underan
authoritarian
regime,wasforthemostpartpreserved by a center-leftcoalitiongovem-
mentafterthetransition
to democracy in 1990(seeEspinola1997)andcomplemented
withsignificant reforms(longerschoolday,training,supportnetworks
quality-oriented
and performance incentvesfor teachers);and targetedsupportfor schoolsin low-
incomeandruralareas(seeDelannoy 2000).
ElSalvador The govemmentimplemented deep decentralization,
includinggrantng parents
(1991-present) greatercontroloverschoolgovemance.Fundsweretransferred to CommunityEdu-
cationAssociabons, whichwerein chargeof hiringandfiringteachersandschooldi-
rectors,anddetermining salariesandhiringdecisions,
teachers' providingandadmin-
isteringsocialsecuritysystemsforteachers,andmaintaining amongother
buildings,
things(Ministryof Educabon1997).

15
The Politcs of EducationReform

Jordan In 1985,afterseveralyearsof followinga narrowstep-by-stepreform,the government

(1985-mid launcheda far-reachingreformpackage(Berryman1997). Therewere increasesin
1990s) mandatory school years, new methods of assessing student performanceand
sweeping reforms of the curriculum in favor of a core education for both academically
indined and vocationally indined students (Haddad 1994:98).

Mexico Fundinghas shiftedfrom highereducabon(the normthroughoutLabnAmerica)toward

(11990s) the needierbasic education. Fundingfor highereducationhas been reallocatedin
favorof innovativeprogramsand researchincentives(whereasbasicoperabonal sub-
sidies have been kept to a minimum)(see Kent 1997). A sweepingdecentralizabon
law was approved(see Schmelkes1997),and new performanceincentivesfor teach-
erswere introduced.

NewZealand A market-oriented and heavilydecentralized

approachwasadopted.Schoolsbecame
(1987-mid uself-managed" by boardsthat includeelectedparentsand which are allowedto em-
I 990s) ploy non-unionmembersas teachers. Budgetauthoritypassedto the schools,which
procureprivatelymost servicesformerlyprovidedby the Ministryof Education.Fund-
ing followsstudentsin a transparentmanner. The ministryhasbeen streamlined,and
now focuseson holdingschoolsaccountablefor outcomes,ratherthan controllingor
deliveringinputs.
Romania In the first stage (1990-1991),
the govemmentachievedthe de-communizabon of the
(1990-present) curriculum,de-linkedthe systemfromthe CommunistParty,introducednew academic
standardsand diversifiedsecondaryeducaton. In the secondstage (1993-1997),
the
govemmentliberalizededucabonmarketsand establishedassessmenttests adminis-
teredby a specializedagencyoutsidethe Ministryof Educabon(Birzea1994;Birzea
1996).
Spain The governmentcarriedout deep decentralization of education,especiallyat the uni-
(1980s) versitylevel. Localcouncils(groupsconsistingof principals,teachers,city officialsand
parents)were establishedand grantedconsiderableauthority,includinghiring and
firing principals,designingschoolactivitiesand approvingbudgetssubmfttedby the
ministryof educabon.(Hanson1990). A series of accessand qualityreformswere
approvedin the late 1980s.
SouthKorea After successfullycompletinga program of educationexpansion,the govemment
(1980s-present) tumedto qualityreforms. In 1994,morethan 80 quality-oriented reformswere insti-
tuted (e.g.,enhancementof primaryand secondaryeducation,encouragingautono-
mous decision-making for admissionto highereducationand establishmentof voca-
tionaltrainingcenters). As of 1998,almost70 percentof these reformswere under
implementation (Moon1998).

Thailand In the 1970s,diversifiededucationwas introduced,underwhich theexistng vocational

(1970s-1980s schoolsbecamediversifiedand secondaryschoolsand the teachertrainingcycleat
and late 1990s) upper secondarylevel were to be phasedout. Schoolfees were increasedsharply.
Curriculumwas revisedto reducedisparitiesin qualityamongregionsand to include
basic academictrainingwith practicalskills (see Haddad 1994). In a new set of
sweeping,quality-oriented reformsin 1999,compulsoryschoolingwas extendedto 12
years; the curriculumwas modernizedto stress math,scienceand English;control
over teacher hiring,firing and developmentwas decentralizedto the provinces;and
the Ministryof Educationwas streamlined.

Uruguay Access reformswere initiatedat the pre-schoollevel, and qualityreformswere intro-

(early1990s) ducedat thesecondarylevel. Secondary-level teacherswere retrained.

16
 Part Two

The above illustrativecases were not randomlyselected. However,they representmany

regionsof the world and various levels of educationaland economicdevelopment. They
show that deep, systemic, quality-orientedreforms are politcally feasible, refuting some
commonnotions aboutpoliticalimpedimentsto reform. For instance,reformscan occur in
both democratic(New Zealand) and non-democratic(Jordan) settings, under center-left
(Spain)and center-right(South Korea)govemments,and in new democracies(Romania)
as well as old ones (Australia). They can occur simultaneouslywith sweepingpackages
of state and economicreform(Argentina),or in isolation(Uruguay).Reformsalso can oc-
cur under the directionof the same politicalparty that in the past tried but failed to reform
(Mexico),or they can survive despitea changein politicalregimes (Chile). Finally,reforms
can occur in countriesemergingfromviolence and polarization(El Salvador).

The analysis in Part 1 fails to predictthese cases of reform because its focus is too nar-
row. Concentratingexclusivelyon a cost-benefitanalysisof interestgroup politics,or on
the low probability of policy entrepreneurshipin the supply side leaves unexploredthe
many strategies that executives can pursue and insttutonal factors that can be rear-
ranged in order to overcomepoliticalobstacles. Lessonsleamed from these and other,
less-successful,cases may provide insight into conditions under which countries can
overcomethe politicalimpedimentsto qualityreform.

Four Strategies for Overcoming Political Obstades

Part I identifiedthree broad politicaldifficultiesassociatedwith education reform.Any p o-

litical strategy or institutionalsettng that addresses these problemsshould, in principle,
enhance the likelihood of reform adoption. This part suggests hypothesesabout such
strategiesand insttutionalsettings.

The hypothesesare grouped into four broad categories:1) type and style of reform;2) po-
libcalstrategiesto bolsterthe supplyof reform; 3) politicalstrategiesto bolsterthe demand
for reform; and 4) institutionalfeaturesthat magnifyor diminishthe power of veto groups.
The discussion of each hypothesisbegins with a brief statementabout why, at least in
theory, the proposed hypothesismight have a causal impact on the chances of reform
adoption. Then, examplesfrom one or morecases are providedto illustratethe viabilityof
the hypothesis. Finally,some caveats aboutthe validity of the hypothesesare discussed.
These caveats do not invalidatethe hypotheses,but they raise issues that researchers
and practitoners must consider. The discussionis not meantto establish conclusivelythe
validity of the hypotheses,but to identify theoreticallyinformed hypothesesthat may or

17
The Politics of EducationReform

may not be confirmedby further research. Due to time and resourceconstraints,the dis-
cussionof cases relieson secondarymaterials.Appendix 1 listsall cases discussed.

Reform Tym

Hypothesis1:Combiningaccesselementsinto qualityreformenhancesre-
formadoption.

Argument:One way to diffusethe problemsassociatedwith qualityreformsis to address

the issue of concentratedcosts/distributedbenefit. Supplementingquality reformwith ac-
cess or expansion elements,which increasethe resourcesavailable to key stakeholders
and thus are politicallymuch easier to adopt(Berryman1997), mightachievethis.

Examples:In Chile after 1990, the new democrabccenter-leftadministrationof Patricio

Aylwin increasedschool budgets and subsidies,and raised teachers'salaries (Espinola
1997:5-8). The govemmentsought to gain support (and placate frustration)among key
actors in the educationsector who were dismayedover the govemment'sintentionto pre-
serve many of the qualityreformsinitiatedby the previousauthoritarianregime.

In Mexico, after various failed attempts to decentralizethe educational system in the

1980s, the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) implemented a
sweepingprogramfor the modemration of educabon. By 1993the govemmentwas able
to transfer513,974 teachers, 116,054administrativeemployees, 1.8 million pre-primary
students, 9.2 million elementary studentsand 2.4 million high school studentsfrom na-
bonal to state-leveljurisdiction(see Murilo 1999). An importantcomponentof the Salinas
reform,absent in the reformeffortsof the 1980s,was the use of access elements:teacher
salary hikes were establishedabove nabonalwage ceilings; new pension benefits,and
pay incentiveswere created (Murillo1999). In addition,the govemmentcreated a fund for
social spending (PRONASOL),which includedsubstantal spending on access educabon
reforms.9 Interesbngly,this increasedspending occurred at the same time that the gov-
emnmentwas carrying out market-orientedreforms and stabilizationthrough fiscal and
monetary austerity. These access elements served as compensatorymechanismsfor
reformopponentsin SNTE,which had rejectedevery previousattemptto changeMexico's
highlycentralizedsystem. Scholars have littledoubt that the extra spending allocatedfor

9 PRONASOL providedfundingfor buildingandrefurbishingschoolsand studentgrants. Political

scientists
arguethat PRONASOL playeda largerrole as a mechanism of politicalco-optation
than
economiccompensation for economiclosers(seeComeliuset al. 1994).

