Desiring Recognition, Accumulating Affect

Megan Watkins

In studies of affect much is made of the ways in which it is distinct from emotion.

Against the more social expression of emotion, affect is often viewed as a preliminal,

preconscious phenomenon. A consequence of this is that affect is often conceived as

autonomous and ephemeral. Its immediate impact is highlighted; the ways in which affect

can arouse individuals or groups in some way but then seems to dissipate quickly leaving

little effect.1 While this distinction is a productive one for dealing with particular types of

affective experience, it doesn’t account for the distinction Spinoza makes between

affectus and affectio, the force of an affecting body and the impact it leaves on the one

affected. Affectio may be fleeting but it may also leave a residue, a lasting impression

which produces particular kinds of bodily capacities. As Spinoza explains, ‘the body can

undergo many changes and nevertheless retain impressions or traces . . .’ (III, Post.2). It

is this capacity of affect to be retained, to accumulate, to form dispositions and thus shape

subjectivities that is of interest to me. It suggests that we grapple with this as a pedagogic

process, whereby a sense of self is formed through engagement with the world and others

and the affects this generates. In turning attention to the cumulative aspects of affect,

however, I don’t want to simply invert the focus of scholarly discussion. I am keen to

explore both dimensions of affect, its ability to function as force and capacity, affectus

and affectio. While a discussion of accumulation may seem to emphasize the latter,

affectio is very much a product of affectus, and so affect as force or the processual aspect

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of affect, is in fact embedded in a discussion of affective capacity. Affect is importantly a

relational phenomenon and using an exploration of pedagogy to theorise affect highlights

this relationality.

In this chapter a particular type of pedagogic process is examined –

primary/elementary education – in which the pedagogic relation is that of teacher and

students. Drawing on key figures in the literature of child development – Donald

Winnicott, Daniel Stern, and Lev Vygotsky – this chapter will consider the ways affect is

accumulated within this context and has an enabling effect for both teachers and students.

As such, it addresses issues of both affect and pedagogic theory as each provides a useful

mechanism for exploring the other. Also, while primarily a theoretical explanation of

these issues, reference is made to a study of teaching desire and classroom practice which

illustrates some of these points. In doing so, it calls into question aspects of contemporary

pedagogy which, in placing emphasis on student-directed learning and on-line delivery, is

experiencing a marginalisation of the teacher at all levels of education. To those in charge

of the ‘purse-strings’ this is a pleasing development. ‘Independent learning,’

‘personalised learning,’ ‘self-paced education,’ whatever the nomenclature, the teacher is

being sidelined as learning is reconfigured as an activity independent of teaching or a

body externally directing the process. This move is certainly cost-effective, but is it

pedagogically effective? What’s lost in limiting the teacher’s role, refashioning them as

facilitators or ‘learning managers’ and conceiving learning as primarily an autonomous

activity rather than a process of intersubjective engagement between teacher and

student?2 While this shift has been exacerbated in recent years by the impact of

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Information and Computer Technologies (ICT) and an economic rationalist drive to

minimize teaching costs through the adoption of the on-line delivery of curriculum, the

bifurcation of teaching and learning has a much longer genesis. To many, this rupture

dates from a period in the early 1970s, if not earlier, in which psychology came to

dominate educational thought, a discipline giving emphasis to students as agents of their

own learning (Walkerdine 1984; McWilliam 1996; Vick 1996; Watkins 2005). The

scientific ‘truths’ framing psychology gave credence to the much older progressivist

educational tradition which places a similar emphasis on the ‘natural’ development of the

child, viewing learning – as did Piaget – as primarily a function of maturation

discounting the effect of social intervention.

In exploring these issues I also want to give consideration to a notion of

recognition which is a fundamental aspect of the pedagogic process. This is not simply in

terms of a student desiring the recognition of their teacher but also the teacher desiring

the recognition of their students. This pedagogic relation involves a process of mutual

recognition realised as affective transactions which at one and the same time can cultivate

the desire to learn, and the desire to teach. It is interesting, therefore, that current

pedagogic practice seems to want to minimize contact between teacher and student and

encourage independent learning over whole-class instruction. While independent enquiry

may be a long-term objective, with students having less reliance on the teacher as they

move into the later years of school and onto tertiary study, independence in learning is

something that is acquired over time and it is the teacher’s role to help instill the

knowledge and bodily capacity for students to work in this way. It does not seem an

