PP23100001P PDF

EDSD REV
REVISION
REVISIONCERTIFICATION
CERTIFICATE VERIFICATION NO. DATE JO/EWO DESCRIPTION ENGG CERT PMT OPRNS
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
N Aug-2014 10-00742 ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB RUK AHN
OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL
CONTROL NUMBER
RUK
AHN
APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, Jan-2015 10-00742 ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2 RUK AHN
O
AGENCY
BY:
PROJECT
DATE: Jan 2016
Jan 2016
BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE
ENGINEER
ENGINEER
DISCIPLINE
CERTIFIED
OPERATIONS
CONSTRUCTION
(DCC) NO. _____________________ P Jan-2015 10-00742 ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2 RUK AHN
DATE:
RAS TANURA
Saudi Aramco 2616-ENG (03/99)
RTR CLEAN FUELS PROJECT

PACKAGE#1 – NAPHTHA PROCESSING FACILITY
3.8 RELIEF SYSTEM J99 & FLARE UNIT J58 (FLARE PROCESS DATA BOOK)
DOC
SAUDI ARABIA
BI-10-00742
JANUARY 2016
J58
PREPARED BY:
JO / EWO:
A
DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY
RAS TANURA REFINERY

CLEAN FUELS PROJECT
BI-10-00742
SECTION 3.8 SCOPE OF WORK
(FLARE PROCESS DATABOOK)
PP-23100
DRAWING NO.
RELIEF SYSTEM J99 & FLARE UNIT J58
25
OF
SHT.NO.
PACKAGE 1 - NAPHTHA PROCESSING FACILITY
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
REV.NO.
THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
PMT OPRNS
Table of Contents
ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................................................... 3
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
3.8.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................ 4

3.8.1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 4
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3.8.1.2 Design Basis .............................................................................................................................. 5

3.8.1.3 Design data ................................................................................................................................ 9
3.8.1.4 Maximum Onshore Flare Radiation Intensities for Personal Exposure ................................... 10
ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2
3.8.2 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS & CONTRACTOR SCOPE ............................................................ 13

ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB
3.8.3 DESIGN GUIDELINES ................................................................................................................. 15

3.8.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 15
3.8.3.2 Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 15
3.8.3.3 Codes and Standards............................................................................................................... 15
DESCRIPTION
3.8.3.4 General Requirements ............................................................................................................. 16

3.8.3.5 Pressure-Relieving Devices ..................................................................................................... 17
3.8.3.6 Overpressure Scenarios........................................................................................................... 20
3.8.3.7 Instrumented Protection Systems ............................................................................................ 21
3.8.3.8 Disposal Systems ..................................................................................................................... 21
3.8.3.9 Materials of Construction.......................................................................................................... 21
3.8.3.10 Documentation ......................................................................................................................... 21
3.8.4 BATTERY LIMIT, OPERATING CONDITIONS & UTILITIES ..................................................... 22
3.8.4.1 Battery Limit Conditions ........................................................................................................... 22
3.8.4.2 Operating Conditions ................................................................................................................ 22
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3.8.4.3 Utilities ...................................................................................................................................... 22

3.8.5 QUALIFIED VENDORS................................................................................................................ 23
3.8.5.1 Flare System & Flare Gas Recovery System Qualified Vendors ............................................. 23
Jan-2015
DATE
3.8.5.2 Television Camera Qualified Vendors ...................................................................................... 24

3.8.5.3 Flare Gas Recovery Units Qualified Vendors .......................................................................... 24
3.8.6 FLARE SYSTEM WASTE EFLLUENTS...................................................................................... 24
NO.
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3.8.6.1 Gaseous effluents from Normal Operations ............................................................................. 24

DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER 3.8.6.2 Gaseous effluents from Upset Operation ................................................................................. 24
RUK 3.8.6.3 Liquid effluents from Upset Operation ...................................................................................... 24
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT
ENGINEER
AHN Appendix-A Methodology and Basis for Relief Load Calculation and Relief Valve Sizing (PP-23189)
Jan 2016
DATE:
CERTIFIED
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
DATE:
OPERATIONS
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
3.8 RELIEF SYSTEM J99 & FLARE UNIT J58 (FLARE PROCESS DATA BOOK) DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION
PACKAGE#1 – NAPHTHA PROCESSING FACILITY DOC

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PMT OPRNS
ACRONYMS
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
AIC Analyzer Indicator and Controller

RUK
RUK
RUK
BTU/SCF British Thermal Unit per Standard Cubic Feet

CCTV Closed Circuit Tele Vision

CFP Clean Fuels Project
DCS Distributed Control System

DESCRIPTION
DGA/SWS Di-Glycol Amine / Sour Water Stripper
FFG Flame Front Generator
FGRU Flare Gas Recovery Unit
GPF Global Power Failure

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H2O Water
H2S Hydrogen Sulphide

Jan-2015
DATE
HC Hydrocarbon
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
HHLL High High Liquid Level
RUK
DATE: Jan 2016 HLL High Liquid Level

PROJECT
ENGINEER
AHN HP High Pressure
Jan 2016
DATE:
CERTIFIED K.O Drum Knockout Drum
DATE: LP Low Pressure

CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
LLL Low Liquid Level
DATE:
OPERATIONS LLLL Low Low Liquid Level
DATE: MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet per Day

CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
NFM Normal Formyl Morpholine

EDSD
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis

DATE:
BY:
RTR Ras Tanura Refinery

CERTIFICATE
T&I Turndown and Inspection

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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3.8.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
3.8.1.1 Introduction
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RUK
Saudi Aramco owns and operates Ras Tanura Refinery (RTR) located in the Eastern Province,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The RTR is split into two sections, North Refinery and South Refinery.
Each of these sections has its own dedicated flare headers, knock out drums and flare stacks.
Saudi Aramco intends to install new units for its RTR Clean Fuels Project (CFP) which will result
in increased load on the existing flare system at the South RTR. The existing South RTR flares
do not have sufficient capacity to process the additional load from the CFP new units.
DESCRIPTION
Furthermore, there is no suitable available space in the South RTR in which to build a dedicated
CFP flare.
A new Flare System at the South RTR is proposed for the CFP Units discharging to new
independent low pressure (LP) and high pressure (HP) flare stacks. The new proposed flares
shall be demountable type and shall be supported by a single derrick structure. Derrick structure
shall also support new flare stacks for the South Refinery existing Units. The new derrick
structure shall also have provision for three future flare stacks with tips sized at 60 inch diameter
minimum.
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The CFP LP Flare System shall also serve for future Diesel Hydro-Treater (DHT) Unit and the
South Refinery Plant J64. These plants shall connect to the CFP LP flare header near the R90
Jan-2015
DATE
Unit battery limit. One of two existing South RTR flares,J58-F-101, (nearest to CFP derrick) shall
be isolated whereas the other flare J58-F-102 should be kept in operation until CFP flares
NO.
REV
derrick structure and flare stacks are commissioned. Once the new South Refinery and CFP
O
N
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
flares are commissioned and the performance test is completed and satisfactory, the South
RUK Refinery existing flares (J58-F-101 & J58-F-102) can be demolished. A switchover plan is
DATE: Jan 2016 needed to for the tie in of the South Refinery existing J64 Plant relief loads to the CFP LP flare
PROJECT
ENGINEER
and for the demolition of the South Refinery existing flares and auxiliary piping. For demolition
AHN and switchover details refer to PP-23113 and PP23145.
Jan 2016
DATE:
CERTIFIED The CFP and South Refinery Flare Systems shall include five stacks: 1 x 100% stack for CFP
LP, 1 x 100% stack for CFP HP, 1 x 100% stack for CFP LP-HP common spare and 2 x 100%
DATE: stacks for the South Refinery Flare System. All flare stacks heights are estimated to be
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
approximately 200 meters tall based on preliminary design and shall be confirmed by the flare
Vendor during detailed design. For flare systems details and specifications refer to PP-23133.
DATE:
OPERATIONS The CFP and the South Refinery Flare Systems shall have their designated TV Monitoring
System for the flare flame monitoring for all flares. Optical Flare Monitoring System shall be
DATE:
provided for smoke monitoring for CFP LP, CFP LP-HP Common Spare flare and the South
Refinery flares. No Optical Monitoring System is required for CFP HP flare system. CCTV shall
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
be integrated with Distributed Control System (DCS) and shall have standalone large display
EDSD
monitors. For flare monitoring and CCTV details and specifications refer to PP-76211 and PP-
76124.
DATE:
BY:
The existing South RTR flare stacks are sufficiently spaced to allow construction on the new
CERTIFICATE
flares to be carried out while one of the existing flare remains in operation. A key design criterion
unique to this project is the minimization of the thermal footprint due to large emergency relief
(DCC) NO. _____________________
flows relative to available site area. To facilitate the use of lower radiation generation factors,
REVISION

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sonic flare tip is proposed for the CFP HP flare and shall be finalized by the flare Vendor during
detailed design.
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
To minimize the impact of the increase in radiation from the future units relief load, the heights
RUK
RUK
RUK
of the flare stacks are to be approximately 200 meters. For radiation calculations and details
refer to PP-23042.
P In order to minimize the continuous flaring, a Flare Gas Recovery Unit (FGRU) shall be installed
to recover normal purge/sweep gas and PZV’s leakages. For FGRU details and specifications
refer to PP-23043.
DESCRIPTION
3.8.1.2 Design Basis
Refer to Load Summary in Tables 1 through 5. These are repeated in Section 3.8.1.3 - Design
Data for CFP LP, CFP HP, and South Refinery Flare duty specifications. Radiation levels for
global contingencies shall be for combined CFP LP, CFP HP, and South Refinery flares when
tips are adjacent (refer to Maximum Onshore Flare Radiation Intensities for Personal Exposure
in Section 3.8.1.4).
The new flare system will consist of three separate systems: CFP HP, CFP LP and South
Refinery flare. The main hazards of a flare system are combustion of unburned gas upstream of
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the flare tip, escape of unburned gas to atmosphere and discharge of liquid droplets from flare
tip (burning rain). Combustion before the flare tip can be caused by air ingress and flashback.
Jan-2015
DATE
Air ingress into the blowdown system shall be prevented by gas blanketing at positive pressure
throughout the entire system, from the farthest point of the process unit flare header and to the
liquid seal at the bottom of the flare stacks.
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK
Flashback shall be prevented by liquid seal. This liquid seal shall also develop a constant back
pressure in the flare system facilitating the FGRU to recover the purge gases and PZV leakages
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT
from CFP Flare System and South Refinery Flare System. Escape of unburned gas to
ENGINEER
atmosphere is caused by flameout of the pilots which shall be remedied by two redundant
AHN
Jan 2016
ignition systems, namely electronic ignitors and Flame Front Generator (FFG). Pilot flame-out
DATE:
CERTIFIED
should also be detected and alarmed by monitoring devices. Burning rain shall be prevented by
Knockout (K.O) drum design and limiting permissible liquid level in the K.O drum.
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION The CFP HP flare tip should be of sonic design and should therefore be inherently smokeless.
AGENCY
The CFP LP and South Refinery flare tips shall be of subsonic design and can use steam assist
to ensure smokeless operation during process upsets for minimum 10% of governing design
DATE:
OPERATIONS
flow of relief gas. During the normal operation a FGRU shall ensure smokeless operation of the
CFP and South Refinery flares. Air ingress to the flare stacks could cause flashback into the
stack and burning in the tip if purged with fuel gas. That would shorten tip life. The system
DATE:
downstream of the seal drum shall be purged with nitrogen. For curtailing the use of nitrogen a
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
molecular seal or equivalent shall be provided in the stacks.

