Phil. Trans. R. Soc.

B (2009) 364, 3549–3557

doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0138

Place illusion and plausibility can

lead to realistic behaviour in immersive
virtual environments
Mel Slater1,2,*
1
EVENT Lab, Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior (IR3C), ICREA-University
of Barcelona, 08035 Barcelona, Spain
2
Department of Computer Science, University College London, London WCIE 6BT, UK
In this paper, I address the question as to why participants tend to respond realistically to situations
and events portrayed within an immersive virtual reality system. The idea is put forward, based on
the experience of a large number of experimental studies, that there are two orthogonal components
that contribute to this realistic response. The first is ‘being there’, often called ‘presence’, the qualia
of having a sensation of being in a real place. We call this place illusion (PI). Second, plausibility
illusion (Psi) refers to the illusion that the scenario being depicted is actually occurring. In the
case of both PI and Psi the participant knows for sure that they are not ‘there’ and that the
events are not occurring. PI is constrained by the sensorimotor contingencies afforded by the virtual
reality system. Psi is determined by the extent to which the system can produce events that directly
relate to the participant, the overall credibility of the scenario being depicted in comparison with
expectations. We argue that when both PI and Psi occur, participants will respond realistically to
the virtual reality.
Keywords: virtual reality; virtual environment; presence; telepresence; plausibility

1. INTRODUCTION
The technology for immersive virtual reality (IVR)
has existed for 40 years, initially as a demonstrated
laboratory-based idea (the ultimate display)
(Sutherland 1965) and for the past 20 years as practi-
cal, affordable and useful systems. The vast majority of
research and development in this area has been to use
it as a way to simulate physical reality. Yet it is a
medium that has the potential to go far beyond any-
thing that has been experienced before in terms of
transcending the bounds of physical reality, through
transforming your sense of place and through non-
invasive alterations of the sense of our own body. In
other words, virtual reality has rarely been seen as a
medium in its own right, as something that can
create new forms of experience, but rather as a
means of simulating existing experience (Brooks Jr
1999). As has been mentioned before (Pausch et al.
1996), it is much like both cinema and television in
their early days, which were used essentially as a
medium for theatre. Our approach is to treat virtual
reality as providing a fundamentally different type of
experience, with its own unique conventions and pos-
sibilities, a medium in which people respond with their
whole bodies, treating what they perceive as real.
This paper presents concepts that may help towards
understanding how IVR has the power to transform
place and even self-representation. These concepts
are immersion, place illusion (PI), plausibility illusion
*melslater@ub.edu
One contribution of 17 to a Discussion Meeting Issue ‘Computation
of emotions in man and machines’.
3549
(Psi) and the fusion of these last two in the notion of a
virtual body. Throughout this paper I use the notation
PI to represent place illusion and Psi to represent
plausibility illusion. The reason for this is that we do
not want the everyday meaning, for example, of
‘plausibility’, to intrude but rather only the specific
meanings that we give to these concepts.
2. IMMERSION AND SENSORIMOTOR
CONTINGENCIES
An ideal IVR system will typically consist of a set of
displays (visual, auditory, haptic) and a tracking
system. The computer maintains a dynamic database,
which is a digital description of an environment, and
the displays are continually rendered from this. The
visual images displayed will be determined as a func-
tion of at least the position and orientation of the
human participant’s head, enabled through head
tracking, and ideally should also include tactile,
force-feedback, heat and smell displays so that all of
the senses may be catered for. A typical IVR system
today delivers stereo vision that is updated as a func-
tion of head tracking, possibly directional audio and
sometimes some type of limited haptic interface. For
example, the Cave (Cruz-Neira et al. 1993), is a
system where between four and six walls of an approxi-
mately 3 m3 room are back-projected stereo projection
screens. The images are determined as a function of
head tracking so that, at least with respect to the
visual system, participants can physically move
through a limited space and orient their head arbitra-
rily to be able to perceive (but not necessarily from
This journal is q 2009 The Royal Society
3550 M. Slater Realistic behaviour in virtual reality
all directions—depending on how many screens there
are). Audio is typically delivered by a set of speakers
in unobtrusive positions around the Cave.
In a head-mounted display (HMD), the displays are
mounted close to the eyes and head tracking ensures
that the left and right images are updated according
to the head movements of the participant with respect
to the underlying virtual environment. The separated
left and right images for each eye ensure stereo
vision. Audio would be delivered via earphones. The
participant has the illusion of moving through a
surrounding, three-dimensional environment that con-
tains static and dynamic objects, including possibly
representations of other people (sometimes real
people in remote physical locations or virtual people
controlled wholly by a computer program). Partici-
pants can effect changes in the environment—for
example, if at least one hand is tracked, then the par-
ticipant can grab objects and move them to different
locations, or carry out a variety of other types of inter-
action. Further details of such systems can be found in
Sanchez-Vives & Slater (2005).
Parameters that determine the quality of the experi-
ence include the graphics frame rate (how long it takes
to graphically render the currently visible portion of
the virtual environment), the overall extent of tracking
(apart from head tracking, how much of the rest of
body movement is tracked), tracking latency (how
long it takes before a head movement results in the
correct change in the displayed image), the quality of
the images (how great the brightness, spatial, colour
and contrast resolutions are), the field of view (how
great the visual field of view is compared to what is
possible in normal vision, and how much the displays
surround the participant), the visual quality of the
rendered scene (how much objects appear geometri-
cally to appear like what they are supposed to depict,
and how realistic the illumination is), the dynamics
(how well does the behaviour of objects conform to
expectations) and the range of sensory modalities
accommodated (and within each sensory modality
the fidelity of its displays). In previous work (Slater &
Wilbur 1997) we defined the concept of immersion as
a description of the characteristics of a system: for
example, by definition, one system would be more
‘immersive’ than another if it were superior on at least
one characteristic above—for example, higher display
resolution or more extensive tracking, other things
being equal. Next I discuss a more conceptually
useful way to classify the degree of immersion.
Immersive systems can be characterized by the sen-
sorimotor contingencies (SCs) that they support. SCs
refer to the actions that we know to carry out in order
to perceive, for example, moving your head and eyes to
change gaze direction, or bending down and shifting
head and gaze direction in order to see underneath
something (O’Regan & Noë 2001a,b; Noë 2004).
The SCs supported by a system define a set of valid
actions that are meaningful in terms of perception
within the virtual environment depicted. For example,
turn your head or bend forward and the rendered
visual images ideally change the same as they would
if you were in an equivalent physical environment. If
head tracking was not enabled, then turning your
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
head would have no effect, and therefore such an
action could not be useful for perception. I define
the set of valid sensorimotor actions with respect to a
given IVR system to be those actions that consistently
result in changes to images (in all sensory modalities)
so that perception may be changed meaningfully. I
define the set of valid effectual actions as those actions
that the participant can take in order to effect changes
in the environment. I call the union of these two sets
the set of valid actions—the actions that a participant
can take that can result in changes in perception or
changes to the environment.
For example, consider an environment displayed
visually through a head-tracked HMD. A participant
in such an environment can usually quickly learn the
effect of head movements on visual perception—the
SCs. Such head movements will be valid sensorimotor
actions. However, suppose the participant reaches out
to touch a virtual object, but feels nothing because
there is no haptics in this system. Here, the reaching
out to touch something is not a valid sensorimotor
action for this IVR. Now imagine an environment dis-
played visually on a large back-projected screen—again
with head tracking. However, now when the partici-
pant looks far enough to one side visual elements
from the surrounding real world would intrude into
the field of view. Actions that result in perception
from outside the virtual environment are also not
valid sensorimotor actions. Suppose in either system
the participant wears a tracked data glove, which is
represented as a hand within the virtual environment.
When this virtual hand intersects an object and the
participant makes a grasping gesture, then the object
might be selected and moved to another place. This
would be an example of a valid effectual action. With-
out the data glove, the moving and grasping action
would have no effect, and therefore would not be a
valid effectual action. With today’s generally available
technology, participants will not experience a virtual
reality system with generalized haptics, so that this
dimension of SC will always fail if tested—for example,
if a participant in a virtual reality touches some arbi-
trary virtual object they would feel nothing. The
whole aspect of physicality is typically missing from
virtual environment experiences—collisions do not
typically result in haptic or even auditory sensations.
There is a fundamental difference between an
immersive and non-immersive system: in an ideal
immersive system it is possible in principle to fully
simulate what it is like to go into a non-immersive
system. For example, using a head-tracked HMD
with appropriate haptics and sound, it is theoretically
possible to construct a virtual environment in which
a participant can virtually carry out all of the actions
of sitting down at a desktop display, and experience
that situation as a scenario within the virtual reality.
However, this property of immersive systems is not
symmetric—it is not possible inside a non-immersive
display to simulate all of the actions of what it is like
to go into an immersive system. The physical capabili-
ties of these systems do not allow this. With an HMD
without tracking it would not be possible to simulate
all of the actions corresponding to going into another
system, but it would be possible in the Cave or

HMD with tracking to simulate what it is like to go
into an HMD without tracking. Hence there is a natu-
ral set of equivalence classes, of systems that can be
used to approximately simulate one another (e.g. in
principle it is possible to approximately simulate the
Cave in an HMD, and simulate an HMD in the
Cave, so these are in the same equivalence class).
They are all varying degrees of direct simulations of
physical reality.
In a system such as the Cave it is possible to use its
associated valid actions to produce the SCs necessary
to ‘perceive’ a virtual environment displayed (for
example) on a desktop system. It is not possible to
use the valid actions that one must learn for percep-
tion of a virtual reality displayed through a desktop
system to simulate the valid sensorimotor actions for
perceiving a virtual reality displayed with the Cave.
In this view therefore, we describe immersion not
by displays plus tracking, but as a property of the
valid actions that are possible within the system. Gen-
erally, system A is at a higher level of immersion than
system B if the valid actions of B form a proper subset
of those of A. We refer to an IVR that has a set of valid
actions that are approximations of reality as a first-order
system, with corresponding SCs in at least one sensory
modality. A second-order system is one that has valid
actions as a proper subset of a first-order system, and
so on for lower orders. Of course, unfortunately, true
first-order systems do not exist today.
In this framework, displays and interactive capabili-
ties are inseparable. Consider for example the issue of
display resolution. At first sight this may appear to
have nothing to do with interaction or SCs, but in
fact if the participant wants to examine an object
very closely, then the extent to which this is possible
will be limited by the resolution of the display. Rela-
tively low visual display resolution will mean that the
normal action of bringing an object closer in vision
by moving the body, head and eyes closer to it will
fail earlier than it would in physical reality, and at
different times in different systems.
It should be noted that the level of immersion is
completely determined by the physical properties of
the system—what happens when a participant carries
out a particular act in terms of changes to the displays
is a question of physics—of how the overall physical
virtual reality and computer systems function. In the
next section, we discuss the consequences for partici-
pants of different levels of immersion embodied in
different physical systems.
3. PRESENCE AND PLACE ILLUSION
A system that supports SCs that approximate those of
physical reality can give rise to the illusion that you are
located inside the rendered virtual environment. In the
literature this illusion of location has been referred to
as telepresence or presence—the ‘sense of being there’
in the environment depicted by the virtual reality
system (Held & Durlach 1992; Sheridan 1992;
Barfield & Weghorst 1993; Sheridan 1996; Slater &
Wilbur 1997; Draper et al. 1998; Bystrom et al.
1999; Sanchez-Vives & Slater 2005). The origin of
the concept of presence as a ‘feeling of being there’
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
Realistic behaviour in virtual reality M. Slater 3551
is rooted in teleoperator systems, and is the feeling of
being at the place of a remote physical robot that
the user is operating (telepresence) (Minsky 1980).
In the early 1990s this idea was transplanted to virtual
reality, where instead of being at the remote physical
environment, the participant was in a virtual environ-
ment with a sense of being at the place depicted by
the virtual displays (Held & Durlach 1992; Sheridan
1992).
We reserve the term ‘place illusion’ (PI) for the type
of presence that refers to the sense of ‘being there’.
This terminology is used in order to avoid confusion,
to make it clear that we refer specifically and only to
the strong illusion of being in a place and not to
other multiple meanings that have since been attribu-
ted to the word ‘presence’. It is the strong illusion of
being in a place in spite of the sure knowledge that you
are not there. Since it is a qualia there is no way to
directly measure it. However, indirect assessments
based on questionnaires, physiological and behavioural
responses have been used, all of which in some way
compare responses with those that would have been
expected in real experiences.
Note that a system with valid sensorimotor actions
that have the same range as in physical reality is not
sufficient to support SCs that approximate those of
physical reality. Imagine a participant viewing a virtual
environment through a head-tracked HMD, but with a
very narrow field of view (say 108 horizontally instead
of the more than 1808 of natural vision). Now since the
HMD has head tracking, the participant can look
around the scene and visually perceive by the full
range of head movements possible with natural
vision. But since the visual capture is significantly
less than that in normal vision the participant would
have to learn how to perceive in a different way, with
greater head movements and patterns of head move-
ments to obtain the same information compared to
normal. This is not to say that eventually with suffi-
cient movement and after a sufficiently long enough
learning period these SCs would not become ‘normal’.
What is left of the distinction between immersion
and PI? PI occurs as a function of the range of
normal SCs that are possible. But we have also defined
immersion in terms of the range of SCs that are poss-
ible, and an immersion hierarchy formed by the extent
to which one system can be used to simulate another.
Apparently PI like immersion has become essentially a
property of the physics of the situation. By definition if
a person perceives the virtual world making use of
motor actions to perceive in the same way as perceiving
the real world, but on the other hand knows that this
is a virtual reality, then this must give rise to PI
(how could it not?). But this would also be the most
immersive system. So, are PI and immersion now the
same from this point of view?
Suppose there are two participants who each in turn
enter into an immersive system (for example, the Cave
system). Person A experiences a low level of PI and B a
high level. Clearly, if immersion and PI were identical
then this could not occur. But in fact it could occur
(irrespective of individual differences between A and
B). Suppose person B stands in more or less the
same position and simply looks around, whereas
3552 M. Slater Realistic behaviour in virtual reality
person A moves around, looks closely at objects,
touches them and so on. Person A will quickly reach
the bounds of resolution of the system, and see
pixels. Moreover, A will expect, touch and feel noth-
ing, except when bumping into the physical Cave
walls—a break in PI, since this is a perception from
outside the virtual environment (Garau et al. 2008).
Person A is probing the bounds of perception to a
much greater extent than B, and therefore PI will
have the opportunity to break more often.
Immersion provides the boundaries within which PI can
occur. Only in physical reality is it not normally poss-
ible to break those boundaries (except in illness or
brain damage that disrupts the motor and perceptual
process). In any kind of virtual system there will
always be limits beyond which SCs fail to be appli-
cable. PI occurs to the extent to which participants
probe the boundaries of the system—the more they
probe, the greater the chance for PI-breaks. This is
further discussed in §7.
4. PI IN LOWER ORDER SYSTEMS
Can PI occur in computer games as used on desktop
systems? To what extent can you have a feeling of
‘being there’ with respect to a desktop virtual reality
system? If we consider PI as based on the extent to
which normal SCs apply to perception, then the
answer is ‘you cannot’.
Recall that in principle it is possible to simulate the
playing of a computer game itself inside an immersive
system. In an immersive system you can pull up a
(virtual) chair, sit down, switch on the computer,
etc. The limitation is today’s off-the-shelf technology,
but with sufficient resources such an application
could be built.
Consider one of the claims of the SC approach to
perception: ‘The basic claim of the enactive approach
is that the perceiver’s ability to perceive is constituted
(in part) by sensorimotor knowledge (i.e. by practical
grasp of the way sensory stimulation varies as the percei-
ver moves).’ (Noë 2004, p. 12). This also happens in
computer games, but the type of sensorimotor knowl-
edge is different. To look to the left, users make use
of a joystick or keyboard presses rather than turning
their heads—these would be valid sensorimotor actions.
A whole new array of knowledge is established, which
establishes a particular set of valid actions.
Now return to the question as to whether it is poss-
ible, or indeed whether it makes sense, to talk of PI
within a desktop system such as a computer game or
online systems such as Second Life. Consider the fol-
lowing thought experiment (which as stated above is
realizable today with sufficient resources). A partici-
pant enters an immersive system such as a tracked
Cave or HMD system, and within that system
approaches a (virtual) computer and starts to play a
computer game or Second Life. Now how can we
speak about PI in such a set-up? They can sit by the
(virtual) computer, pay attention to its display and
carry out valid actions with respect to the desktop
system. But the ‘host’ environment, the one in which
this is taking place, is also a virtual environment
here. So where is PI in all this?
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
Just as immersion is bound to a particular set of
valid actions that support perception and effectual
action within a particular virtual reality, so it is reason-
able to consider that the same is the case with respect
to PI. PI is bound to the particular set of SCs available
to allow perception within that environment. In other
words we can only ever talk about conditional PI with
respect to a particular type of system—more specifi-
cally within a particular equivalence class of such
systems (Slater et al. 1994). Moreover, the types of
PI that are possible are qualitatively different for each
equivalent class, and the responsive actions that it can
support will also be qualitatively different. When talk-
ing of a system that has SCs roughly equivalent to
physical reality, a participant can experience the
qualia ‘just like being there’, meaning that the partici-
pant carries out the same physical actions in order to
achieve approximately the same changes in perception
as in physical reality. It is an illusion of being there
made possible wholly by the physical set-up of the
system in conjunction with the extent to which the par-
ticipant probes the system. Now compare this with a
desktop computer game. People can report a feeling
of ‘being there’ to the extent that they engage in
additional mental recreation that transforms their actions
for perception into the feeling of being in a space in
which they are clearly not located according to the
rules of real-world SCs.
One consequence that follows from this is that when
a participant in a virtual reality is asked to report,
say in a questionnaire, on their feeling of ‘being
there’, the answers that they give are, strictly speaking,
not comparable across systems with different levels of
immersion, since they are not talking about the same
qualia. In the case of a highly immersive system, the
qualia of ‘being there’ is a direct illusion of the same
type as many visual illusions—it just happens without
trying or doing anything special, as soon as the partici-
pant enters the environment and especially as soon as
they move. In the case of a desktop system the situ-
ation is quite different; the feeling reported as ‘being
there’ if it comes at all is after much greater exposure,
requires deliberate attention and is not automatic—it
is not simply a function of how the perceptual system
normally works, but is something that essentially
needs to be learned, and may be regarded as more
complex.
Evidence suggests that the use of the same ques-
tionnaire to measure presence across different
systems is highly problematic. In Usoh et al. (2000)
it was found that standard questionnaires could not
discriminate ‘presence’ between physical reality and a
low-resolution HMD-delivered virtual reality of the
same scene. Hence, PI is the human response to a
given level of immersion, and is bound by the set of
SCs possible at that level of immersion. The illusion
of ‘being there’ does not refer to the same qualia
across different levels of immersion. The range of
actions and responses that are possible are clearly
bound to the SC set that defines a given level of
immersion.
It may, however, make sense to compare experience
between systems that are in the same immersion equival-
ent class. Imagine comparing different Cave systems or

Caves with HMDs, large power walls and so on. Here
we would be interested in how different features of
these systems trade off against each other—higher
resolution compared to larger space, for example,
and so on.
5. PLAUSIBILITY ILLUSION
While PI is about how the world is perceived, the Psi is
about what is perceived. Psi is the illusion that what
is apparently happening is really happening (even
though you know for sure that it is not). Based on evi-
dence over many experiments, it appears that a key
component of Psi is that events in the virtual environ-
ment over which you have no direct control refer
directly to you.
Consider in a virtual reality that there is the appear-
ance of a woman standing in front of you. Perceptually
there is something there, in the same space as you; for
example, as you shift your head from side to side, her
image in your visual field moves as it would in reality,
and you see things behind her that she had been
obscuring. This is PI. Now she smiles at you and
asks you a question, and you automatically find your-
self smiling back and responding to her question,
even though you know that no one is there. This scen-
ario has been used in a study of how shy males respond
to a forward (virtual) woman—a preliminary report is
available in Pan & Slater (2007). She, the virtual
woman, has looked you in the eye, and spoken to
you. An event (that you did not cause) has related to
you. As another example, suppose you move towards
this virtual woman, and she steps backward. Again,
an event over which you have no direct control (her
step backwards) has related directly to you—this time
to your action. Since you are as real as can be, and
this external sensed world appears to be addressing
you, the reality of that external world is itself
enhanced. See also Heeter (1992), who talks about
this in the context of social conventions such as
handshakes.
Just as PI is maintained through synchronous corre-
lations between the act of moving and concomitant
changes in the images that form perception, so I
posit that an important component leading to Psi is
for the virtual reality to provide correlations between
external events not directly caused by the participant and
his/her own sensations (both exteroceptive and interoceptive).
If we consider the avatar that looks at the
participant in the eye (the external event), this would
be likely to cause a response in the participant that
could be expressed by physiological changes such as
with respect to heart rate, skin temperature (blushing)
and so on—changes associated with the internal feel-
ing provoked by an entity that ‘looks at you’. Seeing
a chair, say, angled in your direction, does not have
the same associated feeling—it is not something
directed at you.
It is important to realize that Psi does not require
physical realism—witness people’s responses in the vir-
tual reprise of the Stanley Milgram obedience
experiment, where it was shown that people exhibit
anxiety responses when causing pain to a relatively
low fidelity virtual character in terms of both visual
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
Realistic behaviour in virtual reality M. Slater 3553
appearance and behaviour (Slater et al. 2006a). The
correlational principle mentioned above produces a
cause – effect relationship. In this case the experimental
participant pressed a button on a supposed electric
shock machine and the virtual character playing the
‘learner’ of Milgram’s paradigm responded with
expressions of hurt and anger. The experimental par-
ticipants responded with increasing anxiety with each
wrong answer given by the learner, administration of
the shock and painful response of the learner. In the
control condition, when this virtual learner response
could not be seen or heard, the anxiety response did
not occur. The virtual learner, although humanoid
in appearance, could never be mistaken for a real
person—with respect to neither appearance nor
movements.
Similarly, people respond according to type when
speaking to an audience of virtual characters—people
with a fear of public speaking react with anxiety
whereas confident speakers do not (Slater et al.
2006b). Paranoia, the complex of having persecutory
thoughts, provides another example. Here, partici-
pants in an immersive virtual environment with
virtual characters tend to report the same kinds of per-
secutory feelings that they would have in similar
situations in reality (Freeman et al. 2003; Freeman
et al. 2005a,b; Valmaggia et al. 2007). In these
examples, virtual characters exhibiting neutral
expressions occasionally look at the participant, in
the context of a public place such as a train journey.
It has been found in several studies that people with
a tendency towards paranoia respond to these virtual
characters with persecutory thoughts, and this has
been demonstrated in a large sample (200) of the
general population (Freeman et al. 2008).
The correlational principle as one of the major fac-
tors leading towards Psi appears to be critical. Here is
another example. There have been various studies of
the visual cliff scenario (Gibson & Walk 1960)
implemented within a virtual environment that is
usually called the ‘pit room’ (Slater et al. 1995). The
participant is in an unusual room where the floor is
just a narrow ledge around an open hole to another
room 6 m below. In one group of experiments the
task of the participants was to get to the other side of
the room. The vast majority of them edge their way
carefully around the ledge at the side rather than
simply gliding across the non-existent (virtual) pit.
The utility of this environment is that the expected
responses are clear: people should show signs of
anxiety.
Usoh et al. (1999) found that subjective reports
of PI were enhanced by participants using their body
to actually walk or simulate walking by walking in
place, compared to simply using a pointing device
and pressing a button to move forward in the virtual
environment. Here appropriate SCs engendered by
using the body (i.e. walk) to perceive led to the
expected increase in PI. Meehan et al. (2002) found
that when a physical plank was registered with the vir-
tual plank, so that participants would feel the plank
itself as they placed their foot on the edge, their anxiety
response (measured here by a change in heart rate) was
significantly higher than when they only saw the plank
3554 M. Slater Realistic behaviour in virtual reality
but felt nothing. Again, SCs (touching) correlated with
vision could be said to have enhanced PI. However,
in another between-groups experiment (Zimmons &
Panter 2003) where different groups of participants
were exposed to the pit room rendered with varying
degrees of visual realism (from wire frame through to
the realistic lighting distribution known as radiosity),
the different rendering qualities made no difference
at all to the responses.
To add further to this we investigated the impact of
the correlational aspect of Psi (Slater et al. 2009). The
environment was rendered with real-time ray tracing in
an HMD, so that when the participants moved they
could see shadows and reflections of their virtual
body move in correlation. Here we compared two pit
environments that were the same, except that one
had moving shadows and reflections of the partici-
pant’s (virtual) body that moved in real time as their
body moved (ray tracing), and the other did not (ray
casting). In a between-groups experiment we found
that arousal and anxiety (as measured by skin con-
ductance, heart rate and heart rate variability) were
higher for the group that experienced the shadows and
reflections than for the other group.
Psi is therefore an illusion akin to PI—one that
occurs as an immediate feeling, produced by some
fundamental evaluation by the brain of one’s current
circumstances—‘is this real?’ Of course, at a higher
cognitive level participants know that nothing is
‘really’ happening, and they can consciously decide
to modify their automatic behaviour accordingly. In
the virtual reprise of the Milgram obedience exper-
iment, more than half of the subjects said afterwards
that it had occurred to them to stop and withdraw
from the experiment, but they did not do so because
they kept reminding themselves that it was not real.
6. THE BODY
In physical reality and first-order virtual reality, there is
something very simple that you can do to physically
establish your presence. Look down, and you will see
your body, or see parts of it continuously in peripheral
vision. For example, wearing an HMD a virtual body
can be portrayed collocated with your real physical
body, so that when you do the same movements that
you would do in physical reality to look at your body,
instead you would see your virtual body. Using
normal actions you know how to change your sensory
stimulation as a function of your actions, and one
action that is not special compared to other actions is
to look down and see yourself.
The body is a focal point where PI and Psi are
fused. As we have argued, the action involved in look-
ing at your own body provides very powerful evidence
for PI (your body is in the place you perceive yourself
to be). However, this virtual body is not yours, it is a
representation of you. In principle, you have no control
over what it does. Now suppose you move your limbs
and you see the limbs of this virtual body move in syn-
chrony. This is a very powerful event in the external
world that clearly relates to you—a correlation between
proprioception and visual exteroception. Further, it is
likely that there would be some degree of ownership
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
over this virtual body—it comes to be ‘really’ to
seem to be your body (even though you know it
cannot be).
Recent research activity in cognitive neuro-
science concerned with body ownership is based on
the paradigm called the ‘rubber hand illusion’
(Botvinick & Cohen 1998; Pavani et al. 2000; Armel &
Ramachandran 2003; Tsakiris & Haggard 2005). In
this case, synchronous tactile stimulation on the person’s
hidden real hand and a visible rubber hand
that is located in a plausible position in front of them
results in the illusion that the rubber hand is their
hand. This illusion is demonstrated behaviourally
through proprioceptive drift, that is participants
blindly point to their felt hand position as the rubber
hand position rather than to their true hand. If the tac-
tile stimulation is not synchronous, then the illusion
does not occur. This has been repeated in a virtual
environment, and ownership of a virtual arm project-
ing in stereo out of the person’s body was evoked
when synchronous visual stimulation to the virtual
hand and tactile stimulation to the real hand were
provided (Slater et al. 2008).
This same type of technique has been extended to
give illusions of whole body displacement (Ehrsson
2007; Lenggenhager et al. 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson
2008)—where the persons (to some extent) feel
themselves located outside their bodies. These are
illustrations of the powerful effects that the types of
correlation that we consider as contributing to Psi
can have. Virtual reality can transform not only your
sense of place, and of reality, but also the apparent
properties of your own body.
7. DISCUSSION
The main hypothesis of this paper is that a participant
in an IVR will respond to a virtual reality as if it were
real as a function of PI and Psi. If you are there (PI)
and what appears to be happening is really happening
(Psi), then this is happening to you! Hence you are likely
to respond as if it were real. We call this ‘response-as-
if-real’ RAIR. This framework (immersion, PI, Psi, the
virtual body) leaves open many important questions.
First, what is the relationship of ‘reality’ to a first-
order system? We said that a first-order system has
SCs that approximate those of reality, but also that if
one system can be used to simulate a second one,
then the second is at a lower level of immersion than
the first. So, is reality at a lower order of immersion
than a first-order IVR? Clearly not, since there must
always be actions that are possible within reality that
are not valid actions of the IVR. If this were not the
case, then the IVR would be indistinguishable from
reality and the issue disappears.
Second, is PI with respect to any particular (equiv-
alence) class of systems measurable? We suggest that
PI should be treated as binary—it is a qualia associated
with an illusion. Either you get the illusion or you do
not—you cannot partially get an illusion. But its
measurement can still be continuous—providing a
kind of fuzzy estimate of PI. Let us consider an
example. Suppose a particular IVR supports SCs
associated with horizontal head rotation, but no

other head rotation. So provided that you look around
while maintaining your eyes approximately in the same
plane, the visual images update appropriately. In other
words, the SCs work only for yaw rotation but not for
pitch and roll. Other things being equal, if a partici-
pant looks around a scene only using yaw head
rotation, there would be uninterrupted PI. However,
as soon as pitch or roll rotations are made, PI would
be broken. If we take as a measure the proportion of
time that the participant makes only yaw head
rotations, then this would be continuous, even
though the underlying phenomenon is binary. This
idea of ‘breaks in presence’ measure was introduced
by Slater & Steed (2000) using a simple Markov
chain stochastic model of transitions between ‘present’
and ‘non-present’ states.
Second, I put forward the idea here that PI can
be different in different modalities. Hence a person
could be in a virtual environment moving through a
virtual cityscape with unbroken PI in the visual
sense, while simultaneously having a conversation
with someone who is outside the virtual environment.
If we notice the behaviours of the participant, they
would probably exhibit strong signs of PI—for
example, moving through the environment making
sure to avoid obstacles. Nevertheless, clearly in the
auditory domain there is no PI. Similarly, one could
have auditory PI (with eyes closed) or haptic PI. It is
my contention that provided there are no inconsisten-
cies between these modalities, there can be PI in one
domain without there being PI in another. This
point is important because I regard PI not as a
cognitive but as a perceptual phenomenon. The
illusion, given the right physical set-up and the appro-
priate SCs in a particular modality, is automatic—it
can coexist with different (but not contradictory)
sensations in another modality.
Third, is Psi measureable? Since this is a new con-
cept for virtual environments, this has not been
previously attempted. However, it is likely that
‘breaks in Psi’ could be usefully employed—when the
participant carries out actions that step outside
the reality of what is occurring in the virtual reality.
For example, a virtual character talks to the participant
who ignores this, or a character breaks social norms
such as those of proxemics, and moves too close to
the participant, who does not respond in any measur-
able way. This would be considered a ‘break in Psi’.
Moreover, experience from many past studies suggests
that breaks in PI and breaks in Psi have different
characteristics. When PI breaks it can quickly
recover—in our example of yaw-only head rotations,
if the participant steps outside this limitation then PI
will break, but recover again as soon as yaw-only
head rotations are resumed. This only emphasizes
that PI is very much a perceptual illusion. On the
other hand when Psi breaks, it is unlikely to recover.
Once you have ceased to accept the ‘reality’ of that
virtual character, for example, Psi does not usually
reform again. For examples, see the report by Garau
et al. (2008).
Finally, there is likely to be another layer of Psi that
has not been considered in this paper. We have con-
sidered Psi as an automatic and rapid response of the
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
Realistic behaviour in virtual reality M. Slater 3555
human participant to the important issue—is this
really happening? Now, of course, the participant
knows that it is not happening, and this cognitive
knowledge can certainly dampen down or entirely
change responses away from the instinctive first reac-
tions (to smile back at the character smiling at you,
but then thinking—why am I doing this, there is no
one there?—and consequently stop smiling and
ignore the character). We here put forward the idea
that the maintenance of these types of reactions may
depend on the credibility of the events that are
taking place—how much do they conform to expec-
tations of what would normally happen in the
circumstances portrayed? This layer of conformity
with expectation, with prior knowledge and beliefs,
must also play a very important role in maintaining
the illusion that the events occurring are true. This is
particularly important when the IVR is used to con-
struct an environment that is intended to study the
behaviour of people in specific circumstances. For
example, we have recently started a project on the
use of virtual reality for understanding people’s
responses to violence. Here RAIR is of fundamental
importance—otherwise the enterprise would not be
useful. We not only have to take into account Psi
as achieved by events that are in relation to the partici-
pants (e.g. a person involved in a violent confrontation
looks directly at the participant and speaks to him or
her), but also of critical importance is the credibility
of the scene itself. If unfolding violence, for example,
in the context of a fight between rival football suppor-
ters, does not occur in a way that appears realistic to
the participant, then they are not likely to exhibit
RAIR. Therefore, in designing any virtual environ-
ment it is particularly important to model the events
and interactions so that they depict a likely scenario.
In this sense Psi is far more difficult to achieve
than PI. The latter relies on a set-up that supports
essential SCs, a matter that depends on the physical
system of tracking and displays, and the implemen-
tation of the algorithms needed to use these.
Moreover, it is known that people can within limits
be unaware of the exact consequences of their motor
actions, so that there is some leeway in the accurate
representation of their movements (Fourneret &
Jeannerod 1998). However, Psi requires a credible
scenario and plausible interactions between the parti-
cipant and objects and virtual characters in the
environment—with very little room for error. A
conclusion is that the area of Psi is now a more fruitful
and challenging research area than PI.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We have previously defined presence in virtual reality
as the extent to which people respond realistically
within a virtual environment, where response is taken
at every level from low-level physiological to
high-level emotional and behavioural responses
(Sanchez-Vives & Slater 2005). Although we stand
by this approach, we find the terminology problematic.
The word ‘presence’ has come to have multiple mean-
ings, and it is difficult to have any useful scientific
discussion about it given this confusion. We suggest,
3556 M. Slater Realistic behaviour in virtual reality
for the sake of clarity, an alternative terminology. We
have called PI the ‘being there’ qualia that was referred
to as ‘presence’ in the original literature: it is the feel-
ing of being in the place depicted by the virtual
environment (even though you know that you are not
there). We call the Psi the illusion that what is happen-
ing is real (even though you know that it is not real).
Different levels of immersion are defined by the
SCs for perception that they support. A first-order
immersive system has SCs that are similar to those of
everyday reality. A second-order system can be simu-
lated within a first-order system and so on. In a first-
order system PI is made possible as a consequence of
the physics of the set-up. PI may temporarily break,
and therefore the integrated overall level of PI may
be higher or lower as a function of the activity of the
participant (and of course individual differences
between people). In a lower order system, PI
may still be reported, but this is a consequence of
additional creative mental processing. It does not
refer to the same qualia as for the first-order systems.
Therefore, there is no numerical scale that can com-
pare ‘presence’ across different immersive systems,
since they are referring to qualitatively different
phenomena.
Psi is the second and orthogonal concept to
consider. This is concerned with the ‘reality’ of
the situation depicted. It is maintained through corre-
lations between actions and reactions, and correlations
between events that can be perceived within the VE
that are directed at the participant. It also includes
the notion of the credibility of events in comparison
with what would be expected in reality in similar cir-
cumstances. Psi relies on the process of inference
from evidence (perceptions) to issues concerning the
‘reality’ of the situation. Psi and PI may result in a par-
ticipant within a virtual reality realistically responding
to events and situations. The conceptual framework
presented here is a starting point for much future
research.
The ideas described in this paper arose out of work that was
carried out in the EU FET Integrated Projects
PRESENCCIA (IST-2006-27731) and IMMERSENCE
(IST-2006-027141), with partial help from the Spanish
Ministry of Science and Innovation. Thanks to Dr Maria
V. Sanchez-Vives for comments on an earlier version of this
paper.
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