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Final Paper
Your Steak has a Face: A Look into the Morality of Meat Consumption
I remember sitting at dinner with my family when I was young. My dad was eating a steak and
discussing what a deplorable person Michael Vick was for fighting dogs. I didn’t think anything was
wrong with it at the time; one was a dog and the other was, well, just a steak – I don’t think I had really
This well represents the interesting paradox present in the Western worlds approach to meat
consumption. We fight vehemently for the rights of companion animals; we are even fighting to make
cruelty towards these companion animals a felony (Higgins, 2019). As we fight for the rights of some,
we forget the rights of many. We cannot ethically cherry pick which animals are due moral
consideration, and which are not. All animals are due the same moral consideration. There is no morally
justifiable reason for us to save the dog but eat the cow: there is no morally justifiable reason for us to
circle. The moral circle is a concept that separates those who are due moral consideration, those who are
inside the circle, and those who are not. The needs and interests of those inside the moral circle matter;
they are due moral consideration and it is immoral for us to violate their rights or fail to take their welfare
into consideration when making decisions. The moral circle has expanded, evolved, morphed and
developed from the time that we started conceptualizing this idea of moral consideration. No longer a
place only for white, land owning men, but encapsulating people of any creed, class, race or gender.
The concept that humans are inherently superior to other beings inhibited the expansion of the
moral circle to include any non-human organism for most of human history. Rene Descartes, and other
humanists, argue that we are by under no means morally obligated to extend any sort of moral
consideration to animals. Because they do not believe in expanding the moral circle to include animals,
you would be hard pressed to find a humanist advocating for moral vegetarianism.
Although the animal rights issue is a huge piece of the puzzle when it comes to the morality (or
lack thereof) of eating meat, it is not the only piece. There are other ethical factors at play that can
convince even the humanist that vegetarianism is the only moral dietary option. Livestock farming and
the meat consumption issue are not only an animal rights issue. The harm from the meat industry
expands beyond an animal welfare approach; it is a huge detriment to human beings themselves, taking
Almost a third of the planets clean drinking water is used to in livestock farming and to produce
animal products. All the while, around 500 million people struggle with water shortages (Nagappan,
2016). In the United States alone, livestock consumes 70% of grain produced and 36% of corn produced
(Pittman, 2016). We put a staggering percentage of our consumable food products towards livestock
while almost 13% of the planet is undernourished (FoodAid, n.d.). If the United States alone were to turn
towards an entirely plant based diet, we would be able to feed an additional 350 million people every year
(Webber, 2019). If the entire world were to turn away from the meat industry entirely, we would have
enough excess grain to feed an additional 3.5 billion people (Francis Vergunst, 2017).
With those numbers in mind, even philosophers like Descartes who only extend their moral
consideration to human beings cannot equitably justify animal consumption. Through consuming
animals, we are creating more harm to humanity as a whole. A global vegetarian diet would produce the
greatest good for the greatest number of people. Through the most basic utilitarian framework, regardless
of your opinions on animal rights or land rights, meat consumption is immoral as it is ultimately doing
Descartes had said that animals were not due moral consideration because they lack
consciousness, or the ability to reason or will. In Animals Are Machines, Descartes supports that claim, in
part, with the argument that animals cannot communicate in a way that extends beyond their own natural
impulses (Descartes). Even though this sentiment was presented some 400 years ago, it is still an
Koko the Gorilla is just one animal that exemplifies a non-human beings’ ability to communicate
in the way that Descartes claimed they could not. During Koko’s life, she expanded her vocabulary in
American Sign Language to over 1,000 words, communicated thoughtfully and empathetically with
humans, and even tried to teach sign language to other gorillas (Weisberger, 2018). Her ability to do so
shows us that Descartes reasoning for excluding animals from the moral circle is invalid.
Peter Singer presented a new criterion for entry to the moral circle. Singer suggests that
sentience, the ability for a being to feel pleasure or pain, not consciousness, is the trait that dictates the
necessity to extend a being moral consideration. Singer draws from a utilitarian principle presented by
John Stuart Mill. In his greatest happiness principle, Mill states that our first obligation is to ‘maximize
happiness and minimize suffering (Mill, 1863).’ Singer writes that, “If a being suffers then there can be
no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration (Singer, 1974).” He takes
Mill’s greatest happiness principle and argues that this principle should not only be in reference to
humans, but in reference to any being that has the ability to feel pleasure or pain.