EDSD
3.8.1.2.1 Header System

DATE:
BY:
In each of the three flare systems (CFP LP, CFP HP, and South Refinery), relief gases from
process units shall be sent through headers to the K.O drum and then through a seal drum to
CERTIFICATE
the flare stack. CFP LP, CFP HP Flare K.O drums, and existing South Refinery K.O drums are
(DCC) NO. _____________________
close to the flare field. FGRU take-off shall be downstream of the flares K.O drums after the
high point but upstream of liquid seal drums. Vacuum prevention in the flare headers after a
REVISION

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hot relief shall be provided by controlled fuel gas purge initiated by pressure controller set at 1
inch of H2O upstream of K.O drums. For CFP flare systems headers hydraulics details refer to
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
PP-23048.
RUK
RUK
RUK
The flare tail pipes, sub headers and main headers shall be sized for the flaring scenario
which shall result in the largest size requirement. CONTRACTOR shall perform the relief lines
hydraulics using software acceptable by Saudi Aramco and in compliance with Saudi Aramco
Standards.
3.8.1.2.2 Flare Knockout Drums

DESCRIPTION
Liquid entrained in the relief gas shall be removed in the K.O drums by settling. The coalesced
liquid shall collect in the bottom of the drums and shall be then pumped to the slop cooler. A
hydrocarbon in water analyzer shall be provided downstream of the CFP slop cooler similar to
the South Refinery existing flare slop cooler to direct the liquid to either sour water stripper or
to slop oil tanks depending on the signal from the analyzer.
Excessively high liquid level could cause insufficient residence time for settling of entrained
liquid. The liquid level in the CFP K.O drums shall be controlled by level transmitters relayed
to the DCS. At the Low Liquid Level (LLL), a level transmitter shall turn on the K.O drum first
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pump-out pump. At the High Liquid Level (HLL), level transmitter shall turn on the K.O drum
second pump-out pump. At High High Liquid Level (HHLL), a level alarm shall be activated. At
Low Low Liquid Level (LLLL) in the K.O drums, the level transmitter shall shut off the K.O
Jan-2015
DATE
drum pumps.
Multiple K.O drums shall be required for CFP LP and HP flare headers due to the high volume
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE of relief loads. Each flare system shall have its own spare K.O drum. Two K.O drums shall be
ENGINEER
RUK
provided for the CFP LP and two for CFP HP flare systems. Drums should be manifolded to
DATE: Jan 2016
dedicated common pump-out pumps. With one pump operating, the K.O drum level shall be
PROJECT reduced from HLL to LLL within two hours. The level transmitters shall shutdown any pumps
ENGINEER
AHN
that are running when critical Low-Low-Liquid Level is reached.
Jan 2016
DATE:
CERTIFIED The existing South Refinery HP Flare K.O drum (J58-D-103) shall be provided with an
identical spare K.O drum.
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION Benzene compound in CFP units can solidify during cold season. Pure Benzene component
AGENCY
melting point is as follows:
DATE:
OPERATIONS Compound Melting temperature
Benzene 42 °F (5.6°C)
DATE:
Benzene is unlikely to reach the CFP K.O drums as solids. Freezing points of Benzene
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
component is reduced when mixed with other hydrocarbons. Benzene is discharged to flare
EDSD
system in mixtures with other hydrocarbons or at very high temperature. As a precaution for
carryover in relief vapors, steam coils shall be provided in boots of the CFP LP & HP K.O
DATE:
BY:
drums. The steam supply valve for the steam coils shall be kept open during winters if
temperature drops below 45 °F and shall be kept open till the temperature rises to 50 °F. For
CERTIFICATE
CFP flare systems K.O drums calculation and details refer to PP-23187.

(DCC) NO. _____________________
CONTRACTOR shall evaluate the requirement of steam coils in CFP LP and CFP HP K.O
REVISION

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Drums based on the relieving compositions ascertained during detailed engineering phase.
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
3.8.1.2.3 Flare Tips

RUK
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The CFP HP flare tip should be of sonic design. Vendor shall maximize the CFP HP Flare tip
smokeless capability (desired is 100 %). CFP LP and South Refinery flare tips should be of
subsonic design and can use steam assist to ensure smokeless operation for minimum 10%
of the maximum design relief flow. During normal operation smokeless operation shall be
ensured by use of the FGRU. Requirement for exchangeable tips for spare flare shall be
reviewed with Vendors during detail design.
DESCRIPTION
3.8.1.2.4 Seal Drums
The CFP LP and HP Flare Systems each shall have one (100 % capacity) seal drum/seal
pump/flare stack/tip assemblies and shall have one (100 % capacity) as common spare. The
South Refinery Flare System shall have two (100% capacity) seal drum/seal pump/flare
stack/tip assemblies, only one of which operates at a time.
A liquid seal of process water (stripped sour water from Plant J78 - Sour Water Stripper), shall
be provided inside the seal drum to prevent flash back into the flare system and to create a
barrier against flashback. A jump over line from raw water shall also be provided to the
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process water line to seal drums. Positive pressure of the gas blanket shall be maintained by
controlling the level of the seal liquid above the gas diffuser outlet during normal operation to
Jan-2015
DATE
provide adequate back pressure for FGRU. (If recommended by a Vendor, overflow from the
liquid seal can fall into an optional flare seal overflow drum).
NO.
REV
O
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DISCIPLINE
The CFP LP and HP Flare System seal drum shall have dedicated set of controls for liquid
ENGINEER
RUK
level, and purge gas. Those systems can share seal drum pumps which return sour water to
the Sour Water Stripper (Area J78). Pumped seal water will be partially recycled back to the
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT
seal drum through a restriction orifice (flow rate 0.26 to 1.3 USGPM per drum, to be confirmed
ENGINEER
by the Vendor). Recycle shall maintain liquid levels in the seal drum for sealing flare header
AHN
Jan 2016
and for pump priming. Each seal drum shall have a continuous purge of nitrogen above the
DATE:
CERTIFIED
seal liquid to prevent air ingress into its stack. A stack seal shall be provided to minimize
nitrogen consumption.
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION The South Refinery Flare System shall have two 100% redundant seal drums and shall be
AGENCY
configured the same way as the CFP LP and HP Flare Systems. Each South Refinery flare
seal drum connects to one dedicated flare stack and shares both seal pumps. Seal drum
DATE:
OPERATIONS
pumps shall dispose the seal water to the sour water collection header. The header pressure
at the delivery point is 65 psig.
DATE:
The design and operation of the CFP LP and South Refinery flare tips are impacted by the use
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
of steam assist for smokeless operation because the steam assist must be proportioned with
the total flow of relief gas into the flare stack so that minimum 10% of the maximum design
EDSD
relief flow is steam assisted. Flow of steam for promoting smokeless operation of flares shall
DATE:
be controlled by flow to the seal drum reported by appropriate flow transmitters FIT-0378, -
BY:
0381, -0385, -0390, and -0395 in addition to (or overriding) signal from optical smoke detector.
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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3.8.1.2.5 Low BTU Relief Gas Supplemental Fuel Gas System
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
Supplemental fuel gas should be added to the low BTU relief gas downstream of South
Refinery seal drum to ensure self-sustained combustion at the flare tip.
RUK
RUK
RUK
The design should ensure 500 BTU/SCF minimum at the South Refinery flare tip per SAES-F-
007. The supplemental fuel gas injection rate into the low BTU gas stream should be
controlled by an analyzer indicator and controller (AIC) in proportion to the composition of

relief vapor to the South Refinery flare assuring required minimum heating value.
3.8.1.2.6 Pilot Ignition System

DESCRIPTION
The pilots shall be kept on at all times to ensure combustion of all relief gas passing through
the flare tips. Any pilot should reignite quickly after flameout.
Fuel gas will be provided to each pilot for continuous burning. The fuel gas pressure will be
regulated at about 10 psig (Vendor to confirm). Fuel gas backup bottles sufficient for three
days supply shall be provided. Each pilot shall be protected with a windshield to prevent
flame-out. Each pilot shall be provided with a dual retractable thermocouple to sense pilot
flame-out condition. Pilot status shall be indicated on the local ignition and FFG panel. The
JO/EWO
pilots shall be equipped with an automatic electronic igniting device.

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The automatic ignition panel shall generate a signal to activate the electronic igniter to lit up
Jan-2015
DATE
the extinguished pilot. When a pilot flame-out occurs and automatic pilot lighting fails or a
thermocouple burns out, the local panel shall activate a DCS common trouble alarm to prompt
operator action. The operator can manually light the extinguished pilot locally with the FFG.
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE Retractable thermocouples are provided so a burnt out thermocouple can be replaced when
ENGINEER
RUK
the plant is in operation. An infrared pilot sensor located at grade shall provide remote pilot
sensing to the plant DCS.
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT
ENGINEER 3.8.1.2.7 Flare Gas Recovery Unit (FGRU)
AHN
Jan 2016
DATE: To minimize flame impingement damage of the flare tips the FGRU shall recover up to 2
CERTIFIED
MMSCFD of gas from normal plant operations. It is expected that this gas will comprise of fuel
gas purge and relief valves leaks. FGRU suction pressure will be controlled at a minimum 0.5
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
psig. The FGRU compressor shall draw recycle gas from the CFP LP, CFP HP, and South
AGENCY Refinery flare headers downstream of the K.O drums and shall send it to the Plant 25 for
treatment.
DATE:
OPERATIONS
FGRU shall be isolated in case of relief from the plant by high pressure or high temperature.
FGRU shall be restored manually by operator after emergency blowdown stops. An H2S
DATE:
analyzer shall be installed upstream on common inlet of FGRU to indicate content of H2S in
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
recovered gas. For FGRU details and specifications refer to PP-23043

EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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3.8.1.3 Design data
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
Governing relief loads for South Refinery flare are shown in Table 1.
RUK
RUK
RUK
Table 1: South Refinery Flare GPF Load per Siemens Report (PP-23147)
Unit Flow (lb/hr) MW Temperature (°F)


J06 Hydrogen Plant 63,952 20.62 96

DESCRIPTION
J78 DGA/SWS Plant 24,492 24.51 296
J80 Hydrocracker 1,470,803 17.91 437
J85 Visbreaker 229,843 206.32 853.5
J-80-PZV-136 (Note 1) 80,348 4.8 138
Total Load 1,869,438 18 462

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Note:
1. Data is based on BI-10-1610 "Install Hydrocracker Gas Scrubber Project" J80-PZV-136 data sheet
PP215701001PB.
Jan-2015
DATE
Governing relief loads for CFP LP flare are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: CFP LP Flare GPF Load

NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK Unit Flow (lb/hr) MW Temperature (°F)
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT
ENGINEER J64 Khuff Condensate
472,148 112.35 503.2
AHN (Note 1)
Jan 2016
DATE: R90 NHT/CCR Unit 676,277 80.32 242
CERTIFIED
Future DHT (Note 2) 680,334 36.9 400

DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY Total LP Load 1,828,759 58.88 373
DATE: Note:
OPERATIONS 1. Per Siemens Report PP23147001.
2. Per Existing DHT Flare data sheet R728136001X01. New DHT unit is assumed to be
DATE: identical to the existing DHT unit (J88).
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
Governing relief loads for CFP HP flare are shown in Table 3.