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effective pedagogy for the early years of school or, for that matter, as the sole approach to

learning in the later years. The teacher, whether at a kindergarten level or as a PhD

supervisor, has a significant role to play in scaffolding their students’ learning in the

acquisition of more sophisticated levels of competence. This is a view shared by Probyn

in her account of the affective dimensions of teaching (2004). In seeing herself as ‘first

and foremost a teacher,’ she is critical of the impact of so-called progressive thinking on

tertiary education and the relatively uncritical embrace of the on-line delivery of

curriculum (Probyn 2004, 21). She refers to Brabazon’s work in this area which points

out that, despite the flexibility of on-line learning, students ultimately ‘want to be taught

in interesting ways by teachers’ (Brabazon 2002). Given the current move away from

teacher direction, however, in a recent study I conducted into these issues in the primary/

elementary years of school, teachers were reluctant to foreground their role in their

students’ learning (Watkins 2007). Whole-class instruction, in particular, was not deemed

‘appropriate pedagogy’ and yet, in discussing their practice, it became clear that not only

was the teachers’ desire to teach more obviously realised through this pedagogic mode,

they also considered this a more effective means of curriculum delivery. This suggests

something about the role of affect and recognition in teaching and learning.

Before considering this in relation to one of the teachers in the study mentioned, I

want to explore the connection between recognition and pedagogy more generally and to

then draw upon the child development studies of Winnicott, Stern and Vygotsky to

examine the influence of affect, in particular the ways in which it accumulates in the

process of learning.

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 Recognition and Pedagogy (A)

Progressivist critiques of teacher-directed learning such as those provided by

theorists of critical pedagogy, notably Giroux (1983, 1988) and McLaren (1989) tend to

focus on issues of power and what they see as a misuse of teacher authority. Their vision

of a transformative pedagogy is reliant on problematising teacher authority and

redirecting power into the hands of students giving them responsibility for their own

learning. Current perceptions of recognition within critical and cultural theory view

power in a similar way. As Yar explains, ‘Recognition is taken as the instantiation of an

economy of power which produces objectified and subjugated subjects, and/or as the sine

qua non of an ontology which reduces alterity, otherness and difference to the identitarian

totality of the same’ (Yar 2001, 57). While Yar’s comments are a critique of the use of

recognition in examinations of identity politics, they are of particular relevance to the

negative perceptions of teacher-directed learning. A focus on a teacher’s delivery of

curriculum is seen to be at the expense of student learning with the teacher imposing their

own knowledge upon students, limiting classroom interaction and acting in a potentially

abusive manner by exerting their influence in an attempt to gain the recognition of their

students.

While little explicit treatment has been given to issues of recognition in discussion

of pedagogy, where it is evident, as in the work of Bourdieu, it is viewed in a similarly

negative light. To Bourdieu the search for recognition actually provides the motor for

pedagogic work but to him this is problematic. He views recognition as a form of

‘symbolic dependence,’ ‘an egoistic quest’ for the approval of others (Bourdieu 2000,

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166). His central concern is for the child and the ways in which the symbolic capital

associated with recognition ‘enables forms of domination which imply dependence on

those who can be dominated by it’ (Bourdieu, 2000). The perspective taken here by

Bourdieu, and others who share an equally pessimistic view of recognition, seems to

confirm Yar’s opinion that there is a tendency within critical and cultural theory to view

Hegel’s model of intersubjectivity in a negative light. As Kellner writes,

The Hegelian Master/Slave dialectic can help characterize relations between

students and teachers today in which teachers force their curricula and agendas

onto students in a situation in which there maybe a mismatch between

generational, cultural and social experiences and even subjectivities. (Kellner

2003, 67)

Of course there is always the potential for the abuse of power, it is the tension

underpinning the master/slave dialectic, but this need not be the case. In a pedagogic

context the dominant position a teacher exerts need not simply be read as a type of carte

blanche for the maltreatment of students. This, however, is the perspective taken by

progressivists who, in an attempt to neutralize this power and tip the balance in favour of

the student, give emphasis to student-directed pedagogies. Benjamin explains, ‘Every

binary split creates a temptation to merely reverse its terms, to elevate what has been

devalued and denigrate what has been overvalued,’ but ‘What is necessary is not to take

sides but to remain focused on the dualistic structure itself’ (Benjamin 1988, 9). This

seems a central point in understanding the pedagogic relation and the role of recognition

within it: the relationship between teacher and student may not be an equal one but its

