Philosophia, 48, 2018, pp.

SOCRATIC THERAPY: 85-98

ANTISTHENES 85

SOCRATIC THERAPY: ANTISTHENES*

Introduction

¯The therapeutic approach to reading Socratic literature of the 4th century

BCE is based on the assumption that the Socrates appearing in Socratic
dialogues is not only a tireless inquirer (similarly to the way he appears
in Plato’s early dialogues) or an example of ethical behaviour, as in
Xenophon’s Socratic works, but also a healer capable of healing souls1.
Naturally, this therapeutic layer should not be sought in all “Socratic
dialogues” (λόγοι Σωκρατικοί). However, several of them make references to
therapeia either directly or indirectly, associating Socrates with an ability to
heal, i.e. to help himself and his associates take care of themselves.
Although a major part of the contemporary interpretations of Socratic
literature dating back to the 4th century BCE focuses on analysing individual
issues, the interpreters almost never raise the question to what extent their
analytical approach to reading these texts is actually justified. They do not
ask if it is at all possible to separate issues concerning justice, courage, piety,
anamnesis, erotic love, education, akrasia, or others from the dialogues
involving specific participants these issues are related to. If we accept the
therapeutic assumption, however, analysing the issues exemplified above will
not be a goal unto itself; instead, it will become part of a wider examination
that we can understand only on condition that we call into question the

*This work is a part of the project VEGA, No. 1-0017-17.

1. Understood here in a narrower sense, the term “Socratic literature” is meant to
embrace the texts written by Socratic philosophers who were active in the 4th century BCE
(Antisthenes, Aristippus, Euclid, Phaedo, Aeschines, Xenophon, etc.), including Plato’s early
dialogues and, in a broader sense, texts written by ancient authors who were influenced by
the writings by the first generation of Socrates’ followers (Greek and Roman Cynics, early
Stoics, academic Sceptics, Dion of Prusa, Libanius, Maximus of Tyre, etc.). For more details,
see C. Kahn’s specification of the first circle of Socratic authors in his Plato and the Socratic
dialogue, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 1-35. My references to the
fragments of Socratic philosophers are made in accordance with G. Giannantoni’s collection
Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1990, Vols. I and II (abbrev. SSR).
86 V. SUVÁK

narrative layer of the texts in question, i.e. only if we allow ourselves to be

more receptive of the dramatic structure of the individual dialogues2.
Antisthenes is among the oldest and closest of Socrates’ followers3. It
is likely that he was one of the first authors of “Socratic dialogues”4. If we
were to look for the earliest therapeutic tendencies in Socrates’ discourses,
we would have to start with Antisthenes. The situation is more difficult than
it might seem, though. For one thing, no dialogues written by Antisthenes
have actually been preserved5. Although two speeches he authored are
available in their entirety (namely Ajax and Odysseus), they look more like
epideictic declamations rather than Socratic dialogues in terms of genre6.
Other fragments more or less take the form of gnomes, apophthegms or
chreias, and as such they are in fact based on later Cynic-Stoic genres.
It would probably be futile to try and reconstruct the original meanings
intended by Antisthenes, which is why this paper seeks to find links –i.e.
both similarities and differences– between selected Cynic-Stoic texts and
the Socratic literature of the 4th century BCE. In doing so, we look for
relationships between Cynic-Stoic texts that acknowledge Socrates as their
founder and Antisthenes as a mediator of Socrates’ legacy on the one hand,
and Socratic literature that refers to Antisthenes either directly (Xenophon’s
Symposium) or indirectly (Plato’s dialogues) on the other hand. This paper
seeks to detect various traces of Antisthenes’ therapeia in the attitudes that
selected Cynics adopted from Antisthenes only to adapt them and make
them fit their own model, although the attitudes as such are actually based
on the debates of first-generation Socratic philosophers. Laying no claim
to “originality”, this paper aims to identify Antisthenean ethics in the areas
“shared” by Socratic literature and Cynic writings.

Antisthenes in Xenophon’s Symposium

After almost a hundred years of heated debates, modern critics eventually

came to the conclusion that the character of Antisthenes that appears in
Xenophon’s Symposium is not just a fictional creation of Socratic literature

2. Cf. K. Lampe’s ‘Socratic therapy’ from Aeschines of Sphettus to Lacan, Classical Antiq-
uity, 29, pp. 181-221.
3. This is corroborated by a number of references in Socratic literature of the 4th century
BCE. Cf. Xenoph., Symp. 8,4-6 [= SSR V A 14]; Xenoph., Mem. III 11, 17 [= SSR V A 14];
Plat. Phd. 59b [= SSR V A 20]. Similarly, the doxographic tradition identifies Antisthenes as
Socrates’ closest disciple, who passed on Socrates’ legacy to the Cynics faithfully. Cf. Diog.
Laert. VI 2 [= SSR V A 12]; Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 4 [= SSR V A 12]; Hieronym. adv. Jovin. II 144
[= SSR V A 12]; Philostrat., vit. Apoll. IV 25,1 [= SSR V A 17], etc.
4. Cf. G. Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, Vol. IV, pp. 345-346.
5. Only references to Antisthenes’ dialogues and selected paraphrased passages have
been preserved. Cf. C. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic dialogue, pp. 20, 33.
6. Cf. SSR V A 53 and SSR V A 54.
SOCRATIC THERAPY: ANTISTHENES 87