EDSD
Table 3: CFP HP Flare GPF Load

DATE:
BY:
Unit Flow (lb/hr) MW Temperature (°F)

CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
R47 Isomerization Unit 508,362 55.59 253
REVISION

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R90 NHT/CCR Unit 631,763 45.36 200
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
Total HP Load 1,140,125 49.4 216

RUK
RUK
RUK
Governing vent loads for CFP HP flare are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: CFP Vent Loads

Unit Device Flow (lb/hr) MW Event

DESCRIPTION
R90 NHT/CCR R90-PV-2081B 144,228 6.99 Depressurizing

R47 Isomerization
R47-ZV-0182 1,060,322 52.59 Depressurizing
Unit
Relief and vent loads for CFP Units are from Axens provided data.
For relief load details refer to PP-23128001, PP-23129.001 and PP-23130.002
3.8.1.4 Maximum Onshore Flare Radiation Intensities for Personal Exposure

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Aug-2014 10-00742
10-00742
Jan-2015 10-00742
Jan-2015
NO. DATE
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK
DATE: Jan 2016

PROJECT
ENGINEER
AHN
Jan 2016
DATE:
CERTIFIED
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
DATE:
OPERATIONS
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE
4) Fraction of heat radiated in maximum design case shall be minimized.

(DCC) NO. _____________________
5) Intensities in this table exclude solar radiation.
REVISION

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3.8.1.4.1 CFP and South Refinery Flare Heat Radiation - GPF
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
Due to space limitation for the CFP flares in the South RTR, the flare heat radiation limitation
for the 1500 BTU/hrft2 radiation zone is 400 meters from base of the stacks to edge of the
RUK
RUK
RUK
refinery tank area.
The CFP plus South Refinery flares heat radiation results for GPF scenario are sown in Table
5.
Table 5: CFP plus South Refinery Flares Heat Radiation Results

Ground Radiation Distances Results
DESCRIPTION
15.77 9.46 6.31 4.73 3.2 1.6 kW/m2

K
5000 3000 2000 1500 1000 500 BTU/hrft2
Not Not
597 869 1230 1926 ft
Achievable Achievable
D
Not Not
182 265 375 587 m
Achievable Achievable
Spherical Radiation Distances Results
15.77 9.46 6.31 4.73 3.2 1.6 kW/m2
K
JO/EWO
5000 3000 2000 1500 1000 500 BTU/hrft2

Aug-2014 10-00742
10-00742
Jan-2015 10-00742
640 826 1012 1169 1431 2024 ft

D
195 252 308 356 436 617 m
Jan-2015
DATE
The heat radiation calculation and results are for estimation purpose only. The final heat
NO.
REV
O
N
radiation calculation shall be performed by the flare Vendor based on the relief loads
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
ascertained during detailed engineering phase.
RUK
DATE: Jan 2016 Per SAES-F-007, section 6.7.9, “the sizing and the location of the flares in a common flare
PROJECT
ENGINEER area shall ensure the possibility of maintenance of the standby units when other units are
AHN operating. The radiation level at a maintenance point shall not exceed 1500 BTU/hr-ft2 (5.7
Jan 2016
DATE: kW/m2)”.
CERTIFIED
The CFP flares shall be demountable type and shall be supported by a single derrick
DATE: structure. All the operating and standby flare stacks shall be installed side by side close to
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY each other in the derrick structure. The derrick structure shall have maintenance platforms at
its base.
DATE:
OPERATIONS Per flare Vendors information; to avoid high heat radiation at the maintenance areas (base of
the stacks), the maintenance platforms shall be equipped with radiation shielding roofs to
DATE: protect the maintenance personnel from flare heat radiation.
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
3.8.1.4.2 Existing South Refinery Flare Heat Radiation - GPF

EDSD
Table 6 shows the radius of heat radiation levels at grade and a spherical radius from center
DATE:
BY:
of the flame to the same radiation levels for the South Refinery Existing flare loads post CFP
for GPF scenario where used as those loads produce highest radiation.
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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Table 6: South Refinery Existing Flare Heat Radiation Results
Radiation Level
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
Radiation Level
(BTU/hr-ft
2) Radius at Flame Center
Radius at Grade (m) Spherical Radius (m)
Elevation (m)
RUK
RUK
RUK
5000 - 109 135

3000 62 140 166
2000 132 172 198
1500 171 199 225

1000 228 243 269

500 342 344 370
DESCRIPTION
Notes:
1. The above heat radiation calculation is for estimate only to match the Siemens Heat radiation result
for 1500 BTU/hrft2 radiation zone of 171 meters radius. For details refer to PP23147.001, page 27.
The approximate distance between two existing flares J58-F-101 & J58-F-102 is 262 m.
For details of the heat radiation calculations for the South Refinery Existing Flares refer to PP-
23145.
3.8.1.4.3 Future Paraxylene Unit Relief Load Estimation

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Relief loads from future units are limited to maintain the flare heat radiation level of 1500
Btu/hrft2 extending to 400 meters. Estimated loads satisfying above limit are 1,490,863 lb/hr
Jan-2015
DATE
for Future Paraxylene LP flare and 1,654,415 lb/hr for Future Paraxylene HP flare.
NO.
REV
O
N
The heat radiation from the future paraxylene flares plus CFP Flares and plus the post CFP
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER South Refinery flares are shown in Table 7.
RUK
DATE: Jan 2016 Table 7: Future Paraxylene plus CFP & South Refinery Flares Heat Radiation Results
PROJECT
ENGINEER Ground Radiation Distances Results
AHN
Jan 2016
15.77 9.46 6.31 4.73 3.2 1.6 kW/m2
DATE: K
CERTIFIED 5000 3000 2000 1500 1000 500 BTU/hrft2
N/A 625 1036 1311 1724 2572 ft
D
DATE: N/A 190 316 400 525 784 m
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY Spherical Radiation Distances Results
15.77 9.46 6.31 4.73 3.2 1.6 kW/m2
DATE: K
OPERATIONS 5000 3000 2000 1500 1000 500 BTU/hrft2
826 1066 1305 1507 1846 2611 ft
D
DATE: 252 325 398 459 563 796 m
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
The Future Paraxylene LP and HP flares relief loads to maintain the 1500 BTU/hrft2 heat
EDSD
radiation zone up to 400 meter radius are determined for estimation purpose only. The relief
DATE:
loads shall not be included in any of the flare system equipment design part of this BI. No
BY:
investment shall be made in this BI for future Paraxylene unit except provision for three flare
stacks in the derrick structure as stated in Section 3.8.1.

CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
For flare heat radiation calculation details refer to PP-23042
REVISION

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3.8.2 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS & CONTRACTOR SCOPE
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
3.8.2.1 The CONTRACTOR shall provide comprehensive schedule for construction and
demolition activities of flares. This schedule shall consider opportunities for tie-ins of
RUK
RUK
RUK
flare headers from existing plants (South Refinery J64 shut down), phasing in new
flares while service of old flares can still be restored, and an opportunity for demolition
of old flares. See example of switchover sequence in Document PP-23145.

3.8.2.2 CFP design includes existing J64 Plant flare header tie-in between the existing flange
and the 30” isolation valve on existing LP flare header (54”-RL-1A1D-(J58)0210) in
Plant J51. A condensate collection assembly may be provided at low point of the tie-in
DESCRIPTION
connection to collect any condensation that may occur in existing header during relief
in winter. The condensation collection assembly may include a piece of pipe connected
at low point on the existing header. The pipe will be equipped with a level transmitter
and a high level alarm. The collected condensate will be discharged to the nearest slop
header via pumping trap. CONTRACTOR shall perform condensation calculation
during relief in existing LP header to determine the need of the condensation collection
assembly.
3.8.2.3 The South Refinery existing flares shall be demolished. The existing 78” flare manifold
JO/EWO
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connected to the flares shall be extended and shall discharge through new seal drums
and new flare stacks supported by derrick. Also the relief loads from BI-1610 “Install
Hydrocracker Gas Scrubber Project” shall connect to the existing J80 Plant relief
Jan-2015
DATE
header. CONTRACTOR shall evaluate the impact on the South Refinery existing flare
system due to this modification.
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER 3.8.2.4 CONTRACTOR shall evaluate the exact tie-in locations and their effectiveness for the
RUK
process and utilities tie-ins. CONTRACTOR can propose other tie-in locations which
DATE: Jan 2016 P shall be economical, effective, and shall not require South Refinery shutdown and
PROJECT
ENGINEER therefore not effect normal operation of the South Refinery. Saudi Aramco RTR
AHN
Operations endorsement is mandatory for the tie-ins locations. For tie-ins details refer
Jan 2016
DATE: to tie-in list PP53074.
CERTIFIED
3.8.2.5 Supplemental fuel gas should be added to the low BTU relief gas downstream of South
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
Refinery seal drum to ensure 500 BTU/SCF minimum LHV of the relief gas and to
AGENCY ensure self-sustained combustion at the flare tip. CONTRACTOR shall calculate the
amount of supplementary fuel gas required for all the possible low BTU reliefs and
DATE:
vents from the South Refinery Units.
OPERATIONS
3.8.2.6 Tie-in valves shall be purchased in advance to allow for early installation opportunities
DATE:
during resulting from a planned major plant shutdown. The exact location of the tie-in
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
valves shall be based on plant shutdown schedule.

