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10th Armd Div in the CRAILSHEIM Ope~ation

loth Armored Division in the Crailshelm ,

Operation, 4 -10 Apr 45. Arnrored School ,
Student researoh .report. llay 60 . "­ 'I

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION

.,.... ,.,.... ,
i!*t~~ \
LIBRARY SERVICES

fOltT LEAVENWORTH. KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO.N-2146.58 COpy NO. . 1

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A RESEARCH REPORT

PrepClred at

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

Fort Knox Kentuck y

1949 ·1950
 • •

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CRAILSHEIM

OPERATION

_ J
10th ARMORED DIVISION IN THE CRAU.SHEIM OPERATION

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

BY

COMMITTEE 8 OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

1949-1950

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CECIL HIMES, CAV.

MAJOR CHARLES T. KRM:PITZ, CAV.

MAJOR HUGO Vi. HEFFELFINGER, CAV.

MAJOR CARROLL Me FALLS, Jr. J CA V.

MAJOR MORRIS C. STOUT, FA.

MAJOR WILLIAM J. BOEHMER, CAV.

CAPTAIN STEP'1EN K. PLUI\1:E, CAV.

CAPTAIN GEORGE D. STYER, CiI.V.

CAPTAIN JhMES M. HUDDLESTON I CAV.

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

MAY 1950

 PREFACE

Tho lOth ~rmor6d Division orossed the RtUNE River

as part of the United States Seventh Army in Maroh 1945.

The division spearheaded the driv~ of the VI Corps to the

W?st bank of the NECKl~R River against feeble German nsist­

(lnCG. Arriving in front of HEILBRONN the corps vias halted

by stiffening German resistnnoe. The 10th Armored Division

was dirGcted to move to th6 north in an attempt to outflank

HEI LBRONN • Elements of the division Viere successful in re­

aching CR:I.ILSHEIM, forty air miles to th(;) e!lst. Failing

to move back tOVlClrd HEILBRONN und after defending CRAILSHEIM

for tuo days the division '.-IUS forced to \Ji thdraw. This

study COVE;rs the drive for, oapture of and 'iJithdrQ:~J(),l from

CR.c~ILSHEIM: by tho 10th Armored Division during the period

4-10 l~pril 1945.

Our main purposo in studying this particular action

1::QS to incrcuse our lmm71cdgc of armored operations in

three types of action: penetration, defense, and ,'Jith­

drawul. Besides increasing our lmo':!ledgG Vie ,'Jere trying

to determine udhGrence to or violation of armor cd doctrine,

any lessons to bo learnod from this particular operation,

und to make recommcnd:ltions on the future Gmployment of

armor cd uni ts.

.Ll
 Tho main sources of information D.v,lilable to us ywre

llfta ;'.c tion Reports, 0. Report by Captain Hnmel~ a member

of tho Adv~ncGd Officers Class of 1948, on this same sub­

ject, and letters and interviel"ls YIith former members of

the 10th .<:"rmorcd Division. After Action Reports formed

the basis for most of the report as they uere the only

availablc source that covered the entire period in detail.

;~ grE:at dec.l 0 f the valuo of the rGports 1jJas lost, however,

becG.usc the ~nneX6S such as journals, order s, stu tistical

reports, etc., wGrC not c:..vaiL,blc. Th0 information in the

After .-lction Reports Was confirmed and el::l,bor'.lted on by

C~~pto.in Ha'1lGl and other former mGIJlbers of the 10th il.rmored

Di vision.

The following members of the 10th Armored Div­

ision ·.'Iere helpful in f~nswering our inquiries:

Col Wade C. Gatchel (Rotired)

Lt Col ;ililliom 'J'f. Beverly

Lt Col Curtis L. Ho.nkins

Lt Col 'l'homus C. Ch~berl[\in

Mo.j Ar thur C. Ball

Cupt George F. H:mwl

C~pt R~,ymond K:J.lr,rcn

SFC Hugh S. Johnson

iii
ilerman C. Jacobs

Jrsderict:: r. Haas

Syl \fes tel' r. H sr p;6r

Carl E. Michael

I;;alcol:i1 ::liIerr itt

'IUilliam Hartline

Jcim Vi. Sheffield

Fi.ichard -\1. Ulrich

v~heeler hll. Tha.ckston

In addi-:ion we would like to express oru appreciation

for the work of Hrs. i{jlliam J. B06hw,r on the cover, charts

and rr.aps of this r epor t.

 TABLE OF CCNTEN'IS

0' :\PTF. R Page

1 TIJ TRODUC TI CN • .. ... . . . . . . . .. . . . I • , •

1

2. TJ-fE CAPTlFE OF ,CRAIl SI-TT!::IM • • • • , • • ." ••••••••• 7

Evef;1ts l.eadi~ up to the drive on Crailsheim •• ,• • • • • •• 7

Combat tonmapd l\. • ;, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .• " • • • 12

Combat Cotntnand Bl • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , e , • • • 19

Reserve Cohmahd am 90th Cav. Ren. Sq. Mecz. • • • • • • • 24

;. OFFENSIVE (FH.:Rcl.TIO"lS ThT T~:q; CRAILSU;EIM-llSHOFEN MEA. • • • •• 30

Canba t Comnand A. • • e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 30

Reserve Corrm:md and 90th Cav. Ren. Sq. Meea • • • • • • .. • • 37

Combat Gomnand .-\. (w ith des erve Comnand under oper ational

centrol) 8 ~pril • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • 39

Combat Corrmand ~ (with Reserve Conmand under operational

control) 9 April. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • 47

90th Cavalry Reconnais Sd.'.ce Souadron, Mechanized. • • • • •• 51

4 TF~ ROI I ~l BAF~J. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . .. .. .. •

.. 55
. . . . .. •
The fight along the MSR • • • • • , • • • • • 55

Air re supply ope rations • • • • • • • • • 62

5 THS ',H'WDRA"~L FRO!" C::,.-iFS' EDi • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 65

Combat Con-mand A (wit); Reserve Corrmand under operational

centrol) 10 April. • • • •• " • • • • ••• 65

Combat Comnand B. • • • .. • '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •.• 72

90th Cavalry Reconnaissa'ce Squadron, Mechanized • • •' •.• • • 74

6 StJ'.'l"ARY • • • . '.' , • • • • • • • to • • • • • ........... • _. 77

Elnt'loyrrent of the lOn l-1.rmored Division. • • • • • • • • •• 77

Conclusions and lessons learned • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 79

·APP~TDICES·,' • • • • • • • •.•.•.• • • • • • ~ • • • • • • • •
I. Order of Battle a,ld. Troop List • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 85

II. Terrain &twy. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 91

III. Li ivl s ion, Corps, at'.d ;1.rmy Order s • • • • • • • • • • • •• 94

IV. Personalities. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 111

v
 CHAPTE.'R 1

INTRODUCTION

Tho lOth Armored Division, under the comm:md of

M:,-j or GcnerLll Paul W. Newgo.rden, 'was ac ti VQ ted on 15 July

1942 at Fort Benning, Georgia from elements of the 3d and

11th Cavalry Regimen ts. The newly orgo.nized division

took over the area und somo of the equipment which ho.d

formerly belonged to the 2d A.rmored Division.

The 10th h.rmorcd Division perfonned the usual

l,GF training progrurn \-;hilo u.t Fort Banning, and was soon

known :.1S a "hot" outfit. Concurrently, the niclmumo of

"Tiger" W:.1S acquire,d. When the bas ic :.1nd uni t tro.ining

cycle >''D.s c0mpleted, the ~ntire division spent almost

four ;uonths pl.:.rticipCtting in thE; Ten..'1esscG Maneuvers

CLnd tilen moved to C[;.mp Gordon, Georgi...:. to proc(;ss for

ovcrscCLS dut:y. ;, serious bl07! ':(,:1.3 dC:J.l t the di 'lis ion

by the unti:noly dco.th of General Hcwgarden in :.1 pl:.1ne

crLlsh nc.:o.r Chl tto.noog;' 1 TennessGe on 14 July 1944, almost

t,vo yc._crs to the day after he hetd D.ssu.rncd comrrr:tnd of tho

division. M:.1jor Genera.l W'lillin.m H. Horris, an officer

of livide experience, succeeded to comm:.;.nd of the division

~nd led it through all of its subsequent c ombclt on the

contLlcnt.

1
 SJ::.arpencd by tra.ining" the division loft for Europo

from CD1l'.p Putrick Henry, Virginia. on 13 September 1944,

6YJ.tGring the continent through the port of CHERBOURG on

23 September 1944. After its arrivo.l in Europe, tl& di'l­

ision wus moved to TEURTHEVILLE and underwent a. month of

intensivo truining and comb:lt conditioning prior to enter­

ing combat.

Tho division moved to the front in the MAR LA TOUR

area. on 23 October 1944 where it first suw combat on 1 Nov­

ember in support of the XX Corps. The corps miosion o.t

this timo W:.!S to conblin c!1cmy troops in the arco.. In

mid-November" the di7ision flS a unit 1'10nt on tho offen­

sive, crossing the MOSELLE 'lnd };!fl.LLING and driving to the

SA."-R Rivc.r north of the fortress city of METZ.

As part of the., fo.mous Third J;l-rmy" the 10th Armored

Di 7isic·J:l w:.ts ffi2..king prep:\r~tti()!1s for the dr ive to the

RHINE when it recoived the urg.::;nt cl,ll to go north to

,l.ssist in stopping tbc Germun ,,:intcr offonsive in tho

XEWE1'NES. Tha division rush,)d into the gClP to stop

tho Germo.n onsla.ught on 17 December 1944, und held

defensive posi tions ne(~r Bf·.STOGNE, NOVILLE, Clnd BR.:iS

until tile 'i'cutonic tide ha.d receded. Liko other div­

isions 'ahich hD.d hClstily moved to tho ARDENNES, the lath

sustt:dncd considcro.ble casualtics in both men ;J.nd equip­

ment, and aftor tho action withdrew to rest o.roas.

 :Ster 0. brief r0st in J::muo.ry, the division roturned

to he attack and took part in the clco.ring of the SAAR-MOS­

ELLE Triangle as part of tho Third Army, and th(;n turned

north to capture TRIER on 15 March 1945., At the end of

March, tho division bec~e part of tho Seventh Army"

crossed the RHINE River at l{,LlI..NNHEIH on 28 March 1944, and

took part in the April Offensive ago.inst the hc[,rt of GER­

IvIANY. Under VI Corps the division had the principal rolo

in the battlG of tho HEILBRONN-CR.AILSHED.1-SCHi'JABISCH HALL

Tri~~glG, ~s the combined :llied armies drove toward the

heo.rt of GERM,ANY.

l...fter the failure of the ARDENNES Offensive, it

was incrGo.si!lg1y o.pp::.\rellt th",t it ,1ould be only 0. mo.tter

of time beforo thG once omnipotent Germ::n war mnchine

;v,')ulcJ crumble. Desie:ncd to ho.st611 the fD.ll of GERl1ANY,

the 0.11 iGd Spritlg Ofi'rons i V6 of 1945 envisi oaed o.dv::mc ing

C1.cross tho RHH;'E on n. brwd front and striking deep into

t:le hco.rt of VlC Gerrrnn n'J.tion. Stratogicdly the allied

pl:1,ns cc.llod for tllroe pb),ses. Tho first p11Cl.sc vw.s the

c:lCirclcmcnt or tht. industrial RUI-lR by '). doubl", cmvclop­

ment. The ,n0vcment was to be carried out by Field h~~rsho.ll

Sir Bor~1.Clrd L. 1,:oCltgomery's Tvvcnty-first Army Group in the

north,. and General Omur Bradley I s T:'Jelfth Army Group in the

south. The second and third ph~sGS of the overall plan,

after the central armic::s made D. jUllction wi th the Russians

3
somewhere along the ELBE, called for a rapid advance on each

flc.nk. The northern armies would cut off DENMARK, and the

southern armies would drive to the southeast through GERMANY

into AUSTRIA. In summing up this plan in 0. radio message

to GcnGr·.~l lVLi.RSH';'LL, G€l1eral EISENHOWER said the. following:

I propose, at thE. en.rliGst possible inoment, in

conjunction 'with the SOVIETS to divide ilIld destroy
the GERMAN foroc;s by launching my mo.in attack from
the KASSEL arc8. straight eastward tow:J.rd the heart
of Wh:,lt remains of the GERlviAN industrial power
until that thrust has attained the general area
of LEIPZIG and including that city, unless the
RUSSLiN advance meets us west of that point. The
second. main fe:·ture of the battle is to bring
MONTGOMERY'S forces along on tho left and as quickly
as the above has been accomplished to turn Ninth
h.rmy to the left to flssist him in clen.niEg out
tho '17:;'010, OIGCl. from KIEL and LUBECK westward.
""ftcr the requiremel~ts of' these two moves h:..ve
Deen mGt, I ,Jill thrust colwnns suutho!:lstw8.rd in un
attempt to join up wi th the RUSSIA.NS in the DANUBE
Valley ::l.nd prevent tho Gst,1olishmcnt of a NAZI fort­
ress in southern GEillLANY.
Natur;llly l,ly pLms flre flGxi ble c.nd I mus t ret:1in
freedom of action to meet changing situ~tions. Max­
i:nu:n flexibility VJi~.l result from c·Jncentr~,tion of
maxLm.rril forco in the center.l

On 31 March" the lOOth Ia£'o.ntry Divisio!'1 of ttL VI

Corps crossed the RHINE river near IV1ANNHEDIl. On 1 April,

the 63d Inf cutry Division and the 10th [.rmored Division

joined the corps cmc] the attQck jumpod off to the oG.st

with the proponderance of the attack on the southern flank

of corps. ~G['Lr!1ead8d by elements of the 10th Armored

DivisiO!J the corps mado re.pid progress for throe days aga.11lBt

sporadic Germ<J.n resistance consisting in thE: 10.<J.in of doLlying

forces.
4
 By tho 4tt of April the 63d Infantry Division, on

the north, had advanced eastward 8.S far as aiD MERGEN-

TRETIvl and WClS poised to str ike south across the JAGST Rbror.

Thi s division lnd followed Reserve Commnnd of the lOth

i;..rmored Division cmd noY. had its three inf:::cntry r6giments

sproZld along t:1€. north bnnk of the JAGST River. The c om­

mUllic~~tions center of HEILBRONN apP6arod to have been out­

flanked by the swift ~,ction of this flank.

~~hile the maneuver to th6 north had bean progressing,

Comb~~ t Command .tl. of thE; lOth Armored Division, followed by

the 100th Ini'mtry J.)ivisioll" had been attc.cking west from

HEIDELBERG townrd HEILERONN. Theso southern forc6s had

bcem meeting stiffening resistance on the 2d ;).nd 3d of

l~pr il. By the niEht of the 3d of l~pril this force was

dr::;,vJn up along th:: NEClbR before HEILBRONN and hLld c leured

OllOUgh of the. west brlnk befon, the. city to plzm :J. cros

for the follo\ving d::<y.

Comh:t Commo.nd B of the lOth ".rmorod Division on

the extreme southcrn f1,:u-:k of the corps o.lso 'Jo.s stopped

on th" Y/est h;,nk of the NECKL.R.

Tho first v,eek of the. (,dvunco from tho bridgeh6ad

of the RInNE had seen only light enomy rcsisto.nce. It was

known t'lil t VI Corps wo.s fae ing the depleted German r irs t

k:::my -,dth an cstim-t,.:;d strength of 7,500 comb(",t effectivos.

The en6:n.y made good USG of his monger forces and it Wo.s

5
o.ppi1rO:1 t th::1 t he intended to m:J.ko r:.. stand for HEILBRONN

along the JAGST and NEC&\R River lines.

Tile VI Corps had no t n.nticipLl. ted :l. long de hy in

crossing these rivers. On 3 .Jl.pri1 the corps issued orders

---------
for thG 10th ·"rmored vivi s ion 2.nd the 100th Infantry Di v­
----------~----------

ision to seize HEILBRONN and continue the attc..ck 6L1st}­

}JOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

1D-i:lir,ht D. EisG~1ho,Jer, Crusuade in Europe (G:l.rden City,

NOH York: Dou~)lcd::,-y fend Co., Inc., 1948) p 401.

2Report of Opero.tions, The Seventh United States Army,

1944-1945, Vol III, P '79.

 CEAPTER 2

THE CAPTURE OF CRAlLS JElE

On the night of 28 March 1945, the lOth Armored Div­

ision crossed thE: R1IINE River at EANN_=::EILI, GerIrfmy. During

the period 29 March - 4 April tho diviwion was in

exploi totion operations in the area 30ut11 of the NECKAR River

bet'iJ6Cn ~iIA1:U\P.ElI:I and HEILDROliN (08.5-61.5). The division

carried out this mission, advancinG swiftly against incre­

asing resistunce with Com-bat Co:r:ur.ands A and alJreast, CCA

on the left (north). Combat Command A drove the general

(91.3-04.5), lIELHS1'l,DT (90.0.. 81.5), ~jJIT'E:'.r£-JARDT (98.0-77.9),

and KBCmIAUSEN (00.0 .. 66.0). Combat Command 1:3 moved along

the axis HAIF(mElM, SClrvYETZ E:GLN (61.0.. 87.5), 1iVALLDORF (66.0­

78.6), STETTFILD (66.3-65.3), GROSSGARTACE (01.0-61.5), and

LA1.?l'EN (03.5-54.0). (See Fir:ure 1.) Combat Cornrr.a.nd Reserve

movE;d t;18 same general axis as t ;,s.t of eCA vii th the

mission lito e:"1gaf;e in a reconnaissa.nce in force with the 90th

Cavo. Reconnaissance Squadron to t:!'l.E: oi ty of ROT?ErWERG

"l
(7'1.5-89.4). The Re::lerve Command moved to ASSAl'iST~\DT

(41.5-S3.e) on 4 A.pril a.nd raade contact viJ.th the 90th

Cavalry ::~GconnQissance Squadron w!lich had preceded them.

Plans Yller8 [-;ade for a coordinated atta.ck st

7
,....----.- - -I

• J. I

•
.

,""
cr'-'j
enemy defenses in the vicinity of STUPP~CH (46.0-95.8).

This o.tto.ck wo.s bunched ut 1430B on 4 April 1946 from

ASShlJ[STADT with the Reserve Command on the south und the

90th Cuvo.lry on the nor th. STUPPACH und HACHTEL (49.0-93.0)

were to.ken despite moderate enemy resist~nce Q.nd the fo.ct

reported to division he0.dqu8.rters o.t 1600B hour s. Reserve

Comrn..'"lnd WfJ,S or dered :'y di vi s ion to hold the ground t~1. ken

::::.nd block to the north n.nd northeast.

lilihile the Reserve Comm~Uld and the 90th Cavulry

wore fig;,ting in the vicinity of ASSiJl~:STADT ::md STUPPACJ,

COA and CCB Vlere engtlg.:od in oper:\tions in the vicinity of

HEILBRONN designed to clen.r thE; 0ner:1Y from thG west b.cmk

of the NEC:K:.aR cmd to loco.te crossings n.cross this major

bQ.rr i6r. Combat Comm;.md A ','JUS oper:<ting in the KIRCH­

[TAUS E·} , BI:-JsRACFI (02.5-67.2), FRiiNKENBll.CR (04.5-63.2)

J.re0. YJhilo CCB WClS deployed to the south in the o.rea

between ]EIL5RONN and LAUFFEN.

Combat Commo.nd .:. - 5 il.pril 1945

The morning of 5 ;~pril 1945 found Combat Commo.nd

11. deployGd C1.S follO'.Js: Comoclt COmTIl0.nd L~ Comn,md Post nt

Bli:1ER.'.CEi Ta.sk Force Hankins a.t KIRCIIILmSEN.; Task Force

Roberts ::..t FR..•NKENP'v.I.CH'1nd Task Force Riley Jot BIB:GRACH.

P1o...l1s und reconnuissc.mo6 h~ld O€;6n completed to effect a

crossing of the NEC1G.R River in the vicinity of HEILBRON1'J.

This crossing 'NelS to lu.ve bE-en made in conjunction wit..~

the 3d Battalion" 398th Fiegimeuto.l COl"l:lJ,t Te:l:n ot the loath

Infantry Division. These phns were never carried out, lor

f',t 1030 llOuts Combat COl;r<:1B.nd A was alerted to move north

on [l neW lJ1ission. This mission was to cross the NECK.b.R River

in the vicinity of MOSPACE (02.0-84.5) .. pass through the

bridge~cad established there t::e 3~)d Infantry Division,

the Reserve COlTmand and t:l8 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance

Squadron, an d " r ec annOl'...." er l'n f'orce u2 "l',O t'_, e east.

At 1130B the combat command nc','cd out to accomp­

lish its new rr:ission. The order of :-;'lD.rch was Task Force

Task Force Riley, and Task rorc e berts. The

Combat Comma.nd noved north alonG the route BONrELD

(98.8-69.2) I HUFFE:~HArtLT, .ILLES'r.ADT, .t,CLASTERElAU NECK-

ASSMIS'I'liDi',. o.nd at 1315B hOUl'S the Comtat Cornmai:1d "~ Command

Post closed in ASSAHSTADT. (See Fi~ure 2.) E;.'T 1950B hours

Task Yorce Hankins had closed into R}~l':'G:J:JSF...tUJSEN (44.4..

91.5) and had stopped in order to carry out refueling op­

erations of all vehicles, To.sk loree Riley closed into

f~SS,\?'STADT at approxirna te1y 2030B hou: s and Task Force

Ro'berts into an attack position in the southern outskirts of

ASSAl\~STADT at approxblD.'tely 2100B hOUi"S. Both task forces

immediately refueled and prepared for irmnc;diate action.

10
 While CCA was conducting its movement to the vicinity

of ABSA SI'ADT" General Morris, Corrnnand Genee aI, 10th

ed Division" issued an oral field order to General Piburn.

