PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.

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BUILDING PLANTING SOWING: chattel mortgage (Annex "A" to the complaint) be sold to realize said mortgage debt, interests,
liquidated damages and costs, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Act 3135, as
FILIPINAS COLL, INC V. TIMBANG amended by Act 4118, and Art. 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, Act 1508; and
On December 14, 1959, defendants Rufino G. Pineda and his mother Juana Gonzales
(c) Ordering the defendants Rufino Pineda and Ramona Reyes, to deliver immediately to the
(married to Gregorio Pineda), borrowed from plaintiff Conrado P. Navarro, the sum of
Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac the personal properties mentioned in said Annex "A", immediately
P2,500.00, payable 6 months after said date or on June 14, 1959. To secure the
after the lapse of the ninety (90) days above-mentioned, in default of such payment.
indebtedness, Rufino executed a document captioned "DEED OF REAL ESTATE and
The above judgment was directly appealed to this Court, the defendants therein assigning only
CHATTEL MORTGAGES", whereby Juana Gonzales, by way of Real Estate
a single error, allegedly committed by the lower court, to wit —
Mortgage hypothecated a parcel of land, belonging to her, registered with the Register of
In holding that the deed of real estate and chattel mortgages appended to the complaint is
Deeds of Tarlac, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25776, and Rufino G. Pineda, by way
valid, notwithstanding the fact that the house of the defendant Rufino G. Pineda was made the
of Chattel Mortgage, mortgaged his two-story residential house, having a floor area of 912
subject of the chattel mortgage, for the reason that it is erected on a land that belongs to a
square meters, erected on a lot belonging to Atty. Vicente Castro, located at Bo. San Roque,
third person.
Tarlac, Tarlac; and one motor truck, registered in his name, under Motor Vehicle Registration
Appellants contend that article 415 of the New Civil Code, in classifying a house as immovable
Certificate No. A-171806. Both mortgages were contained in one instrument, which was
property, makes no distinction whether the owner of the land is or not the owner of the
registered in both the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Motor Vehicles Office of Tarlac.
building; the fact that the land belongs to another is immaterial, it is enough that the house
When the mortgage debt became due and payable, the defendants, after demands made on
adheres to the land; that in case of immovables by incorporation, such as houses, trees,
them, failed to pay. They, however, asked and were granted extension up to June 30, 1960,
plants, etc; the Code does not require that the attachment or incorporation be made by the
within which to pay. Came June 30, defendants again failed to pay and, for the second time,
owner of the land, the only criterion being the union or incorporation with the soil. In other
asked for another extension, which was given, up to July 30, 1960. In the second extension,
words, it is claimed that "a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not
defendant Pineda in a document entitled "Promise", categorically stated that in the remote
said structure and the land on which it is adhered to, belong to the same owner" (Lopez v.
event he should fail to make good the obligation on such date (July 30, 1960), the defendant
Orosa, G.R. Nos. L-10817-8, Feb. 28, 1958). (See also the case of Leung Yee v. Strong
would no longer ask for further extension and there would be no need for any formal demand,
Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644). Appellants argue that since only movables can be the subject of
and plaintiff could proceed to take whatever action he might desire to enforce his rights, under
a chattel mortgage (sec. 1, Act No. 3952) then the mortgage in question which is the basis of
the said mortgage contract. In spite of said promise, defendants, failed and refused to pay the
the present action, cannot give rise to an action for foreclosure, because it is nullity. (Citing
obligation.
Associated Ins. Co., et al. v. Isabel Iya v. Adriano Valino, et al., L-10838, May 30, 1958.)
On August 10, 1960, plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage and for
The trial court did not predicate its decision declaring the deed of chattel mortgage valid solely
damages, which consisted of liquidated damages in the sum of P500.00 and 12% per annum
on the ground that the house mortgaged was erected on the land which belonged to a third
interest on the principal, effective on the date of maturity, until fully paid.
person, but also and principally on the doctrine of estoppel, in that "the parties have
Defendants, answering the complaint, among others, stated —
so expressly agreed" in the mortgage to consider the house as chattel "for its smallness and
Defendants admit that the loan is overdue but deny that portion of paragraph 4 of the First
mixed materials of sawali and wood". In construing arts. 334 and 335 of the Spanish Civil
Cause of Action which states that the defendants unreasonably failed and refuse to pay their
Code (corresponding to arts. 415 and 416, N.C.C.), for purposes of the application of the
obligation to the plaintiff the truth being the defendants are hard up these days and pleaded to
Chattel Mortgage Law, it was held that under certain conditions, "a property may have a
the plaintiff to grant them more time within which to pay their obligation and the plaintiff
character different from that imputed to it in said articles. It is undeniable that the parties to a
refused;
contract may by agreement, treat as personal property that whichby nature would be real
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court
property" (Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. v. Jaranillo, 44 Phil. 632-633)."There can not be any
render judgment granting the defendants until January 31, 1961, within which to pay their
question that a building of mixed materials may be the subject of a chattel mortgage, in which
obligation to the plaintiff.
case, it is considered as between the parties as personal property. ... The matter depends on
On September 30, 1960, plaintiff presented a Motion for summary Judgment, claiming that the
the circumstances and the intention of the parties". "Personal property may retain its character
Answer failed to tender any genuine and material issue. The motion was set for hearing, but
as such where it is so agreed by the parties interested even though annexed to the realty ...".
the record is not clear what ruling the lower court made on the said motion. On November 11,
(42 Am. Jur. 209-210, cited in Manarang, et al. v. Ofilada, et al., G.R. No. L-8133, May 18,
1960, however, the parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts, wherein the defendants admitted
1956; 52 O.G. No. 8, p. 3954.) The view that parties to a deed of chattel mortgagee may agree
the indebtedness, the authenticity and due execution of the Real Estate and Chattel
to consider a house as personal property for the purposes of said contract, "is good only
Mortgages; that the indebtedness has been due and unpaid since June 14, 1960; that a
insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based partly, upon the principles of
liability of 12% per annum as interest was agreed, upon failure to pay the principal when due
estoppel ..." (Evangelista v. Alto Surety, No. L-11139, Apr. 23, 1958). In a case, a mortgage
and P500.00 as liquidated damages; that the instrument had been registered in the Registry of
house built on a rented land, was held to be a personal property, not only because the deed of
Property and Motor Vehicles Office, both of the province of Tarlac; that the only issue in the
mortgage considered it as such, but also because it did not form part of the land (Evangelista
case is whether or not the residential house, subject of the mortgage therein, can be
v. Abad [CA];36 O.G. 2913), for it is now well settled that an object placed on land by one who
considered a Chattel and the propriety of the attorney's fees.
has only a temporary right to the same, such as a lessee or usufructuary, does not become
On February 24, 1961, the lower court held —
immobilized by attachment (Valdez v. Central Altagracia, 222 U.S. 58, cited in Davao Sawmill
... WHEREFORE, this Court renders decision in this Case:
Co., Inc. v. Castillo, et al., 61 Phil. 709). Hence, if a house belonging to a person stands on a
(a) Dismissing the complaint with regard to defendant Gregorio Pineda;
rented land belonging to another person, it may be mortgaged as a personal property is so
(b) Ordering defendants Juana Gonzales and the spouses Rufino Pineda and Ramon Reyes,
stipulated in the document of mortgage. (Evangelista v. Abad, supra.) It should be noted,
to pay jointly and severally and within ninety (90) days from the receipt of the copy of this
however, that the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house to be
decision to the plaintiff Conrado P. Navarro the principal sum of P2,550.00 with 12%
a chattel, a conduct that may conceivably estop him from subsequently claiming otherwise
compounded interest per annum from June 14, 1960, until said principal sum and interests are
(Ladera, et al.. v. C. N. Hodges, et al., [CA]; 48 O.G. 5374). The doctrine, therefore, gathered
fully paid, plus P500.00 as liquidated damages and the costs of this suit, with the warning that
from these cases is that although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has been
in default of said payment of the properties mentioned in the deed of real estate mortgage and
considered as a chattel between them, has been recognized, it has been a constant criterion

nevertheless that, with respect to third persons, who are not parties to the contract, and
specially in execution proceedings, the house is considered as an immovable property (Art.