18
 Part Two

the educabonreform, at a bmewhen other sectorswere experiencingcutbacks,was a po-

litcal strategyto win the supportof unions.

Corollary: In additionto materialcompensation,govemmentscan offerpoliti-

cal privilegesto reform adversaries.

Researchon the politicsof market-orientedreformshas found that govemrnments

that grant
potentialpoliticalchallengerscertainpolitcal privileges(e.g.,centralizedcontrolover social
spending,special treabmentduring electon periods, access to policy-making,accommo-
dation of some concemsof dissidents)stand a greater chance of obtainingthe coopera-
bon of those actors (Corrales 1997-98). In Mexico, the Salinas administrabongranted
similarpoliticalprivilegesto the SNTE. The Mexicangovemmentalloweddissidentswithin
the union to enter the nabonalleadershipby introducingproporbonalrepresentationand
abolishingthe automaticaffiliabonof the union with the ruling party (Murillo1999). In New
Zealand,althoughthe govemmentimposedsome reformsagainst the wishes of teachers
(e.g.,grantingschoolsthe right to hire non-unionizedteachers),it also yielded on a signifi-
cant politicalissue:jurisdictionover teachers'salaries was not granted to the newly cre-
ated school boards, remaining instead under the control of the central govemment
(Gordon 1992).

Caveat: It is a mistake to assume that access elements,especiallywhen used for co-

optation purposes,are unproblemabc. Sometmes the increasein spending induced by
access reformscreates opportunitiesfor politicalpatronage(see Gibson 1997; Weyland
1996), which can upsetcivic leadersand the publicat large,and gives rise to accusations
10
of govemmentalcorrupbon. Pakistanprovidesa good illustraabon. Two types of access
reformwere attemptedin Pakistanin the 1980s. One flourishedpolitically,whilethe other
collapsedthree years after its launch. The successful reform was an inibabveto open
schoolsin mosques locatedin villages where therewere no primary schools (mostlypoor
areas). Fundswere allocatedto hire new teachers,providea stpend to mosque leaders
and acquire new school supplies and uniforms. The program became widely accepted.
New users reachedthe hundredsof thousands.

The failed access reform was the Nai Roshni schools program, consistng of drop-in
schoolsfor childrenaged 10-14 who had left or never attendedschool. Like the mosque
program,the Nai Roshnireformmade use of existingfacilites: schoolswere asked to ofler

'° Thediscussion
of Pakistan
drawsfromWarwicket al.(1990).

19
The Politics of EducationRefonn

up to threehoursof extraclassesin theaftemoon.Significant

investments
weremadeto
hireteachersand provideschoolsupplies.At somepoint,morethan 390,000students
wereenrolled.However,the NaiRoshniprogramfailedpoliticallybecausethe publicbe-
cameconvincedthatthe government
was usingthe programfor politicalpatronage.The
evidencewas hardto challenge.Federal-level
politicians,includingthoseat the cabinet
level,weregivenenormousprerogatives 1 " Teachers
over hiringdecisions. desiringap-
pointments
neededrecommendations
frompoliticians.In addition,evaluationteamshad
veryclosetiesto the agencyin chargeof the program,the Literacyand MassEducation
Commission.Publicoutcryforcedthe govemmentto terminatethe programin three
years.

Why did the mosqueprogrambecomepolitically

acceptable,whilethe Nai Roshnipro-
grambecameunpopular?Whydidtwo similaraccessprogramsin the samecountryand
in the sametimeperiodexperiencesuchpolitically
dichotomous outcomes?The answer
mighthaveto dowiththe varyinglevelsof decentralization
thataccompanied
eachreform.
The mosque programwas predicatedon the direct involvementof parents and religious
2 Thus,the mosqueprogramprovided
figures(theImams).1 localstakeholders
opportuni-
tiesto developa senseof ownershipin the program.Incontrast,the Nai Roshniprogram
was setupwitha maximumlevelof interference
by central-level
politicians.Thismadei n-
cumbentsappearas the soleowners(andabusers)of the program,leavingno roomfor
otheractors. Finally,the mosqueprogramconverteda crucialactor-the clergy-into a
stakeholderof the reforms(strategiesfor mobilizingpotentialsupportersare discussed
later).In short,accessreformsthatarenotaccompanied
by reformsthatenhancepolitical
accountability
canbeineffective.

Hypothesis2:An incrementalratherthan all-encompassingapproachen-

hancesthe chanceof refonn acceptance.

Argument: Haddad(1994)arguesthat educationreformsthat followa moregradual,

step-by-step
approach("incremental")
tend to encounterfewer politicaldifficultiesthan

" Forinstance,a federalagency(theLiteracyand MassEducabon Commission) wasauthorizedto

make30 percentof hiringdecisions.Legislators at thenationalassemblywereauthorizedto make
an additional30 percentof hiringdecisions;andthe PrimeMinisterwas permittedto make10 per-
centof hiringdecisions.

12 Thisinvolveda trade-off.The high-profile

role grantedto
Imamsundermined theaccountability
andeffectvenessof the program.Imamsweregrantedthefinalwordon whatis and is notdonein
the mosque.Theywerethusin chargeof hiringand supervising
teachers,
taskswhichmanycritcs
arguetheydidnotperformprofessionally.

20
 PartTWo

sweepingreforms("synoptic").Accordingto Haddad,a narrow

more comprehensive,
scopeallowsofficialsto testtheacceptance
of thereformsand is lesslikelyto provokethe
mobilizationof cost bearers. A piecemealapproachavoidsthe nationalspotightand
keepsto a minimumthe numberof cost-bearers.

Examples:Haddadillustrates
his argumentby comparingreformsin Jordan(1970s)and
Thailand(1960s)with thosein Peru (late 1960s-early1970s). All threereformswere
launchedundernon-democratic
regimes.ThePeruviancaseevenincludedfar morecon-
sultationwithcitizens.Yet,the Peruviancaseexperienced
the mostseriousimplementa-
tion difficulties. He arguesthat a crucialexplanationwas that Jordanand Thailand
adoptedan incremental
approachduringthefirststageof reforms,whereasPeruplunged
directlyintoa synopticapproach(Haddad1994:55-57).

Caveats:Twocaveatscan be raised. First,as Haddadacknowledges,

incremental
ap-
proachesalso cangeneratepoliticalproblems. In Jordan,for instance,the incremental
to investmuchin termsof politicalcapital
approachgaveno incentivefor the govemment
or otherresources.Govemment
attentionwaned,leadingto poorplanning,whichin tum
ledto implementation
difficulties
(Haddad1994:102).A secondcaveatis thatgradualap-
proachesrisk becomingless credibleover time,leadingmanyactorsto doubtthe com-
mitmentof thegovemment which,in tum,hurtssocietalcooperation on reform(seeRodrik
1989). Incremental
approaches alsoallowreformopponentsmoretimeandopportunities
to organizeand mobilizealliesontheirbehalf.Finally,an all-outeffortmightbe preferable
becauseit allowsthegovemmentto expandthe numberof actorsinvolvedbeyondthose
whoaremerelyaffectedby localreforms,therebyincreasing
the numberof potentialallies.
BothJordanand Thailandswitchedto a synopticapproachhalfwayintotheirreformproc-
essesand managedto followthrough.

Hypothesis3: Packagingeducationrefonns with other types of reforms (of the

state or the economy)enhancesthe chancesof reform adoption.

Argument:Appendingeducationreformsto a widerpackageof reformsmightoffersev-

eral advantages.It can generategreatercredibilityby signalingstrongcommitmentto
changingthe statusquo,whichis crucialfor societalendorsement of reforms. Commit-
mentto otherreformsmighthavespillovereffectsto education.Andoncethe countryhas
gainedsomereformmomentum
and seempositiveresults,the publicis morelikelyto ac-
ceptfurtherreformsin otherareas.

21
The Politics of EducationReform

Examples: There are numerous examples of deep education reforms packaged with
broader publicsector reforms,includingthose in Australia,Argentina,Chile, New Zealand,
Romania,Spainand, sincethe 1997crisis,Thailand.

Caveat: Appendingeducabonreformto broader politicaland economicreformsalso can

give rise to new problems. Packaging educabon reforms with economic reform can
sometimestamish the imageof educationreforms. In Peru in 1991,combiningeducabon
reformswith a programof economicstabilizationand adjustmentallowedthe oppositionto
mislabel all education reformsas 'neo-liberal" and IMF-mandated. Given the negative
connotationsof these labels at the time, societal outcry against the reforms intensified
(Graham 1999).

