THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SECURITY

A Case of Strategic Culture in the West Philippine Sea

(2011-2016)

Chester B. Cabalza, Ph.D.

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 Table of Contents

Page
Chapter I
1.1 Background 1
The Anthropology of Security 1
Strategic Culture 7
Operational Definitions 9
1.2 Statement of the Problem 10
1.3 Research Objectives 11
1.4 Significance of the Study 12
1.5 Scope and Limitations 14
1.6 Theoretical Framework 16
1.7 Conceptual Framework 19
1.8 Research Design 21
1.9 Key Informants 24
1.10 The Setting 24
1.11 Instruments and Methods of Research 25
Focus Group Discussion 25
Key Informant Interview 25
Process Tracing 26
Documents Review 26
1.12 Data Gathering 26
1.13 Data Analysis 27
1.14 Ethical Considerations 28
Chapter Two
2.1 Review of Related Literature 30
2.1.1 ‘Securitizing’ Anthropology and Ethnographies
Related to War 31
2.1.2 Unleashing the Strategic Culture 36
2.1.3 Maps as Artifacts in the West Philippine Sea 36
2.2 Configuration of the West Philippine Sea 41
2.2.1Peopling of the West Philippine Sea 46
2.2.2Kalayaan Island Group 46
2.2.3Bajo de Masinloc 50
2.3 Culture at a Distance: Chinese Strategic Culture and
Paramount Leaders 52
2.3.1 Chinese Paramount Leaders 54

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 2.3.2 Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communism 55
2.3.3 Deng Xiaoping and the Socialist Capitalism 57
2.3.4 Jiang Zemin and the Three Represents 59
2.3.5 Hu Jintao and the Harmonious Society 61
2.3.6 Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream 63
2.3.7Strategic Culture of Five Generations 65
Chapter III
3.1 People-to-People Engagements 68
3.1.1 Prologue: Fusion of Language, Culture, History 68
3.1.2 Philippines-China Relations 76
3.2 Elevating State’s National Interests 79
3.2.1Tapestry of External Security Threat in the
West Philippine Sea 79
3.2.2 Rite of Passage in the Battle of Ideas 86
3.3 A Bull’s-eye to Strategic Culture 88
3.3.1 The Maritime Situation in the West Philippine Sea 88
3.3.2 The Great Wall of Sea 96
3.4 ASEAN and the Duterte Administration 104
3.5 Post-Hague Ruling 107
3.6 PH Strategic Culture: Of laws, diplomacy and military might 109
3.7 The Spirit of the Law 117
3.8 Bilateral or Multilateral Negotiation 121
3.9 Building a Credible Deterrence 127
Chapter IV
4.1 Summary 133
4.2Conclusion 135
Consolidating Philippine Strategic Culture 135
- Crafting of National Security strategy and Prescription of a
National Security Policy 135
- Philippines Lack of National Security Strategy despite
Evident Historical and Episodic Robust Strategic Culture 136
- Change of Mindset: Strategy is not Co-terminus with
an Administration 137
- Episodic Strategic Culture from 2011 to 2016 138
- Perspective of the Adversary 141
4.3 Recommendations 142
- Institutionalizing Strategic Culture 143
- Clarity of Defense and Foreign Policies of the New Admin 144
- Mettle of Diplomacy 144
Bibliography 146
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 Figures
Page

Figure 1: Philippine Sector Gaps and Strengths 3

Figure 2: Indigenous Framework of Analysis of Philippine Security 6
Figure 3: Strategic Culture 8
Figure 4: Issue Map 18
Figure 5: Conceptual Framework 20
Figure 6: Murillo Map 39
Figure 7: Crossroad to the West Philippine Sea 42
Figure 8: Overlapping Claims in the South China Sea 42
Figure 9: PH Territorial Claim in the West Philippine Sea 43
Figure 10: Map of the Kalayaan Island Group 47
Figure 11: Territories Claimed by PH in the Spratlys Archipelago 48
Figure 12: Photo of Pag-asa Island (Thitu Island) 49
Figure 13: Maps of Bajo de Masinloc 51
Figure 14: The Rise of the Chinese Paramount Leaders 54
Figure 15: Hierarchy of Powers of Chinese Paramount Leaders 66
Figure 16: Strategic Triangle in the South China Sea with
Scarborough Shoal 93
Figure 17: Focus Group Discussion with Masinloc Fisherfolks 94
Figure 18: Great Wall of Sea 96
Figure 20: Strong Militarization in the South China Sea 129

Table

Chinese Transformative Strategic Culture 55

Annexes

Key Informants 156

Guide Questions for Key Informants 157
SWOC Analysis - Legal Strategy: Rules-Based Approach 158
SWOC Analysis - Diplomatic Strategy: Bilateral or Multilateral 160
SWOC Analysis - Military Strategy: Credible Deterrence 162
Events in the West Philippine Sea 165

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

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AAA - American Anthropological Association

AADS - Active Archipelagic Defense System

AFP - Armed Forces of the Philippines

AO - Administrative Order

APCSS - Asia-Pacific Center of Security Studies

ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BdM - Bajo de Masinloc

CPC - Communist Party of China

CCP - Chinese Communist Party

DFA - Department of Foreign Affairs

DND - Department of National Defense

ECS - Extended Continental Shelf

EDCA - Enhanced Defense and Cooperation Agreement

EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone

FGD - Focus Group Discussion

HTS - Human Terrain System

ITLOS - International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea

KI - Key Informant

KIG - Kalayaan Islands Group

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NAVFORWEST - Naval Forces West

NDCP - National Defense College of the Philippines

NPTC - North Palawan Continental Terrane

NSA - National Statistics Authority

NSC - National Security Council

NSO - National Statistics Office

NSP - National Security Policy

NSS - National Security Strategy

PH - Philippines

PCA - Permanent Court of Arbitration

PLA - People’s Liberation Army

PLAN - People’s Liberation Army Navy

PN - Philippine Navy

PRC - People’s Republic of China

RRL - Review of Related Literature

SCS - South China Sea

SME - Subject Matter Expert

SWOC - Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Challenges

UN - United Nations

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization
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UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the SEA

WESTCOM - Western Command

WPS - West Philippine Sea

WWII - World War Two

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 CHAPTER 1

1.1 Background

The Anthropology of Security

The anthropology of security (Shimizu and van Bremen, 2000; Goldstein, 2010; Cabalza,
2013; Maguire, Frois, and Zurawski, 2014) is a new epistemological perspective that dissects the
evolving ties between anthropology and the security sector. Although defense may fall under the
military dimension that is subdued by the broader concept of security (Baldwin, 1997; Alagappa,
1998; Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998; Kintanar, 2013; Chandra and Bhonsle, 2015), redefinition
of security outside of plainly defense and military to include strategic culture (Gray, 2006;
de Castro, 2014; Booth, 2015) should be enhanced.

Anthropologically speaking, “holism which is the thrust of anthropology has influenced

the study of security because of its multi-disciplinal approach whereby one studies panoramic
phenomena using different bodies of knowledge. Thus, the lexicon of social evolutionary process
in the anthropology’s militarization has a tinge of ‘otherness’ that substantially affects the wide
ranging discourses of security issues” (Cabalza, 2013:76).

Renowned anthropologists like Evans-Pritchard, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead,

Akitoshi Shimizu, Felipe Landa Jocano, and Montgomery McFate may have co-opted with the
military and defense in retrospect to understanding the broad and narrow concept of security.
Thus, “the overt and covert involvement of scholars with wars, single or team, is a common
feature of academic life” (Shimizu, 2003:19).

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 From the time anatomically modern humans (AMHs) fought for territoriality from
mammoth beasts and other human species, arming themselves with novel and innovative lithics
for defense, anthropology has tremendously contributed to human security. 1 The insecurity of
human survival would later on lead to invasion, war, conflict and terrorism that remain insatiable
in an anarchic world seen by many realists.

Security2 is the sum total of our people’s well-being as well as our anchor as a sovereign
state imbued with our dreams and aspirations. Our concept of national security 3 has adopted the
worldview of security that is centered on human security (UN, 1994). It is the state or condition
wherein the sovereignty, territorial integrity, people’s way of life and institutions are protected
and enhanced (NDCP, 2010). Thus, people’s culture being the central national interest, coded in
our security strategy and policies that may form part in our holistic yet imprecise strategic
culture, highlights what is of principal priority to the state.

In the past, national security was perceived primarily as the absence of threat to territory
or the absence of war. As nations progressed in changing environments, the concept of security
architecture has presented a multitude of unprecedented threats and challenges. This requires
different military and other national capabilities.

Even ancient or classical western and oriental thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Kautilya, Sun
Tzu, Confucius and Niccolo Machiavelli regard security vital to society and humanity. The iota
of security was furthermore expounded by modern philosophers including Antonio Gramsci,
Carl von Clausewitz, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Thomas Hobbes that became
more pronounced in post-World War and post-Cold War, profoundly articulated by leading
political scholars such as Robert Kaplan, Henry Kissinger, Harold Lasswell, Walter Lippman

1
Human Security as defined by the United Nations (1994) is a condition which entails basic material needs, human
dignity, meaningful participation in the life of the community and democracy. There are seven (7) areas of security
proposed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report that includes
Community Security, Health Security, Economic Security, Food Security, Political Security, Environmental
Security, and Personal Security.
2
Security was coined early as 15th century from Latin word “securitas” with its semantics “secura” meaning
carefree, without care, and free from care.
3
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998:5) dissect the levels of analysis of security as they scrutinize the international
systems (global security), international sub-systems (regional security), units (national security), sub-units (group
security), and individuals (personal security).

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and Hans Morgenthau as they discussed the importance of security. In post 9/11, the broader and
complex concept of security has been narrowly expounded and defined as Daniel Goldstein
(2010) advocates critical “security anthropology” 4 that recognizes the significance of security
discourses and practices to the global and local contexts in which cultural anthropology operates.

To clarify the concept, “security anthropology” is an attempt to mainstream security

issues as an emerging discourse in the subfield of cultural anthropology under the domain of
political anthropology. In the Journal of Cultural Anthropology by Michelle Stewart and Vivian
Choi (2014), they emphasized security topics archiving contemporary global security threats to
better understand security through their diverse ethnographic settings and approaches.

relatively strong relatively weak

demography internal technology pandemics (more gaps)
refugee crisis security
ASEAN cybersecurity
OFWs migration health integration regional
flashpoints environmental
terrorism transnational crime degradation
SCS/WPS
climate change regional borders
cultural
global warming
conflict
military buildup
peace process
educational
standards Income
Leadership rise of China
Distribution
Global Governance
Financial resource issues
Stability
globalization Disaster Risk
increasing Reduction and
economic blocs Recovery
Disaster response Urbanization Continuity of policies

Public Order and Safety

Figure 1: Visual representation of Philippines Security Sector Gaps and Strengths. Identifying traditional and non-traditional security threats that
the Philippine government must scrutinize and understand to craft an effective National Security Policy (NSP) to enhance the country’s National
Security Strategy (NSS) based from the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) during the Workshop on Global-National Security, organized by the
National Security Council (NSC) and Asia-Pacific Center of Security Studies (APCSS) last September 2015.

4
Security Anthropology is an emerging subfield of Cultural Anthropology under the domain of Political
Anthropology.

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 As the traditional concept of security has metamorphosed into various prisms of
non-traditional security,5 the lens of the anthropology of security will look at it primordially on
the nation-state’s strategic culture embodied in its intergenerational values and cultures
particularly on its continuing ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects.

Then there is also a dichotomy between internal security and external security within the
broader or narrow concept of national security. 6 That Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(APCSS) based in Hawaii deems that there is a caveat in dividing security into internal and
external security threats. These are some of the discourses that should be fluently debated upon
into understanding and dissecting the evolving concept of security.

At the 48th Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur last August 4, 2015 Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario
said that the Philippines considered China an “external [security] threat” because of its
incursions into Manila’s 370-kilometer exclusive economic zone” (Calleja, 2015).

But our reawakening always starts with a conflict. China’s movements and strategies in
the West Philippine Sea (WPS) have made us look at our defense policies anew. The Philippines
has long been confronted with the territorial dispute in the WPS but has had limited capabilities
to address the security issue. The country has been focusing on an internal armed conflict for
decades that external defense, such as the tug-of-war over territories in these waters, has been a
secondary preoccupation of the government (Dizon, 2012).

When President Benigno Aquino III assumed office, he intended to modernize the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), to strengthen the country’s territorial defense and counter
China’s aggression in the WPS. The lack of financial support from the Philippine Congress
prevented the immediate implementation of the plan. But the March 2, 2011 incident between the
5
The rise of non-traditional security widens the scope of traditional security as a subject of analysis. From a realist
and state-centric concept of traditional security, non-traditional security is socially constructed by idealists to
encompass concerns on cultural diplomacy, economic development, governance, human rights, gender, climate
change, technology, and among others.
6
The Administrative Code of 1987 further provides that the defense establishment shall be maintained to maximize
its effectiveness in guarding against external and internal threats to national peace and security, and provide support
for social and economic development.

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Philippine survey ship and two Chinese patrol boats at Reed Bank prompted the Aquino
administration7 to redirect the security focus (de Castro, 2012).

States initiate military transformations to avoid strategic defeats, prevent another country
from occupying its territory, thwart the grand design of a new enemy state or its strategy,
or sometimes respond to the pressures from civilian authorities or a political process internal to
the military such as inter-service rivalries or budget pressure or opportunities. “Military
transformation can be dictated by the armed forces’ priorities or change of focus like shifting
from internal security to conventional military posture or territorial defense. This kind of change
is accompanied by external trappings to upgrade military capability” (de Castro, 2012:69-70).

Understanding the changing concept of security as an academic subject is an ongoing

preoccupation of many scholars, thus the epistemic debates in various fields may stem from
various perspectives in making sense of security as a concept and as a complex phenomenon
(Baldwin, 1997; Buzan, 1998; Chandra, 2015).

Thus, the security landscape requires also a transformation in education and development
of broad competencies. Development of strategic leadership competencies requires integration of
professional education. “Defense education for AFP strategic leadership education framework
should incorporate competency, content, structural elements and an enabling environment.
Integration of education helps improve the delivery of education that helps generate quality
graduates better prepared to meet contemporary security challenges” (Paredes, 2014:47).

A case in point is the Philippines’ concept of security, i.e. holistic and comprehensive yet
fluid but not solid based from vernacular linguistic domains that refer to security. For instance,
the interpretation of the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) hymn, given the
literal and contextual meanings of lines and lyrics leading to a subjective understanding of the

7
“There was a time when we couldn’t approximately respond to the threats in our own backyard. Now, our
message to the world is clear: What is ours is ours; setting foot on Recto Bank is no different from setting foot on
Recto Avenue.” President Benigno Aquino’s policy pronouncement regarding the WPS during his Second State of
the Nation Address (SONA). Official Gazette, 25 July 2011, http://www.gov.ph/2011/07/05/benigno-s-aquino-III-
second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-25-2011-en, accessed on 8 February 2016.

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realities and metaphors in the crafty language of the song, this literary piece uses both the realist
and constructivist tones in idealizing national defense and security.

Me aning / NDCP Hymn INDIGENOUS FRAMEWORK

Kahulugan OF ANALYSIS OF
Pandayan ng pus o is ip at PHILIPPINE SECURITY
Kapayapaan diwa
(Peace) Dalubhasaang pambans a
Sa pagtatanggol ng baya’t
Kapanatagan
bandila
(Safe/ Secure) May patnubay ni Bathala
Ang katatagan ang tanging
Kaginhawaan lunas
(Comfort) Sa katiwas ayan ng Pilipinas SECURITY
Ginigising mo ang kaisahang
Katatagan lakas
(Firmness, Stability) At pag-ibig s a bayang wagas

Kapahingahan (Peace,
Kulturang s arili ay Ka tiwa saya n
mababakas
Repose, Quietness) Na tayo ay maharlikang likas
Ang kahirapan ng kahapo’y
Katimawaan (Liberation, nagwakas Panata g Tanggol
Sa masaganang bukas (Loob) (La bas)
Emancipation, Freedom)
Ang pinkakadakilang
tuntunin mo
Kaligtasan (Protection)
Na tumimo sa pus o ko
Sa layang natamo
Katibayan (Endurance), Ilaan ang buhay ko
Ang layang natamo
Katahimikan (Silence) Dapat lang na ipagtanggol
mo
Hinaon (Relax, CHESTER CABALZA, 2013
- MNSA RC 2 2 (1 9 87)
Diplomatic)
Figure 2: An Indigenous Framework of Analysis in looking at Philippine Security. A tangible artifact that would better describe the country’s
security is found on the NDCP hymn that strongly resonate the lyrics of “stability is the only solution to Philippine security”. Included in the
framework are underlying translations of security expressed in Philippine vernacular language.

Based on the framework of analyzing Philippine security, the essence of “defense” is

tagged in the word tanggol (labas) or “outside” which is the role of the military to safeguard our
territory from invading forces. Unlike the concept of security which appears fluid based from
voracious vernacular translations, it simplifies Filipinos lack or gain of a robust strategic culture.
The NDCP alumni use “katiwasayan” for security that sounds highfaluting to common people,
despite a number of meanings of security.

In the discourse of security, it is not surprising to learn that security in Chinese character
comes from the etymology of a “woman inside a house”. This calligraphic representation of a
woman in the Chinese culture hypothetically places Chinese women with high-esteem supported

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by Mao Zedong’s political decree, referring to them as those “holding up half the sky” in
Chinese society (Cabalza, 2013). Compared to the Philippines, from a Filipino mother’s instinct,
being the “ilaw ng tahanan” (light of the family), she embraces the feeling/thinking of “panatag
ang loob ko” to ensure safety and/or security for a member of the family. In a matrifocal
Philippine society, security can therefore be construed as “internal” rather than “external” given
this predisposition. Could it mean that the country’s strategic culture is generally boxed by this
kind of philosophy, the way we give importance to “panloob” (internal) instead of “panlabas”
(external) in our security?

Strategic Culture

Configurations and patterns of culture are rooted in the formative experiences of the state.
These are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive
characteristics of the nation and its elites (Johnston, 2005). Thus, a strategic culture defines a set
of patterns of and for behavior on war and peace issues. It helps shape behavior on such issues as
the use of force in diplomacy, civil-military relations and strategic doctrine (Booth, 2005).

As of this date, out of 196 countries worldwide, there are only 86 nation-states that have
national security strategy documents (Stolberg, 2012). Although strategy crafting is an art and
not a science, sometimes, strategies can work and sometimes not. Strategic culture takes time to
nurture as it takes a generation to develop. It does not only elevate the culture of leadership but
rather a robust strategic culture must be holistic. Finally, strategic culture is a function of the
following factors: (1) geo-political setting of the nation-state, (2) relations of societies and the
international community, (3) civil-military relations, (4) political culture and ideology,
(5) behaviors and philosophy, (6) military and civilian history of the state, and (7) state of
military technology (Booth 2005). It could also be possible that in times of conflict or war, a
robust strategic culture can work through (8) diplomacy as the first line of defense, (9) use of the
rule of law, and (10) military might (Cabalza, 2015).

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 Summarizing Colin Gray’s thoughts on strategic culture, he deems that scholars cannot
agree on how to define strategic culture. The principal disagreement is between those who
include behavior within their definition, and those who exclude it. This is a burning issue for
theory builders but otherwise is not really of any great significance. However, he emphasizes that
culture is of the utmost importance. It functions at, indeed as, the engine of thought and behavior.
He surmises that Clausewitz tells us that war is a contest between two wills, and the will of a
belligerent is the product of moral factors which can be summarized as culture. Sun Tzu was
right in insisting on the importance of self knowledge and of knowledge of one’s enemies.
Cultural comprehension meets that insistence (Gray, 2006).

Strategic Culture
Strategy
It is a pattern in a stream of decisions
needed in shaping the future. It is an
attempt to get to desirable ends with
available means to ensure long-term
success if followed faithfully. (Mintzberg,
1996; McKeown, 2011; Kvint, 2009)
Culture
Is that complex whole which includes
knowledge, beliefs, law, morals, customs,
and any other capabilities and habits
acquired by man as a member of a society
(E.B. Tylor, 1871). The totality of socially
transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs,
institutions, and human works and thought.

Anthropology of Security STRATEGIC CULTURE

The lens of looking at security in a
holistic nature encompassing broad and
narrow concepts of security and not just
the coercive elements of state power but
also the fate of human collectivities
emphasizing people’s way of life and the
state’s interests (Cabalza, 2016)
It is derived from history, geography and political
culture, and it represents the aggregation of
attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most
influential voices; these may be, depending on the
entity, the political elite, the military establishment
and/or public opinion (Booth, 2005)

Figure 3: A visual representation showing how strategic culture may work with consolidated definitions of scholarly concepts.

Furthermore, David Hugland (2014) cited Johnston as the latter identified three waves, or
‘generations’ of strategic-cultural analysis. The first generation carved the idea of strategic
culture in 1970s with the emergence of Soviet culture to counter Western assessments of
deterrence dynamics. The second generation led by Gramscians as they pave way for the
growing subfield of critical security studies. And a third generation includes Johnston himself
that looks at the symbolic transmission of policy-relevant meaning and emotion across time and
space.

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 Two assumed key foundations that the Philippines may have neglected to explore and
optimize yet to achieve a stronger strategic culture is the lack of crafting a National Security
Strategy (NSS) and prescription of consistent National Security Policy (NSP) 8 that should be
responsive to the volatile, uncertain, changing, ambiguous, threatening and hostile nature of
security that would certainly enhance the country’s strategic culture particularly with complex
internal security problem on protracted secessionism and increasing external security threat on
maritime and territorial disputes in the Spartlys archipelago. The NSS and NSP are unified
documents that embody the people’s traditions, habits, values, way of life and attitudes that
prescribe the behavior and action of a nation-state, helpful in achieving a robust strategic culture.

Operational Definitions

Anthropology of Security – this is the lens of looking at security in its holistic nature
encompassing broad and narrow concepts of security and not just the coercive elements of state
power but also the fate of human collectivities emphasizing people’s way of life and the state’s
interests.

Culture – the totality of socially transmitted behavioral patterns, arts, beliefs,

institutions, and human works and thought.

Security - the sum total of our people’s well-being as well as our anchor as a sovereign
state imbued with our dreams and aspirations.

Strategy – a pattern in a stream of decisions needed in shaping the future in an attempt to

get to desirable ends with available means to ensure long-term success if followed faithfully.

8
“Our quest must not only focus on ensuring stability of the State and the security of our nation. Our ultimate goal
must be the safety and well-being of our people.” This is how President Benigno S. Aquino III characterizes the
national security policy of the Philippines. Under his tenure as president, the National Security Policy 2011-2016
identified elements that include socio-political stability, territorial integrity, economic solidarity, ecological balance,
cultural cohesiveness, moral-spiritual consensus, and peace and harmony.

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 Strategic Culture – the totality of history, geography and political culture representing
the aggregation of attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential voices that can be an
entity, the political elite, the military and security establishment, and public opinion.

West Philippine Sea - uplifting from the legal basis of Administrative Order No. 49, the
West Philippine Sea (WPS) includes the Luzon Sea, as well as the waters around, within and
adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Bajo de Masinloc (BdM) also known as
Scarborough Shoal.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Interpreting China’s strategy in the naval and maritime saga in the South China Sea
would be an embellishment on how we could magnify our own strategic culture in the West
Philippine Sea, most especially that both the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are shifting from “coastal defense” or land-focused to
“offshore defense” or ocean-focused in safeguarding their respective maritime domains (Dizon,
2014).

Renato de Castro (2014), in his article on Philippine Strategic Culture, summarizes the
country’s focus on internal security capped by Communist and Islamic secessionism, showing an
asymmetrical warfare in addressing the threat. Given the country’s unique archipelagic
geography and isolationism, its strategic culture was perceptibly shaped by colonial history and
liberal-democratic political system, with the injunction of self-perpetuating elites, articulated by
Rodel Rodis (2014).

However, de Castro clearly emphasizes that under President Benigno Aquino’s tenure,
the Department of National Defense (DND) shifted its strategy from internal security to external
defense that shows continuity than discontinuity in Philippine strategic culture, thus the
country’s defense policy remains consistent with deeply entrenched strategic cultural
orientations.

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 The purpose of this research is to present a thorough analysis on the country’s strategic
culture in the West Philippine Sea under the scope of the anthropology of security. Therefore,
this study will endeavor to answer the following questions:

1. What are the manifestations of the Philippines’ “strategic culture”?

2. What are the indicators that the Philippines lacks or gains a rich “strategic culture”?
3. What projected Philippine responses can be recommended to advance the country’s
strategic culture in the West Philippine Sea?

1.3 Research Objectives

In the pursuit of this study, I will contribute a better understanding on the Philippines
strategic culture in its continuing battle to protect its territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
This is in line with various strategic culture manifested by the Philippines during its recent
imminent [external] security threat with China and other claimant-countries in the West
Philippine Sea in particular and the South China Sea in general. This research will also look at
the plausible approaches that will further contribute into the epistemic literature of the
anthropology of security. Hence, in order to carry out these objectives, this research will
endeavor to attain the following specific objectives:

1. To describe and examine the country’s strategic culture in the West Philippine Sea.
2. To identify themes on Philippines strategic culture in its imminent external security
threat, i.e. territorial defense and maritime dispute with claimant-states in the West
Philippine Sea.9
3. To recommend Philippine responses to advance the country’s strategic culture.

1.4 Significance of the Study

9
As earlier expounded in the texts, there is a dichotomy of discourse between internal security and external security
within the broader and narrow concept of national security. Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the defense
establishment shall be maintained to maximize its effectiveness in guarding against external and internal threats to
national peace and security to provide support for social and economic development.

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 With the scarcity of literature on strategic culture under the domain of the anthropology
of security, this study will present the country’s search for continuing strategic culture and
express approaches to achieve a robust national strategic culture. It supersedes the belief that this
archipelagic nation-state does not have a strong strategic culture on how to solve the riddles in
combating emerging defense and evolving security threats.

Present critical situation of the West Philippine Sea challenge opens the gates of ‘grand
strategy’10 between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China.
The Philippines v. China case has wrestled the mind over might strategy or the legal approach in
resolving peacefully the territorial dispute. Manila filed the arbitration case against Beijing in
January 2013 in the hope of stopping China’s incursions into the WPS. Despite China’s refusal
to participate in the Arbitration case filed against it by the Philippines, the UN’s tribunal ruling
also considered Chinese written response in the form of a position paper from China’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, indicating the giant neighbor’s wary of the possible effects of the case.
On October 29, 2015 the tribunal court held that it has jurisdiction to hear the Philippines case
seeking the withdrawal of China’s claim to almost all of the SCS, including the waters within the
WPS (Cabalza, 2015).

While the archipelagic country has lastly resorted to seeking legal means,
notwithstanding its diplomatic and military woes, on the other hand, China massively plundered
natural resources in the WPS, rapidly funded island-buildings and runways on reefs and atolls in
the SCS, defied the UN tribunal’s ruling, became deaf of the international pressure, and grabs its
momentum. China’s military growth and military build-up in the WPS creates, nonetheless, new
security challenges to the Philippines.

French geographer Francois-Xavier Bonnet (Nery, 2016) of the Institute for Research on
Contemporary Southeast Asia questions Beijing’s grand narrative of the “archaeological
campaigns” launched by China in 1970s where material remains like Chinese temples and
10
A grand strategy is designed to attain political objectives, including the assurance of external security and social
development.

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porcelains from different dynastic periods are made sovereignty markers. Even Chinese
historical narratives since Han dynasty are recycled to coat credibility of their historical claims
over the SCS.

Lately, a number of Chinese archaeologists, funded by the Communist Party, doing

underwater archaeology have asserted ownership of shipwrecks in an area covering most of the
SCS, which it claims as its territorial waters. They are planning a comprehensive underwater
survey offshore the SCS, although the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) encourages joint excavation of claimant-countries of underwater
cultural heritage sites, since a ship and its owner, cargo, and crew may have been assembled
from international sources in antiquity.11

In Bernard Brodie’s book on War and Politics (Colin Gray, 2006:3), he writes that
“whether with respect to arms control or otherwise, good strategy presumes good anthropology
and sociology.”

At the height of World War II (WWII), British and American colonizers sent
anthropologists to their colonies to study culture, kinship, and networks of various colorful
societies and ‘uncivilized’ tribes unwittingly described by often ‘racist’ and ethnocentric
anthropologists (however, notice how derogatory and politically-incorrect terms were used to
describe peoples and their societies in the past, as interpreted in present-day discourse).
Unknown to the locals, their military tall order would be an assignment for deployment in
isolated hinterlands to act as spies. “Nevertheless in today’s anthropological convention,
espionage entered the academic circles’ debate on whether it is ethical or not to allow scholars
and scientists like anthropologists in military and intelligence operations” (Cabalza, 2013:72).

Anthropologist Montgomery McFate, however, believes that “what social scientists bring
to the military is in some cases a deep expertise on the specific area of interest. Anthropologists
working for defense and security sectors bring a fresh perspective and a methodology for

11
Archaeology: A publication of the Archaeological Institute of America. Territorial dispute includes underwater
archaeology. (2013, December 2). Retrieved from http://www.archaeology.org/news/1562-131202-south-china-sea-
underwater-archaeology.

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research and analysis that benefits both the military and the local civilian population in the area
of operations. Therefore, anthropologists should be involved in developing “military applications
of cultural knowledge,” Vergano and Weise (2013).

Almost a decade now, there is still a sharp divide between academia and the military in
the broader application and conceptualization of national power. A case in point is the 2007
American Anthropological Association (AAA) board resolution expressing “disapproval” of
anthropologists working in Afghanistan and Iraq, through Pentagon’s pilot project in 2005
named Cultural Operations Research, popularly known Human Terrain System (HTS). Professor
Hugh Gusterson vividly renounced the HTS stating that, “the Pentagon seems to have decided
that anthropology is to the war on terror what physics was to the cold war…asking an
anthropologist to gather intelligence.” Same sentiment was shared by Marshall Sahlins in 2011
about the HTS as “manipulating local culture, imposing on them, transforming anthropologists
into spies, and putting people you work with at risk,” Vergano and Weise (2013:81).

1.5 Scope and Limitations

This critical-interpretative study will focus on the anthropology of security, strategic

culture, and the West Philippine Sea. To qualify the content of the study, I will present events
that will determine the what, how and why strategic culture is relevant on the maritime dispute in
the WPS. “Events” here refers to Chinese and Philippine activities, actions and statements in its
territorial disputes in the WPS that present/s the use of the elements of strategic culture. These
may include historical claims and continuing legal actions on the maritime and territorial claims,
diplomatic negotiations looking at both the advantages and disadvantages of bilateral and
multilateral tracks, and military activities to assert power and national interests in the contested
islands.

On the other hand, particular attention will also be given in figuring out the underlying
message of the “Chinese Dream” under President Xi Jinping (limited or narrowed down to its
strategic culture importance) to be able to examine the impact of China’s maritime policy in the

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strategic design of Philippine maritime security framework under the scale of strategic culture in
the WPS.

Most of the sources will be from open sources (primary and secondary data covering
2011 to the first semester of 2016) such as published books, newspaper reports, articles,
commentaries, and other data sourced from the internet. The data of the study is set only within
that timeframe to emphasize the triple effects of law, diplomacy, and military to ascertain
strategic culture in the WPS based from these “events” which are the subject of analysis of the
study.

Some data that are classified or confidential in nature in this study has been used upon the
issuance of security disclosure clearance from competent authority. Likewise, I have looked at
the holistic implications of strategic culture from the lens of the anthropology of security that
could be subjected for future studies.

Some data are derived from the Philippine national and local newspapers, and/or news
articles that were sourced by Filipino journalists from major international newspaper
publications.

Hence, I have undertaken fieldwork last December 13 to 19, 2015 in Puerto Princesa City
and El Nido while visiting the Western Command (WESTCOM) and Naval Forces West
(NAVFORWEST) in Ulugan Bay in the province of Palawan and the town of Masinloc in the
province of Zambales fronting the streams of the West Philippine Sea, which I did another
fieldwork in February 28 to March 5, 2016. But my thorough fieldwork spans since December
2011 when I did my schooling in Beijing, China after obtaining a Master’s degree in Asian
Studies in 2006 to 2008 with focus on Southeast Asia and China, and with my frequent visits to
Manila’s Chinatown in Binondo from 2011 to 2016.

I also interviewed 17 key informants (KIs) to support the arguments and analysis of the
data. Although, I have been working at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP),
inside Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, for more than a decade now, I can claim a wealth of networks

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with top officials (i.e. bureaucrats, policy-makers and active senior military officers) in the
Department of National Defense who could be considered as my key informants for this related
study.

In my Binondo parachute fieldwork, I took by chance to interview some barangay

officials who are Chinoys / Tsinoys and Filipinos by their mere presence during my frequent
visits to Binondo. I have the chance to interview and engage with Chinese military officials
because of their posts at that time in Chinese embassy in Manila. I was recommended to
interview key military officials in Palawan in WESCOM and NAVFORWEST but they wanted
anonymity in the study. During my Zambales fieldwork, I asked the local government of
Masinloc to help me find fisherfolks who have direct involvement in the 2012 clash in the
Scarborough Shoal and who have been fishing in the disputed reef. I sought to interview
informants from the Department of National Defense and National Security Council based on
their direct involvement to policy-making on the external defense of the country, however, they
also asked me for the anonymity of their names. Nikko Dizon was selected as a pioneering and
award-winning senior reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer who deals with the issue of the
West Philippine Sea. Prof Richard Javad Heydarian was chosen because of his insights and he is
more prominent as a commentator on the topic (see Annex A for the list of names).

1.6 Theoretical Framework

All theories are maps of possible futures. Theories can guide us in fitting the pieces
together to form an accurate picture. However, in evaluating the usefulness of any theory to
interpret security conditions, historical overview of the world and local politics suggest that it
would be wrong to oversimplify or to assume that a particular theory will remain useful in the
future.

Since this dissertation is multi-disciplinary, interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary 12 in its

approaches under the cache of Anthropology, Security Analysis and International Relations (IR),
12
Multi-disciplinary approach draws multiple disciplines to redefine problems based on a new understanding of
complex situations, while interdisciplinary approach uses different disciplines in analyzing events, and trans-
disciplinary approach moves beyond disciplines involving more than one subject area focusing on new perspectives
within the context of multiple disciplines.

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Gregory Bateson’s Systems theory will be used as a theoretical framework that will help me
better understand the strategic culture in the West Philippine Sea.

The systems theory was derived from anthropologist Gregory Bateson’s The Sacred
Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology of Mind, (1972, 1991). He developed an approach that
included communication theory, cybernetics, and mathematical logic. He has argued that there
are “ecological systems, social systems, and the individual organism plus the environment with
which it interacts itself a system in his technical sense” (1991:260). It brings together natural and
social sciences to solve the classical problem of duality, for instance, internal-external security.
It suggests that instead of creating closed categories into binaries (subject-object), the system
allows free flow of process and interactions, and in this way the binaries are dissolved.

Thus, system thinking as a concept (Richmond, 2001) is a set of hypotheses postulating

the relationship between variables or conditions, advanced to describe, explain or predict
phenomena, and make prescription about how positive changes ought to be engineered to realize
particular ethical principles. It is also a statement attempting to account for particular phenomena
or patterns rather than explaining unique or individual circumstances.

Not undermining the contribution of anthropology in building this theoretical framework,

legal and political cum security anthropologist Daniel Goldstein’s intense advocacy towards a
Critical Security of Anthropology elevates this framework to recognize the significance of
security discourses and practices to the global and local contexts in which cultural and social
anthropology may be externalized.