after all; instead, he turns out to be an autonomous thinker developing

Socratic ethics in his own peculiar way. In other words, Xenophon’s
portrayal of Antisthenes is based on texts in which Antisthenes defends his
own version of Socratic ethics7. The Antisthenes of Xenophon’s Symposium
is, in fact, so different from what he is described as in later doxographic
reports that we can actually distinguish between two different portrayals of
this Socratic philosopher. On the one hand, we can see Antisthenes as the
founder of Cynicism and “Diogenes’ teacher”, who developed Socrates’
teachings into an ethics that emphasises inner strength and independence.
According to this particular Antisthenes, freedom is achievable only through
“toil”, which later became an essential part of Cynics’ “ascetic practices”.
Surprisingly, this image of Antisthenes as a “practising Socratic philosopher”
–one who refuses theoretical knowledge and focuses solely on ethical
conduct– seems to have been preserved until modern times8.
On the one hand, then, we can see Antisthenes as a philosopher who
represents a smooth transition between Socratic and Cynic ethics – one who
merges with Diogenes to such a considerable extent (or maybe because of
it) that, in the end, it is impossible for us to decide what contributions one
or the other actually made to Cynicism. In terms of modern historiography,
the issue has been resolved very simply: Antisthenes is considered to be
the creator of the most important principles of Cynicism, which were
subsequently put into practice by Diogenes.
On the other hand, there is Xenophon’s portrayal of Antisthenes,
which differs from Xenophon’s Socrates not only in terms of his nature,
temperament and character, but also with regard to his opinions and
attitudes in the sphere of ethics. What is characteristic of Xenophon’s
Antisthenes? For a start, his argumentation includes an echo of the thesis
concerning the impossibility of contradiction, which is attributed to him
by both the Aristotelian and doxographic traditions9. The thesis of the
impossibility of contradiction is based on the assumption that it is impossible
to refute another person’s opinion – if we want to convince someone about

7. Cf. I. Bruns, Das literarische Porträt der Griechen, Berlin, Wilhelm Hertz, 1896, pp. 388-
390; K. von Fritz, Antisthenes und Sokrates in Xenophons Symposium, Rheinisches Museum
für Philologie, n. F. 84, 1935, pp. 19-45; F. Decleva Caizzi, Antistene, Studi Urbinati, I, 1964,
pp. 25-76 (for more details on Xenophon, cf. pp. 60-76); G. Giannantoni, Socratis et Socratico-
rum reliquiae, Vol. IV, pp. 209-222, 388-400.
8. Cf. E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Bamd II/1: Sokrates und die Sokratiker,
Leipzig, Reisland, 1922, pp. 280-281; F. Überweg, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie,
Band I: Philosophie des Altertums, Basel, Schwabe, 1967, p. 160, and others.
9. Cf. Xenoph., Symp. 6,5 [= SSR V A 101]. Cf. the term ἀναμφίλεκτος in Xenoph., Symp.
3,4 [= SSR V A 78]; for more details, see A. Patzer, Antisthenes der Sokratiker: Das literarische
Werk und die Philosophie, dargestellt am Katalog der Schriften, Heidelberg, Diss., 1970, p. 68.
For more details on the “impossibility of contradiction” (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν) cf. SSR V A 148
and SSR V A 152.
88 V. SUVÁK

something we consider to be right, we have to instruct them10. In contrast

to this, Plato’s Socrates uses refutation (ἔλεγχος) as an important tool for
examining ethical excellences (ἀρεταί) – his method of refutation makes
his companions shed their conventional opinions (alleged knowledge) and
guides them towards a better definition of ethical excellences11.
Furthermore, Xenophon’s Antisthenes has a distinctive attitude to the
question of whether or not excellence can be learnt12: ethical excellences can
be learnt but it needs practice, which might suggest that excellence comes
from a change of thought – and a change of thought needs constant self-
improvement13.
Xenophon’s Antisthenes considers justice not only the most important,
but in fact the only ethical excellence there is14. Unfortunately, we have access
to no other resources that would allow us to develop a better understanding
of what Antisthenes means by saying that “sometimes courage (ἀνδρεία) and
wisdom (σοφία) seem harmful to friends and the city, but justice is mixed with
injustice not even in a single respect”15. Perhaps Antisthenes wants to contrast
–similarly to Socrates in Plato’s Charmides– the traditional understanding of
excellence with the Socratic one16. Alternatively, he might be suggesting that