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success depends upon mutuality, a recognition of worth by both parties with this

intersubjective acknowledgment being integral to their sense of self. Honneth (1995)

takes a similar view in his account of recognition. With a more productive perspective on

Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, he describes how individual subjectivity is premised on

the recognition of others. Power here is not neutralized. Rather, it can be conceived in

Foucauldian terms as not simply repressive but enabling, with the moment of recognition

involving at one and the same time a need for acknowledgement and a confirmation of

self-worth. Integral to this process is the role of affect. Honneth explains, ‘recognition

itself must possess the character of affective approval or encouragement’ (Honneth 1995,

95). Affects, as such, are the corporeal instantiation of recognition; the sensations one

may feel in being recognized which accumulate over time, fostering a sense of self-

worth. Moments of recognition, therefore, function as affective force, or in Spinozan

terms, affectus.

While emphasis here is given to recognition as a positive process with the

elicitation of positive affects, this may not always be the case. Recognition can also

function in a negative way carrying the resultant force of negative affects. In a classroom

context this may involve a student being singled out for poor academic performance or

behaviour which, if a common occurrence, has a detrimental effect on self-worth,

impacting considerably on a student’s desire to learn. Similarly, teachers’ sense of worth

can be shattered by the failure of students to behave and engage in the lessons they

conduct, affecting their desire to teach. Negative affects, however, should not be viewed

as all bad. In terms of subjectivity they may have what seems a contradictory effect. As

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Probyn explains in her account of shame, although a negative affect, it is only possible to

feel a sense of shame if one possesses a degree of interest in the object which engenders

this reaction (2005). Shame, as such, has a positive ethical dimension, an essential

element of being human. Probyn bases this insight on the work of Silvan Tomkins

(1962), who attaches considerable significance to negative affects in the process of

learning. He provides an interesting critique of progressivist education in regard to this

and it is worthwhile to quote him at length on this point.

Although the progressive education movement has stressed the importance of

engaging the positive affects in education there has been a gross neglect of the

significance of the mastery of negative affects. The reason is clear. Since the

opposing philosophy of education had stressed rote, drill and discipline it was a

natural assumption that the mastery of negative factors was restricted to this

particular instance of puritanism and authoritarianism. But even a progressive

philosophy of education must include prominently within its program the

development of those abilities to tolerate negative affects ... (Tomkins 1962, 368)

At Tomkins’s time of writing, progressivism was simply a movement. It was yet

to achieve a position of paradigmatic dominance as has been the case in many Western

countries from the mid 1970s.3 Yet even at this point, prior to its mainstreaming as an

educational philosophy, Tomkins was of the view that with an overemphasis on praise

and positive reinforcement progressivism failed to adequately equip students with the

resources to counter, and perhaps more importantly accept, criticism which is an

important aspect of learning.

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 Recognition and Affect (A)

A more positive interpretation of recognition which highlights reciprocity over

domination, sociality over individuation, is characteristic of much recent work in the field

of child development studies, as in the work of Stern (1985) — as well as the earlier work

of theorists such as Winnicott (1965, 1978, 2006) and Vygotsky (1986). Within a

psychoanalytic framework there has been a shift in emphasis away from an understanding

of the development of the infant psyche as based upon a Freudian model of ‘the drive

ridden ego’ to one which relies upon interaction with significant others, and especially,

the mother; a move, therefore, from the oedipal to the pre-oedipal, father to mother

(Brennan 2004, 33). This shift within psychoanalytic thought has major implications for

the study of pedagogy and, in particular, theorising the nature of the pedagogic relation.

Yet notions of the solitary ego and an uncomfortable immersion in the social or

symbolic prevail. Bourdieu, for example, ponders the move from ‘a narcissistic

organisation of the libido in which the child takes himself as an object of desire to

another state in which he orients himself towards another person, thus entering the world

of object relations’ (Bourdieu 2000, 166). In discussing this transition, Bourdieu refers to

the ‘sacrifice of self-love’ in which engagement in the social is represented as a loss,

hence his negative perception of recognition as a loss of self. Given that Bourdieu’s logic

of practice is grounded in the notion of habitus, the embodiment of social structures

which in turn structure individual action, this seems an unusual position on his part as it

emphasizes reproduction over agency, the oft made criticism of the habitus. Yet, as Noble

explains, despite its usefulness, the focus of Bourdieu’s construct is more about

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explicating social reproduction rather than examining subjectivity and interpersonal

relations (2004). In positioning object relations as a phase following initial preoccupation

with the self – the narcissistic ego – Bourdieu in a sense misrepresents Winnicott’s

perspective on child development.4 Winnicott’s theory of object relations is not about a

move from an orientation of self to other. It is, in many respects, the opposite.