We have been shown that we are required to extend our moral circle not only to include people,
but animals as well. This brings us back to the initial paradox presented: we have extended our moral
circle to include certain animals but have closed the circle to others. Do cows, pigs, chickens or any other
animal left outside the moral circle not meet the criteria Singer has presented for moral consideration?
Just like the companion animals we care for; commodity animals too have shown the ability to feel
pleasure and pain. There is no morally justifiable way for us to simultaneously protect one and cast the
other aside. The moral implications of harming a cat and eating a cow are the same – either way, you
have violated one beings’ rights. There is no moral high ground for abstaining from one but partaking in
the other. You cannot view animals as sentient, recognize that they are subjects of a life who experience
The argument surrounding moral vegetarianism never tries to justify the morality of factory
farming and placing animals in abysmal living conditions – regardless of which side of the argument you
are on, people generally tend to agree that animals are beings whom are due moral consideration on some
level or another. A common solution to the ethical paradox of animal consumption is a shift in the way
that we raise, produce and consume animal byproducts. They argue that if we provide animals a good
quality of life prior to consumption, consuming them should not present any sort of ethical dilemma.
The issue with eating animals does not rest with the conditions that they are raised in: the moral
issues that correspond with the factory farming industry are of a completely different subset; although
there may be overlap between these implications and the implications of meat consumption, the
discussion must be a separate discussion. The issue with eating animals’ rests with the fact that,
regardless of the conditions they are raised in, we are still violating a moral beings rights.
Consider Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of intrinsic vs. instrumental value (Kant, 1785). Kant
states that if we treat someone with instrumental value, or only use them for what they are worth to us,
then we are acting immorally. He stated that we must recognize other people for their own, intrinsic
value, and respect that they are valuable in and of themselves, not only for what they can do to us.
Tom Regan expands on this principle Kant’s principle of intrinsic and instrumental value and
argues that it is crucial for us to extend that same treatment towards animals and respect their intrinsic
value. Regan states that intrinsic value comes from being a ‘subject of a life.’ In other words, Regan
believes that intrinsic value comes from leading a life that is independent of its impact or utility to the
lives of others. In Animal Rights, Human Wrongs, Regan writes, “They too have a kind of distinctive
value in their own right, if we do; therefore, they too have a right not to be treated in ways that fail to
respect this value, if we do (Regan, 1980).” The argument is that if animals are a subject of a life, beings
with intrinsic value, as we have been shown many times that they are, that we must respect their intrinsic
value.
The argument stating that ‘ethical’ farming can enable us to ethically consume meat falls flat
once again when examined under this principle of intrinsic vs. instrumental value. Regardless of the
quality of life that we are providing animals when they are being raised for consumption, they are still just
that: being raised for consumption. As long as we continue to raise them with that goal in mind, we are
still only looking at them as a commodity, we are only acknowledging their instrumental value, or the
value that they can provide to us. Raising animals as a consumable product, regardless of their living
conditions, is taking advantage of their instrumental value and discarding their intrinsic value.
Imagine your good friend invites you over for dinner. You ask him what he’ll be serving, and he
tells you that he’s going to be cooking his roommate for the two of you. Shocked, you express your
moral qualms with eating a living being. Your friend tells you that they had only gotten a roommate to
provide them with a happy life, prior to killing him for food. He tells you that it’s okay, his roommate
lived a good and happy life, free to roam where he pleased, eat what he wanted and was treated kindly
This scenario is absolutely ludicrous, but still uses the same line of reasoning that is used to
justify the morality of consuming animals that have been raised on farms. These animals are given good,
high quality lives, seem to be happy, can roam freely within the farm and are treated with kindness. Why
is it then, that we recoil with moral objections to our friend’s treatment of his roommate, but accept the
same line of logic when it comes to the treatment of animals? The difference is because the hypothetical
scenario violates a human’s moral rights, and reality violates the moral rights of an animal.
“It’s different because humans are different!” one may say. Yes, humans are different, but that
difference does not make these two situations different – the real sentiment behind the objection is that
humans are better. Why is it that we believe that humans are better, or more deserving of moral
consideration? Paul Taylor chalks this up to, what he calls, anthropocentrism, or the belief that humans
are superior beings. Taylor believes that we only perceive humans to be ‘better’ because we are ranking
our differences only from a human perspective. “If we as humans value more than tree climbing, that is
because our conception of civilized life makes the development of mathematical ability more desirable
than the ability to climb trees (Taylor, 1986). ” That being said, surely a monkey would place higher
value on the ability to climb trees than it would on mathematics. Taylor argues that we cannot base the
worth or value of a trait upon its application to a human society, but rather on its ability to allow that
species to live a good life. Essentially, the argument that humans are better turns into a logical fallacy.