10. Cf. Stob., Anth. II 2,15 [= SSR V A 174].

11. Refuting is significant in a majority of Plato’s early dialogues (Ion, Laches, Charmides,
Protagoras, etc.). It is also used by Xenophon’s Socrates, although to a much smaller extent (cf.
Mem. IV.2). A great number of modern interpreters (led by Gregory Vlastos) describes the
Socratic-Platonic type of dialogue-based examination as a methodical process characterised
by replacing relatively “worse” hypotheses with “better” ones, i.e. a progressive elimination of
assumptions that have proved insufficient or questionable (cf. G. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and
moral Philosopher, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
12. Cf. Xenoph., Symp. 2,12-13 [= SSR V A 103]. The doxographic tradition would later
ascribe to Antisthenes a simplified thesis, namely that excellence can be learnt, which is as-
sociated with the Cynic conviction that it cannot be lost, i.e. one cannot lose it due to external
circumstances; cf. Diog. Laert. VI 105 [= SSR V A 99].
13. It is possible that Antisthenes’ attitude to the learnability of excellence (ἀρετή) was
adopted by Xenophon, who refused to accept the opinion that a person acquainted with the
sphere of ethics cannot become unacquainted. Cf. Xenoph., Mem. I 2,19 [= SSR V A 103]. O.
Gigon (Kommentar zum zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien, Vol. I, Basel, Friedrich
Reinhardt, 1956, p. 27) assumes that Xenophon was influenced by Antisthenes’ understanding
of excellences (or virtues), which primarily included self-control (ἐγκράτεια), perseverance
(καρτερία), and self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια); cf. Xenoph., Mem. I 2,1-2; I 2,19-24. For more details,
see P. Krafft, Vier Beispiele des Xenophontischen in Xenophons Hellenica, Rheinisches
Museum für Philologie, CX, 1967, p. 108; S. Johnstone, Virtuous toil, vicious work: Xenophon on
aristocratic style, Classical Philology, 89, 1994, p. 221.
14. Cf. Xenoph., Symp. 3,4 [= SSR V A 78]. Cf. also the titles of Antisthenes’ ethical
works: On Justice and Courage, On Good, On Courage, On Fine and Just (SSR V A 41).
15. Xenoph., Symp. 3,4. Translated by S. Prince. Cf. English translation by A. J. Bowen:
“braveness (ἀνδρεία) and intelligence (σοφία) sometimes appear damaging both to friends and
to country, but justice can have no part in injustice at all.”
16. This is suggested by the fact that Callias identifies righteousness with καλοκἀγαθία
(literally “the fine and good”), which represented the traditional aristocratic ideal of
excellence. For Xenophon, καλοκἀγαθία also represents the highest value.
SOCRATIC THERAPY: ANTISTHENES 89

we cannot understand courage or intelligence without justice, which would

mean that the two excellences have to be approached from the point of view
of justice.
Antisthenes’ opinions on justice or whether or not excellence is
learnable are far less significant that his attitudes related to love (Eros)
and wealth. In Xenophon’s Symposium, Socrates highlights Antisthenes’
art of identifying those who are the most suitable for each other, as well
as his ability to ensure they actually desire each other. In Socrates’ eyes,
Antisthenes is such a capable “matchmaker” that he could even match
whole cities and arrange suitable marriages between them. The presence of
an excellent panderer (προαγωγός, μαστροπός) is a blessing for friends, allies,
and whole cities alike. At first, Antisthenes gets indignant at Socrates (which
could be interpreted as a reference to his fierce temper), but in the end he
admits that this type of “pandering” (μαστροπεία, προαγωγεία) is the soul’s
greatest wealth17. In Xenophon’s Symposium, Socrates uses the vocabulary
of conventional pederasty, although he expands the meaning of “pandering”
to include the process of searching for kindred partners among cities, too18.
Xenophon’s Socrates compares himself to lovers who appreciate their loved
ones’ physical beauty and zealous desire for excellence19. Socratic pederasty
thus refers not only to the intimate relationship between an adult man and
an adolescent young man, but also serves as a metaphor for a city striving
to have a community that is excellent both physically and spiritually20.
Antisthenes’ understanding of Eros is characterised by the fact that he
identifies love with friendship (φιλία), because Eros means bringing people
closer to one another and making friends21. Antisthenes’ confession that
he loves Socrates more than anybody else should be understood in similar
fashion22. On hearing this, Socrates makes an ironic remark that Antisthenes

17. Cf. Xenoph., Symp. 4, 61-64 [= SSR V A 13]. According to Höistad (Cynic hero and
Cynic king: Studies in the Cynic conception of man, Lund, Carl Bloms Boktryckeri, 1948, p.
106), the parallel between the individual and the city is a typical Antisthenean motif, which,
Höistad believes, is also accepted by later Cynics.
18. Cf. K.J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989, pp.
153-170.
19. Cf. Xenoph., Symp. 8,41.
20. H.D. Rankin (Antisthenes Sokratikos, Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1986, pp. 20-21) sees
Xenophon’s metaphor of a “good panderer” serving individuals and whole cities as analogous
to Plato’s metaphor of a Socratic philosopher as a midwife who helps give birth to beautiful
ideas (cf. Plat., Theaet. 149a, 150d, l6le, 184b, 210b), alternatively also to the metaphor of
philosophy as “engendering and begetting upon the beautiful” (Plat., Symp. 206c-e).
21. Cf. Plutarch., Quaest. conv. II 1,6 p. 632d-e [= SSR V A 13]. H.D. Rankin (Antisthenes
Sokratikos, p. 20) compares Antisthenes’ activities to those of a statesman establishing friendly
relationships between cities. The idea of philosophical “pandering” might have been also
inspired by Aeschines’ understanding of Erós, as specified in his Aspasia (cf. K. von Fritz,
Antisthenes und Sokrates in Xenophons Symposium, p. 38).
22. Cf. Xenoph., Symp. 8,4-6 [= SSR V A 14].
90 V. SUVÁK