The disposition to break away from mainstream narratives of traditional security to

expand underlying horizons of ethnographically sensitive yet responsive contemporary global
interconnections, I have been confronted with the scarcity on the literature on the anthropology
of security, in which anthropologist Daniel Goldstein attempts to fill in, thus, his groundbreaking
works on marrying anthropology and security discourses will be used as well in my dissertation

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to understand the status of strategic culture in the West Philippine Sea as both anthropological
and security topic.

The act of studying broader and narrow concepts of the anthropology of security and
strategic culture applied in the West Philippine Sea forms part of the calling towards a critical
security of anthropology that Daniel Goldstein offers; this may also be supported with the
premise of system loop courtesy of systems thinking which anthropologist Gregory Bateson
pioneered to unveil an holistic approach in studying the complex, evolving, and top security
threat the Philippines is currently facing on.

Context Setters

LEADERS
ISSUE MAP Players

KEY GOV AGENCIES/UNITS

PALAWAN 7 ZAMBALES as a whole
STATE AND PEOPLE SECURITY SECTOR
CLAIMANT –COUNTRIES KEY INDUSTRIES
LAW, DIPLOMACY, DEFENSE STRATEGIC STAKEHOLDERS
NON-GOV ORGANIZATIONS
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
CULTURE THREAT GROUPS
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

WEST
Transformative PHILIPPINE SEA
ANTHROPOLOGY Culture
OF SECURITY Politicized PLAYERS/SUBJECTS

PLAYERS/SUBJECTS
Policy Environment Credible
Case of Deterrence
Strategic
Internal/ Culture STRATCOM for Transparency/
External Maritime/
Change & Corruption Territorial
State/ Intergenerational Disputes
People Change of Behavior
Policy coherence UNLCOS
Security (NSP) & logic Competing Military and
Initiatives Lack of Strategic Strategies other
Culture laws
Diplomacy
Concept of Bilateral/
Security Multilateral
National Security Strategy

Based from Bryson, 2004. Strategic Planning for Non-Profit Organization as modified from Eden & Ackermann, 1998 (modified by Cabalza 2016)

Figure 4: Visual mapping of the issues in the Anthropology of Security: A Case of Strategic Culture in the West Philippine Sea.

25 | P a g e
 The issue map links the major players in the external/internal analysis security framework
with the various underlying issues. This will help the theoretical framework of systems thinking
under the critical security of anthropology on how to see the totality of the social systems of the
anthropology of security. This will allow the systemic uncovering of underlying causes and
effects of issues within and outside of the domain of strategic culture. The baselines of issues are
given below going up towards the direction of the major issues. The issues (major and minor) are
arrayed below the major issues in a linked sequence on the influence arrows with other issues.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

I have formulated a conceptual framework related to the system thinking of strategic

culture as basis of my study on the assessment of strategic culture in the West Philippine Sea
under the domain of the anthropology of security. This conceptual framework shows how the
different variables to be described on in the study to present how people and state become the
fundamental national interests for which the nation acts. The core national interests are enduring,
in which, the current political administration is pursuing six core national interests, namely:
national values, national harmony, territorial integrity and sovereignty, economic well-being,
welfare of the Filipino people wherever they are, and in times of international peace and
stability.

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 Conceptual Framework of Strategic Culture
State capacity Stakeholders

INTERNAL
Value Supply Chain
SECURITY
Agenda- TRANSFORMATIVE
Behaviours Doctrines Formulation Implementation
setting CULTURE

NATIONAL
STRATEGIC NATIONAL STRATEGIC
PEOPLE STATE SECURITY
CULTURE SECURITY POLICY CULTURE
STRATEGY

EXTERNAL
SECURITY

Regional powers Global pressures

Source: Cabalza, 2016

Figure 5: A Conceptual Framework on how to achieve a robust strategic culture.

The conceptual framework also presents two major national security concerns on internal
security that holds together the whole-of-nation approach including all stakeholders to capacitate
the state on how to confront security threats; and external security referring to the West
Philippine Sea territorial dispute with China. To be able to address these concerns and advance a
robust strategic culture, the country needs to achieve a transformative culture through
institutionalized National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Security Policy (NSP).
Albeit, the Philippine government’s NSP 2011-2016 outlines one of its objectives to capacitate
the country to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and provide protection to its maritime
and other strategic interests. On the other hand, intergenerational behaviors as sum total of our
national identity must adapt/adopt to new doctrines. Henceforth, the Philippines has been
transitioning from focusing on Internal Security Operations (ISO) to Territorial Defense (TD).

In relation to national security, the system loops of national security can be seen in the
same perspective as the connecting and interrelated loops of security that protects good
governance that results with sustained development, in turn, it enhances the provision of security
(sustained development and security is mutually reinforcing and so as security and governance).

27 | P a g e
The loop shows the logic in the strategy/policy and theory, the defined endstates of the leader’s
vision: effective governance, secured environment, and sustained development can be achieved.
Understanding the whole before appreciating the interrelationships of the parts will make a
marked difference in the approach to the business of public service.

In the systems thinking of Strategic Culture, it helps execute interconnected elements of

Strategic Culture to attain a holistic National Security Strategy that is embedded and
institutionalized in an evolving National Security Policy. This allows systems theory to take a
look at how and why strategic culture matters in solving the riddles of the West Philippine Sea
conundrum at the macro level (policies and strategies) and micro level (ethnographies and news
reports) of analysis and assessment. The practice of looking at the interconnected loops of these
variables facilitates the appreciation of the whole before the parts that prevents isolation and
disintegration of desired effects.

Current national laws, policies, and programs suggest that the country has not fully taken
into accounts its unique archipelagic and maritime characteristics in addressing its concerns.
The Philippines has been progressing more as a maritime nation rather than as an archipelagic
nation, largely because of the difficulties in defining the limits of its national jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS). This reality calls for a game-changing transformation to achieve a robust strategic
culture and develop a truly archipelagic and maritime approach for the Philippines that would
embody both inward and outward looking perspectives in protecting the country’s interests and
responding to complex security challenges.

1.8 Research Design

The design that I applied in completing the study is based on the problems, objectives,
significance and scope and delimitation underscored in the research. It presents an overview on
the different research methodologies supported by strong theoretical and conceptual frameworks
to undertake the successful completion of this study particularly in answering research questions
and attaining the research objectives.

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 As a qualitative type of research, descriptive research reflected through ethnographic
method of writing will be used to pursue the study. A comprehensive literature review was
conducted on the concepts of the Anthropology of Security and Strategic Culture but also
configuring the extent of the West Philippine Sea.

I have interpreted the findings on the country’s strategic culture in asserting its territorial
claim over a large portion of the WPS based from his fieldwork in Binondo among the Chinoys /
Tsinoys; interviews in Palawan with commanders in Western Command (WESTCOM) and
Naval Forces West (NAVFORWEST); although a huge regret that I had almost reached Pag-asa
Island or Thitu Island with a last minute recall from the Secretary of National Defense not to
push through with the visit that would rock the boat in the impending Philippine maritime case at
the Hague and may cause regional insecurity in the contested island in summer 2016; and the
focus group discussion with affected fisherfolks of Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal from
the conflict. A biographical ethnographic narrative on strategic culture is expected to come out in
succeeding chapter as a result of the fieldwork.

I had embarked on different research methodologies to support my ethnography for the

successful completion of this particular study and to find answers to the impending research
problems and attain the research objectives.

As a qualitative type of research, participation-observation using ethnographic method of

writing through fieldwork, key informant (KI) interviews, and SWOC (strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and challenges) analysis based from the focus group discussion (FGD) with
fisherfolks shall be used to pursue the study in achieving triangulation for the validity and
validation of facts. A comprehensive literature review was conducted on the concepts of the
anthropology of security and strategic culture, as these concepts were then applied to the security
situation and developments in the West Philippine Sea.

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 Critical to the research is the process tracing, i.e. the presentation of events
(Philippine/Chinese activities, actions and statements in its territorial disputes to reflect various
use of strategic culture). These may include the legal, diplomatic, and defense aspects to identify
the episodes relating to Philippines-China maritime and territorial dispute in the WPS.

Process tracing according to Bennet and George (1997) is a method to generate and
analyze data on the causal mechanisms or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other
intervening variables. Casual mechanisms can be defined “as a complex system, which produces
outcome by the interaction of a number of parts.”

In this research instrument, I have listed and arranged important events as empirical bases
related to the strategic culture in the Philippines-China Wes Philippine Sea conundrum. These
events which were sourced from news reports in Philippine national and local newspapers,
ethnographies and commentaries, will be considered valid because the data will answer the
problem statement and at the same time reliable because other studies are also using these
secondary materials as basis of their studies.

Documents that were subjected for analysis are those that are related to strategic culture.
Most of these documents are found in the summary of the review of related literature.
This instrument will add strength in establishing the study of the anthropology of security and
the case of strategic culture in the WPS.

The SWOC analysis emanating from the initial assessment on the site of the study will be
the most critical in molding a strategic culture for long term initiatives. This will be based from
actual engagements, dialogues, interviews conducted, and fieldwork resulting to ethnographic
writing that would be the focal strength considering the key informants’ professional
qualifications or experience, intent, and predisposition.

Secondary to this is the organization itself where dedicated employees and bureaucrats
continue to execute platform plans and programs. Political leadership also ranks number one as
the greatest opportunity at the perspective of regional to national levels. This is supported by

30 | P a g e
various contributory elements of lines of communication among and within the LGU
organization that can be exploited. When these two major opportunities are exploited, the other
components of external opportunities can be decisively exploited with the strength components.
The stakeholder-power-interest grid will expound more of these interconnected contexts that will
link “doers” in the template of issue map above.

1.9 Key Informants

The key informants were selected on the knowledge of expertise on the dynamics of the
territorial disputes in the WPS. Due to the sensitivity of the study that may breach national
security, although, some interviews were done invoking academic freedom and non-attribution
assured by the Chatham House Rule or the rule for academic freedom and non-attribution, I will
use pseudonyms to some key informants. The list of key informants is attached in ANNEX A.

Considering that the topic is delicate to the country’s national security particularly for
fisherfolks where I have to intricately explain to them the objectives of the study, taking on as
well ethical considerations and consent in their views and predispositions, I also need to protect
their identities including the documents that are confidential.

1.10 The Setting

This ethnographic essay is wide in scope as to the setting while I shuttled to and from
Binondo for a parachute fieldwork or short-term fieldwork usually not more than a week but
focused on the subject to immerse myself with the Chinese-Filipino culture and establish rapport
with some barangay officials in Chinatown who became my key informants.

I have had also flown to and from, and done thorough courtesy calls to local government
executives in Palawan with Governor Jose Alvarez, Puerto Princesa’s Mayor Lucilo Bayron, and
El Nido’s Edna Gadot-Lim. I have had also engaged with Western Command Headquarters
Commander Vice Admiral L [anonymity] and to a former student, the Commander of Naval

31 | P a g e
Forces West Commodore R [anonymity], AFP in Palawan. During my Zambales leg, I also have
had paid courtesy calls to Governor Hermogenes Ebdane and Masinloc’s Mayor Desiree Edora.

These are all part of the fieldwork and engagements to survey the place and to have a
better grasp of issues in the place based from the perspectives of leaders in the field areas related
to my subject or dissertation topic to reconfigure the setting of the West Philippine Sea. I also
have had engagements with Senior Colonel Q [anonymity] and Senior Colonel V [anonymity],
both Defense Attachés of the Chinese embassy in Manila as narrated in the said ethnography.

1.11 Instruments and Methods of Research

FGD - I used focus group discussion or FGD last March 8, 2016 with four identified
fisherfolks to look for more open feedback from the thoughts and feelings of the participants
especially the fisherfolks of Masinloc or the Scarborough Shoal fisherfolks. They were selected
based from their availability from work since fishing is their primary source of income. I also
allowed them to express their clear ideas about the effects of China’s aggressiveness in the
Scarborough Shoal. Topics and discussions were free flowing and the participants were able to
directly comment from others perspectives. Although I prepared several questions (see ANNEX
B) to squeeze substantial data for which the FGD contributed to the refinement of the
researcher’s concepts especially on strategic culture from the grassroots.

Key Informant Interview – Interviews were conducted among informants who were all
subject matter experts by virtue of their knowledge and actual experience on the dynamics in the
current territorial dispute between the Philippines and China over the WPS and in strategic
culture who are opinion-makers, policy-makers, and decision-makers and/or may have influence
to their respective agencies. I must also note that the fisherfolks of Masinloc, Zambales are also
considered subject matter experts because of their indigenous knowledge and expertise on the
ground. Prior to the conduct of the interview, I also presented an overview of my paper to
appraise the key informants on strategic culture and the purpose and objectives of the study.
These gave them a base of knowledge on the anthropology of security and the case of strategic
culture in the West Philippine Sea that enabled them to respond to the prepared interview guide

32 | P a g e
questions. All in all I have 17 key informants, some of them preferred to use pseudonyms for this
study.

Process Tracing – In this research instrument, I listed and arranged most of the events
related to the maritime and territorial disputes from 2011 to 2016 in the WPS. These events were
sourced from news reports in Philippine national and local newspapers that are considered valid
because other scholastic studies are also using news reports as basis for their studies. These
events were initially arranged in chronological manner according to date for easier interpretation
and analysis. Three episodes were tabulated to narrate various strategies under the prism of the
legal track, diplomacy, and military muscle. The interpretation and analysis of these events and
episodes will curtail into the understanding of our strategic culture based on behaviors, interests,
and actions by the Philippines and China.

Documents Review – Documents that were subjected for review are those related to
strategic culture in the disputed West Philippine Sea. There are some documents like maps that
are found in the related literature. The instrument added strength in establishing an understanding
of the variables and broad topic of the study. Most documents reviewed were newspaper articles,
commentaries, UNCLOS articles and other local laws, Hague arbitration ruling, and the
comprehensive review of related literature on the topic. I have collated more than 100 news
clippings and articles related to the West Philippine Sea / South China Sea, read more than 50
books on classical and contemporary China, and I have viewed more than 50 maps related to the
contested islands in the Spratlys and the Paracel archipelagoes.

1.12 Data Gathering

I used distinct ways in collecting data that are essential in a mixed qualitative type of
research. The primary data gathered were sourced from FGD and interviews during the fieldwork
using ethnographic method of participation-observation including (archival method) that were
sourced from books, published articles in newspapers, lectures, briefings, map exhibits, personal
interviews by and from the media, and the internet.

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1.13 Data Analysis

In the data analysis of the study, I collated all data obtained from the mixed qualitative
methods used based on the results of the FGD and key informant interviews; data gathered from
process tracing and document review, and the information processed from the SWOC (strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, challenges) analysis.

Initially, I have charted a personal perception of my study as to the context of what will
be the form and themes that will come out. However, during the course of the FGD and analysis
of the data using the SWOC analysis, it reinforced my personal perceptions and the respondents’
perspectives based on the briefing of my topic to the respondents, particularly the Masinloc
fisherfolks. This only strengthened my hypothesis and the informants’ perceptions on themes on
legal, diplomatic and military dimensions. The validity of the data analyzed using qualitative
methods gave more value to the results of the study.

The SWOC analysis is a strategic planning tool that can be used during the curriculum
assessment and review process to make informed decisions based upon collective input from
multiple stakeholders. In this study, the multiple stakeholders include the fisherfolks who are
also considered subject matter experts, selected experts from the field in the defense and security
sectors, barangay officials in Binondo, and anonymous officials.

The purpose of the SWOC analysis has helped me validate my data during my archival
research, interviews, and fieldwork to put into proper perspective my ethnography.

Certain themes like legal, diplomatic and military tracks enriched in the conceptual
framework, ethnography and analysis were based on the frequency of citations and references
during the key informant interviews and FGD with various respondents.

Guided by the premise of ethnographic method, although broad in practice, most of the
common ethnographic approach is participation-observation during the said fieldworks as part of
the field research. As an ethnographer myself, immersing to the topic, being an actor in the

34 | P a g e
security dynamics in the West Philippine Sea through media interviews and lectures, and have
had immersed into the Filipino, Chinese, and Chinese-Filipino cultures, to better understand each
country’s strategic culture as an active participant reflected in my field notes. As a grounded
theory, there is no preset limiting of what will be observed and no real ending point in an
ethnographic study.

1.14 Ethical Considerations

Romanticizing anthropology and security discourses will not help in attaining the
objectives of the study. The drama that may unfold in colleting and gathering data that I may or
may not have experienced, given the restrictions on some confidential data I have mined from
the organization I am currently working for, the various key informants who want anonymity in
the interview during the course of my fieldworks, and the complexity of the subject I am
documenting under the ambit of breaching protocols of national security of the country, will
certainly summon valid ethical considerations.

Hammersly and Traianou (2012) deem that all social research involves ethical issues.
They advise that the ethos of qualitative research tends to emphasize the need for closeness of
people’s perspectives that are to be understood adequately. Furthermore, data collection usually
takes place in ‘natural’ settings rather than in situations specifically set up for research purposes.

Conscientiously minding of the welfare and security of informants and participants,

particularly, the fisherfolks in Masinloc who I have established rapport with key leaders of the
small town and the community itself during my initial fieldwork through the aquaculture officer
Mr Efren Forono who is also a fisherfolk himself before doing the focus group discussion (FGD)
for another fieldwork in Masinloc. Proper courtesy calls and series of meetings were committed
to top brass of commanders in the military sector to explain about the topic based from the
relevance of their rank and position in the defense sector. Most informants invoked anonymity as
explained earlier and called for the ambiance of ‘Chatham house rules’ (or a meeting where the
participants are free to use the information received but neither the identity nor the affiliation of
the speakers nor that of any participant may be revealed during the interview with frank and

35 | P a g e
pointblank set of questions). I have assured them that the discussions are clothed by clearer rules
on non-attribution and academic freedom due to the national and regional security implications it
could cause. Thus, pseudonyms will have to arise most in the analysis of data and in writing the
ethnography itself since this dissertation will become a public property after it will be
successfully defended.

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 CHAPTER TWO

2.1 Review of Related Literature

The review of related literature (RRL) provided me additional base of knowledge in the
pursuit of my study. RRL examines and content analyzes related literature and studies, both in
the local and foreign setting, dealing on the themes and areas under discussion in the research.
Furthermore, it helped me scrutinize the specific topic of interest and includes an analysis of the
relationship among different literatures that have direct bearing on the research problem. It also
provided foundations for the analysis of my data presented in the succeeding chapters.

The synthesis of the different related literatures, concepts, policies, and ethnographies
supported the evaluation and analysis of the Anthropology of Security in relation to the use of
Strategic Culture in the West Philippine Sea.

The need for analytical implications is vital since concepts and ideas of different
informants and thinkers may differ in their perspectives of the topic at hand. Thus, the aim of this
dissertation is to discuss the analytical implications of strategic culture in West Philippine Sea
under the domain of the anthropology of security using the review of literatures and comparing it
with the general differences of opinions and views of key informants and selected individualities
involved.

The sequence of the RRL is contained in three parts: First in trying to understand the
anthropology of security putting together classical and pioneering ethnographies related to war.
Pioneering researches by the “godfather” of the subdiscipline on the anthropology of security,
anthropologist Daniel Goldstein, creates a wide discourse on urbanity in a Bolivian city.
Anthropologists Mark Maguire, Catarina Frois and Nils Zurawski did an excellent study on
counter-terrorism on European experience that would substantiate in my study on the topic.

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 Classical ethnography by Ruth Benedict on Japanese society became a pioneering
research on “culture at a distance” that was inspired by contemporary anthropology scholars who
wrote on wartime anthropology penned by Japanese Akitoshi Shimuzu and Dutch Jan van
Bremen. With my experience and work at the defense department, I have also written an article
on the anthropology of national security to validate the role of anthropology in security
discourse.

To better understand the broad concept of ‘securitizing” anthropology, a book by David

Barash on Peace and Conflict Studies was also included to compare and contrast situations in
times of war and peace. Joan Vincent’s compilation on the anthropology of politics paved way
for some critic and theory on the duality of politics and security in anthropology. Lastly, Frerks
Georg and Berma Klein Goldewijk’s edited volume on human security and international
insecurity that elevates the literature to contemporary security issues that should be tackled in a
multi-disciplinary approach.

The second part of the RRL deals on strategic culture in the Philippines. Renato de
Castro’s novel journal article sums up the country’s formation of a strategic culture carved by
oligarchs since its independence from colonizers.

The third part of the RRL rolls the series of cartographic map exhibit, entitled Historical
Truths and Lies: Scarborough Shoal in Ancient Maps (2015) through the Institute for Maritime
and Ocean Affairs (IMOA) led by Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio in quest to narrate
the country’s own version of historical truths through artifacts like maps.

2.1.1 “Securitizing” Anthropology and Ethnographies Related to War

Mark Maguire (Head of Anthropology at the National University of Ireland Maynooth),

Catarina Frois (Assistant Professor at the Department of Anthropology in Lisbon University),
and Nils Zurawski (Visiting Professor in Security, Social Conflicts and Regulation at the
University of Hamburg) have edited a book entitled, The Anthropology of Security: Perspectives
from the Frontline of Policing, Counter-terrorism and Border Patrol, that explicitly dissect the

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lived experience of security from an anthropological perspective. It shows how contemporary
Europe uses quasi-military techniques like biometric identification systems and CCTV, to police
migrants and deviant neighbors. It calls for a critical anthropological consideration of security as
a fundamental analytic of the contemporary. The essays chronicle and explore security’s
political, cultural, and policy dimensions, encouraging scholars to take a look at the new
perspectives on security, both framed from local and international lenses.

Daniel Goldstein, a professor of Anthropology at Rutgers University has been studying

the global meanings and practices of security, democracy, and human rights. As one of the
leading political and legal anthropologists, he advocates critical security anthropology as he
combines Security Studies and Anthropology, exploring anthropological theories, methods and
ethical reflections in his myriad books. The substantive content includes digested dense
ethnographies and surveys on how acts of securing and innovation in security are connected to
the art and science of foreseeing the future, overcoming fear and managing contingency,
scrutinizing security-insecurity dynamics in a polarizing world and ongoing processes of
securitization since a post-Cold War world of political unease and economic recession in the
western world. His book “Outlawed: Between Security and Rights in Bolivian City (2012) sets a
gritty ethnography of the insecurity and ingenuity that result when the state becomes an “active
absence” in the lives of urban residents. He uses empirical research into both the selectivity of
law and rights enforcement of popular organizations in informal settlements. His convincing
theoretical insight works in multiple scales from beautifully told ethnographic narratives.

As the Course Director for the Socio-Cultural Dimension of National Security at NDCP, I
have written an article entitled The Anthropology of National Security (2013:79) to expound that,
“to achieve a robust national security, Filipinos must acquire a culture of respected national
character and national morale that are fundamental to metaphysically build an infrastructure to
nationhood propounded by our great ancestors. The vision which was adequately foreseen by
revolutionary generals and past leaders in our history is slowly laying a golden map to fortify
Filipinos psycho-social and socio-cultural imaginings away from persistent colonial mentality.” I
subscribe with then F. Landa Jocano (1980) as the prominent Filipino anthropologist stating that
“redefinition of national security outside of plainly defense or military security must transcend to

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include the security of ideas – the security of the abstract that sometimes play as powerful as
more substantive forces that elevate the county’s cohesive national interests.” I also expounded
in my article that, “by way of making the socio-cultural dimension, the heart and soul of national
security, it affirms the proverbial tone that ‘an army without culture will not win a battle,’
originally articulated in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.” Furthermore, capitalizing on education is
one of the great ways to leapfrog and become a developed country. Educated citizens and
peoples of societies become intelligent and respected as they respond to security challenges of
their countries and resolve problems through their innovative and powerful ideas courtesy of
great education.

Ruth Benedict, one of the first women to attain prominence, generally as a social scientist
and particularly as an anthropologist, is best known in her book, The Chrysanthemum and the
Sword (1946). In this classic ethnography where she emphasizes the importance of culture at a
distance, she has had reverberated the role of anthropologists in high-level policymaking as their
grit for cross-cultural policy recommendations were observed at war time. She headed the Basic
Analysis Section of the Bureau of Overseas Intelligence of the United States Office of War
Information (OWI) and advised President Theodore Roosevelt by the time Japan lost the war to
the US in WWII not to dethrone the emperor of Japan to allow the continuity of the divine
monarchy of the Rising Sun. She believes that the goal of anthropology was to document these
different patterns. By using structural-functionalism, a former student of prime American
anthropologist, Franz Boas, she has attempted to explain Japanese culture and society by
focusing on the relationships between the various social institutions that make up society.
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword is a classic cultural ethnography that may tackle early
concept of the anthropology of security that explores the political, religious, and economic life in
Japan from the seventh century through mid-twentieth century, as well as personal Japanese
family life. In the book, she has written profound observations about Japanese culture and
society by describing it as: “conventions of war which western nations had come to accept as
facts of human nature that did not exist for the Japanese. The Japanese are to the highest degree
aggressive and unaggressive, militaristic and aesthetic, insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable,
submissive and resentful, loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable in
new ways.” She also has highlighted the Japanese behavior during war as anti-materialistic like

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the kamikaze give reverence to the emperor. Japanese soldiers scorned materialism that played a
vital part for the strength of the Japanese Imperial Army, and regarded death itself as a sign of
the victory of the spirit, and thus caring of the sick during war, was an interference with heroism.

Akitoshi Shimizu and Jan van Bremen both have edited the Wartime Japanese
Anthropology in Asia and the Pacific, Senri Ethnological Studies no. 65 (2003). The volume is
based on papers dedicated to the discussion and investigation of the relations between
anthropology and colonization in the region; anthropology and war and the practice and status of
anthropology in the wartime years. They argue that wartime anthropology has played a leading
role in the consolidation and growth of social and cultural anthropology in the past century.
Jan van Bremen tries to distinguish war anthropology from wartime anthropology and the
anthropology of war and warfare. He summarizes that war anthropology applies to the discipline
for fighting a war using academic and professional credentials, expertise, institutions and
personnel directly to serve the war. While wartime anthropology is used as a cover term for all
anthropology in times of war; its forms range from military service to the use of anthropology as
a cover for war activities or spying. Lastly, the anthropology of warfare and war is the
ethnography and study of battles; the life and death of the combatants and non-combatants in war
zones and wartime societies. It includes the study of societies in the phase of preparation and
aftermath of wars. Thus, the gains from participation in wars and the effects of wars have been
large for anthropology, both material and immaterial.

Where there is war or conflict that is inevitable among realists, peace also comes in time
for many idealists. The book on Peace and Conflict Studies (2013) by David Barash from the
University of Washington at Seattle and Charles Webel from the University of New York in
Prague is divided into four parts ranging from the promise of peace and the problems of war, to
the reasons for war, parting to building “negative wars” as to the vestiges of protracted conflicts,
and lastly building positive peace to set a Utopian world. The dichotomy between peace and war
studies roots to the culture that beset humanity. Yet this comprehensive book mirrors the
authors’ vast knowledge and analysis of the 21st century world events. It tackles timely global
security issues including nuclear proliferation, the rise of the BRICS nations, latest developments
in Iran and North Korea, among others. Given the plethora of important security threats at the

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international level ranging from pre-history to the present, it also explores the duality of peace
studies and conflict or war studies that enriches future discussion, encouraging scholars for
further academic pursuit.

Security is originally considered a cognate discipline of Political Science, however, in

Joan Vincent’s The Anthropology of Politics: A Reader in Ethnography, Theory, and Critique,
(2002) she divulges that political scientists would criticize anthropologists for viewing politics
simply as a matter of power and inequality. She levels off the playing field by writing that
political anthropologists can also do beyond the stereotyping. Political anthropology was a late
subfield specialization within social and cultural anthropology. Joan Vincent documents three
phases in the said subfield starting from the formative era of classical anthropologists including
Lewis Henry Morgan’s study of the Iroquois in 1851, this was political anthropology’s suitable
starting point. The second phase includes war ethnographer E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s acephalous
political systems among the Nuer in southern Sudan and encapsulates thinkers using Action
theory through Symbolic theory to Systems theory; and the third phase chronicles imperial times
in colonial places. Although, in her recollection on the prelude to the Anthropology of Politics,
she focuses first on Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and Immanuel Kant as representatives of the
Scottish and German Enlightenments. She concludes by believing that the anthropology of
politics has remained firmly in the grip of systems thinking.

From traditional state-centric security to non-traditional human-centric security of the 21 st

century, Frerks Georg and Berma Klein Goldewijk’s edited substantial book on Human Security
and International Insecurity (2012) brings timely scoop on human security, sweeping everyday
realities of poverty, humanitarian crises, epidemic diseases, injustice and equality, and among
other topics; divulged in this multi-authored book dealing with the origins and developments of
human security. From individual or personal security, to community and global humanity,
security concerns are of vital interests to state and the peoples. It presents new approaches by
focusing on alternative discourses, new actors involved, and the new forms of governance to
achieve security. Digging on contemporary problems brings closer resolutions that this book tries
to contribute in the RRL.

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 2.1.2 Unleashing the Strategic Culture

Renato de Castro, an International Relations professor from De La Salle University,

examines the county’s strategic culture in his paper, Philippine Strategic Culture: Continuity in
the Face of Changing Regional Dynamics (2014). He hypothesizes that the strategic culture of
the Philippines may be summarized into two strategies: (1) alliances, and (2) guerilla warfare.
He has assessed that “strategic culture’s transmission is intergenerational through socialization of
preferences, values and goals. It generates images and symbols that mold public attitudes and
become institutionalized, routine, and procedural in decision-making. The images and symbols
determine the vision and goals of political leaders, government bureaucracies, and the military as
they define their central roles and missions,” originally expressed by Robert Harvey and
Stephanie Neuman on Warfare and the Third World (2011). He sketches that the 400 families or
political dynasties who have dominated Philippine politics and government since post-World
War II constitute the country’s politico/strategic elite, also articulated by David Tibermann in
A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics (1991). He then concludes by
writing that the country’s strategic culture is a product of various factors including its
archipelagic and fragmented topography, the lack of agricultural resources, strong political
culture since prehistory, and local uprisings and insurrections during the most important periods
in our history. In gist, he blames how the Filipino elite carved our negotiated reality, expressed in
Filipinos’ current national defense preferences and goals. This is manifested in the defense and
security policies of the current administration, in its efforts to shift its strategy from internal
security to external defense which only shows persistence rather than a break of the country’s
static strategic culture.

2.1.3 Maps as Artifacts in the West Philippine Sea

Antonio Carpio, Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice, runs a series of cartographic
map exhibit, entitled Historical Truths and Lies: Scarborough Shoal in Ancient Maps (2015)
through the Institute for Maritime and Ocean Affairs (IMOA), a private and non-profit
organization aimed at reaching and engaging the public to encourage wider participation in the
shaping of public opinion and national policy. He continuously lectures in various universities

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and colleges around the Philippines and abroad on “Historical Facts, Historical Lies, and
Historical Rights in the West Philippine Sea”. To him, the root cause of the conflict is the
fictionalized claim based from China’s Kuomintang government in February 1948 when it drew
the controversial eleven-dashed line out in the South China Sea. In 1950s it became nine-dashed
line, removing the two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin without China’s strong explanation, and in
2015 the cow’s tongue turned to ten-dashed line based from the current official map of China.
At present, China argues that it extensively claims the SCS using “historical facts and
international law.” Justice Carpio elucidates that historical facts are not relevant in determining
present-day claims. However, even if the Philippines has taken into account historical facts,
China’s claims are still without basis. This has no bearing in the resolution of maritime disputes
under the UNCLOS. He presented pieces of evidence of ancient maps of China made by Chinese
authorities, Chinese individuals or foreigners, and ancient maps of the Philippines made by
Westerners to debunk Chinese claims. He articulates that the Hainan Island (originally called
Zhuya, Qiongya and Qiongzhou) based from different ancient maps remained the southernmost
tip territory of China. Since the start of the Song Dynasty in 960 A.D. until the end of the Qing
Dynasty in 1912, or for almost a millennium, the southernmost territory of China has always
been Hainan Island based on all official and unofficial maps of China. The ancient maps of
China never included the Spartly Islands in the Middle of the SCS and Panatag Shoal in the
WPS. Hence, there is not a single ancient map, whether made by Chinese or foreigners, showing
that the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal were ever part of the Chinese territory.

Justice Carpio vividly presents several important ancient maps from China as his prima
facie evidence to disprove Chinese claims, and the maps included: (1) Map of China and the
Barbarian Countries or Hua Yi Tu since Song Dynasty of 1136 A.D. – the stone map is now in
the Forest of Stone Steles Museum in Xi’an China; (2) The Great Ming Dynasty
Amalgamated Map or Da Ming Hun Yi Tu of 1389 – the original map is with the First
Historical Archive of China in Beijing; (3) Atlas of the Ming Empire or Da Ming Yu Di Tu
published between 1547 and 1559 where Taiwan is not included and Macau is not marked; (4)
The Atlas of Heaven and Earth or Tian Di Tu published in 1601 by Junheng Zuo; and, (5) A
Map of the Myriad Countries of the World or Kun Yu Wan Guo Quan Tu published in Beijing
in 1602 by the Ming Dynasty based from the creation of a Jesuit priest Matteo Ricci upon the

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request of the Ming Emperor Wanli. The famous Selden map of China bequeathed by John
Selden to the Bodleian Library of the Oxford University in 1659 in which the marker of the map
is an unknown Chinese that shows the different regions of Asia and puts South China Sea
conspicuously at the center of the map. But again Hainan Island remains to be China’s
southernmost territory. Even the Qing Empire’s Complete Map of all Provinces or Huang Chao
Zhi Sheng Yu Di never included the South China Sea. Justice Carpio has also presented ancient
maps made by westerners that were published in and around European countries and in the
United States. These included the following:

Germany – 1636 in Frankfurt by Matthaus Merian and 1760 in Nuremberg by George

Lowitz.

Netherlands - 1700 in Leiden by Johannes Nieuhof; 1662 in Amsterdam by Fredrick De

Wit; 1670 in Amsterdam by Nicholaus Visscher; and, 1697 in Leiden by Philip Cluverius.

France - all from Paris – 1734 and 1786 by Jean Baptiste Bourguignon D’Anville; 1787
by Rigobert Bonne; 1833 by Conrad Malte-Burn; 1650 by Pierre Mariette; 1775 by D’Apres de
Mannevillete; and, 1781 by Gaitte A.J.

Great Britain – all in London - 1676 by John Speed; 1761, 1769, and 1770 by Thomas
Kitchin; 1778 by R. Sayer and J. Bennett; 1787 by Robert Sayer; 1794 and 1802 by Robert
Laurie and James Whittle; 1814 and 1832 by Thomas Kelly; and, 1866 by E. Wilds.

Italy – 1785 in Venice by Antonio Zatta.

Spain – all in Madrid - 1790 by Duque de Almodovar; 1792, 1808, 1862, 1865, and 1875
by Dirreccion de Hidrografia; 1852 by D. Antonio Morata and D. Francisco Coello; and, 1871,
1897 by Seccion de Hidrografia.