1431, New Civil Code).
In the case at bar, the house in question was treated as personal or movable property, by the
parties to the contract themselves. In the deed of chattel mortgage, appellant Rufino G.
Pineda conveyed by way of "Chattel Mortgage" "my personal properties", a residential house
and a truck. The mortgagor himself grouped the house with the truck, which is, inherently a
movable property. The house which was not even declared for taxation purposes was small
and made of light construction materials: G.I. sheets roofing, sawali and wooden walls and
wooden posts; built on land belonging to another.
The cases cited by appellants are not applicable to the present case. The Iya cases (L-10837-
38, supra), refer to a building or a house of strong materials, permanently adhered to the land,
belonging to the owner of the house himself. In the case of Lopez v. Orosa, (L-10817-18), the
subject building was a theatre, built of materials worth more than P62,000, attached
permanently to the soil. In these cases and in the Leung Yee case, supra, third persons
assailed the validity of the deed of chattel mortgages; in the present case, it was one of the
parties to the contract of mortgages who assailed its validity.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, should be, as it
is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
CALAPAN LUMBER V. COMM SAWMILL
This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Abra
dismissing the complaint filed by appellants, upon motion of defendants-appellate on the
ground that the action was within the exclude (original) jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace
Court of Lagangilang, of the same province.
The complaint alleges in substance that appellants were the owners of the house, worth
P200.00, built on and owned by them and situated in the said municipality Lagangilang; that
sometime in January 1957 appealed forcibly demolished the house, claiming to be the owners
thereof; that the materials of the house, after it was dismantled, were placed in the custody of
the barrio lieutenant of the place; and that as a result of appellate's refusal to restore the
house or to deliver the material appellants the latter have suffered actual damages the amount
of P200.00, plus moral and consequential damages in the amount of P600.00. The relief
prayed for is that "the plaintiffs be declared the owners of the house in question and/or the
materials that resulted in (sic) its dismantling; (and) that the defendants be orders pay the sum
of P200.00, plus P600.00 as damages, the costs."
The issue posed by the parties in this appeal is whether the action involves title to real
property, as appellants contend, and therefore is cognizable by the Court of First Instance
(Sec. 44, par. [b], R.A. 296, as amended), whether it pertains to the jurisdiction of the Justice
of the Peace Court, as stated in the order appealed from, since there is no real property
litigated, the house having ceased to exist, and the amount of the demand does exceed
P2,000.00 (Sec. 88, id.)1
The dismissal of the complaint was proper. A house is classified as immovable property by
reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415, par. 1, Civil Code). This
classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land
belonging to a different owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to
exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases. It should be noted
that the complaint here is for recovery of damages. This is the only positive relief prayed for by
appellants. To be sure, they also asked that they be declared owners of the dismantled house
and/or of the materials. However, such declaration in no wise constitutes the relief itself which
if granted by final judgment could be enforceable by execution, but is only incidental to the real
cause of action to recover damages.
The order appealed from is affirmed. The appeal having been admitted in forma pauperis, no
costs are adjudged.
IGNACIO V. HILARIO
PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 2
The issue in this case, as announced in the opening sentence of the decision in the trial court
and as set forth by counsel for the parties on appeal, involves the determination of the nature
of the properties described in the complaint. The trial judge found that those properties were
personal in nature, and as a consequence absolved the defendants from the complaint, with
costs against the plaintiff.
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government of
the Philippine Islands. It has operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu,
municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. However, the land upon which the business was
conducted belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building
which housed the machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly
personal property, the conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted on
foundations of cement. In the contract of lease between the sawmill company and the owner
of the land there appeared the following provision:
That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings
introduced and erected by the party of the second part shall pass to the exclusive ownership
of the party of the first part without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said
improvements and buildings; also, in the event the party of the second part should leave or
abandon the land leased before the time herein stipulated, the improvements and buildings
shall likewise pass to the ownership of the party of the first part as though the time agreed
upon had expired: Provided, however, That the machineries and accessories are not included
in the improvements which will pass to the party of the first part on the expiration or
abandonment of the land leased.
In another action, wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao,
Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that
action against the defendant in that action; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the
properties now in question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No third party claim
was filed for such properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record
made by the plaintiff herein. Indeed the bidder, which was the plaintiff in that action, and the
defendant herein having consummated the sale, proceeded to take possession of the
machinery and other properties described in the corresponding certificates of sale executed in
its favor by the sheriff of Davao.
As connecting up with the facts, it should further be explained that the Davao Saw Mill Co.,
Inc., has on a number of occasions treated the machinery as personal property by executing
chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. One of such persons is the appellee by
assignment from the original mortgages.
Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, is in point. According to the Code, real
property consists of —
1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;
xxx xxx xxx
5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any
building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and
which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of industry.
Appellant emphasizes the first paragraph, and appellees the last mentioned paragraph. We
entertain no doubt that the trial judge and appellees are right in their appreciation of the legal
doctrines flowing from the facts.
In the first place, it must again be pointed out that the appellant should have registered its
protest before or at the time of the sale of this property. It must further be pointed out that
while not conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is
indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the
parties. In this connection the decision of this court in the case of Standard Oil Co. of New
Yorkvs. Jaramillo ( [1923], 44 Phil., 630), whether obiter dicta or not, furnishes the key to such
a situation.
It is, however not necessary to spend overly must time in the resolution of this appeal on side
issues. It is machinery which is involved; moreover, machinery not intended by the owner of
any building or land for use in connection therewith, but intended by a lessee for use in a
building erected on the land by the latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or
abandonment of the lease.

A similar question arose in Puerto Rico, and on appeal being taken to the United States
Supreme Court, it was held that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so
placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner. In the opinion written by Chief Justice White, whose
knowledge of the Civil Law is well known, it was in part said:
To determine this question involves fixing the nature and character of the property from the
point of view of the rights of Valdes and its nature and character from the point of view of
Nevers & Callaghan as a judgment creditor of the Altagracia Company and the rights derived
by them from the execution levied on the machinery placed by the corporation in the plant.
Following the Code Napoleon, the Porto Rican Code treats as immovable (real) property, not
only land and buildings, but also attributes immovability in some cases to property of a
movable nature, that is, personal property, because of the destination to which it is applied.
"Things," says section 334 of the Porto Rican Code, "may be immovable either by their own
nature or by their destination or the object to which they are applicable." Numerous
illustrations are given in the fifth subdivision of section 335, which is as follows: "Machinery,
vessels, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenements for the industrial
or works that they may carry on in any building or upon any land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works." (See also Code Nap., articles 516, 518 et seq.
to and inclusive of article 534, recapitulating the things which, though in themselves movable,
may be immobilized.) So far as the subject-matter with which we are dealing — machinery
placed in the plant — it is plain, both under the provisions of the Porto Rican Law and of the
Code Napoleon, that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized
when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant. Such result would not be
accomplished, therefore, by the placing of machinery in a plant by a tenant or a usufructuary
or any person having only a temporary right. (Demolombe, Tit. 9, No. 203; Aubry et Rau, Tit.
2, p. 12, Section 164; Laurent, Tit. 5, No. 447; and decisions quoted in Fuzier-Herman ed.