desires his body rather than his soul, but all the people around know for sure
that the relationship between the two is based on true friendship23.
Xenophon’s Antisthenes becomes particularly pronounced when he
is expected to comment on his attitude to riches: “people have wealth and
poverty not in their household, but in their souls”24. Several historians
consider this passage from Symposium to be the oldest literary expression
of Cynic life25. Nonetheless, we could equally consider this passage to be
an Antisthenean version of Socratic ethics as Antisthenes creates a direct
relationship between his desire for self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) and a variety
of fractional topics and opinions – opinions on the relationships among
power, wealth and tyranny; satisfying natural desires; bodily desires; physical
exertion; justice; and education26. The desire for power and possessions leads
despots to enslave individuals and even whole cities. Such people suffer
from a serious disease and we should feel sorry for them. In contrast to
them, Antisthenes is self-sufficient – he would not be any less happy even if
he lost all of his possessions27. Antisthenes received the greatest riches from
Socrates: thanks to Socrates, he is free inside, independent on all good things
that are external28. He has so much leisure that he can spend whole days
talking to Socrates.
Judging by Antisthenes’ words, it could be assumed that the “therapy” he
obtained from Socrates and now applies himself to his close friends is not
a remedy that you take only once to become healthy, but continuous self-
improvement instead, i.e. taking care of what our souls possess, a possession
that has to be strengthened through conversations on a continual basis29.
The thesis that man carries his riches in his soul is a typical Socratic motif,

23. Cf. Xenoph., Mem. III 11, 17 [= SSR V A 14].

24. Cf. Xenoph., Symp. 4,34-44 [= SSR V A 82]. Translated by S. Prince. Cf. English trans-
lation by A. J. Bowen: “people don’t keep wealth and poverty in their houses but in their
hearts.” Cf. also Xenoph., Symp. 3,8 [= SSR V A 81].
25. Cf. Ν. Μ. Σκουτερόπουλος, Οι αρχαίοι κυνικοί, Αθήνα, Γνώση, 1998, p. 85; L.E.
Navia, Antisthenes of Athens: Setting the world aright, Westport - London, Greenwood Press,
2000, pp. 69-70.
26. Cf. A. Patzer, Antisthenes der Sokratiker, pp. 76-77. The frequent occurrence of the
verb ἀρκεῖν refers to the principle of self-sufficiency, αὐτάρκεια.
27. The opposite point of view is, for instance, represented by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias
494 b 2, who defends the thesis that a pleasant life consists rather in the largest possible
amount of inflow.
28. Everything that Xenophon’s Antisthenes says about the insignificance of material
goods –in the house of the wealthy Callias and in his presence– points to the indifference
to social conventions that was characteristic of the later Cynics. A. Patzer (Antisthenes der
Sokratiker, p. 75) points out that Antisthenes uses humour, which somewhat alleviates the
harshness of his unconventional views. This is exactly where we can see a certain difference
between Hellenistic Cynics and Cynics of the imperial period, who generally criticise con-
ventional morals and politics very seriously using sharp satire (cf. the Cynic understanding of
“freedom of speech”, παρρησία).
29. Cf. Socrates’ activity in Aeschines’ Alcibiades; Ael. Arist., De rhet. 1,61-64 [=VI
A 53.26 SSR]; cf. also Xenoph., Mem. 1.6,13-14; 4.2,40; 4.3,1, etc.
SOCRATIC THERAPY: ANTISTHENES 91

leading to the conviction that excellence (ἀρετή) is the only type of good
there is, and any mistakes (κακία) we make in our conduct are the only type
of evil30. Everything else is irrelevant, because things become valuable only
with respect to the excellence of our decision-making31.
As we can see, although Xenophon’s Antisthenes holds an ethical
attitude that is Socratic by nature, he puts his own seal on it, making
it different from other versions of Socratic ethics. In many respects,
Xenophon’s Antisthenes prepared the ground for Diogenes’ Cynicism,
although his position is not identical to what the doxographic tradition
ascribes to Antisthenes as the “founder of Cynicism”.