Or, govemments might devote more attention to the other components of the reform
package. Education reforms may fall through the cracks, or be sacrificedon behalf of
other goals. In South Africa, the need to abide by democraticprinciplesand to create a
governmentof nationalunity has placed brakes on education reforms. On the one hand,
the rulingAfrican NationalCongress(ANC)party has agreed to slow spendingand access
reforms in response to reservabonsraised by the main opposition party, the National
Party.13 On the other hand,the ANC has had to resistsome populistdemandsby various
radical educationgroups, many of which have strong links to the ANC, leading to violent
protests.'4 In response,the ANC sloweddown some efficiency-orientedreforms. The re-
sult has been a reform impasse. The exigenciesof consolidatinga democracyrespectful
of minorityparties and economic restraintscreated obstacles for access reforms, while
radical pressuregroups affiliatedwith the ruling party blocked quality reforms(see Pape
1998).

In Poland, education reforms were launched simultaneouslywith democratizaton and

economic adjustment The economic reforms produced a short-termrise in unemploy-
ment. Given the education sector's role as employer of last resort, govemment officials
decidedto slow down educationreform.

13 TheNabonal party(strongin CapeTownand represenbing whiteand upper-income coloredcon-

stituents)opposeda newfundingmechanismwhichmandatedthatonlydassesof 35 pupilsinsec-
ondaryschoolsand40 in primaryschoolswouldbe eligibleto receivefederalfunding.Privatewhite
schools,manyof whichhavesmallerteacher-student
ratios,felt thatthisreformleftthemout.

14 ANClegislators
haveopposeda govemment
proposalfor the introduction
of compulsory
school
fees on a sliding scale based on family income. The legislatorsdemanded free educationinstead
(see McGregor1996; Vergnani1993).

22
 Part Two

Bolstering the Supply Side

One way to overcomeimplementationdifficultiesis to counteractthe shortcomingson the

supplyside of reform. The followingare threepossibleways to do so.

Hypothesis1:Entrustingeducationreformsto ministrieswithlowturnover
rates enhancesthe chanceof reformadoption.

Argument: Loweringturnover rates or transferringreformresponsibilityto ministrieswith

low turnover rates resolves problemsin the supply side such as lack of policy continuity,
propensitytoward quick fixes, littleattentionto long-term goals, preoccupationwith alter-
native career plans, etc. Pensionreforms have advancedmore than educationreform in
Latin America in the 1990s partly becausethe former have been led by more stable and
powerfulministriesof finance(Nelson 1999).

Examples: In Australiaafter 1987 and Argentinaafter 1991, some responsibilitiesof edu-

cation reform were transferredto ministriesof finance. In El Salvador,the government
kept reformswithin thejurisdictionof the Ministryof Education,but assuredthe continuous
tenure of a strong minister. A comparisonwith Colombia,where ministerialtumoverrates
remained high, illustratesthe benefitsof loweringtumover rates. Both countries launched
majorreforms in the 1990s,combiningboth quality and access elements,at a bme of po-
litical polarizationand widespreadviolence. However,reforms in El Salvadoradvanced
farther. The govemmentlaunchedthe EDUCO program,an effortto enhanceschoolcov-
erage in rural areas. Local councils,which include parents, receivedthe authorityto run
publicschools and make hiring, firing and budget decisions. Remarkably,the reformers
elicitedconsensusamong domesticactors, despitethe prevailingpolitcal mistrustand d e-
spite the fact that EDUCOtargeted rural areas, where conflictwas greater (see C6rdova
Macias 1996;Reimersand McGinn 1997;Reimers 1997a; Meza 1997).

In Colombia,however, reformsran into trouble (see Montenegro 1995). In 1989, Colom-

bia's Congressapproved legislationgiving municipalitiesa greater role in basic services.
This culminatedin the 1991 Constitution,which establishedone of the most far-reaching
decentralizationmandates in Latin America, covering the education sector. Although
some reforms were implementedfrom 1991 to 1994, the key components of the re-
forms-approval of school autonomyand the municipalizationof basic education-could
not be implemented. Part of the explanationfor this was the inclusionof recalcitrantanti-
reformgroups,which compromisedthe reform process. There also may be a simplerand
morefundamentalexplanation:lowerministerialtenure in office. Between1989and 1998,

23
The Politics of Education Reform

El Salvador has had two ministersof education-an impressivedegree of continuity. In

fact, when the govemmentchanged in 1994, the ministerof educationand her staff were
asked to remain in office. Colombia, on the other hand, had seven ministers between
1988 and 1997,almost one new ministerper year.15

Caveat: First, ministerialtumoverrates might be neithera necessarynor a sufficientcon-

dition for reform. Some cases of reform have occurred in contextsof high tumover (Aus-
tralia, Jordan, Spain and South Korea). In other cases, low tumover rates have not pro-
duced major politicalbreakthroughs(SouthAfrica). Second, high ministerialtumover may
actuallybe a symptom,ratherthan a cause, of difficulties. High tumover rates may reflect
existingstate-societytensionsover the reform agenda; presidentsmay be changing min-
isters as a responseto difficultiesin containingconflict within the sector. A more refined
hypothesiswould be that low ministerialtumovermight act as an independentvariable-or
at least as an inducement-of reform adoption,but its opposite-a high turnover rate-
may be a reflection,ratherthan a cause, of such difficulties.

Hypothesis2: Greater links with the outside world or the global economyen-
hance the chance of reform adoption.

Argument: Given that part of the new impetus for reform comes from extemal sources
(see Part 1), it would follow that greater receptivityto the outsideworld resultsin greater
incentivesto pursue quality education reform. Openness to global forces exposes coun-
tries to the systemicimperativeof developinga competitiveeconomy,which encourages
education improvements. Extemal links also can providegovemmentswith new political
allies (intemationaladvisors)and sourcesof advice and fundingthat may stimulatereform
initiatives.

Examples: SoutheastAsian countriesare classicexamplesof the presumedconnection

betweenopennessto the globaleconomy and adoptionof quality reformsin education. In
the 1960s,several SoutheastAsian countries adoptedan export-orientedmodelof devei-
opment. Govemmentsthroughoutthe regionreasoned that in order to gain an exporting
edge in highly competitiveworld markets, they needed to raise the educationallevel of
their workforce. Any table of countries with outstandingeducationalperformancein the
last 20 years typicallyincludesAsiancases such as Hong Kong,Japan, Singapore,South

15Otherpossible
examplesof dichotomousoutcomescorrelated
withdifferenttumoverratesindude
Romania-PolandandArgentina-Peru(seeAppendix1).

24
 Part Two

KoreaandTaiwan(seeWorldBank1993;Intemational
LaborOrganization
1995).Singa-
poreis a goodexample.Tocompeteagainstcounterparts in intemational
markets,Singa-
porein the 1980senactedreformsintendedto producethe best-trained
laborforcein the
region.Thegovemmentstimulated
competition
amongpupilsby dividingthemaccording
to abilityand selectingthe mostacademically
giftedstudentsat theage of nine. It encour-
aged competitionamong schoolsby publishingacademicresultsand permittingtop
schoolsto raisetheir feesand becomesemi-independent.
The govemmenteven im-
poseda punitivetaxon foreignfirmswitha highproportion
of low-skilled
workers,thereby
boostingprivatesectordemandfor educatedworkers(Wooldridge1993). Similarly,an
explicitimpetusforThailand'snewlyenacted(1999)educabonreformswas adverseco m-
parisonswith the educationsystemsin neighboring
countriesand the threatof falling
competitiveness.

It alsomaynotbe coincidental
thatthe riseof educationreformon the politicalagendasof
LatinAmericain the 1990soccurredsimultaneously
with the region'sembraceof a more
outward-oriented
modelof economicdevelopment,
includingdeeptradeliberalization
(see
Morrow1998;Edwards1995).

Caveats: Extemalforcesare important,but not decisiveshapersof domesticreforms.

Theycan helpsetthe agenda,evenstimulatereform. But outsideof the realmof eco-
nomicstabilization,extemalforcesareinsufficient
to drivereformand cannotaccountfor
the variationin outcomesacrosscases,especiallyin administrativereformsof service-
providingbureaucracies (Kaufman1999:361).Furthermore, not all open-economycoun-
triesspecializein the exportof goodsand servicesthatdependon high-skill
workers. For
example,manycountriesin CentralAmericaand the Caribbeanhave specializedin
cheap-laborexportssuch as tourism,agriculturaland primarycommodities.For these
countries,
economicopennessis nottheprimaryincentiveforqualityeducationreform.

Theprosandconsof involvingintemational
actorsin educationreformaresimilarto those
in debatesaboutthe meritsof globalization.
Forsome,extemaltiesaredesirableto com-
bat provincialism,
improvestandards,increaseaccountability
of stateofficials,and imbue
reformswith legitimacy,
politicalpowerand resources,etc. For others,theseties under-
minelocalinitiatives,
encourage politicians
to pursueforeignagendas,create"racesto the
bottom"andgeneratenationalist
backlashes.
16

16 For a glance at this ongoingdebate,see Rodrik(1997)and Barber(1992).

25
The Politics of Education Reform

Hypothesis
3: Independent
pro-reformadvisorycouncilsbolsterthesupplyof
reform.