EDSD
3.8.2.7 The CONTRACTOR shall obtain flare Vendor performance guarantee for flare system.
DATE:
This Guarantee shall stipulate performance conforming to specification during

BY:
operation: A) at maximum design capacity of all flares together and at operation of

each stack separately, B) at LP Flare venting capacity after tripping of CCR Recycle
CERTIFICATE
Compressor, C) flare venting capacity during Hydrocracker Unit J80 shutdown. In

(DCC) NO. _____________________
addition the flare performance test shall be simulated by flare Vendor and shall be
tested in real time by Saudi Aramco with flare Vendor assistance at the Ras Tanura
REVISION

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Refinery with plants operating at design process parameters.
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
3.8.2.8 CONTRACTOR shall issue subcontract for Siemens Saudi Arabia to provide the report
in PS PPM for the combined CFP and South Refinery existing units flare loads. Update
RUK
RUK
RUK
P to the Siemens PS PPM report for the South Refinery shall account for J64 operating
at 300 MBD, J80 operating at 55 MBD and J72 and shall be verified and validated by
CONTRACTOR.

The scope shall also include dynamic radiation calculations for the major scenarios to
account for sensitivities like change in wind direction and velocity changes.
DESCRIPTION
CONTRACTOR shall verify and validate all flare system calculations based on the
relief loads ascertained by Siemens study.
3.8.2.9 CONTRACTOR shall propose changes in blowdown and flare system for load
reduction that is achievable with conventional mitigation methods only. The mitigation
methods shall be economically and technically effective and shall be in compliance
with API and Saudi Aramco Standards.
Conventional mitigation methods are defined as follows:

JO/EWO
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10-00742
Jan-2015 10-00742
- Emergency power supply for reflux pumps and air cooler fans
- Use of steam drivers instead of electric motors
- Allowing flare Vendors to use their proprietary methods
Jan-2015
DATE
- Using Vendor recommended flare tip selection

- Other methods permitted in API-STD-521 latest edition.
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE All proposals would need to be approved by COMPANY prior to implementation.

ENGINEER
RUK
DATE: Jan 2016 3.8.2.10 During normal operation, the FGRU shall recover purge gas and PZV leakages from
PROJECT
ENGINEER
the CFP and South Refinery flare systems up to a capacity of 2 MMSCFD. The
AHN recovered gas shall be delivered to Plant 25 for treatment. CONTRACTOR shall also
DATE:
Jan 2016
evaluate economically and technically, the recovery of continuous vents to flare from
CERTIFIED South Refinery and CFP Units. Refer to units H&MB and PFDs for various continuous
vents.
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY 3.8.2.11 CONTRACTOR shall develop a comprehensive procedure for the construction of CFP
and South Refinery flare derrick structure while the South Refinery existing flares are
DATE: in operation. The procedure shall include the safety measure and precautions against
OPERATIONS the flare heat radiation of the South Refinery existing flares as mentioned in section
3.8.1.4.2.
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
3.8.2.12 The flare stacks exits elevation used for radiation level calculations is 200 meters.
VERIFICATION
CONTRACTOR shall finalize the flare stacks and derrick structure heights in
EDSD
conjunction with the flare Vendors based on the heat radiation results ascertained
during detail engineering phase. The stacks and derrick heights shall be finalized
DATE:
BY:
recognizing the fact that the space for the flare is limited and an increase in heat
radiation is possible due to the addition of future units relief load. Investment for any
CERTIFICATE
future unit by this BI and the flare stacks and derrick height selection shall be made
(DCC) NO. _____________________
after Saudi Aramco approval.
REVISION

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3.8.2.13 The CONTRACTOR shall finalize the flare derrick, stacks, seal drums, and seal drums
pumps arrangement and configuration in conjunction with the flare Vendor.
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
3.8.2.14 The CFP HP flare tip is considered to be sonic type based on the current FEED relief
RUK
RUK
RUK
loads and compositions. CONTRACTOR shall re-validate the CFP HP flare tip type in
conjunction with the flare Vendor based on the relief compositions ascertained during
detail engineering phase.

3.8.3 DESIGN GUIDELINES

3.8.3.1 Introduction
DESCRIPTION
This document sets out the project philosophy for the provision of overpressure protection
systems. The philosophy is based on the recommendations of API standards. Where
appropriate, it recognizes the specific requirements of relevant Saudi Aramco Engineering
Standards.
The document does not attempt to define the overall methodology to be followed in the design
of overpressure protection systems but in some areas it does specify certain design criteria
which shall be adopted. In all other aspects, the design shall comply with the general guidance
JO/EWO
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provided in the Saudi Aramco Engineering Standards and the industry publications referenced
in Section 3.8.3.3
Jan-2015
DATE
3.8.3.2 Scope
NO.
REV
As a part of the Ras Tanura Refinery Expansion Project, several new facilities will be installed.
O
N
DISCIPLINE These facilities include new process units, off-sites and utility systems. Pressure systems within
ENGINEER
RUK these facilities shall be protected from overpressure by relief valves or other pressure-relieving
DATE: Jan 2016 devices.
PROJECT
ENGINEER
AHN This document addresses the design of overpressure protection systems for the Project. The
DATE:
Jan 2016 philosophy makes provision for possible use of instrumented protection systems as an
CERTIFIED alternative to mechanical pressure-relieving devices.
DATE: On issues not specifically addressed in this document, the guidance contained in the Saudi
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
Aramco Engineering Standards (especially SAES-J-600 Pressure Relief Devices and SAEP-354
High Integrity Protective Systems Design Requirements) and API Standards shall be followed
DATE: (see Section 3.8.3.3).
OPERATIONS
3.8.3.3 Codes and Standards
DATE:
CONTRACTOR shall comply with the latest Saudi Aramco desk top standards and latest
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
editions of applicable industry codes. CONTRACTOR shall refer to Volume IV of the ITB for a
EDSD
complete list of standards, procedures and general instructions.

DATE:
3.8.3.3.1 Saudi Aramco

BY:
CERTIFICATE
Refer to Volume IV of ITB.


(DCC) NO. _____________________
3.8.3.3.2 Industry
REVISION

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American Petroleum Institute (API)
API-STD-520 Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
Refineries
Part l – Sizing and Selection
RUK
RUK
RUK
Part ll – Installation
API-STD-521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems
API-STD-526 Flanged Steel Safety Relief Valves

API-STD-537 Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochemical Services

API-STD-576 Inspection of Pressure Relieving Devices
DESCRIPTION
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
Section l: Rules for Construction of Power Boilers
Section VIII D1: Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels
Section VIII D2: Alternative Rules
ASME B16.5 Pipe Flanges and Flanged Fittings
ASME B31.3 Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping
ASME B31.4 Liquid Transportation Systems for Hydrocarbons, Liquid Petroleum Gas,
JO/EWO
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10-00742
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Anhydrous Ammonia and Alcohols
International Society for Measurement and Control (ISA)

Jan-2015
DATE
ISA S84.01 Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE
3.8.3.4 General Requirements
ENGINEER
RUK
Overpressure protection is required where equipment failure, process upset, or an external fire
DATE: Jan 2016 can cause the pressure in an item of equipment or pressure system to exceed the maximum
PROJECT
ENGINEER pressure allowed (by the pressure vessel design code).
AHN
Jan 2016
DATE: Wherever possible and cost-effective, the process design for new facilities shall be inherently
CERTIFIED
safe and shall minimize the extent and capacity of the necessary overpressure protection and
disposal systems. In order to achieve this it may be appropriate to increase design pressures of
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
selected vessels or systems to avoid the possibility of overpressure (and thus relief loads) due
AGENCY to operational or equipment failures.
DATE:
Where a protective device is required, preference shall be given to the use of pressure relief
OPERATIONS
valves. Rupture discs may be used in combination with a relief valve where there is a benefit
(see section 3.8.3.5.2), but they shall only be used as the primary protection device where their
DATE: selection over a relief valve can be clearly justified.
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
Historically, the protection of equipment designed to the requirements of the ASME Boiler and
EDSD
Pressure Vessels Code has been provided by a pressure relieving device (normally a relief
DATE:
valve or rupture disc). ASME has recently accepted the use of alternative methods of protection
BY:
and in particular the use of instrumented protective systems (ASME Code Case 2211). Such
systems often provide a more feasible and cost-effective approach to overpressure protection
CERTIFICATE
where discharge of the process fluid may be undesirable or where the design of pressure
(DCC) NO. _____________________
relieving facilities or the necessary disposal system would be impractical or very expensive.
REVISION

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Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) recommendations approved for implementation by
Saudi Aramco Project Management Team (SAPMT) shall be included in design.
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
3.8.3.5 Pressure-Relieving Devices

RUK
RUK
RUK
Traditional pressure-relieving devices (relief valves and rupture discs) shall be used to provide
overpressure protection wherever practicable and cost-effective. The sizing and installation of
each device shall comply with the requirements of the API, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code and Saudi Aramco Engineering Standard SAES-J-600 (Pressure Relief Devices).
Overpressure protection requirements for Section l (Power Boilers) and Section Vlll (Unfired
DESCRIPTION
Pressure Vessels) of the ASME Code differ in terms of the degree of overpressure allowed and
the permissible use of isolating valves.
Unfired pressure vessels classified as unfired steam boilers (e.g. waste heat boilers) may be
designed according to Section I or VIII depending upon process conditions. Overpressure
protection systems for this type of equipment shall always be designed to meet the
requirements of Section I.
Other types of equipment, including compressors, pumps, air coolers and piping, may also
JO/EWO
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require protection against overpressure. Although such equipment does not come under the
jurisdiction of the above codes, the design and installation of overpressure protection systems
shall nevertheless meet the requirements of the relevant API, ASME Code, and SAES-J-600.
Jan-2015
DATE
3.8.3.5.1 Relief Valves

NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE 3.8.3.5.1.1 Set Pressure

ENGINEER
RUK
The relief valve set pressure and other characteristics of the device shall meet the
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT requirements of the relevant section of the ASME Code, SAES-J-600 and API-STD-520 Part
ENGINEER
AHN
I for all pressure vessels and equipment.
Jan 2016
DATE:
CERTIFIED In a liquid-full system, account shall be taken of the static liquid head in the system when
determining the set pressure.
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
3.8.3.5.1.2 Allowable Overpressure
DATE:
The overpressure allowed shall comply with relevant API and ASME Code requirements.
OPERATIONS
3.8.3.5.1.3 Type
DATE:
Relief valves shall normally be either conventional or balanced spring-loaded valves.
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
Conventional relief valves shall typically be used where the discharge is to atmosphere or to
EDSD
another open system. Conventional valves may also be used where the discharge is to flare
and the set pressure is sufficiently high to allow back pressure limits to be met. For all
DATE:
BY:
applications, the maximum total developed back pressure on a conventional valve shall be
limited to 10 percent of set pressure.
CERTIFICATE
For applications where the total developed back pressure exceeds 10 percent of set
(DCC) NO. _____________________
pressure, balanced relief valves shall be used. The back pressure shall be limited to 30
REVISION