A doxographic portrait of Antisthenes

When portraying Antisthenes, doxographic literature draws on Cynic-Stoic

sources, in which Antisthenes appears as a proto-Cynic, or even the first
Cynic, who has all the external hallmarks of a Cynic sage (wearing a doubled
cloak, carrying a stick, and living a beggar’s lifestyle)32. The legend of
Antisthenes the Cynic was probably created by Alexandrian doxographers,
who compiled “successions of philosophers” (διαδοχαί)33.
Now, there are a number of important differences between the
doxographic portraits of Antisthenes and the way he is portrayed in
Xenophon’s dialogues. The most obvious one concerns the fact that
Xenophon’s Antisthenes admits that he is in possession of a small piece of
land34. In contrast, Antisthenes portrayed in doxographic writings is – similarly
to Diogenes– a beggar and a wanderer without any possessions whatsoever35.
There are more important differences, though. Xenophon describes
Antisthenes’ interpretation of Eros using the metaphor of a friendship that
is approved by both individuals and cities alike. However, this understanding
of love as friendship does not correspond to what Clement of Alexandria
attributes to Antisthenes when he has him say that he would gladly shoot
an arrow at Aphrodite because Eros is “a disease of nature”36. Clement’s

30. Cf. Plat., Apol. 29d-30b.

31. Cf. Socrates’ argumentation in Plato’s Euthydemus 279e-280a, which is based on the
analogy of τέχνη: only thanks to our knowledge is our conduct good and successful; it is only
thanks to wisdom (φρόνησις) that all the good things we do acquire the status of being truly
good things.
32. Cf. Diog. Laert. VI 2 and Hieronym., Adv. Jovin. II 144 [= SSR V A 12]; Diog. Laert.
VI 13-15 [= SSR V A 22], etc.
33. Διαδοχαί were responsible for carrying on the traditions of the individual philosophi-
cal schools of thought on a continual basis.
34. Cf. Xenoph., Symp. 3,8 [= SSR V A 81].
35. Cf. Diog. Laert. VI 2 [= SSR V A 12]; Diog. Laert. VI 13-15 [= SSR V A 22].
36. Cf. Clem. Alex., Strom. II, XX 107,2-3 [= SSR V A 123]. Cf. translation of this passage
by S. Prince: “eros is an evil of nature.” Cf. also Theodoret., Graec. affect. cur. III 53.
92 V. SUVÁK

Antisthenes –upgraded using Cynic-Stoic literature and reinterpreted using

early Christian thought– does not see a deity in love, nor does he associate
it with “physical and spiritual begetting upon the beautiful”37. Instead, he
understands love to be a disease that clouds the mind and requires treatment.
While the emphasis on the need to treat the pathological condition of our
nature is a characteristic feature of the texts dating back to the imperial
period, the requirement to “treat the soul” actually comes from the earliest
period of Socratic thought. The concept of Eros as a disease emphasises only
one aspect of love – the erotic desire that enslaves a person unless they can
control it. In this sense, the statement attributed to Antisthenes could be
considered a call to vigilance: if we seek the kind of sexual pleasure whose
only purpose is procreation for its own sake, it will become an evil that will
cloud our mind and weaken our soul. This type of pleasure must be avoided
at all costs38. Other pleasures should be approached in similar fashion,
because the act of seeking them poses a great danger. Only fools are lured by
hedonistic life39.
Based on Clement’s phrasing, it could be assumed that Antisthenes
identified Eros with lust, which makes us act against our will and reason. As
a result, the emphasis on ignorance as the cause of inappropriate conduct
would fit the context of Socratic problematizations of life40. However,
Clement’s phrasing simplifies things to some extent, which results from
his Christian attitude to erotic love. Antisthenean thought would have
been preferably characterised by the idea that love (ἔρως) is reduced to
pleasure (ἡδονή), i.e. any love that is allowed to become a disease (νόσος)
or inappropriate nature (κακία φύσεως) is in direct conflict with practical
wisdom (φρόνησις). This type of love is a false, deceptive Eros (φαῦλος ἔρως),
i.e. the dark side of love. Only a wise man is capable of true love, i.e. the kind
of friendship that Eros is defined as in Xenophon’s Symposium41.
Perhaps the most well-known ethical thesis that ancient authors
associated with Antisthenes concerns the identification of “toil” (πόνος)
with “the good” (ἀγαθόν)42. The concept of toil as a good thing could be
interpreted in the sense that only honest toil is of moral value43. However,

37. Cf. the words of Plato’s Diotima in Symp. 206 b.

38. Cf. Plato’s description of a despot as a person whose soul and decision-making is con-
trolled by the tyrannical Eros (Resp. 573d). Another example is given in Phaedo’s dialogue
Zopyrus, in which Socrates admits that he would not be able to control his bodily desires if it
was not for philosophy (cf. SSR III A 9-11).
39. Cf. L.E. Navia, Antisthenes of Athens: Setting the world aright, p. 70.
40. Cf. Plat., Euthyd. 281 e 4-5; Xenoph., Mem. III 9,4, etc.
41. Cf. Diog. Laert. VI 11 [= SSR V A  58]: “only wise man knows whom it is right to
love”; Diog. Laert. VI 12 [= SSR V A 134]: “a good man is worthy of love”.
42. Antisthenes allegedly expressed this thesis in his treatises entitled Heracles and Cyrus;
SSR V A 85 from Diog. Laert. VI 2.
43. Some interpreters considered Antisthenes’ thesis that toil is a good thing to be part of
the Cynic “gospel of work” (cf. A. O. Lovejoy - G. Boas, Primitivism and related ideas in antiq-
SOCRATIC THERAPY: ANTISTHENES 93