Code Napoleon under articles 522 et seq.) The distinction rests, as pointed out by
Demolombe, upon the fact that one only having a temporary right to the possession or
enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law to have applied movable property belonging
to him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an act of immobilization to become the
property of another. It follows that abstractly speaking the machinery put by the Altagracia
Company in the plant belonging to Sanchez did not lose its character of movable property and
become immovable by destination. But in the concrete immobilization took place because of
the express provisions of the lease under which the Altagracia held, since the lease in
substance required the putting in of improved machinery, deprived the tenant of any right to
charge against the lessor the cost such machinery, and it was expressly stipulated that the
machinery so put in should become a part of the plant belonging to the owner without
compensation to the lessee. Under such conditions the tenant in putting in the machinery was
acting but as the agent of the owner in compliance with the obligations resting upon him, and
the immobilization of the machinery which resulted arose in legal effect from the act of the
owner in giving by contract a permanent destination to the machinery.
xxx xxx xxx
The machinery levied upon by Nevers & Callaghan, that is, that which was placed in the plant
by the Altagracia Company, being, as regards Nevers & Callaghan, movable property, it
follows that they had the right to levy on it under the execution upon the judgment in their
favor, and the exercise of that right did not in a legal sense conflict with the claim of Valdes,
since as to him the property was a part of the realty which, as the result of his obligations
under the lease, he could not, for the purpose of collecting his debt, proceed separately
against. (Valdes vs. Central Altagracia [192], 225 U.S., 58.)
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, the
costs of this instance to be paid by the appellant.
. judgment given in open court on January 28, 1959 was served upon counsel for petitioner only
GRANA V. CA
PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 3
Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
26723-R entitled "Pastor D. Ago vs. The Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, et al." which in part
reads:
In this case for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it appears from the records
that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan rendered judgment (Annex
"A") in open court on January 28, 1959, basing said judgment on a compromise agreement
between the parties.
On August 15, 1959, upon petition, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of execution.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated October 12, 1959 alleges that he, or his counsel,
did not receive a formal and valid notice of said decision, which motion for reconsideration was
denied by the court below in the order of November 14, 1959.
Petitioner now contends that the respondent Judge exceeded in his jurisdiction in rendering
the execution without valid and formal notice of the decision.
A compromise agreement is binding between the parties and becomes the law between them.
(Gonzales vs. Gonzales G.R. No. L-1254, May 21, 1948, 81 Phil. 38; Martin vs. Martin, G.R.
No. L-12439, May 22, 1959) .
It is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a judgment based on a compromise agreement is not
appealable and is immediately executory, unless a motion is filed on the ground fraud, mistake
or duress. (De los Reyes vs. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505; Lapena vs. Morfe, G.R. No. L-10089, July
31, 1957)
Petitioner's claim that he was not notified or served notice of the decision is untenable. The
judgment on the compromise agreement rendered by the court below dated January 28, 1959,
was given in open court. This alone is a substantial compliance as to notice. (De los Reyes vs.
Ugarte, supra)
IN VIEW THEREOF, we believe that the lower court did not exceed nor abuse its jurisdiction in
ordering the execution of the judgment. The petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed and the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore dissolved, with costs against the petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The facts of the case may be briefly stated as follows: In 1957, petitioner Pastor D. Ago
bought sawmill machineries and equipments from respondent Grace Park Engineer
domineering, Inc., executing a chattel mortgage over said machineries and equipments to
secure the payment of balance of the price remaining unpaid of P32,000.00, which petitioner
agreed to pay on installment basis.
Petitioner Ago defaulted in his payment and so, in 1958 respondent Grace Park Engineering,
Inc. instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings of the mortgage. To enjoin said
foreclosure, petitioner herein instituted Special Civil Case No. 53 in the Court of First Instance
of Agusan. The parties to the case arrived at a compromise agreement and submitted the
same in court in writing, signed by Pastor D. Ago and the Grace Park Engineering, Inc. The
Hon. Montano A. Ortiz, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, then presiding, dictated
a decision in open court on January 28, 1959.
Petitioner continued to default in his payments as provided in the judgment by compromise, so
Grace Park Engineering, Inc. filed with the lower court a motion for execution, which was
granted by the court on August 15, 1959. A writ of execution, dated September 23, 1959, later
followed.
The herein respondent, Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, acting upon the writ of execution issued
by the lower court, levied upon and ordered the sale of the sawmill machineries and
equipments in question. These machineries and equipments had been taken to and installed
in a sawmill building located in Lianga, Surigao del Sur, and owned by the Golden Pacific
Sawmill, Inc., to whom, petitioner alleges, he had sold them on February 16, 1959 (a date after
the decision of the lower court but before levy by the Sheriff).
Having been advised by the sheriff that the public auction sale was set for December 4, 1959,
petitioner, on December 1, 1959, filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with respondent Court of Appeals, alleging that a copy of the aforementioned
on September 25, 1959 (writ of execution is dated September 23, 1959); that the order and
writ of execution having been issued by the lower court before counsel for petitioner received
a copy of the judgment, its resultant last order that the "sheriff may now proceed with the sale

of the properties levied constituted a grave abuse of discretion and was in excess of its
jurisdiction; and that the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Surigao was acting illegally upon the
allegedly void writ of execution by levying the same upon the sawmill machineries and
equipments which have become real properties of the Golden Pacific sawmill, Inc., and is
about to proceed in selling the same without prior publication of the notice of sale thereof in
some newspaper of general circulation as required by the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals, on December 8, 1959, issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the
sheriff but it turned out that the latter had already sold at public auction the machineries in
question, on December 4, 1959, as scheduled. The respondent Grace Park Engineering, Inc.
was the only bidder for P15,000.00, although the certificate sale was not yet executed. The
Court of Appeals constructed the sheriff to suspend the issuance of a certificate of sale of the
said sawmill machineries and equipment sold by him on December 4, 1959 until the final
decision of the case. On November 9, 1960 the Court of Appeals rendered the aforequoted
decision.
Before this Court, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding that the
rendition of judgment on compromise in open court on January 1959 was a sufficient notice;
and (2) in not resolving the other issues raised before it, namely, (a) the legality of the public
auction sale made by the sheriff, and (b) the nature of the machineries in question, whether
they are movables or immovables.
The Court of Appeals held that as a judgment was entered by the court below in open court
upon the submission of the compromise agreement, the parties may be considered as having
been notified of said judgment and this fact constitutes due notice of said judgment. This
raises the following legal question: Is the order dictated in open court of the judgment of the
court, and is the fact the petitioner herein was present in open court was the judgment was
dictated, sufficient notice thereof? The provisions of the Rules of Court decree otherwise.
Section 1 of Rule 35 describes the manner in which judgment shall be rendered, thus:
SECTION 1. How judgment rendered. — All judgments determining the merits of cases shall
be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him, stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, filed with the clerk of the court.
The court of first instance being a court of record, in order that a judgment may be considered
as rendered, must not only be in writing, signed by the judge, but it must also be filed with the
clerk of court. The mere pronouncement of the judgment in open court with the stenographer
taking note thereof does not, therefore, constitute a rendition of the judgment. It is the filing of
the signed decision with the clerk of court that constitutes rendition. While it is to be presumed
that the judgment that was dictated in open court will be the judgment of the court, the court
may still modify said order as the same is being put into writing. And even if the order or
judgment has already been put into writing and signed, while it has not yet been delivered to
the clerk for filing it is still subject to amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the
judgment signed by the judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and
binding judgment. Prior thereto, it could still be subject to amendment and change and may
not, therefore, constitute the real judgment of the court.
Regarding the notice of judgment, the mere fact that a party heard the judge dictating the
judgment in open court, is not a valid notice of said judgment. If rendition thereof is constituted
by the filing with the clerk of court of a signed copy (of the judgment), it is evident that the fact
that a party or an attorney heard the order or judgment being dictated in court cannot be
considered as notice of the real judgment. No judgment can be notified to the parties unless it
has previously been rendered. The notice, therefore, that a party has of a judgment that was
being dictated is of no effect because at the time no judgment has as yet been signed by the
judge and filed with the clerk.