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percent of set pressure for single valve and 37.5 percent for the multiple valves per API
standards. During detailed engineering, this may increase to a maximum of 50 percent of set
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
pressure provided a suitable capacity correction factor, as recommended by the relief valve
manufacturer, is applied.
RUK
RUK
RUK
Where bellows failure would result in an unacceptable increase in set pressure or reduction
in valve capacity, a balanced bellows relief valve shall be equipped with an auxiliary piston.
To minimize the potential for a hazardous release to atmosphere in the event of bellows
failure, bonnet vents shall be configured as described in SAES-J-600 section 9.3.
The sizing of the flare headers shall not be dictated by the preferential use of conventional
DESCRIPTION
relief valves.
Where a spring-operated relief valve is considered to be inappropriate, pilot-operated relief

valves may be used, provided the service is clean and there is no risk of blockage.
Situations where a pilot-operated valve might be considered are:
• where the margin between operating and set pressure is less than 10 percent
• where the maximum back pressure exceeds the limit for a balanced valve
• where the inlet line pressure drop cannot be limited to 3 percent of set pressure (see
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section 3.8.3.5.1.7)
• Using a pilot-operated relief valve, it may be possible to accommodate a back pressure
greater than 50 percent of set pressure.
Jan-2015
DATE
The use of pilot-operated valves shall be by exception and only with the approval of Saudi
NO.
REV
Aramco. Valves shall be of the non-flowing type and shall meet the requirements of SAES-J-
N
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
600 section 5.5.
RUK
DATE: Jan 2016 3.8.3.5.1.4 Sizing and Selection

PROJECT
ENGINEER
AHN Relief valves shall be sized using the methods contained in either API-STD-520 Part 1
DATE:
Jan 2016 (pressure systems) or API Standard 2000 (atmospheric storage tanks) and in line with the
CERTIFIED guidance contained in SAES-J-600 section 7. During detailed engineering, relief valve sizes
shall be confirmed using the manufacturer’s sizing methods.
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
Relief valves shall be sized for the governing overpressure case using a realistic maximum
developed back pressure. Both superimposed and built-up back pressures shall be
DATE: established. The specified superimposed back pressure for valves discharging to the flare
OPERATIONS system shall be in the form of a range, the maximum of which reflects the system pressure
when all other co-incident reliefs are active.
DATE:
The sizing of relief valves in two-phase service shall be based on the method contained in
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
API-STD-520 Part 1 Appendix D. The required area determined by the manufacturer shall
EDSD
be validated against this method and any inconsistencies satisfactorily resolved.

DATE:
BY:
3.8.3.5.1.5 Materials
CERTIFICATE
Relief valve materials shall comply with the requirements of API Standard 526, subject to the
exclusions contained in SAES-J-600 section 6.
(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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3.8.3.5.1.6 Sparing
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
All relief valves shall be provided with an installed spare other than those in the services
identified in SAES-J-600 section 8.15. Each relief valve shall be provided with an upstream
RUK
RUK
RUK
isolating valve. Relief valves discharging to the flare shall be provided with an isolating valve
in the discharge line.
Isolating valves shall meet the requirements of section 3.8.3.5.1.8 of this document.
3.8.3.5.1.7 Inlet Lines

DESCRIPTION
The design of relief valve inlet lines shall comply with the requirements of SAES-J-600
section 9.7.
To minimize the potential for chattering, the inlet line to a relief valve shall be as short as is
practicable and sized so as to limit the total non-recoverable pressure loss between the
protected equipment and the valve to 3% of the gauge set pressure at the relief valve rated
flow. The pressure drop shall take account of the piping entrance loss and be based on the
rated flow through the valve and a conservative pipe roughness value. Where spare or
multiple valves are provided, the most tortuous routing shall be considered.
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The cross-sectional area for flow in the inlet line between the vessel and the valve shall not
be less than that of the relief valve inlet flange.
Jan-2015
DATE
The inlet line to a relief valve located in a vapor space shall be free-draining to the process.
In a liquid-full system, consideration shall be given to the potential for the fluid to solidify in
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE the line and the need for trace heating.

ENGINEER
RUK
3.8.3.5.1.8 Installation
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT
ENGINEER The installation of relief valves shall meet the requirements of SAES-J-600 sections 9.4 and
AHN
Jan 2016
9.7.
DATE:
CERTIFIED
Relief valves shall be installed in the vertical position as close as possible to the equipment
or system they protect. In equipment and systems which are partially liquid-full and where
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
the relief valve discharge may be vapor, the valve shall be located in the vapor space at the
AGENCY highest practicable point.
DATE:
Inlet and discharge pipe work which would normally contain no liquid shall be free-draining
OPERATIONS
without any low points where liquid might collect. Any isolation valves installed in relief valve
inlet or discharge piping shall be full-bore and car-sealed either open or closed to ensure
DATE: that the required relief capacity is always available. Full-bore and car-sealed requirements
CONTROL NUMBER
shall be noted on the P&ID. Three-way valves shall not be used.

VERIFICATION
EDSD
An evaluation of acoustically-induced vibration shall be made for the pipe work of selected
DATE:
relief valves in vapor service. The screening process set out in SAES-J-600 shall be used to
BY:
identify those installations where there is the potential for fatigue failure of the discharge
pipe work. Evaluations of those high risk systems shall be carried out using the methodology
CERTIFICATE
contained in Saudi Aramco Engineering Report SAER-5317 (Relief System Evaluation).

(DCC) NO. _____________________
More than one item of equipment may be protected by a single relief valve provided the set
pressure takes account of the system pressure drop between each item of equipment and
REVISION

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the relief valve. Any isolating valve in the process line between the relief valve and an item
of equipment it protects shall be car-sealed open. This approach is not viable if a control
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
valve is installed in the process line.

Under no circumstances shall a check valve be installed in the discharge line from a relief
RUK
RUK
RUK
valve.
3.8.3.5.2 Rupture Discs and Rupture Pins


A rupture disc, buckling pin, or rupture pin shall only be used as the primary relief device
where the use of a relief valve is inappropriate or non-feasible and with the prior approval of
Saudi Aramco.
DESCRIPTION
Rupture discs may be installed upstream or downstream of a relief valve where the fluid in
contact with the valve may be of a corrosive nature or where there is the potential for plugging.
Sizing and selection shall be in accordance with the guidance contained in API-STD-520 Part l
and based on the advice of the Vendor.
Rupture discs and rupture pins shall meet the requirements of ASME Section Vlll and SAES-J-
600 section 5.6.
JO/EWO
3.8.3.6 Overpressure Scenarios

Aug-2014 10-00742
10-00742
Jan-2015 10-00742
The pressure relieving device protecting an item of equipment or a pressure system shall be
Jan-2015
DATE
sized to provide adequate capacity for all potential overpressure scenarios.
Overpressure scenarios shall be identified from a detailed line-by-line review of the P&IDs to
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE identify all potential sources of overpressure. This review shall take account of start-up,
ENGINEER
RUK
shutdown and intermittent plant operations, together with any pressure-related items from the
PHA review. In general, double jeopardy scenarios shall not be considered.
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT
ENGINEER
AHN
Failure scenarios for utility systems shall be developed and the potential for both total and
Jan 2016 partial failures considered. This is particularly important in the case of the power supply.
DATE:
CERTIFIED
It may be possible to eliminate the need to provide overpressure protection for certain low-risk
DATE:
overpressure scenarios. Such cases shall be adequately quantified and the written approval of
CONSTRUCTION Saudi Aramco obtained on a case-by-case basis.
AGENCY
Overpressure scenarios shall be evaluated in accordance with the guidance provided in API-
DATE:
OPERATIONS STD-521 and SAES-J-600. However, the cases considered shall not necessarily be limited to
those identified in these documents.
DATE:
Saudi Aramco Engineering Standard SAES-J-600 section 8 sets out the required basis upon
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
which relief loads for a number of common overpressure scenarios shall be calculated and
EDSD
process engineers must thoroughly familiarize themselves with this standard.

For failure scenarios not referred to in SAES-J-600, or for which additional guidance is needed,
DATE:
a methodology has been established, consistent with the requirements of API-STD-521

BY:
attached as Appendix-A.
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
3.8.3.7 Instrumented Protection Systems
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
3.8.3.7.1 De-Pressuring
RUK
RUK
RUK
In addition to pressure relieving systems, the new process units shall be provided where
appropriate with de-pressuring facilities to safeguard process equipment subject to
compressor trips. Requirements for venting systems are addressed in process Licensor’s
documents.
3.8.3.8 Disposal Systems

DESCRIPTION
The discharge from a relieving device shall be routed to the process, to atmosphere or to the
flare system.
3.8.3.9 Materials of Construction
For process piping and utility lines materials specified in piping classes should be used.
Materials of construction of flare systems parts operating at high temperatures shall be
recommended by the Vendors.
JO/EWO
Aug-2014 10-00742
10-00742
Jan-2015 10-00742
3.8.3.10 Documentation
Standard Saudi Aramco data and specification sheets shall be used in this Project.
Jan-2015
DATE
Overpressure scenarios and relief loads for each process, utility and offsite unit or area shall be
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE
summarized in the standard Saudi Aramco “Flare Load Summary” (form SA-9544) or similar.
ENGINEER
RUK
DATE: Jan 2016

Calculations for relief loads and relief device sizing may periodically require revision to reflect
PROJECT changes in plant operation or equipment modifications.
ENGINEER
AHN
DATE:
Jan 2016
It is important that the thought process for the evaluation of each failure scenario which has
CERTIFIED been considered is clearly recorded; even where it has been concluded that there will be no
overpressure. The calculations for each relief valve shall include a summary table showing the
DATE: overpressure scenarios considered for each item of equipment and the calculated relief loads.
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY This summary shall clearly indicate those items of equipment whose size or design governs the
existence or size of a specific relief load (e.g. control valves, car-sealed isolating valves).
DATE:
OPERATIONS
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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3.8.4 BATTERY LIMIT, OPERATING CONDITIONS & UTILITIES
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
3.8.4.1 Battery Limit Conditions

RUK
RUK
RUK
RTR CFP and South Refinery Flare Systems battery limit will be from upstream of the flare K.O
drums (CFP LP, CFP HP and South Refinery Flare Systems)