Winnicott’s intention is to explain the process of differentiation. His focus is the

move from what he views as complete union with the mother – hence his famous

declaration that there is no such thing as an infant – to a position of independence as a

separate self with his notion of transitional object mediating the process (Winnicott 1965,

39). In doing this, however, Winnicott gives emphasis to the interaction between mother

and child with the development of self premised on intersubjective engagement.5

Recognition is central to this process. As Kojeve points out, ‘The establishment of one’s

self-understanding is inextricably dependent on recognition or affirmation on the part of

others’ (1969, 11). In explaining the development of a sense of self, the issue for

Winnicott is not simply how we become independent of the other but, as Benjamin

explains, ‘how we actively engage and make ourselves known in relationship to the

other’ (1988, 18). Winnicott stresses that independence is premised on initial periods of

dependence and that this dependence has actually grown out of what he terms ‘double

dependence’ (2006, 5). His reasoning here has much to offer pedagogic theory as if

typifies the mutual recognition underpinning a productive conceptualisation of the

pedagogic relation of teacher and student. Another dimension to how such a connection

with the other frames our notion of self is discussed by Honneth (1995, 99). Drawing on

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Winnicott, he refers to the ways in which infants gain a sense of bodily schema through

the process of being held. Intercorporeality, skin acting on skin, the sense of touch and

the affective realm allows one to know one’s body. A similar perspective is evident in

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body: understanding our somatic selves through

engagement with the world (1999).

In more recent work in the area of child development from the 1980s, Stern gives

a similar emphasis to the role of intersubjectivity in the formation of the self. Yet his

starting point and the way in which he maps development is quite different to that of

Winnicott. To Stern there is no point at which the infant is confused in relation to a sense

of self and other where development entails a process of differentiation. To Stern infants

are ‘predesigned to be aware of self-organising processes’ (1985, 10). He is interested in

how different senses of the self manifest – an emergent self, a core self, a subjective self

and a verbal self – which, to Stern, are not successive phases of development. He

explains that once acquired each of these aspects of self continue to function and remain

active throughout one’s life. These different senses of self are each a product of

increasingly complex forms of relatedness beginning with the mother/child dyad as the

primary relation of intersubjective engagement. This is an accumulation of self that

seems dependent upon an accumulation of affect, which Stern alludes to in his account of

mother/child interaction.

In discussion of this dyadic interaction and the ways in which infants engage with

the world psychologists make reference to what is termed ‘contingent responsiveness,’

that is, the sense of pleasure an infant feels in response to a reaction of which they are the

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cause (Benjamin 1988, 21). This could involve pushing a ball or other toy and the joy that

ensues in making it move. While the infant expresses joy in the response of the inanimate

object, it proves to be more pleasurable if this is accompanied by a reaction from the

mother or significant other. What becomes important in the repeated performance of this

activity is not so much the action itself but the reaction of another subject and the sense

of recognition it generates. This acknowledgement acts as a spur for further action; the

desire for recognition on the part of the infant instills a form of agency in the successful

completion of the process involved in making an object move. In this instance the desire

for recognition is not one-sided, it is mutual. The mother likewise desires the recognition

of her child and gains fulfillment in his or her responsive play. So, despite the differential

power relationship between mother and child, there is both a need to recognise the other

and in turn to be recognized. In discussing this dialogic play between mother and child

Benjamin refers to studies which provide a frame by frame analysis of the facial, gestural

and vocal actions and reactions of both parties that reveals a kind of ‘dance of

interaction’ (1988, 27). Benjamin explains that ‘the partners are so attuned that they

move together in unison’ with this play of mutual recognition seemingly fuelled by affect

(1988, 27).