Argument: Perhapsone of the most promisingways to compensatefor shortcomingsin

the supply of reforms is to establish independentadvisory/monitoringcouncils to advise
the ministryof education,debate and propose policy reforms, and monitor the implemen-
tation process. By establishinggroups of reformadvocateswith longertermsof officethan
those of the education ministers,these councils may compensatefor one of the main po-
litical obstaclesto reform adoption-supply deficiency. Ideally,councils prevent inertia in
the ministryand introducecontinuitydespiteministerialchanges. Like independentcentral
banks, independentcouncilscan insulatedifficultpoliciesfrom politicalpressuresand e n-
couragegovemmentsto upholddisciplinedespitepopularpressure. Unlikecentralbanks,
however,educationadvisorycouncilstend to include representativesfrom across society.
As such, they can avoid the democraticdeficit associatedwith independentcentral banks,
which are always govemed by a single non-elected/non-representative
leader. In short,
independentcouncils can help advance reforms because they can produce both policy
impetusand ties betweenchangeteams and civil society.

Examples: Some of the most far-reachingreformers have establishedvarious forms of

independentcouncils. In New Zealand,the Picot Commission,an independenttask force
composedof two educators,two business peopleand various politicians,was established
in 1987 with a broad mandateto propose reforms (Gordon 1992:7). The Commission
proposalsinduded the creationof several independentinsttutionsto sell the reformsand
the govemmentorganizedtours of pro-reformindividualsfrom educabongroups including
parent representabves,known as "cause champions,"to speak at public fora on behalfof
the reforms. In additon, a group of evaluators, composed of eminent educators, met
regularlyto scrutnize the actvibes of the working groups and serve as the liaisonto non-
cabinetparliamentarymemberswith experienceor interestin educabon(Perris 1997).

In Jordan in 1985,when KingHusseindecidedto switchfrom an incrementalto a synoptc

approach,he appointedthe NabonalCommissionto Assess EducationalPolices,a reform
committeeheaded by the Crown Prince. The commissionset up a central task force,
comprisingboth privateand public sector representatives,and appointedfield committees
to collect data. Overall,the committeemonitored the reform process,evaluatedpolicies,
identifiedcost-effectiveinnovabonsand advised the ministry (Berryman 1997; Haddad
1994:92-98).This advancedthe reform processin a countrynotoriousfor a high tumover
rate in the ministryof education. Another independentcommission,the NabonalCenter

26
 Part Two

for Educatfon
ResearchandDevelopment,
whichincludedrepresentatives
fromhigh-level
bureaucracies,
vocationaltrainingcorporations,
universitiesand think tanks as well as
economists
andeducatorswasestablished
to monitortheimplementation.

In El Salvador,an advisorycouncilof 50 representaffves

from30 differentgroups(includ-
ing insurgents,
clergyand technicalexperts)was createddurngthe assessment stages.
Stakeholderswererequiredto submitpositionpapersto the council,whichprovedso suc-
cessfulin maintaining
the paceof reformsthat the initiallyskepticalministerdecidedto
extenditslifethroughout
theimplementation
stages(Reimers1997a).

In Mexico,qualitycontrolin highereducation,
an importantfeatureof the 1990sreforms,
has beendelegatedto bodiesthat are eitherindependent
of ministerialappointments
or
7 or at leastrelativelyautonomous
funding,such as CENEVAL,1 (bothfrom the ministry
and unions),suchas the peerreviewcommittees.ThesebodieshaveinfusedMexico's
reformssince1988witha significantdegreeof continuity,
despitethe increasein political
turbulence
on the nationalsceneandhighministerial
tumoverin the 1990s(Kent1997).

In Thailandin 1974,theCouncilof Ministersestablished

a specialcommittee
of prominent
and highlyrespectedThaiintellectuals,
high-levelbureaucrats,
educationexpertsand rep-
resentativesfrom civic organizationsand teachersunions(Haddad1994:140). This
commissionsucceededin gainingsocietalacceptancefor potentially
polemicalreforms,
such as the diversificabon
of secondaryschooleducation.Morerecently,independent
commissions chairedby respectedbusinessleadersplayeda key rolein the designof
Thailand's1999reforms.

Comparable
independent
bodieshavebeencreatedin Chile(theBrunnerCommission),
SouthKorea(the Committeeon EducationReformImplementation), Romania(theNa-
tionalCouncilfor Reformof Education)
andUruguay(theNationalAdministration
of Public
Education,
in chargeof primaryandsecondary
education).

Certaincommonalities
emergefrom these cases. To be effective,independent
advi-
sory/evaluative
bodiesshouldincludenotjustpoliticians,
butalsorepresentatives
fromcivil
society,respectedintellectual
leaders,opinion-makerssuchas joumalistsand think-tank

17 CENEVAL (CentroNacionalde Evaluaci6n)

is a non-govemmental
institution
charged withen-
tranceexaminations
foruppersecondaryschoolsandhighereducation.
CENEVAL is allowedto
generateincomethroughthesaleofassessmentservices
to educabonal
institutions,
bothat home
andabroad.

27
The Politicsof EducationReform

experts. In some cases (e.g., Uruguay),involvingtechnocratsfrom intemationalorganiza-

tions such as ECLAC helped politically to signal impartialityand competence. In the
1970s in Thailand,communityleadersdisseminatedinformationconcemingschools and
made suggestionsregardinghow schoolsmightcontributeto the community.

Independent advisory councils are not panaceas, but they can perform crucial political
tasks. First,the respectabilityof council members infusesthe reform effortwith credibility,
thus contributingto societalacceptance. Second, council members who are joumalists
and intellectualsestablishlinks betweenreformersand the opinion-makingsector,thus i n-
creasing the chance that local commentatorsbecome both stakeholders and frequent
writers on the topic. Third, and most important,councils counteract expected shortcom-
ings in the supplyof reforminitiatives. In some cases, for instance,heads of state instruct
their ministersof educationto follow the directivesof these independentcouncils. Setting
up a formally constitutedgroup with longer terms of office, nonevidentalternativecareer
plans and interestin the reform can act as an effective counterbalanceto the negative
side-effectof high ministerialtumover.

Caveat: The effectivenessof independentadvisory/evaluativecouncilsmay depend on

the initialdegree of commitmentat the executivelevel. Initially,the chief executive must
be committedenough to appointthe independentbody, and second, to instructthe minis-
ter to follow its advice. Councils cannoteasily create govemment commitmentto reform
where it does not already exist. What the councils can do is to galvanizeexistingcom-
mitment, give it direction, prevent it from waning during the implementationperiod, and
establishstrongerlinks betweenthe state and society. Another problem is that, over time,
councils can become yet another vested interestgroup, more concemedwith defending
the status quo than promotingaccountability. Finally,advisory councilsdo not easily ad-
dress one of the most serious problemsof educationreform:oppositionfrom cost-bearers.
Mechanismsfor engagingsocietalallies and neutralizingreformopponentsare still nece s-
sary.

Bolstering the Demand for Reform

The recent swellingof societaldemand for quality education reform might still be insuffi-
cient. Left to themselves,quality reform beneficiaries(e.g., parents,employersand citi-
zens in general) are unlikelyto coalesceinto strong pressuregroups advocatingreforms.
A successful reform strategy requires mechanismsfor counteractingweaknesseson the
demandside.

28
 Part Two

Hypothesis1:Infonnatfon
dissemination
strategiesbolsterthe demandforre-
form.

Argument:Citizenstendto minimizethe bme and energytheyspendinformingthem-

selvesaboutpublicaffairs.In a worldof limitedtimeand resources,theymayseelittlere-
wardin investingenergyto understand
increasingly
complexissuesoverwhichtheyhave
littleinfluence("rabonalignorance").
Consequently,
citizensresortto information
shortcuts
to formtheiropinions.Theyfollowcuesfromtechnicalexperts,favoritepoliticians,
peers,
or goodmarketngcampaigns,
ratherthanactivelyresearchall existinginformaton.This
can be eithera liabilityor an assetfor changeteams. On the one hand,rabonaligno-
ranceand informationshortcutsmakecitizenssusceptbleto vetogroups,whichmount
effectiveandemotionalpublicrelationcampaigns
that serveas informatonshortcuts.On
the otherhand,if changeteamsmounttheirownpre-emptive
informatoncampaigns,
they
standa chanceof gainingcitizens'support.Informatondissemination
is morelikelyto be
effectiveif it is backedby professional,scientificresearch(see Reimersand McGinn
1997).

Examples:In NewZealand,the govemmentestablished

workingparties(composed
of
leadersfromall interestgroups)whichmetregularlyat the locallevelto seekconsensus
on reformimplementation.
In El Salvadorin the 1990sreformersusedboth informaton
disseminabon
and inclusionstrategies.At a timewhen societalenthusiasmfor the re-
formswas waning,localreformers,
togetherwitha teamfromthe HarvardInsttutefor In-
temationalDevelopment
(HIID),helda seriesof meetingsand workshopswith localac-
tors,civicleaders,businessleaders,joumalists,ministerial
staff,etc. (Oneof thesemeet-
ingsinvolvedthe presidentalcandidates.)
As a result,theoppositionpartiesendorsedthe
reform. In Uruguaythe reformersalsoconducteda massiveinformatoncampaign
once
the reformprogramwas designed.Theseeffortssucceededin convincingcitzensabout
the needfor extensivereforms,not a trivialaccomplishment
consideringthat in the late
1980sfewcitizenstreatededucationreformas an urgentmatter.