We state that humans are better because we possess uniquely human traits. If asked why those traits are
One specific way in which we state that humans are better is the ability of free will, judgement,
reason, etc. We hold the belief that humans are better because we have the ability to reason critically and
know our obligations towards other, amongst other things. We use this fact of a moral high ground over
other beings who do not have these same abilities. Using this line of reasoning to protect humans over
other animals is flawed as well, as Taylor points out. What about mentally incapacitated people? People
in vegetative states? Infants and small children? Those people are not able to reason as other humans are,
so are they not to be morally protected as other humans are? Would the situation with your friend and his
roommate if the roommate was an incapacitated person? It would be different, but likely we would be
Taylor has presented us with the concept of moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents have
the ability for accountability and critical reasoning (amongst other traits) that have been discussed above.
Moral patients, on the other hand, do not possess those traits, but still are moral beings with rights that
need to be protected. This does not only include humans who do not have the ability for critical thinking,
but also must be extended to animals. Taylor argues that we have a higher ethical obligation to protect
While the animal rights case certainly is enough to prove that there is no ethical excuse to eat
meat, there are still other ethical factors that need to be discussed in order to fully understand the
magnitude of the immorality of this issue. The meat industry causes exponential harm to both humans
and animals, that we have seen. The havoc that it wreaks does not stop there. Livestock farming also
Livestock farming been proven to be the leading human-produced greenhouse gas and contributor
to climate change. This industry alone is responsible for 18% of humanities greenhouse gases (Francis
Vergunst, 2017). Combine the total greenhouse gasses produced by every single human form of
transportation, and it still does not match the amount of greenhouse gasses that can be contributed to
livestock farming.
Essentially, the greenhouses gasses produced by factory farming are only contributing to the
death and destruction of the planet we live on. Just as many philosophers have argued that we must
expand our moral circle to include animals, Aldo Leopold has advocated for expansion once again, to
include the planet itself. In A Sand County Almanac, Leopold writes, “A thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise
(Leopold, 1949).” Leopold’s new standard for morality requires that we respect the biotic community
itself – the biotic community being a community not only made up of humans, but of animals and all
other parts of the world’s natural ecosystems. The farming industry directly opposes Leopold’s concept
of preserving and protecting this biotic community. Instead, it is a huge contributor the planet on which
we live.
The argument for the morality of animal consumption falls apart when closely examined with the
use of any single moral theory. A utilitarian and humanist cannot deny that the negative consequences
(even to humans alone) significantly outweigh the benefits of eating meat. An environmental ethicist
cannot deny that the farming industry is destroying our planet. Someone who has chosen to bring
companion animals into their moral circle yet continues to eat meat cannot deny that their behavior is
paradoxical and that commodity animals deserve the same type of respect and moral consideration as any
other sort of moral being. There is, simply put, no morally justifiable reason for human beings to
continue to eat meat. So, the next time you discuss animal rights or global issues over dinner, or even just
the next time you pick up your fork, just remember, your steak had a face.
Works Cited
Descartes, R. (n.d.). All Animals Are Machines.
Francis Vergunst, J. S. (2017, April 26). Five Ways the Meat on your Plate is Killing the
Planet. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/five-ways-the-
meat-on-your-plate-is-killing-the-planet-76128
Higgins, C. (2019, January 28). A Proposed Bill Will Make Animal Cruelty a Federal
Felony. Retrieved from CNN: https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/28/us/animal-cruelty-federal-
felony-bill-trnd/index.html
Leopold, A. (1949). A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Mill, J. S. (1863). Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son and Bourn.
Nagappan, P. (2016, February 18). Demand for Meat is Driving Water Shortages
Affecting 4 Billion People. Retrieved from TakePart:
http://www.takepart.com/article/2016/02/18/4-billion-people-face-water-scarcity
Regan, T. (1980). Animal Rights, Human Wrongs. Envirionmental Ethics Volume 2, pp.
99-120.
Taylor, P. (1986). Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princton, NJ:
Princton University Press.
Webber, J. (2019, July 18). What Would Happen if Everyone Stopped Eating Meat?
Retrieved from Live Kindly: https://www.livekindly.co/everyone-stopped-eating-meat/