The battery limit conditions for normal (purge only) and maximum (relieving) case at flanges of
the upstream isolation valves are shown Table8.
DESCRIPTION
Table 8: Normal and Upset Operating Conditions of Relief Headers

South
System Condition LP HP
Refinery
Pressure Normal 1.5 ~ 2.5 1.5 ~ 3 1.5 ~ 2.5
(Psig) Maximum 10 ~ 15 40 ~ 50 10 ~ 15
Temperature Normal Ambient Ambient Ambient
(°F) Maximum 660 ~ 680 550 ~ 570 730 ~ 750
Flow Normal 78 21 85
(lb/hr) Maximum 1,828,759 1,140,125 1,869,438
JO/EWO
Aug-2014 10-00742
10-00742
Jan-2015 10-00742
For battery limit table details refer to PP-23126
3.8.4.2 Operating Conditions

Jan-2015
DATE
During refinery normal operation, purge gas from the upstream end of relief headers and leaks
from relief valves will route to their respective unit K.O drums. From unit K.O drums the gases
NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE will flow to CFP LP, CFP HP or South Refinery flare main K.O drums where any entrained liquid
ENGINEER
RUK
(if present) will be knocked out and will be collected at the bottom of the K.O drum. Gas from
K.O drum will then route to FGRU which will prevent venting of these gases to flare stacks.
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT FGRU will recover up to 2 MMSCFD of gas. The FGRU compressor will draw recycle gas from
ENGINEER
AHN
the CFP LP, CFP HP and South Refinery LP and HP flare headers downstream of the K.O
Jan 2016 drums and send it to Plant 25.
DATE:
CERTIFIED
During relief events the isolation valves (ZVs) on the suction lines of the FGRU will shut down,
DATE: the liquid seal will be broken and relief gases will vent through seal drum to the flare stack.
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
During reliefs, conditions between normal and maximum will be observed. See Table 8.
DATE:
OPERATIONS 3.8.4.3 Utilities
DATE: CFP and South Refinery Flare Systems will mainly include the following utilities.
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
• Electric Power
EDSD
• MP Steam
DATE:
BY:
• Potable Water
CERTIFICATE
Raw Water
•
(DCC) NO. _____________________
• Instrument Air
REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
• Utility Air
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
• Nitrogen
Fuel Gas
RUK
•
RUK
RUK
Table 9 summarizes the utility loads required for the CFP LP, CFP HP and South Refinery flare
systems.
Table 9: CFP and South Refinery Flare System Utility Requirement

Flare System
Utility
DESCRIPTION
Usage
Electrical Power hp 1475
MP Steam lb/hr 94255
Potable Water USGallons 456
Raw Water USGPM 150
Instrument Air SCFM 53.4
Utility Air SCFM 39
Nitrogen SCFM 575
JO/EWO
Aug-2014 10-00742
10-00742
Jan-2015 10-00742
Fuel Gas SCFM 12879
For CFP and South Refinery Flare System utilities consumption details refer to Document PP-
Jan-2015
DATE
23183.
3.8.5 QUALIFIED VENDORS

NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK 3.8.5.1 Flare System & Flare Gas Recovery System Qualified Vendors
DATE: Jan 2016
PROJECT
ENGINEER
AHN
Jan 2016
DATE:
CERTIFIED
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
DATE:
OPERATIONS
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
3.8.5.2 Television Camera Qualified Vendors
ENGG CERT
AHN
AHN
AHN
RUK
RUK
RUK

3.8.5.3 Flare Gas Recovery Units Qualified Vendors
Flare Gas Recovery Units are not shown in Procurement list of approved Vendors. Any
DESCRIPTION
experienced package unit assembler could be used with approved suppliers of system
components. Flare Vendors are generally qualified to supply these units.
3.8.6 FLARE SYSTEM WASTE EFLLUENTS

3.8.6.1 Gaseous effluents from Normal Operations
During normal operation effluents will be:

• Combustion products from pilot burners of active flare stacks.
JO/EWO
Aug-2014 10-00742
10-00742
Jan-2015 10-00742
• Combustion products of purges and reliefs sour gas reliefs.

• Nitrogen purge from CFP and South Refinery flares.
• Steam assist discharge from CFP LP and South Refinery flare
Jan-2015
DATE
3.8.6.2 Gaseous effluents from Upset Operation

NO.
REV
O
N
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER During upset operation effluents will be:
RUK
DATE: Jan 2016

PROJECT
• Combustion products from pilot burners of active flare stacks.
ENGINEER
• Combustion products of reliefs and blowdown.
AHN
Jan 2016 • Steam assist discharge
DATE:
CERTIFIED
3.8.6.3 Liquid effluents from Upset Operation
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION All liquids except surface run-off (rain water) are contained in closed systems and returned to
AGENCY
slops or SWS for further processing. For surface drainage see Document PP-20100
DATE:
OPERATIONS
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
END of Section 3.8

EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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A
OF P
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EDSD REV
REVISION
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
N Aug-2014 10-00742 ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB RUK AHN
CONTROL NUMBER
RUK
AHN
APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, Jan-2015 10-00742 ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2 RUK AHN
O
AGENCY
BY:
PROJECT
DATE: Jan 2016
Jan 2016
ENGINEER
ENGINEER
DISCIPLINE
CERTIFIED
OPERATIONS
CONSTRUCTION
(DCC) NO. _____________________ P Jan-2015 10-00742 ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2 RUK AHN
DATE:
RAS TANURA

3.8 RELIEF SYSTEM J99 & FLARE UNIT J58 (FLARE PROCESS DATA BOOK)
DOC
SAUDI ARABIA
Appendix-A
J58
JO / EWO:
A
BI-10-00742
and Relief Valve Sizing (PP-23189)
PP-23100
DRAWING NO.
25
25
OF
SHT.NO.
Methodology and Basis for Relief Load Calculation
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
REV.NO.
EDSD REV
REVISION
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
A Apr-14 10-00742 ISSUED FOR CLIENT REVIEW RUK SWM
CONTROL NUMBER
RUK
APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, Apr-14 10-00742 RUK SWM
B ISSUED FOR CLIENT REVIEW
AGENCY
DATE: May-14
BY:
PROJECT
ENGINEER
ENGINEER
DISCIPLINE
CERTIFIED
SWM
OPERATIONS
CONSTRUCTION
(DCC) NO. _____________________
C May-14 10-00742 ISSUED FOR CLIENT REVIEW RUK
DATE:
RAS TANURA

METHODOLOGY & BASIS FOR RELIEF LOAD CALCULATION AND RELIEF VALVE SIZING
DOC
SAUDI ARABIA
MAY 2014
PROJECT
BI-10-00742
J99
PREPARED BY:
JO / EWO:
VALVE SIZING
A
PROCESSING FACILITY
BI-10-00742
PP-23189
DRAWING NO.
RAS TANURA REFINERY CLEAN FUELS
PACKAGE#1- RTR CFP ISBL – NAPHTHA
1
RELIEF LOAD CALCULATION AND RELIEF
12
OF
SHT.NO.
APPENDIX-A - METHODOLOGY & BASIS FOR
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
REV.NO.
PMT OPRNS
Table of Contents
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................................................... 3
RUK
RUK
1.0 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................... 4
2.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 5
3.0 METHODOLOGY & BASIS ................................................................................................................... 5

ISSUED FOR CLIENT REVIEW
3.1 External Fire .................................................................................................................................. 5

DESCRIPTION
3.2 Top Cooling Failure ...................................................................................................................... 6

3.3 Blocked Outlets ............................................................................................................................ 7
3.4 Abnormal Heat Input .................................................................................................................... 7
3.5 Instrument Air Failure .................................................................................................................. 7
3.6 Overfilling ...................................................................................................................................... 8
3.7 Opening of Manual Valves ........................................................................................................... 8
3.8 Automatic Control Failure ........................................................................................................... 8
JO/EWO
10-00742
10-00742
10-00742
3.9 Heat Exchanger Tube Rupture .................................................................................................... 9

3.10 Power Failure ................................................................................................................................ 9
May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
3.11 Mechanical Equipment Failure .................................................................................................... 9

3.12 Steam Out ...................................................................................................................................... 9
NO.
REV
C
A
3.13 Depressuring ................................................................................................................................. 9

DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK
3.14 Reverse Flow ............................................................................................................................... 10
DATE: May-14 3.15 General ........................................................................................................................................ 11
PROJECT
ENGINEER
DATE:
CERTIFIED
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
DATE:
OPERATIONS
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
METHODOLOGY & BASIS FOR RELIEF LOAD CALCULATION AND RELIEF VALVE SIZING DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

J99 PP-23189 2
A
RTR CLEAN FUELS PROJECT OF C
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
ACRONYMS
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
CFP Clean Fuels Project

RUK
RUK
HEM Homogenous Equilibrium Method
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

MABP Maximum Allowable Back Pressure

DESCRIPTION
MAWP Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
RTR Ras Tanura Refinery
T&I Testing & Inspection
UA Product of Area and Heat Transfer Coefficient

JO/EWO
10-00742
10-00742
10-00742
May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
NO.
REV
C
A
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK
DATE: May-14
PROJECT
ENGINEER
DATE:
CERTIFIED
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
DATE:
OPERATIONS
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

J99 PP-23189 3
A
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
1.0 REFERENCES
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
SAES-F-007 System Design Criteria of Flares

RUK
RUK
SAES-J-600 Pressure Relief Devices
SAES-B-058 Emergency shutdown, Isolation and Depressuring

SAER-5317 Relief System Evaluation

DESCRIPTION
34-SAMSS-611 Safety Relief Valves, Conventional and Balanced Types
34-SAMSS-612 Safety Relief Valves Pilot Operated Types
API STD 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving

Devices in Refineries Part I & Part II
API STD 521 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems

JO/EWO
10-00742
10-00742
10-00742
API STD 526 Flanged Steel Pressure Relief Valves
API STD 527 Seat Tightness of Pressure Relief Valves

May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
API STD 537 Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochemical
Services
NO.
REV
C
A
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK
DATE: May-14
PROJECT
ENGINEER
DATE:
CERTIFIED
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
DATE:
OPERATIONS
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

J99 PP-23189 4
A
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
2.0 INTRODUCTION
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
The document covers the methodology and basis for relief load calculation and relief valve sizing
RUK
RUK
for RTR Clean Fuels Project (CFP). This document serves as a quick reference guide and is not a
substitute for Saudi Aramco Standards, Engineering Practices and Industry Standards and
Practices (e.g. API 520 or API 521). If this document contradicts any of the aforementioned then
the aforementioned standards and practices shall govern.
3.0 METHODOLOGY & BASIS

DESCRIPTION
Overpressure scenarios that would result in discharges to the Flare system (J58) shall be
identified. The overpressure scenarios shall be then evaluated for their applicability, and the
applicable scenarios shall be then further studied to calculate the relief loads.
The following methodology & basis will be used for determining the overpressure scenarios for
calculating the relief loads and for sizing of the relief valves:
3.1 External Fire

JO/EWO
10-00742
10-00742
10-00742
3.1.1 For vertical and horizontal vessels in continuous service (Accumulator, knockout
drums, etc.), the liquid level shall be considered up to 25 ft. from grade or a surface
that could sustain a pool fire. For vessels in intermittent service the liquid level shall
May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
be considered at Liquid Level High High point.