Besides, the Rules expressly require that final orders or judgments be served personally or by
registered mail. Section 7 of Rule 27 provides as follows:
SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments. — Final orders or judgments shall be served
either personally or by registered mail.
In accordance with this provision, a party is not considered as having been served with the
judgment merely because he heard the judgment dictating the said judgment in open court; it
is necessary that he be served with a copy of the signed judgment that has been filed with the
clerk in order that he may legally be considered as having been served with the judgment.
PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 4
For all the foregoing, the fact that the petitioner herein heard the trial judge dictating the
judgment in open court, is not sufficient to constitute the service of judgement as required by
the above-quoted section 7 of Rule 2 the signed judgment not having been served upon the
petitioner, said judgment could not be effective upon him (petitioner) who had not received it. It
follows as a consequence that the issuance of the writ of execution null and void, having been
issued before petitioner her was served, personally or by registered mail, a copy of the
decision.
The second question raised in this appeal, which has been passed upon by the Court of
Appeals, concerns the validity of the proceedings of the sheriff in selling the sawmill
machineries and equipments at public auction with a notice of the sale having been previously
published.
The record shows that after petitioner herein Pastor D. Ago had purchased the sawmill
machineries and equipments he assigned the same to the Golden Pacific Sawmill, Inc. in
payment of his subscription to the shares of stock of said corporation. Thereafter the sawmill
machinery and equipments were installed in a building and permanently attached to the
ground. By reason of such installment in a building, the said sawmill machineries and
equipment became real estate properties in accordance with the provision of Art. 415 (5) of
the Civil Code, thus:
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements tended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
This Court in interpreting a similar question raised before it in the case of Berkenkotter vs. Cu
Unjieng e Hijos, 61 Phil. 683, held that the installation of the machine and equipment in the
central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc. for use in connection with the industry carried by the
company, converted the said machinery and equipment into real estate by reason of their
purpose. Paraphrasing language of said decision we hold that by the installment of the sawmill
machineries in the building of the Gold Pacific Sawmill, Inc., for use in the sawing of logs
carried on in said building, the same became a necessary and permanent part of the building
or real estate on which the same was constructed, converting the said machineries and
equipments into real estate within the meaning of Article 415(5) above-quoted of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Considering that the machineries and equipments in question valued at more than P15,000.00
appear to have been sold without the necessary advertisement of sale by publication in a
newspaper, as required in Sec. 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is as follows:
SEC. 16. Notice of sale of property on execution. — Before the sale of property on execution,
notice thereof must be given as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In case of real property, by posting a similar notice particularly describing the property for
twenty days in three public places in the municipality or city where the property is situated, and
also where the property is to be sold, and, if the assessed value of the property exceeds four
hundred pesos, by publishing a copy of the notice once a week, for the same period, in some
newspaper published or having general circulation in the province, if there be one. If there are
newspapers published in the province in both the English and Spanish languages, then a like
publication for a like period shall be made in one newspaper published in the English
language, and in one published in the Spanish language.
the sale made by the sheriff must be declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside
and We declare that the issuance of the writ of execution in this case against the sawmill
machineries and equipments purchased by petitioner Pastor D. Ago from the Grace Park
Engineering, Inc., as well as the sale of the same by the Sheriff of Surigao, are null and void.
Costs shall be against the respondent Grace Park Engineering, Inc
TAYAG V. YUSECO

This is a petition for the review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No.
710 holding that the petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is liable to the payment of the realty
tax on its maintenance and repair equipment hereunder referred to.
Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner's
above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of
Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City
sustained the city assessor, so petitioner herein filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition
for the review of the assessment.
In the Court of Tax Appeals the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
Petitioner and respondents, thru their respective counsels agreed to the following
stipulation of facts:
1. That petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by
motor trucks, over its authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by
the Public Service Commission;
2. That petitioner has its main office and shop at Cagayan de Oro City. It maintains Branch
Offices and/or stations at Iligan City, Lanao; Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur; Davao City and
Kibawe, Bukidnon Province;
3. That the machineries sought to be assessed by the respondent as real properties are the
following:
(a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "A";
(b) Storm Boring Machine, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "B";
(c) Lathe machine with motor, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "C";
(d) Black and Decker Grinder, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "D";
(e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "E";
(f) Battery charger (Tungar charge machine) appearing in the attached photograph, marked
Annex "F"; and
(g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "G".
4. That these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms as may be seen in the
attached photographs which form part of this agreed stipulation of facts;
5. That petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU
motor trucks; a repair shop; blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries
which are placed therein, its TPU trucks are made; body constructed; and same are repaired
in a condition to be serviceable in the TPU land transportation business it operates;
6. That these machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipments to
produce finished products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the
general public indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes for which petitioner has
never engaged in, to date.1awphîl.nèt
The Court of Tax Appeals having sustained the respondent city assessor's ruling, and
having denied a motion for reconsideration, petitioner brought the case to this Court assigning
the following errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Tax Appeals erred in upholding respondents' contention that the
questioned assessments are valid; and that said tools, equipments or machineries are
immovable taxable real properties.
2. The Tax Court erred in its interpretation of paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code,
and holding that pursuant thereto the movable equipments are taxable realties, by reason of
their being intended or destined for use in an industry.
3. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in denying petitioner's contention that the respondent City
Assessor's power to assess and levy real estate taxes on machineries is further restricted by
section 31, paragraph (c) of Republic Act No. 521; and
4. The Tax Court erred in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondents contend that said equipments, tho movable, are immobilized by
destination, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 415. — The following are immovable properties:
xxx xxx xxx
PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 5
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. (Emphasis ours.)
Note that the stipulation expressly states that the equipment are placed on wooden or
cement platforms. They can be moved around and about in petitioner's repair shop. In the
case of B. H. Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 663, the Supreme Court said:
Article 344 (Now Art. 415), paragraph (5) of the Civil Code, gives the character of real
property to "machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein
and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry."
If the installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central of the
Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., in lieu of the other of less capacity existing therein, for its sugar
and industry, converted them into real property by reason of their purpose, it cannot be said
that their incorporation therewith was not permanent in character because, as essential and
principle elements of a sugar central, without them the sugar central would be unable to
function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. Inasmuch as the
central is permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment installed for
carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessarily be
permanent. (Emphasis ours.)
So that movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be
"essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works
would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established."
We may here distinguish, therefore, those movable which become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry for those which may not be
so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and principal.
Thus, cash registers, typewriters, etc., usually found and used in hotels, restaurants, theaters,
etc. are merely incidentals and are not and should not be considered immobilized by
destination, for these businesses can continue or carry on their functions without these equity
comments. Airline companies use forklifts, jeep-wagons, pressure pumps, IBM machines, etc.
which are incidentals, not essentials, and thus retain their movable nature. On the other hand,
machineries of breweries used in the manufacture of liquor and soft drinks, though movable in
nature, are immobilized because they are essential to said industries; but the delivery trucks
and adding machines which they usually own and use and are found within their industrial
compounds are merely incidental and retain their movable nature.
Similarly, the tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature,
not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting
passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as
movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without
such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on,
without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on
without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another
shop belonging to another.
The law that governs the determination of the question at issue is as follows:
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works; (Civil Code of the Phil.)
Aside from the element of essentiality the above-quoted provision also requires that the
industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Thus in the case
of Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng, supra, the "machinery, liquid containers, and instruments or
implements" are found in a building constructed on the land. A sawmill would also be installed
in a building on land more or less permanently, and the sawing is conducted in the land or
building.
But in the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service
the transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of
land, as demanded by the law. Said equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property.