'rIds fiGld order directed Combat Conmand A to continue the

\
attack to the southeast, capture

turn to t~1.e
(70.5-62.5,) ,

southwest and west and seize the line CRAILSEE1J.,1, (

SC~'~dABISCH HALL (46.0-59.Q)" BACKHAHG (24.0-40.0) 3 • General
\

Piburn then issued verbal crders to t~~e task force conunanders )

/
to carry out this mission. His plan ,-nas to attack with Task

Force Hankins in thE lead" followed by Task Force ley.

(
Task Force Roberts was given the initial mission of clear J
(
the enemy from the sector between ASSAIMSTADT and DORZBACH

(43.0-89.0). Considerable enemy resistance had been devel­

oped at DORZBACH during the evening of 5 April by the 90th

Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.

Combat Command A - 6 April 1945

Having quickly refueled" r ecei ved its order s, and pre­

pared f'or the attack" Task Force :-~ankins passed through the

lines of tile 90th Cavalry in the northeastern outskirts of

REHGBHSI-IAUSEH and cormnenced the a ttack toward CRAILSHEIM.

The initial movement VJas extreme ly d ifficul t. This was

occasioned by the poor road net, enemy road blocks, dark­

ness, and t -~e fact that Task Force Hankins had to remain

on the roads becau.se of the. heavy woods. This made it

12
very simple for the enemy to cons.truct effective roadblocks

by felling trees across the roads • He took full advantage

of this and Task Force Hankins struggled throughout the

night to get the attack moving. Terrain was the major

enemy, as only sporadic small arms and mortar f.ire, larg­

ely' ineffective, was encountered by the column. 4 Bypasses

were used to get uro~nd the extensive roadblocks but, since

the ground was very soft, vehicles continually mired and

had to be pulled out~ Despite these difficulties Tusk Force

Hankins continued its slow movement forward. Daybreak found

them approaching HOLLENBACH (50.3- 88.4) ~ (See Figure 3.)

. Since .TaskForce Hankins was having so much trouble

traversing the route between RENGERSiIAUSEN and HOLLENBACH

(50.3~88.4), General Piburn ordered Task Force Roberts

to attack to the south toward DORZBACH and reconnoiter a

route to the west 0 f Task Force Hankins, bypass him, and

5
get the attack moving. The Task Force moved from the sou­

thern outskirts of ASSAMSTADT at 004513 hours, 6 April 1945.

They took the wrong road in the darkness and advanced into

undefended HORRENBACH· (39.5-91.9) • 6 Discover ing their

mistak;e they turned east and advanced to LAIBACH (41.9­

90.8); thence to DORZBACH. Here they encountered det­

erLlined enemy resistance in the form of roadblocks and

heavy small arms, antitank, and artillery fire. The tusk

force spent the remainder of the nifh t attempting to find

13
a bypass around DORZWiCH but was unsuccessful.. They

attacked bORzBl~CH after daylight andj after a severe

.' ,

fire fight, took the toWn that evenirlgt

Arter ~aptu~e of the town, it was discovered

that the main road f·rom DORZBhCH to HOLLENBACH, via

HOHEBACH (45.0-86.7) and AILRINGEN (46.2-87.8), was

blocked by a destroyed bridge across a small stream

which ran through the town-. They were unable to find

a bypass and this fact was· inunediately reported to Combat

Command A. Task Force Roberts was then ordered to move

back to its original assembly area in ASSiiMSTADT. This

move was accomplished without incident. (See Figure 3J

~vhile Task For C6 Hankins was attacking toward

HOLLENB.t~CH n.nd Task For ce Roberts was engaged ilt DOR­

ZBACH, Task Force Riley had remained in liSSAMSTADT

with Combat Comm~nd A Heudquarters. They were prepared

to follow e i th6r Task Ii orce Hankins or Task For ce

Roberts, depending upon ~hich tusk force found a suitable

route and bogan to move 'with the speed \vi th which an

7
ar.morcd task force is cffpable of moving. This opport­

unity did not present itself during the night of 5-6

April because of th6 conditions already stated.

,L'it approximately 0900B hours, 6 April 1945, while

Task }< or ce Roberts was attacking DORZBAeH and Task Force

Riley was waiting expectantly in ASSAMST~DT, Task Force

Hankins captured and cleared HOLLENruiCH. The attack was

15

imrtwdid.tGly continuE;d toward GUTBACH (56.8-87'&2)-_ Two

roa.db1ocksdcfended by sttulli etiemy gkooupa d.rilibd with

smull arms and panzerfausts were 6TJ.countered between

HOLLENBACH and GUTBACH, but were swiftly oleared through

the coordinated a.~tion of the leading teams. GuTB8.CH

fell at 1245B hours and the attack began to pick up

speed. RIEDBACH (58.2-85.7) was captured at l~OOB

against slight resistance and it became apparent that

Task Force Hankins had a brer:'kthrough. The ruce was on~

The column vV ith little or no int6rference from the enemy

pushed swiftly through DLAUFELDEN (62.5-80 ..0), 1443B

hours; BRETTENFELD (65.8-76.0), l515B hours; ROT AM SEE

( 66.6-74.7), 1550 B hours; w-ALLHAUSEN (69.6-70.6), 1634B

hours; GRONINGEN (69.6-68 ..3), 1650B hours; SATT11iiEILER

(70.6-66.7), 1710B hours; SATTELDORF (71~2.66.2); l730B

hours; and NEIDENFELS BURLESTIAGEN (69.8·66.8) at 1745B

8
hours. The main column of Task Force Hankins dashed

into CRf~ILSHEIM at the same time that elements of the

task force were clearing surprised, bewildered enemy out

of NEIDENFELS BURLESViAGEN. Ene!'.1Y resistance in CRAILSHEIM

was light and disorganized, and it was apparent that com­

plete surprise had been acheived. The town was hastily

searched, since darkness was fast approaohing, and by

2100B hours Task Force Hankins Was disposed in CRAIL­

SHEIM for defense.

16
 Tc.sk Force Riley, Vvhic~1 had remained in ASSAM­

ST.d.DT C\.vJaiting the opportunity to exploit any success,

received the ttgo" signal fl'om Combat Contrna.nd 11 Head.­

qJarters at appI'oximatei~ iSOOB hours. It was apparent

from reports from Task }i'orce Hankins that a breakthrough

was in the ffi.::..king, and General Pi burn wanted Task .r orC6

Ri ley to as s i st in the exp loi to. tion.. Task It orce hi ley

moved out at 1510B hour s.9 It was immediate ly apparent

that t~leir move was to be no mere "motor march". Th6

enemy had inf il tra ted behind Task For ce :·tankins and

harrassed Task r'orce .hiley with small arms fire While

the task force was negotiating the stretch of bad road

through the woods northeast of RENGERSHAUSEN. The

task force continued a sl~1iv, steady advance following

the same route taken by Task }i'orce H:.lnkins. After

clearin~ the stretch of bad road the task force began

to roll, and at 2058B hours lead elements of Task Force

Ri ley entered CRAILSHEIM and made contact with Task Force

Hankins. Since radio communication between both task

forces and Combat Command A lieadquarters had been lost,

because of the distance involved, the commanders of

Task Force l1f.lnkins and Task :B' orce Riley conferred and

agreed upon a plan for the defense of the CRilILSHEIM

area. They decided to reinforce Task Force Hankins in

17
CRll.ILSHEIM VJi th one team from Task Force Riley and to pI ace

the remaining two teams of Task Force Riley in S..; 'TTIL­

~;J-EILER and SATTELDORF. These dec isions were quickly carria:l

into abtion and by midi-iight th(3 CRJ~ItSI-I~!M area W~B firmly

~6sting in the hands of the assault task forces of Combat.

Command j~.

~-vhile preparations for the defense of the CRAIL­

SHEIM area were be ing carri ed out, Combat Command A Head­

quarters, which was still located in b.SSAI\~STADT .. received

orders from division to continue on its mission; .at the

same time holding CRAILSHEIM until relieved by the Reserve

Cornnand. General Piburn decided to follow his original

pI an of having Task l' orce ~{ankins block at CRAILSHEIM While

Task }i'orce b.iley passed thr ough and attacked toward SCH­

Vll.BISCH HALL-B..:·~CKNANG. These orders, hov.Jever, never

reached the troops in the CR;-I.ILSHED!I area due to the fact

that radio communication with them had been lost and, des­

pi te repeated attempts involving the use of relay stations.

could not be reestablished. IO Consequently, the troops in

CR1~ILSH.J~IM did not move to accomplish this mission during

the night of 6-7 April •.

It became apparent during the night that the enemy

had been completely surprised by the capture of CRAILSHEIM.

It "vas furthEr apparent that enemy forces in the area. were,

18
in most cases, unaware that CRAILSHEIMwas in American handSJ

This VJas proven by the faet that several command vehicles

and their occupants were ~aptur6d by ~he outpost~ of Task

Force Hankins during the night •. These vehicles had been

tr3.veling toward CRAILSHEIM and their occupants were ast­

ounded to find CRi.ILSHEIM in American hands. At SATTiL-

DORF a German army bus passed unmolested through the outpoots

of Task Force Riley and Was stopped in front of the command

post by the task force S-4. The occupants of the bus stated

they h:~d been sent to pick up laundry.ll They never accomp­

lished their 17lissionl

Com bo. t Cormn nn d B - 4, 5 and 6 Apr i 1 1945

On 4 April 1945 Comb~t Comm~nd B was probing the

WGst b3.nk of the NECKA.R River seeking like ly bridgeheads

across tllO barrier. 12 On the preceding day VI Corps had

or der-e d the 10th iirmor ed Divi s ion and th e lOOth rnf antry
Di vis), on to S6 ize I-{EILBRONN and to continue the attack east

into the heart of GERMANy. 13 . The command post of Comba t

Command B Was located in the vicini ty of FRANKENBACH.

Elements of the combat command reconnoitered for bridges

in the HORKHEIM-KLINGE~CURGH-LAUFFEN (04.5-58.4) area.

Enemy resistance stiffened along the entire river line

as he sought fran ticnlly to guard his internal commun­

ication and supply line s. Air and ground reconnaissance

19
 shovved that all bridges·; with the exception of the ee,st

bridge at HORKHEIM and the bridge at LA.UF'FENj were des.

troyed.
14: the lattet Were intndt but heavily defended.

Befote daylight on 4 April, in the northern sector of

HEILBROHN, the 398th Infantry Re giment of the lOOth Inf­

antry Division had succeeded in establishing a limited

bridgehead on the far bank of the NBCKAR River. The

infantry, unable to expand its bridgehead, held tenaciously

to who..t Ii ttle they had against fanatical enemy counterattacks.

Upon expansion of the lodgement by friendly inf~ntry VI

Corps planned to erect a treadway bridge across the NECKAR

River for the crossing of supporting armor. 16 Elements of

the FRZlTCT{ First Army were attempting to force crossings

of the NECKAR south of LAUFf'EN on the right flank of Combat

Command B.

CombJt Command B, consisting of the 56th Armored

Infantry Battalion and the 11th Tanle Battalion wi th the

normal attachoonts of engineers, artillery, medics, ord­

nance and tank destroyers, was organized into two reinforced

battcllions: Task Force Chamberlain :tnd Task F'orce Richard­

son.

Oper:J.tions Order No. 19, issw:;d by the Commanding

General 10th Armored Division, was received at 2400B,

4 hpril 1945 by Combat Command B. The combat command was

20

ordered to continue its present mission of probing the river

line for crossings, and to be prepared oh division drder

to cross bridge No, 3 at k~uFFEN, bridge No~ ~ north of

HEILBRONN_ br bridge No.1 in the vicinity of NECKARELZ,

a.nd a.ttack to the east. The combat oommand objective,

regardless of "Nhere the crossing of tho NECKAR occurred

(S6C annex for division order), WQS to seize the line

SCH~IiAJ3ISCH Hil.LL-C.RJiILSHEIM. It Vlio.S apparent from thi s

ordor th(~ t VI Corps had all but givon up hope of success­

fully eliminating the resist:lnce at HEILBRONN and foro­

ing tho a.rmor cd support through in tha t c~r en.. Instf.1ad the

pIon bec~"Ile one of flD.nking the sali Gnt to the north and

o.ppro~ching the corps objective from the reur.

The combat command, on 5 April, continued its mis­

sion in the same :J.roCl.. Task Force Richa.rdson was engaged

wi th tllC enemy in the gener:.:.l vicini ty of LAUFFEN. Tnsk

Force Cho...rnberlain was enga.ged in tho vicinity of KLINGEN­

BERG (03.6-58.8) and south to LAUFF'EN. The e'.lrly morning

hours werG m:,rked by slow progress and general confusion

in the comb:::..t command's sector. This was brought about

by the intermingling of French and Aoericun units using

the srune route for identical missions. 16 During the

hours of poor visibility this condition became aggravated

by stiffening German resist:::..nce and sever e anti-tank and

artillery fire delivered from enemy posi tions on both sides

21
of the river. The b~o task forces suffored casunlties in

mell and vehicles from the heavy artillery fire delivered

from positions east of the NEC~~R River which could not

I

be silenoed by our forc~s&17 In nt least one cn~G Pbrt~

ions of Task Force Chamborlain were forced to withdrClW

to locations of safety.

Shortly before noon Combat Command B was directed

to support ele~nGnts of the 397th Inf :mtry Regiment, which

Were to pass through the comoot cOlTIl7lnnd a.nd attempt 0. cros­

sing of the NECKAR Rive~ at BOCKINGEN (05.5-60.5). In the

afternoon one battulion of thG 397th Infantry succeeded in

crossing the NECKAR River, supportGd by their own division

fires a.nd those of Cor:1bat COmrrlr"..nd B, a.nd esta.blished a.

bridgehead on the southern edgo of nE ILBRONN. 18

Combat CO~~Qnd B passed to VI Corps control with

no chnnge in mission at 1700B, 5 .L~pril 45. Other elements

of the lOth Armored Division WerG given the mission of

reconnoitering in force to the line Bil.CKNA~JG, SCR,-ABISCH

HALL-CRAILSHEIM (see annex for Corps order). Comba t

Command B cOiltinued operations in the same general area

dur ing the rGmaindor of 5 April. Efforts to cross the

riv('r ceased ~)"nd gu ins were consolidated. Elements of

the FRENCH First Army had fought into NORDHEIM (01.5-57.5)

and Ll~UFFEN only to bo forc€d back by tho he nvy resistance

of Ss troops in NORDHEIM. Another attack by the FRENCH

22
First Army ~t 1315B sccured both of those towns.
I "
Combut Command B reverted to division control at

1600Bi 6 .i~pril 45~ nnd waS o.lertGd to crcHH3 the NECKAR

Ri \fer to tho north in the vicinity of NECKARELZ. After

crossing the NEC~~ River, Combat Com~and B w~s ordered

to move into an Q.sscr.1b1y urG':~ in the vicini ty of ASSAMSTADT

and to be prepurcd for co~~itment on one hour notice.

Confusion arose as to the exact time th~t the bridge would

bo available. Division contacted corps~ and the division

G-3 notified Combat Cor.unund B that they wculd move across

19
tho.t night.. Comb'1t Com."nllnd B informed division that

they would move out nt 2118B with un ostimat6d t~e of

nrriv~l at the crossing of 2318B. The co~~and post of

Combat Command B cltared FRl!..NKENBACH at 2200B. The order

of march to the crossing site Was Task Force Richardson,

93rd ~rmor6d Field Artillery Battalion, Headquarters Combat

Conmand B, Task Force Chamberlain, 423d Armored Field Art­

i11cry Buttalion, 141st '>I.rmorcd Field ;;\rti11ery Battalion,

20
and Battery B, 976th Field Artillery Battalion. The

route followed to the bridge site was KIRCHAUSEN, BON­

FELD, Rl~PPENAU (99.5-72 .2) HOFF:SNHi~RDT, ViOLLENBERG

(94.5-77 .5)•. BARGEN· (93.• 5-f9.4)., BEI.MSTADT"

21
AGLi.l.STER HAUSEN. (Se~ f:tgure2.) Progress of the crossing

~as slow due to poor visibility and road oonditions. The

lead elements of Combat Command B arrived at the crossing about

23
0525Bj 7 ll.ptil -i5 and started cro ssing the NECK.\R Rivcr.

The movG!1ent to the crossing had been executed under con­

trol of VI Corps, and the 10th At~ot6d Division provided

guides to lC:1d the elements of COl"JOO t COD."':lund J.j to their

Ilssembly area o.t l1.SSlt.l"lSTADT.. The actual crossing of the

river was slQl.v, and it Wo.s not until ll15B tha.t the last

element oleared the br.idge. At this time the cOI!lnand post

of Co::tbat CorJraand B was at ijjINDISCI-IBUCH (36.7-94.7) •. Task

Force Richllrdson, which was the leading element of the

conbat cor.ll-:Iund, rea.ched the assenbly area ut ASSAMSTADT at

l020B.. and discovered that the area. Clssigned was too STI'lllll

and the surrounding fields were too soft fron recent rains

to support the weight of heavy vehicles. The remainder

of the COl-:lba.t cOITL.';l~l.nd continued to close in the ASS:i.M­

STADT assembly are a.. (See Figure 4..)

Reserve Cor:rrnand and 90th Cnvo..lry Reconnaissance

Squa.dron, • 6 April 1945

The Reserve Command and the 90th Cavalry had not

been idle while Combat Command ~ was engaged in the capture

of' CRAILSHEIM. As previously stated they had captured a

line east of .t"SS;~MST.b.DT running generally tnrough STUP­

PACH,. HA.CHTiliL, and RENG ERS HI1.USEN • They. held this line

24.
during the night of 5-6 April despite small groups of

ene8Y SS troops who attacked from the direction of BAD

MDRGENTHEn,l (47.5-01.0) and ROTHENBERG, The Reserve

COTrlr:'land wus pla.ced on a bvo hour alert prepared' to move

south following Combat Con:na.hd A.22 The German continued

his pressure against the line held by the Reserve Comnand

and the 90th Cava.lry. Forces of tho Reserve Command which

hud taken ROTH (50.6-91.3) against no opposition were

counterattacked by the enemy during the night. The enemy

VJus dr ivcn off with heuvy casualtie s, after an intense

fight which was conducted wi thin the to'Nn itself:. Shortly

beforo duylight on 6 April 1945 , n force, estimated one

hundred ~'.nd fifty strong', of SS troops infiltrated back

in STUPP.t~CH, drove out the defender s composed of both

Reserve Cor.UJund and 90th Cavalry troops, and set up n.

defense of the town·. Some .i·i.r:lcrican troops vvere cut off

and captured during this !J.ction. An attack, consisting of

elements of the Heserve Coml:Hlnd und Troop B (Reinforced),

90th Cuvc.lry, was launched against STUFPACH dur ing the

morning a.nd fighting continued throu~r~out the day'. As

a result of this action, the Reserve Command was relieved

from the two hour alert and ordered to hold their pos­

i tion until they could be relieved by other units·. As

soon as this raIief could be accomplished .. the Reserve

COl:nond Wa.s to proceed to CRAILSHEDh: and relieve Comba.t

26
CO!:1lTl'J.nd A. 2 3 As c.. result of the coordinated attack of

elcncnts of the Reserve COmrrll..'.Tlcl :lnd c lcrnents of the 90th

Cavalry) STUPPACH Was recn.pturcd by 1730B hours' Thirty-

five priSr)ncts t"-lcre taken UriC: seventy-five Germ:-.n dcad

2/,1
counted' The Reserve Corr~und and the 90th Cavalry held

their blocking positions throughout the night of 6-7 rtpril.

Small cnany patrols continually probed the outpost system

throughout the night, but no major att:l.ck developed. (See Figure 3.)

The night of 6-7 Apri 1 found the 10th .tl.rnored Div­

ision v.Jell along toward the occomplishr.lCnt of the mis sian

' : £ I ' l.gurc

:J.ssigl1od to thGr.l by VI Corps. ~Sec • 4- ) The division

had, in approxinutely 40 hours, disongaged from the enemy in

tho vicinity of liE ILBRO}Jl'T , mnd·"; a 90° change in direction,

and acccmplished Ll m2rch of approxinntely 59 miles from

the vicinity of BEILBRONN to ASSAMST.'l.DT. :lore they S'lIliftly

prepared for combQ.t, l:lunched a.r... ;.ttn.ck during hours of

0
darkness, turnbd 180 from the tlircction followed during

the raa.rch from r:EILBRONN, Oond drove to ClliI.ILSIf.8IM, approxima­

tely 31 miles behind the Gcr rn."1n lines and approxim,J.tcly 40

air milos from the major ele:nents of VI Corps fighting in

the vicinity of HEILBRONN. They had ca.ptured more than

300 prisoners 25 during this period, and had killed and wou­

nded r.lD.ny nore l as well as capturinf; und destroying a large

~~ount of enGmy materiel - ~ateriel which he could ill

ufford to lose at this stage of the Vi'or.

27
 In addition to the muteriel succoss of the division,

trw cnptux<e of CRAILSHEIM plncod American troops, personi­

ficd by ~~ major element of the division, in control of 0.

to.ctio~lly important loeality, CRAILSIIEn.1: was D. cormnuni­

cntions centor of major ~portunce, QS it controlled the

mc..in highways between EEILBRONN and N1JRNBERG, o.nd between

STUTTG.ART ::lnG NURNBERG. It also controlled the rnnjor ra.il­

road be~Jeen I{EI~BRONN and mr~NBERG,and the most direct

railroad be~Jecn STUTTGART and NURNBERG 1 vio. lu\LEN (73.0­

29.3), ELL'dl~NGEN (75.5-43.3), CRAILS]EDvI. It was of vito.l

importance to the 0erman if he was to hold his line along

tho NECKi~R RIVER betw.een HEILBR01'1N ond STUTTGAllT. Just how

import~nt the German considerec CRAILSHEIM shall be seen in

his a.ctions in that area described in succeeding cbapters.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

lRecorG:".6ndatil~n for Unit Citation, 24 AUf;ust 1945, Head­

quarters 10th j~r;10red Division, p 1. (Inclosure #5)

2Aftor i~ction HGport, Conbat Com.rnand J.';., lOth Arnored Div­

ision, entry for 5 April 45.

4Cc.ptain GeorgE; F. Hamel, The Crailsheim Opera tion of the

lOth Armor6d Di vi sion, (Richr:1ond: Armored Cavalry Journal,
fl1rch-April 1949) p 37.

BAfter J~ction Report, 54th Armored Infantry Battalion, Combat

Cm-.imand A, 10th Armored Division l entry for B April 1945.

28
 70p cit, The Crn.ilshiem Operation of the lqtr Ar~ored Pivision,
p 37.

8Aft6r Action Report, 51st Armored Infnntry Battalion, Conbat

COI:una.nd A, 10th Armored Divi sion, entry for 6 April 45.

goP cit, AJ'ter ~~ction Report, Combat Con."land A, entry for

6 .April 45.
lOOp cit, The Crailsheim Operation 0Ff.~ 10th .ii.rmored Division,
pp 37-38.

llIbid, P 38.

l2Aft6r Action Report, Co~bat Con~and B, 10th Armored Division,

entry for 4 April 45.

l3Report of Operations, The Seventh United Stat6s Army, France

and Gc~any, 1944-1945, p 779.

l4.Aftcr Acti'Jn Report, 11th Tank Bo.ttD.lion, 10th Armored Div­

ision, entry for 4 April 45.

l50p cit,keport of Operations, The Seventh United States Army,

'P78O-;
16 Qp ci t, After Action Report, 11th Tank Ba.ttalion, entry for
5 April 45.
l7Ibid, entry for 5 April 45.

l80p cit, Report of Operations, The Seventh United States

l~rmy, p 782.

19 G_3 Journal, lOth .i~rmor€d Division, entry for 6 .April 45.

20.After Action Report, 405th Field Artillery Group I April 45.

210p Cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry

for 6 l1.pr i1 45.

22.i~ftGr ~ction
Report, 3d Tank Battalion" 10th Armored Uivi­
sion, entry for 6 April 45.

230perations Instructions No. 21, Headquarters, lOth Armored

Division, 6 ~pri1 45, par 3.

24G_ 2 Periodic R(;port, 10th Armored Division, 6-7 April 45.

250p cit, The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th ArmorGd Div­
.- '
ision, p 38.
·29
 CHAPTER 3

OFFENS±VE OPERATIONS IN THE CRAIlSHEIM-ILSHOFEN

AltEA,

Combat Command A - 7 April 1945

The morning of 7 April 1945 found bo th Task Foroe

Hankins and Task Force Riley in CRAILSHEIM. They were

reluctant to move out to continue the mission which, the

reader will remember, was to "seize the line CRAILSHEIM,

SCHNABISC~-I HALL, BACKNANG." Their reluctance was occas­

ioned by the fact that they had been out of conmunicat­

ion with Combat Command A Headquarters in ASSAMSTADT

since the night before,and both commanders were fearful

of becoming strung out and possibly defeated in detail

by the enemy.l An additional factor was the shortage of

fuel and ammunition. lA considerable amount of fuel had

been used during the march from HEILBRONN to ASruu!STADT

and refueling operations in ASSAMSTADT had used up most

of the fuel carried in the trains. , Operations during the

6th of April had practically depleted the fuel carried

in the unit trains and they had been sent to the rear

for resupply. They had not rejoined the task forces on

the morning of the 7th. Consequently both task forces

redistributed their supplies equally among themselves but

neither had enough for more than a few hours of offensive

action.
 Since General Piburn was out of communication with

elements of his cormnand in CRAILSHEIM, he flew in an art­

illery liaison plane to join thGID during the morning of

tho 7tH. Prib.r to ieaving his command post he ordered

Task Force Roberts, which had remained in ASSAMSTADT

s inca returning from the ir fight u t DORZ BA.CS, and the

command post to move to CRAILSHEIM. He arrived at

CRAILSHEIM during tho morning, was informed of the sit­

uation, and relayed the information by a.rtillery liaison

plane baok to the division headquarters.

Meanwhile both task forces in CRAILSHEIM had \.

begun to improve their positions by clearing out t~vns

\

in the vicinity. No effort was made to continue the

attack toward SCHflABISCH HALL. Team Hill of Task Force

)
Hankins cleared INGERSHEIM (71.0-60.7) at 1035B and

returned to CRA.ILSHEIM. Team Havlovi tz of Task For ce

Hankins attacked the a.irfield areo. (69.0-62.5) west of

CRL.ILSHEllvl and secured it by 1135B. In the process a

dual purpose 88-mm gun was knocked out and fourteen

2
enemy planes captured and destroyed. Terun. Holland of

Task Force Hankins cleared ALTENMUNSTER (69.3-61.3)

and remained there all day in a blocking posi tion.

While Task Force Hankins was engaged in these operations,

Task Force Riley was preparing to attack toward SCH-

Wi.. BISCH HfiLL.

31
 After being briefed on the s i tuo.tion, General

Pi burn ordered Task Fl orce Riley to attack SCH'.l1JABISCH

It~LL w hi 10 Task Force Hankins continued its blocking ro Ie

in und around CRAILSHEIM. General Piburn established

his personal command post with the command post of Task

Foroe Hankins p~nding the arrival of his command post

personnel from ASS.l).MSTADT.

Task Force Riley commenoed its attack toward

SCI~ABISCH HALL shortly before noon and by l230B the lead~

ing team, Team Felice, had reached ROSSFELD (67 ••-62.5).

Shor tly befor e the ca.pture of ROSSFELD Team Fe lice sighted

a railroad train approaching CRAILSHEIM from the west. They

allowed the train to reach an advantageous position and then

stopped it with tank cannon fire. They then proceeded to

shoot up the entire train. 3 Team Graham passed through

Team Felice at ROSSFELD and continued the attack through

M:AULACH (65.0-62.8) which fell at l400B. Enemy resistance

was light,consisting mainly of small arms fire from both

sides of the road and from the woods west of lVJAULACH.

Team Felice passed through Team Graham near 1~ULACH and adv­

anced thr ough ILSHOFEN (59.3-65.6), scene of a hasty w ith­

drawal by the headquarter s of a German corps. Task For ce

Riley was strafed and bombed by a small group of ME 109

fighter-bomber s in the vicinity of ILSHOFEN; this del ayed

but did not stop their advance~4 Team Felioe continued

32
the attack and captured WOLPERTSi~USEN (53.7-65.2). While

the task force was in W~OLPERTSF..AUSi!JN II lia ison plat;ie repor t­

ed that a bridge across the KOCHER River at CROFFELBACH

(52.1-64.3) was intact. Lt Col Riley immediately dispatched

a team (apparently Felice) to take the bridge. This bridge

Vias loco. ted in a defile and was blown up by the enemy jus t

as the l6ad tank of the team reached it. Intense resistance

quickly developed. Enemy mortar fire began to fall around

the approaches to the bridge# and small arms and panzerfaust

fire was deliver ed on the colunm from the hi ~h ground on both

sides of the road near the bridge. I:)ince they Were tra.pped

in a defile, the team could not maneuver to attack the enemy

and were forced to withdraw. This they accomplished wi th

considerable difficulty since it was necessary to back ~~

tanks out# trlere being insufficient room in which to turn

them around. One tank was destroyed by panzerfaust fire

from the high ground when a round penetrated its engine

comf;urtment. 5 The team withdrew to WOLPERTSHAUSEN and re­

ar ganized.

Thi s conc I uded the offensive oper at ions of Task r arc e

Riley for the dQy. As night was fast QPproaching, Lt Col

Riley decided to hold wrat he had gained. Consequently he

ordered Team Felice to or ganize t re defense of WOLPERTSHAUSEN

while the remainder of the task force defended I LSHOfEN •

The task force command post was located in 11S~OFEN and

33
the 4l9th Armored }ield Artillery B~ttalion, the direct

support artillery ·battalion for the task force, Was in

position in the vicinity of ILSHOFEN. Task Force Riley

was reinforced at ni ghtfClll in the ~iOLPERTSF..AUSEN-ILSHOFEN.

area. by the Reserve Comnand. These positions were held

without incident by Task Force Riley_ reinforced, throughout

the night.

Task F' orce Hankins improved their bloc king posi tions

around CRAILSHEIM during the day but made no major attack~

due to a shortfl.ge of supplies and the nature of their mission.

~ihi Ie Task Force Ri ley was' bear ing the brunt of the

fighting insofar as the division and Combnt Cormnand A were

concornod, Task Fores Roberts and the commClnd post of

Combc~ t Command A were moving south toward CRAILSHEIM. The

column departed from ASSAMSTADT at l045B on tLe 7th ~f

April, following the route taken by Task Forces Hankins

and Riley. It was pl~ned to make this route the main

supply route although it actually became the MSR in name

only. As future events will sho;,;, enemy infiltration and

action along this routes Vias to prevent its ever becoming the

MSR in practice.

Task }orce Aoberts, accompanied by the Headquarters,

Combc.t Command A, moved from ASSAMSTADT to HOLLENBACH with­

out incident. Near HOLLENBACH they ran into the tail of

the Re serve Command which had prec€ded them from ASSAMSTADT

and had been stopped by intense enemy fire in the woods

34
northeast of HOLLENBACH. At l3l5D ti1ey bypassed the Reserve

Cbmn:lnd, which was engaged in clearing a roure through the

WbodSj and pushed on toward HARTENSTEIN (~5.5-86.5). As

the column. was moving through the woods northwest of

BARTENSTEIN at approximately l530B, they were strafed by

6 ME 109 aircraft and two jet p~pelled aircraft and halted.

6

They resumed their :ldvance and reached n. point in the woods

at (56.0-87.3). Here they began to receive heavy small anns,

antitank and flak fire from both sides of the road. Sevbral

personnel cn.sU!llties were sustained and one light tank, one

half-track, and one i ton truck iNere destroyed. The enemy

was engnged vi th tank, tank destroyer I ar.d ma.chine gun

firo, and the enemy fire was silencE:.d. The column then

continued its advance and moved swiftly tovJD.rd CRAILSHEIM

which they entered at approximately 1800B. (See Figtre 5J

Upon arrival in CRAILSHEIM Task :r orce Roberts was

ordered by lcenerfll Piburn to attack and seize KIRCHBERG

(63.7-69.5). The task force moved out at 1830 B. Team

Reilly and the command post moved to and remained at

WALL[{[~USEN whi Ie Team Mc Intosh pus hed on toward KIR­

CHBERG. This team took HORNBERG (64.7-70.1), but did not

continue the advance ~ince they could not find a route

7
from HORN BERG to KIRCHBERG. Team McIntosh therefore rem­

ained at HORNBERG throughout the ni ght.

35
 Raserve COrron'lnd and 90th Cavalry Reconn~issunce

S9\lag,9!:. • 7 April 1945,

The Reserve Command was ordered to disengage from

the enemy on the morning of 7 April and proceed to CRAIL­

8
SHEIM. Their neW mission was to relieve Task Force Hankins

,~md to block enemy approaches into CRAILSREilvI from the south

and southeast. The 90th CavC'clry wns order6d to extend their

blocking positions to take over the positions occupied by

the ReservE: Comm:::md. Elements of the Reserve Commn.nd exp­

erienced grc:1t difficulty in withdra.wing from ROTH becnuse

of o.n Gnemy countoro.ttack. The disengc.gement wns finally

accomplis hod by deli berately setting fire to 0. por tion of

9
ROTH 1l.."1Cler co vcr of ,~rhich the c omlT1nnd withdrew. (See Fig 5.)
The 90th Cavalry completGd their relief by 0630B,

::1"t which time the squadron was disposed as follows:

nquo.dron headquarters, I~CHTEL;Troop A, attached to Combat

Command i .. in CRAILSHEIMi Troop B, HL.CHTELJ Troop C~ ROTH;

Troop D, HOLLEN:a~CH; HGD.dq u::~rter sand Servi ce Troop, SCH-

WABHhUSEN (35.2-96.8). The light tc.nk plo.toons and assault

gun (75-nun HOW) platoons of Troops E and .t, were !J.ttached to

Troops B, C, and D. the h6adqu::'.rters of these attached troops

remained with squadron headquarters in H1CHTEL. The squo.d­

ron held these blocking positions all day with little dif­

ficu1 ty, the only [lct ion being from small groups of Germans

who made no determined attacks. (See Figure 5.)

J7
 After b(;ing relieved by the '::JOth Cavnlry, the Reserve

Commnnd moved out along the route followed by Combat Command

A, The column ran into intense enemy resistance in the woods

northeast of HotLEN~iCH. As a result of this enemy res­

istanc6, which included smull arms, 88-mm antitank, and aut­

ornntic vleapons fire, the column Wi.lS split. The woods were

finally cleared with the loss of two light tanks, and the

column resumed its advance. After moving through the woods

into more open cOWltry, the column vms unable to pick up

the des ired speed bec~"use of road blocks and intense enemy

air action. This nir action, in the form of bombing 'lnd

strafing, continued throughout the dc~y. Despite this enemy

air f'..nd ground action, the ReservG Command continued to

move and late in the afternoon re nchud CRAILSHEnv.r." Upon

arrival they were unable to accomplish their mission of

relieving Combat Command a, due to the fact that the all-day

fight along the route to CRAILSHEIM hnd caused a severe

shortage of supplies, especially ummunition and fuel.

Accordingly they were placed under opera ti ona 1 centro 1 of

. 10
Comba t Cornmand he, Team Connolly of Task Force Thackston".

the only tusk force in the Reserve Comnand, was sent to

WOLPERTS~~~USEN and set up blocking positions, in conjunction

with Team Felice of Task Force Riley, to the south'lnd

west., TeL~m Griswold proceeded to the vicinity of MAULACH

and cut the main east-west railroad leading into CRAILSHEIM.

'38
~he main body of this team moved into ILSHOFEN, where they

strengthened the defense organized by Task Force Riley_

H6Qdquarters, Reserve Command was set up in CRAILSHEIM.

Meanwhile, the 90th Cavalry continued on their block­

ing mission throughout the day. They were ordered to assemble

~s soon as relieved and move to CRAILSHEIM to take over the

line C&~ILSHEIM-SCHN1~BISCH HALL" as soon as that line had

11
beGn secured by Combat Command ii. At the conclusion of

tho day's'operation in the CR~ILSHEIM arsa, it was becoming

apparent that the enemy was recovering from his initial

surprise nt the capture of CR1~ILSHEnn:. Increasing enemy

resistance to the forces operating in the GU~ILSHEIM area,

togcth8r -,';i th repented attempts by the ene:ny to cut the

main supply route betV!een ASSAMSTADT and CRAILSHEIM. were

only indicrtions of future violent enemy action to re­

capture this vital area.

Combat Command A (with Reserve Command under operational

control) - 8 April 1945

Eo..rly on the morning of 8 .!~pril, at approximately

0530 B-, the 1. i rst 1 :.x ge SCQ Ie enemy attack agains t thE:.

CRAILSHEIM area was launched.. It cOInnenced wi th an intense

rocket o..nd mortar preparation, under Iii hose cover simultaneous

att~cks were delivered from the east, southeast, ~nd north-

Gast~ (S66 Figure 6...) This enBmy attack was conducted

by :m estimated 400-700 SS engineer troops.. The northeastern

39
column VlO.S repulsed immedi~ tely. The Gnemy was a.pparent ly

un~WJC\r8 of tho true dispositions of Task Force Hankins in this

o.rc:\. ., for he moved into th 6 attn ck in o.n undeployed forntl. tion ~

The entire attacldng formation Was ldlled., wounded, capt­

urcdj or di sper sed.

The attacks from the east and southeast proved a

different story from the northeastern attack, for the enemy

pressed his assault skillfully 'lnd determinedly. He over­

ran the outposts ~nd penetrated into the outskirts of CRAILSH­

ElM. fighting developed and continued throughout the

morning. Shortly before noon Task Il orce Hankins gained the

upper hund and forced the enemy b~ck. The enemy suffered

severe casual tics in this nct ion. Team Holl::.nd followed the

withdrawing German troops, mr.:tintr-.ining ~\. constant pressure on

them. The team cle1.red .i\.LTEm.!f1JNSTER for thtJ sec ond time and

established 0. bloc position in thn.t tovm. (They held

this position throughout the day and moved back to CRAlLSHEDJ.

as night fell.) CRhlLSHElM wa.s o.go.in sGJ.rched to insure

tho.t no enemy hLld infiltrn.t6d into the town. nt tl1G same

time T6:1111 Hi 11 again searched INGERSHElM and Team Havlovi tz

the J.irfield areCl. e. By noon 0.11 German attacks on CRhILSHEIM

had been defeated and the task force was again in its

origin~l blocking positions.

General Piburn's plan to carry out the division

mission, tho capture of the line SCHVITABISCH HALL-BACKNANG,

WQS to h~ve the Reserve Command (Task Force Thackston) rel­

ieve Task Force Hankins in CRAILSHEIM. T~sk Force Riley waS

to continue the attack in the vicinity of SCHJlTABISCH HALL,12

Due to enemy pressure this plan could not be accomplished.

At 0900B.. Gener:ll Piburn received orders from div­

ision headquQrters, which had moved to ASSll.IvISTL.DT late in

the afternoon of thE 7th of .April. These orders directed

Comba t Conrmand i'.. to c ontinuG the tl ttnck from SC}~NABISCH

HALL and continue to the west to conto.ct the lOOth Inf:.ntry

Division moving east from HEILBRONN.

13 In order to carry

out this mission Goneral Piburn ordered To.sk Force Riley

to continue the attack to the west. They 'Noro to be followed

by Task ~orce Hankins when relieved. It soon became apparent

that Task force Hcmkins could not be relieved by the Reserve

Comr.1D.nd unless that command was rGinforced. The Reserve

Command had beGn given the mission of keeping the road open

between '(~OLPERTS~ii~USEN and CR11.ILSHEIM. This proved to be

D. difficult task, since the enemy continu~lly infiltrated

behinc. elements of the cOTIUnJ.nd 80S they cle'1red the road,

necessitating t:1at the clearance be continually repeated.

Nevertheless Task Force Riley undertook the mission.

Task} orce rtiley attack6d from ~~OLPERTSHA.USEN toward

CROFFELBACH, but was soon stopped by heavy small arms und

bazooka fire. 'l'he terrain in this area was not suitable

for tank employment because of numerous defiles. The tlnks

42

were practically ro~dbound. Since the task force h~d only

one company of o.rmored infantry I it was not pos sible to launch

a.n inf2ntry o..ttack in suffieistlt strength to ole at the area.

For 'the foregoing reasons, and the fact that reports from

civilians and PW's indic:lted n strong buildup of enemy forces

:'.nd probable a.ttacks in the CRAILSHEIM a~en., Task Force

Riley Was ordered to break off its D.tt~ck and establish a.

perimeter defense in the vic ini ty of ViOLPERTS:a;'U:;>EN. v~hi Ie

engo..ged in prepr.ration for 0. perimeter defense" Task Force

Riley VIets ordered to send one teom to GEISLINGEN (49.6-65.3)

to seize ~ bridge across the KOCHER River reported int'1ct by

0. liaison pls~ne.. Team Gr::..hum moved out to accomplish this

mission. lhey encountered sroll ::lrms and panzerfaust fire at

the edge of GEISLINGEN. Resist'lnce was overcome and they

Were ',rv ithin sight of the bridge v>then it was blown. 14 The team

then returned to ij~OLHERTSHA.USEN. This proved to be the far­

thest penet:1tion to the west of any element of the 10th

..·..rmor6d Division during offensive oporn.tions in the CRii.ILSHEIM

n:re[~. (See Figure 7.)

Task Force Roberts, which had spent the night of 7-8

I..pril in tho ·vv.LiLLfL'\.USEN... HORNBERG area" cormnencod offensive

opero.tions ut 0730B on the 8th. Te:,J!l.s McIntosh and Reilly

occupied KIRCH1)ERG n.t 1100B. No onemy resist:.::.nce VJUS en....

countered. The task force was ordered to hold the line

~'f.L\'LL~Y~USEN-KIRCH5ERG during the afternoon. This was in accord..

anC6 wi th the combat C01TDJlf..lnd pla.n to temporarily assume the

43

defensive in anticipation of enemy J..ttacks. The task force

was accordingly disposed to defend against possible enemy

attncks from the northwest. Task Force Roberts spent the

remainder of the afternoon qui6tly, awaiting enemy- attacks

which never came.

;l.fter defea t of the enemy attacks on CRAILSHEIM

proper and restoration of their blocking positions, Task

Force {-bnkins was ordered to locld all prisoners of war

on all av~ilable Class I and V supply vehicles and evacuate

them to 11.SS.:.. MST.L\.DT·" This procedure had been ordered by

VI Corpse Since the MSR was not open betv~een 'i~SSAMSTADT and

CRAILSH.l1iIM" Combat Command .0 being engaged in attempting to

open it, it Was considered very unlikely thut the convoy could

reach .L·~SSliMSTi~DT. nm'1ever, the supply trucks and pri soner s.,

numbering approximately 550, 'Were assemblGd in CRAILSHEIM

and the prisoners loaded. Combat Commnnd A ordered Troop

A, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron to escrot the convoy..

It was :..nticip:l ted th:.lt the convoy could fight its W0..Y thr ough

to Comh:.lt Command B... The convoy proceeded to the vicinity

of BL.i1.UFELDEN where i t was ambushed by the enemy. Several

supply vehicles were destroyed and several personnel cas­

ualties were suffered. During the fight most of the prisoners

war e killed or escaped. The convoy could not breD. k through"

~nd returned to CRAILSHEIM with the rennining vehicles and

prisoners. The mQin supply route was still cut and supplies

were fas t running out ..

4.5
 To allevi:tte the ori fical supply si tu~:. tion, General

Piburn requested that the troops in the CRi"l.ILSPEIM area be

resupplied by air. Engineers were sent to the airfield to

Gnl8Xge the strip. The request for air resupply was approv­

ed, but the operation could not be mounted on the 8th.

Meanwhile enemy activity and reports from civilians

and prisoners had indicated an all-out attack was being plan­

ned to rcc~pture CRAILSHEIM. Accordingly General Piburn had

ordered all ~~sk forces, as previously discussed, to assume

the defensive in anticipation of the attac'k. Orders were

received from di vision at 1545B to Itpush Task F'orce ROBERTS

15
to tr.c northvvGst between K9CHER and JAGST Rivers". Ta.sk

Force Roberts WQS ordered to abandon its defensive positions

and carry out this mission. General Pi burn reported to div­

ision tho.t av~il·~1.ble supplies would support an attack of

only fot~ hours dur~tion. He also requested night fighter

16
prot~ction but it Was not received.

Task Force Roberts assembled in KIRCHBERG at 1900B

ctnd moved via ALL1I[ERSPl1.N (61.0-66.0) to I LSHOFEN • Here

the t2sk force received fuel and sane ummunition from

the 419th Armored J:t'ield Artillery Battalion. Supplies were

redistributed among all vehicles in the task force in order

to make an attack. Battery C of the 419th .L1.rmored Field

Arti llery Bo.tt~lion joined the task force to provide close

46
artillery support. By 2400B hours Task Force Roberts Was

reo.uy to begin its assigned mission, (See Figure 7~)

IvIe:::L1'.vhile Task Force Hankins had been reinforced in

CRJiILSHEIM. During tIle night I enemy patro Is continua lly

probed the defenses of CRi~ILSHEIM. These patrols set off

fllrlny of the fl Dr6S c.nd booby traps and Were engaged by fire

on num6rous occasions. They did not infiltrate through the

defenses.

CombQt Command A (with Reserve Command under operat­

ional control) - 9 April 1945

The suspected enemy attack on CIlliILSIfEIM during the

night of 8-9 .April did not take plo..ce. Just prior to da.wn,

however I intense enemy rocket o.nd artilJe ry fire was deliv­

ered on Clli\ILSHEIM, ILSHOFEN, and WOLPERTSBAUSEN. The cOITll'Tk'1nd

post of Combat COIn...'Tlnnd .n. received direct hits nnd was forced

to move to the northern part of CRAILSHEIM. CRAILSHEIM received

a bombing und stro.fing attack from ME 109 and jet aircraft

at 0635B. 17 .At daylight Task 110rc6 H~.~nkins searched the

nref:< surrounding CRAILSHEIM for enemy, n.nd Team Hollund

was o.g~in dispatched to ~-"LTENMUNSTER. They cle.';.red this

town for the third time_.to..king some prisoners. The tea.m

o.gc'tin remained in ALTENMUNSTER throughout the day, returning

to CRAILSHEn~ at nightfall. The rernn.indel of Task Force

Hankins remained in their blocking positions during the 9th

of .a.pril without serious interference from the enemy. Friendly

47
aircraft bor.lbed and strafed roads (74-64) east of CRAIL­

SI-:EIM and it was believed that this action disor ganized

18
enemy forming for an attack.

Hhile Task Force Hankins was engaged with enemy

patrols, awaiting the suspected Gnemy night attack, Task

ForcG Roberts Was atto.cking to the northwest from ILSHOFEN.

As the to.sk force was moving out, they received word that

Comb:--.t COJTI:1:J.nd B hod finally brokt>n through to CRAILSHEIM

with supplies • .The task force was halted and all of its

vehicles resupplied. lifter being resupplied the task force

attr.cked RUPPERTSHOF'EN (58.5-68.2) nnd encountered small

arms and punzerf~ust fire. The task force wi thdrew to allow

an :"rti11ery prepnrD. tion to be fired on the toYW'"n. They

o.g,'lin att~1ckcd illlder cover of the o.rtillery fir e rmd ent ered

the tmm without opposition. (See Figure 7.)

TO,sk Force Riley ho.d been ordered by Gener'll Pi burn

to wi thdraw from positions around VlOLPERTSHl\.USE}! and to

fcll)v: Tusk Force Roberts. This . . .J ClS in accordo.nce v.rl. th

instructions issued by division he~dquarters for T~sk Force

Riley to assist Tusk Force 1\oberts. 19 The task force with­

dreVl, ;'J.ssembled in ILS30FEN, \Vas r(:3supplied, and joined the

t<li I of Ta sk :F' or ce Robe rts near RUPPERT SHOFEN • (See Figure 7.)
To.sk Force lio ber ts, followed by Task F arc e H.i ley,

c olltinued the n.tt::.~ck fron RUPPERTSHOF'EN to the vicini ty of

DUNSBACH (56.5-70.q). Here" at 0700B.I the combined colunm

48
was bombGd and strafed by approximo. te ly t'JlJenty-fi ve (25) enemy

planes. J-.. considerable number of c~sual ties in both men

;""lnd materiel Vlo.S suff€ r ed by Task Force RQberts. Immedia­

tely ufter the ~ir uttuck the leading eiements of the col-

Q~ were subjected to hGQvy artillery ~nd mortar fire~ and

b0CD.mC involved in Q. seriE:S of sm[lll fire fights. During

the confusion occasioned by the air and ground attack, the

re::'..r cler:lcnts of Task Force Rob6rts took thG wrong roa.d and

advnnced towc..rd LEOFELS (59.0-69.9), while lead clements of

the colu.mn proceeded trl1"ough DUNSBACH in the direction of

NESSELE.tl.CH (53.8-71.8). As the rear elements of the column

reac hed ,:1 pos i tion :lpproximate ly 300 yards from LEOFELS,

he~lV'J c.utorrl.C4tic 'weapons':tnd rifle fire was received. The

column Was momentarily thrown into confusion as, believing

tho.t they V'Jere following ths lead elements of the task force,

tl1e fi re \,1.).S unexpected. Lt Col Roberts, who had been uccomp­

nnying the roar colurnn., order ed thE. colunm reversed and exp­

osed himself ,r..h ile personally reorg:tnizing his troops. He

20
V1('1S kiJ.led. by u sniper. The co lurnn mn.no.ged to turn around

o.nd proceeded" under fire, bGck to RUPPERTSHOFEN. Here the

senior officer of the task furce, Co.ptain Ulrich,. the 8-3,

W[lS notified of wha t had transpired. C:lptCl.in Ulrich was

-"'1. th the leading el€ m ents of Task Force Roberts 'uhich had

captured NESSELBL.CH. He outposted the town and returned to

RUPPERTSJOFEN where he leurned the situation and requested

49

orders from Comret Cono.mand A. He vvus ordered to assume

cormn;:..nd of the task force D.nd continue on his ~ssion.

NOTE: Eerenfter Task Force Roberts vd 11 be referred to as

Task ForcG Roberts (Uirich). Captain Ulrich then ordered an

attack of LOEFELS.· This attack, led by light tanks, vms

successful and the task force was assemblod in NESSELBACH.

They resumed the advance and pushed through LASSEACH

(50.9-76.0) to BUTTELBRONN (47.5-80.3).

T:-.sk Force Riley had follo'wed Task Force Roberts

(Ulrich) to tIE vicini ty of DUNSBACH. Here they moved out on

a parallel route to the west (left) of Roberts (Ulrich).

By 1500B they had re!.lched F.J~SSFELDEN (54.5-66.8). They

continued to udv8.nce p8.rallel to the route t .ken by Task

ForcG Koberts (Ulrich). (See Figure 7.)

j~fter passing tnrough BUTTELBRONN, Task Force Rob­

er ts.. (Ulric h) I ::l t 'lpproximnt61y 1530B I enc ounter ed a wash­

out on the rCIc.d towo.rd EERMUTHAUSEN (45.0-81.1). They

received eneI'!1.Y s!n::..ll D.rns fire which 71::1S quickly eliminated.

The column attempted to advr:.nce 8.round the. w:J.shout on a new

route" but recei VE:G. iHortu.r fire which WD.S identified as

friendly.. It was believed th:-::.t this fire vns from elements

of' the 63d Infantry Division driving dovIn townrd CRf~ILSHEIM

from the northwest •.. Since contact vvi th the 63d Division

wus now imrnin6nt, CCtpt Ulrieh decided to stop his adva.nce.

The task force moved into position on the high ground sur­

rounding BERNDSHhUSEN (48.-0-78.8) and WOLFSOLDEN (48.2-79.8)

50
to block the retr6o..t of any en6my forces from in front of
21
the 63d Infantry Division.

Throughout the day Task Force Thackston was engaged

in keeping the supply routes be~veen Cfu\ILSHEIM and Task

Forces Riley and Roberts (Ulrich) open and in protecting

"t:1C ",ir£' icld near CRJ\ILS!1EIM. Team Griswold, 'which had

been assisting Task Force Hankins in the defense of CRhIL-

SHEIM during the night of 8..;9 April,. moved to the airfield

during the morning. The ir mis s ion VIas to secure the air f ie ld

so thn t o.ir re supply operations could be carri ed out. They

continued on this mission throughout the day. MeanWhile

Teo.m Connolly VJO,S engaged in pf.l.trolling the roads between

CRAILSHEIE D.nd ILSeOFEN, ::.nd between ILSHOFEN and Task

Forcos RilGY und hoberts (Ulrich). Elements of Task Force

Thackston renJ.in6d in ILSHOI'EN, defending thr1.t to'i~n from

Gner;lY throats from the south und west •.

~othCnvalry Reoonnnissnnoe Squadron - 9 April 1945

The 90th Cavalry Reconnuissunce Squadron, which had

entered CRiI.ILSHElIvI during the night ~of 8-9 April, reinforced

the tr oop s in the CRil.ILS ;EIM arGo.. Troop D (r einf orced)

joined Troop A, which was :.1lrec.. dy o.ttuched to Combat CorYml':lnd

A,. in p~, trolling roads in the immedif.l. te vicinity of CRAILSHEIM.

Squo.dron headqu·:.rters 'was established in W"OLLMERSHAUSEN (67.5­

66.4).- Troop B (reinforced) and the heudqu~rters of Troops

E und F wore 0.1 so Ioca t£d in ~~OLLMERSHAUSEN. Troop C

51
(reinforced) was based in ILSHOFEN, c.nd Q.ssisted Tc..sk Force

Thackston throughout the day in patrolling the roads between

ILS~~IOFEN o.nd the advancing locntionS of Task :boreas Riley

and Roberts,' (Ulrich)' All ttoops met continuous li ght

resistance tl~oughout the day, but the enemy did not seriously
22
intorfere with the o.ccomplishment of the squadron mission.

The night of the 9th of April concluded the offensive

oper~ltions of the 10th lirmored Division in the CRAILSHEIM area.

These operations were actually concluded when Task Forces

Riley and L\.oberts (Ulrich) halted for the night in the BERN­

DSF..AUSEN area.. (See Fi gure 7. ). Tho d i vis ion had co. ptur ed

CRl~IL31.1EIMJ but all efforts to continuG the o.ttack to capture

the line SCHv1f1.BISCH HALL-B..'lCKNANG had been unsucce ssful due

to sco.rcity of supplies, lack of o.dequn.tG troops;, and enemy

re~ction. The enemy continued to build up his strength in

the CIL·~ILS.1EnE arE-a. Prisoners of WQr nnd civilians reported

lcrge num.b3rs of enemy troops concentro.ting in the BEUERLBACH (71.7­

64.7) area. This concentration vms estimated as bEdng

23
3000 strong. These reports were a factor 'which prevented

the use of Tnsk } orce Rich'U'dson in offensi v€ operations

upon the. ir arr iva 1 in CR[\.ILSHEIM. As sOOl1 be seen, this

ener!1Y thren.t and other concurrent enemy action was to

prevent the 10th .d.rmored Division;and therefore VI Corps,

from exploiting th6 price16ss tacticnl advantage gained

wi th the c aptur 6 of CR~ ILSHEIM •

 NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

lCo.ptn.in GGor ge F. Bamel" The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th

Armored Division, (Richmond: Armored Cavalry Journal,
March-April 1949) p 38.

2After Action Report, 61st Armored Infantry Battalion, lOth

Armored Division, entry for 7 April 45.

30p__~it, The Crailsheim operatio~f the lOth Armored Division,

p 39.
4
~",p 39.
5 Ibid , P 39.

6After Action Report, Combat Cownand A" 10th Armored Division,

entry for 7 .t1pr il 45.

7 A fter Action Report, 54th Armored [nfantry Battalion, lOth

Armored Division, entry for 7 April 45.

8After Action Report, Reserve Command, lOth Armored Division,

entry for 7 April 45.
9
Op cit, The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th Armored lJivi­
sion, p 39. ­

lOOperations Instructions No. 23, Headquarters, lOth

Armored Division, 8 April 45, par 3.

110perations Instructions No. 22, Headquarters, 10th

Armored Division, 7 April 45, par 4.

12After Action Report, Comba t Command A, 10th Armored

Division, entry far 8 April 45.

l3 0p cit, Operations Instructions No. 22, par 1.

140p cit, The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th Armored

Divisior}., p 40.
15
0p cit, Operations Instructions 1'10.23, par 1.
-.;;.,-­

160p cit, After Action Report, Combat Command A, entry for

8 April 45.

17 Ibid, entry for 9 April 45.

53
180p cit, After Action Report, 61st Armored Infantry BattalicriJ
entry for 9 April 45.

190p cit, Operations Instructions No. 23, par 1.

20Letter Interview, Major Richard W. Ulrich, 3 Febl'"Uary 50.

2l0p cit, After Action Report, 54th Armored Infantry Battalion,

eutry for 9 April 45.

22After Action Report, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,

lOth Armored Division, entry for 9 April 45.
23
Op cit, After Action Report, Comuat Comnand A, entry for

9 Apr il 45.

54

 CHAPTER 4­
'!HE ROLLa;BAHN

Fight_A!.~---.!:h~ ~~

hs units ot Task F'oi"ce .h.ichardson were closing in

the ASS.i\IvlST..\DT assembly area, Combat Corrmand B was ordered

by the lOth Armored uivision to move from their present

location with its leading task force to CRAILSHEIM. There,

contact was to be made with elements of Combat Command A or

the Reserve Command. Task Force Richardson was instructed by

Combat Command D at l120B to move out immediately to CRi~IL­

SHEIM, via STUPPACH , W.t1.CHB.£~CH (49.0-95.6), and HERBSTHAUSEN

1
( 51 .8-91 .7). •

Combat Command B was issued further fragmentary orders

at 1340B which Ie. ter were confirmed by Operation Instruction

No. 22" 072200B April 45 (see annex No .. IIl),. The combat

command was assigned the mission of securing and holding

open the highway from CRAILSHEIM to BI1.D MERGENTHEIM. This

was to be used as the division main supply route, support­

ing elements of Combat Connnand A v~hich by a swift move had

piercGe;. the enemy defenses and entered CRi~ILSHEIM. This

action cut the German lines of communication to HEILBRONN

from the east. 00ntact was to be maintained with elements of

the 4th Infantry Divi si on on the nor th and VJi t h Reserve

Command, lOth Armored Division on thG south. Meanwhile

Task Force Chrunberln.in closed in ASSAMSTADT and continued to

follmv the route of Task Force Richardson, Which was reported

b'.f division
55
at this time to be between LUSTERONN (44.2-96.1) O-nd
2
STUPPACH. Combat Command B, on division orders, sent

Task l!'orce hichardson on to CRl1..ILSHEDJI, where contact was

to be made 'wi th either the Reserve Command or Task Force

Roberts of Combat Connnand A. Task}.i orce Chamberlain was

orderod to move in U10 columns and secure the road net in

tho vicinity of BAD MERGENTHEIM and STUPPACH.. maintaining

contact with clements of the 4th InfDntry Division at BAD

3
MERGENTHEIM and the 90th Cavalry at STUPPACH. (See Figure 5)

In oral orders the 10th Armored Division G-3 stated

that he 1vanted a continuous "chain of armor" down the road

4
from Bi1.D MERGENTHEIM to CRAILSHEIM. Since thi s "chain of

armor" was to extend some thirty miles" Combat Command B"

at 1845B, requested clorii'ico.tion and interpretation of this

term" as the combat cornm~nd had insufficient vehicles to

form the continuous line of armor which was desired. The

pr 0 blem appGared to offer two alternJ.ti ve s: either string

the vehicles out at wide int6rv~ls ~long the road, Or Gstab­

lish a series of strong points in critical areas. Feeling

that extending the vehicles would be inviting enemy infiltra­

tions" division suggested setting up strong points at every

like ly ave nue of approa.ch and filling the gap between strong

points with light mobile patrols. This began a phase of

action between BAD MERGENTHEIM and CR~I.ILSHEIM which centered

around the effort of keeping the main supply route open

and free of enemy.

 Thi s phase of action, to mai:ltlJ.in the main supply

route be~Je6n BAD MERGENTHEIM and CRAILSHEIM, became known

to the Germuns in succeeding days as the nRollenbahn." The

GermClns aptly applied this de scr ipti ve phrase, which me!3.ns

Bowling Alley. (See Figure 8.)

Task Force Ri~hardson moved from STUPPACH to WACH~iCH

aguinst very light enemy resistance. The route, however,

from Wl.. CIfBil.CH south to HERBSTHtl.USEN was characterized by

increQsing enomy resist~ce. It must be remembered that

•
this Bnme rond had been passed over by other elements of

th~ loth il.rmored Division on their drive into CH.L\.ILSBEIM.

In many inst:"'lnces, s:nnll groups of Germons would strike

out, harass the colUL'1ll1, ~lnd thon melt back into the darkness,

unly to reappEar ilgain at some other pl<lce along the column

of Combat Command B.6 Task Force Chamberlain followed Task

Forc:; Richardson .. maintaining cont:J.ct whenever possible.

Th':'.t nigh t physiC'll contact was maintained between til e two

task for ees in the town of WACHBACH. 6

Task Force Chamberlain was ordered to continue south

on the 8th of April :It 0730B, following Task Force Richardson,

the mission of outposting the road to CRAILSHEIM

with patrols and strong points. One team, Team Maher, was

ordered to Gst~blish four strong points on the northern

sector of thG road. Team OtGrndy was to outpost the southern

Section of the road.

7
To.sk Force Richardson ,r';~lS to continue

57
o•__-"__~1C--"'C-~'__-l'___ '"--J!__-'.c--"'__-,.
MllE.5
south as rapidly as possible in order to get the supply

vehicles, which had been intermingled in his column, to

the belG~guered troops of Combat Command J.l. in CRAILSHEIM.

Ec.rly the morning after Task Force Ricb.o.rdson passed, the

enemy succeeded in cutting the ma.in supply route where it

passed through the woods, about four miles north of B.n.R­

TENSTEIN 4 Fighting the-ir way to the south, Task Force

Richardson's entire column was held up by intense small

8
arms fire L"'..nd morto.r fire at 1350B. Friendly air strikes

and column cover flown in the afternoon materially assisted

in keeping the revi tJ.lized Lufuvaffe from D.ttacking the

troops using the road. SevcrQl times during the use of the

mQin sup~:ly route the Luftwaffe bombed and strafed the road.

Task Force Ch;J.mt·erlain, me8.nwhi le, W:J.S c Ie rUling up

isolated, stubborn pockets of enemy rGsist~nce, which had

been bypassed by task Force Richardson. An estinnted 200-400

0nemy infantry had duZ; in clnd occupied the woods bordering

the main supply route north of BartGnstein in the vioinity

of (53.0-89.0). These troops were stubbornly contesting

the usc of the MSR. Heavy J.rtillery fire from the northeast

Was falling on the main road junct ion at (52.5-89.9). Team

Maher of Task Force Chamberlain was ordered to clear the se

woods of the enemy, while Team O'Grady continued south in

contact wi th the rear elements of Task II'orce Richardson

which 'Were moving s 10"Nly south ugD.inst dogged resist3.nce.

59
Team Maher completed the clearing of these vIooas by

14l5B and continued sout~. 9,

The enemy had succeeded in infiltrating behind the

head of the Comb~t Command B column south of N~CHBACH.

This, cou.pled with the appearance of the Luftwaffe, mat­

erio.lly slowed down the colwnn. In o.ddition to the fire

of artillery, mortars, and small arms, the Germans had

constructed abutis across the road. 'In one case about

100 yards of abs.tis had to be cleQred before the columns

could continue. German artillery, occupying high ground

be uveen HERRENZ INlNIERN (54.4-94.3) and NEIDERSTETTEN (58.2­

91.5), comrrl.::lnded Q. long stretch of the rond wi th their

ox t rem6 1y accurn t e f ,·~re. II At 1700B one of our o.ir OPs

reported twelve enemy tmks moving tovJard the hG<J.d of Task

Forco Richo.rdson from the vicini ty of BLi-UFELDEN und

SCHROZDI:;RG (63.0-85.4). Fortunately this report wo.s in

error and no hostile armor appeared.

During the night, ele:rwnts of Task Force Chamberlain

completGd setting up strong points Qnd continued patrolling

their sector of the MSR •. Enemy resistance was sporadic and

light. The Gcrmuns appeared to have lost some of the aggres­

eiveness which had previously characterized their actions

along the MSR.

Task :B orce Richardson app0.rently had crashed thr ough

the crust of the enemy defensive line and was advancing

rapidly towo.rd CRAILSHEIM. After clc::\ring a fev! roadblociks

and brushing aside iight resistance, Tdsk :B orce rt:lohardson

11
entGI'ed CRAIL~HEiM before daylight of 9 Apr.il.