United States of America – 1818 in Philadelphia; 1899 in Washington by Jose Algue

S.J.; and, 1908 in Baltimore by Caspar Hodgson. All of these maps indicated above show the

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regions in East Asia and generally imply that Hainan remains the southernmost portion of China.
Scarborough Shoal is more than 500 nautical miles from Hainan Island located at the other end
of the South China Sea. More so, all of the maps of the Philippines from 1636 to 1940, a period
of 304 years, consistently show Scarborough Shoal, whether named or unnamed, as part of the
Philippines.13

Interestingly, there are two controversial maps recently presented by German Chancellor
Angela Merkel as gifts to visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping in October 2015 in Berlin that
would debunk Chinese territorial claims, which included the famous (1) Murillo map called
Carta Hydrographica y Chorographica de las Yslas Filipinas published in Manila by the Jesuit
Pedro Murillo Velarde, and (2) the Second Part of the Map of Asia or its French title Seconde
Partie de la Carte D’Asie published in 1786 by Jean Baptiste B D’Anville as part of his Atlas de
D’Anville. According to Justice Carpio, the Murillo map is the oldest map that gives a name to
Panacot shoal. This map named two Filipinos, Francisco Suarez who drew the map and Nicolas
dela Cruz Bagay who engraved it. The map is considered as the “mother of all Philippine
maps”.

Figure 6: The famous Murillo Map, also known as the ‘mother of all maps’ in the Philippines.
Based on the exhibit on Historical Truths and Lies of Justice Carpio, accessed on December 2015

13
Based from the Primer on the Map Exhibit on “Historical Truths and Lies: Scarborough Shoal in Ancient Maps,
2015”.

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 When the British invaded Manila they stole the famous Murillo map surrounded by
copper plates. While the D’Anville map shows Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Moluccas, the
Philippines, and Japan. The map also shows Panacot shoal. The first part of the map of Asia is
basically the 1734 China map D’Anville and the D’Anville Atlas which was later on reprinted by
Robert Sayer, Robert Laurie and James Whittle, and others. No country has ever claimed the
high seas except China. Carpio views that it is nonetheless important for the Philippines to
recognize two important treatises: (1) Treaty of Paris and (2) Treaty of Washington, over its
claim in the Scarborough shoal. These international legal documents prove the legality of
ownership of territories of the Scarborough Shoal belonging to the Philippines. The Uti
possidetis juris (as you possess under law) is a strong argument which provides that newly
formed sovereign states (post-independent Philippines from the US) should have the same
borders that their preceding dependent area had before their independence. This principle of
international law has been applied in several countries over territorial disputes to prevent
intervention by eliminating any contested terra nullius or no man’s land. Thinking out of the
box, Carpio finally deems that the Philippines has the right to abuse, i.e. bombings and actual use
of the shoal as shown in ancient maps, in which in the past decades, China never protested in the
first place. For instance, as documented in the cartographic exhibit, the Philippine Air Force’s
warplanes used Scarborough Shoal as an impact range when they practiced bombing runs.
Neither China nor any other country protested these bombing practices by American and
Philippine warplanes, despite worldwide prior notices to mariners, through the Maritime
Organization of the United Nations, to keep away from Scarborough Shoal during the bombing
practices.14

On the other hand jurist scholar Wang Hanling (2014), professor and director of the
Centre for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Institute of International Law, Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences with a degree of Doctor of Law has countered the proposition and offered
pieces of evidence of foreign maps indicating the contested South China Sea if part of the
Chinese territory:

14
Based on the lecture of Senior Associate Justice Carpio in October 2015which I moderated at the jam-packed
NDCP Honor Hall, attended in full-force by powerhouse policy-makers of the Department of National Defense, led
by Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T Gamin and Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General
Gregorio Pio Catapang.

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  The Welt-Atlas published by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954, 1961, and
1970;
 World Atlas published by the Soviet Union in 1954 and 1967;
 World Atlas published by Romania in 1957;
 Oxford Australian Atlas and Philips Record Atlas published by Britain in 1957
and Encyclopedia Britannica World Atlas published by Britain in 1958;
 World Atlas drawn and printed by the mapping unit of the Headquarters of the
General Staff of the People’s Army of Vietnam in 1960;
 Haack Welt Atlas published by German Democratic in 1968;
 Daily Telegraph World Atlas published by Britain in 1968;
 Atlas International Larousse published by France in 1968 and 1969;
 World Map Ordinary published by the Institut Geographique National (IGN) of
France in 1968;
 World Atlas published by the Surveying and Mapping Bureau of the Prime
Minister’s Office of Vietnam in 1972; and,
 China Atlas published by Neibonsya of Japan in 1973.

2.2 Configuration of the West Philippine Sea

The West Philippine Sea (WPS) is a politically and strategically concocted point of
reference to the country’s continuing claim over the disputed islands in the South China Sea
(SCS). “The SCS connects the Strait of Malacca in the southwest to the Bashi and Balintang
channels and the Taiwan Strait to the north and northeast: that is, it connects the maritime world
of the Middle East and Indian Subcontinent to that of Northeast Asia” (Kaplan 2014:41).

Administrative Order (AO) No. 49, promulgated by President Benigno Aquino last
September 5, 2012, describes the geographical features of the WPS. It does not explicitly
configure and cover all of the contested small islands, islets, coral reefs, cays, rock formations,
atolls, shoals and sandbanks located in the SCS. The maritime areas on the western side of the
Philippine archipelago are hereby renamed as the “West Philippine Sea”. It includes the “Luzon

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Sea, as well as the waters around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) 15 and
Bajo de Masinloc (BdM)16 also known as Scarborough Shoal.” (Baviera and Batongbacal,
2013:1 in AO No. 49 Section 1). Likewise, the KIG and BdM were categorically declared under
Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9522 dated March 10, 2009
(Kintanar, 2013).

At present, the Philippines occupies eight islands in the Kalayaan Island Group off the
Spratlys archipelago, namely: Kota (Loait Island), Lawak (Nansham Island), Likas (West York
Island), Panata (Lamkian Cay), Pag-asa (Thitu Island), Parola (North East Cay), Patag
(Flat Island), and Rizal (Commodore Reef).

Figure 7: The islands and islets occupied by the Philippines Figure 8: Overlapping claims (Photo source: WESCOM).
in the WPS off the contested Spratlys archipelago and Bajo de Taken last March 1, 2016.
Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal (from NAVFORWEST). Taken
last March 1, 2016.

15
In 1978, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (PD) 1576 which created Kalayaan Municipality out of the
vast expanse of the SCS which was then and until now outside our Treaty of Paris boundary.
16
Bajo de Masinloc or BdM is an integral part of the Philippine territory. It is also called as Scarborough Shoal. It is
not an island and not part of the Spratlys. There are only about five (5) rocks in BdM that are above water during
high tide. The rest are below water during high tide. Accordingly, these rocks have only 12 nautical mile (NM)
maximum territorial waters under Article 121 of UNCLOS. Because the Philippines has sovereignty over the rocks
of BdM, it follows that it also has sovereignty over their 12-NM territorial waters. Department of Foreign Affairs.
Philippine position on BdM and the waters within the vicinity. Official Gazette, 18 April 2012. Retrieved from
http://www.gov.ph/2012/04/18/philippine-position-on-bajo-de-masinloc-and-waters-within-its-vicinity, accessed on
8 February 2016.

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 On the other hand, the land territory of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) includes
the mainland PRC and its coastal island; Taiwan and all islands appertaining thereto including
the Diaoyu Islands; the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha Islands (Pratas); the Xisha Islands
(Paracels); the Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank) and the Nansha Islands (Spartlys); as well
as all other islands belonging to the PRC (de Guzman, 2014).

The SCS is a broader expanse of water, often described as a semi enclosed sea, bounded
by China and Taiwan in the north, by the Philippines in the east, and by Vietnam, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei in the west and south. Scattered over the SCS are various
geographic features, the most prominent of which are known internationally as the Spratlys, the
Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, and Pratas Island. There are overlapping claims by various
countries to these features and to the seas and resources surrounding them, including parts of the
WPS (Nguyen, 2011; Johnson, 2012; Baviera and Batongbacal, 2013).

Figure 9: Philippine territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea (Photo courtesy of Inquirer), accessed on March 2016.

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 The recent developments in the WPS highlight the challenges to our territorial integrity
and sovereignty. The areas of concern are the KIG, BdM, and other critical features within the
overlapping boundaries of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

China’s baselines are all expressed through a U-shaped line in the SCS and in several
offshore places. This exceeds those allowed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS)17 and international law. On the other hand, the Philippines being an archipelagic
country, is entitled to enclose large bodies of water within baselines and assert sovereignty over
it (Heydarian, 2012).

The contest over potential hydrocarbon resources in SCS have catalyzed unilateral oil
explorations undertaken by several claimant states, particularly the Philippines, Vietnam, and
Malaysia as well as their respective legislation of sovereignty claims such as baselines and
continental shelf submissions (Executive Summary, NDCP, 2011).

Because of the magnitude of the West Philippine Sea conundrum brought by China’s
saber-rattling and muscle flexing to lay claim entirely the maritime territories in the SCS based
from its massive reclamation and island-building to secure its “great wall of sea” (Dizon, 2015) 18
in the disputed reefs of Kagitingan (Fiery Cross), Calderon (Cuarteron), Burgos (Gaven), Mabini
(Johnson South), Panganiban (Mischief), Zamora (Subi) and McKennan (Hughes), China is
adamantly using an ambiguous historical claim of the nine-dotted lines to assert its maritime and

17
Around 17th century, the major maritime powers began to develop a law of the sea to protect their colonial,
commercial and military interests. This “Law of the Sea” had two basic principles: (1) Freedom of the Seas that
designates mainly freedom of fishing and navigation. It assumes that the biological resources of the sea were
inexhaustible; (2) Sovereignty of the flag state that calls for the country under whose flag the ship was sailing had
exclusive jurisdiction over all activities aboard ship. After WWII, there was a gradual shift from an individual state
perspective to a more global and independent view of the world. A double set of claims evolved: (1) a number of
coastal states claimed exclusive jurisdiction over natural resources in extensive submarine and water areas off their
coasts; (2) a number of countries developed distant fishing fleets with sophisticated fishing equipment enabling them
to quickly exploit the biological resources of the oceans. In these circumstances, it became obvious that the
traditional principles of the Law of the Seas would have to be revised (Jose Antonio Socrates, Palawan Spratlys
Commission Officer, 2001).
18
I said that China is occupying Philippine territory in the disputed Spratlys archipelago because the Chinese
government has a timeline that they need to meet. The building of the artificial islands in the SCS is a Chinese act in
carrying out its Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, a military doctrine used to deny foreign militaries access
to a certain area, impinging on other countries’ freedom of navigation and overflight.

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territorial jurisdiction over the contested seas that have many political and strategic names. 19
On the other hand, the Philippines saw this as a “wake-up” call and a reawakening to review its
defense policies (Dizon, 2012).

Given this imminent danger and insecurity in the Philippine maritime endowments as an
archipelagic nation, the Philippine Navy (PN) is facing two major challenges concerning the
defense of the Philippine archipelago. The PN is proposing an Active Archipelagic Defense
Strategy (AADS) that addresses the need to defend the country’s territory and secure maritime
interests pursuant to existing government policies. This framework of defending the country,
a proactive control of the seas and the denial of its use to an adversary, is capitalizing on the
archipelagic configuration of the Philippines. Under the AADS framework, some regimes will be
protected during peacetime, including Extended Continental Shelf (ECS), contiguous zone,
territorial sea, EEZ, the archipelagic sealanes, the regime of islands such as the KIG and BdM,
the Benham Rise, the Recto Bank, critical infrastructures such as the Malampaya Natural Gas to
Power Project, and the country’s archipelagic waters (Philippine Navy, 2015).

But the mind over might strategy that the Philippines reaped in last year’s legal battle
against a giant neighbor at The Hague for the maritime jurisdiction of the disputed islands
specifically in the WPS demonstrates the Philippines’ dramatic show of force to stand on equal
footing with wealthier and powerful China (Cabalza, 2015).

Prior to China’s aggressive actions propounded by its robust strategic culture in the SCS,
it has indicated to avoid the internationalization of the dispute, as evidenced by its continued
drive for bilateral negotiations. But the Philippines proposed a multilateral Triple Action Plan
(TAP) in the ASEAN to resolve the SCS complexity, which identified ‘arbitration’ as the final
and enduring resolution to address the destabilizing activities in the region.

19
Originally, China’s Koumintang Government, then, in battle with the Communist Party, concocted an eleven-
dashed line historical claim in 1947. It issued a local map in the SCS, enclosing it in irregular eleven-dashed lines of
varied lengths and distances nearby coasts. But when the Chinese Communist Party took over of the territorial
claims, Vietnam has successfully negotiated for its disputed territories with China over a bilateral talk as it was
adjusted to nine-dashed line. Although, among scholars and government officials in China, the dotted lines are
incongruent to their historical narratives and maps, and it has no unified position over such maritime and territorial
claims until recently in 2009. But the eleven-dashed lines would eventually become the basis for the now better-
known nine dashed-lines map that China uses to illustrate its claim.

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 While China has indicated that it will not participate in the arbitration case filed against it
by the Philippines, the decision to issue a written response in the form of a position paper from
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that China was wary of the possible effects of the
case. Finally, in the David versus Goliath legal battle witnessed by the international community,
the Philippines won in the first round of the legal saga in which the Permanent Court of
Arbitration held that it has jurisdiction on the case over the legality of China’s “nine-dotted line”
claim over the SCS under the UNCLOS – the constitution of the ocean.20

2.2.1 Peopling of the West Philippine Sea

The three tectonic elements of the Philippines are the (1) Luzon-Mindanao Mobile Belt,
i.e. includes Visayas; (2) North Palawan Continental Terrane 21 (NPCT); and (3) Sulu Tectonic
element, i.e. includes Palawan Island South of the Ulugan Bay Fault (Baltazar 2001:30).

According to Monique Chemillie-Gendreau (2000), records show those islands in the

South China Sea having been inhabited by small bands of Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen
and the imperial Japanese troops during the Second World War.

2.2.2 Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)

In May 1956, Filipino businessman and navigator Tomas Cloma claimed he discovered a
group of islands in the SCS and named it Kalayaan or Freedomland. On May 11 of the same
year, together with 40 men, Cloma and his brother took formal possession of the islands,
including Itu Aba (currently possessed by Taiwan). Four days after, he sent a note to Vice
President Carlos Garcia informing the Philippine government that he is claiming the territory on
his behalf. On July 6, 1956 he declared the establishment of a separate government for the “Free

20
UNCLOS as the Constitution of the Oceans was crafted to regulate its use and symmetrically settle all disputes
that may arise from it. Its relevance in the international affairs continues to transcend States and governs the proper
use and the disposition of jurisdiction to promote order at sea. The UNCLOS is the codification of customary
international law, judicial decisions, and opinions of renowned publicists formed into a treaty, and was ratified by
States that has stake in the maritime domain (Executive Summary, In UNCLOS: A Reference. Office of Naval
Strategic Studies, Philippine Navy).
21
“Terrane” as distinct from “terrain” is a fault bounded by the body of tectonic blocks and fragments that has a
different history from adjacent region (Socrates, 2001).

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Territory of Freedomland” with the capital at Pag-asa (Thitu Island) with himself as “Chairman,
Supreme Council of State.” The series of events since May 1956 elicited a series of international
protests from other claimant-countries (Baltazar 2001, in Caino 1998).

Figure 10: Map of Kalayaan Island Group originally called Kalayaan Chain of Islands (source: manilalivewire.com) Accessed on March 2016

President Ferdinand Marcos called an emergency meeting on the grounds that Philippine
vessels operating in the Spratlys were cordoned by Taiwanese naval patrol units. As a result an
official claim was announced for the “53 island groups which Cloma explored but occupied only
47 islands in 1959.” Marcos asserted these islands are res mullius and under international law
can be acquired through occupation and effective administration. Philippine navy and marine
units were deployed months after, to as far as Mariveles Reef, and occupied Parola Island
(Northeast Cay). In 1972, despite strong protests from other claimant-countries since 1971,
Kalayaan was made part of Palawan province in 1972 to be administered as a township. Tomas
Cloma was named chairman of the civil administrative council (Baltazar, 2001). But in 1974,
Cloma ceded his rights over the islands for one peso after being imprisoned by Ferdinand
Marcos (Womack, 2006).

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 Figure 11: Territories claimed by the Philippines in the Spratlys archipelago (Source: WESCOM), photos taken in 2015,
accessed on April 2016.

In February 1974, the Philippine government also reinforced its forces and confirmed its
claim on five (5) main islands including Lawak (7.9 hectares/20 acres), Pag-asa (32.7 hectares/81
acres), Kota (6.45 hectares/15.9 acres), Likas (18.6 hectares/46 acres) and Parola (12.7 hectares/
31 acres). In June 1978 The Philippines occupied two (2) more islands in Panata (0.44
hectares/1.1 acres) and Patag (0.57 hectares/1.4 acres). That same year, a military installation and
airstrip on Pag-asa Island were installed and constructed (Baltazar, 2001).

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Figure 12: Photo of the Pag-asa Island (Thitu Island) runway, the first among the contested islands in SCS/WPS (source: philnews.ph).

On June 11, 1974 President Marcos created the Municipality of Kalayaan by signing the
Presidential Decree (PD) 1596 into law, establishing what the document described as “distinct
and separate municipality of the Province of Palawan” (http://www.lawphil.com). The
Municipality of Kalayaan is located in the western section of the Province of Palawan. It
currently exercises jurisdiction over eight islets (three of which are cays) and two reefs, with an
aggregate land area of approximately 79 hectares. PD 1599 was signed by President Marcos
declaring the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) as part of the economic exclusive zone (EEZ) 22
under the UNCLOS.

Based from the Municipality Population data from the Province of Palawan (LWUA,
2013), population census of Kalayaan started from 50 civilians only in 1990, 349 inhabitants in
1995, 223 settlers in 2000, it decreased to 114 residents in 2007, and now it has 222 population
as of 2010 (https://www.psa.gov.ph/). The lone municipality beyond the EEZ of the Philippines
accounts for point zero three (0.03) percent of the provincial population of Palawan.

Kalayaan, now the Philippines’ last frontier, is the largest municipality in terms of
territorial jurisdiction in the regime of islands of KIG that is endowed with rich and diverse
natural resources. The island is plunked with significant number of decent structures including a
municipal hall, multi-purpose hall, health center, elementary school, water filtration plant,
engineering building, marina, airstrip, communication tower, and military barracks.

22
The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea with a breadth of 200 nautical miles (nm) from the
baseline (UNCLOS, Article 57). It is not part of the territorial sea of a coastal State. The history of the development
of EEZ came out from the practice of States in the declaration of their respective fisheries zones and measures on
the natural resources in the waters and seabed (Office of Naval Strategic Studies, UNCLOS: A Reference, 2015).

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 Although there is no study yet on the ethno-linguistic profile of the inhabitants in
Kalayaan since most of them came from nearby towns of Palawan, [mostly first or second
generation] from deployed foot soldiers in the area, it could be said that some of them are
Palaweños who are Cuyunon, its subgroup Agutayanon, and Tagalog from northern Palawan
fronting the West Philippine Sea (http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/province.asp).

In terms of the human development index (HDI) in the island, obviously because of the
inadequate accessibility of basic needs and social services, the population is striving for living.
However, simple literacy rate is 95 percent, only for basic education, that opened only in June
2012. There are no incidences of malnutrition in the area due to the abundance of fish where
locals resort to drying most of their catch to lengthen its shelf life and practices of horticulture
are considered where residents maintain a vegetable demo-garden and simple poultry. The island
has a forest cover of 44,170.175 square meters (http://www.kalayaanpalawan.gov.ph).

2.2.3 Bajo de Masinloc (BdM)

Based from the Murillo Map or the 18th-century map "Carta hydrographica y
chorographica de las Islas Filipinas" (1734), it shows that the Scarborough Shoal, named for the
first time as Panacot from “tacot” that means “shoal”. Spanish cartographers mapped what is
known today as Bajo de Masinloc (BdM), translated as “under Masinloc”, and also known as
Panatag Shoal. This shoal that has many names is a disputed shoal located between Macclesfield
and off mainland Zambales province. It was named by Captain Philip D’Auvergne on 12
September 1784 (Joseph Huddart, 1801).

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Figure 13: Maps of BdM (source: timawa.net), photo of Scarborough Shoal (source: veooz.com), Municipality of Masinloc (source: LGU
Masinloc).

Masinloc was established in 1607 is the first town in the province of Zambales, although,
among the native settlements of the Zambals visited by Juan de Salcedo in his exploration to the
province in 1572. Masinloc with 33,150 hectares is a coastal town situated between the Zambales
Mountain in the east and the West Philippine Sea on the west. It is composed 13 barangays.
The Municipality of Masinloc has a population of 46,016 inhabitants and 9,238 households
(NSO CPH as of 2010). Once considered as the first capital of the then extensive province of

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Zambales, it extended from Cape Bolinao in Pangasinan to Olongapo City, far reaching the
municipalities of Sta. Cruz in Botolan and Iba. Masinloc in the early days has had only flat
section on its area occupied by people. Because of its proximity to the province of Pangasinan,
Ilocano and Pangasinense native speakers migrated to this first class municipality of Zambales
(http://www.masinloczambales.gov.ph/index.php/about-masinloc/history-of-masinloc).

2.3 Culture at a Distance: Chinese Strategic Culture and Paramount Leaders

Since the birth of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Shanghai, Chinese post-
modernizing society has never been the same way now. The ruling party is the source of all
political power and exudes all the exclusive right to legitimize and control all other political
organizations. It alone determines the social, cultural, economic, and political goals for the
society; however, all other institutions in China are controlled by the elites who themselves are
leaders of the party hierarchy.

The CPC has four main levels of organizations: (1) the central organizations; (2) the
provincial organizations; (3) the xian (county) or district organizations; and, (4) the basic and
primary organizations – party branches in schools, factories, and communes (Wang, 1992).

Over the course of China’s twentieth century, the dynastic system crumbled; the
traditional literati-gentry elite disappeared; state-society relations were transformed several
times; three revolutions of 1911, 1928 and 1949 created new systems of governance; and
modernizing nation-state emerged (Zarrow, 2008).

The Communists claimed victory contra Nationalists in the civil war when they convened
the People’s Political Consultative Conference on 1 October 1949 to establish a new People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. Prior to its political triumph, China suffered the backlash of

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hundred years of humiliation23 and Japanese invasion and semi-colonization (Cabalza and
Manalo, 2010).

In 1829 the Chinese government banned the import of opium, much to the fury of the
British. As relations deteriorated, the British launched the First Opium War (1839–42) and
bombarded south China into submission. In the Treaty of Nanjing, the Chinese were forced to
hand over Hong Kong, open the first five treaty ports and pay reparations. Thus, China’s
‘century of humiliation’ had begun (Jacques, 2009).

In hindsight, the Cultural Revolution of 1960s was not the beginning of a new
revolutionary phase but the last grasp of the Chinese Revolution. It was a revolution within a
revolution. It was an “ideological crusade” aimed at preventing gradual erosion of the
revolutionary spirit fostered by the early guerilla experience of reliance on the masses and
egalitarianism. Officially launched on 8 August 1966 when the Eleventh Session of the Eighth
Central Committee approved a sixteen-point guideline for conducting a thorough revolution
(Dirlik, 1992; in Kam, 1992).

Mao Zedong dominated the “First Generation” leadership of the PRC. Deng Xiaoping
and his cohorts defined the “Second Generation” as China opened its economy to the world.
Jiang Zemin spearheaded China’s peaceful development of the “Third Generation” stabilizing
the country since post-Tiananmen economic reforms posting a consistent economic growth
trajectory and propagated the Three Represents theory. By passing the baton of rule to a rising
group of politicians, Hu Jintao’s peaceful rise and harmonious society formed the “Fourth
Generation” (Finkelstein & Kivlehan, 2013). While China’s quest for economic dominance in
the world shall come into reality, the “Fifth Generation” under Xi Jinping will be leading an
army of Chinese dreamers.

23
The century of National Humiliation can be termed myth, but not because the episodes pointed to by Chinese
scholars did not occur. It is mythic, rather, in the sense that the fact of belief is more important than what actually
occurred. The story of National Humiliation is constantly told and retold in Chinese schools, in mass media, and in
countless mandatory study sessions attended by Chinese citizens.

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 Figure 14: The Rise of the First to the Fifth Generations of Chinese Paramount Leaders

Socialism in China is guided by two premises: (1) the socialist revolution in China
entangled to raise nationalism and nation-building. This has encouraged some scholars to view
socialism merely as one more expression of a national search for ‘wealth and power’; and,
(2) Socialism in China flourished as part of regional search for revolutionary alternatives to
Euro-American capitalism (Dirlik, 2003).

However, the economic system of today’s China is state-private capitalism based on a

mixture of forms of ownership, with private businesses playing an increasingly important role.
It is incorporating more and more elements of conventional Western capitalism but with
intervention in the economy in order to support industries and companies and contain the threats
of excessive lending, high-risk financial transactions, and asset bubbles on the other
(Tselichtchev, 2012).

2.3.1 Chinese Paramount Leaders

The five charismatic and enigmatic paramount leaders of the CPC has led and will be
leading the Chinese society to its Manifest destiny in the world as it celebrates the centennial by
2049 since the revisionist China has had theoretically founded a new political dynasty in 1949.

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Five strong-willed chairmen and presidents of the PRC bannered peculiar political slogans and
created magnanimous strategic culture setting the vision of each respective ‘generation’ to
further strengthen the evolving guiding principles of the ruling party.

Table 1. Chinese Transformative Strategic Culture

CPC/PRC Mao Deng Jiang Hu Xi

Political Marxism- Tiananmen Post-Tiananmen Regional Global
Leninism- Massacre Power Hegemony
Maoism
Economic Great Leap Economic Secured Beijing World’s World’s Largest
Forward Reforms Olympics Second Economy
Largest
Economy
Socio- Cultural Social Three Harmonious Chinese
Cultural Revolution Capitalism Represents Society Dream
Military Civil war PLA PLA Fourth and Maritime/
(Communist vs. Transformation Modernization the Fifth Naval Power in the
Nationalist) Domains Asia-Pacific
Source: Cabalza, 2015 (PowerPoint Lecture on Chinese Society and Culture, NDCP)

2.3.2 Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communism

Mao Zedong literally means ‘Benefit the East’ is often called “Chairman Mao”. He
became the founding father of the PRC and governed as Chairman of the CPC from its
establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976.

The Chinese Communist ideology consists of three basic elements: (1) the influence of
the Chinese revolution, particularly the intellectual ferment of the May Fourth Movement; (2) the
ideas of Marxism-Leninism; and, (3) the thought of Mao Zedong (Wang, 1992). Furthermore,
Maoism mixes Marxist-Leninist theories, military strategies, and political policies collectively
known as Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

The Maoism of Mao is often presented as the Chinese version of Marxism. The official
CPC policy of the ‘Sinification’ of Marxism was implemented while the pluralism of the Chinese
left was reduced to shadow of its former self under the impact of the counter-revolutionary
repression of the Kuomintang, then that of the Japanese occupation, and finally the Stalinization
of the Comintern (Yu, 2012).

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 Mao thought of the Great Leap Forward, part of his economic reconstruction aimed at
mobilizing the Chinese masses for economic growth and development, dubbed as “dual
technology”. These capital-intensive and labor-intensive duality of technology merged
cooperatives into people’s communes. Unfortunately, the economic program failed and
dichotomized Chinese leadership, not only because of the overdevelopment strategy but also
over the ideological implications of the strategy. This controversy is frequently referred to as the
‘red’ for politics versus ‘expert’ for technology.

The ideological crusade of the Cultural Revolution aimed at preventing gradual erosion
of the revolutionary spirit fostered by an early guerilla experience of reliance on the masses and
egalitarianism. This is a way of rectifying campaigns contrary to the guiding principles of the
ruling party to align policy differences regarding strategic culture and priority of its leaders in an
inevitable changing political landscape within the party.

During his regime, top radical leaders known as the “Gang of Four” which included
Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen – became the
minority group within the party and advocated continuous class struggle under the dictatorship of
the proletariat (Wang, 1992).

The revolutionary energies of the CPC which landed its victory in 1949 also sowed the
horrors of war with 20 million dead, some 95 million refugees and untold property damage. The
Communists froze society as peasants were not allowed to leave their communes; urban workers
became a privileged class with better access to housing, health care, schools, pensions and urban
entertainment. In other words, Maoist China was relatively egalitarian (Zarrow, 2008).

The truce between the Communists versus the Nationalists in China became a big pain
for the two Chinese factions fighting over ideological differences. The triumphant victory of
Mao Zedong in Mainland China made him the “core” of the “first generation” of the CPC. By
imbibing Confucian values in his political and military strategy, he even declared that, “an army
without culture is a dull-witted army and a dull-witted army cannot defeat the enemy.”

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 2.3.3 Deng Xiaoping and the Socialist Capitalism

Mao Zedong predicted that it would take five years for the Communists to defeat the
Nationalists. In August 1947, about 200,000 troops under a 43-year-old commander named Deng
Xiaoping drove south to establish a base in the strategically important Dabie mountain area along
the Anhui-Jiangsu border. After the Nationalist lost nearly half a million troops in the bloody
Manchurian campaign in 1948, the Communists had the most soldiers, and the People’s
Liberation Army began massing on the outskirts of Shanghai to Nanking (Gilley, 1998).

French and Russian-educated Deng Xiaoping rapidly reached the pinnacle of his political
career in the Communist Party of China starting from 1955 when he was elected to the powerful
Politburo and held the position of General Secretary to the Party. He became the leader of China
from 1978 until his retirement in 1992 and was considered the “paramount leader”.

Only Mao’s death in September 1976 and the takeover of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 opened
a gateway for reforms that were responsible for the sleeping dragon’s economic jump start.
The start of reforms in China is commonly dated from the Eleventh Congress of the CPC in
December 1978. But neither precise reform were concluded nor a time schedule was elaborated
yet there was an ideological change; Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism won over Maoist dogmatism;
and economic development was declared as the primary goal of party policy (Grupe & Rose,
2010).

In contrast to Soviet Communism, which suffered from a growing state of paralysis and
ossification, the Chinese party, under Deng displayed great creativity and flexibility, responding
to the crisis it inherited from Mao by initiating a process of reform that has transformed the
living standards of the great majority of the people. That period, the rule of the Communist Party
was no longer in doubt rather it enjoyed the prestige that one would expect given the
transformation that it presided over (Jacques, 2009).

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 His powerful economic philosophies of “to get rich is glorious” (Mahbubani, 2008:76)
and “it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice” (Li, 1977:7)
generalized Deng’s realistic economic brilliance. He even declared that, “to make revolution and
build socialism we need large numbers of path-breakers who dare to think, explore new ways
and generate new ideas.” (Jacques, 2009:167). He became instrumental in China’s economic
reconstruction following the Great Leap Forward in the early 1960s. Contrary to Chairman
Mao’s political and strategic ideologies, his economic policies placed him as the architect of a
new brand of socialist thinking, combining the communist party’s socialist ideology with
pragmatic adoption of market economic practices. Henceforth, a variety of forms of ownership
was endowed which pushed the confidence of private enterprise.

After his visits to Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore, Deng realized how
progressive those Southeast Asian cities were in November 1978. The five-day Third Plenary
Session of the historic Central Committee gathering in December 1978 utterly changed China.
He raised the importance of livelihoods above class struggle, loosened state controls, and led to
the opening of China to foreign trade and investment since then.

Guangdong turned to be the brainchild of Deng Xiaoping. It was well on the way to
becoming the industrial center of China - full of factories, many Hong Kong-owned, making
cheap, mass-produced goods for the global market. This is how and where China’s economic
transformation started (Jacques, 2009).

The 1979 propaganda efforts were mounted to reiterate the applicability of Marxism-
Leninism and to reinterpret its meaning in light of the aberration of the Cultural Revolution and
the liberal reforms introduced in the economic system (Wang, 2003). Yet military reform under
Deng remained a status quo to his predecessor’s old dictum of political power that grows out of
the gun barrel in which the party must command the gun.

He was responsible in consolidating his control over the central command structure of the
armed forces; staff key military positions at the central command headquarters with his trusted
associates; implanted reforms in the command structure and in personnel; reformed the PLA

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military officer corps training; and replaced the large number of aging officers by younger in age
and better educated officers.

2.3.4 Jiang Zemin and the Three Represents

Jiang Zemin or ‘Benefit of the People’ effectively became the “paramount leader” of
China in the 1990s. Jiang’s faction represents an ideology of nationalism with a stress on the
primacy of the military’s needs to ensure a prosperous and strong nation while his conservative
cohort collectively known as the “Shanghai Faction” (Tkacik, 2013). He served as General
Secretary of the CPC from 1989 to 2002, as Chairman of the Central Military Commission from
1989 to 2004, and as President of the PRC from 1993 to 2003.

Jiang became the “core” of the “third generation” of the CPC and ascended into power in
a coup, broadly defined. If Mao seized power at a meeting in Guizhou province in 1935 by
lambasting the military tactics adopted by the party leadership at that time; on the other hand,
Deng had used arcane debates on Cultural Revolution to discredit remnant of Mao’s supporters
and seize power in 1978. But Jiang’s accession was bloodier than his two predecessors - if the
Tiananmen massacre is interpreted as an action. Jiang was chosen by Deng and endorsed by
broad factional support within the party to be the “core” of the “third generation” of party
leadership (Gilley, 1998).

By the time of Deng’s death, Jiang had already achieved the goal of restoring political
stability and economic growth to China following the Tiananmen protests. Foreign investors
began to flood in China and Beijing’s voice in new international organizations such as the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the first multilateral organization China joined in
as a member, and later on the World Trade Organization was loud and influential (Gilley, 1998).

Jiang’s “Shanghai Gang” which originated when he was mayor and party chief in
Shanghai during the 1980s has close association with the fourth generation. Since Jiang was
promoted by Deng from Party Secretary of Shanghai to General Secretary of the CPC after the

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Tiananmen incident, he has promoted some of his friends from Shanghai to important national
leadership positions (Finkelstein & Kivlehan, 2013).

But he was confronted with certain dilemmas by his cohorts within the CPC since the
post-economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping paved the way to “open-door” policy causing the
regime to be challenged, more directly before, by hostile western forces through their
‘westernizing’ (xihua) and ‘splitting-up’ (fenhua) strategies and their ideologies.

Jiang stressed that the party’s brand of communism is inseparably consistent with
patriotism. Zemin refers to three historic events critical to the party: (1) the founding of the CPC
in the 1920s; (2) the anti-Japanese war in the 1930s-40s; and, (3) the collapse of communism in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. This was to show how nationalism supported
the party’s birth, success, and survival (Wu, 2013).

By way of stating China’s open-door policy, the party widely opened the door to private
entrepreneurs and other social influential groups that kept the CPC closely connected with its
traditional class bases and to constantly consolidate the class foundation by expanding its
popular support and increasing its social relevance.

Beyond that, he also reflected on the decline in public morality and national esteem.
The party and state control was felt to be slowly eating away at the corpus of the Communists
China like a cancer. In his alleged forthright criticism to the party, despite the market economics
propounded by Deng Xiaoping that won the support of the Chinese people; he complained about
the fall in moral standards of the Chinese people (Gilley, 1998).

Jiang’s economic vision did not constitute China’s ‘be-all and end-all’ but focused on
“development dictatorship” at the expense of ethics. But from late 1995 to 1996, he outlined his
new vision, in which political and ideological issues would be put on an equal footing with
economic issues. His ‘pay attention to politics’ campaign was an obvious way to consolidate his
personal authority, just as the Cultural Revolution had been used by Mao.