Resuming what we have set forth above, we hold that the equipments in question are
not absolutely essential to the petitioner's transportation business, and petitioner's business is
not carried on in a building, tenement or on a specified land, so said equipment may not be
considered real estate within the meaning of Article 415 (c) of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the petition for review is hereby set aside and the
equipment in question declared not subject to assessment as real estate for the purposes of
the real estate tax. Without costs
FELICES V. IRIOLA
Petition for a writ of certiorari against the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
It appears that during the lifetime of Esperidion Presbitero, judgment was rendered against
him by the Court of Appeals on October 14, 1959, in CA-G.R. No. 20879,
... to execute in favor of the plaintiff, within 30 days from the time this judgment becomes final,
a deed of reconveyance of Lot No. 788 of the cadastral survey of Valladolid, free from all liens
and encumbrances, and another deed of reconveyance of a 7-hectare portion of Lot No. 608
of the same cadastral survey, also free from all liens and encumbrances, or, upon failure to do
so, to pay to the plaintiff the value of each of the said properties, as may be determined by the
Court a quo upon evidence to be presented by the parties before it. The defendant is further
adjudged to pay to the plaintiff the value of the products received by him from the 5-hectare
portion equivalent to 20 cavans of palay per hectare every year, or 125 cavans yearly, at the
rate of P10.00 per cavan, from 1951 until possession of the said 5-hectare portion is finally
delivered to the plaintiff with legal interest thereon from the time the complaint was filed; and to
pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, plus costs.
This judgment, which became final, was a modification of a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, in its Civil Case No. 3492, entitled "Helen Caram Nava,
plaintiff, versus Esperidion Presbitero, defendant."
Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated December 8, 1959, sought in vain to amicably
settle the case through petitioner's son, Ricardo Presbitero. When no response was
forthcoming, said counsel asked for, and the court a quo ordered on June 9, 1960, the
issuance of a partial writ of execution for the sum of P12,250.00. On the following day, June
10, 1960, said counsel, in another friendly letter, reiterated his previous suggestion for an
amicable settlement, but the same produced no fruitful result. Thereupon, on June 21, 1960,
the sheriff levied upon and garnished the sugar quotas allotted to plantation audit Nos. 26-237,
26-238, 26-239, 26-240 and 26-241 adhered to the Ma-ao Mill District and "registered in the
name of Esperidion Presbitero as the original plantation-owner", furnishing copies of the writ of
execution and the notice of garnishment to the manager of the Ma-ao Sugar Central
Company, Bago, Negros Occidental, and the Sugar Quota Administration at Bacolod City, but
without presenting for registration copies thereof to the Register of Deeds.
Plaintiff Helen Caram Nava (herein respondent) then moved the court, on June 22, 1960, to
hear evidence on the market value of the lots; and after some hearings, occasionally
protracted by postponements, the trial court, on manifestation of defendant's willingness to
cede the properties in litigation, suspended the proceedings and ordered him to segregate the
portion of Lot 608 pertaining to the plaintiff from the mass of properties belonging to the
defendant within a period to expire on August 24, 1960, and to effect the final conveyance of
the said portion of Lot 608 and the whole of Lot 788 free from any lien and encumbrance
whatsoever. Because of Presbitero's failure to comply with this order within the time set forth
by the court, the plaintiff again moved on August 25, 1960 to declare the market value of the
lots in question to be P2,500.00 per hectare, based on uncontradicted evidence previously
adduced. But the court, acting on a prayer of defendant Presbitero, in an order dated August
27, 1960, granted him twenty (20) days to finalize the survey of Lot 608, and ordered him to
execute a reconveyance of Lot 788 not later than August 31, 1960. Defendant again defaulted;
and so plaintiff, on September 21, 1960, moved the court for payment by the defendant of the
sum of P35,000.00 for the 14 hectares of land at P2,500.00 to the hectare, and the court, in its
order dated September 24, 1960, gave the defendant until October 15, 1960 either to pay the
value of the 14 hectares at the rate given or to deliver the clean titles of the lots. On October
15, 1960, the defendant finally delivered Certificate of Title No. T-28046 covering Lot 788, but
PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 6
not the title covering Lot 608 because of an existing encumbrance in favor of the Philippine
National Bank. In view thereof, Helen Caram Nava moved for, and secured on October 19,
1960, a writ of execution for P17,500.00, and on the day following wrote the sheriff to proceed
with the auction sale of the sugar quotas previously scheduled for November 5, 1960. The
sheriff issued the notice of auction sale on October 20, 1960.
On October 22, 1960, death overtook the defendant Esperidion Presbitero.
Proceedings for the settlement of his estate were commenced in Special Proceedings No.
2936 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental; and on November 4, 1960, the
special administrator, Ricardo Presbitero, filed an urgent motion, in Case No. 3492, to set
aside the writs of execution, and to order the sheriff to desist from holding the auction sale on
the grounds that the levy on the sugar quotas was invalid because the notice thereof was not
registered with the Register of Deeds, as for real property, and that the writs, being for sums of
money, are unenforceable since Esperidion Presbitero died on October 22, 1960, and,
therefore, could only be enforced as a money claim against his estate.
This urgent motion was heard on November 5, 1960, but the auction sale proceeded on the
same date, ending in the plaintiff's putting up the highest bid for P34,970.11; thus, the sheriff
sold 21,640 piculs of sugar quota to her.
On November 10, 1960, plaintiff Nava filed her opposition to Presbitero's urgent motion of
November 4, 1960; the latter filed on May 4, 1961 a supplement to his urgent motion; and on
May 8 and 23, 1961, the court continued hearings on the motion, and ultimately denied it on
November 18, 1961.
On January 11, 1962, plaintiff Nava also filed an urgent motion to order the Ma-ao Sugar
Central to register the sugar quotas in her name and to deliver the rentals of these quotas
corresponding to the crop year 1960-61 and succeeding years to her. The court granted this
motion in its order dated February 3, 1962. A motion for reconsideration by Presbitero was
denied in a subsequent order under date of March 5, 1962. Wherefore, Presbitero instituted
the present proceedings for certiorari.
A preliminary restraining writ was thereafter issued by the court against the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid orders of the respondent Judge, dated February 3, 1960 and
March 5, 1962, respectively. The petition further seeks the setting aside of the sheriff's
certificate of sale of the sugar quotas made out in favor of Helen Caram Nava, and that she be
directed to file the judgment credit in her favor in Civil Case No. 3492 as a money claim in the
proceedings to settle the Estate of Esperidion Presbitero.
The petitioner denies having been personally served with notice of the garnishment of the
sugar quotas, but this disclaimer cannot be seriously considered since it appears that he was
sent a copy of the notice through the chief of police of Valladolid on June 21, 1960, as certified
to by the sheriff, and that he had actual knowledge of the garnishment, as shown by his
motion of November 4, 1960 to set aside the writs of execution and to order the sheriff to
desist from holding the auction sale.
Squarely at issue in this case is whether sugar quotas are real (immovable) or personal
properties. If they be realty, then the levy upon them by the sheriff is null and void for lack of
compliance with the procedure prescribed in Section 14, Rule 39, in relation with Section 7,
Rule 59, of the Rules of Court requiring "the filing with the register of deeds a copy of the
orders together with a description of the property . . . ."