such an interpretation would lead to several misunderstandings if we were

to juxtapose it with other Antisthenean statements44. Toil (πόνος) is not a
means of achieving salvation, just as its opposite, i.e. laziness, does not mean
that one has succumbed to the devil. In this connection, it is worth noting
again that Xenophon’s Antisthenes praises “leisure” (σχολή), his greatest
good being the time spent talking to Socrates (SSR V A 82)45.
Modern critics agree that the statement referring to πόνος = ἀγαθόν
had an important place in Antisthenean ethics, even though we look on it
through the eyes of a later generation of doxographers, who also attributed
the concept to all Cynics alike. Judging by the reports that have been
preserved, we know that Antisthenes paid a lot of attention to “toil” in his
most well-known writings, namely Heracles and Cyrus. Based on several
parallels between Heracles’ and Cyrus’ “toils” (πόνοι), it would be possible
to outline what the two writings by Antisthenes might have been about46:
since toil is associated with the condition of being a slave (δουλεία), Cyrus
must have been an ex-slave (δοῦλος), not afraid to perform toilsome activities
(πόνοι) and able to take advantage of them for good purposes. As a result
of this, he earned his freedom (ἐλευθερία) and became a perfect ruler
(βασιλεύς). Some later Cynics, namely Onesicritus and Dio Chrysostom,
portray Cyrus in sharp contrast to Alcibiades: both of these well-known
personalities were characterised by physical beauty and great power but
while Cyrus’ actions are based on excellent decisions, Alcibiades exercises
his power without scruples. It is in this contrast that we could seek the
Antisthenean version of the legend of Cyrus47.
On the basis of Book 3 of De oratore, in which Cicero identifies major
branches of Socratic philosophers, we can assume that Antisthenes considered
“toil” crucial to all efforts to lead a life of excellence48: “Antisthenes, who
was chiefly delighted with the patience and endurance recommended in
the discourses of Socrates”49. Both of the terms he uses here –patientia
and duritia– might refer to Socrates’ teaching, which was developed by

uity, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 131). The Marxist historian H. Schulz-
Falkenthal (Die Kyniker und ihre Erkenntnistheorie, Klio. Beiträge zur alten Geschichte. LVIII,
1976, pp. 535-542) goes so far as to see the Cynics as “precursors of Marxists” because their
praise of work is an expression of solidarity with the repressed working class.
44. According to A.-H. Chroust (Socrates, man and myth. The two Socratic apologies of
Xenophon, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957, p. 275), the worst misinterpretation of
Cynicism is to associate it with the idea that only honest toil is of moral value.
45. The whole context of the Antisthenean-Cynic understanding of toil is discussed in de-
tail by W. Desmond, The Greek praise of poverty, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame
Press, 2006, chpt. 2.
46. Cf. R. Höistad, Cynic hero and Cynic king: Studies in the Cynic conception of man, p. 92.
47. Cf. Athen. XII 534 C [= SSR V A 198]. For more details, see R. Höistad, Cynic hero
and Cynic king: Studies in the Cynic conception of man, pp. 87-90.
48. Cic., De orat. III 16,61-17,62 [= SSR I H 4].
49. Translated by J. S. Watson (Cicero, De oratore). The meanings of the two Latin terms
Cicero uses here refer to the Socratic-Antisthenian understanding of ethics: patientia = “per-
94 V. SUVÁK

Antisthenes (at least according to Cicero) rather one-sidedly, i.e. he prioritised

the requirement of a simple and restrained life over all other Socratic themes,
which were developed by other significant Socratic philosophers. It seems,
then, that the motif of “toil” should be sought in its moderate version in the
“historical” Socrates50. However, Cicero mentions “Socrates’ debates” (in
Socratico sermone), which might be a reference to “Socratic dialogues” (λόγοι
Σωκρατικοί), i.e. texts featuring Socrates (or other advocates of the Socratic
way of life, such as Cyrus). Although it is possible that Cicero distinguished
between Antisthenes’ portrayal of Socrates (with an emphasis on patientia
and duritia) and other portrayals of Socrates, such as those created by Plato,
Aristippus, Phaedo, Aeschines or Xenophon, there is nothing that would
suggest Antisthenes considered πόνος a goal in itself, i.e. “a good in itself”. It is
more likely that Antisthenes would have considered “toil” to be a good thing
with respect to what a person seeks to achieve through the pain they have to
suffer.
In this connection, it is worth getting back to Antisthenes’ well-known
statement that excellence is enough for a person to be happy – man does
not need anything else, except the kind of spiritual strength that Socrates
had51. The term Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς (“Socratic strength”) refers to the great
enthusiasm for examining oneself and others that stayed with Socrates
throughout his life. The term Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς refers to perseverance in
examination because Socrates’ debates do not result in the kind of wisdom
that we could “possess” and readily use from now to eternity. Dialectic
examinations help us make the right decisions, but every decision requires
additional self-improvement, additional toil. The term Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς also
refers to the act of decision-making itself – more precisely, its ethical nature.
In Antisthenes, the sphere of ethical wisdom is inseparable from conduct:
without subjecting our wisdom to examination and correction on a continual
basis, our conduct cannot be excellent; and vice versa, without subjecting our
conduct to examination on a continual basis, we cannot acquire true wisdom.
A good life is never complete or fully reasoned. It requires efforts – the
kind of toil that is best exemplified by Socrates’ life52. In other words, toil in
itself will not lead us to excellence if we do not have a sufficient amount of
“Socratic strength”, which is vital for us to translate our idea of a good life
into a job well done.