Caveats:First,a high-profile
approachis notalwaysappropnate. Duringthegestationpe-
riod (e.g.,whenstudiesaboutthe country'seducatonaldeficitsare beingconducted),a
low-profile
approachmightbewiser.At thisstage,the govemmentis ill equippedto win a
publicrelations
war,if one develops,particularly
sinceits findingsand recommendabons
maybe incomplete
or not agreedor both. Engagingthe entre publicin a policydebateat
a time when the reformersthemselvesare unsureabout their positonscan backfire.

29
The Politics of EducationReform

Someauthorseven suggestshieldingthe reformteamfrom outsideinterference

during
this stage(e.g.,see Thomas1994). In Uruguay,El Salvadorand Nicaragua,officials
launchedmassiveinformation-consultation
campaignsonly afterthe diagnostictests in
publicschoolswerecompletedandproposals
forreformweredrafted.

Second,information
dissemination
maybolsterdemand,but it maybe ineffective
in neu-
tralizingoppositionfrom cost-bearing
groups. Adverselyaffectedpartiesin the reform
processdo notalwaysacceptas valideventhe mosttransparent
information
providedto
them (Reimersand McGinn1997;seealsoHusen1994:18).For instance,in a referen-
dumamongteachersonthe needfor reform,78 percentof teachersin Polandvotedin fa-
vor of noreform,despitethegovemment's
all-outinformation
campaign(Sabbat-Swidlicka
1994).In Pakistan,a teamfromthe HIIDconductedextensiveresearchon the education
needsofthe country,onlyto discoverthateducation
officialswerecompletely
unmovedby
the findings(Relmersand McGinn1997:xiv).Mostlikely,the officialsun,derstood
the is-
suesat stake,but nonethelessrejectedthe informationbecausetheyhad concreterea-
sonsto feartheirimplications-thereformswouldcurtailthe powerof centralbureaucrats.

In short,in somecases,a moresuccessfulstrategymaybeto keepa low-profileinforma-

tion strategyduringthe reformgestationperiod,then switchto a high-profilestrategyof
disseminationwhenadvocateshavea beKter
ideaof needsand goals,supplemented
by
strategies
to dealwithreformopponents.

Hypothesis2: Involvingpotential beneficiariesin reformn

design and evaluation
enhancesthe chanceof reformacceptance.

Argument: Becausebeneficiaries
facedistributed
benefitsas wellas variousexitoptions,
theydo notoftencoalesceintoeffectivepressuregroups.Incorporating potentialbenefici-
ariesin the reformprocessmightcounteractthis. The notionthat the inclusionof actors
enhancesreformacceptanceis paramountin theoriesof democratization and corpora-
tism. Inclusiongiveschangeteamsthe opportunity
to addressreservations
and,moreim-
portant,to convertopponents(seeReimers1997b).Inclusioncantum passivebenefici-
ariesintoactivestakeholders.Inclusionalsoallowsreformersto uncoverand respondto
opponents'
objections.Thus,'an expandingbodyof evidencesupportstheconvictionthat
includinglocalpersonnel,suchas teachers,in decisionsaboutimproving
schoolsfosters
moreeffectiveimplementation
of reforms"(Thomas1994:1855;
see also Navarroet al.
1998;Reimersand McGinn1997;Crouchand Healey1997:1-15
and 1-17;Fiske1996;
WorldBank1995:138-142;
Husen1994:8-9).

30
 Part Two

Examples:In Pakistan,onereasonforthe successof the mosqueprogramwas the in-

corporation
of the religioussector,the Imams,whoweregivena directrolein the schools.
In Thailandin the 1970s,the govemmentincludedlocalprovidersandconsumers
of edu-
cationin the implementation
process(Haddad1994:157).Teachersandschooladminis-
tratorswerebroughtin to helpdesigna diversified
curriculum;
administrators,
parentsand
studentswerecalledon to assessits success.Schoolsofferedtrainingand awareness
programs,providing
townand villagedwellersopportunities
to observethe newschoolsin
action. In El Salvador,NewZealandandNicaragua,parentsweregivena role as voting
membersin newlycreatedschool-level
councilsor boardsof trustees,chargedwithschool
management In NewZealand,studentrepresentatives
were also givenseats,and a
1991revisionof the by-lawsallowedanyone,notjust parents,to be electedto boardsof
trusteesin orderto encourageinvolvement
of otherpotentialbeneficiaries,
e.g.,business
leaders.

Caveats:As with informationdissemination

strategies,inclusionmightbe ineffectual-
maybeeven counterproductive-in
dealingwith reformopponents. Reformopponents
maytakeadvantageof their inclusionin policydeliberations
to derailthe reformprocess.
Opponents
do notgiveuptheiroppositionsimplybecausethegovernment listensto them.
In Argentinain the 1980s, reform opponentsincludedin public debatesblocked
meaningfulreform. The new administration
of Raul Alfonsin(1983-1989),
electedafter
sevenyearsof authoritarian
govemrnment,
attemptedto improverelationswithactorsin the
educabonsectorand pavethe way for qualityeducationreformsby adoptinga policyof
changethroughcitizenparticipation.
Thegovemment
conveneda Pedagogical
Congress,
madeup of localprovincialand nationalassembliesto meetoverthe courseof several
yearsto reacha consensus
on a neweducationlaw. "[E]veryonewasto havethe rightto
participate,"
includingactorswitha vestedinterestin the statusquo (Hanson1996:309).
Afterfour yearsof constantdebate,no meaningfulconsensusemerged. Cost-bearing
groups,includingteacherunionsandclericalinterests,
tookadvantageof theirinclusionin
policydeliberations
to waterdownthe reformistimpetus.

Colombia'sreformsin the early1990s,whichcalledfor one of the mostfar-reaching

de-
centralizations
in LatinAmerica,wereblockedin partby the leadingteachers'union(F E-
CODE),a highlyorganizedand centralizedunionwith more than 200,000members.
Govemmentofficialsnevermanagedto persuadeFECODE. Inclusionof FECODEin
policydeliberations
endedup impedingthe deepeningof reforms. Moreover,it sentthe
wrongsignalsto congressional
leaders.It ledthemto overestmatethedegreeof societal

31
The Politicsof EducationReform

oppositionto reform. As a result, both Congressand the ministerof education beganto

questionthe desirabilityof some reforms(Fiske 1996; Montenegro1995). New legislation
adoptedin 1993 and 1994 did not provideschoolsthe autonomyto select, hire or sanction
personnel.

In Poland in 1993, the 300,000-strongPolishteachers' union (ZNP) resistedthe govern-

ments attempt to decentralizesecondaryeducationand introducea performance-based
promotion system for teachers. To placatethis opposition,the govemment appointeda
ZNP leaderas deputy prime ministerof education in 1994 and promisedto raise teacher
salaries. ZNP oppositionremainedas unyieldingas ever,eventuallyforcingthe ministerof
education(KazimierzMarcinkiewicz)to resign(see Sabbat-Swidlicka1994).

In short, inclusionmay be an insufficientstep. It does not address the main reason that
veto groups opposereforms. It also failsto protect changeteams from the actions of veto
groups.

Hypothesis 3:In casesof decentralization,

grantinggreaterfinancialautonomy
to localentitiesenhanceslocal-leveldemandfor reform.

Argument: To bolsterlocal-leveldemandfor decentralization,it is necessaryto generate

"localempowerment,"i.e.,grant local organs the appropriateauthorityand meansto man-
age resources(Kemmerer1994:1415;see also Rondinelliet al. 1989). Withoutautonomy
over budget,tax collection,and personnelmatters, local entties will see decentralizabon
more as a burdenthan an opportunity,possiblytuming againstthe reforms.18 Conversely,
accompanyingdecentralizationwith increased financialtransfers or revenue powers can
increasethe chance of local supportfor educationreform.

Examples: In Spain in the 1980s,a social democraticgovemment camiedout a quasi-

devolutionof decision-makingauthorityin educationto 17 newly createdquasi-federalre-
gions, calledautonomouscommunities,some of which harboredstrongpro-independence
movements(Hanson1990;Hanson 1989). The centralgovemmentgrantedlocal councils
authorityover school staffingand budget issues. The six communitiesthat were granted
competencias,i.e., decision-makingauthorty plus financial transfers, willingly accepted
the new decentralized reforms. In Papua New Guinea, provinces received both the
authorityto run schools and considerablecontrol over expenditures. Local entities thus

18 Forefficencygainsassociated
withlocalbudgetautonomy,seeSavedoff
(1998).

32
 PartTwo

becamestrongalliesof reform-minded
officialsbecausetheyreceivedbothrightsandnew
responsibilites.In Argentinain 1991,at the timeof the decentralization
decision,prov-
incesreceiveda significantincreasein fundingto manageeducation,facilitating
the ap-
provalof the 1992FederalEducationLaw. Predictably,
whentheserevenuesbeganto
declinein 1995,tensionsbetweenthe centralgovemmentand the provincesresurfaced
(Garciade Fanelli1997:99-102).

Caveats:Theliterature
on the benefitsandshortcomings
of decentralization
is vast,sug-
gestingthat decentralization
is not a panacea.Leavingasidethe controversial
question
overwhetherdecentralization
producesbetterlearning,therearepolitcalrisksassociated
with decentralization.
Decentralization
mightreduce,ratherthan increase,the account-
abilityof the localelite. Decentralized
institutions
mightreflect,ratherthanresolve,regres-
sivesocialpractices.In Bijnor,Indiadecentralized
localschoolsincorporate
provincialdi s-
criminatory
practices,
discouraging
accessto schoolsby Hindugirlsand Muslimminorities
(Jefferyand Jeffery1998). Moreover,
grantingfiscalautonomyto localentitiesmaybe in-
sufficientto addressa largerpoliticalproblemwithdecentralization-equivocal,
insincere,
or mixedcommitmenton the part of centralauthorities, as discussedin Part1. These
problemswill persistevenafterlocalentitiesbecomestrongreformadvocates.Oncethe
originalfactorsthatmotivated
the stateto decentralize
subside(information
andfiscaldefi-
cits, legitimacyneeds,inter-tieror inter-bureaucratic
politicalconflicts),centralauthorities
maybetemptedto reversedecentralization.

Neutraliing ReformOpponentsby OvercomingInstitutionalObstacles

Often,vetogroupswill be unswayedby strategiesof inclusion,information,

or compensa-
tion. It maythenbecomenecessary to thinkof strategiesto reducethe politicalleverage
of thesevetogroups.Teachers'unionscanbe one suchgroup. Teachers'
unionsoften
perceivequalityreformsas extractingseriousmaterialandpoliticalsacrifices
on theirpart
Comparedto othercost-bearers,
teachers'unionsenjoycomparative
politicaladvantages
as pressuregroups(seePart1). Theiroppositioncanseriouslyunderminereformproc-
esses. For thesereasons,reformapprovaland implementationis contingenton the co-
operationof teachers'unions,or at least,preventingthemfromderailing
the reformproc-
ess.

Undercertainconditions,
govemments maybe powerlessto do this. Unioncooperation
maydependon institutional
factorsbeyondthe controlof reformers.Underothercondi-
tions,however,
governments
cansignificantly
affectthe propensity
of unionsto cooperate.
Thissectionexaminessomeof theseconditions.

33
The Politics of Education Reform

Hypothesis1: Theaffiliation of teachers'unions(or anycost-bearing

group)
withoppositionpoliticalpartieshindergovemment-union cooperation.

Argument: Manypoliticalscientistsstressthat publicpolicyis greatlyshapedby the

characteristics
of domesticpoliticalinstitutions
(seeKaufman1999;Crowsonet al. 1996).
Thefeaturesof the partyare critical.In fragmented
and polarizedpoliticalpartysystems,
govemments
facegreatergovemingproblems(Haggardand Kaufman1995;Mainwaring
and Scully1995). It followsthat unionswith stronginstitutional
linksto oppositionparties
in polarizedor fragmentedpartysystemsare likelyto tum uncooperative.If opposition
partieshavea strongpresencein the legislature,unionresistanceis likelyto be even
stronger.A symbioticrelationship
betweenthe two actorsemerges.Partiesin the legis-
laturewith linksto unionsdeemthemto beworthdefendingin fearthat lossof unionsup-
portwill damagere-election
prospects.Simultaneously,
unionsthatexpectthe supportof
the legislature
are morelikelyto adopta recalcitrant
stand;theyshoutbecausetheyex-
pectto be heard. Thispressureslegislators
to beevenrmore
attentiveto uniondemands.

Examples:
In Polandin 1994,oncethe leadingteachers'uniondevelopedclosedlinks
with the mainoppositionparty,the Democratic
LeftAlliance,the reformprocessslowed
down. Similarly,
in Argentinabetween1983and1989,the govemmentsaKtempt to reform
the stateandstabilizethe economygeneratedenormoustensionbetweenthe rulingparty
(the UCR)and the mainoppositionparty(the Peronists).When,in 1986,the Peronist
Partytook leadership
of a teachers'union(CTERA)awayfromthe rulingparty,govern-
ment-teachers'
unionsrelationstumedincreasingly
hostile. In the 1990s,the govemment
hashadtroubleintroducing universityreformsin partbecauseof the stronglinksbetween
universitystudentassociations
andtheoppositionparties(Garciade Fanelli1997).

Caveats:Whileunionaffiliationwith oppositionpartiesmighthindergovemment-union
cooperation,
unionaffiliationwith the rulingparty is no guaranteeof unioncooperation.
Unionscanusetheirtiesto rulingpartyleaders,manyof whomoccupyinfluenbal positions
in government,
to advancetheir politicalpreferences.Thisis one reasonthateffortsto
decentralize
educationin Mexicoin the 1980sfailed. The SNTEopposednegotating
workingconditionsand other maKterswith 31 separategovemmentalentities(Fiske
1996:18).A seriesof unionstrikesfollowed.Checkmate
occurredwhenunionsbeganto
use their linkswith otheranti-reformrulingparty membersto blockthe reformsjointly.
Rulingpartyaffiliationthusfacilitatedthe riseof a formidableunion-bureaucrat
coalition
that forcedthe Mexicanexecutiveto retreat(McGinnand Street1986:486-488;
Lorey
1995;Perissinotto
1983).

34
 Part Two

Corollary: Improvingexecutive-legislative
relations on the issue of education
reformcanmoderateunionopposition.

Politicalpartieswithlinksto vetogroupsarenotalwaysbeholdento thesegroups.Some-

timesinfluencerunsthe otherway. Partiescandisciplineandgainthe cooperation
of af-
filiatedinterestgroups.Presidents
whomanageto negotiatedirectlywith-and win over-
politicalpartiesmaysucceedin getfingthesepartiesto obtainthe cooperation
of theiran-
cillarygroups. Reform-minded
executiveswho take congressional
relationsseriously
(e.g.,consultwithoppositionparties,encourageministersand technicaladvisersto attend
congressional
hearings,respondto legislators'
concems,acceptsomeof the opposition's
demands,etc.) standa fair chanceof obtainingthis type of endorsement
(seeCorrales
1997). Giventhe widespreadpopularityand prestigeof manyeducationreforms,even
legislators
fromthe oppositionmaybe persuaded
to supporteducationreforms,reserving
disagreements
withthe executivefor other,morecontentious
publicpolicies,provided,of
course,that the executivetakestheirconcemsintoaccount. Thismay neutralizeunion
opposition.Onceunionsrealizethat theiralliesin congresswill not acton their behalf,
theirpropensity
to actuncooperatively
maysubside.

Hypothesis2: Intemal unionfragmentationhinders union-govemmentcoop-

eration;extemal union fragmentationdiminishesthe power of unions.

Argument: Murllo(1999)arguesthatevenmoreimportantthan unionpoliticalaffiliation

arelevelsof unionfragmentation,
bothintemalandextemal.Intemallyfragmented
unions,
i.e.,unionswhoseleadership facesseriousintemalupheaval,includingchallenges
to the
leadership,are likelyto contestreforms.Whenunionleadersfeelthreatened frombelow,
theyare morelikelyto act as 'agentsof workers."Theywillfeel a greaterneedto com-
petefor members'
votesby challenging
stateeffortsto imposeconstraints.Unionleaders
whodo notfaceintemalchallenges,
on theotherhand,willfeelmorecomfortable cooper-
atingwith the stateand evenacceptingcertainsacrifices,as longas thereis somecom-
pensation.

Ontheotherhand,externally
fragmented
unions,i.e.,thosein whichmultipleunionscom-
petewithone anotherfor teachermembership, will be lesseffectivein disruptingreform.
In this institutional
setfing,"eachunionis weaker,and all of themcan onlybargainafter
coordinating
theiractions."(Murillo1999:48).The collectiveactionproblemsassociated
withfragmentation
reducethecapacityof unionsto blockthereforms.

35
The Politics of Education Reform

Examples: Murillo illustratesher argument by comparing Mexico and Argentina in the

1990s. Both are cases of reform implementationbut involvedifferentdegrees of govern-
ment concession. In Mexico duringthe early 1980s, the SNTE faced intemal fragmenta-
tion, which prompted union leadersto adopt a more adamantant-reform posture. When
PresidentSalinastook office in 1988, he addressedthis by settling internalfragmentation
and offeringpoliticaland materialconcessions. Unioncooperab'onfollowed. In Argentna,
teachers'unionsfaced external fragmentation.In addibonto three major unionsat the na-
tional level (CTERA, UDA and AMET), there were many smaller independentunions at
the provinciallevel. Unions thus had all the right motivationsto challengethe govemment
(their positon as cost-bearers,their links with oppositionparties)but none of the bargain-
ing power to extract concessions(extemalfragmentation). Thus, the governmentyielded
less.

Caveats: The institutionalfactors that fuel union propensityto challengereforms-links

with opposibonpartiesin a polarizedparty system and levels of intemal and extemalfra g-
mentation-are not insurmountable. Govemmentscan still counteract these institutional
obstacles,eitherby isolabngreformopponentsor creatingcounterbalancingcoalitionswith
other pressuregroups.

Hypothesis3: Strategiccoalitionsbetweencost-bearinggroups and other so-

cietal actorshinder reformn
adoption.

Argument: When veto groups form strategiccoalitionswith other societalgroups, reform

adopbonsuffers. Changeteams must thereforeanticipateand counteractthese coalitions.
It is importantto understandwhich actors may serve as potentialcoalition partnersof cost-
bearers.

Actors in processes of education reform can be classifiedinto two groups (Cerych and
Sabatier 1994). One group consists of affected players, or cost-bearers:those who di-
rectly bear the consequencesof reforms and play important roles in the implementation
process (e.g., teachers' unions, bureaucrats, school principals,politiciansin parliament
and universitystudentgroups). The second group consistsof outsider players:those who
do not bear the impact of the reforms directly, beneficialor otherwise (e.g., citizens-at-
large, employers,intellectualleaders,the media,the clergy, some students, some parent
groups and non-govemmentalorganizations). Although not direct stakeholders,outsider
playersare crucialin the politicsof educationreformbecausethey can be decisiveallies of
eitherpro-reformor anti-reformplayers.

36
 Part Two

Chart2: Scenariosto Avoid in Dealingwith Anti-reform"Affected Players"

Scenaro1

Player r [ayer

Scenario2

Affected Players OutsiderPlayers

Politicians,Teachers'Unions,Bureaucrats,
Principals, Civic Leaders,Employers,NGOs,Parents,
Universitystudentgroups,etc. Clergy,Media,etc.

Scenario1: Anti-reformplayerformscoalitionwith outsiderplayer

Scenano2: Anti-reformplayerformscoalitionwith anotheraffectedplayer
Result: Politicalinstabilityduringimplementation

If unions build coalitionswith either outsider players (Scenario1 in Chart 2) or with cost-
bearinggroups (Scenario2 in Chart 2), the reformsare injeopardy. If changeteams pre-
empt these coalitions,perhapseven counterbalancingthem by building coalitionsof their
own, they may reducethe powerof veto groups.

Examples: In Australiabetween 1987 and 1992, the nationalgovernmentlaunched a

far-reachingsystemicreform, includingsite-basedmanagementof schoolsand the estab-
lishmentof a nationalcurriculumat the primary and secondarylevels. The reformswere
informedby the principlesof economicrationality:greater schoolefficiency,higheroutput
targets, effectivenessand accountabilitywithout generatinghigher levels of state expen-
ditures (Robertsonand Woock 1991). The unions proceededto build an anti-reformalli-
ance with anotheraffectedplayer-politicians in parliament(Scenario2). The govemment
responded,not by counterbalancingthese alliances but rather by deployinga corporatist
strategy: incorporatinginto policy-makingofficiallyrecognizedinterest groups affected by
the reforms(Robertson1994;Robertsonand Woock 1991). The resultwas that the lever-
age of unions actually increased. They had not only societalallies, but also access to
policy-making,which they used to block the project. By the late 1980s,despite the issu-
ance of more than 20 major reportscalling for reform, very littlewas accomplished(Rob-
ertsonand Woock 1991).

37
The Politics of EducationReform

Caveat Unlikethe other two conditions(union-oppositionlinks and levels of fragmenta-

tion), coalitionswith other societalactors can be shaped by govemmentactions. Specifi-
cally,govemmentscan succeed in working around recalcitrantoppositiongroups. As a
general rule, govemmentsshould not be in the business of excludingpoliticalopponents,
or of surrenderingits attemptsto make new converts. Seekingto isolatea societalplayer
is always politcally risky becauseit fuels the ire of anti-reformplayersand signalsa lackof
commitmentto participation,which can tamish the credibilityof the reformprocess. How-
ever, when recalcitrantopponentsare involved and show no signs of yieldingdespitethe
best efforts by change teams to persuade them, working around them might be the only
choice. It is crucialat this point to mobilizenew coalitionpartners.

This is preciselywhat the state governmentof Victoria,Australiadid after 1992. A new

reform-mindedminister advanced education reforms by avoiding corporatism and de-
ploying instead strategiesto counterbalancethe coalitional possibilitiesof unions. The
minister avoided confrontationswith the unions and instructed bureaucrats to do the
same. He even ceased mentioningthe unions in public (Pascoeand Pascoe 1997; Rob-
ertson 1994:103). The govemment also foreclosed scenario 1 by forming its own alli-
ances with other actors. The govemment deployed an intensive communicationand in-
clusionarycampaigntargeted at outside players. For instance, it organized a series of
meetingswith joumalists,civic groups, NGOs, parentalassociationsand numerousother
civic leaders. It made heavy use of newspaperadvertisementand informationdissemina-
tion campaigns. The govemment also foreclosed the possibilityof scenario 2. It de-
ployed a strategy of co-optingschool principals,one of the affectedplayers in the reform
process. School principalswere granted a handsome package of inducementsfor in-
volvement,includingthe ability to hire their own staff and managetheir budgets,freedom
from many bureaucraticregulations, attractive remunerationpackagesand professional
development programs. In short, the govemment built a strategicalliancewith outsider
actors as well as one crucial potential cost-bearer (principals), which effectively pre-
empted the coalitionpossibilitiesof veto groups.

Mexico in the 1990s followed a similar approach. By channelingfunding into previously

under-funded education sectors and actors, the govemment gained new political allies
and, in the process,diminishedthe alliancepossibilitiesof unions. For instance,the gov-
emment funded the creation of 18 new technologicalinstituteswith close links to private
sector employers. Publicinstitutionswere urged to augment their income using nongov-
emmental sources, includingraising student fees, selling services and establishingcon-
tracts with the privatesector. As a result, new actors-businessmen, rectors, department

38
 Part Two

heads,policyconsultants
and researchers-wereincludedand,consequently,
the poten-
tial cost-bearer-union leaders,student activistsand sectors of academia-were
.pushed offto the sidelines"
(Kent1993).

Coalitionsthusmaximizethe powerof vetogroups,but alsoof changeteams. If change

teamssucceedin formingtheirowncoalitionswithoutsiderandaffectedplayers,theycan
overcomesomeofthe institutional
factorsthatbolsterthepowerof vetogroups.

39
Conclusion

The politicalimpediments
to educationreformarenottrivial,buttheyare not insurmount-
ableeither.Sincethe1980s,numerouscountries
fromvariousregionswith differentlevels
of developmenthavemanagedto approveand implementimpressivequality-oriented
educationreforms. The lessonfromthesecasesis that reformimplementation
is more
feasiblepolitically
whenthe followingconditions
are met:

1) Addressing
the cost-impact
of reforms

Therearethreewaysto addressthecost-impactof reforms.Thesestrategies,however,

involvetrade-offs.The firstis to compensate
for the costsof reformwith concentrated
benefits.Thesebenefitscanbe material(higherwages)or political(reorganization
of un-
ionpolitics).Onepotentialpitfallof thisis the possibilityof usingthesebenefitsfor corrup-
tion and politicalpatronage. A secondstrategyis to "lower"implementation
costsby
movingincrementally.
Thiscanreducethe intensityof opposition,but runsthe riskof re-
formprocesseslosingmomentum.A thirdstrategyis packaging
educationreformsin tan-
demwithbroaderpublicsectorreforms.Thiscanmakecost-bearers
feellesssingledout,
butalsocanleadto educationreformsbeingmarginalized
orcompromised.

2) Bolstering
thesupplyof anddemandforreform

Boththe supply(govemment
initiative)and demand(organizedcitizenacclaim)for quality
reformsin educationare likelyto be weakor unreliable.Successfulreformadoptionre-
quiresaddressing
this. Weaknesses
in the supplyof reformscan be addressedby en-
suringlongertermsof officeforreformers(i.e.,lowerministerialtumover),maintaining
links
withthe globaleconomyand intemational
advisorsand,importantly,
settingup independ-
entVadvisory
councils. The latteroptionemergesas a promisinginstitutionalchannel
availableto almostanygovemment.Independent
councilshavethe potentialto galvanize
and sustainministerialcommitment
whilesimultaneously
forgingties betweenreformers
andsocietalgroups.

Weaknessin the demandfor reformmaybeenhancedthrough:a) inclusionary

strategies
that assignconcreteroles to passivestakeholders(e.g., incorporateparentsin new
school-level
boards),b) information
campaigns
that counteractthe propensity
of thegen-
eral publicto remainrationallyignorant;and c) grantingfinancialautonomy(notjust new
duties)to localentitiesin casesof decentralization.
One shouldbearin mindthatthese

41
The Politics of EducationReform

steps are effectivemostlyas mechanismsfor mobilizingpotental beneficiarieswho might

be initiallyapatheticabout reforms. They are less efFectiveand may even be counterpro-
ductive as strategiesto deal with recalcitrantcost-bearinggroups. These groups will not
become supportersof reformsimply becausethey are listened to or targeted by informa-
tion campaigns.

3) Addressingthe institutionalfactorsthat magnifythe bargainingpowerof veto groups

Seriouseducationreformsinevitablyproducelosers. Whetheror not these losers take ac-

tive stands against the reforms may depend on certain institutionalvariables:a) strong
links betweenveto groups and opposition parties in polarized politicalparty systems, b)
the status of executive-legislative
relations;c) leadershipchallengesinsideand outsidethe
unions; and d) strategic coalitions betweenveto groups and other societalgroups. Of
these, (b) and (d) seem to be the most malleableby govemment policies. These are ar-
eas inwhich govemmentalpoliciescan overcomeinstitutionalblocks.

It is clear that for qualityeducationreformsto proceed politically,these three politicalhu r-

dles must be overcome. It is lessclear, however,which variablesor approachesare most
effectivein addressingeach of these hurdles. Becauseof limitationsin the selectionproc-
ess of the cases used, this paper can not providedefinitive assessmentsabout the gen-
eral validity of hypothesizedfactors. However,the factors identifiedare theoreticallyin-
formedand, most important,groundedon empiricalexamples,and thus deserve attention
by future researchers.

42
 Appendix

I
Changes in Ministers of Education and Ministers of Finance in Selected Cases of Education Reforrm

Argentina Australia Chile Colombia El Salvador Indonesia Jordan

Year Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance

78 Catalan Martinez Canick Robirson Niemann de Castro Rivas Palacio Herrera Lopez Thayeb Wardhana Majaii Ad-Dabbas

79 Llenera Vial UoLreda Garcia Joesoef

80 Fife Prieto Coindres Riqueza Shafiq Musadeh

81 GuilFoyle Angulo Aquilino Tenorio Jusuf Al-Tal

82 Burundarena Alernan Alban Wiesner

83 Licciardo Wehbe Baume Arriagada Luders Arias Gutierrez

84 AJconada Grinsptun Ryan Dawkins Aranguloz Caceres Escobar Rigoberto Notosusanto Prawiro AI-Saket Odeh

85 Walsh Escobar Eder Junguito Buendia Lopez

86 Vtal Gaete Buchi Suarez Palacios Hassan AF-Majali Awdah

87 Rajri Urbe Gaviria AI-Hindawi

88 Sabato Dawirins Guzman Yepes Alarcon Cruz

89 Salonia Becerra Sumarlin AP-Asad

90 Rapanelli Salarne Costaval Hemandez Alvarado Hamdan Jardaneh

91 Erman Willis Lagos Foxdey Valdivieso Hommes Akaileh

92 Cavallo Beazley Holmes Gallardo Sagrera Hindawi

93 Rodriguez Arrate

94 Crean Beaziey Pachon Dojojonegro Muhammed AI-Ommar Gammo

95 Molina Aninat Saravia Perry Cordova Al-Rawabidah Jardaneh

96 Mejia Al-Masr Awad

97 Decibe Femrandez Vanstone Fahey Arellano Nino Ocampo Zablah Hafiz

98 Kemp Unndula Hamdan

Average
Tenure 2.1 2.33 2.33 3 1.75 2.63 1.24 1 75 3 2.33 3.5 5.25 1.5 2.33

43
 - - - S1-1
- - ~ . - . .11111
Year Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance
78 Hoff Phillips Solana Ibarra Gandar Muldoon Khan Hoti Kazi Tammur Holloway Elbsperu Saenz Kuberski Kisiel Gadea Dumitrescu
79 Blamo Wellington IshagKhan Guabloche Sava
80 Fahnbulleh Zulu Tulo Kaputin Teichma Sporic Niculescu
81 Alarco Ulloa Kruszewski Krzak
82 Boley Jones Benavides Faron Gigea
83 Reyes Silva . Holloway Bouraga Rodriguez Nieckarz Teoreanu
84 Afzal Paniagua Benaviles
85 Marshall Douglas Vacant Wingti Cardo Garrido-
Lecca
86 Gonga Gonzalez
86 Gonga
Gonzalez Aheer ~Khan Matiabe
~~~~~~
~~~ _
Chan
_
Pango
~~~~~~~~Wattoo
_ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
Alva
_ _ __
Michalows
ka
87 Bestman . Petricioli Davis Kwarara Samojilik Babe
88 Farhat Lange Haider Aoae Cabanillas Saberbein Bednarski Paraschiv

89 Bartltt Aspe Caygill Shah Bhutto Genia Pora Rivas Fisiak Wroblewsk Patan

90 Shaw Goff Vasquez Samsonow Balcerowic Sora

icz z

91 Vacant Tarr Smith Richardson Imam Aziz Samana Punte Boloria Glebocki Gheorghe Dijmarescu
I I P~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~uent
92 Vacant Zedillo Ba=lilas Stelmacho
________ ________ ________ ________ ~~~~~ Vacant _
Golu
_
Danielescu
~ ~~~wski _ _

93 Vacant Baing Chan Camet Flisowski Osiatynski Maior Georgescu

94 Zangai Tarpeh Solana Birch Shah Bhutto langalio Trelles Luczak Kolodko rg
95 Limon Ortiz Onguglo Haiveta C6rdova Czamy
96 Bah Kromah I _Creech I Palemmo Wiatr
97 Ali Shah Aziz Vacant Beka Petrescu Ciumara
GhousAll Babcerowic
98 Kandakai Saleeby Gurria Shah Taranupi Yagabo Baca Handke z Marga Daianu
Average
Tenure 1.91 2.1 3 3.5 3 3 2.33 2.63 1.75 2.1 1.62 1.62 1.4 1.91 2.33 1.91
(years)

44
 Appendix 1 (continued)

South Africa South Korea Spain Thailand Uruguay Venezuela

Year Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance
78 Cruywagen Horwood Chan-Hyun Yong-Whan Cavero Femandez Martin Suthatham Danacq Ansmende Rafael Silva
79 Won-Ki _ Pungtrakul FHemandez Ugueto
80 Janson Ok-GUI Woun-Gie Otero Garcia Ketudat Viravam
81 Viijoen Kyu-Ho Sung-Yun Ortega
82 Bae-Rha Mayor Sirisumpundh Hoontrakool Lombardo _

83 Kyung-Shik Maravall Boyer Aznarez Sosa

84 E-Hyok Mahn-Je Leekpai Schoeder Vilegas Lemer Azpurua
85 de Kberk Du Plessis Jae-Suk Reta Zerbino Carbonell
86 In-Yong Soichaga
87 Bunnag Singhasaneh
88 Young-Shik Kong-ll Ratankoses Cabello Hurtado
89 Won-Shik Kyu-Sung Solana Sabhavasu Roosen Hurbe
90 Merwe Yung-Euy Garcia Braga Pocaterra

91 91 Hyong-Sup
gp Sawasdipanirc
Singhasaneh
~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ha
Sngasna
92 Marais Keys Wan-Kyu Yong-Nam Simasathien Posadas Augusto Rosas
93 Byung-Moon Jae-Hyung Perez
Byung-Moon
Perez
Jae-Hyug ThongsamakNrmanahae
Thongsamak minda Mercader
__________
de Cakderas Rafael

94 Bengu Sook-He Suarez Solbes Cardenas Sosa

95 Liebenberg Saavedra Randsitpol Sathianthai Lichtensztejn Mosca Matos
96 Manuel Byung-Young Woong-Bae Aguirre Rato Chunnanand
97 Kyong-Sik De Ratoy Vacant

98 Hae-Chan Kyu-Song Silpa-Archa mmanda Izaguierre

Average
Tenure 3 4.20 1.62 1.31 2.1 3 2.1 1.62 3 3 2.33 1.75
(years)

45
 High. Educ.
Education (created Finance
_ ~~~19J8)
78 Walker Colvilile
79 ConiJeGibson Bulle
80 Mutumbuka Nkala
81
82 Chidzero
83
84
85 _
86
87
88 Chung Mutumbuka
89 Vacant
90 Ishemunyoro
91
92 _
93 Mangwende Mudenge
94
95 Lesabe Chombo Chambati
96 Garwe Murerwa
97 Machinga
98 _
Average
Tenure 2.63 2.2 3.5
(years)

Source:Eumpa WorldYearbook,variousyears.
Notes:The Yearbookdoesnot publishexacttenuresof a country'sministers.Instead,it providesthe nameof the ministeravailableto the editorsat the timeof publishing,usuallybetweenJanuaryand March. The
Yearbookwould not reflect two or more changes of ministers in one year. Thus,this listmay under-represent
the exactnumberof ministers.For instance,in Mexicotherewere two ministersof education
betweenSolana(1993)and ULmon(1994). Thus,for mostcountriesreported,theactualcoveragetenure in offioeis probablylowerthan indicatedby thesefigures. Vacancieswerecountedas a changein minister.

46
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ETHE WORLD BANK
The objective of this series is to provide client countries
with timely insight and analysis of large-scale education
reform efforts around the world. The series examines
how education reforms are successfully launched, imple-
mented and managed effectively in a given political
economy. This series is under the editorial supervision of
the Education Reform and Management Team (ERM), part
of the Human Development Network-Education at the
World Bank. The views expressed or implied in this se-
ries should not be interpreted as official positions of the
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tion Knowledge Management System.

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