In contending that sugar quotas are personal property, the respondent, Helen Caram Nava,
invoked the test formulated by Manresa (3 Manresa, 6th Ed. 43), and opined that sugar quotas
can be carried from place to place without injury to the land to which they are attached, and
are not one of those included in Article 415 of the Civil Code; and not being thus included, they
fall under the category of personal properties:
ART. 416. The following are deemed to be personal property:
xxx xxx xxx
4. In general, all things which can be transported from place to place without impairment of the
real property to which they are fixed.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent likewise points to evidence she submitted that sugar quotas are, in fact,
transferred apart from the plantations to which they are attached, without impairing,
destroying, or diminishing the potentiality of either quota or plantation. She was sustained by
the lower court when it stated that "it is a matter of public knowledge and it is universal
practice in this province, whose principal industry is sugar, to transfer by sale, lease, or
otherwise, sugar quota allocations from one plantation to any other" and that it is "specious to
insist that quotas are improvements attaching to one plantation when in truth and in fact they
are no longer attached thereto for having been sold or leased away to be used in another
plantation". Respondent would add weight to her argument by invoking the role that sugar
quotas play in our modern social and economic life, and cites that the Sugar Office does not
require any registration with the Register of Deeds for the validity of the sale of these quotas;
and, in fact, those here in question were not noted down in the certificate of title of the land to
which they pertain; and that Ricardo Presbitero had leased sugar quotas independently of the
land. The respondent cites further that the U.S.-Philippine Trade Relations Act, approved by
the United States Congress in 1946, limiting the production of unrefined sugar in the
Philippines did not allocate the quotas for said unrefined sugar among lands planted to
sugarcane but among "the sugar producing mills and plantation OWNERS", and for this
reason Section 3 of Executive Order No. 873, issued by Governor General Murphy, authorizes
the lifting of sugar allotments from one land to another by means only of notarized deeds.
While respondent's arguments are thought-provoking, they cannot stand against the positive
mandate of the pertinent statute. The Sugar Limitation Law (Act 4166, as amended) provides
— the person or persons making the most favorable bid. Charles M. Swift was awarded the said
SEC. 9. The allotment corresponding to each piece of land under the provisions of this Act
shall be deemed to be an improvement attaching to the land entitled thereto ....
and Republic Act No. 1825 similarly provides —
SEC. 4. The production allowance or quotas corresponding to each piece of land under the
provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be an improvement attaching to the land entitled
thereto ....
And Executive Order No. 873 defines "plantation" as follows:
(a) The term 'plantation' means any specific area of land under sole or undivided ownership to
which is attached an allotment of centrifugal sugar.
Thus, under express provisions of law, the sugar quota allocations are accessories to land,
and can not have independent existence away from a plantation, although the latter may vary.
Indeed, this Court held in the case ofAbelarde vs. Lopez, 74 Phil. 344, that even if a contract
of sale of haciendas omitted "the right, title, interest, participation, action (and) rent" which the
grantors had or might have in relation to the parcels of land sold, the sale would include the
quotas, it being provided in Section 9, Act 4166, that the allotment is deemed an improvement
attached to the land, and that at the time the contract of sale was signed the land devoted to
sugar were practically of no use without the sugar allotment.
As an improvement attached to land, by express provision of law, though not physically so
united, the sugar quotas are inseparable therefrom, just like servitudes and other real rights
over an immovable. Article 415 of the Civil Code, in enumerating what are immovable
properties, names —
10. Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is by law, therefore, that these properties are immovable or real, Article 416 of the Civil Code
being made to apply only when the thing (res) sought to be classified is not included in Article
415.
The fact that the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 (U.S. Public Law 371-79th Congress) allows
transfers of sugar quotas does not militate against their immovability. Neither does the fact
that the Sugar Quota Office does not require registration of sales of quotas with the Register
of Deeds for their validity, nor the fact that allocation of unrefined sugar quotas is not made
among lands planted to sugarcane but among "the sugar producing mills and plantation
OWNERS", since the lease or sale of quotas are voluntary transactions, the regime of which,
is not necessarily identical to involuntary transfers or levies; and there cannot be a sugar
plantation owner without land to which the quota is attached; and there can exist no quota
without there being first a corresponding plantation.
PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 7
Since the levy is invalid for non-compliance with law, it is impertinent to discuss the survival or
non-survival of claims after the death of the judgment debtor, gauged from the moment of
actual levy. Suffice it to state that, as the case presently stands, the writs of execution are not
in question, but the levy on the quotas, and, because of its invalidity, the levy amount to no
levy at all. Neither is it necessary, or desirable, to pass upon the conscionableness or
unconscionableness of the amount produced in the auction sale as compared with the actual
value of the quotas inasmuch as the sale must necessarily be also illegal.
As to the remedial issue that the respondents have presented: that certiorari does not lie in
this case because the petitioner had a remedy in the lower court to "suspend" the auction sale,
but did not avail thereof, it may be stated that the latter's urgent motion of November 4, 1960,
a day before the scheduled sale (though unresolved by the court on time), did ask for
desistance from holding the sale.
WHEREFORE, the preliminary injunction heretofore granted is hereby made permanent, and
the sheriff's certificate of sale of the sugar quotas in question declared null and void. Costs
against respondent Nava.
IGNAO V. CA
From the stipulation of facts and evidence adduced during the hearing, the following appear:
On October 20, 1902, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484 which authorized the
Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric
street railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of Manila and its suburbs to
franchise on March 1903, the terms and conditions of which were embodied in Ordinance No.
44 approved on March 24, 1903. Respondent Manila Electric Co. (Meralco for short), became
the transferee and owner of the franchise.
Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls,
Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires,
running from the province of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission wires which
carry high voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers constructed by
respondent at intervals, from its hydro-electric plant in the province of Laguna to the City of
Manila. The respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City,
on land belonging to it. A photograph of one of these steel towers is attached to the petition for
review, marked Annex A. Three steel towers were inspected by the lower court and parties
and the following were the descriptions given there of by said court:
The first steel tower is located in South Tatalon, España Extension, Quezon City. The findings
were as follows: the ground around one of the four posts was excavated to a depth of about
eight (8) feet, with an opening of about one (1) meter in diameter, decreased to about a
quarter of a meter as it we deeper until it reached the bottom of the post; at the bottom of the
post were two parallel steel bars attached to the leg means of bolts; the tower proper was
attached to the leg three bolts; with two cross metals to prevent mobility; there was no
concrete foundation but there was adobe stone underneath; as the bottom of the excavation
was covered with water about three inches high, it could not be determined with certainty to
whether said adobe stone was placed purposely or not, as the place abounds with this kind of
stone; and the tower carried five high voltage wires without cover or any insulating materials.
The second tower inspected was located in Kamuning Road, K-F, Quezon City, on land
owned by the petitioner approximate more than one kilometer from the first tower. As in the
first tower, the ground around one of the four legs was excavate from seven to eight (8) feet
deep and one and a half (1-½) meters wide. There being very little water at the bottom, it was
seen that there was no concrete foundation, but there soft adobe beneath. The leg was
likewise provided with two parallel steel bars bolted to a square metal frame also bolted to
each corner. Like the first one, the second tower is made up of metal rods joined together by
means of bolts, so that by unscrewing the bolts, the tower could be dismantled and
reassembled.
The third tower examined is located along Kamias Road, Quezon City. As in the first two
towers given above, the ground around the two legs of the third tower was excavated to a
depth about two or three inches beyond the outside level of the steel bar foundation. It was

found that there was no concrete foundation. Like the two previous ones, the bottom
arrangement of the legs thereof were found to be resting on soft adobe, which, probably due
to high humidity, looks like mud or clay. It was also found that the square metal frame
supporting the legs were not attached to any material or foundation.
On November 15, 1955, petitioner City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel
towers for real property tax under Tax declaration Nos. 31992 and 15549. After denying
respondent's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken by respondent to the
Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which required respondent to pay the amount
of P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956.
Respondent paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA for short) which rendered a decision on December 29, 1958, ordering the
cancellation of the said tax declarations and the petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City to
refund to the respondent the sum of P11,651.86. The motion for reconsideration having been
denied, on April 22, 1959, the instant petition for review was filed.