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 In 1999, PLA was considered a boxer suffering from ‘short arms and slow feet’ while
Beijing maintained a force of 2.8 million uniformed personnel, the PLA was largely restricted to
conducting on-shore operations within marching distance of China’s territorial borders.
China lacked air and sea lift, had few over-the-horizon intelligence gathering capabilities, and
planned for conducting single-service military operations (Kahlilzad, 1999).

But that has changed during the latter part of Jiang Zemin’s presidency in his effort to
modernize the PLA which has started to flex its muscles and essentially contains enemies using
four possible strategies: (1) playing the superpower game; (2) playing to its strength; (3)
changing the rules of the game; and by (4) do not play that game (Scobell, 2016).

It is difficult to achieve the status of a global power without first becoming the dominant
power in one’s own backyard or region. In doing that, Jiang made sure that the biggest spectacle
on earth in 2008 will be the Beijing Olympics. Analyst credited Jiang Zemin who secured the
Olympics for China, and the achievement was reaped by his successor and heir-apparent Hu
Jintao while concelebrating China’s debut as a hegemon in the region and a plausible superpower
in the world’s theatrical stage.

2.3.5 Hu Jintao and the Harmonious Society

What makes Hu a favorite successor and “core” of the “fourth generation” was due to his
broad political associations he has had established throughout his career – a prominent member
of the Qinghua University Clique; head of the Chinese Communist Youth League in the early
1980s; and president of the Central Party School in 1993 - all three of these institutions have now
become the main sources of elite recruitment.24

He has been known for his low-profile personality, leadership experience in youth affairs
and nationalistic appeal to young people, open-minded and effective in expressing patriotic
sentiment. However, Hu Jintao also has had shortcomings, including his little connection with

24
Ibid 26.

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the military, an underachiever as provincial chief in Guizhou or in Tibet, and must prove his
competence in economic and foreign affairs during his regime.25

At the beginning of 2000s, the CPC opened door for businessmen to join its ranks. At the
end of the last decade, President Hun Jintao proclaimed that Chinese citizens could outrightly tell
the authorities about their grievances and that grievance mechanism must seek solutions to the
various issues posed (Tselichtchev, 2012).

Colloquially within the PRC these ‘new rich’ (Goodman, 2008) are referred to most
commonly as xingui (the new rich), xinfu (new wealth), or dakuan (big spender); but also more
variedly in terms that highlight their political and social impact as well such as zhongchan jieji
(middle class), xin zibenjia (new capitalists), and xinrui (new blade) or that return to pre-1949
terms such as xinquangui (the new influential) and fuhao (the rich and powerful).

But most entrepreneurs seek to be more closely integrated with the State and the ruling
Party, rather than form an opposition to it. Furthermore, state owned enterprises and privately
owned do not exhibit the kinds of political beliefs that make them natural allies with democracy
advocates. However, emerging ‘red capitalists’ – those competing the existence of free-wheeling
economy alongside Leninist political institutions – fundamentally challenged the continued party
rule in China’s nominally communist system.

Between 2000 and 2009, China jumped the eleventh to the fifth position among the
world’s largest services exporters. It has by far the largest foreign exchange in the world; rapidly
emerging as one of the world’s leading lender nations, while China’s nominal gross domestic
product has just become the second largest in the world (Goodman, 2008).

In 2007, PLA sees US battle networks, which rely heavily on satellites and the internet to
identify targets, coordinate attacks, and guide ‘smart bombs’. The Chinese have tested an anti-
satellite missile, used lasers to temporarily blind US satellites, and conducted cyber-attacks on
the US military for years. This is in addition to the large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles

25
Ibid 26-27.

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and other anti-access/anti-denial weaponry that it has been fielding to undermine the American
bases in Asia (Krepinevich, 2010).

Hu Jintao’s driving influence on Chinese Military has great impact for PLA as he himself
was hands-on for security, military, and defense matters. He decided to earmarked more funds
for the digitization of operations as well as the development and procurement of weapons.
His concept of the army’s functions goes way beyond “traditional” tasks such as protecting its
borders and ensuring safety of sea lanes. He deemed that the PLA must provide substantial
power and force to ensure the consolidation of the ruling party status to provide strong security
backing for China’s development (www.jamestown.org/single/?tx...3882).

2.3.6 Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream

Xi Jinping’s ascension as “core” of the “fifth generation” and to China’s presidency is

marked by great expectations both by the Chinese nationals and world citizens alike with the
formation of his strategic culture on the Chinese dream by the reviving the maritime silk road
when eunuch Admiral Zheng He of Ming dynasty first circumnavigated the world; the
strengthening of the silk road in Central Asia to Europe, the enterprising road network traversed
by Marco Polo; and the establishment of the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) as
a competitor of the US-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
Japan-dominated Asian Development Bank (ADB), thus making China the second largest
economy in the world by size of its nominal gross domestic product (GDP) since 2010 and the
largest economy in the world by size of its power purchasing parity (PPP) in 2014.

The Chinese dream, a Sino-centric world order, was first mentioned by Xi during his tour
of an exhibit at the National Museum of China in November 2012, shortly after he became the
president of the CPC. That exhibit is called the ‘Road to National Rejuvenation’, and Xi Jinping
reiterated the Chinese dream is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese dream
includes having a powerful country, a good education, a happy family, or a bountiful harvest
(Tao Xie, 2016).

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 In the past three years since taking office, Xi Jinping placed much priority on enhancing
regional and international cooperation, as it pressed ahead with comprehensive agenda that
depends more on reform and opening-up (Zhenmin, 2014).

In the realm of economic security, China is rapidly elevating its role as the world’s leader
in manufacturing production and merchandise exports. Its economy has proved to be structurally
stronger than most economies in the West in the aftermath of the global economic crisis in 2008-
2009, although recently since last year, China is weakening economically speaking. PRC is
changing history, economic history included as the first major Asian power that has a market or
capitalist economy non-aligned to the West unlike Japan and India. China has established a de
facto monopolistic position as a major global platform for low-cost manufacturing, both low and
high technology (Tselichtchev, 2012).

China dreams farther to modernize its armed forces since it has not yet fully realized
national reunification (including islands in the Southeast China Sea and renegade province
Taiwan). These are all factors which place Chinese military under heavy pressure in securing the
country and its border areas. A decision to strengthen the reform of China’s national defense and
armed forces was adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the
CPC. Its armed forces have benefited from the country’s economic growth and stepped up their
efforts to pursue modernization by ensuring a balance development of national defense and the
economy (Wanquan, 2014).

From Mao Zedong’s Ideology, Deng Xiaoping’s Theories, Jiang Zemin’s Three
Represents, to Hun Jintao’s Harmonious Society to Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream – these strategic
cultures reinforce a mantra that, “the great revival of the Chinese nation is the greatest Chinese
dream.” Although, it may vary in terms of interpretations, China at present is also maligned with
increasing corruption challenges, extreme gaps between the rich and poor, and imminent
environmental degradation.

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 China’s defense budget has increased by double digits nearly every year since 1988,
leading to an eightfold swelling in the size of its defense budget over the past two decades.
In 2011, it defense budget grew to another 12.7 percent. China is the world’s second largest
military spender; although, it spends only around two percent of its gross domestic product.
It has over sixty submarines and will acquire more the soonest. It has the most active land-based
ballistic antiship ballistic missiles using information from space-backed tracking systems
(Kaplan, 2014).

Lastly, in its candidature as a global superpower, Chinese hegemony will involve at least
four fundamental geopolitical shifts: “first, that Beijing will emerge as the global capital; second,
that China will become the world’s leading power; third, that East Asia will become the world’s
most important region; and fourth, that Asia will assume the role of the world’s most important
continent, a process that will also be enhanced by the reemergence of India” (Jacques,
2009:386).

2.3.7 Strategic Culture of Five Generations

The PRC is a single-party state governed by the CPC with a seat of power in Beijing,
blessed with paramount leaders in five succeeding generations that crafted an unprecedented
strategic culture. The architect and master-thinker of the current successful political dynasty in
People’s Republic of China is Mao Zedong who changed the destiny of the Chinese people
including the pattern of world affairs today.

Among China’s leaders, Mao is largely venerated by the masses in China. His
dominating influence, known for his charismatic appeal and numerous achievements to his name,
wanted to purify the party and state leadership. However, he may be faulted for introducing the
Cultural Revolution, adamantly pushed for the Great Leap Forward, and launched a personality
cult.

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 Yet the influential Chinese newspaper Global Times published an opinion poll in 2014
which revealed that more than 85 percent of Chinese respondents see the merits of the first
generation’s founder of Communist China. The poll also greatly outweighs his mistakes with
more than 90 percent of respondents showing reverence or respect to the late Chairman Mao
(www.globaltimes.cn/content834000.shtml).

Furthermore, his political influence still resonates in PRC’s political system, economic
basis, international position, and strategic culture. This is the rationality behind his massive
portrait posted in the Tiananmen Rostrum or entrance to the Forbidden City as a symbol of state
power.

Despite the capitalist colossus of Deng, most people always believed the official line that
Mao was the man who transformed China, despite being responsible for over 70 million deaths
of the Chinese in peacetime did much damage than Hitler or Stalin, according to Chinese author
Jung Chang (www.cbsnews.com/maos-unrelenting-influence).

Mao

Deng

Jiang Hu Xi
Figure 15: Hierarchy of Powers of Chinese Paramount Leaders (Cabalza 2016).

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 Deng, on the other hand should also be credited for the PRC’s staying power, and not for
his pragmatic economic brilliance, China could have not reached its global status today as the
‘other’ superpower.

His goal in 1976 was to set China back on the course of economic development that had
been badly interrupted during the final years of Mao’s leadership. He advocated for ‘four
modernizations’ as articulated by Zhou Enlai a year before, which entailed the development of
industry, agriculture, defense, and science and technology (www.afe.easia.columbia.edu).
And his biggest break was when he reformed and opened up China’s economy externally in
1978.

The Mao-Deng extreme leadership values and strategic culture obviously differ, as the
first laid the ground on political reforms for 27 years while the second paved a way for economic
reforms for 14 years. Although, it terms of seniority and hierarchy of influence of power, Mao
exudes reverence on top of Deng. Complemented by Mao’s and Deng’s own brand of brilliance
and charisma, both leaders however remained popular and influential until their death in 1976
and 1997, respectively. It was Deng who agreed to Jiang Zemin’s elevation to party chief and
who nominated Hu Jintao as Jiang’s successor. But Xi Jinping, often paralleled to Deng’s cult
position, will further strengthen Chinese strategic culture as it aims to achieve the Chinese
Dream.

Hence, Chinese strategy is based on both Western historical successes and careful study
of how ancient Chinese empires rose and fell. China’s strategy does not use rigid road maps or
timetables or blueprints. It is poised to seize opportunities – suddenly if necessary (Pillsbury,
2015).

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 CHAPTER 3

3.1 People-to-People Engagement

3.1.1 Prologue: Fusion of Language, Culture, History

Binondo throbs vibrantly while I was strolling along its filthy, narrow alleys. The rays of
the sun have already kissed the humungous red bloody arc emblazoned with dragons and Sinitic
calligraphy when I arrived at the mouth of the famous Chinatown in the city. My sudden
immersion has certainly awed and struck me, telling me in gist, as if I have reached Beijing.

Since Binondo is the earliest Chinatown to be established in the whole world, it probably
has the largest concentration of Chinese population in Metro Manila or around the archipelago.
Most of the Chinese in Binondo belong to the third generation of Chinese immigrants. They own
business establishments in the booming area, flamboyantly exuding their expertise on
entrepreneurship.

Based on Chinese legends, the Chinese people are called Zhōngguó ren and consider
themselves the head of the dragon.26 The Chinese dragon is a mythical snake-like creature
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200311/03/eng20031103_127479.shtml) with four legs. It
represents strength and valor, potent and auspicious powers, unlikely represented as dark and
evil, understood in the Judeo-Christian tradition.27

The abundance of Chinese businessmen in Binondo could be traced back from the
Spanish colonial era where it became a place to confine to the ever growing Chinese population.
Though initially of low status, the Chinese slowly gained the confidence of the Spanish officials

26
This legend was based from the discovery of the Peking Man in China. Chia Lan Po (1908-2001) originally
narrated that he first discovered the cave site where the fossils or the “dragon bones” of the Peking Man was
unearthed coming from the Dragon Bone Hill. Although, Chinese archeologist Chia Lan Po was not the first to
discover the Peking man skull but his specimens were so much better preserved than any previous or subsequent
finds that they are immeasurable value to scientific research.
27
Based on the lecture of Dr Mario Miclat, PhD at NDCP in 2013.

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since they heavily contributed in the Philippine economy as the Spanish empire began reforming
its colonial policies (Amyot, 1973).

It is also important to consider that as the Chinese population in Binondo grew and as
they gained the confidence of the Spaniards, they were then allowed to have a certain degree of
self-governance as a form of political privilege.

Binondo as a political unit has been very attractive to Filipino writers for it can actually
expose a different political take under a modernized Chinese community in the heart of
Philippine political culture. Aside from the economic reverberations of Binondo as the earliest
Chinatown in Asia, where extensive trade and commerce prosper, it also captures a perfect
picture how culturally-different political unit can adapt to a larger and stronger political
environment (Wickberg, 1964).

The extent of why political culture adapts in the first place matters the argumentation on
how such new political system may actually replace a traditional one. Another worth noting is
the flexibility of Chinese strict economic purpose to be subsumed by the need to extend
politically side-by-side with their intentions to constitutionally orient their local bodies.

The alien Chinese population of Greater Manila was officially reckoned to be big in
number.28 Defined in cultural and not in legal terms, whether they be Filipino citizens or not,
full-blooded or not, they are distributed throughout all of the metropolitan area, but they tend to
congregate in their own enclaves.

As they create their own identity, the descendants of the mythical dragon who settled in
the Philippines, shaped by history and community, would later ascribe to call themselves
Chinoys or Tsinoys (Chinese Filipinos).29
28
According to Ang See, she believes that “the natural sociological process of integration was triggered by the
objective reality of the Philippine environment, especially by the fact that because of the interrupted immigration
and the application of the Chinese Exclusion Law, the ethnic Chinese only make up 1.2 percent of the total
population” (2013:44). According to Amyot, “the largest Chinese concentration is in downtown Manila in the
districts of Tondo, Binondo, San Nicolas, and Sta Cruz” (1975:48).
29
Chinoy is a coined term for Filipino-Chinese who are actually Filipino national with Chinese descent and are
staying and doing business in the country. The word is a combination of Chinese (chi) and Pinoy (noy) to become

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 Election30 as a process of Chinese adoption is one important aspect of understanding the
phenomenon that envelops the argument of Chinese community as an agent of political change in
the country. For them, they contributed a lot to Philippine nation-building. The Chinoys or
Tsinoys are proud to say that they have the first in the Philippines alluded to the first Filipino and
national hero Jose Rizal, the first Filipino saint Lorenzo Ruiz, and the first Philippine president
of the republic General Emilio Aguinaldo, all had Filipino-Chinese descent.31

Is there really a political struggle in the part of Binondo's Chinese community during
Philippine local elections? What is their primary consideration in entering formal politics if their
economically-coated goals may be achieved even in a non-partisan manner? Could Binondo as a
political unit survive the whips of modern Philippine politics while retaining the spirit of Chinese
culture or would it be possible to actually survive it politically but not culturally?

As I converse with one local official in Binondo, I have learned that the place is not
actually a Chinese community if residential population is to be considered based from walk-in
interviews. Local officials disclose that most of their voters are Filipinos who are said to be
either natives of the Binondo area or employees who decided to reside there permanently.

Although the establishments are owned by the Chinese businessmen, a number of

workers are mostly Filipino citizens. These Chinese establishments made Binondo the primary
economic haven spearheading Chinese economic prominence, and eventually, their political
grasp locally grew exponentially.

ChiNoy. Sometimes, called as Tsinoy because in Filipino China is called Tsina. There is no definite year when was
Chinoy was coined, but according to Teresita Ang See, it was only in early 1970s before and during the
Constitutional Convention to draw up the new constitution that the problems of citizenship and political identity of
the ethnic Chinese were discussed or debated upon (2013:75).
30
Based from my interviews to Chinoy officials in Binondo, election is important to them because they were not
allowed to vote or run for public office before. There was a time when their forefathers had to lobby for intense fight
for citizenship and legal recognition in the Philippines especially during the American period.
31
Based on the exhibit at Balay Tsinoy in Intramuros, Manila which I have seen it on a regular basis each time I
bring my NDCP and UP Diliman students in this not so old museum.

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 Political scepticism among local voters is actually one aspect why Binondo posed a
different local political regime since Chinese officials are widely accepted while voters are
predominantly Filipinos. In this sense, economic prominence may be a good starting point why
political culture has been shared by both the Chinese and Filipinos within a defined territory for
almost three generations.

According to Chairman Nelson Ty, a second-termer of Barangay 289, Zone 27 of

Binondo Manila, he tells me that a Barangay Kagawad of Filipino descent has won a seat, and
the other six local officials are Chinese. He also says that since Chinese officials dominate the
barangay, the council adopts a decision-making process where decisions of the elders are highly-
respected, noting seniority and hierarchy, a part of the political culture.

In my attempt to ask about the current maritime and territorial dispute between China
and the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea, in his Solominic judgement, he concedes that
they will not side in either country for the greater good of their constituency. In his personal
opinion, he thinks that China should respect the rule of law and international law.32

In Barangay 290, Zone 8 of Binondo, the Council is headed by Barangay Chairman Dick
Ching, a Chinese. Under him, three Filipino Barangay Kagawad and four Chinese Barangay
Kagawad form his council. According to Kagawad Antonio Diaz, a Filipino, most of the criminal
records in their ledger are committed by Filipinos. While talking to him, I could see in his face
that he is contented and proud to be part of a Chinese administration, praising altogether the
chairman's fair policies.

There is also an existing Chinese youth association, a formal non-government

organization, working as fire fighter volunteers. Obviously, most local politicians in Binondo are
dominated by the Chinese, often commended for making this busy Chinese community
competitive.

32
Three questions were intended to ask during the fieldwork to gain insights from what Chinoys think of the
political landscapes in the Philippines: (1) China-Philippines conflict; (2) Binondo’s peace and order situation; and
(3) preferential treatment of Chinoys in domestic economy.

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 The third barangay of 288 is located near Divisoria, the bustling economic hub in the
area. Kagawad Herbert Chen Sy, an owner of a relatively large retail store, claims that there is no
racial discrimination in his area. He deems that the general public leaves no special treatment to
the local Chinese even among council members of Chinese descent.

He says, “Kung meron man i-didiscriminate, kami yun, kasi kami yung dayo dito,”
(If they would discriminate people here, it is us [referring to the Chinese], since we are alien in
the place).

Having the world’s oldest Chinatown found at Binondo, Manila’s erstwhile financial
center in the past centuries, it still feeds my vivid imagination of Fookien language and culture
that has epitomized China’s intergenerational image in tropical Philippines.

I remember when I stepped into the bustling entrepreneurial center of Binondo, classic
red lanterns hanging everywhere to signify the Chinese colorful culture. This economic hub,
located across the Pasig River from Intramuros, locates Chinatown marked with gates known for
its architectural grandeur and style, and old edifices plank side by side with a touch of Spanish
facades. Its busy streets boost with oozing characters with dynamic enterprises and street foodies
along Ongpin and Quintin Paredes streets. But the more prominent rendition of tigers and
dragons, often armored, can be seen in temples and arcs across Chinatown.

A newly built yet sophisticated boxed mall sports a white convex plate in between the
second floor windows that feature orthodox prints of a lady in flowing robe harvesting rice or
playing with younger kids, but everywhere all stores sell expensive and luxurious goods. A gem
for the middle class and elite local Chinese, a deviant sight from the mass-based 168 and 888
malls that sell cheap and bargain goods.
Upon entering the newly constructed Lucky Chinatown, a sprawling upscale shopping
Mecca, I have heard a lot of elderly Chinese conversing in Fookien. If you are an outsider, you
would expect Mandarin to be the preferred language in a Chinese-speaking community like
Binondo, but in most Chinatowns around the world, you would hear more people speaking in a
regional language like Cantonese or Fookien but not Mandarin.

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 The reason, in Chinese society, Mandarin is a prestige language. It is more often used in
formal settings like in schools, the media and business. To be able to speak Mandarin is a sign of
good education and a higher social class.

The immersion of learning and hearing the prestige language of Mandarin in school and
higher social class I have had come to experience only when I attended a short course for
Military Diplomacy also called International Symposium Course at the Center for Defense
Studies in China’s National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army, adjacent at the
foot of a mountain range overlooking above the humungous and iconic Great Wall of China in
Winter of 2011. The executive class combines theories and praxis of Chinese strategies and
perspectives of the world, in which one of the fervently debated topics discussed in class,
attended by military and civilian officers, and represented by major countries around the world
that certainly have caused commotions and enormous reactions was on “Questions Concerning
the Ownership of the South China Sea Islands and Related International Laws,” delivered in
straight Mandarin by Rear Admiral Yin Zhou, Director of the Naval Information Expert
Committee, with a young Chinese military interpreter in English beside him.

In the presentation, the seasoned military delivers pointblank China’s claims over the
South China Sea as the earliest discoverer of the disputed maritime territories by first naming it;
and the Chinese being the earliest people to manage and develop it; also, the earliest to exercise
jurisdiction with ‘undisputed sovereignty’ over the regime of islands. He draws his legal and
scientific bases from its dotted boundary lines that have come into being in the struggle to
safeguard China’s territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests. The historical waters
count for the country who claims historical ownership that has already exercised rights over the
sea waters; that right must be exercised continuously without interruption; lastly, that right has
been recognized openly and tacitly.

Legally, using Intertemporal Law, China seeks to believe that a judicial fact must be
appreciated in light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when
a dispute has already occurred, as it arise or falls to be settled. Furthermore, using the Estoppel

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Principle, China thinks that if a government breaks the promise that it has made, there is a
serious violation of international law (Yin Zhuo, 2011). All in all, China asserts its historical
rights with a five thousand year old unbroken civilization, one of the world’s oldest.

Because of the language barrier, one of the strategies to better understand China is
through language and culture. I myself have enrolled in basic Chinese language to feel the grasp
of the vivid and poetic monosyllabic language of the Sinitic culture, foreseen to replace English
as the world’s lingua franca, but in my dreams of becoming fluent in Mandarin. The best effort
to learn and grasp thorny words and sentences, syllables and intonations, calligraphy writing, and
a taste of Chinese culture can be counted through my travels and study tours around Mainland
China and its littoral city-state Hong Kong, but it was an unfortunate attempt for me to fluently
speak and read the Mandarin language.

I myself must admit that it is difficult to learn the art of calligraphy through writing and
reading Chinese characters, which I also suffered the same fate when I studied Nihonggo. Better
yet now that there is the popularity of the pinyin33.

The pinyin system, which was officially adopted by China in 1953, has successfully
Romanized the Chinese language, and this makes it possible for English-speaking people around
the world to learn Chinese. Moreover, the English and Chinese languages share some basic
grammar rules. A sentence has a subject and a predicate; the word order is almost the same.
However in Chinese, prefixes and suffixes are not prominent because it does not exist in the
language itself (Merin, 2011).

It has been said to me that in the realm of communication, an average Chinese needs to
memorize or should know at least 2,000 to more than 10,000 characters to be able to read and
write. The Chinese language seems so familistic as reflected in their kinship system that one

33
Hanyu (spoken Chinese) is the most commonly used language in China. The Hanzi (Chinese written characters) is
the most commonly used written language. Pinyin is the Chinese phonetic alphabets and English translations, which
is now becoming popular simply because of people’s interests, from all walks of life, on basic and advanced Chinese
language worldwide. The basic sound of modern Chinese language is not difficult to reproduce if one speaks the
English language. Pinyin (spelling the sounds of Chinese characters) uses the English alphabet. Most of the letters
are similar to the English sounds. Only a few sounds in modern Chinese do not occur in English.

81 | P a g e
needs to recognize a relative based on the latter’s seniority and position within a chronological
sequence of kinsmen that is cognizant of the Confucian values they solely patronage.

The stigma attached to the Chinese language, which is as old as its civilization, reflects
only its sophistication since its ancient invention. This contested future lingua franca uses
morphemes to represent characters with corresponding meanings. It requires simple logic with
neither particles nor prefixes. Unlike other Romance or Austronesian languages which are
bi-syllables.

Hence, returning to Chinatowns, you find people coming from provinces of China and
where the language demands a colloquial setting, regional languages are preferred than the
national language Mandarin, so with the case of Binondo. You would still be able to find
Mandarin-speaking Chinese in Binondo, though.

The languages spoken in Chinatown are mainly Filipino, English and Fookien. The first
two primary languages are spoken and heard in Binondo because these are the languages used
for non-Chinese in the community. In communication, local Chinese prefer Fookien in speaking
to their fellow Chinese. Fookien is a Sinitic language from Fujian province in China which most
of the Chinese community here in the Philippines come from that island region. However,
majority of the Fookien speakers in Chinatown are mostly elders. The second and third
generations of Fookien speakers are rather comfortable in speaking English and Filipino in
everyday communication, making them to have a less command of the Fookien language,
according to my informants.

Furthermore, since the earlier form of the language was brought to Binondo, the Fookien
variety in the place differs from the Fookien being spoken now in Fujian. The Fookien variety in
the country contains borrowed words from English and other Philippine languages and some
words are considered now as dialects. The Fookien variety spoken in Binondo differs to the kind
of Fookien spoken in Palawan and Zambales based from my fieldworks in these three settings.

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 In Binondo, the Chinese writings that are used are still in traditional Chinese. Traditional
Chinese characters are more complicated than simplified Chinese characters. They are preferred
when writing signs and doing calligraphy in Chinese because of its intricateness and aesthetic
value compared to simplified Chinese characters that were instituted in 1950s by the Communist
government of China; thus, the Chinese in Binondo who settled there even before 1950s until
today have been using the traditional writing system.

But what makes Binondo a culture-vulture for Filipinos and Chinese alike? Perhaps the
languages. The soul of a language is simply a product of two nations and of two cultures:
the Philippines and China. The union of these two nations is also manifested in language with
Binondo consisting of speakers of different Chinese and Philippine languages; thus, the prevalent
presence of Filipino, English and Fookien in the world’s oldest Chinatown makes a place rich of
culture and history.

3.1.2 Philippines-China Relations

It was during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644 CE) that the Philippines and China friendship
has first reached its peak. The aspect of the Sino-Sulu relations, recounted in the Ming annals,
transcribed the earliest state visit of the Sulu sultan, Paduka Patara, in China in 1417 where he
had been royally received by the Chinese emperor. On his way home after a 27-day visit, the
Sultan was stricken ill and died in the city of Dezhou in Shandong province. But the emperor
honored the Muslim king with the title Kong Ting (brother) and ordered the building of a
handsome mausoleum to mark the tomb of his Filipino friend – the only tomb of a foreign
monarch in honor of the 15th century Sulu sultan (Laurel, 2000).

Prior to western conquest of the Philippines in 16 th century, Chinese traders and

diplomats began incursions in our islands; even named Mindoro as Ma-i or Ma-yi, known to
locals as Mait,34 according to the accounts of Zhufa Zin, written around 1225 CE during the Song
dynasty (www.globalsecurity.org).

34
Literally means “country of the Blacks”.

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 Analyzing Philippine historiography in pre-Spanish times could surface a new look in our
narratives on the iota of who first discovered our country. Spain called our Islands, Las Islas
Filipinas, in honor of King Philip. It was known that during the “Indianization process” from
first to fifteenth centuries in Southeast Asia, China wrestled its energy more on trade and
diplomacy, influencing Austronesian chiefdoms in the region. A case in point of a rich trading
activity with the Philippines unearthed in June 1993 through the Palawan archeological
discovery of the wreck of a fifteenth century Chinese junk that yielded thousands of artifacts
including jars, ceramics, and coins bearing the date of “1414” that coincided with the time frame
of Admiral Zheng He’s expedition and circumnavigation of the world.

Fast forward today. In one of the murals at the National Defense College of the
Philippines, a realist painting shows that Chinese in the Philippines have had always been
partners of the Filipino people in the struggle for freedom. During the Spanish occupation, the
Chinese rebelled against the oppressive western ruler. Filipino historians referred to these
rebellions as the Chinese Uprisings.35

In the war against resistance to Japanese, the local Chinese organized eight guerilla
groups that fought side by side with Filipino guerillas. Most notable was the Filipino-Chinese
Anti-Japanese Guerilla Force, popularly known by its Chinese name as Wha Chi or Squadron 48.
The group composed mainly of Chinese Hukbalahap. Even in modern times, many of Chinese
lineages who are strongly assimilated to Filipino culture have triumphantly succeeded in leading
different sectors of Philippine society. The Chinese in the Philippines, and the Chinoys, are
generally partners of the Filipino people in the fight for freedom.36

Since many of the Chinese descent in the Philippines originated from Fujian and other
southern coastal provinces of China, the waves of migration have occurred twice. The pre-war
diaspora from China to the Philippines and other developing Southeast Asian countries listed

35
In 1953, Chinese rebels led by P’an Ho Wu killed Governor Luis Perez Dasmarinas. The illustrado or bourgeois
class, which led the Reform Movement and the Philippine Revolution against the Spaniards and the Americans, was
basically a Chinese-Filipino mestizo class. Worth mentioning was Ignacio Pua, the full-blooded Chinese general in
the revolutionary army. He was responsible for building munitions factory in Imus, Cavite. He was the revolutionary
army’s fundraiser, and led many battles against the Spaniards.
36
Narrative can be read at NDCP’s mural in its august lobby inside Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

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Chinese migrants as ‘undocumented’ and ‘illegal’. The influx of illegal Chinese migrants
increased as they escaped poverty from the Mainland. On the other hand, the post-war diaspora
in 1940s only allowed investors, students, and tourists, then considered ‘documented’ who later
on became billionaires and wealthiest tycoons in the country. These paved way to smooth
migration due to the economic reforms that opened up the ‘out of China’ path where Chinese
citizens immigrated to all continents, forming their own Chinatowns in the four corners of the
world (Ang See, 2005).

More so, before the Philippines-China relations were normalized in June 1975, the
archipelagic country stayed away from the giant neighbor for fear of communist contagion,
in light of a strong internal Maoist insurgency and the presence of a small but vulnerable ethnic
Chinese minority. “Manila’s subsequent decision to normalize ties was based on the calculation
of undermining Chinese support for the insurgency, tapping new sources of oil supply,
and expanding relations with socialist states to balance perceived American weight in Philippine
foreign policy. While the relations in the last thirty years or so have been characterized by
occasional frictions, on the whole they have been cordial on the political front, if rather
unremarkable in terms of economic exchanges” (Baviera, 2009:3).

But “Manila’s assimilating culture has allowed natural sociological process of integration
that was triggered by the objective reality of the Philippine environment, especially by the fact
that because of the interrupted immigration and the application of the Chinese Exclusion Law,
the ethnic Chinese make up only 1.2 percent of the total population in the country” (Ang See,
2013:44).
But one reflective trivia of how, through centuries, demographics of trade and commerce
around Binondo have opened stratification as negligible number of Filipino businessmen fails to
own retail shops, for example in either 888 or 168 malls, oftentimes because they are lured to toil
only as salesman, while Chinese businessmen become giant fish in the big pond of market.

It is a common stereotype among the Chinese and the Filipino-Chinese to be elevated as

best entrepreneurs. Historically, even before the Spanish period, Chinese traders came to
Binondo and exchanged goods with local chieftains. In each colonial periods and post-World

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War II and during the phase of nation-building from post-war to contemporary period, Chinese
in the Philippines have remained the pillars of our economy, thereby creating taipans who may
become billionaires and founders of business conglomerates in the country.

If we look at Chinatown as a whole, it is not just a residential area of the Filipino-Chinese

community. It is also a commercial center along the area. Walking through Ongpin Street,
plunked and emblazoned with various quirky establishments, most of the edifices look antique
and preserved from the original design. Filipino employees residing in the area agree that the
cost of living in Binondo appears higher compared to other districts in Manila City alone.

To gain a bigger market, Chinoys have infused Chinese and Filipino cultures as evident
in their products and services. Apparent hybridity of Chinese and Filipino culture comes
basically true in the area. Integration to Filipino mainstream culture has been adapted by the
Chinese and Chinoys, evident in their fluency in Filipino and English languages and Catholicism.

3.2 Elevating State’s National Interests

3.2.1 Tapestry of External Security Threat in the West Philippine Sea

My baptism of fire as a security actor and/or a bit player through participation-

observation in this ambit of regional security theater in the South China Sea vis a vis the West
Philippine Sea, where often than not, I also persuade my voice and thoughts as an academic that
may have been voluminously relayed through lectures, media interviews, discussion among
circle of colleagues, and to common people in the grassroots during fieldwork, kicks off when I
became a tenured faculty at the National Defense College of the Philippines, immediately
thereafter, I was sent to Beijing for my first official engagement and schooling.

December 2011 when I arrived in Beijing as the winter’s solstice grudgingly shakes off
my simple get up of khaki and jacket illuminating a typical anthropologist look in me, common
to any fieldwork. Unprepared and unaccustomed of the harsh cold weather condition in northern
China since barely coming from a humid state of the Philippines who keenly has had adapted to

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dry and wet season. From one of planet Earth’s densely populated ancient capital of Peking
renamed as Beijing in modern times, tenseness has abruptly assaulted my nerves as I traverse the
gigantic and winding Beijing Capital International Airport, notorious in practice to detain
foreigners after a maximum of three hours wandering outside the vicinity of the airport. First
time to travel alone to the giant communist country,37 without friends or family members, and in
an official capacity as a civilian officer from the Philippines.

A tall and sleek young Chinese lady who later on I found out in our thread of
conversation, a linguistics graduate from Tsinghua University, welcomed me from the entrance
of the airport, holding a huge placard with my name inscribed on the board with calligraphic
characters below it, perhaps a translation of my name. She is a bit confused to meet and see me,
judging on her gestures that she might be expecting an older professor to fetch who may be
appearing cold with grey hair wearing a respectful formal suit. But to her surprise, as I keep my
nearness to her, and immediately shaking off my freezing hands with her gloved hands, broach
myself to her, and I seem to emerge opposite of her expectation. A joint amazement and
bafflement paints her face during the long ride to outskirts of Beijing inside the Audi car,
common to all official government vehicles in the capital. She speaks fluent English but
discreetly expresses her astonishment of me looking very young in my stature as an academic.

The same experience I had when the Chinese embassy turned down my visa in Manila
before leaving for the said schooling. I have sought for the assistance of the Chinese defense
attaché stationed at Makati, a certain senior colonel Q from the PLA, equivalent to a brigadier
general in our defense corps, based from the suggestion of Brigadier General Fermin de Leon,
the newly appointed president of NDCP at that time, and a friend of his. Senior Colonel Q
[pseudonym for anonymity] quietly comes out from his third floor office, about to take his lunch,
while I irresolutely stand up and awaits him outside his workplace for almost an hour, since the
Filipino guard has properly observed the protocol barring anyone from disturbing the senior
military diplomat during lunch. In haste, I courteously broach myself to him but with a baffled
query.
37
China is politically and officially labeled by the West as communist country, though communism is an economic
system and not a political system, same with socialism.

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 “Where is the professor?” in a perplex conduct while he holds a plastic bag with a box of
viands.

“I am the professor, sir…” in my humble reply.

“Oh, you look very young, professor!” he simply responds

His confusion turns into anxiety as he rush inside his office and summon me to chase him
unhurriedly ascending to his semi-unlit room decorated with antiques and jaded figurines,
emblematic of a Chinese abode. He runs left and right to set free of his hands from his box of
viands but has allowed me to sit in his deluxe sofa as he later on converses with me.
After promising me all the assistance he could extend on my part to secure a visa, he confronts
my stance on the South China Sea but courageously expedites the Chinese side of the narrative
and tells me in quick jest.