NO.
REV
C
A
3.1.2 For non-liquid full spherical vessels (LPG storage, etc.), the liquid level shall be taken
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
as 25 feet or the distance to the maximum horizontal diameter, whichever shall be
RUK greater.
DATE: May-14
PROJECT
ENGINEER 3.1.3 For liquid-full vessels, the initial liquid displacement/two phase relief shall not be
considered.
DATE:
CERTIFIED 3.1.4 The maximum fire height shall be taken as 25 feet unless the equipment is located
directly above a fire source. Cases in which the equipment is located over a fire
DATE: source and is greater than 25 feet above grade shall be treated on a case-by-case
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY basis and agreement shall be solicited with Saudi Aramco personnel.
DATE: 3.1.5 For columns, the wetted area shall be based on normal liquid level plus 2” per
OPERATIONS column tray to account for tray drainage, otherwise the liquid level shall be assumed
up to the reboiler inlet nozzle or the first tray.
DATE:
3.1.6 The wetted area of the vessel bottom head supported on skirt shall also be included
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
in the fire calculations.

EDSD
3.1.7 For knock-out drums such as fuel gas knockout drums and compressor suction
DATE:
BY:
drums, the normal liquid level shall be considered. If the liquid level is non-existent,
the drum shall be treated as a vapor filled vessel. If the liquid is primarily made up of
CERTIFICATE
water, while the vapor phase is hydrocarbon, then a method to account for the whole
fluid shall be used. If the liquid quantity is insignificant, then it shall be calculated
(DCC) NO. _____________________
whether the liquid may have evaporated before reaching the set pressure.
REVISION

J99 PP-23189 5
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PMT OPRNS
3.1.8 Credit for fireproof insulation shall not be considered. The associated equipment
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
shall be considered bare vessel. The environment factor of 1.0 shall be used.
RUK
RUK
3.1.9 Latent heat used shall be based on the heat required to vaporize the ten percent (10
%) by mass of the normal liquid composition at the relief pressure. The relieving
temperature and vapor composition shall be based on the ten percent (10 %)
vaporization point.
3.1.10 For heat exchanger shell sides in service that maintain a normal level (kettle type
exchangers, etc.), the liquid level shall be considered up to liquid weir height or up to
DESCRIPTION
25 ft. from grade whichever is higher.
3.1.11 Fire relief loads from the tube sides of exchangers shall not be considered.
3.1.12 Block valves on the shell side of exchangers present for shell isolation shall be
assumed to be open during an external fire event, such that the relief load from the
exchanger may be relieved by an upstream or downstream relief device. In the event
that the exchanger and the upstream or downstream vessel are in the same fire
zone, the relief device shall be sized for the combined relief load from individual
pieces of equipment (instead of the combined wetted surface area).
JO/EWO
10-00742
10-00742
10-00742
3.1.13 For air-cooled exchangers, fire relief loads shall be calculated using the wetted
May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
surface area of the bare tubes located within the fire zone. Relief loads for air cooled
heat exchangers in different services shall be calculated following the guidelines of
API 521, Sixth Edition 2014.
NO.
REV
C
A
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER 3.1.14 Fire relief loads from double pipe exchangers shall not be considered.
RUK
DATE: May-14
PROJECT
3.1.15 For external fire scenarios; fire zones shall be considered based on 2,500 ft2 circles
ENGINEER identified from the plot plans.
DATE:
CERTIFIED
3.1.16 For external fire cases in which the vessel fluid is found to be supercritical at the
relieving pressure, the wetted area shall be determined using the normal liquid level
(prior to upset) in the vessel. The heat input shall be then based on API 521, Sixth
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION Edition 2014 correlations for vessels that contain liquid. The initial relief temperature
AGENCY
shall be determined by adding heat to the vessel, while maintaining the overall
density (vessel blocked-in). Once the initial relief conditions are determined,
DATE:
OPERATIONS
successive expansion calculations shall be employed to determine the maximum
required orifice area of the relief device.
DATE:
3.2 Top Cooling Failure
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
3.2.1 Two separate cases of (1) Loss of overhead cooling with continued reflux and (2)
loss of both overhead cooling and reflux cases shall be considered for columns. The
DATE:
relief requirements for both cases shall be determined by using a process simulator
BY:
and performing a heat and material balance on the system at relief conditions.
CERTIFICATE
3.2.2 The heat input shall be based on the reduced duty (Reboiler Pinch Duty) of the
(DCC) NO. _____________________
reboiler at relieving conditions using clean service UA of the reboiler and column
feed as the cold side fluid. If the reduced duty drops below 50% of the normal duty
REVISION

J99 PP-23189 6
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EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
then 50% of the normal duty shall be used. However, if the bubble point of feed,
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
reflux and bottoms stream at relief pressure exceeds the hot medium inlet
temperature then no vaporization from the reboiler is expected. A 25 % credit for
RUK
RUK
natural convection shall be considered in case of condenser fan motor failure. No

credit for natural convection shall be considered in case of condenser flooding.
3.3 Blocked Outlets

3.3.1 Overpressure due to the blocked liquid or gas outlet manual valve or control valve
shall be considered. The blockage shall be considered in one stream line at a time
DESCRIPTION
with other inlet and outlet streams, cooling and heat input operating normally unless
a common mode failure exists that may block multiple outlets e.g. overhead
compressor trip due to overfilling of compressor suction drum.
3.3.2 A relief device shall be required and shall be sized for full outlet flow from the fired
heater in the event that the upstream pressure source can exceed the design
pressure of the heater coils and the outlet contains a control valve or other back
pressure device. Any relief device should be located at the outlet of the heater tubes
instead of the inlet.
JO/EWO
10-00742
10-00742
10-00742
3.3.3 In the event that the cold side fluid in an exchanger is being vaporized, a relief device
shall be required and shall be sized for the vapor generation rate at the relief
May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
pressure (based on reduced duty of the exchanger and latent heat at the relief
pressure). Note that the latent heat of the cold side fluid shall be determined in the
same manner as described under External Fire.
NO.
REV
C
A
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK
3.3.4 A relief device shall be required where pump deadhead results in overpressure of
downstream equipment. Unless the blockage can result in an increase in suction
DATE: May-14
PROJECT pressure, the dead head pressure shall be based on normal suction pressure. For
ENGINEER
new pumps, the pump dead head may be assumed no less than 150 % of pump
maximum discharge pressure under normal operating conditions.
DATE:
CERTIFIED
3.3.5 In the event that the turbine outlet or downstream piping could be over pressured by
DATE:
the upstream fluid pressure, a relief device shall be required on the outlet of the
CONSTRUCTION turbine and it shall be sized for full outlet flow from the turbine.
AGENCY
3.3.6 Residual heat duty of a furnace in case of a forced reboiler pump shutdown shall be
DATE:
OPERATIONS 40 % of the design duty of the furnace. No credit for furnace trip due to ESD
activation shall be taken.
DATE:
3.4 Abnormal Heat Input
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
3.4.1 Overpressure due to the abnormal heat input either from a feed stream or from an
exchanger with heating media valve stuck open shall be considered while rest of the
DATE:
system operates normally.

BY:
CERTIFICATE
3.5 Instrument Air Failure


(DCC) NO. _____________________
3.5.1 Overpressure due to instrument air failure shall be considered with all the control
REVISION

J99 PP-23189 7
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PMT OPRNS
valves at their fail safe positions.
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
3.6 Overfilling
RUK
RUK
3.6.1 Overfilling of columns and vessels shall be considered for the purposes of this study.
Overfilling shall be considered unless the time to fill the column or vessel is greater
than 20 minutes. For overfilling of the vessels the liquid inside the vessel shall
assumed to be at high liquid level based on the set level alarm.
3.7 Opening of Manual Valves

DESCRIPTION
3.7.1 Overpressure due to the inadvertent opening of manual valves not associated with
control valve bypasses that have a normal upstream pressure in excess of the
downstream MAWP plus accumulation shall be considered.
3.7.2 Simultaneous inadvertent opening of multiple normally closed block valves in series
or a normally closed block valve fitted with a blind shall not be considered a viable
scenario.
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3.8 Automatic Control Failure
3.8.1 All automatic control valves shall be assumed to have the potential to be full open
May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
regardless of fail position. The required flow shall be based on the normal flow
through the wide-open control valve using the normal upstream operating pressure
NO.
REV
and downstream relief pressure.

C
A
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK 3.8.2 If no single contingency could result in an upstream control valve failure/bypass
DATE: May-14
opening and simultaneous blockage of the outlet flow from the downstream
PROJECT equipment, the simultaneous failure open of the control valve and the bypass valve
ENGINEER
shall not be considered.
DATE:
CERTIFIED 3.8.3 Loss of liquid level in the upstream high pressure vessel and subsequent gas flow to
the downstream low pressure vessel through a failed open level control valve shall
DATE: be considered. In addition, consideration shall be given to the relative liquid volumes
CONSTRUCTION of the two vessels to determine if a liquid release may occur in the downstream
AGENCY
vessel.
DATE:
OPERATIONS 3.8.4 Inadvertent opening of a control valve manual bypass shall be considered as a
separate contingency assuming that the control valve is in its closed position.
DATE:
However, if a common mode failure exists whereby an automatic bypass and the control
CONTROL NUMBER
-
VERIFICATION
valve rely on a single instrument element (e.g. transmitter or controller), then

EDSD
simultaneous opening of both valves should be considered.

DATE:
BY:
- Also, if operations partially open the manual bypass while the control valve is fully open,
then a simultaneous failure of control valve and its bypass should be considered.
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
3.9 Heat Exchanger Tube Rupture
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
3.9.1 A heat exchanger single tube failure shall be considered when the high pressure side
RUK
RUK
MAWP shall be greater than the hydro test pressure of the low pressure side. The
flow shall be based on the normal high side operating pressure and the low side
relief pressure.
3.10 Power Failure

3.10.1 Overpressure due to complete South Refinery power failure or due to the individual
DESCRIPTION
units local power failure shall be considered. For complete South Refinery power
failure, all electric power equipment shall be considered to be shut down except any
material or energy delivered to South Refinery from North Refinery through electric
powered equipment located in North Refinery. Or, from any electric equipment that
shall be on emergency / alternate power source.
3.11 Mechanical Equipment Failure
3.11.1 Spare pumps or compressors that are normally not in operation shall not be
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considered to be 100% reliable and credit shall not be taken for the spares.
3.12 Steam Out

May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
3.12.1 Overpressure due to steam out during T&I shall be considered with the vessel fully
NO.
REV
isolated and the vent valve inadvertently closed.

C
A
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
RUK 3.13 Depressuring
DATE: May-14
PROJECT
ENGINEER
3.13.1 Technology licensor should be consulted for any stringent depressuring criterion that
is specific to the technology involved e.g. Hydrocracker system may require quicker
DATE:
depressuring rate to mitigate the risk of a temperature excursion in the reactor
CERTIFIED system.
DATE: 3.13.2 Process vessels shall be designed with systems to depressure to 50% of the vessel's
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
design gauge pressure within 15 minutes if:
DATE: a) The vessel contains flammable or potentially toxic liquids with true vapor pressure equal
OPERATIONS to or greater than an absolute pressure of 200 kPa (29 psia) at 54°C (130°F), and
DATE: b) The vessel is designed for pressures equal to or greater than a gauge pressure of 1725
kPa (250 psig).
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
c) Fireproofing of a process vessel exterior may be taken into account in the depressuring
system design for large process vessels, such as surge bullets, fractionation columns
DATE:
BY:
and associated reflux drums according to API RP 521. See API RP 521 for more
information.
CERTIFICATE
3.13.3 For equipment in liquid service, the depressuring rate shall be the rate of vapor
(DCC) NO. _____________________
formed from boiling due to fire heat input and an additional rate to further reduce the
REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
pressure with time.
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
3.13.4 Depressuring shall be assumed to continue for the duration of the emergency. The
RUK
RUK
valves shall be considered to remain operable for the duration of the emergency or
shall be failed in a full-open position. Otherwise, fireproofing of the control signal and
valve actuator or other protective measures (e.g. location of the valve, valve
actuator, and control signals outside the fire area) to assure the appropriate
operability of the valve during a fire requires consideration.
3.14 Reverse Flow

DESCRIPTION
3.14.1 Backflow through series check valves shall be considered when analyzing relief
contingencies where the maximum operating pressure of the high-pressure system is
greater than the low-pressure equipment’s corrected hydrotest pressure.
Consideration shall be given to the potential for backflow through pumps with a
single discharge check valve.
3.14.2 For all the applicable backflow scenarios the entire upstream system, including
vessels, piping and auxiliary devices (e.g. gasketed joints, instrumentation), shall be
JO/EWO
considered for the overpressure scenario.

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3.14.3 For rotating equipment such as reciprocating compressors and positive displacement
May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
pumps with a recycle line installed downstream of the equipment, reverse flow shall
be considered due to opening of the recycle valve.
NO.
REV
C
A
DISCIPLINE 3.14.4 Complete check valve failure shall be assumed for all check valves in series that are
ENGINEER
RUK
not inspected and maintained and for a single check valve regardless if it is
inspected and maintained. The following assumptions shall be made to estimate the
DATE: May-14
PROJECT reverse flow through a failed check valve (select one):
ENGINEER
d) The failed check valve has no flow resistance in the reverse flow direction,
DATE:
CERTIFIED
e) The failed check valve has the same flow resistance in the reverse flow direction as in
DATE:
the forward flow direction,
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
f) The failed check valve is equivalent to an orifice equal to the check valve flow area without
internals.
DATE:
OPERATIONS
3.14.5 For check valves that are internally inspected and maintained but reliability does not
meet the standard criteria, it shall be necessary to estimate the reverse flow. The
DATE:
severity of reverse flow through these check valves depends on the following:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
a) The rigor and experience with the Saudi Aramco’s check valve inspection/maintenance
program,
DATE:
BY:
b) The types of check valves,

CERTIFICATE
c) The fouling nature of the fluid,

(DCC) NO. _____________________
d) The materials of construction,

REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
e) Whether the service is pulsating.
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
3.14.6 Where no specific experience or guidelines exist, the following approach shall be
RUK
RUK
used.
a) Where multiple check valves in series are inspected and maintained, it shall be assumed
that the smallest check valve has completely failed and all other inspected and
maintained check valves have severe leakage. Two methods shall be followed to
calculate the reverse flow rate. The higher relief rate of the two methods shall be used
for sizing the relief device.
DESCRIPTION
1) The check valve shall be treated as an orifice with a diameter equal to 10 % of the
check valve’s nominal flow diameter (i.e. orifice area equal to 1 % of the nominal flow
area). The reverse flow shall be then calculated using the orifice area, the relief fluid
properties, the maximum operating pressure on the side downstream of the check valve,
and the allowable accumulation on the side upstream of the check valve.
2) The check valve shall be treated as an orifice that is sized to pass 10 % of the normal
forward flow. The orifice area shall be calculated using the normal fluid properties,
maximum operating pressure on the upstream side of the check valve, and the maximum
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operating pressure on the downstream side of the check valve. To determine the reverse
flow rate, the orifice shall be then rated using the relief fluid properties, the maximum
May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
operating pressure on the side downstream of the check valve, and the allowable
accumulation on the side upstream of the check valve.
NO.
REV
C
A
DISCIPLINE
b) The pressures used on each side of the “orifice” can reflect credit for pressure drop in
ENGINEER the piping, valves, and equipment. The hydraulics profile shall be based on the high-
RUK
pressure side at maximum operating pressure and the low-pressure side at allowable
DATE: May-14
PROJECT
accumulation. The hydraulic calculations shall take into account the effect of fluid phase
ENGINEER change during the reverse flow when applicable (e.g. reverse vapor breakthrough).
DATE:
CERTIFIED
3.15 General
DATE:
3.15.1 For Toluene or other organic streams, specific thermodynamics shall be used that
CONSTRUCTION predicts reliable heat of vaporization and thermodynamic vapour-liquid equilibrium.
AGENCY
For typical refinery hydrocarbon streams, Peng-Robinson equation of state may be
used.
DATE:
OPERATIONS
3.15.2 Credit for instrumentation and shutdown systems (such as heat medium to reboilers)
shall not be considered in lieu of pressure relief protection for individual equipment.
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
3.15.3 API orifice areas shall be used in the sizing of relief valves.
EDSD
3.15.4 Two phase and flashing liquid nozzle and pipe flow calculations shall be based on
DATE:
the HEM.
BY:
CERTIFICATE
3.15.5 Inlet pressure drop for the relief valve shall be limited to 3 % of the set pressure and
shall be based on the rated (Actual) relief load. The pressure drop shall be
(DCC) NO. _____________________
considered for non-recoverable losses (friction) only.
REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
3.15.6 Standard operator response time shall be assumed to be 20 minutes.
ENGG CERT
RUK SWM
SWM
SWM
3.15.7 The discharge co-efficient used for sizing of relief valves shall be as follows
RUK
RUK
- Vapor service 0.975.
- Liquid service (liquid certified valves) 0.62

- Liquid service (non-liquid certified valves) 0.65

DESCRIPTION
- Two phase service 0.85.
3.15.8 Pipe roughness used for inlet pipe sizing shall be 0.00015ft, typical for a clean
carbon steel piping.
3.15.9 The simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated causes of overpressure

(double or multiple jeopardies) shall not be considered for the design.
3.15.10 The overpressure considered for valves in fire event shall be 21 % of the set
pressure. In events other than fire case the overpressure considered shall be 10 %
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of the set pressure for single valve and 16 % of set pressure for multiple valves.
May-14
DATE
Apr-14
Apr-14
3.15.11 The constant back pressure to be considered for sizing of the relief valves
discharging to the LP & HP Flare system shall be 1.5 and 2.5 psig, respectively.
NO.
REV
C
A
DISCIPLINE
3.15.12 The MABP considered shall be as follows
ENGINEER
RUK
- Conventional type valves: 10 % of set pressure
DATE: May-14
PROJECT
ENGINEER - Balanced Bellows type valves: 30 % of the set pressure
DATE:
CERTIFIED
- Pilot type valves: Per API 520, 8th Edition (2008)
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
DATE:
OPERATIONS
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________
REVISION

J99 PP-23189 12
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EDSD REV

RTR CLEAN FUELS PROJECT

RAS TANURA REFINERY

3.8.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................ 4

3.8.1.2 Design Basis .............................................................................................................................. 5

ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2

3.8.2 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS & CONTRACTOR SCOPE ............................................................ 13

3.8.3 DESIGN GUIDELINES ................................................................................................................. 15

3.8.3.4 General Requirements ............................................................................................................. 16

3.8.4.3 Utilities ...................................................................................................................................... 22

3.8.5.2 Television Camera Qualified Vendors ...................................................................................... 24

3.8.6.1 Gaseous effluents from Normal Operations ............................................................................. 24

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

PACKAGE#1 – NAPHTHA PROCESSING FACILITY DOC

AIC Analyzer Indicator and Controller

BTU/SCF British Thermal Unit per Standard Cubic Feet

ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2

CCTV Closed Circuit Tele Vision

CFP Clean Fuels Project

DCS Distributed Control System

DGA/SWS Di-Glycol Amine / Sour Water Stripper

FFG Flame Front Generator

FGRU Flare Gas Recovery Unit

GPF Global Power Failure

H2S Hydrogen Sulphide

DATE: Jan 2016 HLL High Liquid Level

DATE: LP Low Pressure

DATE: MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet per Day

NFM Normal Formyl Morpholine

PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis

RTR Ras Tanura Refinery

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

T&I Turndown and Inspection

PACKAGE#1 – NAPHTHA PROCESSING FACILITY DOC

ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

PACKAGE#1 – NAPHTHA PROCESSING FACILITY DOC

ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2

3.8.1.2 Design Basis

molecular seal or equivalent shall be provided in the stacks.

3.8.1.2.1 Header System

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

PACKAGE#1 – NAPHTHA PROCESSING FACILITY DOC

ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2

3.8.1.2.2 Flare Knockout Drums

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

PACKAGE#1 – NAPHTHA PROCESSING FACILITY DOC

3.8.1.2.3 Flare Tips

ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2

3.8.1.2.4 Seal Drums

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

PACKAGE#1 – NAPHTHA PROCESSING FACILITY DOC

ISSUED FOR PROJECT PROPOSAL / ITB-ADDENDUM 2

controlled by an analyzer indicator and controller (AIC) in proportion to the composition of

3.8.1.2.6 Pilot Ignition System

pilots shall be equipped with an automatic electronic igniting device.

recovered gas. For FGRU details and specifications refer to PP-23043

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE