Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=lebtaylorfrancis.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (Taylor & Francis Group) is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Rhetoric Review.
http://www.jstor.org
R. ALLEN HARRIS
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
I.
The familiar iconic account of a rhetorical moment, from Aristotle via
Kinneavy (1971) and others, looks like this:
SPEAKER LISTENER
SUBJECT
Generalizing right past the verbal chauvinism of the terminology-to the
point where I can speak on this page and you can listen-we can take the
first move in fitting Phaedrus to this geometry, and plug the dialogic ele-
ments into its categories. The obvious start is to put Socrates in the speaker
slot, Phaedrus in the listener slot, and rhetoric in the subject slot.
SOCRATES PHAEDRUS
RHETORIC
The problems have clearly started already-the most immediate being that
Socrates also listens. Phaedrus also speaks. Since their roles are literally
inverse, moment to moment, we can attempt to salvage the model by mak-
ing it graphically inverse as well:
RHETORIC
SOCRATES PHAEDRUS
PHAEDRUS SOCRATES
RHETORIC
However, the story is considerably more involved yet. There are, for
instance, a good many other nominees for the speaker's chair. Consider the
number of voices Socrates takes on, either by invoking some authority or
by invoking some fiction. He speaks the words of Ibycus (242), of Homer
(252), of Theuth (275), of "the musician" (268). He speaks for a reified
Rhetoric (261). He puts his first speech into the voice of "a certain cunning
170 RhetoricReview
fellow" (237), but later tells Phaedrus it "was spoken by you through my
bewitched mouth" (243). He attributes his second speech to Stesichorus
(244). And, on one of the many oddly reflexive passages in the dialogue,
he appears to speak directly for Plato, "the author who is to write our trea-
tise" (272). (All quotations are from Schmedley's translation [New York:
Bachus Books, 1942].)
Phaedrus is given to precisely the same heteroglossia. He recites Lysias'
speech (231-34). He speaks for Eryximacus and Acumenis (268), for Sopho-
cles and Euripides (268)-even, at one, revealing, self-referential moment,
for an irreal version of himself (236).
A roughly parallel pattern of listeners also shows in the fabric of the
text. Socrates addresses the several voices of Phaedrus (268-69). He
addresses Tsias (273-74). He addresses Thamus (in the voice of Theuth;
274). He apostrophises the Muses (237), Love (257), and Pan (279). Reflex-
ively, he even takes on other voices to address himself and Phaedrus (269,
272). And-in another, highly peculiar, reflexive moment-he directs his
first speech to "a youth . . . of great beauty" (237), a coy surrogate for
Phaedrus (243), in a speech he says originates with Phaedrus.
Phaedrus' appetite for listeners is less omnivorous than Socrates', though
(in yet another self-referential moment) he does speak Lysias' words to a
thinly veiled version of himself (230-34), he replies to the arguments of
Rhetoric (261), and he answers the challenges of "someone" for physicians
and poets (268).
In short, then, while the discussion remains low level and quite rudimen-
tary, the visual metaphor again needs revision, along the following spiro-
graphic lines:
II.
More troubling:Even if we can manage the trick of shuttingout the
choir, we are left with the question,"who, exactly, is in charge?"Plato is
a speaker,surely,but he is also, in a very compellingsense, a listener.Pass-
ing over the generic fiction that Plato overhearsSocrates and Phaedrus'
exchange, reportingit directly to us, Plato was a man who listened to
Socrates,who repeated,refracted,remade Socrates'words for his fellow
Athenians,for posterity,for you and me. From this vantage point, up one
more level, it is not Plato speakingthroughSocratesso much as Socrates
speaking through Plato (speaking through Socrates (speaking through
Theuth)).With sufficientknowledge,time, and perversion,a regressionof
this sort could be extendedindefinitely,since Socrateswas also a listener.
We are what we hear. We appropriateand transformstrandsof language,
and the bits of thoughtspuninto them,and throwthemout again-hopefully
with enoughvelocity,direction,and adhesivethat they catch onto someone
else. Socrateswas fast,his aim was true,andhis glue was good:The Socrates
in the dialogue is, necessarily,part Plato, but Plato is also part Socrates.
This may be one of the messagesSocratesand Plato,in concert,are sending
us when Socrates speaks for "the author . . . [of] our treatise."
Among other implications,this means that there are at least two Soc-
ratesesin Phaedrus.One is Plato'sfictionalcomposite-part 'real,'partrhe-
toricalexigence,part ventriloquist'sdummy.The otheris an elementof the
intellectualcomposite, Plato. Both do a good deal of speaking. And, of
course, there were other Greek thinkerswho put the right stuff on their
words to get them to cling to Socrates,or Plato, or both. In additionto
the ones Socrates cites openly, like Ibycus and Homer, there are a good
many other influencesplaying in the dialogue. An obvious case in point
is the sophisticmovement.The voices who comprisedit, manyof them lost,
suffuse the Phaedrus.This is clear if we take Socratesat his iterationand
considerhis remarkson rhetoricas opposedto the sophists(thereis no oppo-
sition without a position) or if we notice such jabs at Gorgianicrhetoric
as Phaedrus'preoccupationwith copiousness(e.g., 234, 235, 236). It is also
clear if we notice the frequencywith which sophisticnotionsappearin the
dialoguestraight-faced,such as Socrates'remarkson opinion(doxa), on the
importanceof definition,and on audience analysis.And it is true at the
172 RhetoricReview
III.
The result of taking the model up one level from the narrative, then,
is stilling of one set of ripples by starting two more. Unifying the speaker
a
into "Plato" alters the focal range of the analysis. It obscures the diversity
of figures at play in the dialogue by looking past them, to the man with
his hand up their backs. But as soon as Plato comes under close scrutiny,
his seams begin to show. He collapses into a bundle of influences and
desires. And as soon as the mantle of speaker comes up out of the dialogue,
it brings with it a multitude of listeners, that is, a multitude of interpretations.
Notice that I've said very little so far about the third element, about
the subject of the Phaedrus.But now that the inevitable word, interpretations,
has reared its many heads, the subject of subject is unavoidable. It is, of
course, no more univocal than speaker or listener. A conservative estimate
of subjects in the dialogue easily runs to several dozen. Just on the surface,
these include love, reason, the nature of the soul, persuasion, ornamentation,
Bakhin,Phaedrus,and the Geometryof Rhetoric 173
That is, the appropriatemodel for this rhetorical event is analog, not discrete.
Any attempt to find a clearly identifiable peg in the dialogue to hang our
hat on puts too much pressure on it, and it pulls out of the wall. But we
can still speak of rhetorical events, you say. We can still see trends in dis-
course. We can see themes and structures. We can label elements. We can
understand.
IV.
True. It is a maxim in language studies that for all the complexities,
all the idiosyncrasies, all the diversity and inconsistency, the successes of
Bakhin,Phaedrus,and the Geometryof Rhetoric 175
communication are more spectacular than the failures. One of the men who
has most ably charted these successes is Mikhail Bakhtin, and his voice has
already done a good deal of speaking in these pages. I have appropriated
his vocabulary, his concepts, and now his circle. He views discourse, indeed
language, as fundamentally dialogic:
Works Cited
Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Problem of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 1984.
Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: U of California P, 1945.
Holquist, Michael. "Answering as Authoring: Mikhail Bakhtin's Trans-linguistics." Critical
Inquiry 11 (1983): 620-41.
Kinneavy, James. A Theory of Discourse. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1971.
Pieper, Josef. Enthusiasm and Divine Madness. New York: Harcourt, 1964.
Schuster, Charles I. "Mikhail Bakhtin as Rhetorical Theorist." College English 47 (1985):
594-607.
Weaver, Richard. The Ethics of Rhetoric. Chicago: H. Regnery, 1953.