“You’re an academic, I hope you write the truth. Chinese and Filipinos are Asians and
the Americans are sweet talkers. They will not support you in case conflict arises [in the disputed
islands]…” he utters in his proverbial words.

During the three-week course in Beijing, participants mostly dominated by defense

attachés and a minority of civilian officers like me working for the defense sector, has frantically
opposed the imposed Chinese dictum of a harmonious society, particularly from Western
countries.

The political slogan that has certainly evolved into stages of strategies, quoted as agenda
of reforms since November 2002, composed the mantra for “society becomes more harmonious,”
laying the ground for the six goals of China’s development towards a well-off society.
In September 2004 it was rephrased as, “the ability to build a harmonious society,” carrying
together the five abilities in which the ruling CPC should strengthen. But then President

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Hu Jintao addressed his people and set the policy straight to the provincial leaders in central
party school in February 2005 which audaciously echoed the decision of the party central in
October 2006 for the building of a harmonious society; thereby sanctifying it as part of the Party
Constitution in October 2007 (Mei, 2011), away from other countries’ perception of a ‘China
threat’ to the world order.38

Beginning 2011, the South China Sea issue has remained a high-level discussion for
track one and track two diplomacy and/or for many scholars, marine scientists, underwater
archaeologists, seasoned diplomats, defense/security actors and plain observers. Exchanges of
note verbale and communiqué, defining archipelagic baselines, joint seismic and oceanographic
expeditions, regional defense and security cooperation, and other various publications or
researches pertaining to the South China Sea as the ‘mother of territorial disputes’ (Baviera,
2005; Hoesslin, 2005; Banlaoi, 2007; Batongbacal, 2008; Bensurto, 2010; Severino, 2010;
Nguyen, 2011; de Castro, 2012; Johnson, 2012), pull off the fulcrum of a seesaw in a balancing
act to reduce the tension in the area.

Alarmingly, as early as the second decade of the twenty first century, communist China
has armed itself with a polite yet confident ambition of a peaceful rise to an open punctuated
question mark of “what does China really want?”

Positioning itself as a plausible superpower, China has turned toward the kinetic vibration
of awe to alarm smaller and powerful nation-states to appeal to its wants: (1) strategically, China
is most likely to become the future superpower but it is not prepared to take on this leadership
role; (2) diplomatically, China is tilting from peaceful development to more assertive foreign
policy. Nationalism and special interest groups are emerging quickly; (3) economically, China’s
rise is a huge opportunity for Europe and the US but western countries’ concern is also

38
Michael Pillsbury’s book on The Hundred-Year Marathon (2015:35-36) outlines nine principal elements of
Chinese Strategy to reach hegemony in the world: (1) induce complacency to avoid alerting your opponent; (2)
Manipulate your opponent’s advisers; (3) Be patient – for decades, or longer; (4) steal your opponent’s ideas and
technology for strategic purposes; (5) Military might is not the critical factor for winning a long-term competition;
(6) Recognize that the hegemon will take extreme, even reckless action to retain its dominant position; (7) Never
lose sight of shi; (8) Establish and employ metrics for measuring your status relative to other potential challengers;
and, (9) Always be vigilant to avoid being encircled or deceived by others.

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increasing; (4) ideologically, communism is very hard to accept but China’s system currently
works well though with much uncertainty remains (Li Fan, 2011).

Meanwhile, academics and policy-makers in the Philippines react to China’s expansionist

goal, citing Renato de Castro’s opening text in his paper entitled, “Aquino Administration’s 2011
Decision to Shift Philippine Defense Policy from Internal Security Operation to Territorial
Defense,” to wit: “A chronic security issue that has bedevilled the Philippines since the early
1990s has been China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, in turn, threatens the few islets
and reefs (collectively called the Kalayaan Island Group) that the country controls in the
Spratlys”.

Foreign scholars even document in their body of works that 2011 ‘events’ witnessed the
escalation of tensions in the South China Sea as Robert Kaplan foresees it as “the future conflict”
while Aaron Friedberg sees the same divergence he calls “ripe for rivalry” owing to the
increasing belligerence of claimants as they turn acidic in their resolute diplomacy and pound-
for-pound militaristic muscle.

Security analyst Rommel Banlaoi (2011) documents in his research a series of ‘events’ in
2011 that certainly increased unilateral patrols and surveillance ship activities in the South China
Sea, triggering emotional mistrust and enmity among neighbours in the region, therefore,
claimants clandestinely resort to muscle building of their military capability. These alarming
events are listed in the following confrontations: The May 26, 2011 cable cutting incident
involving three Chinese surveillance ships and Vietnamese state-owned Binh Minh 02 seismic
survey ship; subsequent cable cutting episode occurred on May 9, 2011 with three Chinese
fishing vessel Number 62226 and PetroVietnam’s Viking 2 seismic survey ship.

Still in Banlaoi’s 2011 comprehensive report, the AFP has sighted the Chinese Jianhu V
Class missile frigate Number 560 that fired three shots at three Filipino fishing vessels, namely:
Jaime DLS, Mama Lydia DLS, and Maricris 12 on February 25, 2011, operating the waters near
the Quirino or Jackson Atoll, 140 nautical miles west of Palawan. On March 2, 2011,
two Chinese maritime patrol vessels Numbers 71 and 75, threaten to ram MV Veritas Voyager,

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an energy research vessel of Forum Energy commissioned by the Philippine government.
The research vessel that time has been conducting a seismic survey in the Reed Bank, 85 nautical
miles north of Palawan. Thus, the target vessel has sought assistance and help from AFP, thereby
immediately sending two units of OV10 jets to the site to verify the incident, with obvious verbal
defense from the Chinese counterpart of securing their perimeter.

Other imminent sightings include a Chinese maritime research vessel in Abad Santos or
Bombay Shoal on May 6, 2011; the presence of two unidentified Chinese fighter jets near
Palawan on May 19, 2011; a Chinese maritime patrol vessel Number 75 near Southern Bank
with Salvage research ship 707 on May 21, 2011; Chinese ships unloading construction materials
near Amy Douglas Bank while Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglei has been conducting a
“goodwill” visit to Manila to foster the two countries’ relations on May 24, 2011. An incident
where the Philippine Navy patrol ship 74 has accidentally collided with a Chinese fishing vessel
towing 25 smaller boats near the Reed Bank; and two Chinese vessels and a navy ship intruding
the waters of Escoda or Sabina Shoal, 70 nautical miles off Palawan (Banlaoi, 2011).

Malacañang Palace seems disturbed by Chinese provocations and conscious incursions in

our maritime domain that during the second State of the Nation Address (SONA) of President
Benigno Aquino III, he has strongly uttered the following policy pronouncement regarding the
WPS: “We do not wish to increase the tensions with anyone, but we must let the world know that
we are ready to protect what is ours. We are also studying the possibility of elevating the case on
the West Philippine Sea to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, to make certain that
all involved nations approach the dispute with calm and forbearance,” (Aquino, 2011).

These events and episodes have carefully awakened the national defense department,
especially on the kind of strategy to approach and operate, which I have had expounded in one of
my earliest interviews with media in December 2, 2012, that the escalating conflict in the West
Philippine Sea has brought some good learning opportunities for the Philippines, from revisiting
the country’s defense policies to introducing the public to a weighty concept of national security
(Dizon, 2012). With my tact statement, that: “our reawakening always starts with a conflict. We
have to thank China because its recent movements and strategies in the West Philippine Sea

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have made us look at our defense policies anew. The fact that the Philippines has long been
confronted with the territorial dispute in the WPS but has had limited capabilities to address the
security issue. Moreover, the country has been focusing on an internal armed conflict for
decades that external defense, such as the tug-of-war over territories in these waters, has been a
secondary preoccupation for the government.”

However, while the Philippines catches shock and vulnerability because of this “sudden
shift” from internal security threat to external security challenge, notwithstanding its weakness to
mount a credible posture, often tagged as one of the poorest when it comes to military spending
and military capability in Asia; and still at the mercy of a protracted war with insurgents,
secessionists, and terrorists plaguing domestic affairs while also dying out by frequent raids of
foreign fishing poachers and coast guards externally.

The archipelagic country also has to preserve its national interests and balancing acts
with major powers in the region and treaty allies to survive the show of force of bigger
stakeholders. Considering the context, the Philippines’ conduct of a diplomatic strategy of
equi-balancing with the United States and China, evident in its strategy has caught the small fish
in the big pond of two competing sharks as it enhances and deepens relations with a strategic
ally, the United States, while at the same time obtaining economic aid or diplomatic concessions
with emergent power China to explore a hedging strategy.

The trigonometric equation in triangular relations has placed the Philippines in such a
dilemma and litmus test to gauge and examine the presence of its strategic culture in the WPS
whether it is robust or lacking?

Imbibing Daniel Goldstein’s ‘critical anthropology’ in my holistic analyses, at the same

time, taking sides on the escalating maritime conundrum in the West Philippine Sea, it connotes
professional risks on my part as an academic, while working in an organization where secrecy of
strategies are sacred, tact words in public are expressed, and a dilemma of roles as academic and
bureaucrat can be halved.

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 3.2.2 Rite of Passage in the Battle of Ideas

My rite of passage in this battle of ideas begins when I was interviewed by an

international media, a year after my brief study at NDU China. The article published at Asia
Times Online last September 12, 2012 entitled, Philippines on frontline of US-China Rivalry by
Richard Javad Heydarian, brings a bittersweet immersion for me on the continuing saga of
external security threat in the country. Aside from me, two other scholars from the Philippines
were also asked to weave the contentious story which has included prime sociologist Walden
Bello and political scientist Herman Kraft.

In the article, all of the three scholars agree on the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Seas and unanimously defy the U-shaped line or nine-dash line
regime of China in the South China Sea. However, given the geo-political and security situation
at that time, the US has not expressly pronounced yet its intention to pivot to the Asia-Pacific.
That gives China a vantage point to elevate its interest in Southeast Asia as a whole and
influence smaller and neighboring countries including Indo-China nation-states in ASEAN.

Given the context, expressing boldly my views about the present architecture of regional
security in the region, I have modestly stated: "There is a neo-Cold war in the region ... the
region is torn between the US and China. This is very apparent in most official regional and
multilateral engagements that I have attended. Actually, all Indo-Chinese countries in ASEAN
are handcuffed by China…The Americans are sweet talkers. The Philippines should not rely on
US military capability in case of a conflict with China in the [South China Sea]. The US will not
save us and won't act as our knight in shining armor. The US will protect its own economic and
strategic interests with China." (Heydarian, 2012). 

The article receives favorable responses from readers with minimal constructive and
controversial remarks. However, one online commenter garners threads of response from other
readers as inscribed below:

Haav Bline ·  Top Commenter

Excellent article. Unfortunately for the Phillipinos, president Aquino is neither bright enough nor strong
enough to play the intricate balancing game that will maximize benefits and reduce risk for the country.
Instead, he will be leaning on one side (US) for support because he lacks any achievement in his

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 presidential term. This will not only hurt his country economically, but put the Philippines in a very dangerous
situation in the long term.

 · 7 · September 14, 2012 at 5:20pm

abm_ww3 (signed in using yahoo)

Indeed you are absolutely correct! 

Neither bright enough nor strong enough indeed!
But you did not expect anything more from the number one puppet state of the US did you?
The Filipinos will go all the way will LBJ to the detriment of the nation they always have and they sadly
always will!

3 · September 14, 2012 at 8:11pm

Rinoa Heartilly

I think our President is just using our friend wisely (US), we're not a powerful country and we're still
developing, we have no chances against china but we're neither a coward nor stupid country, we're just
fighting for what we believe is right..... We are also not owning the whole south china sea, those only within
our territory (200 nautical miles), and Mr. Aquino's government is the reason why Philippines is one of the
fastest growing economy in Asia.

 16 · September 15, 2012 at 7:01am

john_doe20070101 (signed in using yahoo)

topolcats alias agent abm_ww3. I want you to give your intelligence report to our dear leader, Major General
Luo Yuan, commander of the Second Artillery Division and Propaganda Unit of the People's Liberation
Army. He has been waiting for your report. He cannot give you your 15,000 renmenbi as your allowance
unless you submit the result of your propaganda works to him. However, he wanted me to relay this
message to you that you are doing your propaganda job in a superb manner. Keep it up, comrade
abm_ww3. Long live Mao Zedong, long live Gu Kailai, long live Bo Xilai, long live Bo Guagua. 3 · September
16, 2012 at 1:01am

John Sheehan · President at Millennium Media Entertainment

Does read like Chinese propaganda piece. · September 17, 2012 at 4:57am

The article has been archived in other websites, social media pages, and other blogs that
frequently pop up in the internet whenever I Google the topic.

When the politburo of the Department of National Defense has read the news article,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, mostly controlled by retired generals have congregated
closed-door; they discuss in a management committee meeting about my statements inscribed in
the news article about the Americans being sweet talkers and their commitment not to extend
help to the Philippines in a scenario of war. Then, an assistant secretary, concurrently tenured as
associate professor at the Political Science Department in the University of the Philippines
Diliman, summons me to rethink of what I may say in the media. He says in a diplomatic manner
that higher officials in the department are not happy with my statements which may prejudice

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our defense relations with the Unites States. Hence, my future statements should be aligned to
the policies of the department or else it may cost at stake in my job like what happened to one
former professor at the National Defense College of the Philippines, who was fired from his
teaching stint by DND because of his bold statements in several defense and security issues in
the purview of academic freedom.

That has made me rethink of my role as a scholar and personnel of the department of
national defense’s bureau. But that experience has also fortified my belief to uphold more of the
academic freedom as a public thinker.

3.3 A Bull’s-eye to Strategic Culture

3.3.1 The Maritime Situation in the West Philippine Sea

The frontpage news article entitled, “By hook or by crook, China will plunder our
resources,” published on May 27, 2015 reaches the pinnacle of China’s aggressiveness in the
West Philippine Sea that commentators and observers apprehensively turn aghast of a plausible
proxy war between two competing superpowers; a current police of the world and a challenger
Asian power, in the new maritime battlefield at disputed islands. The severity of economic losses
and environmental damages contained by a military show of force by Chinese white ships
through the Coast Guard, assume to have been changed by color from gray ships of Chinese
Navy to white ships which has caused probable fright and high-intensity tension in the Spratly
archipelago.

In my burly speech and scrutiny of the imminent external danger pick up by the press,
I express a strong conviction that the rapid action, “is a test of power, money, everything.
Everybody wants to defy China’s actions but now it’s all pronouncements,” while the Philippines
waits for the decision of the United Nations arbitration committee and maintains a status quo in
the disputed areas in late 2015. The US may have pivoted to the Asia-Pacific and issued warning
to China, but Beijing still has the upper hand in its continuous island-building construction and
plundering of resources in the greater South China Sea. In my utterance to caution the public of

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no war will indeed happen despite the escalating conflict, I set straight my opinion,
“I’m not saying they (China) will win in terms of war, no war will happen. But they will succeed
in the plundering of resources as we can see now. By hook or by crook, they will get those
resources. The pressure is high-intensity but both countries (US and China) cannot afford [to
wage war], not in terms of defense. More likely, it would be a word war, not a world war. No
arms would be involved, but harsh words, diplomatic protests, economic sanctions…”(Dizon,
2015).

The plundering of resources in our own backyard by non-Filipino fisherfolks proves

prevalent in the past, particularly in the disputed islands of the South China Sea. Rich resources
tantamount to food and fossil fuel energy security are at stake for he who controls the passage
way of trade and commerce in the region, given the overlapping claims escalating over the
scrambled dotted lines of abundant maritime territories, may become triumphant in gaining the
bounty of resources.

“It is not only location and energy reserves that promise to give the South China Sea [vis-
à-vis the West Philippine Sea] critical geostrategic importance but also territorial disputes
surrounding these waters, home to more than two hundred small islands, rocks and coral reefs,
only about three dozen of which are permanently above the water” (Kaplan 2014:10). Yet these
disputed islands are valuable mainly because of the oil and natural gas that may lie nearby in the
intricate, folded layers of rock beneath the sea.

Filipino national scientist and UP professor emeritus for marine science Edgardo Gomez
reveals that reefs buried by China in sand and rocks as it created artificial islands have expanded
to nearly 1,200 hectares, raising to $500 million the annual losses in marine resources to the
Philippines, China and other nations claiming territories in the Spratlys. He admonishes that
oceanic reefs cannot be replaced and corals cannot grow on airstrips, referring to the facilities
built by China on Fiery Cross or Kagitingan Reef, Subi Reef or Zamora Reef, Mischief Reef or
Panganiban Reef and four other major reefs in the disputed West Philippine Sea. The estimate of
losses is based on natural capital ecosystem service valued at $352,000 per hectare per year.
The long-term impact of the destruction of reefs could be compared to oases in deserts; such as

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the fingerlings that are spawned on the reefs settle on the coastlines of the Ilocos region up to
Palawan and Sulu. The reduction of fish production in those areas should therefore be monitored
and included in the case the Philippines raised against China in a UN arbitral court in The Hague
(PDI, 2015).

In a dramatic and emotionally charged speech of former Secretary Alberto del Rosario of
the Department of Foreign Affairs at The Hague, he argues that, “apart from altering the existing
status quo in the South China Sea through its reclamation, China has ‘irreversibly damaged the
regional maritime environment’ which is against UNCLOS. China destroyed coral reefs in the
SCS, including areas in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone by its destructive and
hazardous fishing practices and by its harvesting of endangered species,” (Calleja and Dizon,
2015).

What is even alarming among Chinese marine scientists and strategists when they have
presented China’s status of reef-building corals in inshore Mainland China during the recently
concluded Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) in the First Meeting of
the CSCAP Study Group on Marine Environment Protection held last April 4-5, 2016 at Marco
Polo Ortigas in the Philippines, in which China will host next year’s second meeting of the same
dialogue, Chinese scholars have highlighted in their slides about China’s robust legal
frameworks for environmental management and protection based from recent studies, to the
delight of mixed experts from the Asia-Pacific countries, coated with hopeful feeling of mining a
scoop of information from xenophobic Chinese scholars that day, as it was well-attended by a
band of Chinese marine scientists. As a delegate myself in the track two diplomatic high-level
meeting, I ask about any publications or researches of China’s protection in offshore reef-
building corals at the South China Sea.

The direct question certainly has alarmed the Chinese colleagues and it took minutes for
them to congregate and chirp like birds before Vice Chair Haihan Wang of CSCAP China
replied and revealed to the panel of experts that even among them [referring to the entire Chinese
scientific community] could hardly access researches done in the South China Sea.
Other Chinese scholars including Associate Professor Wentao Niu of the Third Institute of

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Oceanography, State Oceanic Administration in Xiamen, who has presented the report, agrees.
Chinese scientist Xinqing Zou of the School of Oceanographic and Geographic Studies of the
University of Nanjing claims that there is an asymmetry of scholarship and lack of research
publications when it comes to the South China Sea despite rapid and massive island-building in
the contested maritime territories where marine resources have become vulnerable to human-
induced activities.39

Considering the strategic location of the West Philippine Sea in the coral triangle
covering as well the entire South China Sea, the meta-center of the earth’s marine biodiversity,
it has certainly been identified as such because of the main criteria used by scientists and
conservationists in the area due to its high species biodiversity and habitat diversity and
oceanographic currents. The coral triangle consists of 76 percent of the world’s coral species
having endowed with 605 out of 798 coral species; 15 of which are regionally endemic species
and shares 41 regional endemic species. It has 37 percent of the world’s reef fish species or
2,228 out of 6,000 of its kind are found in the area. The coral triangle also houses 51 of the
world’s 70 mangrove species; six of the world’s seven marine turtle species; seven of the world’s
12 giant clam species; 23 of the world’s 50 seagrass species; and various cetaceans including
whales, dolphins, porpoises that are frequently observed in the region including the dugong
(Gomez, 2016).

In the March 7, 2014 banner story by Nikko Dizon in Philippine Daily Inquirer entitled,
“Chinese boats harvest giant clams, corals,” she pens in her first-hand account that fishing
vessels in Bajo de Masinloc, 220 kilometers off Zambales province, allegedly from China,
harvest giant clams and corals enough to fill their black-and-red mother ship. Chalky smoke rise
in the air as the small vessels pull their catch with ropes. Nearby are three Chinese Coast Guard
ships with bow numbers 3210, 3062, and 3383. Not far away, Filipino fishing boats mill around,
as do what appear to be two Vietnamese fishing vessels. Boats can easily be identified atop an

39
My question has become a topic of chitchat among Filipino marine scientists and strategists over lunch during the
CSCAP meeting alluding to Chinese comments on the absence of scientific studies or marine researches in the SCS.
Some colleagues conclude that Chinese access to publications may cost the stake of their careers and profession or
maybe transparency becomes an issue among their own circle of scholars.

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aircraft: the Philippine-owned boats have ‘katig’ or outriggers, the Vietnamese shape slightly
rounded, and the Chinese boats are guarded by the Chinese Coast Guard.40

The gift of marine resources found particularly in the West Philippine Sea and/or largely
the South China Sea is threatened not only by natural hazards like climate change but most
importantly by human-induced and man-made disasters with the mounting of fake islands and
expansionist territories by claimant-countries. Scientists construe the status of marine ecosystem
can be blamed from coastal urbanization, fisheries and aquaculture, shipping, destruction of
ecosystems, pollution, and massive island-building constructions.

Beginning with the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines on
April 8, 2012, over the Philippine Navy’s apprehension of eight Chinese fishing vessels
plundering the resources at Bajo de Masinloc, visualized to be as vast as the Quezon City land
area, with the most beautiful hues of green and blue in waters, glistening clear water defines the
base of the rocks and reefs, and could be a tourist attraction described by senior reporter Nikko
Dizon when she covered for news the disputed shoal last March 7, 2014.

Figure 16: Strategic Triangle in the SCS with the Scarborough as part of it (Source: WESCOM). April 2016 accessed on May 15, 2016.

40
The banner story can be further read at http://www.globalnation.inquirer.net/99921/chinese-boats-harvest-ginat-
clams-corals#xzz2uK0yHT61. Accessed on 18 April 2016.

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 The Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal under the Municipality of Masinloc in
Zambales sits as a large coral reef 124 nautical miles from Zambales. 41 It has been named after a
tea trading ship “Scarborough” shipwrecked on it. But based from the Republic Act No. 9522
enacted in 2009, the marine-rich shoal is explicitly declared as part of Philippine territory
(WESTCOM, 2016).

Masinloc in the early days painted scenery of only flat section of its area occupied by
people. Food crops, animals and particularly fish are still abundant in the lower section. Natives
produced rice, cañadulce, cacao ‘cote de maderas’ and other products of the land. The Catholic
Church of Masinloc was constructed in 1607 and at present faces directly to the west, now
situated very close to the beach during low tide area. In the early days, the town’s expanse was
wide traversing in the middle by the Masinloc River. It is the presence of this particular river
where the theory of how Masinloc has acquired its name with the phrase of, ‘it is the town where
there is a river’. In the Bolinao-Zambal dialect interpretation, it is gently expressed as, ‘Babali
nin Masin Ilog.’ The repeated and mispronounced phrase ‘Masin Ilog’ resulted to the name
‘Masinloc.’ Situated at the northern part of the coastal strip of the Zambales and northwestern
part of Region III, Masinloc is located about 250 kilometers northwest of Manila, 110 kilometers
from Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, and 30 kilometers from Iba, the capital of the province
(LGU Masinloc, 2016).

Based on the personal accounts of my key informants in Masinloc who are all fisherfolks
conducted during a focus group discussion: Efren Forono (52 years old), Viany Mola (48 years
old), Francisco Miranda (35 years old), and Jerry Ecape (56 years old), they themselves have
witnessed the direct standoff from that uninhabited Scarborough Shoal, the shape of a horseshoe,
and since then Filipino fishermen were banned by the Chinese Coast Guard to go near the bluish-
greenish shoal to practice fishing in their traditional fishing ground. Although before the
incident, they can freely catch a bounty of variety of expensive fish when sold to markets around
the rich shoal altogether with fisherfolks from claimant countries. In their recollection, regardless
of nationalities, whether they are Chinese, Taiwanese or Vietnamese, these fisherfolks share food
41
Zambales is a long strip of irregular landscape in the western seaboard of Central Luzon consisting of 13
municipalities and one chartered city which is Olongapo City with Iba as the provincial center.

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with one another. Notwithstanding intelligence report from the military that Chinese fisherfolks
are allowed to befriend Filipino fishermen to get information from them, accrued in their
espionage game plans.

Figure 17: Focus Group Discussion with Masinloc fishermen. Some fisherfolk do not want to be photographed.

Even Mayor Desiree Edora of the coastal town of Masinloc seems wary of the plight of
the local fisherfolks after the 2012 clash from the traditional fishing ground off Scarborough
Shoal. During my fieldworks to Masinloc in December 2015 and February 2016, at the center of
a long winding highway, sits a handsome masterpiece of newly constructed marbled and
spacious town hall plunked with a beautiful European-designed fountain financed by the tax
revenue of prominent coal-fired thermal power plant, apparently standing tall from the shores
near the public market and a kilometer away from the town’s centuries-old church; a far cry from
the antique governor’s capitol manned by Governor Hermogenes Ebdane who is fond of red
color as his lucky charm, predominantly visible in all his decors inside his office during my
courtesy call and conversations with him in the thriving provincial capital of Iba in Zambales.

A month after my last fieldwork in Masinloc, a documented aggression by the Chinese

officers to Filipino fishermen has occurred again. In the March 5 and 6, 2016 incident, Chinese
Coast Guard rubber boats deliberately rammed and damaged Philippine fishers’ boat off Panatag
or Scarborough Shoal, carrying 11 fishermen after a 16-day fishing trip. A uniformed Chinese
Coast Guard told the Filipino fishermen to go back to Subic, to their surprise. But the Filipino

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fisherfolks have ignored the admonition but returned to the Scarborough Shoal, and from there
on they have been rammed for the second time (Macatuno, 2016).

“Military confrontation resorting to military diplomacy on both ends precisely have

occurred several times in Manila and Beijing, resolving the conundrum to military pact, but
deception as an art of war from the Chinese end triumphed, placing the Philippines at the losing
end, perhaps a reflection of the small country’s miniscule strategic culture” (Pillsbury, 2011:15).

But the high-profile standoff shows China’s assertiveness to counter Philippine legal
approach. “The giant neighbor’s aggressive behavior has certainly stirred the emotions and
perceptions of Philippine authorities and some sectors of Philippine society by continuously
harassing Filipino fishermen in the WPS through the use of propaganda tools like scripted voice
message and blowing of horns. To reinforce its actions through psychological warfare, China
sponsored a fishing expedition in our waters, publicly announced in Chinese media. Moreover,
China has since then increased its naval patrols in the WPS, harassing a Philippine resupply ship
in Ayungin Shoal” (Casem, 2014:88).

3.3.2 The Great Wall of Sea

The ‘Great Wall of Sea’ hit flashed as a banner story in Philippine Daily Inquirer on
June 18, 2015 that has tickled the minds of Chinese strategists to start building infrastructure on
its artificial islands in the South China Sea, drawing condemnation from the Philippines and its
allies Japan and the United States. In my apprehensive lexis I utter to the press, “they are
occupying our territory rapidly because they have a timeline that they need to meet. This is
already an illegal occupation by China through their construction of infrastructure and as a
result, we lose a lot of our resources. The building of artificial islands carries China’s Anti-
Access Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, a military doctrine used to deny foreign militaries access
to a certain area. By using A2/AD, China is denying other militaries access to the South China
Sea and impinging on other countries’ freedom of navigation. The more China blocks access to
the SCS, the more power it gets in the region as it controls the area.” (Dizon, 2015).

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 Figure 18: Great Wall of Sea: current island-building and infrastructures in WPS as of December 2015 (Photos courtesy of WESCOM).

As shown on the above photo, the continuous island-building of the People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) shows its pure intent to build ‘great wall of the sea’ aimed at securing and
protecting the maritime domain of the larger South China Sea covering the West Philippine Sea.

In the same reportage by Nikko Dizon, the Department of National Defense through
spokesperson Peter Paul Galvez, confirms that there is no indication that China would stop
building fake islands and infrastructures in the hotly contested South China Sea. He believes that
there is a need more to pressure China by informing the international community of its deviant
actions that is contrary to the international law. At that time, 75 percent of the airstrip in
Kagitingan Reef was almost complete to receive large cargo and military aircraft.

In the same way that the Great Wall of Sea42 headline became a buzz, GMA News pick
up in another interview, transcribing China’s activities in the West Philippine Sea could be the
beginning of the great wall of seas plan which would create a security barrier around the waters
China is claiming. The maritime great wall could reach the East China Sea where both China and
42
Although there are few related scholastic literatures referring to the Great Wall of Sea, mostly penned by western
thinkers, many American strategists would use Great Wall of Sand referring to the massive island-building of China
in the South China Sea.

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Japan are claiming the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands. In my opinion as recorded in the news article,
I claim that, “a large part of the world’s trade sails through the disputed waters, and whoever
manages to control the South China, East China, and the West Philippines Seas could acquire
great power and wealth” (Cruz, 2015).

The Chinese dream of enlarging its defensive perimeter, aside from its controversial
eleven-dash line, lessened to nine-dash line, now on its current (un)official ten-dash line’s
figment of configuration,43 is described in the so-called U-shaped cow’s tongue that intends to
cordon offshore territories. In 2014, it has irked the ire of rival Japan, Vietnam and the
Philippines, as China plans to map out the blueprint of its maritime extent from Hainan Islands
as the traditional farthest southern territory based from ancient and contemporary maps, to
artificially configuring new territories surrounding its peripheral and littoral spaces,
reinvigorating a prehistoric Chinese tributary system.

President Benigno Aquino and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe joined forces to contradict
China’s island-chain defense strategy in the face of Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness in
averring its territorial claims. In my vivid description of the regional security implication of the
disputed seas of the East China Sea and the South China Sea encroaching the West Philippine
Sea, I have illustrated to the press some geographical features of the contested islands by saying
that, “Japan sits above the first and second island-chains, while the Philippines lies between the
two chains. Although, the precise and official boundaries [of the two island-chains] are
unidentified and often exaggerated and so are subject to speculation. The first island-chain
includes the major archipelagos of Japan and the Philippines, including the Aleutians, the
Kurils, and the Ryukus, Taiwan, and the Greater Sunda Islands. The second island-chain
includes the Bonins, Marianas, Guam and Palau. But the second chain is quite vague in
boundaries, as it extends to the oceanic region and some US territories in the Pacific. A third
island-chain, which reaches as far as Hawaii, is a topic for debate.” Both leaders met to
interpret China’s strategy to determine its implications for the Asia-Pacific region. Hence,
China’s aggressiveness indicates its intent to consolidate its controversial dotted lines and make
the southern half of the first island chain a reality (Dizon, 2014).
43
The dotted lines are China’s demarcations in its official and unofficial maps that encompass 90 percent of the
South China Sea indicating the extent of their territory.

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 Varied speculations from many observers and strategists have been constructed, while
waiting for the first result of the UN arbitral court over the Philippine case against China. The act
of suing, however, is a slap on the face of emergent powerhouse China by a smaller yet free-
spirited Philippines. In Chinese culture, Chinese people are humiliated when they are sued in
court by their neighbors. Despite being neighboring countries and even having rich historical
ties, the Philippines filed an arbitration case against China in ITLOS to invalidate its excessive
claims in the SCS (Casem, 2014).

While waiting for the resolution, I have constructively deemed that ‘diplomacy is still the
country’s best strategy’ amid Beijing’s expanding reclamation work in the West Philippine Sea;
these pacific words appeared in a news article, entitled, “PH best hope against China still with
UN,” as the Philippines is hinging on the voice of the international community. With two
scenarios in mind, I said that, “there are really only two things that China would do should the
international court rule in favor of the Philippines: give in to world pressure or ignore it
altogether and continue with its expansionism” (Dizon, 2015).

On lighter note, I have described the Philippines response as a ‘game-changer’ to

challenge Beijing’s claim over the nearly 90 percent of its stake in the disputed islands.
The decision by the international tribunal would serve as a benchmark in settling international
maritime disputes. In my musing of an alternative decision will not favor the Philippines,
I have expounded to the press, “it could be likewise be ‘game-changing’ in terms of the security
environment in the Asia-Pacific region. If we lose the case, then it’s going to be a new era for
China. Definitely, they will flex their muscle.”(Esguerra, 2015).

Notwithstanding acerbic language and the US pivot in the Asia-Pacific region to contain
China’s maritime strength, the Asian Argonaut has dismissed all precautions from the
international community to halt its island-buildings and infrastructure despite the ruling of the
UN Permanent Court of Arbitration on October 30, 2015 that it has jurisdiction to hear the
Philippines’ case seeking the invalidation of China’s claim to almost all of the South China Sea,
including waters within the West Philippine Sea.

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 The Department of National Defense through spokesperson Peter Paul Galvez welcomes
the good tidings as a very good development not only for the Philippines but also for all nations
believing in the UNCLOS. Senator Antonio Trillanes IV, head of the Senate committee on
national defense and security agrees that the tribunal’s decision to validate the country’s
complaint against China strengthens its call for global intervention. Senate President Franklin
Drilon prudently cautions though that the ruling comes as a ‘crucial positive step’ in the
Philippines’s efforts to protect its sovereignty and it should remain committed to the peaceful
settlement of conflicting claims in the West Philippine Sea in accordance with international law.
Lastly, House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte sees the prism that the sea conflict is only one aspect
and that through many years our country and its people have had very close and fruitful ties with
China while we intend to sustain that (Dizon, 2015).

But in the interpretation of Philippine strategic culture, two scholars tend to disagree on
the use of legal approach of the country. Legalist Jay Batongbacal, Director of the UP Institute
for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, foresees that the tribunal’s ruling could provoke China
into becoming more assertive in the SCS, believing that the realities on the ground have changed
but is vehemently worried about the Aquino administration’s ‘overreliance on the legal track’
and should have instead developed the diplomatic track to settle the issue amicably. On the other
hand, negating Batongbacal’s perspectives, I have expressed to the media that although the legal
track can be considered our last resort, notwithstanding our diplomatic and military woes,
seeking legal means is the best strategy President Aquino has done. But the tussle of ideas, later
on complemented by both scholars, concurring on China’s territorial integrity has now been
challenged by the United States as the revisionist Asian power has stringently safeguarded its air
and naval spaces and continuously flexes muscle to assert sovereignty over the SCS. China will
certainly finish their constructions and island-building in the disputed waters that would help
secure their strategic interests with or without the tribunal’s decision (Dizon, 2015).

Early this year, China has nearly completed construction of a runway and other facilities
on Mischief Reef or Panganiban Reef, on the Philippine side of the Spartly archipelago,
216 kilometers west of Palawan and 37.8 kilometers away from the ramshackle BRP Sierra

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Madre, deliberately grounded by the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal or Ayungin Shoal in
1999, housing a contingent of Philippine Marines, within the country’s 370 kilometers exclusive
economic zone recognized under the UNCLOS. But China is also rapidly completing
construction of a runway and other facilities on Subi Reef or Zamora Reef, 23.4 kilometers away
from Pag-asa Island or Thitu Island, home to a pocket of Filipino civilian population (Dizon,
2016).