In upholding the cause of respondents, the CTA held that: (1) the steel towers come within the
term "poles" which are declared exempt from taxes under part II paragraph 9 of respondent's
franchise; (2) the steel towers are personal properties and are not subject to real property tax;
and (3) the City Treasurer of Quezon City is held responsible for the refund of the amount
paid. These are assigned as errors by the petitioner in the brief.
The tax exemption privilege of the petitioner is quoted hereunder:
PAR 9. The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate, buildings, plant
(not including poles, wires, transformers, and insulators), machinery and personal property as
other persons are or may be hereafter required by law to pay ... Said percentage shall be due
and payable at the time stated in paragraph nineteen of Part One hereof, ... and shall be in
lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatsoever nature and by whatsoever authority upon the
privileges, earnings, income, franchise, and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the
grantee from which taxes and assessments the grantee is hereby expressly exempted. (Par.
9, Part Two, Act No. 484 Respondent's Franchise; emphasis supplied.)
The word "pole" means "a long, comparatively slender usually cylindrical piece of wood or
timber, as typically the stem of a small tree stripped of its branches; also by extension, a
similar typically cylindrical piece or object of metal or the like". The term also refers to
"an upright standard to the top of which something is affixed or by which something is
supported; as a dovecote set on a pole; telegraph poles; a tent pole; sometimes, specifically a
vessel's master (Webster's New International Dictionary 2nd Ed., p. 1907.) Along the streets,
in the City of Manila, may be seen cylindrical metal poles, cubical concrete poles, and poles of
the PLDT Co. which are made of two steel bars joined together by an interlacing metal rod.
They are called "poles" notwithstanding the fact that they are no made of wood. It must be
noted from paragraph 9, above quoted, that the concept of the "poles" for which exemption is
granted, is not determined by their place or location, nor by the character of the electric current
it carries, nor the material or form of which it is made, but the use to which they are dedicated.
In accordance with the definitions, pole is not restricted to a long cylindrical piece of wood or
metal, but includes "upright standards to the top of which something is affixed or by which
something is supported. As heretofore described, respondent's steel supports consists of a
framework of four steel bars or strips which are bound by steel cross-arms atop of which are
cross-arms supporting five high voltage transmission wires (See Annex A) and their sole
function is to support or carry such wires.
The conclusion of the CTA that the steel supports in question are embraced in the term
"poles" is not a novelty. Several courts of last resort in the United States have called these
steel supports "steel towers", and they denominated these supports or towers, as electric
poles. In their decisions the words "towers" and "poles" were used interchangeably, and it is
well understood in that jurisdiction that a transmission tower or pole means the same thing.
In a proceeding to condemn land for the use of electric power wires, in which the law provided
that wires shall be constructed upon suitable poles, this term was construed to mean either
wood or metal poles and in view of the land being subject to overflow, and the necessary
carrying of numerous wires and the distance between poles, the statute was interpreted to
include towers or poles. (Stemmons and Dallas Light Co. (Tex) 212 S.W. 222, 224; 32-A
Words and Phrases, p. 365.)
PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 8
The term "poles" was also used to denominate the steel supports or towers used by an
association used to convey its electric power furnished to subscribers and members,
constructed for the purpose of fastening high voltage and dangerous electric wires alongside
public highways. The steel supports or towers were made of iron or other metals consisting of
two pieces running from the ground up some thirty feet high, being wider at the bottom than at
the top, the said two metal pieces being connected with criss-cross iron running from the
bottom to the top, constructed like ladders and loaded with high voltage electricity. In form and
structure, they are like the steel towers in question. (Salt River Valley Users' Ass'n v.
Compton, 8 P. 2nd, 249-250.)
The term "poles" was used to denote the steel towers of an electric company engaged in the
generation of hydro-electric power generated from its plant to the Tower of Oxford and City of
Waterbury. These steel towers are about 15 feet square at the base and extended to a height
of about 35 feet to a point, and are embedded in the cement foundations sunk in the earth, the
top of which extends above the surface of the soil in the tower of Oxford, and to the towers are
attached insulators, arms, and other equipment capable of carrying wires for the transmission
of electric power (Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Oxford, 101 Conn. 383, 126 Atl. p. 1).
In a case, the defendant admitted that the structure on which a certain person met his death
was built for the purpose of supporting a transmission wire used for carrying high-tension
electric power, but claimed that the steel towers on which it is carried were so large that their
wire took their structure out of the definition of a pole line. It was held that in defining the word
pole, one should not be governed by the wire or material of the support used, but was
considering the danger from any elevated wire carrying electric current, and that regardless of
the size or material wire of its individual members, any continuous series of structures
intended and used solely or primarily for the purpose of supporting wires carrying electric
currents is a pole line (Inspiration Consolidation Cooper Co. v. Bryan 252 P. 1016).
It is evident, therefore, that the word "poles", as used in Act No. 484 and incorporated in the
petitioner's franchise, should not be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to defeat
the very object for which the franchise was granted. The poles as contemplated thereon,
should be understood and taken as a part of the electric power system of the respondent
Meralco, for the conveyance of electric current from the source thereof to its consumers. If the
respondent would be required to employ "wooden poles", or "rounded poles" as it used to do
fifty years back, then one should admit that the Philippines is one century behind the age of
space. It should also be conceded by now that steel towers, like the ones in question, for
obvious reasons, can better effectuate the purpose for which the respondent's franchise was
granted.
Granting for the purpose of argument that the steel supports or towers in question are not
embraced within the term poles, the logical question posited is whether they
constitute real properties, so that they can be subject to a real property tax. The tax law does
not provide for a definition of real property; but Article 415 of the Civil Code does, by stating
the following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tends directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
xxx xxx xxx
The steel towers or supports in question, do not come within the objects mentioned in
paragraph 1, because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil.
They are not construction analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per description,
given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by
means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to
place. They can not be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. Each of these steel towers or

supports consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of bolts, which can be
disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by screwing the same. These steel
towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries,
receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for
industry or works on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works in the land in
which the steel supports or towers are constructed.
It is finally contended that the CTA erred in ordering the City Treasurer of Quezon City to
refund the sum of P11,651.86, despite the fact that Quezon City is not a party to the case. It is
argued that as the City Treasurer is not the real party in interest, but Quezon City, which was
not a party to the suit, notwithstanding its capacity to sue and be sued, he should not be
ordered to effect the refund. This question has not been raised in the court below, and,
therefore, it cannot be properly raised for the first time on appeal. The herein petitioner is
indulging in legal technicalities and niceties which do not help him any; for factually, it was he
(City Treasurer) whom had insisted that respondent herein pay the real estate taxes, which
respondent paid under protest. Having acted in his official capacity as City Treasurer of
Quezon City, he would surely know what to do, under the circumstances.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners.
PECSON V. CA
After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as
personal or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such
property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party.