severance”, “patience”, “self-control”, “restraint”, “submissiveness”; duritia = “hardness”, “te-

nacity”, “simplicity”, “moderation”, “strictness”.
50. Cf. G. Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, Vol. IV, p. 388.
51. Cf. Diog. Laert. VI 10 [SSR V A 134]; Diog. Laert. VI 105 [= SSR V A 99].
52. In Xenophon’s Symposium 4,44 [= SSR V A 82], Antisthenes uses Socrates’ life as an
example of the kind of life that provides inspiration for the lives of Socrates’ companions. For
the sake of comparison, see also Posidonius’ message (ad. Diog. Laert. VII 91 [= SSR V A
137]): “The proof… that moral excellence really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and
Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress.”
SOCRATIC THERAPY: ANTISTHENES 95

Preserved in Gnomologium Vaticanum, another statement by Antisthenes

goes as follows: “toils are like dogs; for also they bite those who are not used to
them”53. In the doxographic tradition, Antisthenes appears as a typical Cynic,
convinced that only repeated toils lead to excellent decisions54. Cynics may
have adopted the motif of “toils” (πόνοι) from Antisthenes, who in turn might
have developed the original Socratic conviction that anyone who longed for
a life of self-sufficiency needed exercise (ἄσκησις), especially exercise focused
on self-control (ἐγκράτεια)55. However, πόνοι may not have played the same
role for Antisthenes as they did for later Cynics. This can be supported by
fragments suggesting the desire for a good life is conditioned by Socrates’ ἰσχύς,
which is something that Heracles and Cyrus apparently have, but Alcibiades
does not. Several contexts suggest that the initial topic of Antisthenes’ Cyrus
would have been the contrast between Alcibiades and Cyrus, or the question
of what kind of sovereign can be called “a good ruler” (βασιλεὺς ἀγαθός).
Alcibiades would have served Antisthenes as an example of a ruler who does
not have the most important ethical excellences, namely moderation and self-
control56. Antisthenes might have contrasted Alcibiades’ desires for pleasure
(ἡδονή) and subsequent slavery (δουλεία) with the qualities of the Persian king
– toilsome activity (πονεῖν), simplicity (ἁπλότης) and freedom (ἐλευθερία)57.
This would have been corroborated by the well-known Antisthenean
saying that excellence primarily resides in deeds, i.e. in completed jobs, and
does need extensive λόγοι (“explanations”) or μαθήματα (“learnings”)58.
Antisthenes’ emphasis on practical decision-making could be understood
in the sense that, rather than with pure knowledge, he identifies wisdom with
exercise, which could mean that an excellence that one fails to exercise can
weaken or disappear over time, possibly even turn into erroneous conduct59.

53. Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 1 [= SSR V A 113]. The gnome clearly comes from the Cynic tradi-
tion, as suggested by the comparison to a dog.
54. The following passage from Diog. Laert. VI 104 [= SSR V A 98] is a typical example
of doxographic interpretation: “The goal is to live according to virtue, as Antisthenes says in
the Heracles”. This can be supported by the expressions τέλος and τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, which
the Stoics used from as late as the 2nd century BCE. See also Hieronymus’ words about
Antisthenes’ inclination towards Cynicism (Hieronym., Adv. Jovin. II 144 [= SSR V A 12]).
55. For more details, see S. Johnstone, Virtuous toil, vicious work: Xenophon on aristo-
cratic style, pp. 220-222.
56. Cf. SSR V A 141.
57. Cf. Dio Chrysost. Orat. XV (65) 22. Cyrus is portrayed in similar fashion by Xeno-
phon in his Cyropaedia (Cyrop. I.4.3). In Plato’s Alcibiades I., an analogous opposition is used
by Socrates in connection with Persian kings’ upbringing (Alcib. I. 121e).
58. Cf. Diog. Laert. VI 10-13 [= SSR V A 134]. Xenophon’s Socrates emphasises the
priority of action over word, too (cf. Mem. IV 4,10). A similar attitude would later become
characteristic of the late Cynics. In Seneca’s paraphrase (Sen., De benef. VII.1,3), Demetrius
explains the attitude quite aptly: One gained more by having a few wise precepts ready and in
common use than by learning many without having them at hand. Translated by A. Stewart.
59. This could be another possible interpretation of Xenophon’s thesis that without suf-
ficient practice courage and wisdom can sometimes harm your friends and city. Cf. Xenoph.,
Symp. 3,4 [= SSR V A 78].
96 V. SUVÁK

Antisthenes puts a much greater emphasis on deeds (completed by individuals

by themselves) rather than on studies (adopted from others)60. Our deeds
by themselves will not make us happy, though. If we want our conduct to be
excellent, we need the kind of spiritual strength that Socrates had.
This is probably the kind of spirit with which we should also approach
the following Antisthenean fragment from Gnomologium Vaticanum:
“moral excellence (ἀρετή) is brief in speech, but evil (κακία) is boundless in
speech”61. This quotation might be based on the experience that the right
decisions do not result from the kind of endless studies that eventually
bring us to the conclusion that there is no answer to the initial question
of what excellence means – as stated in Plato’s early dialogues62. Socratic
examinations require that we stick to “concise explanation” (βραχυλογία),
as opposed to “long discourses” (βραχυλογία), i.e. conversations typically
performed by self-proclaimed teachers of political excellences, i.e. sophists63.
Socratic βραχυλογία refers to words, speeches and deeds at once, its product
being education towards excellence.

Conclusion

The purpose of Socratic education is to give the life of an individual a

sense of direction, turning it into something beautiful and good. The key
virtue in this effort is practical wisdom (φρόνησις). Our reconstruction of
Antisthenes’ understanding of practical wisdom suggests that early Socratic
philosophers struggled to grasp the notion. Antisthenes’ concept of practical
wisdom –provided that our interpretation based on doxographic reports
and Xenophon’s version of Antisthenes is right– is an alternative to the
way Plato understands the notion. Antisthenes links practical wisdom with
perseverance and self-control – with an asceticism that results in excellent
decisions. Antisthenes draws on the Socratic conviction that only thanks to
wisdom can we distinguish between things that are deceptive with regard
to life and those that are actually beneficial. The therapeutic function of
practical wisdom consists in eliminating all deceptive assumptions about
what it means to live a good life. If we desire pleasures or if we long
for wealth and power, we will soon become slaves to our own desires.
However, wisdom by itself is not enough for anyone to live a happy life.
Wisdom requires Socratic education, i.e. instruction aimed at others as well
as ourselves. Without Socrates, i.e. without receiving help from someone

60. Cf. Diog. Laert. VI 103 [= SSR V A 161].

61. Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 12 [= SSR V A 104].
62. According to Aristotle, Antisthenes wanted to prove that it is impossible to define
what a thing is for the definition … is a lengthy formula (λόγος μακρός); cf. Aristot., Metaph.
1043 b 4-32 [= SSR V A 150].
63. Cf. Plat., Prot. 336 b-d.
SOCRATIC THERAPY: ANTISTHENES 97

who helps others through mutual love, we cannot give our lives the right
direction. In this sense, Socratic therapy is a care of the self – a continuous
journey of self-improvement.

Vladislav Suvák
(Prešov)

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ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΗ ΘΕΡΑΠΕΙΑ: ΑΝΤΙΣΘΕΝΗΣ

Περίληψη

Τὸ παρὸν ἄρθρο προτείνει μία ἀνασκευὴ τῆς κατανόησης τοῦ Ἀντισθένη ἀναφορικὰ
μὲ τὴν πρακτικὴ σοφία (φρόνησις), ἡ ὁποία βασίζεται στὴ σύγκριση τῶν δοξογραφικῶν
ἀναφορῶν γιὰ τὸν Ἀντισθένη μὲ τὸ πορτραῖτο τοῦ Ξενοφώντα γιὰ τὸν φιλόσοφο.
Ἡ σύγκριση φανερώνει πὼς ὁ Ἀντισθένης συνδέει τὴ σοφία μὲ τὴν ἐπιμονὴ καὶ
τὴν αὐτοκυριαρχία –μαζὶ μὲ ἕναν ἀσκητισμὸ ποὺ ὁδηγεῖ στὶς βέλτιστες ἀποφάσεις.
Ἡ θεραπευτικὴ λειτουργία τῆς πρακτικῆς σοφίας συνίσταται στὴν ἐξάλειψη κάθε
παραπλανητικῆς ὑπόθεσης σχετικὰ μὲ τὸ τί σημαίνει νὰ ζεῖ κανεὶς μία καλὴ ζωή. Παρ’
ὅλα αὐτὰ ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ μόνη της δὲν ἐπαρκεί γιὰ νὰ ζεῖ κανεὶς μία εὐδαίμονα ζωή. Ἡ σοφία
προϋποθέτει τηὴ σωκρατικὴ παιδεία, δηλαδὴ ὁδηγίες ποὺ ἀφορούν στὴ στάση μᾶς πρὸς
τοὺς ἄλλους, καθὼς καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἴδιο μας τὸν ἑαυτό.

Vladislav Suvák
(μτφρ. Δάφνη Αργύρη)