Having delivered the supply vheiclos, Task Force

Richo.rdson was <iirected to set up 0. series of strong points

from CRAILSHEn~ north to Bu\UFELDEN. During the day all

elcn~nts of Combat Conmand B continued on the mission of

outposting and patrolling the MSR. Enemy infiltrations had

been largoly eliminated, but determined harassing fires,

especially in the northern sector~ still denied our force

frGedom of movement along the MSR. Friendly infantry uni ts

"\Ner e be ginning to move from the north and assumed re spon­

sibility for most of thG northern part of the route •

.-(

Early in th~morning a flight of thirty-six enemy

fig~rters o..ppe:J.red over Team 0 'Grady but failed to do any damage

12
on t~1 air strafing runs. At 1300 B, aleman ts of the 90th

Cavalry Reconn::i.iss.~<.nce Squadron" which had been relieved

on the 8th by tre 117th Cavcl1ry iteconn::tissance Squadron

in the vicinity of STUPPACH" passod through Combat lionmand

B and. continued ro uth tovIctrd CRAILSHEIM, arriving there

the night of 8-9 ~pril.13 At;~510~, Combat Command b"

in an urgent message .. w:.lrned all elements of the command that

air supply of CRAILSHEIM -would be effected between 1545B 'lnd

164SB. and ordered no firing at low flying aircraft unless

they showed deliberate signs of o.ttacking. 14

-61
 The hours of darkness remained generally quiet with

only oocasional outbursts of fighting along the MSR. Friendly

infantry continued occupying the northern sector as far

south as the towns of BARTENSTEIN and ADOLZHAUSEN (54,1-91.4).

Friendly supply col~ns were repotted moving southward with

very little difficulty.15 ~tom the stillness and luck or

resistance along the main supply route it appeared that the

struggle to open and maintain the route had terminated.

Air Supply during the CRAILSHEIM Operation ­

No narrative of the 11th Armored Division's action in

the CRAILSHEIM-ILSH FEN area would be complete without ment­

ion of the part played by the air supply to the forces of

Combat Command A within CRAILSHEIM.

The breakthrough of Combat Conrnand A in the Crail­

she im are:3. momentar ily tr.rew the Germans off balance. : The

enemy reaction to this swift advance was to seal off the

land corridor leading into CRAILSHEIM from the north, thus

effectively isolating the troops in CRAILS:·~IM from the

remainder of the division and supplies, there is no doubt

that the tactical advantage which had been gained by Com­

bat Corrunand A's bold act ion had been dulled by the almost

impossible task of maintaining an adequate supply route

against the pressure of the enemy. It must also be remem­

bered th at the bridges over the NECKAR and JAGST Rivers

had been blown by the enemYI and the temporary bridges

62
which had been erected were under hostile fire6

FortunateiYJ just to the east of CRAILSHEIM was

located a good airfield. During the period 9.10 April

fifty C... 47 transports of the 9th Troop Carrier Corrunand,

escorted by P-47 ',s, flew in fuel, food, and ammunition.,

16
:And ovacuated the 'IN ounded. In the two-day period of air

supply 20,000 gallons of ~asoline, 7,000 rations, 1,000

rounds of l05mm. and 100,000 rounds of small arms wnmunition

. 17
were f1 own In. This operation was successfully and skill­

fully co~ducted. Although the airfield was under constant

enemy artillery and small arms fir.e" the operation terminated

with the loss of only one aircraft which was destroyed on

the ground by hostile artil1e ry fir.e.

'NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

lAfter Action Report, Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division,

entry for 7 April 1945.

2G- 3 Journal, lOth Armored ~ivision, entry for 7 April 1945.

3After Action Report, 11th Tank ba ttalion, 10th Armored

Division, entry for 7 ~pril 1945.

4
up cit, G-3 Journal, entry for 7 April.

50p cit, After Action Report, Combat Command B, entry for 7

Aprl.I.

60p cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for
'1 April.
7up 'cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for
8 Apri-l.

Sup Cit, After Action Report, Combat Command B, entry for e April.
90p cit, After ~~ction Report,. 11th Tank Battalion; entry fot
8 April'

lOup pit, After Action Rt3pcr t, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for
8 April ~

110p cit, After Action Report, Com('at command B, entry for

9 April •... '

12up cit,. After Action Re~ortl 11th Tank Battalion, entry

for 9 i1.pr11.

13After .L·~cti,on Report, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,

Mechanized,. 10th Armored Division, entry for 9 April 1945.
14
Op cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry
for 9 April.
15
Op cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank ButtQlion, entry

for 9 j'~pril ~

16
Be.;ichhead News, 11 April 1945.

17Report of Operations, The Seventh United States Army,. 1944­

1945, Volume III p 784.
 CH!'i.PTER 5

Combat COIT~and
__._,_, ____ A (with ReSErve
_ _ _..............r-..__
~~__..._ ._~_~_" _ • - .. _ ..... , ••Command
_ _ _
under

As has been recounted, the e!.'.e~ll~r continually probed

t~lf; defenses of CllfiILS:-::EUl with patrols tllr the ni ght

-10 l..pr il. These pa trols were appar see information

o thE- n;l.ture of the defenses, for at approximately 0430B

on of 10 April the enemy launched a coordinated

attack a t the CRb.ILSHEIM area, attack developed from

the 30u.tl1, east, and northeast, and contained an estimated 6eO

8n8~O;V soldicrs. l (See Figure 9.) Task Force Hankins bore

t11e brunt of' the attack sine e Were still occupying their

Cl ensive positions in CR,,\ILS'JBIIl. The te:.sk force was disposed

wit.l Team T:ill defendin£:: t~le soutl1ern sector of CRAILS'(lETII,

::~avlovitz
l
1 carn t l l6 ea::3tcrn and northCl.lstern sector" and Team

in res 8r '1{6 • ( Se e Ii' 9. ) "

'1'>.6 attack on 'I'c\m Havlovitz was pressed determinedly

the German forces. They were !CGn under fire by all team

we:::.-[;Wl1S and by tj-1(: p;uns of the 420th li.rlil0red It'ield Artillery

Battalion. The artillery fire was extremely effective and tIE

attack was repul sed after small numbers of the enemy had s uc­

cecded in breaking throuGh the main line of resistance. They

2
were taken care 01 by the tea:rr.. reserve.
 The thrust against Teum Hill in the south was much

more serious than the attack against Team :--Iavldvi tit. The
I ,

enGmy btoke thr ough thE.. outposts and penetra ted the main
t
line of ¥esistance. Hard fighting at extremely close range

developed within Team Hill's posi ti.on and ragvd thr oughout

the streets in the area. To overcome this en6lTlY penetration,

which threatened to disrupt the entire defensive system of

the task force ... Major Hankins conuni tted a pIa toon from his

reserve team, Team Holland, to support Team Hill. This

pI atoon,. together wi th the reserve from Team Havlovi tz.t attac­

ked the enemy penetration. The enemy was prevented from

reinforcinE his engaged troops by artillery concentrations

'INhich nere fired on his avenue s of appr oach to CRAILSHEIM

from the south. Supported by fire from the elements of

Teom l{ill in contact with enemy,. the reserve force proceeded

to clear out the are~. They advanced through the contested

area and reached the outpost line., destroying or capturing

all enemy forces in their Zone. The lines were reestab­

lished. Team Holland attncked and cleared ALTEN'MUNSTER

for the fourth time .. By noon all positions in the CRAIL-

SHED.l area had been restored. The enemy attack had been

repulsed and he had suffered severe casualties.

In coordination with the assault on CRAILSHEIM,

German troops attacked Task 1< orce Thackston in ILSHOFEN.

This attack began at approximately 0630B and came from

67
the nort!1. and northwest. (See Figure 10.) It consisted of

approximately 200 German infnntry supported by at ieast ohe

ass~1ult gun.:3 The enemy was engaged by ail elements of the

task force and by tite ftb~ the ~19th hr,mored Field Artil­

le~y Battalion. The enemy attack was pressed with vigor and

determina tron, but VJo.s f ina lly repuls ed at 0900B. Enenw

,losses were very heavy, consisting of fifty killed, seven­

teen wounded, ~md sixty-five captur cd, inc luding the com­
4
mc.. nder of the attn..king forces. One hostile assault gun

w:::\.s destroyed. After the termination of the attack, Task

Force Thackston improved its positions and awaited devel­

opments.

~hile lOth Armcired Division troops were defeating

the German attempts to recapture CRAILSI1EIM, Task Forces

Riley and Roberts (Ulrich) were occupying their defensive

positions in the BihNDSP~USEN area. At 0845B Task Force

Roberts (Ulrich) made conto.ct with Company I, 254th Inf­

antry Rogiment, 63d Infantry Division in the vicinity of

\IOLFSOLDEN. Elements of this division ha.d been given the

5
mission of D.tto.cking toward CRAILSHEIM from the northwest.

An air resupply mission had been scheduled for

Comb:}.. t Corrmand A during the morning of 10 Apr il. .tiS a

result of the enemy attacks, during w mch the airfield

Was subjected to heavy artillery· fire, division was

notified at 0600B that the supply planes could not be

68
r6ceived i111til the attack had been defeated. This message

Was not reeeived in time, ~nd at 0630B the planes began

l:--nding. Tec.lm Griswold of Task Force Thackston was holding

the airfield, ~nd despite the intense artillery fire the

6
pI Dnes VJerG u..'1.1oaded.

After defGating the enemy assault on CRAILSHEIM,

General Piburn requested th'1t infL';.ntry reinforcements be

sent to assist Combat COmm':tnd I. if the 'J.reD. was to be

retained. The g6neral was becoming alarmed at the increasing

enemy reQction. This, coupled with the facts that his troops

had suffered serious losses" hld bcen fighting continuously

for several days, Qnd could not be properly supplied, made

it pro!')le:m~tic;~tl 'nhether the area could be held against

.
the grovnng Germo.n concen t rat10ns.
. 7 Gener~ 1 Pi burn made

it cleo.r th'lt VI Corps would hn. ve tb cormni t sizeable forces

to destroy the enemy concentrations in the Ctr~o..

Since VI Corps had insufficient troops to accomplish

the mission of cle:lring the enemy forces from tre CRAILSHEIM

area, it ordered the 10th .il.rmored Division to withdraw

"t~ are:lS northwest of general li':1e STEINKIRCHEN (48,2­

72.5) LANGENBURG (54.0-75.0) BLcl.UFELDEN." 8 These orders

wero transm.itted to Comb:::.t Commclnd A and plnns were made to

execute the order. The plan was to assemble in the vicini ty

of DORZBlI.CH. To.sk Force ThaCkston was to withdraw from

ILS,]OFEN, follovJed by Task Force Honkins. Both task

forces v.,rere to follow the route taken by Task Force

70
Roberts (Ulrich). Combn.t L.ommand B and the 90th Cavalry

Reconnu is sance Squadr on wer e to cover the wi thdrawal and

fo 110"1;; Combu. t Cornmc..'..nd A to the assembly area.

~ihen Task Force Tho.ckston received the or ders to

wi thdraw, it Wo.s eng.'lged VV i th the enemy in tho vicini ty

of ILSHOFEN. Team Connolly wn.s ~.ttf"1.cking nn enemy force

in the woods north of ILSHOFEN o.t (58.0-65.5). The team

stopped its att~ck upon receipt of the withdrawal orders

and returned to ILSHJFEN. The task force moved out at

upproxim.:J.tely 1900B ::md was harassed by enemy artillery fire.

Tho.ckston's task force procoeded along the ~oute followed

by Task Force Roberts. Although the enemy had continuously

infil trated the route between BERNDSHil.USEN and ILSHOFEN

during the duy, no enemy interference was met. The task

force closed into an assembly area in the vicinity of

HOHEB.!.. CH at OIOOB on the 11th of April. This brought to

0. close their opern.tions in the CRaILSHEIM area during

which the tr..sk force had suffered serious personnel losses

which inc luded sevente6n killed, seventy-seven wounded, :lnd

thirteen missing in action. The to.sk force had accomplished

a very difficult job, and had inflicted severe cusuo.l ties

on the enemy.

M8o.nwhile Task Force Hn.nkins hn.d receiVed orders

to v~i thdrllVJ in accordance wi th the combat command plan.

At 2000B troops of the task force began disengaging .~

71
and moved out along the route taken by Task Force Thackston.
I
The task force closed int? an assembly area in the vicinity of

DORZB~CH at 0810B on the 11th of April. Sin6e Task Force

Ha.nkins had borne the brunt of the German assault s in the

CRAILSHEIM area g,nd had also been the spearhead of the lOth

Armored Division dri ve to capture CRAILSHEIM, it had suffered

heavy losses. These losses were approxi:mo.tely twenty-six

killed 8.nd one hWldred wounded.

TQsk Force Roberts (Ulrich) was attache d to Task

Force Riley for control purposes during the withdrawal.

Task 10rce Riley, wi th Roberts (Ulrich) attached, was

detCl.chGd from Comba t Command A and placed under direct

control of the Com.'1lc..nding General, 10th Armored Division

9
at 1740B. The combined task forces moved to an assembly

arca in the vicinity of DORRENZ IMr~illR (40.5-83.5), closing

thero at 1945B. They 'Were immedi[~tely assigned the mission

of reconnoitering crossings over the KOCHER River in the

vic ini ty of ,;EISSBACH (35.0-79.3). This was in accord­

10
ance wi th the new pI JIlS of VI Corps to hn. ve the 10th

ArmorE,d Division (ltt:J.ck toward HEILBRONN. At the close of

the period, Task Force Riley hc..d commenced this new mission.

Comba t Command B- 10 April 1945

The morning of 10 April found Combat Command B

disposed as follows: Tflsk Force Chamberlain patrolling the

"RollenbSl.hn" between B.i~RTENSTEIN and BLAUFELDENj Task Force

72

Ric ~'1ards on in the w~ll.LLHl~USEN-Gl"1GGSTJ.~DT (65.4-71.3) area,

blocking to the northeast with Team Lordwood alerted to

move to CRl.l.ILSFlEIM on order to assist Combat COnInand A;

and the Combat Command Headquarters at ROT am SEE.

At 0730B Colonel Thayer ordered Task Force

Chamber lo.in to as semble at BLAUFELDEN and move to Q.n

assombly area in the vincinity of KIRCBBERG. The task

force o..ssembled '":'..nd J7loved out, and CLt l030B Were on the WFly

to KIRCITBERG. As they neared this locality, the column was

bombed and strafed by cnc:;w ~iror=tft. The task force

closed in.to this new assembly area without further enemy

interference •. At 1500B the task force was ordered to

prepCLre, in conjunction with the remc..inder of Combat

Command b, to cover the v·Ji thdro.w:.."'..1 of Combat Command A

from CRAILSHEIM. Upon completion of this mission Task

Force Clk'.mber lain was to move to a new di vision assembly

area. The task force moved out at 2100B Qnd closed into

an asserrloly arG(~ near Bll.RTENSTEIN aftor an all-night march

during which it was continually h<1rD.ssed by the enemy.

Te~lm Lordwood of TL~sk F or co Richardson was al erted

L'.t 0630B to f[~OVG to CRAILSHEIM to assist Combat Comnand A

which was under severe enemy att:::.ck. The te.:"lm 'was never

ordered to m:tke the move since,.as ho..s been previously

related, To..sk Force Hankins defeated the enemy assault.

Lieutenant Colonel Rich~rdson was ordered to report to the

73
c-.)mb8.t o.)rnrr..~nd comrna.nd p.'s t [).t ROT :lm SEE to receive inst­

ructions incident to the withdr~wD.l of COmbD.t Cmmnnnd B

frem the CR'i.ILSHEIM o.rerJ.. il.t 1345B he left the task force

comn:lnd post which was located Q t ",d1.LLHAUSEN and proceeded

to Combat COmm'.lnd B comrrL'. nd post. There hE: received orders

from ColonE.l Thayer to COV6r th€ wi thdr[).~;n.l of Comb..l t

Comrr.o..nd A from CR.l.ILSHEHiI and then to wi thdravv his tesk

force tu o..n assembly n.re~:::. in thE: vicinity of MULF INGEN

(19.• 8-84.5). The tQsk force accomplished this mission

without incid6nt .. and after an nIl-night march closed into

tho new ,J.ssembly ~re3. at 0840B on thE: 11th of April.

90th C~vulry Reconnaissance Squadron - 10 April 1945

The 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squudron was engaged

in the execution of a dual mission on the morning of 10

April. Troops A emu D (reinforced) wore in CRAILSHEIM

nssi sting Task For ce Hankins in the defens e of that town.

Troop C (reinforced) WQS patrolling the road between

CRi;.ILSHEIM and ILSHOFEN and :SERNDS~'-lAT]SEN. The squadron

hoadquc..rtGrs f'.nd the headquarters of Troops E and F

rem'1ined in '\~-OLLMERSHf'l.USEN. Troop B, in reserve, Was

guarding the bridge I:?cross the JAGST ri ver at KIRCHBERG.

This troop ViaS movGd t'O ROSSFELD at approximately l800B

mld was given the mission of patrolling the gU1eral line

ROSSFELD-Yl.AULJ-\. eH.

74
 Troops A, C, and D continued their missions through­

out the day. Troop C encountered continuous sniper and

panzerfau~t fire while nttempting to keep the rond between

CRi~ILSHEIM and ILSHOFEN opon. The rond was Q.ctunlly open

only when armored units were moving over it, as the enemy

continually infiltrated behind elements clearing the road.

This necessitated a continuous back and forth movement

between CRAILSHEIM and ILSHOFEN. (See Figures 7 and 10.)

On the afternoon of 10 April, the 90th Cav~lry,

in conjunction VJi th Combat COlTlITlD.nd B, received orders to

cover the withdrawal of Combat Command A from CRAILSHEIM.

The squadron carried out this mission during the night of

10-11 April. Although small groups of Germans harassed

elements of thE; 90th Co.V<llry, no serious opposition to

tho withdrawal was encountered. The squadron completed its

movement to the division assembly areo. by 1700B, 11 April.

The withdrawal of the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance

Squ~dron brought to ~n end the operation of the 10th Arm­

ored Di visi un in the CRAILSBEIM area. This operntion,

'which had enjoyed brillinnt initi:tl success, concluded

on a note of fo.ilure. D6 spi te thE.. heroic effor ts of

troops of the 10 Armored Vivi sion, the C~l.ILSHEIM area

vms again in Germ:::m hands.

75

 NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5

lAfter Action Report" 6lst Armored Infsn try Battalion,

lOth Armored Division, entry for 10 April 45.
2
~~.

3'ft
J.i. ' t ·lon R
er ,,1.C .. epor t , 3d Tan k Ba tt U 1·l .on, 10th Armor e d
Division,_ entry for 10 April 45.

4 Ibid •

50perations Instructions No. 74, Headquarters, VI Corps,

10 April 45, por 2.
6
CD.ptain George F. H8Jn61, The Crailsheim Opera tion of the
lOth lirmcred Division, (Richmond: Armored Cavalry Journal,
March-April 19~9) P <b3.

BOp cit, Operations Instructions No. 74, VI Corps .... par 1.

9
After i"l.ction ROt-\.)rt, 21st Tank BCltt .,lion, lOth Armored
Di'vision, Gntry for 10 April 45.

10 Op cit, uper~tions Instructions No. 74, VI Corps,

pur 1.

76

 CHAPTER 6·

SUMMJ1.RY

Employment of the 10th Armored Division

The VI Corps,' spenrhended by the 10th Armored

Di'<rision, hud experienced rapid successes in its drive fror.l

the RHINE River southeast toward MUNICH and th e hC:lrt of

Germany.' VI Corps ovident1y expected th~lt thG crossing

of the NECKAR Ri vcr and the capture of BEILIJRvNN vIOuld be

an easy task, agaLl1st we(:l.k resist~,nce. However, on the 3d

of April, the advance of the 10th normored Division and VI

Corps wns stopped at riEILBRJNN by doturmined resistance

of the enemy. Combat commands of the civision Were

spread over a wide area along the NECKAR River; Reserve

Comnand on the left, Corabn t Corm-nand no in tho center nnd

Combc,t Command B on the right. The stubborn and skillful

defense 1::y the Gernwns prevented Corps from estu blishing

an adequate bridghend at dEILBR0NN and dictated a chang e

of corps plans for employment of the 10th Armored Division.

On 5 11.pri1, the 10th .il.rmored lJivision less Com'08.t

CO!T'Jf:and B WetS ordered to exploit gains in the northern

sector Where Reserve Command D..l1d tl1.6 90th Cavalry Reconnais­

sance Squadron had cros SGd the NECI-\L1.R River anG. WGre in

the vicinity of B-,~D ItERGENTHEIM. The division was to

reconnoi ter in force to CRi1.ILSHEIM nnd to approach

77
HElL.BRONN from the east. Since the Reserve Cormnand and

the 90th Cavalry were engaged in the vicinity of DORZBACH

a.1J.d STUPPACH, the division had only Comcat Corrrrnand A

a vai 1 abl e for imnedia te employmen t in an attack toward

CRAILSHEIM •. lr;titially the bold movement eastward of Combat

Comm:J..nd A caught the German forces off bal'mce. The ITlljor

port ion of the comb~t corrnnand, after piercing the German

defensive shell in the vicinity of ~'~SSAMST,,~~DT, was able

to enter CBL.ILSHEIM by l700B, 6 "~pril against only dis­

organized resistance. On the 7th ~nd 8th of April, elements

of Combat Comnand ,,1. probed to thG west to ILSIIOFEN and

KIRCHBERG.

en 7 April, Reserve Command in the north was

ordered to relieve Combat Comnand A at C&:~ILSHEnv1 to enable

tho 1 cltter to push to the west. Combat Corrmand B was

released by corps to rejoin the division and on 8 April

was given the mission of reopening the main supply route to

CombQt Corrmand ,d. at CRAILSHEIM~ After considerable action

with minor enemy forces along the route, elements of

Combat Comnand Breached CRAILSHEIM on the morning of the

9th of April wi th 0. convoy of much needed supplies.