In the banner story of Philippine Daily Inquirer on “More runways on reefs,” apparently
showing China’s hardheadedness, it has made me believe in describing the progress of China’s
work on Panganiban and Zamora reefs as “alarmimg”. In my succinct words I have stated,
“China has become daring. They have completed their construction, so what’s next? China
wants to ‘challenge the international community’ with its expansive construction activities on
the disputed areas in the Spratlys. China wants to let the international community know ‘That
this is ours’ after it had been able to follow the timeline it set for staking claim to nearly 90
percent of the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in global trade passes every year. The
next step is to totally claim what they say is theirs,” (Dizon, 2016).

Even after the first round of ruling by the arbitral court on the merits of the Philippine
case, China has been physically and continuously constructing infrastructures offshore the
Mainland. It has rankled Malacañang Palace over photos of Chinese tourists and civilian on
Kagitingan Reef or Fiery Cross days after the touchdown of commercial airlines to fake islands
from Hainan Island, a symbolic air travel to extend China’s expanding territorial tail-ends.

GMA News (2016) has clearly expressed my interview in their broadcast and online
news that, “the Chinese government seems to have a well laid out plan for the reclamation
project at the disputed area. After sending off the civilian population there, the next thing is
build infrastructure whether commercial and investment, and then the Philippines will be
surprised that the Chinese government will erect a city or resort in the islands. Hence, if there
are investments in the disputed islands and once a rich neighborhood develops, Filipinos will be
lured to get employment from their end. China should be stopped from further developing the
area because if Chinese civilians start to live in the area this would be the basis of their

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government to protect the region.” The same strategy as what we have done in Thitu Island or
Pag-asa Island. Recently, China has become bolder with the landing of military aircraft in their
newly-constructed runways off the disputed islands.

It must therefore be noted that the South China Sea joins the nation-states of Southeast
Asia with Western Pacific, functioning as the bottleneck of global sea routes. Coral reef
ecosystems in the near shore and offshore areas nurture and propagate the region’s supply of
fish. Commercial as well as military navigation have established the SCS as a major waterway
and a lifeline for trade and energy supplies connecting countries in the Middle East, Africa,
South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. More than half the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage
passes through these choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic (Kaplan, 2014).

“Oil and some other natural resources are becoming attractive and lucrative among the
Chinese. China has recently become a major importer of fuels and many minerals, and getting
equipped for such a competition so fast. With its rapidly growing highly-energy and resources-
intensive economy, the consequences of resource supply irregularities may be fatal”
(Tselichtchev, 2012:169-170).
In a UN 1969 report, it unveiled that the Paracel and Spratly Islands of the South China
Sea contains high potential reserves of hydrocarbons. Exploration for oil in the SCS began in
1973 amid oil crisis of the 1970s. Claimant countries explored for oil unilaterally through joint
venture as well as with other non-claimant states and private corporations. According to the
Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, the untapped hydrocarbon reserves are estimated to
amount to 120 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. International trade
worth around US$5.3 trillion also passes through the SCS each year of which 23 percent is US
trade (World Energy Outlook, 2012).

The rise of China as a regional hegemon and global economic heavyweight is seen by the
US as a potential threat to its economic, military, and political strategic interests which needs to
be checkmated.

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 The discovery of a natural gas field in 1992, strategically located 62 kilometers off the
west coast of touristic El Nido within the West Philippine Sea, promises a new sunrise industry
for the Philippines. The Malampaya Natural Gas to Power Project (MNGPP) is a joint
government and private sector undertaking between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the
Shell Philippines Exploration (SPEX). It is the single most expensive project of the Philippine
government with a total investment of $4.8 billion, currently supplying up to 30 percent of the
country’s electricity requirements. This world-class Filipino-operated installation continues to be
the largest and most significant foreign investment and infrastructure project in the country to
date, and acknowledged as the most successful public-private partnership (PPP). Malampaya
provides the government with eight to ten billion dollars in revenue (Joint Task Force
Malampaya, 2016).

The gas reservoir is located under water at 3,000 meters in depth with estimated
recoverable volume at 2.7 trillion standard cubic feet. To visualize the processing of natural
liquefied gas, beneath the Malampaya gas bears oil with estimated recoverable volume of 200
million barrels. At some 820 to 860 meters of water depth, the wells are connected to a manifold
that allows the gas to flow; the gas is transported via two 30-kilometer pipelines to the
production platform. The gas drawn from the wells will be transported to a shallow water
platform where the gas shall be initially dried and separated from the condensate. An initial
process of the natural gas in a production platform, after which it shall be transported through a
504 kilometers underwater pipeline that snakes through the seabed of northern Palawan and
eastern Mindoro to the facilities in Batangas (Malampaya, 2016).

Ensuring security of the mega-project comes with a great responsibility from the
Joint Task Force Malampaya based in El Nido under the domain of the AFP’s Western
Command based in Puerto Princesa City. Erstwhile president Gloria Arroyo signed the
Presidential Proclamation No. 72 on July 10, 2001 establishing the Exclusion and Safety Zones
for Offshore Natural Gas Wells, Flowlines, Platform, Pipelines, Loading Buoy and other related
Facilities of the Project over certain Waters and Submerged Lands adjacent to Batangas,
Mindoro and Palawan.44
44
See lawphil.net on PD No. 72. The exclusion zone covers 5 NM radius from the platform while the safety zone
consist of the waters and submerged land in offshore Palawan, Mindoro and Batangas extending up to 500 meters on

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 Since October 29, 2001, the DND has issued the Malampaya Security plan delineating
tasks for the AFP through the JTFM, the Philippine National Police (PNP), and Philippine Coast
Guard (PCG), respectively. It contains three parts for the overall security measures: (1) the
security of the main platform, calm buoy and underwater pipeline extending up to Illin Point in
southern Mindoro, approximately 250 kilometers from the site, under the responsibility of the
AFP; (2) the PCG through the support of the PNP will be responsible for the security of the
underwater pipeline at the safety zone from south end off Illin Point in Mindoro extending up to
the shore of Batangas, 254 kilometers of pipeline; and, (3) the PNP is responsible for the security
of the on-shore facilities and infrastructure of the project located at Tabangao, Sta.Rita Ilijan and
San Lorenzo in Batangas (JTFM, 2016).

Hence, the defensive rings security strategy, originally conceptualized with surface
surveillance radar system has been installed at the platform itself, but is found unsafe. The new
security concept adheres to the four defensive rings framework, dependent on the operation and
synchronization of littoral observation station at Lalutaya to provide the commander the overall
maritime situational picture of the sea of operation in the surface, sub-surface and air domains
around the vicinity of the oil rig.

In my brief ocular to the oil rig, my eyes keenly observe the innermost first ring,
as it reserves the exclusion zone that covers a five nautical miles radius from the platform
extending out to sea. It requires control of surface, sub-surface and airspace to detect, identify,
prevent and repel or destroy intrusion. The second ring extends from five to ten nautical miles
radius showing the interdiction or neutralization zone that requires the deployment of a rapid
response unit consisting of fast patrol boats, fast attack helicopters and naval special operations
unit. The third ring extending from 10 to 15 nautical miles radius from the platform
consolidating the identification zone for early warning and timely response from time of
detection and identification to engagement of intruders in the exclusion zone. Finally, the
outermost fourth ring from 15 to 25 nautical miles from the platform is used for the monitoring

either side of the 504-kilometer-long offshore pipeline of the project.

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and surveillance, detection and identification zone under the responsibility of littoral observation
station at Lalutaya.

Overall, there are three main reasons why the South China Sea vis a vis West Philippine
Sea has gone to naval skirmishes and territorial disputes: the potential for oil deposits and natural
gas; the rich fishing grounds; and its strategic importance as a sea lanes of communications
(SLOCS) for both claimant and non-claimant countries.

3.4 ASEAN and the Duterte Administration

By mid-to-end of May 2016, I have been part of the study tour and official engagements
as a faculty of the National Defense College of the Philippines with our Master in National
Security Administration students in Southeast Asia to gather thoughts and information with our
neighbours in the region in preparation for the Philippine chairmanship of the ASEAN in 2017.

My group has study toured in Vietnam and Laos, two of the remaining communist
bastions in the region but with capitalist socialist economy. In most of our engagements, officials
of these two countries are also watching events in our recent national election and the sudden
shift of position the incoming administration may pronounce in response to the West Philippine
Sea issue. In their musing, curious about the upcoming second decision of the arbitral court in
our case against China and the transitional government for the tough-talking constructivist
presumptive president Rodrigo Duterte, Vietnam in particular has been apprehensive with the
changing policy and strategic culture of the Philippines from multilateral track of negotiation to
bilateral diplomacy with China.

Last March 5, 2016 Vietnam-based media Tuoitre.vn, interviewed me about China’s

aggressiveness in the South China Sea particularly in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which I
have said, “the show of force China exuberantly exercises is a manifestation of a military might
feared by smaller claimant-countries. The Philippines and Vietnam should seek alternative
mechanisms and approaches to deflate high pressure escalating in the region and resolve the
maritime tension peacefully. Self-restraint must be exercised as we wait for the decision of the

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arbitral court. The increasing militarization in the SCS should be halted and China should set an
example as a regional power. Peace and security can be achieved if China plays its role
constructively and become a responsible giant neighbour. A tripartite dialogue among ASEAN,
US and China must be encouraged and forged to discuss security issues over the maritime
disputes in the SCS. No country has the monopoly of the freedom of overflight and navigation.
A rules-based norm should become a guiding principle for countries engaged in disagreements
over territories. This message is wide and clear.” (Quynh, 2016).

Given the heavy investment of the Philippines to sue the giant neighbour at the Peace
Palace, ASEAN has been relying to the promises of the Philippines to peacefully and legally
resolve the conundrum, and with the one hundred eighty degrees turn of the new administration
to resolve the issue by engaging bilaterally with China, this may affect the credibility of the
Philippines reflecting its kind of incoherent, reactive yet pragmatic strategic culture.

Only this early June 2016, after a new president and vice president of the Republic of the
Philippines have been officially proclaimed by the Commission on Elections, the defense attaché
of the Chinese embassy in Manila proposed for a dinner meeting with me in one of the fine
dining Chinese restaurants at the Marco Polo Hotel in Ortigas Avenue.
But prior to that meeting, the press in its capacity to figure out the character and
personality of president-elect Duterte and his intended policies for the country, I have been asked
by the media on how Duterte would be able to reconcile the ideological differences of the
extreme left and extreme right to achieve lasting internal peace and security, which would
become one of the biggest challenges for the new administration to face in the country.

In my opinion I have uttered, “that would test his promise of unity and healing. That’s
the challenge to him and it’s good because here we have a complex problem that will test his
skill as a leader…The key words for everyone are trust and respect…The resumption of the
peace talks with the Communist Party of the Philippines is long overdue. We’ve had the longest
protracted warfare with the left…Duterte came at the right time because we are confronted by
external threats and we need to solve our internal security issues.”(Dizon, 2016).

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 The president is believed to have self-proclaimed ties with the communists and he might
be the right leader to talk to them. Thus I have added in my interview, “any peace process takes
time. This time around, we are starting from scratch because of the long pause we’ve had in the
negotiations. And here comes a new leader who is sympathetic to them.” (Dizon, 2016).

During the dinner meeting at Marco Polo, Chinese defense attaché Colonel V to the
Philippines (anonymous for security purposes) and Major Y (also anonymous) his assistant,
arrived late based from the time set due to the rush hour traffic from Makati. We have exchanged
pleasantries and they ushered me to a secluded table, a corner of the plush dining restaurant,
perhaps to set the tone for quiet conversation.

Aware of the meeting, they have asked me insights about the upcoming administration of
President Duterte, the impact of the impending decision of the arbitral court on our case against
China, and aspects of regional security in the Asia-Pacific. I have candidly expressed my views
as an academic guided by the Chattam house rule, which from the beginning of the conversation,
I have specially invoked from them, to have overflowing exchanges of ideas.

In our conversations, I have asked them also if they (China) are willing to act as a broker
to the Philippine government’s efforts to peacefully settle the country’s internal threat with the
left since China is the premier and largest communist nation in the world. Hence, a new leader in
the Philippines in the persona of Mayor Rody Duterte won the presidency with a strong plurality
mandate from the electorate and is known for his self-proclamation’s close ties with the left.

Upon hearing the suggestion he was shocked, perhaps surprised, but he bit the idea and
said to me, “Oh, that’s my first time to hear that…” still digesting the idea I presented to him,
“perhaps in the future…” wallowing the substance of the thought while his assistant kept
nodding his head by totally agreeing to the proposition.

Then I courteously said, “Perhaps in that way you could help us in our peace process
with the left, who would know, later we could also patch up our differences in the West
Philippine Sea. But first help us understand you and your communism to get rid of that fear…”

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3.5 Post-Hague Ruling

As the world awaits the final verdict amid fears of further tensions, two days before the
historic maritime ruling on the Philippines v. China over the disputed and scrambled rocks in the
South China Sea, an Indian journalist based in Beijing working for India’s leading newspaper
Hindustan Times interviewed me, which I have succinctly stated: “Manila opted to sue Beijing,
firstly on the jurisdiction of ITLOS on the maritime dispute and secondly on the legality of the
historical claim of China’s nine-dash line. The legal track proceeded after a reality check on the
part of the Philippines that it could not level off with the strength of a giant neighbor. There is
an asymmetry of military capability between China as Goliath and the Philippines as David in
the maritime dispute.” To find its impact to regional and global security, I said, “the increasing
militarization in the SCS definitely affects trade, commerce, diplomacy, ecological resources and
power relations among major actors in the region including the US, China, Japan and
India.”(Patranobis, 2016).

The landmark maritime dispute case the Philippines won against China last July 12, 2016
highlights China’s claims to resources as incompatible with Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs);
the South China Sea is basically part of the high seas thereby invalidating China’s historic
claims; high-tide features in Spratlys are rocks that do not generate EEZ; artificial islands are
insignificant features with no maritime zones; and China breached UNCLOS with aggravated
disputes while settlement process ongoing.

American regional strategist Anders Corr even deems that China owes the Philippines
and other countries more than $177 billion in rent and damages in the SCS. Since the PCA ruled
that the Mischief Reef, a low-water elevation within the Philippines’ EEZ, China irreparably
harmed the reef’s delicate marine ecosystem by dredging and building an artificial island with
military garrison and air strip. That damage alone costs $12.4 billion for the Mischief Reef. This
monetary calculation can be based from the environmental damages the United States had caused
to Philippines’ 0.58 acres of coral reef destroyed by the USS Guardian in 2015 (Corr, 2016).

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 But in my analysis right after the historic ruling, the media captured my statements as to
the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague akin to the “beginning of
an end” as I fervently said, “the case will end today but this will only be the start of an
intensified power play between China and the US, the two opposing titans, eventually dwarfing
the Philippines. And this will happen whoever wins in the case. After the ruling comes out,
whoever wins, it won’t be the case anymore. The decision will become key to unlocking
alternative options for the new administration. It could either go for a convergence or
cooperation in terms of diplomacy, economy, and defense or it could opt for divergence.”
(Dizon, 2016).

However, China People’s Daily writes that Beijing will still continue on reef construction
in the South China Sea despite pressures from the international community after the ruling.
Despite China’s ratification of the UNCLOS in 1996 and support for the EEZ regime, in
contrary, China has not honored the tribunal’s ruling. The Asian Argonaut maintains its claim to
sovereignty rights over all of the maritime areas, land and waters, within South China Sea
through imagined nine-dotted lines.
In the end, China’s cognitive dissonance as a regional power, in its haste aversion to
change the world order will play its own rules insisting a preconditioned terms in case of pursued
bilateral talks with any claimant countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

3.6 Philippine Strategic Culture: Of laws, diplomacy, and military might

Informants magnify ambits of knowledge in their quest to personally define strategic

culture as I conscientiously inquire them of the subject to test their consciousness of the presence
or absence of strategic culture in our country.

A young rising academic and my former student at the University of the Philippines
Diliman, political analyst Richard Javad Heydarian, a prominent commentator and a junior
faculty of De La Salle University who is sought after for his commentaries and perspectives on
regional security. He is also known as author of scholastic books. Heydarian has written for
and/or interviewed by leading news agencies, whether local or international, for which he

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verbalizes his thoughts on strategic culture that is essentially the prevailing practices and policy
paradigms that govern the overall orientation of the defense establishment in pursuit of the
national interest of a specific country in the international system. He deems that in some
countries, particularly among great and regional powers, there is a more robust, defined,
legalistic, institutionalized and coherent sense of national interests and corresponding strategies
by which a specific country can pursue. Among smaller countries like the Philippines, the
strategic culture is more informal, personalistic, adhoc, and embedded in practice of the
bureaucracy rather than a clearly defined policy paradigm.

A more convincing belief by Director Madam X [pseudonym and prefers anonymity of

her name as one of the trusted policy-makers from the Department of National Defense] clearly
sees that the Philippines has a national strategic culture that is influenced, if not based, on the
state of our national identity deeply rooted in our collective history. She was made to understand
that strategic culture is the sum total of values, beliefs, traditions, practices, even its biases and
fears, formed over time that shape, for right or wrong, how a nation perceives, decides and acts
on certain issues, especially those pertaining to national security.
A civilian senior analyst from the National Security Council, Director Madam Y
[pseudonym and also requests for anonymity due to the nature of her job] thinks that the country
has strategic culture, although there is no constancy on this because of inconsistent policies of
different administrations. Being in an institution that has carried out the formulation of security
policies, acted as the coordinating mechanism that have been “putting out fires” for different
political crises, and provides policy options and advises both on internal or external security
threats, the NSC is a “user” and to some extent a “purveyor” of strategic culture.

On the other hand, award-winning senior reporter Nikko Dizon who continuously
produces headline stories about the West Philippine Sea for the Philippine Daily Inquirer thinks
in the same wavelength with other key informants. She says that if the Philippines has a strategic
culture, it is not apparent to a journalist like her covering defense and security in the Philippines;
adding that government security strategies have a six year life span, dependent on who is elected
President every six years. But she deems that the Aquino administration has actually begun
institutionalizing a national strategic culture even defining it as such that can be gleaned in the

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National Security Policy, however the language used of the way NSP was written, fails to reflect
it.

More so, Bloomfield (2013) thinks that strategic culture was constructed by social
scientists, mostly coined by political scientists, as a birth-right in 1970 just after the failure of the
United States to predict the reaction of the Soviet Union in the conduct of war during the Cold
War epoch. It is a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force,
which are held by a collective and rise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical
process. Strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the ear of its original
inception; it is not a permanent or static feature. Thus, it is shaped and influenced by formative
periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s
experiences.

The rhetoric that Filipinos are best strategist remains debatable but it can be valid.
The spirit of placing Filipinos’ strengths as a people in prime positions where anyone who will
attempt to subjugate us can now suffer online bashes and crux of hatred in a transborder and
wired world.

In my interviews with respondents, they would often cite classical examples of prime
Filipino strategists and their benevolent behaviors that mustered Philippine robust or developing
strategic culture; and these include the country’s initiative as one of the original signatories of
the United Nations believed that most of those who formulated the United Nations Charter were
Filipinos, directly infusing their bright ideas and vision of a strategically better world for the
entire humanity; notwithstanding to mention that the first UN Secretary General was the
legendary Carlos P Romulo.

The Philippines is also one of the founders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
and most of those who have drafted the Charter for ASEAN Integration emanated from the
brilliant minds of the Filipinos. The Philippines also propelled and organized the creation of

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Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines-East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). Lastly, the
country hosts more than 60 foreign embassies and more consular offices worldwide, fostering
robust bilateral, multilateral and other diplomatic engagements among other nations.

These grandiose strategic cultures at the macro scale are a living proof of the indomitable
Filipino strategic culture. Arguably, the best combatants and field strategists, known among
circles of strategists are Filipinos. In 1952, for instance, former President Fidel V Ramos and six
other officers were celebrated national heroes in North and South Koreas in the epic Battle of
Eerie Hill. Then Lieutenant Ramos led 44-men to Hill Eerie from the Red Chinese Army where
Ramos’ men suffered only one injury against 1,100 dead Chinese and 2,540 wounded Chinese.
The Filipinos showed bravery, courage, and sense of clear strategy in the said battle as the final
assault on Hill Eerie when UN and Filipino forces defended the outpost against invading Chinese
in the Korean peninsula (http://www.pinoyhistory.proboards.com).

History unfolds that great Filipino resistance from conquistadores made ordinary sword
smiths to becoming heroes immortalizing folklores about warriors like Lapu-Lapu of Cebu,
Amai Pakpak of Lanao, Sharief Kabungsuan of southern Mindanao who helped carve and foster
our ancient strategic culture long before the modern political concept of strategic culture came
about. By the time Filipino national heroes and thinkers have shaped our reawakening to
emancipate us from the bondage of colonialism, the bloody revolutions we struggled to gain our
independence, all these we have been embarked in various strategies that may consciously or
unconsciously build the foundations of our strategic culture, gauging on diplomacy and alliances
as the centerpiece of our strategic culture underway.

In modern times, the first bloodless People Power and the remarkable 1987
Constitutional Assembly of Corazon Aquino which has formulated the 1987 Philippine
Constitution are considered artifacts of our strategic culture. Notwithstanding that Cory’s son,
Benigno Aquino’s administration has crafted the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) that
refocuses the AFP’s attention from internal defense to external defense strategy. These efforts
represent continuity more than change suggesting that Philippine strategic culture continues to
influence the country’s saga on fostering a robust strategic culture (NSP 2011-2016).

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 Given the context, it can also be construed that the Philippines has unconsciously built on
a strong foundation of strategic culture, neither coded nor institutionalized, as manifested in the
country’s unripe political and national strategic culture. The problem beholds to strategic
behavior and attitude or lack of political and strategic will to attaining a consistent rules-based
approach in dealing with internal and external security challenges.

Our country’s dependence on alliance as a short-term remedy to stoutly hold a credible

deterrence leading for a long-term self-reliance to foster strategic culture remains apparent.
However, dependence on alliance is not an absence of strategic culture, rather a preference for
partnership with a foreign power that may juxtapose another feather of holding a strategic culture
to fill the gaps of its momentary impairments.

Then this proposition may lead to the argument that the Philippines may lack strategic
culture to combat its internal and external security. Lack may be defined as “not having of
something or not having enough; to be deficient or short of something,” according to dictionary
Meriam-Webster. But simply put, the word lack may mean two things: either one does not have
something or one does not have enough of it, which explains why there is lack of it.

One of the bones of contention in our strategic culture is by alliance. The Philippines-
United States alliance, for example, forged under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is an
argument in itself that alliance as a strategic culture may have been cultivated but this treaty is
not a guarantee to ensure our security. Our alliance with the US has failed to protect our security
objectives regardless of our defense treatises with the sole superpower in the world, as it still
evolves yet it is lacking.

Given the current context of the West Philippine Sea conundrum, in November 2011, the
Obama administration has announced a strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region at the height of
the South China Sea hullabaloo. The measure entails a gradual shift from the US military
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan to a deeper strategic involvement in the region. Overall,
China remains skeptical of the pivot with growing Chinese nationalist societal undercurrents,

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whose views are increasingly influential in Beijing pushing for a more robust Chinese response
to both the US rebalance and to regional affairs.

The US rebalancing act or pivot to Asia can be referred to Washington’s increased

military presence in the region as the White House paved way for modernized alliances with
Japan and South Korea that also included defense agreements with Australia and the Philippines
while deepening relations with key emerging partners such as Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and
Malaysia.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between Washington and

Manila was specifically mentioned in the White House fact sheet that inked the US rebalance to
Asia with an American panoramic vision to preserve and enhance a stable and diversified
security order in which countries pursue their national objectives peacefully and in accordance
with international law and shared norms and principles. In the said EDCA, it allows the US to
station troops, equipment, ships and aircraft at selected Philippine military bases. The agreement
is seen by both the Washington and Manila, designed to implement the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1951. Thus, EDCA has been recently concurred by the Philippine Supreme Court stating that it is
constitutional and set for implementation (Elefante, 2016).

Hence, the US and the Philippines have begun joint patrols in the disputed South China
Sea under the legal auspices of EDCA last April 15, 2016 wherein US troops and military
equipment would be sent on regular rotations in the country, which is seen as something rare for
the US that has not done any with other partners in the region according to the American
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter. The Pentagon chief also witnessed the joint military exercises
between US and Filipino forces to help build interoperability and improve the Philippine Navy
while sending $40 million military assistance to beef up intelligence sharing, surveillance and
naval patrols to aid enhanced information network for classified communications, sensors for
patrol vessels and an unmanned aerostat reconnaissance airship (Dizon, 2015).

Amid an increasingly ill-tempered discourse over competing maritime territories,

disputes have escalated into tit-for-tat actions at sea that have included naval skirmishes and

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provocative land reclamation projects. As the US responds by pivoting its strategic focus to the
Asia-Pacific, the obvious question is whether the region is heading towards conflict as a prelude
to the rise of one great empire and fall of another. Thus, the pivot premised on the recognition
that the Lion’s share of politics and economics of the 21 st century will be written in the Asia-
Pacific region. It could be thought that the pivot is a strategic motive to see that freedom of
navigation, open access to maritime commons and adherence to UNCLOS are ensured in the
region. Or could it mean that the pivot will provide reassurance to US allies like the Philippines
of a more stabilized region?

Using critical anthropology in analyzing events, where was the US when China grabbed
and occupied the Mischief Reef in 1994? Where was the US when China cordoned off the
Scarborough Shoal in 2012? What has the US done in response to China’s reclamation and
island-building at Mabini Reef, Chigua Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Burgos Reef? Did the US stop
China from building its Great Wall of Sea and runways in Fiery Cross Reef and Panganiban
Reef? Unfortunately the US has pronounced not to take sides and to remain neutral in this
reclamation saga. The Philippines’ knight in shining armor, the United Sates, cannot commit its
complete shield in us if we rely too much on alliance. Given the case, it can therefore be
construed that failure of our alliance with the US to deter China from occupying our territories
indicates the Philippines’ lack of strategic culture.

Guerilla warfare as the second component and the last resort of our strategic culture has
been employed once in our armed forces, in its desperate act or the last ditch in attempting to
resist foreign occupation in our national territory. Hypothetically, even if Filipino soldiers
succeed in guerilla fighting, the human and material losses would be overwhelmingly
unacceptable. The Vietnam War is a prime example of the success of the guerilla warfare against
a superior force but it has resulted to the death of about one million Vietnamese versus the death
of only about 58,000 American servicemen (http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-
war/casualty-statis).

The perspective that the Philippines could only offer a strategic culture based on our
alliance with the US and wage a guerilla warfare are desperate last resorts due to our failure to

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foster a robust and indigenous credible armed forces but weakened by our low defense
expenditures. These weaknesses in our strategic culture support the view that our strategic
culture prevents us from attaining our security objectives.

Overall, what has been practiced is a culture of asymmetric or guerilla warfare. It has
been heavily hinged on the archipelagic geography of our country where inhabitants of one
island or group of islands run through is peculiar and distinct to other islands of group of islands.
In essence, it cannot homogenously represent the strategic culture of the whole archipelago.
The fragmented nature of the Filipino culture may be one reason that contributed to the
inadequacy of Philippine strategic culture.

But as strategic culture evolves, especially when the external environment provides a
severe ‘shock’ that invalidates prevailing assumptions, like Germany’s and Japan’s defeat in
1945, both strong countries’ strategic cultures essentially switched from a unilateral-expansionist
strategy, to a more multilateral and pacifist modes (Bloomfield in Berger and Legro 1998).

The Philippines’ accommodating and friendly attitude to foreign powers can become a
historical basis for its conquest for over 300 hundred years in the convent, 50 years in
Hollywood, and three years in the arsenal. Naval superpowers Spain and the United States
notwithstanding an emergent Pacific power Japan, the first modern Asian naval power to subdue
the Philippines. Now, a resurgent and revisionist naval power of the 21 st century China is
claiming almost all the maritime and territorial stakes in the highly congested sea lanes of
communications in the world.

Then, why the Philippines has always been so vulnerable to the onslaught of maritime
powers in this part of the world? Is it because of the Philippines’ strategic and geographic
location at the heart of the Asia-Pacific region?

As fast facts on the Philippines’ assets: it is the second biggest archipelago in the world,
after Indonesia. Two of the maritime countries that proposed for the ‘Archipelagic Doctrine’ in

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UNCLOS covering the 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone of archipelagic nation-states.
It has the world’s longest coastline and sits at the heart of the coral triangle’s marine biodiversity
worldwide. In terms of fisheries and aquatic resources, the Philippines is endowed with the
following: 1,403,202 registered municipal fisherfolks; then seventh among countries in fish
production and third in aquatic plants across the globe; it has at least five million Filipinos who
depend on Philippine waters for livelihood; in addition 55 percent of the country’s 1,490
municipalities are located along the coasts of the Philippine archipelago. Lastly, the country’s
7,107 islands make up only one-sixth of the Philippine territory while the bigger part of the
Philippine five-sixth is a vast stretch of the waters in and around these islands.45

Informants agree that the Philippines is merely reactive to China’s aggression despite the
presence of Philippine strategic culture amplified in various epochs of our history. Scarce and
snapshots they may be, the mere existence in Filipino culture is a valid belief that there is a
presence of strategic culture in the country.

Given the three ‘episodes’ or themes on legal, diplomatic and militaristic tracks found out
by the researcher to examine Philippine strategic culture that is robust in terms of actual ‘events’
mined through primary and secondary data, this chapter will dwell on analyses and scrutiny of all
the facts, selected events, and primordial data as these will be processed conscientiously.

3.7 The spirit of the law

In 1609, Hugo Grotius published Mare Liberum or the Free Sea arguing that the oceans
and seas belong to all mankind by articulating the position of the Netherlands. In a rejoinder by
John Selden who wrote Mare Clausum or the Closed Sea, he refuted that the oceans and seas are
subject to appropriation and ownership by sovereign states while defending the positions of
naval powers Portugal, Spain and England, of that bygone era. For centuries, these two opposing
ideas battled the mightiest waves of the maritime domain but the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius won
the great battle of the minds, by formulating the foundation of modern Law of the Sea with the

45
Philippine Defense Newsletter, “Our Nation’s Hope: Our Youth, Our Hope” West Philippine Sea Special 2015,
ISSN 2244-4394, page 6.

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iota that states are not governed by force or warfare but by actual laws and mutual agreements to
enforce the laws (Philippine Defense Newsletter, 2015).

The first round of the arbitration case between the Philippines versus China raises various
issues by the smaller archipelagic country, including two issues that refer to fishing activities of
Filipinos in the West Philippine Sea. First, that China has unlawfully failed to prevent Chinese
nationals and vessels from exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines. Secondly, China has unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from pursuing their
livelihood by interfering with traditional activities at Scarborough Shoal (Philippine Defense
Newsletter, 2015).

In January 2013, the Southeast Asian Philippines filed an arbitration case against a giant
Northeast Asian China to the spectacle of big powers and maritime countries around the world.
The case brought to the UN International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to verify the
legality of the nine-dash-line that China uses in its historical claims.

The ITLOS which is headquartered at The Hague in the Netherlands was established on
November 16, 1994 under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) of
December 10, 1982 also known as the Law of the Sea Treaty or the Law of the Sea Convention.
ITLOS aims to settle disputes between states arising out of the interpretation and application of
the Convention while UNCLOS is an international agreement that sets limits to the territorial
seas of the nations and the areas in which the nations can exploit marine resources. Its crafting
was borne of the States Parties desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and
cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the sea and their awareness of the historic
significance of the said Convention as an important contribution to the maintenance of peace,
justice, and progress for all peoples of the world (Philippine Defense Newsletter, 2015).

Undeniably, the Philippines and China are both signatories of the Constitution for the
Oceans and Seas. While China has revived John Selden’s argument by claiming the entire South
China Sea encompassing portions in the West Philippine Sea, far beyond the limits established

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by the convention based on so-called historic rights over exclusive right to the resources of the
sea and seabed.

But Philippine legal luminary, Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines sheds light to the battle of the free sea versus the closed sea by saying:
“this is the core issue before the UNCLOS tribunal hearing the Philippines’ arbitration case
against China. If China’s nine-dashed lines claim is allowed to stand, it will be a direct attack
on the Grotian foundation of the Law of the Sea. The settled principles on freedom of navigation,
freedom of overflight, freedom to fish in the high seas, the right of coastal states to exclusive
economic zones and continental shelves, and the common heritage of mankind, will all be in
peril,” in a jam-packed Department of National Defense Forum on the West Philippine Sea last
July 29, 2015 held at Tejeros Hall of the AFP Commissioned Officers’ Hall, three months before
the decision of the ITLOS at the Hague.

During the oral arguments at The Hague, Filipino chief diplomat Secretary Alberto del
Rosario, decries in words in his blowing dramatic speech, “we are here because we wish to
clarify our maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, a question over which the tribunal has
jurisdiction. This is a matter that is most important not only for the Philippines, but also to all
coastal states that border the South China Sea and even to all the state parties to UNCLOS.” 46
He even argued that to make sure that the Philippines’ maritime claims are in harmony with the
Constitution for the Oceans, the country amended its national legislation and converted its
straight baselines into archipelagic baselines in conformity with Articles 46 and 47 of
UNCLOS.47 The Philippines also ensured that the maritime zones of the KIG and BdM in the
WPS would be consistent with Article 121 of the treaty (Calleja and Dizon, 2015).

In April 2016, another forum in the same venue at Tejeros Hall was held inside Camp
Aguinaldo, exclusively set for Filipino prime maritime jurist Antonio Carpio, as he expounds on
three scenarios of ITLOS’ decision for the second case of the Philippines against China on the

46
Calleja, N and Dizon, N. (2015, July 13). China violated int’l law, Del Rosario argued. Philippine Daily Inquirer.
A1 and A13.
47
Part Four of UNCLOS tackles the Archipelagic States in which Article 46 in under that defines archipelagic state
and archipelago; while Article 47 provides for the Archipelagic baselines with nine provisions under it.

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merits of the giant neighbor’s total claim to the disputed islands cordoned by its dotted lines
around the visual cow’s tongue.

According to Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, Chinese aggression in the South
China Sea is the gravest external threat to the Philippines since World War II. From China’s
2009 note verbale explaining its nine-dashed line maps, it has indisputable sovereignty over all
islands and adjacent waters surrounding the contested SCS. The same argument China has
expressed in 2013 map with 10-dashed lines as national boundaries. Thus James Shoal, 950 NM
from Hainan Islands, becomes its southernmost border in contemporary maritime saga, and holds
sovereignty of the territory since 2014, though it seized Philippine-owned territory Scarborough
Shoal in 2012. These events make the South China Sea the Chinese Lake, a precedent to Las
Islas Filipinas as the Spanish Lake in colonial times. But Justice Carpio has clarified, based from
his research that, before the South China Sea was coined by Portuguese navigators, it was then
called as the Champa Sea, in reference of the Cham people of ancient Vietnam. It was translated
in Austronesian as ‘pulo’ or islands.

Hence, he foresees three post-arbitration scenarios in our second case at The Hague:
(1) The Middle Ground where the tribunal declares the 9-dashed lines void; Scarborough Shoal
generates only a territorial sea which is a traditional fishing ground of Filipino fishermen; and
the Tribunal does not rule on all other issues. (2) Best Case where the tribunal declares the nine-
dashed lines void and Itu Aba does not generate an exclusive economic zone. It confirms the
status of LTEs identified by the Philippines. The Scarborough Shoal generates only a territorial
sea which is a traditional fishing ground of Filipino fishermen. (3) Worst Case where the tribunal
does not rule on the validity of the 9-dashed lines and declares that Itu Aba generates an EEZ.
Scarborough Shoal generates only a territorial sea and it does not rule on other issues (Carpio,
2016).

But not only does China claim historic rights dating as far back as its glorious centuries
beginning the Han dynasty where it was told to have sent its oceanographers to survey the
Nansha islands, off the southernmost island in Hainan. Southeast Asian and Sino-centric
Vietnam also claims historic title to the islands as far as 17 th century where it marked effective

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and continuous occupation in the Spartly and Paracel Islands. But its claims can only be traced
since 1927, when the French government sent ships for expeditions in different periods which
provoked protests from Japan and Vietnam. Malaysia bases its claim on the concept of exclusive
control over the continental shelf (Doroy, 2015). Its official map now covers part of the Spartlys,
while oil-rich Brunei’s claim is similar to that of Malaysia, but has not tried to occupy any reef
or island (See Annex C on the SWOC analysis of the legal strategy or rules-based approach).

3.8 Bilateral or multilateral negotiation

The mind over might the world have witnessed in the legal battle of the Philippines
against China at The Hague for the maritime jurisdiction of the disputed islands specifically in
the West Philippine Sea shows the Philippines’ dramatic show of force to stand on equal footing
with wealthier and powerful giant neighbor.

China through its ambassador to the Philippines Zhao Jianhua has expressed his
continued intentions to offer for bilateral talks with Philippines as the best way to peacefully
settle these disputes. But prior to China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea, it has
indicated that it wants to avoid the internationalization of the dispute, as evidenced by its
continued drive for bilateral negotiations (Ang, 2015).

However, during the opening salvo speech of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del
Rosario before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Peace Palace, he asserted that the
Philippines has diligently pursued to resolve the problem bilaterally and multilaterally for over
two decades (Calleja and Dizon, 2015).

The Philippine government has strongly countered China’s ambiguous historic claims by
espousing a multilateral approach to peacefully settle the maritime flashpoints.

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 Despite diplomatic efforts, China thinks alone it possesses maritime rights in virtually the
entirety of the South China Sea and that the Philippines must recognize and accept China’s
sovereignty. Del Rosario enumerated incidents where China lawfully violated international
maritime laws and forcibly seized and built structures in the disputed islands attracting dissenting
opinions and violent reactions from the international community.

Two year ago, the Philippines proposed a multilateral Triple Action Plan (TAP) of
ASEAN in the South China Sea, which identified Arbitration as the final and enduring resolution
to address the destabilizing activities in the region (Cabalza, 2015).

While China has indicated that it still does not intend to participate in the Arbitration case
filed against it by the Philippines, the decision to issue a written response in the form of a
position paper from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that China is indeed wary of
the possible effects of the case.

Given two hypothetical and plausible strategic options for the Philippines to deal with its
utmost challenging external threat today, how do we weigh our options in case multilateral
engagements will falter and the only choice left would be bilateral negotiation?

Bilateral negotiation strong points benefited the Asian way of looking at our historical
bilateral trade relations with China when early immigrant Chinese founded the world’s oldest
Chinatown in Binondo long before western colonization of the Spaniards and Americans
including the Japanese occupation in the Philippines. Over the centuries, Chinoys and influential
taipans and some intellectuals of Chinese blood have been assimilated in our society.

The patterns in the bilateral economic relationships between the Philippines and China in
terms of trade, investments, labor, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) based from
statistical data seem asymmetric, critical and vulnerable. But China’s rising power has paved
way for many ASEAN countries to open trade with China as its best economic partners, thus to
factor in hedging strategies (NEDA, 2015).

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 When I studied in Beijing at China’s National Defense University, my Chinese lecturers,
most of them belong to the Corps of Professors of the People’s Liberation Army were outspoken
of bilateral negotiation to settle disputes with claimant-states in the South China Sea. They
would often brag ‘respect’ and ‘trust’ on how they would shoulder the cudgel to painstakingly
negotiate with sovereign smaller countries.

Historically, bilateralism failed to provide just and equitable solutions to conflicts. This
option was elucidated in highly controversial agreements like the German-Russo Agreement in
the late 1800s; German-Polish Non-Aggression Treaty signed in 1939; Non-Aggression Pact
between Germany and USSR in 1939; and US-German Peace Treaty in 1921. All these bilateral
treatises failed and resulted to war between and among those nations (http://www.history.com).

Some strategists believe that bilateral negotiations should be engaged by two states with
almost equal economic status and military capability. But even if with equal footing in terms of
military might as the above-mentioned examples have shown, still bilateral treatises would fail
and can damage the world security order. In this case, the Philippines is way below the Chinese
maximum credible deterrence, economic prowess, and military power projections, therefore our
country will certainly end up at the losing end of the bilateral talks.

But there are recent notable successes in bilateral cooperation courtesy of excellent
negotiation skills used to resolve territorial disputes in some other countries and regions
including the 2007 Australia and Timor-Leste Agreement on the 50-year development zone and
revenue sharing arrangement; China-Russia Bilateral Agreement in 2004 on the disputed islands
of Amur and Assuri confluence and the Argun River; and Norway-Russia Comprehensive
Maritime Boundary Agreement in 2010, to name a few
(http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/03/09/Timor-Sea-boundary-dispute-Australia-is-out-
of-step-with-international-best-practice1.aspx).

Some views that bilateral resolution of the South China Sea issue will foster maritime
regional cooperation to the territorial disputes and it will mean more open communication

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between maritime law and enforcement agencies as well as setting up a hotline between foreign
ministers for use in case of maritime emergencies. In this case, the proposal may look ideal only
for two countries with long tradition of ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’.

Under a bilateral agreement, a range of preventive measures could ease regional tensions
and de-escalate the risk of military conflict as both parties agree on resource-sharing agreement
considering bilateral controlling mechanisms that would deter potential sources of conflict like
illegal fishing and skirmishes arising from oil and gas exploration. Stronger military to military
communication would increase dialogue to reduce conflict escalation.

But greed and megalomaniac claims would ruin all facets of potential cooperation under
ideal bilateral agreements.

The Philippines has proactively engaged in multilateral approach in dealing with this
security threat as the best prerogative since it involves many countries in Southeast Asia,
Northeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific in general with sprouting multi-dimensional regional and
global interests that cut across political, economic, cultural, techno-scientific, environmental, and
military issues.

The South China Sea dispute is multilateral in nature because it involves other claimants
including Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Resolving issues
between two countries will not entirely solve the dispute as other states are also claimants of
islands. The dispute remains a potentially strong flashpoint especially with the ASEAN’s recent
shelving of a proposed code of conduct that would have regulated aggressive activities of
stronger claimants.

The multilateral approach will also give the country leverage against bullying tactics of
the adversary as it will put international pressure to its misbehaviors. The internationalization of
the case should also be complemented by the Philippines’ continuous strengthening of
relationships with its current allies. This is especially true for Japan, South Korea and other
ASEAN countries where China has ongoing territorial disputes.

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 Pessimist would argue that multilateralism is generally viewed as ineffective involving
various parties with diverse interests which make it difficult to arrive at an acceptable agreement.
It will also invite major powers in the region, not so much involved in the playing field, but will
prefer to assume a neutral stance and declare non-intervention posture or may just verbalize
pronouncements without tangible actions. In other words, it may not work in an anarchic
international arena where interests of nations will define their wants.

The diplomatic and legal actions our country may have chosen will certainly affect the
kind of strategic culture we have mustered in the long run. The mind over might strategy we are
pursuing will sum up our deterrence in this David versus Goliath maritime saga that we have had
encountered with China.

By unearthing what lies beneath the very rich resources of the South China Sea, it is
therefore inevitable to view that there are also ecological and economic implications on the
maritime and territorial disputes concerning the region’s security using bilateral and multilateral
diplomacy.

The disputes are not the sum-total of bilateral or multilateral relations of claimant
countries of the islands, rocks, and cays in the South China Sea. Beyond that, there are mutual
interests that must transcend beyond the issue, most importantly, economic diplomacy and the
maritime areas through its diverse ecological and rich archaeological importance. The SCS has
been used as the marine silk road, based from archaeological findings and trade routes in the past
as attested in today’s increasing number of merchant fleets tonnage passing through its busy sea
lanes.

There was a time in recent years when scholars and policymakers agreed to elevate
marine scientific research and hydrographic surveying to be done in the contested islands in the
South China Sea to ease tension and forge cooperative mechanisms that can be done through
Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs).

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 These formal multilateral arrangements should address common maritime problems like
search and rescue, environmental protection, drug trafficking, and smuggling of arms and
humans. Further out the sea, in time and space, a Southeast Asian ocean peacekeeping force
might ensure safety and security of navigation, undertake air sea rescue, protect fisheries from
illegal fishers, and the environment from pollution, oil spill, and potential polluters. The harder
issues include comprehensive fisheries management, and ultimately, common security to be
realized.48
In this case, Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards (2003) defines strategic culture as a set
of beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of military force often molded according to
historical experience. Given our weak military might, alliance is a temporary prescription often
favored than self-reliance as an enduring strength to better achieve modernized armed forces.
It should also be noted that alliance as a form of strategic culture, apparent in bilateral or
multilateral approaches, will not ensure the protection of our internal and external territories.

On the other hand, some experts may deem that our shift to pursue Arbitration as a sign
of soft power through the power of international laws would serve as the greater equalizer among
states, whether weak or mighty, has become our final resort to peacefully settle maritime
disputes with China. Obviously, China is determined to show off its hard power in the Asia-
Pacific as it continuously flexes muscles in the region.

The dichotomy of hard and soft powers in terms of strategic cultures shown by the
Philippines and China in defining their bilateral and multilateral approaches in the South China
Sea conundrum would highlight two different poles on the continuum of power. Both concepts
imply different ideas, interactions, persuasions, and institutions for foreign and defense policies
when looking at the fields of politics, security, economics, and strategic culture.

Christian Wagner (2014) deems that, ideally hard power strategies focus on military
intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions in order to enforce national interests
resulting in confrontational policies vis-à-vis neighboring countries. In contrast, soft power

48
In Mark Valencia’s “Beyond the DOC: Guidelines for Military Activities in Foreign EEZ,” 2011:91-92.

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strategies, Joseph Nye (2004) emphasizes common political values, peaceful means for conflict
management, and economic cooperation in order to achieve common solutions.

Given the hard and soft powers in the context of strategic culture, China still portrays the
Philippines in Chinese media as the aggressor to mask its aggressive acts in the WPS and
insinuates Philippine’s insincerity in its commitment to resolve the dispute peacefully. This
Chinese strategy definitely undermines Philippine sovereignty over WPS and pressures the
Philippines to withdraw from international arbitration and accede to bilateral negotiations.

But Commodore R of the Naval Forces West (NAVFORWEST) in Ulugan Bay Palawan
firmly believes by saying, “do not to rock the boat (referring to the current WPS conundrum)
and the Philippines should exercise self-restraint while waiting for the ITLOS decision for the
second round of the Philippine case. Devil is in the details. The Philippines should prepare for
different scenarios from light to heavy pressures corresponding to China’s actions in the WPS.”

Perhaps with a mix second-round verdict in the arbitration tribunal and realistic
intergenerational solutions in the maritime saga, the Philippines should rather play its cards
conscientiously and become pragmatic in its negotiations to fight for its maritime rights in the
contested islands. Despite our bravery to seek legal means in settling our bilateral differences
with China, whether we win or lose, the Philippines has indeed achieved a moral ascendancy to
pursue international rule of law and gained the respect of the international community.

In line with the presidential debate last April 24, 2016 all presidential aspirants have
agreed to seek diplomatic means in solving the country’s maritime dispute with China over the
West Philippine Sea, despite support of the international community to Philippine case at The
Hague. Lady candidates Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Senator Grace Poe including
Secretary Mar Roxas vow to extend diplomatic efforts to resolve the sea row but with will
strengthen the Philippine Coast Guard according to Poe. Frontrunner Mayor Rodrigo Duterte
will even risk his life to assert the country’s claim by personally planting the flag in the disputed
waters (Viray, 2016). While Vice President Jejomar Binay including Poe and Roxas all vowed to
provide assistance to fishermen while the country’s arbitration case against China is ongoing

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(See ANNEX D on the SWOC analysis of the diplomatic strategy whether it is bilateral or
multilateral).

3.9 Building a credible deterrence

Philippine and international news have for several years reported that China is racing to
occupy and control more of Philippine territorial waters in the WPS under its medium and long
range naval plan aimed at dominating the entire maritime region. Accordingly, Beijing naval
plan was set in motion in 2013 following the creation of Sansha City at Woody Island in the
Paracels – an island group also claimed by Vietnam (Kaplan, 2014).

Given this scenario, the Philippines as an archipelagic country composed of porous

borders and disputed maritime territories has every right to protect and safeguard its own
national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This will increase its commitment in the
international community to strongly adhere to international rule of law and observe freedom of
navigation.

The modernization programs of the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, triggered by
China’s provocative actions, and as a response to the tensions when Chinese Coast Guard vessels
blocked a Philippine civilian ship en route to bring supplies and troops to Scarborough Shoal are
efforts to meet the “minimum credible deterrence” the Philippines is in dire need to protect itself
from China’s resurging maritime power.

Although, the revived AFP modernization programs can either be a boon or bane for our
defense and security establishments. The apparent transformations, part of broader efforts at state
building, are needed encouragements for the defense/protection agencies transitioning from
internal security operations towards external territorial defense. It is also important that
institution building and capability upgrade must go hand-in-hand in order to fast-track
transformation that must be holistic and substantive.

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 In my recent interview about the AFP modernization with regards to the Department of
National Defense’s purchase and donations of military equipment including assault jets, frigates,
radars, drones, sophisticated sea vessels, among others, I have expressed my thoughts to the
media by saying that, “it is not only about acquisition and possession of sophisticated military
equipment, it’s also about training the human resources. This must go hand in hand, the
material possession and the human resources. For example, there are plans that the government
will buy a submarine but aside from buying the submarine, one has to train the sailors and it
takes 5 to 15 years to train them.” I also insist that there should be change in strategy to
correspond to the internal and external security threats which forces the AFP to shift from
terrestrial power operations to a combined naval and air powers.

Thus I have stated, “the problem here is that majority of our military are coming from
the Army and most of the chief of staff are from the Army, so the priority, the interest are on the
terrestrial power when in fact we are now shifting. We want to see more chiefs of staff coming
from the Navy and Air Force in the future because of this sudden shift in our strategy.” Finally,
the belief that this modernization program and structural reform and transformation are
achievable, I view that, “the good thing is that we are now open to these changes and all of a
sudden the people are all imbibing about these defense policies.” Thus, recognizing the benefits
of the Balikatan or shoulder-to-shoulder military exercises with the US military will help
improve the AFP’s competence and capability (Ardenia, 2016).

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 Figure 19: Strong Militarization in the South China Sea (Photos courtesy of CSIS). February 2016, accessed on May 15, 2016.

Understanding the Chinese and their wants will give us a broader perspective of their
actions and behaviors. Now that the sleeping dragon is wide awake, the Zhōngguó ren has
rediscovered themselves and that Zhōngguó may reign tomorrow. Many are worried as the
Chinese did behave and think superior in the past, the way they exercised their strong power
during the Han dynasty when the Middle Kingdom claimed a superior culture.

In fact, China has already reclaimed 17 times more lands in 20 months than the other
claimants combined over the past 40 years. It now accounts for approximately 95 percent of all
reclaimed land in the Spratlys. Since China’s land reclamation began in December 2013, it has
reclaimed more than 1,170 hectares of land. A paper produced by the Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative and the Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic Studies
provides another perspective. The said paper written by Huoy Duong states that, “within the
short span of year, China’s rapid construction of artificial islands in the disputed Spratlys has
radically changed the geographical and security landscapes in the South China Sea. The island
construction has so far created over eight million square meters of real estate in the open sea,
outstripping other countries’ reclamation activities,” (Doronilla, 2016).

Department of National Defense Spokesperson Peter Paul Galvez affirms that China has
been reclaiming land in the West Philippine Sea at a rapid rate of nine hectares a day, completing
some 550 hectares in less than two months since August 2015. More than half of the estimated
550 hectares was added to the artificial island China is building on Panganiban or Mischief Reef.
550 hectares were completed between April and May 2015. By Philippine government estimates,
some 300 hectares have been added to expand the artificial island China is building on
Panganiban Reef, 41 kilometers from Ayungin or Second Thomas Shoal. The rest have been
added to expand the artificial islands China is building at other shoals and reefs in the Spratlys
archipelago (Dizon, 2015).

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 In response to this, the Philippines through the AFP adheres to self-restraint, and Rear
Admiral L of WESCOM provides in his policy that no new construction should be built while
waiting for the ITLOS decision contrary to China’s rapid island constructions.

The Western Command based in Puerto Princesa City is the largest unified command in
the AFP in terms of air and sea areas. It covers the whole of Palawan Province including the
Scarborough shoal in Zambales and the sea and air spaces of the West Philippine Sea. WESCOM
is task-organized within the Joint Task Force set-up which incorporates composite sets of
capabilities. To sustain the conduct of internal peace and security operations, WESCOM
employs the Joint Task Force Peacock, composed of the 3rd Marine Brigade, and the Army’s 18th
SFC and Cafgu Auxilliary Unit in Palawan, while ensuing the security and protection of the
country’s economic crown jewel, the Malampaya natural-gas-to-power project (WESCOM,
2016).

Law enforcement agencies prominent in the West Philippine Sea include the Palawan
Police Provincial Office (Palawan PPO) of the Philippine National Police, the Coast Guard
District Palawan of the Philippine Coast Guard. Furthermore, the Coast Guard maintains a
detachment in Masinloc, Zambales.

Aside from continuously conducting maritime patrols by the Philippine Coast Guard in
upholding sovereignty and sustainment of all Philippine detachments within the scope of the
West Philippine Sea, it includes Parola Island, Pag-asa Island, Kota Island, Rizal Reef, Likas
Island, Patag Shoal, Lawak Island, and Panata Island. Although most of these detachment
facilities are in dire need of repair and upgrading which are long overdue, the Philippine troops
continue to render their patriotic duties despite the hardships and challenges that they face. Still
having the Philippine flag proudly raised in these detachments is indicative of how strongly the
country believes in upholding our sovereignty.

However, the capabilities of the security agencies in performing their mandates especially
in the WPS are very limited. WESCOM has limited capability to patrol the high seas and ensure
the country’s sovereignty in its area of operation. It has not met a minimum credible deterrence

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for external defense. This is being aggravated by limited joint operations capability of the source
and sustainment of land domination which is threatened by internal threats. Thus, the
complementary role of the PNP to enforce local laws and the PCG to enforce maritime laws and
security are also limited. This consideration limits options for the country in employing other
agencies in operationalizing our sovereignty. On the other hand, WESCOM has yet to implement
an effective Integrated Territorial Defense System which includes a whole-of-nation involvement
in securing the community.

Also, the threats posed by the Chinese PLA Navy and its Coast Guard vessels highlight
the AFP’s lack of defense systems and surveillance capabilities to patrol and protect Philippine
military territory. In the WPS, the risk of a possible armed confrontation remains as both
militaries have their own mandate to protect their respective maritime interest over the contested
islands and islets. With Chinese growing military pressure, the Philippine defense sector will still
be unable to fully enforce maritime laws within the WPS even if the arbitration decision favors
the Philippines.

During the Asean-US Summit declaration in February 2016, the first of its kind dialogue
to give importance to these relations, both parties avoided direct reference to China but it called
for an easing of tensions and a “halt” in the reclamation and construction activities and
“militarization” in the disputed areas in the South China Sea, a major international trade route.
As the special meeting winded down, China deployed two batteries of surface-to-air missile on
Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam claims.

In my analysis, I have said to the media that whatever takes place in the disputed areas in
the South China Sea, whether on the Paracel or the Spratlys, would have a “domino effect” for
the Philippines, “when we talk of the whole South China Sea, whatever you do on one part will
affect the other areas. It has implications on the regional security. Whatever they do on the other
islands in the South China Sea, they can do to the islands we are claiming,” (Dizon, 2015).
While there are no reports that China has deployed missiles on any of the artificial islands in the
West Philippine Sea, I see that there is an already “increasing militarization” in the South China

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Sea. “Given that you have the surface to missile on Paracel islands, it would impact on the other
islands as well,” and aptly added, “we don’t have a unified and continuous policy regarding the
West Philippine Sea issue.” (See ANNEX E on the SWOC analysis of the military strategy or
credible deterrence).

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 CHAPTER 4

4.1 Summary

The ambiguity in Philippine strategic culture is once again tested while the archipelagic
country in Southeast Asia awaited a clearer policy from President Rodrigo Duterte after the
historic verdict of the Peace Palace in The Hague invalidating the legality of the controversial
Chinese nine-dashed lines claims in the South China Sea.

In January 2013, the Philippines filed an arbitration case against the giant Northeast
Asian China to the spectacle of big powers and maritime countries worldwide. Despite the small
nation-state’s first legal triumph in October 2015, the rising dragon continuously flexed military
muscle that it accounts for approximately 95 percent of all reclaimed land in the Spratlys. China
has revived John Selden’s argument of Mare Clausum and radically changed the geographical
and security landscapes of the U-shaped contested islands.

Prior to China’s aggressive actions propounded by its robust strategic culture in the South
China Sea, it has indicated to avoid the internationalization of the dispute as it opens its wide
door for bilateral talks with the aggrieved party and indicated that it will not participate in the
arbitration case.

There are some persuasions that politely adhere to the belief that the Philippines merely
reacted to China’s belligerence despite poor presence of strategic culture amplified in various
epochs of its recent history contrary to the theory that strategic culture takes time to nurture as it
takes a generation to develop.

During this episodic period, the use of established international systems in settling the
disputes between states is the best option for the archipelagic nation against a civilization-state to
pursue a developing strategic culture in approaching an imminent challenge on its territorial

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integrity by applying the state’s diplomatic power through its foreign affairs by elevating the
case against China to the international tribunal.

The problem beholds to strategic behavior to attain a consistent rules-based approach in

dealing with prominent external security challenge. The Philippines dependence on alliance as a
short-term remedy to stoutly hold a credible deterrence paving a way for a long-term self-
reliance to foster strategic culture remains apparent. However, dependence on military alliance is
not an absence of strategic culture, rather a preference for partnership with a foreign power that
may juxtapose another feather of holding a strategic culture to fill the gaps of momentary
impairments.

The lack of crafting a national security strategy, despite evident episodic strategic culture
under the tenure of President Benigno Aquino, as the Philippines grapple with prominent
external security threat, is a reflection of reactive policy decisions rather than a well-defined
strategy nurtured by time and generations. Just as strategic culture is polished through time, it
can also change overtime. The habit of codifying and testing it in times of conflict is
instrumental in strengthening a nation’s own robust strategic culture. This leads to a good
tradition of building collective memories by preserving a material culture of lived experiences of
the actual practice of a certain generation where strategic culture is not co-terminus with an
administration.

The Philippines has been in the frontline for a rules-based peaceful resolution of the
maritime dispute as it tried to influence Southeast Asian neighbors to bandwagon on a new-
found strategy. A sudden shift to an established policy of the outgoing Aquino administration
would impact on the credibility of the Philippines as it gained moral ascendancy from the
international community after suing a giant neighbor. The litmus test for President-elect Rodrigo
Duterte is how he will set his policy anew on the maritime row with China and whether or not he
will continue or discontinue the strategic culture developed by his predecessor.

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4.2 Conclusion

Consolidating Philippines Strategic Culture

(1) Crafting a National Security Strategy and Prescription of a National Security Policy

Since strategic culture takes time and generations to nurture, and strategy crafting slices
an art and divides no science, crafting a National Security Strategy (NSS) 49 and prescription of
effective National Security Policy (NSP)50 in a way would flourish a nation’s strategic culture.

Certainly, in determining an NSS, a country should take stock of its preferred value
outcomes, carry the conditions in the international environment, studies its domestic
environment, the nature of the threats, and the required strategies to avert the threats (Brown,
1977).

This serves as a broad construct for government departments or ministries and other
branches of the bureaucracy to ensure the intent (approach or direction) that the elected senior
leadership desires in selected security areas (Tuggle in Stolberg, 2012). National interest should
also be articulated and spelled out in the NSS that lies at the very heart of the military and
diplomatic professions that would lead to the formulation of national strategy and the calculation
of the power necessary to support that strategy (Stolberg, 2012). Hence, NSS appears and
typically disseminated in formal and written documents and treated as public domain. A good
example of which is a nation’s White Paper that indicates a clear focus on crafting whole of
government coordinated documents. 51

49
National Security Strategy (NSS) is a set of pre-selected means or approach to achieving goals while coping with
current and future external conditions. This is the overall plan of employing available resources to enhance the
national interests and national goals and objectives. It consists of ends (national goals and objectives), ways
(national security policy), and means (instruments of national power).
50
National Security Policy (NSP) is the specific course of action designed to achieve national security goals and
objectives. These are broad guidelines approved by the nation’s highest authority and its parameters for actions are
to be taken to safeguard the nation’s vital interests.
51
Brazil in 2008 has the National Strategy of Defense (NSD). Both the South African White Paper and Defense
Review assisted the nation in moving beyond the apartheid era. United Kingdom proposed for the National Security
Risk Assessment (NSRA) and Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR). But the United States is the only
complete whole of government national security document that the US government publishes.

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 However, one of the biggest misconceptions in strategic discourse is to assume that only
countries of certain size and wealth should and can afford to have an NSS or a sophisticated
strategic culture for that matter.

A cursory look at developing country like Vietnam and smaller city-state Singapore in
Southeast Asia reveal that it is possible for developing and small powers to actually develop
overtime and lay down robust foreign and defense policies asserting a dynamic strategic culture.

Given the growing geopolitical volatility in the region, especially in light of China’s
increasingly disruptive rise, it is incumbent upon the Philippines to look into both scientific
(military-defense-international law) and artistic (diplomacy and rhetoric) aspects of national
security formulation.

(2) Philippines Lack of National Security Strategy Despite Evident Historical and Episodic
Robust Strategic Culture

Our lack of national security strategy, despite evident historical or episodic robust
strategic culture, has seen during the span of the study from 2011 to 2016 in six years time, as
the Philippines grapple with several internal and external security threats, particularly the West
Philippine Sea conundrum, in which the country’s strategy is a reflection of reactive policy
decisions rather than a well-defined strategy based on foresight and appreciation of the evolving
strategic landscape in the region.

On the other hand, National Security Policy (NSP) is a complex task entrusted upon
governments, though, policy can never be absolute; the change in objective conditions
necessitates updating of existing NSP.

It should also be construed that policy making combines both scientific method and
artistic magic that uses data gathering required in enriching informed decision making but it
considers creativity required for in-depth analysis of issue and convey the same to general public
for better understanding.

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 Although the Philippines has an existing NSP under the previous administration of
former President Benigno Aquino and the National Security Council (NSC) has categorized the
key themes on national security in terms of the context of national security, the external and
internal threats of the nation, goals and objectives, and strategic issues, the NSP merely serves as
a general guide or framework for the government to act on its national security concerns. The
NSP does not contain specific strategies, programs, action plans, and quantified resources unlike
the NSS which is holistic.

While the country does have an NSP in place and changing every political administration,
the challenge for the government in crafting a responsive NSS to sustain the NSP lies in
designing an NSS that is relevant, up-to-date, and accounts for the various internal and external
factors influencing the nation.

(3) Change of Mindset: Strategy is not Co-terminus with an Administration

Thus, there has to be a change of mindset among people in government that strategy is
not co-terminus with an administration or a political actor like the president or any leader. A
state’s goal and national interests should be clear and well-defined that should not be changed
every six years in the case of the Philippines.

Just as strategic culture takes time to form it can also change over time and generations
but the habit of codifying it through NSS and NSP are instrumental in strengthening the nation’s
own robust strategic culture. This would lead to a good tradition which, in turn help us build
collective memories by preserving material culture and pieces of evidence of the lived
experience of the actual practice of a certain generation.

But the NSS tend to be more specific, actionable, responsive and measurable compared to
just a policy doctrine like NSP that merely provides general guidelines to achieve national
security.

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 Institutionalizing the crafting of NSS and NSP, an articulation of the country’s security
strategy in pursuit of national aspirations, should be more synchronized and to cascade through a
whole-of-nation which requires the formulation of an NSS supplemented by the NSP by each
administration and in times of a national crisis including internal and external security threats.
Hence, these documents may become artifacts on the constancy in the policy direction of the
government that could help develop our robust strategic culture.

(4) Episodic Strategic Culture from 2011 to 2016

While the Philippines claims the area in the South China Sea constituting the West
Philippine Sea that is covered by our national waters within its 200 nautical miles exclusive
economic zone under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, President Benigno
Aquino under his turf declared the Luzon Sea including the Scarborough Shoal as well as the
waters around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group as part of Philippine territory.

The overlapping claims of the five neighboring countries with the Philippines (9),
Vietnam (21), Malaysia (5), Taiwan (1) and China (7) including islands, coral reefs, and shoals
in the Spartly archipelago creates wary competition for marine resources constituting territorial
disputes.

The intensity of clashes that originate from China’s aggression and assertion of the nine-
dashed line using historical rights by claiming in entirety the South China Sea capped with
ongoing or almost completed island and infrastructure buildings bespectacled by military and
commercial flights envisioned to populate reefs and shoals turned into artificial islands for
investment and strategic intentions.

Cordoning our marine-rich Scarborough Shoal and along the fast-paced development of
nearby transformed reefs into fake islands within our territories in the West Philippine Sea’s
Kennan (Chigua), Johnson (Mabini), Calderon (Cuarteron), Gaven (Burgos), Fiery Cross
(Kagitingan), Mischief (Panganiban), and Subi (Zamora) adorned with multi-storey facilities,

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solar panel power facility, lighthouse, port fability, communication tower, helipads and airstrips
are clear manifestations of giant neighbor’s hegemony in the contested archipelago.

Unchecked incursions on Philippine territory means offensive to our rights and dignity.
Thus, the elevation of the West Philippine Sea conundrum in the arbitral tribunal at The Hague
articulated our position to draw diplomatic and moral support from the international community.
Despite our legal triumph for the first round of our case on the jurisdiction of the arbitral court on
our maritime dispute with China’s, the suspenseful second decision affirmed our position itself.

Legally speaking, although the policy of claimant states in the SCS is heavily influenced
by economic and security concerns, the disputes in the WPS cannot be fully understood unless
these can be analyzed thoroughly in light of the relevant rules of international law, especially the
UNCLOS.

The elusive action to pacify increased militarization, by approving and implementing the
Declaration of Conduct for ASEAN and China to work together in good faith, may be placed at
the back burner because of these legal hullabaloos that the international community is also
watching. Thus, diplomacy is sidetracked due to different strategic cultures implemented by
claimant-countries to increase or decrease such collision and mistrust. It seems that although
security concerns and economic interests will continue to dictate policy despite environmental
degradation of the world’s meta-center of biodiversity in the SCS, still the principles and rules of
international law will continue to influence and frame the debate of Philippine robust strategic
culture in the West Philippine Sea.

Local security issues related to Palawan and Zambales’ geographic features including the
Kalayaan Island Group in the Spartlys and Scarborough Shoal that are currently involved in the
maritime and territorial disputes with various claimants may stumble. Aggravated by China’s
incursions into our maritime zones, artificial-island buildings that could serve as military bases,
restrictions to air and naval spaces, and destruction of ecosystem while depriving the marine-rich
natural resources from Filipino fishermen for their livelihood and fishing industry are looming
effects of the continuing defense and security saga in the WPS.

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 The changing flavor of negotiation from multilateral to bilateral vis a vis bilateral to
multilateral may confuse allies and crux due to changing behaviors of leaders and the
environmental security itself, although this can be justified by the evolving nature of security,
thus strategic culture must also be understood based from the clearer national interests of nations.

For instance, bilateral negotiation between the Philippines and China can be a lot easier
when only two parties are involved encouraging flexible approach such as the designation of
functional zones in the contested islands with the EEZ of the aggrieved party. But power
asymmetry may result to inequitable solutions, or China may not also recognize other pairs of
bilateral within ASEAN claimant-countries with maritime disputes given the disparity of
interests and intent. This exclusivity of two sovereign states, whether big or small, may further
fuel mistrust by those excluded in the process that could cover only peripheral areas not the
entirety of issues in the SCS.

On the other hand, multilateral mechanism of negotiating the dispute may reduce the
impact of power asymmetry in negotiations to include greater transparency to help build
cohesion and trust. This kind of norm focuses on functional cooperation for mutual benefit of
claimant-countries that will nevertheless favor long-term commitment by parties to boost
community building and confidence building mechanisms. Although, this may take a longer
process and funding to negotiate due to the need to consult different stakeholders with strong and
continuous commitment of leaders and actors.

During this episodic period, the use of established international systems in settling the
disputes between states is the right kind of strategic culture in approaching the challenge to our
territorial integrity by applying the state’s diplomatic power through foreign affairs by elevating
the case against China to the jurisdiction of the ITLOS. This manifests our commitment to the
ASEAN Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, the UNCLOS, and the community of nations.

The diplomatic approach would be more logical than containing China militarily which
we cannot afford. This sensible action would be our ace despite the seemingly disappointing
disregard of China to other claimants in the region. Strengthening our alliances with the

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community of nations in the implementation of the arbitral court’s decision which would be
another challenge considering that the giant neighbor has poured in large infrastructure
investments in the disputed islands.

(5) Perspective of the Adversary

Lastly, in gaining better understanding of the strategic culture in the West Philippine Sea,
it would also help to look at the crisis from the perspective of the adversary at that timeframe.
China’s higher and uncompromising objective in the region is to gain dominance in the South
China Sea. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is the center of gravity
backed by its sustained economic growth and flexing of muscles. One of its requirements in
achieving that dominance is the control of the islands in the West Philippine Sea, legitimizing its
historical nine-dotted lines claims and massive island building constructions.

The anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy of China is one of its steps into
dominating the entire SCS. Because of the building of islands (already habitable territory) where
there had previously been only rocks (an uninhabitable feature that breaks the surface) and reefs
(submerged features that did not break the surface) is also an attempt to alter facts on the ground
(or in water).

These reclamations will certainly challenge an array of international laws. In particular, it

is an attempt to create new features (fake islands) that would project both territorial waters (with
twelve nautical mile limit) and exclusive economic zones (EEZs) extending to 200 nautical
miles. Rocks extend only twelve nautical mile territorial waters while reef projects nothing.

Definitely, the alteration of the natural features in the West Philippine Sea caused by the
reclamation activities of China will also impact changes to standing international laws. Not only
that, it will also challenge the laws that consider the right of innocent passage and the freedom of
navigation both for air and sea.

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 Although China may seem unchallenged militarily, the clever and reactive Philippine
strategic culture with the mixture usurpation of legal, diplomatic and military alliance identified
during the episodic period remains an impediment and sore eye for revisionist China.

The challenge to the territorial integrity of the Philippines caught the attention of the
community of nations and the impact of Chinese intrusions cuts across multi-dimensional issues
causing economic loss of opportunity for Filipino fishermen, environmental degradation due to
catastrophic reef destruction affected by the massive and rapid island building constructions, test
of asymmetrical powers and challenges to freedom of navigation or overflight.

Mounting a credible deterrence on the part of the Philippines has paved way for clever
and alternative strategic cultures courtesy of arbitration of case to seek justice and equal footing
with an emerging superpower in the region. While efforts are initiated at the international level,
adequate efforts are done domestically to confront the security challenges on the ground during
my fieldwork. Best practices from the local government units include good governance fostered
by inter-agency collaboration and people-centered programs for development affected by the
maritime conundrum.

4.3 Recommendations

Based on the objectives of this ethnography, the pursuit of this study wants to contribute
to a better understanding of the Philippines strategic culture in its continuing battle to protect its
territorial integrity and national sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea.

The research has looked at the plausible approaches in contributing to the epistemic
literature of the anthropology of security by examining the country’s strategic culture in the West
Philippine Sea, identifying themes on the Philippines strategic culture in its imminent external
security threat, and to recommend projected Philippines responses to advance the country’s
strategic culture.

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 Based on the findings of the ethnography, China has already risen economically,
militarily and politically. The pronounced power shift in the West Philippine Sea, two
superpowers, one emerging (China) while the other declining (United States), are tossing coins
with each other as they flex military muscles in the new-found maritime battleground at the
expense of smaller nation like the Philippines, ascribing and still trying to identify and
institutionalize its own strategic culture.

In-depth analyses and rhetoric sandwiched in this ethnographic account identified legal
remedies, diplomatic negotiations, and military alliance as part of building the capacity to foster
the country’s robust strategic culture.

It is obvious that although the country manifests strategic culture, it is still episodic and
not well-defined or long-term, although it is not lacking as accounted in the oral traditions of
Philippine strategic culture, but it only needs to be codified, defined, and institutionalized to
empower its existence and robustness. This is perhaps the silverlining in the West Philippine Sea
crisis that has jolted the Philippine defense establishment out of stupor.

The following are some of the recommendations:

(1) Institutionalizing Strategic Culture

More than producing the policy documents, albeit there is a serious need to
institutionalize the process of strategic culture, by and large through a holistic NSS specifically
supported by NSP, which would require political administrations at the start of their term to spell
out their security and defense plans and strategies and have the same reviewed and evaluated
towards the end.

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 (2) Clarity of [Defense] and [Foreign] Policies of the New Government

The clarity of the newly installed administration on his policy on sea dispute matters
particularly that a sudden shift by the Duterte administration in policies could taint the credibility
of the Philippines before its neighbors, as I have said to the media, “we have been in the
frontline and we tried to influence our neighbors to join us in the strategy on how to deal with
the maritime row, and then we would suddenly shift policies? That would impact on the
credibility of the Philippines. We gained moral ascendancy after we sued a giant neighbor then
we’ll do a drastic change?” The Duterte administration should engage in thorough consultation
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), the claimant countries, and even the
outgoing Aquino administration. Thus I aptly said, “we need to listen to our neighbors. We are
pursuing Asean centrality and our neighbors are relying on us. We have to assess the security
environment and weigh the best option,” (Dizon, 2016).

In my recent interview with Inquirer, I have expounded by saying that: “The President
must clearly define what he means by an independent foreign policy in order for the
international community to know our intents and values. Our independent foreign policy should
regard the importance of present alliances notwithstanding the long-term goal of self-reliance in
its defense posture to safeguard its people and territory. Interpreting the Constitution, the
government can and may forge an independent foreign policy. But the intent and validity of the
prerogative should be taken at the right time. There should be a thorough study of past foreign
policies that connects to the present global and regional security environment. An independent
foreign policy must be executed in a manner not maligning small, middle and great powers,”
(Dizon, 2016).

(3) Mettle of Diplomacy

After the decision, in my haste proposal to the media in one interview to send former
Fidel V Ramos to Beijing as a special envoy, which the Chinese counterparts welcomed, I said
that, “whatever the decision of the arbitral court would be will test the mettle of President
Rodrigo Duterte as the country’s chief diplomat, particularly his ability to morph into a regional

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leader. This will be a litmus test for the President. The world will be watching us” (Dizon,
2016).

Next year (2017) would particularly be significant for President Duterte’s skills in
diplomacy with the Philippines chairing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as Manila
will be hosting the regional bloc’s 50th founding anniversary. The regional organization itself has
grappled with the South China Sea maritime dispute, as five of its members (Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines) have overlapping claims in the vast ocean where an
estimated $5.3 trillion worth of trade passes.

President Duterte has also softened its stance with China and is allowing the continuity of
bilateral negotiation with the giant neighbor fostering an independent foreign policy away from
the mantle of American reliance. He is also turning his appreciation to left-leaning countries
including Laos, Vietnam, Russia, Cuba and China on how to deal with nations. The twist in the
continuing saga has been reversing and thus strategic culture must transpire that would redound
to the benefit of the Filipino people.

Hence, this written tradition based on documents as artifacts of our strategic culture
should strongly define the country’s national interest/s which also means institutionalizing it,
regardless of whoever holds the power, to provide constancy in the policy direction of national
security that could further enhance our robust strategic culture in the West Philippine Sea and
other internal and external threats.

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Municipality of Masinloc. History. http://www.masinloczambales.gov.ph/

National Economic and Development Authority. http://www.neda.gov.ph/

National Statistical Office. Population of Kalayaan, Palawan. Retrieved from

https://psa.gov.ph/.

Statistical Information about Fatal Casualties of the Vietnam War.

http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statis/

World History. http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/german-soviet-nonaggression-pact

162 | P a g e
ANNEX A: Key Informants

Binondo Fieldwork

Dick Ching – Chairman of Barangay 290, Binondo Manila.

Antonio Diaz – Barangay Kagawad of 290, Binondo Manila.

Herbert Chen Sy – Barangay Kagawad of Barangay 291, Binondo Manila.

Nelson Ty - a second-termer Chairman of Barangay 289, Zone 27, Binondo Manila.

Chinese Embassy Manila

Senior Colonel V (anonymous)
Major Y (anonymous)
Senior Colonel Q (anonymous)

Palawan Fieldwork
WESCOM – Rear Admiral L
NAVFORWEST – Commodore R

Zambales Fieldwork (Fisherfolks do not want to be located by barangay. Three other

fisherfolks do not want to be identified for security reasons and neither to be photographed)
Efren Forono (52 years old)
Viany Mola (48 years old)
Francisco Miranda (35 years old)
Jerry Ecape (56 years old)

National Government / Civilian Sector:

DND – Director Madame X
NSC – Director Madame Y
Media – Nicollete Dizon (Senior Reporter, Philippine Inquirer)
Academe – Richard Javad Heydarian (Assistant Professor, De La Salle University)

163 | P a g e
ANNEX B: GUIDE QUESTIONS FOR KEY INFORMANTS
For the defense, civilian government, academe and media

1. What is your understanding of strategic culture? Do you think that the Philippines has
strategic culture? If yes, how do you perceive our national strategic culture? Is it robust or
lacking?

2. Given the West Philippine Sea conundrum, our country is using three approaches in
resolving peacefully the conflict. Can you consider the legal track or the use of the rule of
law, diplomacy as the first line of defense, and military modernization as part of our
national strategic culture?

3. Since strategic culture takes time and generations to nurture, and strategy crafting is an
art and not a science, is the proposal for crafting a National Security Strategy (NSS) and a
prescription of an effective National Security Policy (NSP) will flourish one’s strategic
culture?

4. What recommendations can you suggest to have a robust strategic culture? Are your
suggestions will correspond to the solution of our current “external” security threat in the
West Philippine Sea?

Mangingisda

1. Gaano kahalaga sa inyo ang pangingisda sa Scarborough? Kailan kayo huling nangisda
sa Scarborough? Bakit ipinagbabawal nang mangisda sa Scarborough?

2. Simula nang dumating ang Chinese Coast Guard at Navy sa Scarborough, apektado ba
ang inyong pangingisda sa Scarborough? Malaya pa rin ba kayong mangisda sa
Scarborough? Paano kayo tinatrato ng Chinese Coast Guard at Navy sa Scarborough?

3. Maliban sa pangingisda, ano pa ba ang inyong hanapbuhay? Anong alternatibong

hanapbuhay ang binibigay ng lokal na pamahalaan sa inyo simula nang di na kayo
maaaring mangisda sa Scarborough?

4. Sa tingin niyo, may pag-asa pa bang maayos ng gobyerno natin ang lamat sa pagitan
ng Pilipinas at Tsina? Kung sakaling may pag-asa pa, gusto pa rin ba ninyong pumalaot
at mangisda sa Scarborough kasama nang iba pang lahi ng mangingisda tulad ng mga
Tsino at Vietnamese?

164 | P a g e
ANNEX C
SWOC ANALYSIS
LEGAL STRATEGY: RULES-BASED APPROACH
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Challenges
UN Convention on Passive assertion and Strong indication that China’s non-
the Law of the Sea territorial rights over ITLOS decision will recognition of ITLOS
(UNCLOS) and the WPS eventually favor the taking jurisdiction
ITLOS jurisdiction Philippines over the over the WPS
over the WPS WPS issue
Philippine position Political divide over Japan, India and other There is no knee jerk
over the WPS per AO MDT, VFA and allied countries are reaction as far as
29, PD 1599 (EEZ) EDCA (Balikatan sympathetic to the China is concerned
and RA 9522 Exercises) Philippine position (no chilling effect as
(Philippine Base their aggressive stance
Lines) continues)
Establishment of the Presence of anti-US GPH position and No clear agenda of the
Municipality of sentiment China’s creeping incoming political
Kalayaan invasion over the leadership as to how
within the province of Congressional delays WPS rekindled the diplomatic and
Palawan (elections for and overly discussion nationalism among peaceful resolution of
its local leaders are of issues causes delay Filipinos the conflict be
held regularly) in the approval of pursued
relevant measures
Support of local and China’s state- Benchmark case for Divisive ASEAN
foreign press for the sponsored news maritime and support for Philippine
continued news and agency is strong in territorial claims in case; ASEAN is
media reports of making propaganda to the world while the divided between the
China’s incursion in advance their interest international US and China
Philippine territories community
sympathizes with the
Philippine case
Great potential of Limited capabilities of Joint seismic and Chinese encroachment
economic values of AFP and PCG to oceanographic studies of islands and reefs.
fossil and marine conduct maritime and researches. Island-building and
resources patrol Enhancing the infrastructure
technical skills of construction
Rich in mineral Dependency of local scientists, engineers,
resources such as on fishing industry planners and workers.
nickel, copper,
manganese and
chromite combined Recto Bank is a
with a flourishing potential for
tourism and/or alternative gas
agricultural business
Zambales is rich in Threat to Philippine Eco-tourism boom Severely limited

165 | P a g e
coastal and marine sovereignty on with very promising fishing in the disputed
resources (mangroves, Scarborough Shoal hydrocarbon deposits areas due to Chinese
Scarborough Shoal – Resource over- to address energy incursion
a rich fishing ground). exploitation crisis
It is also rich in Biodiversity
mineral deposits such Poor Solid-Waste Implementation of degradation due to
as nitrate, chromite Management Environmental Laws destruction of coral
found in the north- and Regulation reefs (artificial islands
Central Zambales building), poaching,
Range. Mangrove Ecosystem illegal fishing, and
Palawan is dubbed as Destruction Public Awareness on illegal wildlife trade
the ‘last ecological environmental issues
frontier’. It is Unsustainable coastal in the WPS Loss of livelihood due
biologically diverse and marine to environmental
with rich flora and development due to degradation
fauna totaling 32 island building and
marine and terrestrial infrastructure The disturbed
Key Biodiversity construction ecological balance
Areas (KBAs) were due to dredging of
identified in the artificial islands by
Palawan region out of China and poaching is
the 228 in the country affecting the marine
life, thereby, reducing
Republic Act No 7611 fishing opportunities
entitled “An Act for the Philippines
Adopting the Strategic
Environmental Plan
for Palawan”
Causes Effects
Philippine reliance and/or dependence on US Active involvement of US in securitizing WPS
support implies weakness/vulnerability is seen by China as interference
Passiveness of local community Heightened aggressive stance of China
Philippine limited defense and security Creation of artificial island and air strip
capability development for possible military air base
Core issues: The twin and inseparable issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity are central to
the conflicting claims in the West Philippine resulting to lack of strategic culture caused by
political uncertainty, vulnerability and instability in the region. China’s continued militarization
of the WPS results in the escalation of tension and lead to more political instability among
claimant countries. Overfishing and unabated mining destroys and depletes scarce natural
resources. Thus, unchecked Chinese incursion on Philippine territory undermines national pride
and dignity arousing unity and nationalism.
Assessment: China is moving towards their ultimate goal which is to control the South China
Sea/West Philippine Sea in the pursuit of the legality of historical nine-dash-line claims. The
protection for exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the annexed and reclaimed
areas in the WPS and sailing or navigating off the international waters beyond China’s territorial
boundaries are mere secondary objectives.

166 | P a g e
ANNEX D

SWOC ANALYSIS
DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY: BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Challenges
Foreign Policy: China wants bilateral Strong indication that Changing policies on
Diplomatic and negotiation but PH ITLOS decision will the use of bilateral or
peaceful resolution of adheres to multilateral eventually favor the multilateral tracks of
issues talk Philippines over the negotiation
WPS issue

Constitution: Defensive diplomacy National elections in No clear agenda of the

Renunciation of war PH as leading incoming political
as an instrument of Shift from multilateral presidential leadership as to how
foreign policy to bilateral diplomacy candidates support the diplomatic and
under new diplomatic and peaceful resolution of
administration peaceful resolution of the conflict be
conflict pursued
ASEAN Recognition Not all ASEAN Rallying ASEAN China’s non-
of PH position in countries are support and seeking recognition of ITLOS
WPS/SCS sympathetic to PH the support of the taking jurisdiction
position in WPS/SCS international over the WPS
community

G7’s call for G7 statement is seen Japan, India and other China’s growing
diplomatic/non- as interference from allied countries are economic diplomacy
military means to China’s political lens sympathetic to PH in the region and the
settle WPS row position world

Strong PH-US Presence of anti-US Seeking the US Denied access to the

relations sentiments government to express fishing grounds and
their support to PH marine resources

Peaceful resolution of Failed bilateral and Peace-building/ Increased

the problem by multilateral Alternative Dispute militarization in the
pursuing bilateral or diplomatic Resolution / WPS creating fear and
multilateral engagements between Confidence Building mistrust
diplomatic track PH and China Mechanism
Cultural Diplomacy Chinoys as economic Binondo as home to Chinoys are often
and people-to-people pillars in the country the world’s oldest considered spies and
engagement between using economic Chinatown not loyal to PH
PH and China diplomacy to pursue
their interests
Wide interest on Educational and
Economic diplomacy cultural exchanges

167 | P a g e
 Causes Effects
Philippine reliance on alliances in its Strong sympathy of allies and support from the
diplomatic efforts to lobby its case to the international community that leads to robust
international community Chinese aggressiveness in the WPS/SCS
Case filed at the International Tribunal on the China’s adamant stand not to internationalize
Law of the Sea and acceleration of the Code of the issue and instead advance bilateral
Conduct in the South China Sea to forum shop engagement; abrasive discourses in diplomatic
in multilateral engagements at various levels of tracks and continuous harassment to smaller
diplomatic tracks countries like the Philippines
Core issues: The lack of clear diplomatic policy may hamper delivery of basic services and
building of essential facilities in Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal to improve socio-cultural
conditions of the country. On the short-term, the Philippines will continuously ink agreements
with allies to safeguard its national interests, territorial integrity and national sovereignty as it
deals on how to use either bilateral or multilateral tracks of negotiation to resolve the complexity
of its current external threat in pursuing a robust strategic culture.
Assessment: The Department of National Defense compels diplomatic protest against China and
may summon Chinese envoy. Among competing claimants in the South China Sea, the
Philippines and China have the most toxic bilateral relationship and strained diplomatic efforts
brought about by law suits in ITLOS and increasing militarization in the disputed islands. Manila
has called Beijing as “bully” while the latter addressed it as the “troublemaker” as they wrestle
on the unending maritime saga in the hotly contested waters of the West Philippine Sea.

168 | P a g e
ANNEX E

SWOC ANALYSIS
MILITARY STRATEGY: CREDIBLE DETERRENCE
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Challenges
Strong Armed Forces Weak Philippine Future basing of AFP Has not met the
of the Philippines- Coast Guard and EDCA Minimum Credible
Local Government capability Deterrence criteria
Unit (Palawan
/Zambales) relations No central Arms build-up
government direction requires government
in mandating local spending needed for
inter-agency issues social and economic
activities
Base of WESCOM Limited AFP air and Procurement of air Territorial disputes
(air and naval assets) naval assets and naval equipment with neighboring
for external defense countries
No central Limited Joint
government direction Operational
in mandating local Capability
inter-agency efforts
Presence of Task Sustained land Venue for Balikatan Malampaya Natural
Force Malampaya domination has not Exercises (joint Gas-to-Power Project
yet achieved / Limited exercises) has only 20-year
PNP maritime capacity now on its
capability midway exploitation.

Incursion of
insurgents from
adjacent region
Causes Effects
Philippines’ poor military spending creates Chinese incursions and island constructions
more dilemmas on its internal security threat triggered the revival of the AFP’s
and external security challenge modernization program
Limited capability for deep sea exploration and Chinese assertiveness in the West Philippine
research, cybersecurity infrastructure for Sea with their sophisticated military naval
intelligence reporting, limited capability to stop equipment, financial resources to modernize
poaching, illegal fishing and other activities PLA and exploit marine resources dwarfs
that endanger the terrestrial and marine AFP’s credible deterrence in safeguarding and
ecosystem of PH in the WPS. protecting PH territories
Core issues: WESCOM is in a challenging and balancing act in protecting Philippine territorial
integrity and national sovereignty, and also by managing and preventing the escalation of tension
in the WPS. There is a need to address the WPS issue not only by military means alone but
through a whole-of-nation approach
Assessment: The action carried out by the Philippine Navy, a legitimate maritime law

169 | P a g e
enforcement operation in Philippine waters was criticized by China as a violation of international
maritime law. This puts the Philippine government in a position where it has to decide when to
deploy its naval vessels to protect Philippine interests. Since there is a possible risk of armed
confrontation with Chinese vessels, China is prepared for war with the Philippines and perceives
that the use of force is a solution to pressure the Philippines to accept China’s own will. The
scenario also shows the AFP’s lack of defense system and surveillance capabilities to protect
Philippine territorial integrity. This pressure the AFP to defend the Philippines with limited
capability. The almost completed Great Wall of Sea with outposts and airstrips will definitely
pose a big threat to the Philippines and its allies who have common interest in the WPS as China
will control the new maritime canal translated into economic and strategic powers in controlling
the Asia-Pacific region at the heart of the SCS/WPS.

170 | P a g e
ANNEX F: EVENTS IN THE WPS

‘EVENTS’ IN THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA

LEGAL STRATEGY
Person Opinion/Statement/Report Source/s
/Organization
People’s Republic China said it would initiate “friendly consultations” with Estrella
of China and neighboring countries to avoid confrontations over Torres, ‘China
Republic of the fishing activities in disputed portions of the South China offers to talk,
Philippines Sea, but the Philippines said it would await the ruling of but PH will
an international tribunal on China’s maritime claim. wait,’ 11 April
2016.
The arbitration case raises various issues filed by the Philippine
Philippines, including two issues that refer to fishing Daily Inquirer,
activities of Filipinos in the West Philippine Sea: (1) that A22.
China has unlawfully failed to prevent Chinese nationals
and vessels from exploiting the living resources in the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines; and (2)
China has unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from
pursuing their livelihood by interfering with traditional
fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal.

Lu Kang, Chinese “Fishery cooperation is an important part of mutually

Foreign Ministry beneficial cooperation between China and neighboring
Spokesperson countries, including coast countries in the South China
Sea.”
Pres Benigno The Philippine Constitution renounced war as an Nikko Dizon,
Aquino III, instrument of foreign policy and that the Philippines was ‘War is a futile
Philippine not engaged in any arms race. “We have no illusions of exercise, says
President ever trying to march – trying to engage anybody in an president
arms race or in a military buildup. We will prioritize Aquino,’ 31
butter rather than guns.” March 2016,
Philippine
He was satisfied that the Philippines’ firm stand on Daily Inquirer,
resolving the maritime row through a rules-based A15.
approach had gained ground, with more claimant
countries “joining” the Philippine position. “We are
glad that our voice has been heard and the voice of
others who are similarly situated has been noted and
there has been positive movements toward resolving this
particular crisis.”
Ernest Bower and “The implications should be clear. If the court decides ‘Time is the
Conor Cronin, that China’s claims are not legal, then the Philippines, essence in Ph
contributing Asean, and countries across the world who believe that v. China case,’

171 | P a g e
columnists the rule of law should govern the seas will need to Opinion, 22
(commentary) carefully and constructively encourage Beijing to January 2016,
embrace the core tenet of international governance and Philippine
security.” Daily Inquirer,
A16.
“If the court hopes to pass down a decision which will
not be thoroughly ignored as realpolitik overtakes it, it
needs to ensure that the Aquino administration has time
to institutionalize its approach. Since there are no
formal enforcement mechanisms for the decision, the
messaging from the Philippines and the international
community is of great import.”
John Nery, The 1937 expedition set sail five years after China discovered that ‘A Chinese
columnist in the French had claimed part of the Paracels, and four years after Strategy:
Francois-Xavier the French sought to expand their foothold in Asia by annexing Manipulating
nine Spratly islands. In Bonnet’s much-discussed 2012 paper,
Bonnet, French “Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal,” he draws a picture of Chinese
the Record,’
geographer at the befuddlement when news about the Spratly annexation circulated. Opinion, 21
Institute for April 2015,
Research and “These two claims of the French government confused the minds … Philippine
Contemporary not only of the Chinese public and the media, but also the official Daily Inquirer,
Southeast Asia. authorities like the military and the politicians in Guangdong A13.
Province and Beijing. In fact, the Chinese believed that the Spratly
Islands and Paracel Islands or Xisha were exactly the same group,
but that the French had just changed the name as a trick to confuse
the Chinese government. To ascertain the position of the Spratly
Islands, the Chinese Consul in Manila, Mr. Kwong, went, on July 26,
1933, to the US Coast and Geodetic Survey and discovered, with
surprise, that the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands were
different and far apart.”

The practice of what Bonnet calls “patriotic archaeology” was

mirrored by Taiwanese expeditions to the Spratlys; sovereignty
markers were placed in Itu Aba and perhaps two other islands
(there is some dispute in the records) in 1956 (the same year
Filipino Thomas Cloma claimed the Spratlys)—but “backdated” to
1946.
Which makes Bonnet’s conclusion unassailable: “In all, it suggests
that ‘patriotic archaeology’ is deeply flawed and that experts
should be wary before relying on it to pass judgment on the
territorial disputes.”
Sec Alberto del “We are here because we wish to clarify our maritime entitlements Niña P. Calleja
Rosario, Secretary in the South China Sea, a question over which the tribunal has and Nikko Dizon,
of Foreign Affairs jurisdiction. This is a matter that is most important not only to the ‘China violated
Philippines, but also to all coastal states that border the South int’l law, Del
China Sea, and even to all the state parties to Unclos,” he said. Rosario argued,’ 9
July 2015,
Both the Philippines and China ratified the Unclos, considered the Philippine Daily
“Constitution for the Oceans.” Inquirer, A1, A13.

To make sure that its maritime claims are in harmony with Unclos,

172 | P a g e
 the Philippines, he said, amended its national legislation and
converted its straight baselines into archipelagic baselines” in
conformity with Articles 46 and 47 of Unclos.

The Philippines also ensured that the maritime zones of the

Kalayaan Island Group and Panatag Shoal (Scarborough Shoal) in
the West Philippine Sea would be consistent with Article 121 of the
treaty.

Del Rosario argued that China had been claiming that it was
entitled to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction, including the
exclusive right to the resources of the sea and seabed, far beyond
the limits established by the convention, based on so-called historic
rights to these areas.”
China demarcates its claim in the South China Sea with “nine-dash
lines” on the map, encompassing swaths of the sea claimed by the
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan.

“China is not entitled to exercise what it refers to as historic rights

over the waters, seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of its
entitlements under the convention,” Del Rosario said.

Apart from altering the existing status quo in the South China Sea
through its reclamation works, China, Del Rosario said, has
“irreversibly damaged the regional maritime environment,” which
is against Unclos.

Del Rosario said China destroyed coral reefs in the South China Sea,
including areas in the Philippines’ EEZ, “by its destructive and
hazardous fishing practices, and by its harvesting of endangered
species.”

Earlier, the Philippines said China had destroyed 300 hectares of

coral reef systems and caused economic losses of $100 million to
coastal states annually.
Ma Ceres Doyo, According to Yorac, Vietnam also claims historic title to the islands ‘Other Spratlys
columnist, in but its claims can only be traced to as far back as 1927, when the Claimant,’
Haydee Yorac French government sent a ship on an expedition. Two more Opinion, 9 July
expeditions followed, after which a French flag was planted in the
area. The French government incorporated six groups of islets in a
2015,
Vietnamese province, which provoked protests from China and Philippine
Japan. Daily Inquirer,
A11.
Vietnam does not recognize the right of discovery and first
occupancy. It asserts that occupation by private individuals will not
entitle their country to sovereignty as only the state can be a title
holder. This is perhaps Vietnam’s argument against Tomas “The
Admiral” Cloma’s claim on behalf of the Philippines, about which I
had also written.

Vietnam reasons that in the 17th century, the Spratlys (and the

173 | P a g e
 Paracels as well) were already under its effective and continuous
occupation until China invaded the islands. The French colonizers
later administered the islands and drove out the Chinese forces
after World War II.

Vietnam, which was occupying the most number of islands in the

Spratlys (Truong Sa) in the 1990s, had supported its claims by
invoking the principle of effectivity—“effective occupations and
effective, continuous and peaceful exercise of state authority.”

While Vietnam’s precolonial claim needs scrutiny, its invoking the

French expedition could run aground. Yorac asked then: “Did the
French expeditions in 1927 and 1930 redound to the benefit of
Vietnam?”

China claims that people from its Hainan island have been in the
Spratlys since ancient times. Vietnam disputes this, saying that
China had never administered the islands effectively and
continuously in the past, and that other peoples—Vietnamese,
Malays, Persians and Arabs—had made voyages to the areas.
Complicating the Chinese claim is the “two China” reality.

Malaysia bases its claim on the concept of exclusive control over

the continental shelf. Its official map now covers part of the
Spratlys. In 1988, 48 Filipinos fishing near the Commodore Reef
claimed by Malaysia were detained by Malaysian authorities. The
reef is where Malaysian and Philippine claims overlap.

In the early 1990s, Malaysia put up a resort hotel on Swallow Reef

(Terumbu Layang Layang), which is in a contested area. I remember
this. It was seen as Malaysia’s show of sovereignty and expansion
of its continental shelf. However, I learned that reefs, on their own,
cannot sustain human life and therefore cannot be taken as basis
for measurement.

Oil-rich Brunei’s claim is similar to that of Malaysia. So far Brunei

has not tried to occupy any reef or island.

Maybe the Philippines can learn a lesson or two from this: When
Pugad island, the Philippines’ ninth island, was abandoned about
two decades ago, the Vietnamese moved in with lightning speed.
DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
Person Opinion/Statement/Report Source/s
/Organization
Michael Tan, We have to understand politics as theater, and Chinese ‘Theater,
columnist politics is theater on a grand scale. What we see being peace and
played out is Beijing Opera on a global stage. Each naval war,’ Opinion,
vessel, each island being occupied (or being created), is 4 November
an important prop. The seas are generally quiet and the 2015,
operatic scripts are played out, broadcast through Philippine
Beijing, in a complicated script where each line declares Daily Inquirer,

174 | P a g e
 something like: announcing a claim, denouncing other A17.
countries’ claim. The volume increases when China gets
nervous, which should be occasions for us to smile.

Yale Law School’s Graham Webster argues that the

Chinese are not using confrontational language at this
point and are instead using ambiguities. Just one
example: Instead of accusing the United States of
violating territorial waters, China uses the words “abuse
of navigational freedoms.”

Do we have a script other than fretting about China

going to war? Are we ready to do our own theater and
show we do care about our territorial waters? Can we
walk the talk and set the theater “stage” by replacing that
one rusted ship patrolling the waters with a more
credible show of our naval capabilities?
Wire Reports The members of the Association of Southeast Asian ‘Int’l pressure
(Kuala Nations (Asean) finally made a stand against China’s on China
Lumpur)/Philippin reclamation in the South China Sea. Rises: Asean,
e Daily Inquirer US, Japan,
from ASEAN- Beijing has insisted it will not discuss the South China unite against
Japan Ministerial Sea during formal meetings at the forum, saying its island-
Meeting last 5 disagreements must be handled on a bilateral basis building spree,
August 2015 in between rival claimants. 6 August 2015,
Kuala Lumpur Philippine
The Chinese foreign ministry made it clear that the halt Daily Inquirer,
to the land reclamation was not an acquiescence to A16.
pressure, whether from the United States or from Asean
rival claimants and that the construction of infrastructure
on the islands was within the rights of China, as it had
“undisputed sovereignty” over the South China Sea.
Sec Alberto del The Philippines is pressing its proposal for cooperation in the Niña P. Calleja,
Rosario, Secretary enforcement of maritime laws among Southeast Asian countries ‘PH sees China as
of Foreign Affairs amid China’s increasing aggressiveness in asserting its claim to external threat,’ 6
nearly all of the South China Sea. August 2015,
Philippine Daily
Speaking at the 48th Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Association Inquirer, A16.
of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) in Kuala Lumpur on Tuesday,
Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario said the Philippines considered
China an “external threat” because of its incursions into Manila’s
370-kilometer exclusive economic zone.

But he emphasized the need to deal with the “evolving regional

security architecture.”
“It has to be founded on the rule of law, especially the principles of
international law as embodied in the UN charter and international
conventions and regional agreements,” Del Rosario said.

175 | P a g e
 “To be effective, it should be a product of the collective
effort, not just of the countries in Asia but also of
countries [that] have key interest[s] and stake[s] in the
region,” Del Rosario said.
Sec Alberto del Del Rosario said arbitration became the Philippines’ only resort Niña P. Calleja
Rosario, Secretary after all its efforts, which included bilateral talks with China and and Nikko Dizon,
of Foreign Affairs dialogues within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ‘China violated
(Asean), had failed. int’l law, Del
Rosario argued,’ 9
July 2015,
Asean and China have yet to conclude a binding code of conduct in Philippine Daily
the South China Sea. But a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in Inquirer, A1, A13.
the South China Sea was signed in 2002 to resolve the disputes in
the region.
MILITARY STRATEGY
Person /Organization Opinion/Statement/Report Source/s
Capt Hiroaki Two Japanese destroyers and a submarine docked Allan Macatuno,
Yoshino, Japan in Subic for a three-day goodwill visit timed with ‘Japanese sub,
Maritime Self-Defense the annual Balikatan war exercise involving destroyers here on
Force (JMSDF), Philippine and United States military goodwill visit,’ 4
Training Submarine personnel.“Hoping for more regular maritime April 2016,
Division 1 exercises between Japan and the Philippines, a Philippine Daily
country as a very important partner of the Inquirer, A8.
JMSDF.”

Commander Lued “The visit is a manifestation of a sustained

Lincuna, Philippine promotion of regional peace and stability and
Navy spokesperson enhancement of maritime cooperation between
neighboring navies.”
Junmar Pumicpic, Chinese Coast Guards harass other fishing boat Allan Macatuno,
captain of fishing boat remained at sea and its crew struggling to get ‘Chinese drove
FB Bughoy away from them patrolling around the shoal. away 2nd PH boat,’
“That group of fishermen tried to evade the 21 March 2016,
Chinese patrols by throwing rocks at them. Philippine Daily
Unfortunately the glass windows of their fishing Inquirer, A2.
boat were damaged during the chase.”

Pumicpic urged the government o protect Filipino

fishermen who are trying to make a living in the
shoal, a traditional fishing ground. The shoal is
located 230 kilometers from Masinloc town in
Zambales, within the Philippines’ 370-km
exclusive economic zone. China seized the shoal
from the Philippines after a two-month standoff

176 | P a g e
 between Chinese and Philippine vessels in 2012.
It has since cordoned off the shoal, driving away
Filipino fishermen.
Amando Doronila, The Pentagon report said China was in the process of ‘China stepping up
columnist completing a runway on one of its seven manmade Spratlys landgrab
outposts. Once the airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef is – Pentagon
operational, China could potentially use it as an alternative
runway for carrier-based planes, allowing its military to
report,’ Opinion, 5
conduct “sustained operations” with aircraft carriers in the February 2016,
area. The report said China’s sole aircraft carrier, a Soviet- Philippine Daily
era ship bought from Ukraine and refitted in China, has Inquirer, A17.
carried out exercises in the South China Sea but is not fully
operational.

Some experts believe that China will deploy domestic

carriers by 2020 as part of its plans to develop an ocean-
going “blue water” navy. China is using reclaimed sites in
the Spratlys, where it is in the building phase. It has
excavated deep channels and constructed new berthing
areas to allow larger ships access, the Pentagon report
said: “The infrastructure China appears to be building
would enable it to establish a more robust power
projection into the South China Sea.”

China claims most of the South China Sea, through which

$5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year, in an area
where the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and
Brunei also have overlapping claims.

China has reclaimed 17 times more land in 20 months than

the other claimants combined over the past 40 years. It
now accounts for approximately 95 percent of all
reclaimed land in the Spratlys.

A paper produced by the Asia Maritime Transparency

Initiative and the Washington-based think tank Center for
Strategic Studies provides another perspective. The paper,
written by Huoy Duong, states: “Within the short span of a
year, China’s rapid construction of artificial islands in the
disputed Spratlys has radically changed the geographical
and security landscapes in the South China Sea. This island
construction has so far created over eight million square
meters of real estate in the open sea, outstripping other
countries’ reclamation activities.”

China’s land reclamation began in December 2013. It has

reclaimed more than 1,170 hectares of land, the Pentagon
report said. Previously, US officials had put the total at 809
hectares.
Dr Peter Paul China has been reclaiming land in the West Philippine Sea Nikko Dizon, ‘DND:
Galvez, Spokesperson, at a rapid rate of 9 hectares a day, completing some 550 China reclaiming land

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Department of hectares in less than two months, an official of the at a rate of 9 ha a
National Defense Department of National Defense (DND) said on day,’ 6 August 2015,
Wednesday. Philippine Daily
More than half of the estimated 550 hectares was added Inquirer, A16.
to the artificial island China is building on Panganiban
(Mischief) Reef, defense spokesman Peter Paul Galvez told
the Inquirer.

He said the 550 hectares were completed between April

and May this year. By government estimates, some 300
hectares have been added to expand the artificial island
China is building on Panganiban Reef, 41 kilometers from
Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal. The rest have been added
to expand the artificial islands China is building at other
shoals and reefs in the Spratly archipelago.

US estimates placed China’s land reclamation works in the

region at 800 hectares over the past 18 months, with
artificial islands coming up at Panganiban, Kagitingan (Fiery
Cross) Reef, Calderon (Cuarteron) Reef, Burgos (Gaven)
Reef, Mabini (Johnson South) Reef, McKeenan (Hughes)
Reef and Zamora (Subi) Reef.
All those reefs are in the West Philippine Sea, part of the
South China Sea within the Philippines’ 370-kilometer
exclusive economic zone recognized under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Airstrips for its jets and ports for its warships, as well as
high-rise buildings that could all sustain a round-the-clock
naval and air patrols are fixtures on the artificial islands.
China’s claims almost the entire South China Sea and its
aggressive land reclamation would ultimately give it
control of the sea-lanes and maritime resources in the
area, experts said.

Four of the 10 member states of Asean claim parts of the

South China Sea—the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and
Brunei.

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