This interaffectivity is a key concern of Stern. He points out that ‘the sharing of

affective states is the most pervasive and clinically germane feature of intersubjective

relatedness’ (Stern 1985, 138). Elsewhere he stresses that it is only through the intensity

of this form of interaction that infants are able to attain high levels of feeling (Stern 1993,

207). What the infant experiences, however, is not simply joy – this amplification of

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feeling has direct links with cognition. Prior to the work of Tomkins it was felt that affect

and cognition were separate and unrelated functions yet, while affect can operate

independently, Tomkins was able to demonstrate its impact on both thought and

behaviour, in a sense confirming the psychophysical parallelism expounded by Spinoza

and also the relationality of affect (Angel & Gibbs 2006).6 The interrelationship between

affect and cognition and the difficulty in identifying the former’s effect on the latter is

perhaps best demonstrated by an examination of the affect of interest. Tomkins explains

how in his work on the emotions Darwin overlooked interest altogether, confusing it with

the function of thinking (1962, 338). To Tomkins, however, ‘the absence of the affective

support of interest would jeopardize intellectual development no less than destruction of

brain tissue’ (1962, 343).

This relationship between affect and cognition and the heightening of affect that

recognition can evoke is of particular importance to pedagogic theory in terms of what it

suggests about the significance of the pedagogic relation of teacher and student: the ways

in which a teacher’s support influences student learning. While the focus of Stern’s work

is the interpersonal world of the infant, and so his argument about the relationship

between affect amplification and interpersonal engagement relates to the early years of

life, he is also of the view that while adults can reach high levels of joy when alone, this

is largely dependent on an imagined other. Intensification of positive affects – as in

interest – seems a function of engagement with others and, pedagogically, a significant

other. The techniques teachers utilize in classrooms can act as a force promoting interest

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which over time may accumulate as cognitive capacity providing its own stimulus for

learning, a point I will return to below.

Accumulating Affect (A)

In Stern’s discussion of affect, however, he does not simply refer to categorical

affects such as those identified by Tomkins. He also documents what he terms ‘vitality

affects’ – ‘those dynamic, kinetic qualities of feeling . . . that correspond to the

momentary changes in feeling states involved in the organic processes of being alive’

(Stern 1985, 156).7 He explains: ‘They concern how a behaviour, any behaviour, all

behaviour is performed, not what behaviour is performed’ (Stern 1985, 157, emphasis in

original). This notion of vitality affects seems to nicely complement specific categories of

affect as together they can account for the ongoing interaction between self and other,

self and world. These may peak at particular intervals with the experience of positive

affects, such as joy or interest, or negative affects, such as shame or disgust, but, although

the general flow of sensation – what Stern nicely terms ‘the interpersonal traffic of

feeling’ – is decidedly less intense, it still possesses an affective quality contributing to

different states of being. Affect, as it is understood here, is not viewed as simply transient

in quality. These states of being are not only momentary. Through the iteration of similar

experiences, and therefore similar affects, they accumulate in the form of what could be

considered dispositions that predispose one to act and react in particular ways.

In much of the quite diverse literature on affect, from psychology and philosophy,

cultural studies and literary theory, this ability of affect to accumulate is either denied or

rarely made explicit. Affect, as a bodily phenomenon, is typically conceived as fleeting

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whereas emotion, with its cognitive dimension, is viewed as long-lasting, triggered on an

on-going basis throughout one’s life 8. Massumi, for example, sees emotion as the capture

of affect given that the latter ‘escapes confinement’ (2002, 35). Nathanson similarly

explains that ‘affect lasts but a few seconds’ (1992, 51). From his perspective ‘affect is

biology whereas emotion is biography’ (Nathanson 1992, 50). In making this distinction

Nathanson does point out that ‘an organism’ has the ability to retain and store

information, but this storage capacity seems almost exclusively a mindful phenomenon,

namely as memories that produce emotion. Affect, as such, is viewed as the biological

component of emotion. While this may be the case, affect also operates independently,

accumulating as bodily memory that, while both aiding cognition and inducing

behaviour, may evade consciousness altogether. This is perhaps best demonstrated by an

example offered by Shouse (2005). He recounts the case of an elderly female patient of

the neurologist Oliver Sacks who suffered an accident and lost all feeling in her legs for a

period of three years. Continued therapy to help her regain mobility proved unsuccessful

until Sacks noticed that her foot would tap in time involuntarily when she listened to

music. After a change to music therapy, the patient eventually made a full recovery.

Shouse uses this case to highlight how affect trumps will, with the recollection of music

stored in the body prompting the woman’s leg to move. He also feels that it shows how

affect always precedes both will and consciousness.

Something, however, seems to be missing from this analysis. While Shouse points

out how the body is continually affected by numerous stimuli which it in turn ‘infolds,’

registering them as intensities, this does not capture the ways in which affect actually

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accumulates in the body nor the role of pedagogy in the process. This woman’s

involuntary tapping of her foot to music seems to indicate a lifetime of listening to music,

perhaps learning an instrument or how to dance and embodying particular rhythms.

Affect here does not so much precede will and consciousness, it simply evades or

bypasses them, provoking habituated behaviour stored in what could be termed ‘muscular

memory’: the ‘motor significance’ of which Merleau-Ponty writes.9 This is not to suggest

that affect always operates independently. As mentioned, affect provides a motivating

force for consciousness. But while stressing their relationship, it is important to maintain

an analytic distinction between mind and body, consciousness and unconsciousness,

emotion and affect given the pedagogic implications of each category. Also, my interest

is not so much the role of emotions within education but that of affect and the ways in

which its accumulation within the body can promote the desire and capacity to learn.

Affect and the Pedagogic Relation (A)

It is this ability of affect to accumulate and its relationship to recognition that I

want to consider in terms of the interaction of teacher and students, particularly on a

whole-class basis, and the ways in which teaching and learning seem fuelled by these

interconnected processes. Learning, needless to say, is generally conceived as a cognitive

activity. While it has an affective dimension this seems to receive very little theoretical

explication. The connection Tomkins makes between affect and cognition has been

mentioned. Stern, similarly, is of the view that ‘affective and cognitive processes cannot

be readily separated’ and explains how ‘Learning itself is motivated and affect laden’

(Stern 1985, 42). This is a view shared by the early 20th century Russian psychologist Lev

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Vygotsky, a leading figure in the field of child language development. He was interested

in the relationship between intellect and affect and remarked that, ‘Among the most basic

defects of traditional approaches to the study of psychology has been the isolation of the

intellectual from the volitional and affective aspects of consciousness’ (Vygotsky 1987,

50). Within education Vygotsky is best known for his theory of the Zone of Proximal

Development or ZPD which refers to the gap between children’s actual development

determined by independent problem solving and their potential development achieved

when assisted (Vygotsky 1986, 187).Vygotsky was interested in the benefits of play and

peer support in learning but attributed greater significance to the role of teachers and the

support they provided students. He was actually a fierce critic of the progressivist free

education movement prevalent in the Soviet Union during the 1920s (van der Veer &

Valsiner 1991, 53) and claimed that, ‘Instruction is one of the principal sources of the

schoolchild’s concepts and is also a powerful force in directing their evolution; it

determines the fate of [their] total mental development’ (Vygotsky 1986, 157).

While Vygotsky gave some account of the influence of affect on language, due to

his untimely death, he was never able to elaborate his ideas about affect and learning

(Vygotsky 1986). Given more recent developments in this field, as in the work of Stern, it

seems affect and interaffectivity could be especially useful in the theorisation of

pedagogic practice and engagement in learning, allowing for a more positive

interpretation of the teacher’s role in line with Vygotsky’s notion of the ZPD.

These ideas came to mind as I was interviewing teachers as part of a study into

teaching desire – a notion that can be understood as a double articulation of both the drive

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or motivation to teach and the engagement to learn that this can promote in students. As

less and less emphasis seems to be placed on whole-class instruction, with a preference

for independent and group-based learning, especially in primary/elementary school

contexts, I was keen to investigate which pedagogic modes teachers considered the most

effective and which gave them the greatest sense of satisfaction. The study involved

interviews with twelve teachers and their principals in three schools within the Sydney

metropolitan area of New South Wales (NSW), Australia. The teachers taught a spread of

grades, from kindergarten to 6th Grade, and ranged in age from 22 to 64, possessing,

therefore, a range of experience and understanding of the profession. The schools

similarly represented a diverse group in terms of geographic location across Sydney and

the socio-economic status (SES) and ethnic mix of students. The focus here, however, is

not so much the study, which is discussed in detail elsewhere (see Watkins 2007).

Instead, I want to refer to a number of teachers’ comments from both this study and an

earlier investigation (Watkins, 2006) and the account that one in particular provided of

her teaching that exemplifies the affective dimensions of pedagogy presented here. My

intention is not to present this example as empirical proof but rather to simply use it to

lend support to the notion of an accumulation of affect and the ways in which more

detailed analysis of the pedagogic relation could prove fruitful in explicating this point.

In interviewing the teachers I began by asking them about their practice and

having them identify their pedagogy as being either more teacher- or student-directed. As

with most of the teachers in this study, Nerida, a 2nd Grade teacher, saw her approach to

teaching as more student-directed or progressivist in design. Nerida was one of the mid-

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career teachers involved in the study. She had been teaching for thirteen years and trained

at a time when emphasis was given to progressivist techniques of teaching and learning, a

perspective still dominant within Australian teacher training institutions. As Nerida

explained,

They encouraged the teacher to be more of a facilitator rather than the person who

stands up the front and gives information. Do you know what I mean? You are

facilitating their learning. You are giving ideas.

Nerida displayed a reluctance to foreground her role in the classroom and her

involvement in her students’ learning. As the interview progressed, however, and she

began to discuss specific examples of her practice, it became clear that her desire to teach

was more obviously realised through whole-class instruction; the actual performance of

teaching and engaging with students. While Nerida seemed unable to explicitly articulate

this desire, there were a couple of teachers who reluctantly did so. Sally, for example, a

more experienced teacher in another school remarked, ‘I have to admit I like my place

upfront and centre for instruction.’ Two other teachers, commenting on what they

considered the key ingredients for effective teaching, pointed out, ‘Getting their attention.

I see it as performing. You need to perform, get them in and keep them there. You need

to be really animated I think to keep their attention.’ A colleague added,

To teach properly you really have to teach. You have to be a teacher out the front

[sic]. I mean I still believe that, I really do. That’s the one thing I’m a great

believer in and really going around to kids on the spot.

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 While not acknowledging the centrality of her position in the classroom, Nerida

took great delight in describing a lesson on syllable poems that had taken place on the

day of the interview which exemplifies this. Nerida was teaching at Spring Hill Public

School located in the more affluent northern suburbs of Sydney with a student population

high in SES but low in the number with a language background other than English. Like

most primary/elementary classes in NSW, Nerida’s 2nd Grade class of 8/9 year olds was

of mixed ability, though in terms of state averages in literacy and numeracy, they were of

a higher standard. In discussing this lesson she explained,

Today it was just one of those lessons where it was like, ‘Wow,’ I wish every day

was like that. And, we made one up together and they were coming up with all

these fantastic descriptive words and this whole year I’ve been drumming it into

them.

She then provided more detail about her role in the lesson:

Well, we made it quite fun. Like I was hopping in and out of them and walking in

amongst them and I‘m going, ‘Okay, what’s another descriptive word about

this?,’ and then they would all cheer and I’d write it on the board. And do you

know what I mean? I suppose it is your personality that comes through.

In explaining the effect of the lesson on both herself and the class, she pointed out

that,

You have the same feeling I think as the kids because they are excited about a

particular activity, or a particular experience and you think ‘Oh!’ You are excited

for them because what you wanted them to learn is what they’re actually learning

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 . . . Yeah. And so they did it and it was just like you could see the kids’ faces. I

mean I know it’s like the cliché thing but you could just tell that they were so into

it.

In this brief account of her lesson Nerida effectively captures the way in which

her pedagogy impacts upon her students. In teaching the class she was not only assisting

them to arrive at a bank of words they could use in their own poems, with this input

acting as an aid to cognition, the desire that was driving this teacher’s performance

seemed translated through the act of teaching into a desire to learn, a potent force or

series of affects that her students embodied prompting their engagement in the lesson.

What is evident here is something akin to the dance of interaction between mother and

child that Benjamin describes, a form of mutual recognition en masse that seems to

captivate both teacher and students, heightening the learning experience and the

effectiveness of Nerida’s pedagogy. As she explains: ‘You have the same feeling.’ This

affect attunement to which Stern refers is amplified here given the whole-class nature of

the learning activity, as opposed to students working independently or in small groups

(1985). This is not simply a dyadic relation of teacher and student but the excitement and

interest that are generated prove contagious with other students keen to be involved as

part of the experience. This contagious nature of affect has been explored by Tomkins

(1962) and more recently by Brennan (2004) who borrows the neurological term

‘entrainment’ in discussing how the nervous and hormonal systems are activated by this

process.

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 The contagion that seems evident from Nerida’s account, and what she sees as the

success of not only her lesson but the poems that the students produced both as a class

and later individually, did not simply result from this singular affective experience. These

effects, and in particular the quality of the writing that the students later produced, seem

indicative of an accumulation of affect. While individuals are innately predisposed to

affective response, much of what we respond to, and how we respond, is a consequence

of learning; the repeated experience of similar affects accumulating in a dispositional

tendency. As Nerida explained, she had spent ‘this whole year drumming it into them.’

Many of her students reacted the way they did as throughout the year she had encouraged

an interest in writing, which this account of her lesson demonstrates, and this interest had

fuelled their desire to learn.10 As Tomkins explains, ‘interest has a physiological function

as an aid to sustained effort’ (1962, 337). In applying themselves as a result of the interest

she promoted, Nerida’s students had embodied the skills to write effectively. As with the

mother/child dyad, however, the relationship between teacher and students is also

unequal, yet this does not rule out the desire for mutual recognition. Despite her dominant

position, Nerida seems intent on acquiring the recognition of her students and it is this

that engenders her desire to teach. Similarly, the students’ desire to please their teacher

serves to promote their engagement in learning and further the interest already ignited

which, as Nerida recounts, is clearly evident in the expression on their faces, what

Tomkins considers the primary site of affect.

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 Concluding Remarks (A)

What this example suggests is that pedagogy plays an important role in the

accumulation of affects that can generate a desire to learn. The role of the teacher,

however, seems central to this process, as Vygotsky demonstrates in relation to his notion

of a ZPD. Rather than emphasizing the potential abusive nature of this relation, it is

important to stay mindful of the insights provided by child development studies which

emphasize the intersubjective nature of the formation of self and the important role of

recognition within this. As Reed explains, ‘Becoming a self is something one cannot do

on one’s own; it is an intensely social process’ (1995, 431). The social, however, as it is

embodied as an ongoing series of affective transactions, needs to be conceived as not

only a source of subjection but as a site of possibilities. It is cogent to conceive of

teaching desire in much the same way; that is, as a force with productive potential.

Giving emphasis to learning over teaching de-emphasises the teacher’s role and the

potentially powerful ways in which recognition and interaffectivity can augment the

pedagogic process. While power may be ever present, it provides the means through

which agency is achieved. As such, the transformative potential of education can be more

effectively theorized as for too long it has been clouded by the tired critique of both

reproduction models and critical pedagogy that seek to downplay the role of the teacher

and give students responsibility for their own learning; assuming power is only a force to

be resisted rather than embodied as capacity with agentic potential.

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 Notes (A)

1
There are exceptions to this interpretation of affect. Gregg, for example, examines the

use of affective address employed by key figures in cultural studies, arguing that the

writing technologies they employ do have a lasting political impact (2006).

2
In some cases on-line learning functions as an intersubjective experience between

teacher and student but, given the exchange is mediated by technology, the kind of affect

that is produced is quite different.

3
For an historical account of the impact of progressivism, please refer to Cope, Bill and

Kalantzis, Mary. Histories of Pedagogy, Cultures of Schooling in The Powers of Literacy

eds. Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis. London: The Falmer Press, 1993.

4
Piaget theorises this move in a similar way as is evident in his examination of the

transition from what he refers to as ‘egocentric’ to ‘social’ speech (1997).

5
In much of the child development literature reference is made to the mother/child dyad.

Contact with the mother is viewed as the primary initial relationship of the infant. While

in many cases fathers now take a much more significant role in raising children in

contemporary Western society, the term ‘mother’ is used here rather than ‘caregiver’

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given the mother generally retains a more significant role, particularly during the first 6

months in which breastfeeding occurs. Also much of the research drawn upon here makes

use of this term.

6 More recent work in neuroscience confirms the interaction between neural systems of

emotion and those underlying cognitive functioning. See Phelps, E. A. (2005, 52) on this

point who explains that, ‘These interactions have prompted a reconsideration of the

appropriate role of emotion in efforts to understand cognition.’

7
Stern actually makes reference to three categories of affect: categorical affects, vitality

affects and relational affects (1993). He explains that this third category or ‘register of

feelings’ operates in parallel with the other two and concerns the feelings of being loved,

hated, secure etc. While Stern is of the view relational affects cannot be reduced to the

categorical or vitality affects and so must form a separate type, I do not find this a

particularly useful distinction as, it could be argued, that most affects are relational when

they involve another animate body.

8 For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between affect and emotion see

Watkins (2006).

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9
Maria Montessori makes use of the term ‘muscular memory’; a form of bodily know-

how required to successfully perform different tasks (1966, 145). To assist in the

development of physiological movements she advocated that children perform certain

exercises on a repetitive basis to ensure they habituated particular skills.

10
Please see Watkins, which draws on observational data in a classroom with students

exhibiting similar reactions to the techniques their teacher employed (2006).

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