Supplies were also flown by our Air Force to the air­

field just west of CRAILSHEIM on the 9th and again on the

10th of Apri 1. .By.10 Apri I" alar ge porti on of the supply

route extending soutt to BLAUFELDEN had been secured by an

attached regimental combat team from t:re 44th Infantry Division.­

78
 During the period 6 to 10 April elements of Comtat

Cor.mw.nd il.j reinforced oh 7 April by elements of Reserve

Comm~nd ~nd the 90th Cavalry, had resisted strong enemy

counterattacks in the CRi!.ILSHEIM area. By the 10th of

April, the situation was greatly relieved and the principal

efforts of the Gernans to pinch off this salient had been

overcome. Just as success in this operation seemed within

the division's grasp, t~G division was ordered to assemble

in the vicini ty of DORZB!~CH to prepnre for a coordinated

corps attack to th~ southwest.

In the study of this action of the 10th Armor ed

Division.. the commi ttee attempted to deduce.. objective ly J

logical conclusions from th~ limited source Mtterial avail­

able to it. -lihile these conclusions are retrospective in

nClturo, 0.. close inspection of the available reports will

substo.ntiutG the conclusions drawn.

Conclusions and lessons leD.rn~d

1. VI Corps committed the 10th .l:~rmor€d Divisicn

to t~lc Cr~i~ILSHEIM opera. ti,:~n piecemeal .. by combat c omnand

r·-·ther thc;.n as a uni t. This reduced the possibility of

employing the division as Q unit in a coordinated action.

Reserve C OL1;.1and WD..S eng:-.tged east of the NECKAR in the vicinity

of B..;".. D MERGENTH EIlJI when corps gave eli vis ian the mission of

rcconnoi tGring in forcG to the 1 ine CRi\"ILS~1EIN-SCR..ABIS cn

H..I.LL-B:.. CKNll.NG ... while retaining Combut Command B west of the

NECICl.R River under corps control. This gave the division

79

commander but one combat commund fot the initial a~tion 1h

the CRh.ILSHEIM a.reG.. 1~ uni t should bG employed wi th suf­

ficient forces to ensure a reasonable chance for success.

2. The cross country mobility of uni ts was greatly

reduced by the seD.sonD,l rains which creQted quagmires of

thG country side. Vehicles became roadbound with the cor­

responding loss of freedom of maneuver. In the assignment

of mi ssions to armored units due considerr'.tiun must be

given to tile effect of weather ilnd terra in on opera tions •

3. Instructi ons from highGr headqut:..rters to sub­

ordinn.tc "Lilli ts were not always clcctr or sp ecific. Examples

of this were the corps oreer to division to "reconnoiter

in forcG to the line CRJl.ILSEillIM-SCHJ1~BISCH IL'\.LL-BA.CKNANG n

~nd the instruction of the division directing Combat

Corrnnand B to "establish 3. continuous cht~in of n.rmor along

the MSR~'. Both of these orders cre~"'..tec1 doubt and confusion

in the mind s of' uni t c oITmllnders n.s to exactly whc.. t wa s

desired of their units. Orders to subordino.tGs must have

sufficient clarity and be specific in nn.ture" in order

thClt positive Q.nd correct :J.ctionVlill te t:lken by the recipient •

.;1. There v.,rere f:.:tilure s in c ormnunicQ. tions betv:ecn

comr)o.t commands and task forces. On 6 Apr iI, Task Force

H~l!"lkins and Task Force Riley had no communicati.:>ns with

their ccmba.t cOl11znr:;.nd commander. ~;.s a result they both re­

mained in the vincinity of CRAILS~ffiIM instead of Task Force

Riley pushing west as ordered by the combat co~and commander.

80

Combat Command B lost contact wlth its leading element,

Task Force Richardson; on the 7th of April when rejoining

the division. The combat command indirectly learned of the

location of its unit from the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance

Squadron vlhich had informed division. It is believed the

command group of Combat COlTh118.nd B should have remained nearer

its leading elements and placed greater emphasis upon main­

tenance of communications. The combat command then would

have been more cognizant of the situation of its leading

eleme:lts and mfi)ra able to direct their efforts to accomp­

lish assigned missions.- In a fast moving situation corrnnuni­

cations are all the more important and every effort should

be made to maintain them.·

5. Units did not capitalize on their initial gains.

Elements of Combat l,.,·ommand ~ entered CRAILSHEIM with little

opposition after the initial breakthrough. ·Even though

previously instructed to press on in tiE vast from CRAILSHEIM,

Task F'orce Riley remained in CRAILS~-1EIM and did not begin

its attack to the west until the follovling day. 'Higher

headquarters also failed to exploit Combat Command A's

initial successes with an immediate follow-up by other

troops. If other elements of the division and tLe corps

had been immedia-te ly pushed into CRAILSHEIM and to the west,

the impact upon German troops in the area would have been

considerable and the German defenses to the west would have

been enveloped from the rear. ~hen coromi tting troops to

81

an action which may result in a penetration or envelopment.

forces must be a~ailable and prepared to exploit those

successes.

6, Staff planning was notihorough. Ccmbat

Command B was ordered into an assembly m'ea in the vicini~

of ASSAMSTADT when the assembly area could not accomodate

even one of the combat command's task forces. Staff action

must be complete tlefore orders are transmitted to subordinate

units. The issuance of faulty instructions only destroys the

confidence of subordinate commanders in all instructions

originating from the same headquarters.

7. The Commanding General of Combat CO~lnd A did

not arrive in CRAILSHEIM until the 7th of April, about six­

teen hours after the arrival of his comhJ.t elements. If he

had bcen with his combat elements :..1.nd arrived the evening

beforE- .. he could hD. ve pus hed the 3. ttack to the V!GS t as he

had previously instructed. There is no indication that the

division commander or the corps commander ever visited

CRAILS .ED/.[ during this cri tical period.. It was not until

10 April thr).t the COmrn:lnding General of the 10th Armored

Di vi s ion arrived at CRAILSHEIM .J.nd ordered the VIIithdrawal.

A comm:::~nd8r should not expose himself unnecessarily but he

must rem;J.in far enough forward to influence his combat

elements in crucial action.

82
 8" The division f'J.iler1 tn ann,..., ""t"~ '"'."'~rr+~'~~ its

main suprly route into Ch.iiILS JEH!I. .L}ds ~ ',.L.L'~U· d CV'J..Ld G .......?

result in the eventual failure of' t ro foroes enga.ged in

vicini ty' 0;" CRAILsEEIM bGCilUse of the laok of adequate

logistio~l support. Most of the 6nemy ~ction against

tho main supply t"oute oentered around HOLLENBACH and

£.-:..B.tENSTEIN, If these enemy troops had been cleared out

immediately, as was later done by the follo~ving infantry

during the 1'inal phase of the operation" the 8).CC(;SSCS in

CRAILELillIM could have been L,).ploi ted to the fullest, a.nd

troops would not lLtve be(;D wi thdr·-tvvn by corps at a time

when complete success seemed at h~nd, The supply routes

of D. lIDi t must be clG:l.rod, secured" n~d ITID.. int::.ined.

9. Small units instinctively took the proper

action without instructions from higher headquarters and

ret:1.ined the initiative. An outstr ':lding ex~~mple of this W:1S

the c,Jordin:'.. tioD beuvoen Task F orCG ::Iankins 8.nd Task Force

Riley ill the c onsolici::'. tion of positions and redistr ibution

of limited supplies in CRAILS]EI1VI.

10. The defense, of CRAILS~ __EIMI ROTH" and ILSHOFEN

ug:.:.inst Successive countorattClcks by the Germ:.:..ns displayed

an aggressive spirit and a sound tuctic:ll "knov'i how" in

tho defense of a built-up urea.

1,1. BQdly needed CIa ss I II [~nd V suppliGS were

successfully flown into the CRAILS-1EIM are'). with the loss

of only onG pl:me. This WO,s accomplished despi.te continuous

83

~~til18ry ~ire on the

et:. ) i vi ~;i O'L1 f:;.... OIC "i:,-.~8 J .~""1.IL..):_.-JII·~ .2l~e ..;J o~ 10

I
I.
-~.i"ell e:;~8Cl.rt3,:~. ITne ·iivisio:1. br·o~.:e C;J·i.~.tjc

frt'''cce''rtl'':'''llTT
- ·-' '1- '.. .;
'I

..L.·~J.e \(,t.:~ ~;"'val""l"'l'" ~l"-"~O': j.-:--,,-;t a~-"-11~'\"Te='

- v'"" - J .) c_ .. -< - L .~ ,. - . - v ___ -- ~ u --

:........ _-..['~L~:.._ ·~·:._i;~ cr.. .) 3L·..;.. tio·..l 0':: t:1e ~ollo"t:!l:'1:} t""'-J6 1111cSio"t'lse
_ _ L- ..... I '

8:~~:;lai GJ.tiO:l a·i.1 :;,~ sep ~.e J.·~e .:.:xis 0: ~ :.VJ..:1C~, lJ.'i:o-cec-cio·..1
II

l i vi D i ~)"iJ. sector,
I
I

o ~-: e ·n. , Q, 'L1 c1

i

J.'hese I~'i ~ 8i O~l.8

C 3, S1..-1 .3,. JJ t 1e s
I
I

24

 A F FEN r I X I

TROOP LIST

3d Tank Bn 59th Armored }i Id Arty Bn

11 th Bn 93d d ield Arty Bn
21st Tank En 405th Fi cld il.r ii llery Group
634th Field n.rty Bn

20th Armored Infa ntry Bn 141st ield Arty Bn

54t~ Armored Infantry Bn 939th Field Arty bn

61st Armored Infantry Bn Btry B, 976th Field Arty Bn

55th Armored ~n neer En 324th Infantry Regiment

80th Armored Medical
90th Cavalry Rcn En
132d Armored Ordnance
150th Armor ed Co
419th .t'''rmored 1: ie Id Arty Bn
420th il.rmor d Field Arty En
423d Armored Fiel3. Arty tin
609th Tsnk Lestroyer Bn
796th AAA AR Bn (Sp)
59th AAA AN Bn (Sp)
31st Engineer Combat Bn (-)
until 6 April 1945
2827th Engineer Combat En (-)
from 6 April 1945
442d ltuartermaster k Co
448th ~uartermaster Truck Co
I FiTI[ Team Yo. 13

OFERATI~m

Unit Strength
Reported Estimated
9th V.G. Livision 850 -- 400
57th Ini'antry He ~i.mGn t 500 200
IlGt~ Infantry Regiment 250 150
Sth Fusilier Battalion 100 50
212th V.G. Division 220J 194:0
423d Infantry Re _. 420
320
K.G. Sachs 600 500
Gr. Ers. battalion 42, EAYREUTH 600 450
Marsch Company, :Nebel Tr. 68 100 90
dsrier Ers u Ansb battalion 8 220 180
212th usilier Dattalion 160 100
l059t~1 .t.. ntitank
2d C 100 300
553d V.C'. ?j..C) 5CO
1119th 350
2d Compa'ly 60 ?
1121st Grenadier battalion 2 bv 250 150
 Unit stren@:th

Reported Estinated

JaG g;er Fee f?~imont "Alpen 2" ----

1734 1180
I Battalion (5 Companies) 7'50 500
II Dattalion (5 Companies) 7'50 500
AT Compa.ny 114 100
3d Llatt'.,ry" Heavy Arty_ Bn., Alpen 120 80
646th nridfe Construction Battalion 650 400
ICG. Duernagc:; 1 2500 1800
I b8.tt,C).lion 500 375
II Lattalion 500 375
p~s sclU].-C Company 90 75
283d Stomach Dsttalion 600 450
(2 Companies identified)
Kurfurst 30 300 200
V.S. ~ergentheim 400 250
K. G. Jiu bne r 500 350
(F~ Gr Ansb u Ers Bn 5)
K.G t Lucker 265 150
.Kemnant.3 73d Inf3.ntry Eeg,irnent
260th Gr Lrs battalion 300 250
pz hgt e Rosenheirr 440 375
(4th and 5th Companies identi:Lied)
Artillerv ~attalion 3chramm
J 400 400
Schutzen' Battalion, }t urth It 480 150
Flieger Horst Company 120 80
19th li.ll. R6 r.rim6nt" 2d Battery 90 85
(Comrni tt~~d as Infantry)
TOTAL 11,184 8,06e

86

 CRAILSH£IM OPf.RAT'ON

t'
CCR

405 FA 6rotJp :32Ord l3n C-) 32'4 Inf. R9 t

&J r?ect 8n.(.) 609 T£) BI7 ( )
·'J~"O "';;:A .~f1 93 AFA Bn. (33 FA 8n .)
79G:> AAA A 10/ .sp 8n t-J
59 1'1"'=4 "n (33 F/1 13r ilJ 141 FA t3n. (405 r';4 G Y) 5.5 Eng (3n (0)
3.' £nq (c) all() ur:!·! bA ..... r)
"~AFA 8n.(4l:J4r,Q!?p) 423AFAan. (/OAiJj;o· 90 RCN Bn (.)
~827 Enj. (c) Bn () f'mm I;A.'?r/
f:J39 ':I'f 8n. (1'.10:; F ...~ Gp) 1505'.9 CO. '5"S AAJI A W S D an
8 Blry 976F,q ~2 ~/V1 Trl< CO
448 QM Tr'r, Co
 (RAILSHEJM OPE.RATiON (4-10 Apr. 45)

CCA lOAD

TASK }:"'ORCE tASK FORCE.

RIL£Y ROBE.R.TS

,;, AftJ (-CoA) ciS!TK On [GJI3) 54 -'1, A!8 (- Cos A~l..~l TrA.90 CdV R<:.n 8n 419 .iJF~ Bn
CoA 3rr/ TK Bn CoA 6/ AIJ3 u, J~ 21st TK Bn CoA5'sAE 8n(-) CD/S7r Ri/~'I1 tGkl'lJ
I PliTt Coa (CL)970BrJ / Plat wB,~D.9 rOBn I Plat, wBG09rD CoBW9TDl3n() 420Af'A 8r '"
2nd PldtCoA 5.54E8 wA
.31'1:::/ Plat S5AEB CoA80MedBn
(o/s TF ha/."(li1;::,-:J
I sI Plat, Cot4 .55 A£ Bn ~..34 FA an
C&/s CCA; /4,.'3-rn::/
alcfJtl4/.9AFA )~~pr)
 CRAJLSHEJM OPERATION (4-10 Apr. ~5)

TASK FORC£ TA.5K FORCE.

CHAM8ERLAfN RKHARDSON

/1 11< :>n. (. Cae, -1"4; !U) 20AI8 (-Co( 3/.4) HYf H9 Co CCB 423 AFA 8n
CaC ZO+hAIB (0(; ilH,TJ( 8n eoA fo097D 8n{-) Co l3 80 M Ell Bn
3 PLAT CocA 20rhAIB .3 Plat C..oA / jill TK 13n CoB S5 A£8 (-) wA 1320r4Bn
Pliif CoB 55 AEB .3PlilfCo8 55 AE8 405 rA {;-p
!
Is"! Plol GOD IITK8n 93 AFA Bn
I PIJt CoA '09 TO Bn 3PlciJtCoA b0910 8n
/ Pw TEAM -#/1.3 /41 FA Bn
CoC .31 £119 (C) BI1 8 Bfry.976FA
CoA 3/ Eng (,)Bn(!"f'/t!;w)
(.08 2287 ~(()8n (rpIAfi»
2 PI.tCoA 90Rcn 8n
 CRArL5~IEIM Qp£RATfON C4-IOApr 45)

-
.3rd Til( Bn. {- (0.4: -2 pl.,f DCa) 5!1 f-;.q an. CO/.s)

CoA.54 AlB

Cae S4AI8

2nd pl.:rl-Co ·c (009.'1)&.

3rd p1a+ Co ·c·· .5.5 A£B

90

 AP P E D I Z II

TEH.RA 1fT STUDY

The HElL BRONN-ASSA1,ISTADT-CRAILSHEIM area lie s in

the state of WURTTEM:J3URG 'which is in the southeast corner

of GERMANY. This east central portion comprises approxim­

ately one fifth of the state.

r;URTTEVIBURG, a hilly I agricultural pr ovince, is a

part of the South Germany r::'ableland. About fifty-seven

percent of the state is drained the YEGKAR River and its

main tributaries- the KOCHER .. the JAC the El~S,jl and the

RC1"S Rivers with their nwnerous tributaries. Sixty-four

percent of thG area is under this mostly

grains, vllith a scattering of orchards [dIU vineyards. Thirty­

one percent of the state is in forest land. To the west,

betr:een the IEIHTE and the NECY~R sand and

I<ARLSRUdE.. lies the black rorest. Small stands of this

dense forest spread to the east of th,e lli ECKAR. road

net, in some instances dating back to the time of the

RQr.r:.,l\YiS, is fairly good. I'~ost roads are of tr..e hard surface

bJa ck-top variety, averaging about five to six meter s in

width. l

The T-JE ILBROliN-ASSN TSTADT-CRAILS:'-IEIJlii area is traversed

by three rivers: the l'TECKAR River fl0·DS north through

91
HEILBROlTN to EBERBu.CH where it turns west through HEIDELBERG

and empties into thE, RHINE River; t~le KOCHER River flows

north through SCEtW:l.BISCf-I ELIoLL.:; approximately forty-six

kilometers east of the NECKAR River .. e;r::\dually swings in

a gentle curve to the west and GS into the NECKt'..R River

seven kilometers north of the J:.. GST River flows

north through Cfu.. ILSHEIE" ki lome ters to the

east of the KOCHER River .. and curves westward" roughly

par~lleling the KOCEER.. and s in to the NECKAR River

eleven kilometers north of HEILBRONN. These rivers .. which

are unfordable ~nd require hr I and th e ridge line s

betvveen them divide the 8.re~'. of operations into numerous

complex compartments. In addition, the aphica lly old

terrain is deeply locerated the stre'J.m nevNork formed by

numerous small streams, resulting in stream beds with

soft banks and steep slopes. 'rhis condit ion renders even

tIle narro1';est of stre[lmS unfordable. The ro ,

moder'1tely open terrO-in provides observation and fields

of fire. HOYleVer, continuou.s cultivation for centuries

has c'1used the soil to pI' esent c. mu.ddy morass dur the

ing season, reducing the trafiica )il 1

of vehicles for
2
cross-country operation.
 During a dry season t''£ terro.in "jQuld h~~V6 favored

the employment of armor. However t~le 10th Armored Divis ion

was 'lampGrGd by tL6 lack of cross~COt1.ntry tr''1.fficability for

its vehirles. The mire-like condition oi the soil, resulting

from t:1G annual spring rains and t~;.av'·sJ confined the activity

of t:,6 vebicles to the roads, w!lich ciisintergra.ted rapidly

under the constant U8e by heavy armored vehicles. The 1Nater

barriers presented by the NECKAR River and its tributaries,

the JAC~ST and K0CHlli Ri ver s, further canalized the movements

of tIle division into narrow c·omp~r-b:16nts and greatly aided

the German defense of the area.

------_._--------,---_._--_.._. ------­
NOTI~S FOR APPEFDIX II

lLetter, The Americana Institute, He'i:: York IS, l:evl York, 24

Fe :)ruary 1950.

2I,Laps: G~RMANY, 1:100,000, Sh('3ets ROL;~K"BUHC" U-4; ELL';'AlTGLN"

V'-~'j 10_1~LSicTr~~~, iJ-3; REUT]INC~I;;, -3. G.;;m\'fjI.~\TY 1:25,000,
Geographical Section, General St,:Lff 1'0. 4414, Britis>J..

93

 A P P E. D I X III

OPERATIOES ORDERS AnD OPERA1'IO"lS rirSTRUCTlot"s

94

 lOth Armd Div

A?O 260
0424CIOB Apr 45

Copy Ho.

OPERATIors INSTRUCTIONS NO. 19

(Co'lfirming Oral and Yrag:cn0ntClry Orders)

MAPS: GSCS 4<b16, CEYJTRAL EUROPE, Scale 1:100,000 3heets

U2, V2 & U3.

1. 90th Cav Ren Sq (Mecz) (-):

a-:---1Tove at once to Rcn "hi force to line ROTHENBURG (7789)
CRAILS.LEnF (7062).
b. Establish Ln with 63d Ini Div and coordinate passage
thru their lines.
c. Coordinate all movements with nes Comd.

2. Re s Comd:
a. Atk at once to seize line ROTllirmJRG (7789) ­
:-{.l~TTRIPG:=;r (7676).

b. Establish Ln with G3d lnf Div and coordinate passage

tilru t~leir lines.
c. Coordinate all I;lOVGm8nts \"Iitb 90th Cav Rcn Sq (rvlecz).

3. C CA:
a~ Cont present miss~~n.
b. Prepared on Div ° to:
(1) Cross Dr No.2 and Atk to E.
(2) Cross Dr No.1 anG. Atk to E.
( 3) Cr 0 S s Dr 1\) o. 3 an d A tk to L.
c. Obj will be to seize line CRAILSilliIi\l (7062) -
YJE'lTRIT'.TGElJ (7676) recardless
'-'
of W>lere crossin,r:<.... . is made.
d. EstJ.blish Ln '.\Iith fri6nc~.ly illlit in whose i... crossing is
made to coordinate passa~6 of li~es.

4. CC B:
a;--Cont present mission.
b. Prepared on Div °to:
(1) Cross Br No. 3 and Atk to E.
(2) Cross Dr No.2 and Atk to E.
( 3) Cross Br No. 1 and Atk to E.
c. Obj VI/ill be to seize line 3CE'-:A:JISH HALL (4659) ­
CHAILST1EI!': (7062) regardless of IN ,ere crossing is made.
d. Establish Ln v.J1. th friendly lUli t in whose Z crossing is
made to coordinate passage of lines.

95
5• C:':;lJERAL :
cs vIill not be blocked (Jlms. If he8.cl is
Itcd f or any rSL,S on" CIm~Ji 11 curl v"d and clear
both approC\.ch s to Dr.
b. is esttnatcd !3r ~ • 2 will be completed 5 lipr.
c. ProT11pt and reports 0 '1 prog;ress of Clms
is mandator;),',

MO:RHIS

Maj Gen

ICIAl:

S'IEf'rIELD

Actp; G-3

DISTRIBV,eIOl'~: "X" plus 3-VI Corps

I-2d Fr Corps
l-locth Ini' Div
1-63d In:!. Di v
I-44th Inf Div

96

 lOth Armd Di v
APO 260
061600e Apr 45

Copy l'Jo.

o::':rt.A l' I (J~ S r ~ STRr err I (!~ ,;,3

(Coniirr;li'1[:: verbal..,; Orders)

I,J..F3: C3r:-3 -1416, EUROFE, Scale 1:100,000, Sheets

TJ( & '14.

1. CB~TERAL :
a:-°-B"d 4betvleen VI and XXI Corps chan-;ed effective 06000lB
Afr 45.
b. 4th ID~ Div and 101st operates on uivision left.
c. Division co inues to in Z 63d and 100th Inf
Division.
d. VI Corps COlltiuues Atkl c:-lan direction to SEe
e. Division limi t of Ren changed (overlay). Atks to
SE at once to seize line BACK:Al\jG (2440) SCFlrliABISCH
ilALL (4660) ( 7063) •

2. CC ii:
~oYltinu6s attack t SEt
b. Turn to S~~ and d on re6ehin" Vic CHAILS":1EnE to seize
line BACKl:'AHG (2440) SC~r..(~.. Bisc ::~ qft.. LL (4660) both
inc lusi VB.

3" PES COT:D:

a.-}'ollorJ CC A initial
b. La soon as possible 3 to S and seize line
SC? I'.. BISCll '~'{ALL (4660) (exclusive) GROS ALTDORF
(5860) (exclusive).

4. 90TH OF-V HeN sQ (J;Jl£CZ) (-):

a-;----rolloVJ Res Comd ini tinl t
b. [ail;.tain physical contact ith i.riel1c> ly 11ms on left
keeping t~.Lem ini orr;.ed of Oll!' pos itions.
c. As soon as possible sides to SE and S to Rcn in
force to line GROS ALTDORF 5860) (inclusive)
CRAILSliliIM (7063) (incl us i VG ) •

5. ALL U~nTS IN COnTACT:

.. ---=~.

a. Prepared for flrrthGr offensive action to Sand SE on

Div o.
 b. Resistance and towns will be bypassed wt.ere pOssil)le
in order to reach Obj line as qlJ. icl-::ly as possib Ie.

llIOREIS
J"/aj Gen

c~'r IC IAL:

IELD

ST~f}i'
Actg G-3

DISTRIBTJTIO~~: "Xii plus 3-VI Corps

l-IOlst Cay Gp
I-4th InI' Div
l-lOOth Inf Di v
1-63d Ini' Div

98

 Eq 10th Armd Di v
APO 260
062200B Apr 45

Copy '0.

OI--ERJ._TI'Ji:'S L,TSmUCTIO:JS NO. 21

(Confirminp; Oral 0: }'ragmentary Orders)

EAPS: GSGS 4416, CElfTPJiL EUROFE, Scale 1:100,000.. Sheets U4

&, V4.

1. CC A:
a;--No change in mission.
b. Bxploi t to rnaximum breaktj,1ru 01 TF TIankins.
c. Pr otec t left (:8) flank of oym advance.
d. I~'old shoulder at CBAILS~rr~11'1 (7062) until Rlvd by Res
Comd.

2. CC
a. Reverted to Div control as of 061645B Apr 45.
b. Ordered by VI Corps to move so as to re8.ch Er

(800834) by 062300B.

c. (':0'1e from Br by Rt indicated to Assy Are:) Vic

ASSA~STADT (4193) (overlay).

d. Prspared upon arr).. -:1.1 for cOITll:1itrnent on 1 FIr notice.

3. RZS COl D:
a:--f~Qchar.lge in present mission.
b. Assi3t 90th Cay Rcn Sq (Mecz) in HE Div Z initially.
c. Rlv Elms CC A at CRAILSHEnI (7062) as soon as possible.
d, nold shoulder at CRAILSi3EHC (7062) until [Uvd by 90th
Cay fLcn Sq C:ecz).

4. 90th Cay Rcn Sq (Mecz):

a. ~Iold NE shoulder Di v Z until Rl vd.
b. Proceed on mission assigned or NO. 20 on Div O.

MORRIS

Maj Gen

OIT Ie IAL:
s~mrrIELD,
Actg G-3.
DISTRIBUT 101: "x" plus 3 - VI Corps
1 - 101 s t C a v G:.)
1 - 4t'l In:l~ vi v
I - IOOth lui Div
1 - 63d Ini' Div

99
 lOth Armd Div
APO 260
072200B April 1945

Copy No

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 22

(Confirming Oral and Fragmentary Orders)

rvIAI.PS: GSCS 4416 .. CENTRAL EUROPE, Scale 1:100 .. 000 .. Sheets U4

f~ V4.
1. CC A:
a:---iTo change in mission.
b. Send minimum of one light Task Force from SCHvVABISH
HALL (84659) toward HEILBROFJ; (S086l) to contact Elms
100th Inf Di v movtng E from tha t point.

2. CC B:
a:--Becure and hold open ~vy CP~ILSc~IM (S7062) - BAD
rrl~T{Gm'THEn!i (S470l) (both exclusive) for Div MSR.
lJ. I'Jlaintain contact wi th Elms 4th Inf Div to N and Res
Comd on S.

3. R~S COlIn:
a. Mission Asgd 01 No. 20 cancelled.
b. Block and protect CRA TLSHEHI Rd center.
c. Maint8.in contact wi th 90th Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz) on
It and CC B on L.

4<'1 90th CAV RCN SQ U·fECZ):

a-.--:";~ission
Asgd or No. 20 cancelled.
h. Take over and hold Obj Line Cl~ILSHEIM (S7062) ­
SCEVLADISCH EALL (both exclusivo).
c. rJ18.intai~ contact with Rss Comd at CRAIL3HEIM and
CC A at 8CHNABISCH HALL

MORR.IS

Maj gen

OFF IC IAL:

SHEFFIELD

Acte; G-3

DI8TRIBUTIOF: "X" plus 3 - VI Corps

1 - 101st Cav Sq
1 - 4th Inf Div
1 - 63d Inf Div
1 - 100th Inf Div

100
 10th Armd Div
AFO 260
082400B Apr 45

Copy l~o.

Ol:;ERr.. Tlors I:JSTRUCTIONS NO. 23

(ConI' Oral and Fragmentary Crders).

GSGS CENTRAL EUROPE, S081e 1:100 , 000 Sheets

U4 and V4.

TF Roberts to t-J-~i between KOC:illR and JAGST Rivers.

b. Seize any intact Brs over KOCHER R.
c. Gain contact with 63d Inf Div Atking from N~
d. ize that portion of Rd from ':.rOHEBACH (4586) to
se H HALL (S4659) in Z.
eo If unable to cross KOCHER R at present locatim,
he is to follow Rt of TF' Roberts prepared to ad-
of any intact Er 0 '.Jr KeC dER R. Cross to
Y'f as soon as possi'Jle and Cont Atk tm':ard BEIL13RONN
(30861) to contact lOOth Inf Div.
£'. 0 Chffi1[e in remainder of present mission.
go CG CC A has operational cOl~trol of Res Comd until
fur ther notice.

2Q CC 13:
a;--C-cmt on pre se:1t mis s ion initially.
b. On be relieved in sectors 8525898) to
(36279) (Incl) hold line BLJ.. t1F~LDEN (S6279)- CRAIL­
e (S7062) (both exclusive) keeping balance of
CC in mobile :t{es Vic KIRCE=BEEG (36369).
c. W':aintb.in contact v,;ith CC A on Sand 324th RCT on V"
d. Close coor dina tion bet1Neen Tf: Chamber lain and leading
En 324th RCT is maDdatory.
e. Team l,faher to Cont rr.ission on 1,~SR between (4800)
and (S525898) until further notice.

3. RES COJ:D: (Temporarily under Oper3.tional Control of CC A.)

4. 90th C!.v Rcn Sq (Mecz) (-):

a. change in mission.
b. Move as rapidly as possible to mi ssi on"
bypassing and p1 ss ing thru fri where
possible. .

101
5. 324th ReT:
a. Itchd Div Eff 08lBOOB Apr 45.
b. Assemble in designated area (overlay).
c. JtL~p-off as soon as posiJible after 9 Apr
Atk S to secure MSR in Z.
d. CoopEJrate closely Y.:ith 1'F C:iamberlain of CC B who
now has responsibility of Z to be d by RCT.

6. 59th Armd FA Bn:

a:--Atchd Di v l'.:ff 08l200B Apr 45.
b. Comd Rpt Co Div Arty for orCter s.

MORRIS
Maj Gen

OFFIC IAL:

SHEFFIELD

Actg G-3

DISTRIBUTION: "X" plus 3 - VI Corps

1 - lOlst Cav Gp
1 - 4th Ini Div
1 - lOOth Inf Div
1 - 63d Inf Div
1 h. 324th RCT

102

 10th ~~rmd Di v
APO 260
092400B Apr 45

Copy No.

OPEH~';.TIOUS INSTHUCTIO:bIS j\IO. 2.:1

( I:"'onf irming; Or '.11 and Iragmentary Order s)

l\~jl.FS: GSGS 4416 1 CEi~T}:.;~L EUnOPE, So:c:.le 1:100,000.. ets

U4 :::tne! V4.

cont3.C "i<lith EL~s G3d Inf Div, initi'3.te

Ron iramecli for crossi:l;' over KOCEER rt..
b. Push 54th I.\.rred IrL~ Bn (-) (Reinf) and 21st Tk (-)
(Reinf) across KOC.~~i:R R 3.S rapidly as possible.
o. Cant ;.\.tk toward H.b:ILbRONi'I.
d. M:aintm n close Ln with Elms 63d Div during crossinf;
p:Bse to ooordinate passage t ru their troops.
e. ITo Oh8.nr;8 in mission Vic Cn;i.lLS~·iEn!J..

2. CO No 0

3. Res Comd: No cl:ange

4. 90th Cay Ron Sq (Meoz): In addi tion to present mission

Ron- to Nand 8 of SC -~rvLJ:'ISC I,':::':'.\.LL for Br s and fords over
KOC .IE], R.

J\,:1GRTUS
j Gen

OFfICL;.L:

SJ:-CfF I ELi)
G-3

DISTRILUTIO: "Xn plus 3 - VI Cor pa

1 - 63d Inf Div
1 - 4th Inf Div
1 - lOOth Inf Div
1 - 1
324 RC1J.

103
 Irq 10th Armd Div
AFO 260
l01300B Apr 45

Copy No.

OFERATIO;J8 LI3T:RU(;T 10; S NO. 25

(Confirmin;c Verbal (J. 1'1ragmentary Orders)

LIAFS: GSCS 4416, CElTTRAL EUI{OPE, Scale 1:100,000, 5heets

U4 aYld V4.

1 • GE}TLRAL :
a. Div wi thdraws irrunediately fro!:1 CEAILST-l:G;IM Area to
Assy Area (ov;:;rl ay) •
b. Prepared on arrival to Cont Atk to ~~ toward HEIL13ROHN
wrwn crossinp:s over KOCT-ffiR R are available.

2. CC A:
a:-Initiate withdrawal at once to designated Assy Area.
b. Use ~oth Red & Blue Hts as required.
c. On closing Assy Area prepared to Cont Atk to W on orderc
d. R8s Comd remains under your oY:Jer3.tional control until
closed in Assy Area.
e. Tr A, 90th Cay Rcn Sq (Mecz) reverts Sq control.

3. 90th Cuv Rcn Sq (Mecz):

-a-;--C'-C"VervJ ithcrr:-avJaflS'c A fr am CTc..A.ILSl£H.f Area.
b. Co-,ler withdrawal CC B from KIRCIIBBE.G Area.
c ~ Fall back to ,9,; hold generally along E-\·[ 80 Grid Line
from BLAUfELDE1'; to BUCEE}TBACK until Rlvd by 117th
Cav Sq.

4. CC B:
a.-Ho ld pre sent pas i tions &: cover vd tr.dr a"li'al C CA.
b. After CC A has cleared" move to desi[nated .Assy Area
Via Route Red or any availa~_lle Ii.outes to Nor th E of
JACST R.

MORRIS

Maj Gen

OFFICIAL:

SHI;FFIELD

Actg G-3

DISTRIBUTIOlJL "X" plus 3 - VI Corps

1 - 6~) d I nf Di v
1 - 4th Inf Div
1 - lOOth Inf Div
1 - 324th RCT
104
 E-l.-T-R-A-C-T

S SEVENTH AlnlY
APO No. 758 ~L S. Army
0

4 Apr il 1845

OPERATIons FJSTltUCTIO~~S

122

1. a. Fir s t Brench Army on the right secures the line

KARLSRUHE--HEILBRONl1 and reconnoiters to the line
LICHTElJAU R2014) --LUDiJIG-SJURG (80734).

0.., Third Army 0:2 the left continues the advance

tow3.r d LEIPZ IG--DRES:CE~ •

2. Boundar ies:

a. Present boundary betr~een Seventh Army and Third

Army is extended as follows: livest of FULDA
(H3819) no ehange--FULDA (to Seventh Army)-­
IlIEEJINGEN (H9022)--COBlTRG (03089)--BATttEUTH
(907556) (all to d Arn~).

b" Boundary between Seventh Army and First Fr eneh

effGctive i:mr:lediately: BITccffi (Q7750)-­
EDENKOBEIT (R2876)--SPEYER (R5180) .... -all to First
French Army--HICHELFELD (R7670)--HILSBAC3 (R8267)
--LAUFT'EN (80454) (all to Seventh --thence
NECKAR l~~\rer to STUTTGi..RT (to First French
(see Overlay). ~nrbstricted use of the
main railroad from '-est of the running
thr IIAGUElTAU and LAEDAL to Seventh Army.
Unrestricted r ri s on the r PdALSBOURG
_-Sh'lER!:TE-- BR1.J1I.t~ TR--FAC UEITAU- ..Nv IS SE1,1 BOURG-­
LANDAU .. -EDENKOBEr to Seventh Army.

Co Joui1dary bebc'een Cor erective OOOIE 6 April 1945:

(1) Between XV Corps Clnd ~aI Corps; oV"erlay.

(2) Be-bueen XXI Corps and VI Corps: Bee overlay.

Corps:

(1) Co~~tinue advance und secure objective shown

on overlay.

105

 (2) Maintain close liaison wi th Fir st Frenc h ;).rmy.

E-Z-T-R-L.-C-T

OPDR.:..TIOiTS INSTRUC TIONS 7 April 1945

:r:ruTlBER 126

1. 44th Division:

Eave the 324th RCT (Reinf) to VI Corps Zone. Effect­

ive upon arrival in VI Corps zone, 324th ReT (reinf)
is attached to VI Corps .for Operations.

E-X-T-R-.i~-C":T --­

10 Apri 1 1945

128

1. Confirming VOCG Sellenth Army, thE, following is IT..1.de

of rec or d:

a. Effective 1500J J 10 April 324th ReT (reinf)

is relieved from attL-1.c11ment to 'iI Corps and is
attac:16d to XXI Corps.

c. jor elements VI s in advance at general

1 ine: KUFF3hZ.,-=;L (84271) --LAIIG.t;}- a.RG (35475) --DLl..­
UFELDEN (86280) 'will }:ie wi thdrawn.

E-X-T-R-l..-C -T

106

 HEADQUAR TEllS V I COR 1-; 8

APO 46 U .. S. Arr~r

051700B Apr 45

OP:JliA TIO~:IS INSTRUC TION)

71)

Ie lOOth Inf Div:

a. Continue Atk to seize BEIL13RO-cJlf (S0862) - EITZFELD
(S2467) - LO'\i~ElTSTEIN (S205 6) are a. (Overlay) •
b. Protect Corps R (S) flank. _
c. Maintain physical contact II Fr Cor}S on.8..
d. 163d Cml SG Co Atchd effective 050200B Apr 45.

2. 63d Ini Djv:

a. Continue Atk to seize OURINGEn (82968) - HO:JEBACK
(B4586) - NITZENHAUSEN (85078) area. (Overlay).
b. Protect Corps L (n) flank.
c. MaL1.tain physical contact ZYI Corps on L"

3. 10th Armd Jiv (-):

a. }-.-lSS C'C B to Corps control in present area. Co CC B
establish Ln ':Ii th CG VI Corps immediately.
b. Reconnoiter in force to line ,JACIGTAtTG (82440) - S\"TABI8CE
K~LL (34660) - CR1~ILSFEIM (87063). (Overlay).

4. New prl:!:"'ies effective 06000113 Apr 45.

50 Hq & Hq Btry 46th FA Gp ReId AtchElent VI Corps Arty

effective 030800B Apr 45 and vlill operate as "T" Force
VI Corps under instructions to be issued thru G.. 2 VI
Corps.

6. Other uni ts" no chCl_nge.

BROOKS

Maj Gen

-OFFICIAL:

/s/ Davison

I
It DAVI80N

1 Incls - Overh y
DISTRIB1JTION:
Special

107
 HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46 U. 8. Army

07l500b Apr 45

OPERATIOlJS INSTRUC TION)

NUMbER 72)

1. lath Armd Div:

CC B reverts control 10th Armd Div effective
061700B Apr 45.

2• 63d I nf Di v;
Maintain 2d En 254th Inf alerted for movement by motor
on Corps order on two hours notice.

3. lOOt)1 T:--lf .:.\i. v:

---6~ithC~;r-SG C)l Atchd effective 062200B Apr 45.

4. 35th AAA Brig:

a~ 216th AAA Gun En reld Atcrunent VI Corps and 35th
A.~A Brig.1 reverts control Seventh Army effecti ve
0300015 Apr 45. cO 216th AAA Gun Bn report CG 44th
AhA Brig for further instructions.

b. B-~ry B 353d AAA 8L Bn (-1st Flat) Atchd effective

or(-L200B Apr 45.

5~ Other lnits, no change.

BROOKS
Maj Gen

OFF Ie IAL:

IS/Davison

It/DAVISON

DISTRIBUTION:

Special
 HEAf,QUARTBRS VI CORPS
APO 46

OPERATIOJ..TS HJSTRUCTION)

rUHBER 73)

1. 10th Armd Div:

324th RCT (44th Inf Div) Atchd effective 081800B Apr
45,

2. 100th Inf Div:

Co 'B 83-CI-Cml N~ort Bn Atchd effecti ve 191000B Apr 450

3• 6 3d :;:, ,: Dj y ~
---~';: -2r'-'ZS lth
Inf released from alert status (Par 2"
c

O~ ~o 72; Hq VI Corps, 071500B Apr 45) effective

072330B Apr 45.

4. 35th j."AA. Fr 3. e::

a-:--G~: ~dF ;::-Sn Atc hd efi e cti ve 191200 B Apr 45.
b. 2-iSth hAA Gun En Atchd effective on arrival.

5. VI Corps Arty:
--t(~~v~86~qJth FA Bn (240mm How) without delay to Vic
11EID~~BERG (R6990)o Adv Det report to CO 421st FA Gp
at H~~·DELBERG. On arrival destination, unit ReId Atch­
ment VI Corps and VI Corps Arty, reverts control Seventh
Army.

6. Coordina te vehi cul ar movement s thru M-PACS VI Corps

(Redwood 50). Comply with Opns Memo "[ITO 1" Hq VI Corps,
12 ~/Iar 45, "Signal Security Measures".

7. Other units, no chan[e.

BROOKS
Maj Gen

OFFICIAL:

IS/Davison

.It/DAVISON

Asst G-3

DISTRIBUTION:
Special

109

 HEADQUART~RS VI CORPS
APO 46 U. S. Army

l01800B .Apr 45

OFERATIONS IPSTRUCTION)

74)

1. lOth Armd Div:

a I 324th RC T (44th Inf Di ,,-) re Id a tc hment 10th Armd 1:i y
and IV Corps, and atchd XXI Corps in present position
effective 101500B Apr 45.
b. vHthdraw elements in CRAILS-;EP~ (S7062) - ILSEOFEN
(S5965) - KIEC,.1BERG (36369) area to areas NWof
g('!1'3raL line .3TEIUKIHC·'lEN (S 4872) - LANC'ENBURG (S5475)
.- ';~-,.I\.\T:i~T-,DE·'. (s 6280).
c. C O'Jf, ~.u(:,IEh. it using all availacle crossincs and atk
i'l 'lir-:;,:tion ~IBU£NSTADT (S1671) and BLILBR~NN (S08S1)
'wi -L ~10U 1: delay.
d~ Mai>rcain contact ele,nents },AI Corps at n.J (3602789)
\x'l'·~~_l _'eld by elemeL1ts 63d In.t Div alon? general line
':'>:;:IHn.J.l(:",·-IEN - LAi\;GE1'.JBFRG - BLAUlF;LDE~l (Par 2a).
e. CC2rdinnce 'with CG 63d In:~ Divo

f • 5ee Fa~ 2b.

2. 63d:~ _f Di 7 ~
-3.-~-L ,'on-cc.Jntact, reli~ 'Ie ele:n.6nts 10th Armd J..iiv along

r~'j'1eral line STEI~\'KIRcr{EN (S4~72) - lANG~i\'PjRG .

(S4575) - BL!~TnELr)EF (36280), t:lereafter maint:l.in
contact elements iXI Corps at rtJ (3602789).
bo 59th Arrr.d lA b n reld atchmeY'~tJ atchd 10th Armd

Div effective 081200B Apr 45.

3. OthGr units, no chang.e.

bROOKS
Maj Gen

OJ J IC TAL:

/ s!Daviscn

/ t/Dl'.VI SeN

Asst G-3

110

 A P PEN D I X IV

PbRSOFALITIES

1. 1\'lajor Goneral d. H. H. lv iORRIS .. Jr.

2. Brigadier General ED \~. FIBURH

3. Colo~1.Gl BASIL Go TlIAYER

4. C 0101.181 tJADE C. GA TC HELL

5. Colonel n:crUJARD F. LUE:CBERMAlT (deceased)

7. Lie'.'.: . - , l'~' ~lo11el C01U!ELIUS Ao LIC:IIRIE

8. Lis u t ~,:r ':;" .:-'~ C' oJono 1 elm TIS L. }U\_lEcr [,is

9. Lieutcel..nt (~ olonel 1l1JILLIAM T.S 0 EOr:T~~~S (deceased)

10. L ie'L-;.t 1.;1.1 a:r t C'cloYlel JO ;'~,"

,.1': R. EIL:,.=-:{

11. LioutrnJ.nt Colonel JACK J. RICEAEDSmr (deceased)

13\1 Llajo::. \VHEELEH ~J" TdACKSTOl\T

14.. j0.aj or HIC 'i[[J.~-m 'J. ULRIC H

111

 l'laj or Gensr 301 r,!IorI' is wa s born at Ocean Gr ove" r. J"" 22

March 1890. After graduating from tlle [jni ted States Military

Academy in June 1911, he was appoint8d second lieutenant of Inf8ntr;

Following assi:,nments 'J:ith the 9th Inf':\.n-cry in the Phillipine Islml(

and the 15th Infa...Yltry at Tientsin., ChLJ.a. he sailed to rrance in

Jillle 1918 as a battalion commander in the 360th Inf antry Reg­

iment oJ:' the 90th Infantry Division. !.Iis battalion participated

in the MEUSE-ARGOl,nJE Campaign.. and he attained the temporary grade

of lieutenunt colonel.

During the period bett~een dorld Hars I and II he served as

PMS 8: T of Buclme 11 Universi ty (Penn) and Texas A & }:j a member of

Irq VIII Corps at Fort Sam Houston" Texas; an instructor at the Army

Y~ar College; a member of t"le Inl. ccntry Board at Fort Benning; and

Chief of t~'1e Planning Br,c?.~lch of tli.e Personnel Division, Ir:ar DepCtrt-.

ment C:eDeral Staff. His militD.ry ec~ucl:.tion throue;hout this period

included t ~lG Commo.nd and Gener ,:-;.1 St;::tff ::3c'lo01 (1925)" the Army

YJar College (1930) I and the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill.

In May 1942.. Major General ~Iorr is was appointed COm'nanding

General of the 6th Armored Division at Calnp Chaffee" Ark. After

participatin~ in tLe Louisiana and lJesert :~aneuv6rs he was given

comn~nd of II Armored Corps at San Jose., Calif. In September

1943 be performed as Army Ground }'orces ObservGr at the Battle of

Salerno" It-:ly, and in October 1943 was assicned as Commandinr

Ge:'ier,l oS the XVIII Corps at Camp Bovvie, Texas.

Major General Morris assumed comrru.1.nd of the 10th Armored I

Division in July 1944 and sailed with it to FrJ.nce. Under his

capable cormnand t'ile lOt~l Armored DiviGion performed admira'bly in

tJ1e SAAR-VOSELLE Tr iangle.. the Ba ttl e of tne Bul ge, the Br eak­

tirr ough to the RHINl:!i, and the captur eo,: BEIDELBURG and ULM.

During his distinguished oareer l\'i:.:..jor General lvlorris :nas

been awarded tie Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished ServicG

Medal" Leg'ion of 1"'eri t, Silver Stur" Bronze Star He do. 1" Purple HearJ

Commendation Ribbon, French LevioD of Lionor" Croix de Guerre v.'ith

palrn,,, Belgium Croix de Guerre, and t:£ ;3ro.zilian Order of Hilitary

Herit with g;racle of Comma~1der.

'31' i 9;a...~ ie~ Ge~~":"~l___~_~r: IX_~.;!~C1_,?}:.Eun~ __

Bricadier General P:i.burn Vias born in Kansas, 9 July 1895.

After o.tt(mdil1g the Univ6rsity of Io'po. he joined the Oklahoma

National Guard" and was commissioned second lieutenant of Infantry

(one) 15 AUGust 1917. In November 1917, he was appointed seoond

lieutenant 01 Infantry in the Eegu13l" Army.

During ~Jorld War I Brigadier GG(Lera1 Piburn served with th:

1st and 2~th Infantry Divisions. He gr~du~ted from the Infantry

School a. t For t Benninf'1 Go.. J and the Ta::'1k School at Fort Meade l

Maryl3.lld in the decade fo llowinf! Wor Id 1~!ar I.

113
 In February 1.941, Br iCCldier Gellerc!.l Fiburn was tr[Ulsferr(d

from t LC, 2nd Armored Divis ion ancL'lssi ':~cd as observer with the

Br itish Ei(~hth Army in Egyptl with the:; 8.dditional duty of Defense

Aid Representative and Lend-LGase Administrator to the Middle-East

Countries. je was assigned to tIle G~2 Section of \[ar Departnent

Goneral StQff in April of 1942.

VIllen the 10th Armored Division was activated he asswnecl

comt",~i~1.nd 0.·. t.'.e 3rd Tank Regiment. Thereafter he served vvitll the

lLltb D..nd 9 th Armored Di vi s ions, returning tot h e 10th Ar nwr ed

Division in November 1944. Brigadier General Piburn c ornrnanded

Conlbu,t Command A, which spe::lrhsG.ded tile division's advance into

CRAI1$'D~nI 0

In recogni tiOD of his eminent services Br igo.dier General

Piburn ~H}S beon awarded t}le Silver Star" Legion of ~,~erit with oak

leaf' clus-cer, Bronz,e St8.r 1-:Iedal v'ith oo.k laf cluster, Purple l:Ieart,

Colonel BAS II. Go T"'AYZn.

Colonel Thayer was b~rn 16 July 1898 in tile state of

IIEssouri. He graduated from the United states Militill'Y Academy

1 July 1920, o..nd. was appointed second lieutenant of Infantry.

He tral1.sferr,':)d to the Cavalry 10 September 1920. Further professioL'

schooling includes the COInrrlLlnd and Gen.erJ.l Staff School (1940),

Advanced Equitation Cour 36 (1932), aTIc: the C3.v~lry School Basic

Course (1920).

114
 During tne CRAILSHEIM Opero.tion CoI1bat Cormnand B,

10th Armored Division" 1..'ndcr the co·'~mJ.:ld 'Jf Colonel Thayer ..

was primarily responsi ble for tIll; ml.dn':~E:nJ.nce of t~1e division

m~in supply route into CRJ-iJLST{EIM.

For his exemplary service 8010;1.61 Thayer has been

aV-farded 'Ci1E: Silver Star, Ler;ion of l'.ierit, Bronze star }iledal

with oak leaf cluster, and the Purple ~leart.

Colonel ThaY6r is r ,'""'1 serving at Fort Knox" Kentucky

as G-3 .. Tne Armored Center.

Col one 1 ~NADE C. GA TC ~:.ELL

Colonel Gatchell was born at Saxtons Rivers, Vt., onl0

f,IIay 1895. He attended Norwich University: and in May J917

entered the Fj.rst Training Camp at PI attsburgl N. Y. Upon

gradl 1:)tion he was appointed second lieutenant of Cav1.1ry

(ORC) and on 12 November 1917 was conmlissioned in trie ReGular

Army ..

During the period betvve6n wars Colo:lel Gatchell served

as an R. O. T. C 0 Instructor in CllicJ.fO Tligh Schools and w:ts

assigned to the Civilian Conservation Corps in L.entucky. His

military education includes the CavaJry School Troop Officers

Course (1926) and the Command and Gen6ral Staff College (1941),

Colo!:lel Gatchell W8.'· assigned to the Armored Force

Replacement Center at rort Knox in 1940, and in 1942 joined

the 5th Armored Division as trains connnander. He was later

assigned to the 13th Armored Division as Acting Chief of Staffo

115
In September 1944.J he r to t 10th Armored Division

and was assigned as executi ve officer of Combat CorrJl1.and B.

He vv'as htcr 'i7en command of the Reserve Coinrnand and led it

durir;~~ the CHAI1SEEIM Oper~tion.

Decoratior:s received COI0Tl.cl Gatchell for l1is not8.1:Jle

achievements include the 1e on of 1I,':E.rit, Bronze Star 1[edo.l

wi.th oak leaf cluster" ~nd the Croix de Guerre with palm.

Colonel Gatchell was retired on permo.nsnt diso.hility

in October 1946, 8.nd is presently I i at 1635 48th Str6et~

San Die[o 2, California.

Colonel Luebberman vv8.S i,:JOrn i:1 lEoi..lna on 19 December

1902 • tIe vvu.s ed to the United States Hilit:J.ry Academy

from Ohio and g:raduated 12 June 1924 as a second lieutenant

of Ii' i e 1 d AI' t i

he attended e Field Artillery School in 1930~ served

"\l'Jith the 2nd Armor Division as c. batt;~lion commander in 1941,

and joined the 10th Armored Divi:]ion at Camp Gordon" Gear in

• V'las t."Gn assigned as division 0.1' commander.

On 8 April 1945 Colonel LU8b~)ermo.n, who was held in

esteem hy his fellow officers, was mol' 1younded by

D. l' when proceedinr" to-ward Cfu~:rLS:

DecoratiolJ.s o..nd awards rrGSe~lt Co10[J.6 1 LuebbGrm~1n

for is ve.1iant service include t 1 1e ion of Esrit, 2ronze

star :Medo.l and Pur p 1e Heo.r t.

116
 Lieutenant Colonel JOHN W. SHEFFlELL

Lieutenant Colonel Sheffield was born in Americus,

Georgia on 11 April 1906. He entered Virginia Military

lnsti tute in 1923, and graduated from that institution with

the class of 1926. He was commissioned second lieutenant

of Cavalry (ORC) in May 1927.

Called to active duty on 10 February 1941, Lieutenant

Colonel Sheffield was assigned to Eq l; I-:1:q Ce, 68th Armored

Regiment (L) of the 2nd Armored iJivision at Fort BenninG, Georgia.

Subsequent assignments were liaison officer, assistant S- 3, and

8-3 of GGA, 2nd Armored Division.

Lieutenant Colonel Sheffield joined tile. newly-formed 10th

Arlliored Division in July 1942, and performed as aide to the

division comnander. He later served as assistant G-3 and G-3

of the division. During the CRAILS]EPff Operation Lieutenant

Colonel Sheffield executed his tasks, as G-3 of lOth Armoted

Division, in a very creditable manner.

Service schools attended by Lieutenant Colonel Sheffield

include The Armored School, Communications Course (1941) and

Advanced Course (1943)~ and the Corrmand and General Staff College

(1944).

Lieutenant Colonel Sheffield reverted to an inactive

status 14 November 1945. He is nov~ residing in Americus,

Geor gia.

117
-
Lieutenant Colonel COR&ELIIS Ao LIC{IRIE
- - - ,------ -.._- - - -~-'-'-.---'-

BorL in New York 26 September 1906 and appointed to

the Dni ted States Mili tary .rl.cademy from that state, Lieutenant

Colonel Lichirie graduated with the class of 1931 and was

comrnissioYled second lieutenant oJ Cavalry 11 June 1931. He

graduated from the Cavalry School Hegular Course in 1935 and the

Command and General Staff College in 194·4,.

Lieutenant Colonel Lichirie cornmal1ded tLe 90th Cavalry

Reconna issance Squadron of the 10th Armored Di vision dur ing

operations in the CnAILS "'EDf area. -~is u...Y1it did particulary

outstandil1g -work W,_"en the division executed its 1,·,.d.thdra w al to

t !'.e nor thv,le st.

Decorations and 8.1f1al ds received by Lieutenant Colonel

Lichirie include the Silver star l,;ith oak leaf cluster .. Legion

of Merit .. Bronze Star Medal" and t~le Purple Heart 1~Jith oak

1 e a f c 1us t e r •

Lieutenant Colonel CURTIS L ,HANKI'PS

- - - -- - .-- -------­
0

Lieutenant Colonel Hankins was born in Arkansas 2

February 1917. .de graduated from tJ-:ce Universi ty of Arkansas

in 1940.. and 1Nas appointed second lieutenant of Infantry (ORC)

30 May lS40.

The 61st .rl.rmored Infantry Battalion" reinforced, com­

mandej by Lieutenant Colonel (then Ma jar) Hankins .. led lOth

Armored lJivision's drive to CRAILSHSIH and performed with gre3.t

distinction throughout the operations in that area.

118
 Lieutenant Colonel Hankins' aFlards for his outstand

professional achieve~nents include the Silver Star vith oak

leaf' olus ter, Br onz e Star Medal with oak 1 eaf cluster J and

the jear t wit h oak leaf cluster.

Integrated into the ... egular Army as first lieutenant

of 16 July 1946, Lieutenant Colonel Hankins is presently

ser with arters 2nd ConstarJulary Brigade, APO 407-A,

c/o Postmaster New York" N. Y.

Lieutenant Colonel -V~ILLIAM T. So ROBERTS (deceased)

Lieutenant Colonel Roberts iT-las born 12 ember 1899

in t:.1e rict of Columbia. 3:e graduat6d from Vir a

Mi Institute in 1920 and vIas c omnissioned second lieutenant

of in the Refular Army 4 August 1921. qis military

education included the Tank School (1923) and The Infantry

School Company Officers' Course (1932).

\~hi Ie Ie ading: the 54th J~rmored Battalion,

r einf or of Combat Cormnand A, 10th Armored Division on its

Ii drive northwest from CRAILSTEn: Lisutenant Colonel

Roberts made the supreme sac~'ifice near LOEFELS .. Germany 9 April

1945.

Lieutenant Colonel JO ~ R. RILEY

Lieutenant Colonel Riley was born at lle, Virginia

on 29 il 1909. He was appointed second lieutenant, Infantry

( 2 April 19?i6 and promoted to first lieutenant on 6 November

1940 II He came on active duty in February 1941 and assumed

119
command of Company D, 191st Tank on. He subsequently

served as ~-2 and 8-3 of the 1st on, 37th Armored Regi­

ment.

On 1 July 1942 LieutGnant Colonel rli joined the loth

Armored Division and was assigned as Gom..J landing Officer of the

3rd Battalion) 3rd Armored ~e • After the lOth rtrmored

Division was reorganized, he was given cOIThIl3.nd of the 21st

Tank Battalion. ae retained command of this unit until the

end of \I'iorld ~var II, and his task fo~ ce fought with distinction

durin~ the CRhILSFiliIM Operation.

Lieutenant Colonel rtiley was integrated into the Regular

Army on 29 August 1946 as a captain of Inf' a ',1 try • In acknow­

ledgement of his praiseworthy acccmplisbments he has been

a,1varded the Silver Star, Legion of MGrit, bronze Star Medal

wi th oak leaf 01 uster, Cr oix de GUGrre cf Luxembour g, and the

french Croix de Guerre.

Lieutenant ('olonel Riley is rnGm~,er of the current clas s

at tL,8 Command and General Staff CollGP~e.

Lieutenant Colonel JACK J 0 HIC·iP~RDS01'-J (deceased)

Lieutenant Colonel Ric~ardson was born 9 January 1912

in Texas and received his ar!"'ointment to t~16 United 5tates

Military Academy fr om that state. Upon raduation from the

Academy in 1935 he was appointed sGcond lieutenant of Infantry.

Furtl'ler professional schooling was received when he attended the

120
Rc~ular Course (1939) and the Tank CoursG (1940) ai' The Infa{ltry

School at Fort Benning , Georgia.

Th0 20th Armored Infantry Battdlion, reinforced, which

played a proIEinent role in securine: tLC main supply route to

CAAILSHEDil, Y";3.S ably led by Lieutel1i..Elt Colonel hichardson durinG

the operation of lOth Armored Division in that area. 1e was

killed in action soon thereafter in fi~;,ting vicinity KIRcr'IEF ,

Germany on 22 April 1945.

In recogni tion of his renowned leadership Lieuten:J.nt

Colonel .t(ic~1ardson has been aV'larded -t'n SilVer Star ¥Jith two

oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Purple rieart

'with one oak leaf cluster. RICHAHDSQi\, .~all, located in the

Armored School ar63. of Fort !(nox 1 Kentuoky, was namE.d in his

honor.

Lieutenant Colonel THOII'AS C. CTIAMBERLAIN

Lieutenant Golofwl Ohamb6rlain 'V'J8.S born at Ficrce City,

Missouri on 13 January 1917 e He o.ttended Ohio State University

during the period 1935-1936 and was apL'ointed to the Uni t6d

states Military Academy from Ohio. Upon graduation in Juno of

1940 he was commissioned second lieutenant of Cavalry.

His first assignment was the 11th Cavalry, and he servcd

as platoon lecJ.der and troop c)HLrnander with trlat unit until

July 1942. He then joined the lOth Aroorcd Division and served

as battalion commandGr of the 1st Batt~lion, 11th Armored Regi­

mente VVhen the division was reorgr~lnizcd Lieuten&nt Colonel

121
retained cormnand of this unit until S5ptGmber 1945, and very

competently directed its employment during the CRAILS --mUff

Operation.

Lieutenant Colonel Chamberlain is a gradua tE.) of the

Conl:n2.. nd and General Staff College (c lass of 194~)) at For t Leav­

en'Nor th" Kansas.

A Silver star 'With two oak leaf clusters, Legion of

Ivkri t, Bronze 3tar Medal, and Purple:: :lGart arE.) among the uwards

conferred Lieutenant Colonel Chamberl-1in for his display of

excellent combat leadership.

At the present time Lieutenant Colonel ChambGrlain is

assif,';ned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of' Staff G-4,

GenGr ,':'1.1 Staff" Fni ted Sta tcs Arrrp;l.

Maj or WHEELER ~=-~_~~~.~~

Major Thackstcn's birthplace is Greenville, South

Carolina; the event occurcd 14 March 191~. He graduated from

Clemson College in 1935 and received :..1 reserve commission in

t:1e Army. ThE; iollm"ing yr::;ar he:: pursued a post graduate course

at Cornell UniVersity.

In February, 1942 ~,0ajor Thackston reported to lor t

Knox, Kentucky to begin his acti ve duty tour. 1< rom June to

August, 1942, he served with the 4th Armored Division at Fine

Camp, New York. de 'Nas then assigned to the 10th Armored

Division at Fort Benning .. Georgia, ar:d remained ','lith thtit unit

until his relief from active duty ih December 1945,

M.ajor Thackston skillfully commanded the 3d Tank Bat­

talion.. reinforced,.. of the Reserve COITmand" 10th Armored Di v­

ision during the operations in the CRAILST1EIM area •. "{is unit

played an important part in tl1G successful defensi v·s ba.ttle

waged by the division following the seizure of CRAILSHEIM.

Awards presented Major Thackston include t"16 Silver

star, Bronze Star Medal with oak 163.f clust6r, Purple "'.:feart,

and the Pistinguisbed Unit Badge.

lYIajor Thackston IS present addrsss is .Koute 3,. Green­

ville,. South Carolina. de is now servir:g with the 3139th

Medium Tank Battaion (ORC).

Major RICHARC WI ULRICH

Major Ulrich was born 22 August 1918 at Albany .. New

York .. He graduated from the Citadel at Charleston J 3. C...

in 1941.. and was then assigned to the 51st Armored Infantry

Regiment, 4th ArrnorE.d lJivision at Pins Camp, :\T. Y. In July

194~he joined the 10th Armored Division which ~as then being

activated at Fort Denning.. or

Major (then Captain) Ulrich served as executive officer

and S-3 of the 54th I!.rmored Infantry Batt.llion.l' reinforced,

during the initial e of opers.tions in the CFAILS:r:Epf area. •.

When the ba ttal ion commander 'Vvas fa tlllly wounded in tho vic ini ty
Division at Fort Benning, Georgia .. and rGmained vrith that unit

until his relief f~om active duty ih December 1945.

Mb.jor Thackston skillfully commanded the 3d Tank Bat­

tJ.lioll.,t r eini'oreed,. of the Reserve Command, loth Armored Di v­

ision during the operations in the CRAILS:-illIM area •. T-{is unit

playc d an important part in t~1c suee essful defensi ve ba ttl e

waR';cd by the division following the seizure of CRAILSHEIM.

Awards presented Major Thackston include t~6 Silver

star .. Bronze Star Medal with oak h;af clustcr, Purple T{eart,

and thE. Distinguiscled Unit Badge.

Major Thackston's present addr6ss is .houte 3,. Green-

vi lle, South Carolina. de is now serving with the 3139th

Medium Tank Battaion (ORC).

Major Ulrich was born 22 August 1918 at Albany, New

Yo r k .. He gr ad un ted fr om the Cit ad el at C hn r 1 G S t on J 3. C.,

in 1941, and was then assigned to thG 51st Armored Infantry

Regiment, 4th Armored liivision at Pine Camp, 'i\T. Y. In July

194~he jOined the 10th Armored Division which ~as then being

activatsd at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Major (then Captain) Ulrich served as executive officer

and S-3 of the 54th Armored Infantry Bo. ttJ.l ion,. re inforeed,

Q'.J.ring the initial phase of operations in the CFAIlSFEr' area •.

WhGn the bo.. ttal ion commander was fa ta lly 'Nounded in tho vic ini ty
of LOEFELS~ Germany on 9 A~ril 1945~ bajor (then Captain)

Ulrich assumed command of the unit 8.nd ably directed its

r3..fic1 ::tdv',.i.lc(3 to contact doughboys of t:16 63d Infantry

Division nrsar ~~01FSTi01DEN, Germany on 10 April 1945.

At the present time Major Ulrich is living :it 700

Kensington Road, Avondale Estates" Georgi:l and, as executive

officer of the 1st Battalion, 122nd Infantry of the Georgia

National Guard, continues to play an active role in the national

defense 3.ctivi ties of' this country~

•