The Case chanrobles virtual law library
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the January 6, 1999 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA)[2] in CA-GR SP No. 47332 and its February 26, 1999
Resolution[3] denying reconsideration. The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads as
follows: chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order dated February 18, 1998 and
Resolution dated March 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33500 are hereby AFFIRMED. The
writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 15, 1998 is hereby LIFTED.[4] chanrobles virtual
law library
In its February 18, 1998 Order,[5] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 218)
[6] issued a Writ of Seizure.[7] The March 18, 1998 Resolution[8] denied petitioners Motion for
Special Protective Order, praying that the deputy sheriff be enjoined from seizing immobilized
or other real properties in (petitioners) factory in Cainta, Rizal and to return to their original
place whatever immobilized machineries or equipments he may have removed.[9]
The Facts chanrobles virtual law library
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:[10] chanrobles
virtual law library
On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing for short) filed
with the RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of money (Annex E), with an application for a writ of
replevin docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33500. chanrobles virtual law library
On March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a
writ of replevin (Annex B) directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary
expenses. chanrobles virtual law library
On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioners factory,
seized one machinery with [the] word that he [would] return for the other
machineries. chanrobles virtual law library
On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective order (Annex C), invoking
the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its
processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of
replevin. chanrobles virtual law library
PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 9
This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex F), on the ground that the properties [were]
still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin. chanrobles virtual law
library
In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable
as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to
innocent third parties. They further stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these
machineries as personal because the contracts in which the alleged agreement [were]
embodied [were] totally sham and farcical. chanrobles virtual law library
On April 6, 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of
the remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers
from taking the rest. chanrobles virtual law library
On April 7, 1998, they went to [the CA] via an original action for certiorari.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals chanrobles virtual law library
Citing the Agreement of the parties, the appellate court held that the subject machines were
personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners. It also ruled
that the words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the
contracting parties. Observing that Petitioner Goquiolay was an experienced businessman
who was not unfamiliar with the ways of the trade, it ruled that he should have realized the
import of the document he signed. The CA further held: chanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore, to accord merit to this petition would be to preempt the trial court in ruling upon
the case below, since the merits of the whole matter are laid down before us via a petition
whose sole purpose is to inquire upon the existence of a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the [RTC] in issuing the assailed Order and Resolution. The issues raised herein are proper
subjects of a full-blown trial, necessitating presentation of evidence by both parties. The
contract is being enforced by one, and [its] validity is attacked by the other a matter x x x
which respondent court is in the best position to determine. chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, this Petition.[11]
The Issues chanrobles virtual law library
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration: chanrobles
virtual law library
A. Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by SERGS became real property
by virtue of immobilization. chanrobles virtual law library
B. Whether or not the contract between the parties is a loan or a lease.[12] chanrobles virtual
law library
In the main, the Court will resolve whether the said machines are personal, not immovable,
property which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin. As a preliminary matter, the Court
will also address briefly the procedural points raised by respondent.
The Courts Ruling chanrobles virtual law library
The Petition is not meritorious.
Preliminary Matter:Procedural Questionschanrobles virtual law library
Respondent contends that the Petition failed to indicate expressly whether it was being filed
under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It further alleges that the Petition erroneously
impleaded Judge Hilario Laqui as respondent. chanrobles virtual law library
There is no question that the present recourse is under Rule 45. This conclusion finds support
in the very title of the Petition, which is Petition for Review on Certiorari.[13] chanrobles virtual
law library
While Judge Laqui should not have been impleaded as a respondent,[14] substantial justice
requires that such lapse by itself should not warrant the dismissal of the present Petition. In
this light, the Court deems it proper to remove, motu proprio, the name of Judge Laqui from
the caption of the present case.
Main Issue: Nature of the Subject Machinerychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of
the Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property. Serious policy
considerations, they argue, militate against a contrary characterization. chanrobles virtual law
library

Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of
personal property only.[15] Section 3 thereof reads: chanrobles virtual law library
SEC. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall
issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged
to be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his
custody. chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real property as
follows: chanrobles virtual law library
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x chanrobles virtual law library
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x chanrobles virtual law library
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal
elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or
personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because
they are essential and principal elements in the industry.[16] In that sense, petitioners are
correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article
415 (5) of the Civil Code.[17] chanrobles virtual law library
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines
are not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. chanrobles virtual law library
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal.[18] After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently
estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is
ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. chanrobles
virtual law library
Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio,[19] the Court upheld the intention of the parties to treat
a house as a personal property because it had been made the subject of a chattel mortgage.
The Court ruled: chanrobles virtual law library
x x x. Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal
property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage
defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least,
intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an
inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. chanrobles virtual law library
Applying Tumalad, the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile
Mills[20] also held that the machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry, as in the
present case, was a proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal
property in a contract. Pertinent portions of the Courts ruling are reproduced
hereunder: chanrobles virtual law library
x x x. If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may
be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as
long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced
thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and
becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the
chattel mortgage. chanrobles virtual law library
In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are
to be considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as
follows:[21] chanrobles virtual law library
12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property
notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in
any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property
or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent. chanrobles virtual
law library
PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 10
Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject
machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ
of Seizure. chanrobles virtual law library
It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the machines should be deemed
personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned.[22] Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third
persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject
machinery as personal.[23] In any event, there is no showing that any specific third party
would be adversely affected.
Validity of the Lease Agreement chanrobles virtual law library
In their Memorandum, petitioners contend that the Agreement is a loan and not a lease.
[24] Submitting documents supposedly showing that they own the subject machines,
petitioners also argue in their Petition that the Agreement suffers from intrinsic ambiguity
which places in serious doubt the intention of the parties and the validity of the lease
agreement itself.[25] In their Reply to respondents Comment, they further allege that the
Agreement is invalid.[26] chanrobles virtual law library
These arguments are unconvincing. The validity and the nature of the contract are the lis
mota of the civil action pending before the RTC. A resolution of these questions, therefore, is
effectively a resolution of the merits of the case. Hence, they should be threshed out in the
trial, not in the proceedings involving the issuance of the Writ of Seizure. chanrobles virtual
law library
Indeed, in La Tondea Distillers v. CA,[27] the Court explained that the policy under Rule 60
was that questions involving title to the subject property questions which petitioners are now
raising -- should be determined in the trial. In that case, the Court noted that the remedy of
defendants under Rule 60 was either to post a counter-bond or to question the sufficiency of
the plaintiffs bond. They were not allowed, however, to invoke the title to the subject property.
The Court ruled: chanrobles virtual law library
In other words, the law does not allow the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge
the writ of seizure (or delivery) on ground of insufficiency of the complaint or of the grounds
relied upon therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary attachment or injunction, and thereby
put at issue the matter of the title or right of possession over the specific chattel being
replevied, the policy apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined
only at the trial on the merits.[28] chanrobles virtual law library
Besides, these questions require a determination of facts and a presentation of evidence, both
of which have no place in a petition for certiorari in the CA under Rule 65 or in a petition for
review in this Court under Rule 45.[29]
Reliance on the Lease Agreement chanrobles virtual law library
It should be pointed out that the Court in this case may rely on the Lease Agreement, for
nothing on record shows that it has been nullified or annulled. In fact, petitioners assailed it
first only in the RTC proceedings, which had ironically been instituted by respondent.
Accordingly, it must be presumed valid and binding as the law between the parties. chanrobles
virtual law library
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation[30] is also instructive on this point. In that case, the
Deed of Chattel Mortgage, which characterized the subject machinery as personal property,
was also assailed because respondent had allegedly been required to sign a printed form of
chattel mortgage which was in a blank form at the time of signing. The Court rejected the
argument and relied on the Deed, ruling as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
x x x. Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a
contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable, or
annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code, by a proper action in court. There is
nothing on record to show that the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that
steps were taken to nullify the same. x x x
Alleged Injustice Committed on the Part of Petitioners chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners contend that if the Court allows these machineries to be seized, then its workers
would be out of work and thrown into the streets.[31] They also allege that the seizure would
nullify all efforts to rehabilitate the corporation. chanrobles virtual law library
 PROPERTY CASES: II. RIGHT TO ACCESSION A.1-6 11
Petitioners arguments do not preclude the implementation of the Writ. As earlier discussed,
law and jurisprudence support its propriety. Verily, the above-mentioned consequences, if they
come true, should not be blamed on this Court, but on the petitioners for failing to avail
themselves of the remedy under Section 5 of Rule 60, which allows the filing of a counter-
bond. The provision states: chanrobles virtual law library
SEC. 5. Return of property. -- If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicants
bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the
property, but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to
the applicant, require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a
bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the property as stated in the applicants
affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the
payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the adverse party, and by serving a
copy bond on the applicant. chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners