2.
GABI was a mere accommodation
AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC.,
and JOSE IGLESIAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000
Amado J. Lansang filed a petition to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals, alleging that the complaint filed
against him is a complaint against the State, thus making
him immune from suit.
Facts
Private respondents were allegedly awarded a “verbal
contract of lease” in 1970 by the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated
civic body engaged in the development of national parks,
including the Rizal Park.
NPDC’s verbal accommodation to private respondents
was unclear, for there was no document to show the
grantor of the verbal license to private respondents to
occupy a portion of the Rizal Park.
Amado J. Lansang, the New Chairman of NPDC after the
EDSA revolution, terminated their so-called verbal
agreement with GABI in a written notice, demanding
them to vacate the premises and kiosks.
Another notice was given to the respondents, informing
them that they were given only until March 8, 1988 to
vacate. Iglesias signed the notice.
Iglesias claims that Ricardo Villanueva (then chief warden
of the Rizal Park) deceived him by telling him that by
signing the notice, he was merely acknowledging receipt.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner
and dismissed GABI’s action for damages and injunction.
The RTC ruled that:
1. The complaint of the private respondents
was actually directed against the State
which could not be sued without its consent,
and
concessionaire and could only recover
damages upon proof of profits. However, no
such proof was presented.
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the
RTC and ruled that mere allegation that a government
official is being sued in his official capacity is not enough
to protect such official from liability for acts done without
or in excess of his authority. Granting that petitioner had
the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, the “abusive
and capricious manner in which that authority was
exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must
now be held liable for damages”. The CA also noted that
GABI was evicted after these two significant incidents:
1. When Iglesia entended monetary support to
striking workers at the NPDC, and
2. When Iglesia send a letter to the
Tanodbayan, denouncing alleged graft and
corruption in the NPDC.
ISSUES
The petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent’s complaint
against petitioner, as Chairman of NPDC,
and his codefendants, is in effect a suit
against the State which cannot be sued
without its consent.
2. Whether or not the petitioner’s act of
terminating respondent GABI’s concession
is valid and done in the lawful performance
of official duty.
RULING
1. The Supreme Court is convinced that the
petitioner is being sued not in his official
capacity, but in his personal capacity. The
complaint filed by private respondents in the
RTC merely identified petitioner as
chairman of NPDC, but did not categorically
state that he is being sued in that capacity.
Also, the petitioner was sued allegedly for
having personal motives in ordering the
ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. The
doctrine of state immunity from suit does
not apply where the public official is being
 sued not in his official capacity. Therefore,
the respondent’s complaint is not a suit
against the State.

2. The Supreme Court found no evidence of

abuse of authority. Rizal Park is beyond the
commerce of man and thus could not be
the subject of a lease contract. Therefore,
private respondents cannot claim a vested
right to continue to occupy Rizal Park. They
were allowed to occupy office and kiosk
spaces in the park as they were
accommodated by the previous
administrator. However, the petitioner who
is the New Chairman, may validly
discontinue such accommodation and eject
them from the park when necessary.

__________________________________________________

DECISION

The Supreme Court granted the petition of Amado J.

Lansang, set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals,
and affirmed the dismissal for the complaint of damages
by the Regional Trial court.