Prov Rem Case Digests Rule 66 71 PDF

TABLE
OF CONTENTS: RULE 66-71
Rule 66 - QUO WARRANTO 4

Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona -----------------------------------------------------------------------4
Batario Jr. v. Parentela, Jr., -----------------------------------------------------------------------------5
Caraan-Medina v. Quizon ------------------------------------------------------------------------------5
Lota v. Court of Appeals --------------------------------------------------------------------------------6
Calleja v. Panday -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7
Topacio v. Ong --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8
Mendoza v. Villas --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10
Chamber of Real Estate v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform ---------------------------------------------12
Mendoza v. Allas ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14
Madrigal v. Lecaroz ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15
Hon. Luis Mario M. General v. Hon. Alejandro Urro ---------------------------------------------16
Arquero v. CA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------18
Republic vs. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno -----------------------------------------------------------19
Rule 67 - EXPROPRIATION 26
Republic v. Legaspi, Sr., -------------------------------------------------------------------------------26
Manosca v. Court of Appeals ------------------------------------------------------------------------28
City of Manila v. Tan Te -------------------------------------------------------------------------------29
Republic v. De Castelvi --------------------------------------------------------------------------------30
Masikip v. The City of Pasig --------------------------------------------------------------------------32
National Power Corporation v. CA -----------------------------------------------------------------34
Barangay San Roque, Talisay Cebu v. Heir of Francisco Pastor -------------------------------36
Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation -----------------------------------------37
Bardillon v. Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna --------------------------------------------------38
Republic v. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation ------------------------------------39
City of Iloilo v. Hon. Lolita Contreras-Besana ----------------------------------------------------41
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 1

National Transmission Corp. v. Lacson-De Leon ------------------------------------------------43
Rule 68 - FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE 44

Dela Pena v. Avila --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------44
Asiatrust Development Bank v. Tuble -------------------------------------------------------------45
Fortaleza v. Lapitan -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------46
Town and Country Enterprises v. Quisumbing, Jr. ----------------------------------------------48
Preduntial Bank v. Alviar -----------------------------------------------------------------------------49
Bustamante v. Rosel -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------51
Rule 69- PARTITION 53

Marcos v. Bangi ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------53
Lacbayan v. Samoy ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------54
Municipality of Binan v. Garcia ---------------------------------------------------------------------55
Notarte v. Notarte -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------56
Engreso v. Dela Cruz ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------57
City of Mandaluyong v. Aguilar ---------------------------------------------------------------------58
Miranda v. CA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------60
Gochan and Sons Realty Corp.v. Canada ----------------------------------------------------------62
Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot ----------------------------------------------------------------------------64
Espina v. Abaya -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------65
Rule 70- FORCIBLE ENTERY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER 67

Estel v. Heirs of Diego ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------67
Heirs of Maligaso v. Encinas -------------------------------------------------------------------------68
Jose v. Alfuerto -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------70
Villondo v. Quijano ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------71
Macaslang v. Zamora ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------72
Ocampo v. Dionisio ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------74
Manalang v. Bacani, -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------76
Javier v. Lumontad ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------77
Mangaser v. Ugay --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------79

Vda. De Legaspi v. Avendano ------------------------------------------------------------------------80

Amagan v. Marayag ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------81
Samonte v. Century Savings Bank ------------------------------------------------------------------82
Air Transportation (ATO) v. CA ---------------------------------------------------------------------83
Alconera v. Pallanan -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------86
Manalang v. Bacani ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------87
Republic v. Mangotar ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------89
Penta Paci ic Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation --92
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. CITI Appliance M.C. Corp. ----------------------95
Rule 71- CONTEMPT 97

In the Matter of the Allegations Contained int he Columns of Mr. Amago Macasaet
Published in Malaya ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------97
Baculi v. Belen ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------97
Baculi v Belen ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------98
Baculi v. Belen ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------100
Garcia Jr. v. Manrique --------------------------------------------------------------------------------101
Lorenzo Shipping v. Distribution Button Management Assoc. of the Philippines -------103
Inonog v. Judge Ibay ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------103
Sanguniang Panlunsod ng Baguio City v. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation ------104
Angeles v. CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------105
Silverio v. Silverio Jr. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------106
NPC DAMA v. NPC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------107

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Rule 66 - QUO 5. Senators Santiago and Tatad iled a

petition for quo warranto, alleging that
WARRANTO Senator Guingona had been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader, a
Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
GR No. 134577. Nov. 18, 1998
JUSTIN NIEL (TIN) VILLANUEVA ISSUES: Whether or not the quo warranto is valid.
NO.
DOCTRINE: In order for a quo warranto
proceeding to be successful, the person suing RULING: NO, the quo warranto is not valid.
must show that he or she has a clear right to
the contested of ice or to use or exercise the Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized
functions of the of ice allegedly usurped or
arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by
unlawfully held by the respondent. one without color of title or who is not entitled by
law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the
FACTS: proper legal remedy to determine the right or title
1. During the irst regular session of the to the contested public of ice and to oust the
eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was holder from its enjoyment. The action may be
declared the duly elected President of the brought by the solicitor general or a public
Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled
2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the to the public of ice or position usurped or
agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly unlawfully held or exercised by another. The
the only other member of the minority, he action shall be brought against the person who
was assuming the position of minority allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully
leader. He explained that those who had holding or exercising such of ice.
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
majority, while only those who had voted In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be
for him, the losing nominee, belonged to successful, the person suing must show that he or
the minority. she has a clear right to the contested of ice or to
3. Senator Flavier manifested that the use or exercise the functions of the of ice allegedly
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD- usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.
UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also
a minority had chosen Senator Guingona In this case, petitioners present no suf icient proof
as the minority leader. Thereafter, the of a clear and indubitable franchise to the of ice of
majority leader informed the body that the Senate minority leader.
he was in receipt of a letter signed by the
7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating As discussed earlier, the speci ic norms or
that they had elected Senator Guingona standards that may be used in determining who
as the minority leader. may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not
4. By virtue, thereof, the Senate President been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes,
formally recognized Senator Guingona as or the Senate itself in which the power has been
the minority leader of the Senate. vested.

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Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be Quo warranto proceeding is a question of
said that illegality or irregularity tainted DISPUTABLE TITLE to a public of ice. It should
Respondent Guingona's assumption and exercise only be granted if the person iling can show that
of the powers of the of ice of Senate minority he has a clear right to the of ice or to use or
leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion exercise of the of ice allegedly usurped or
has been shown to characterize any of his speci ic unlawfully held by another person.
acts as minority leader
It must be noted that the petitioner didn’t have all
the necessary quali ications needed to be a Justice
Batario Jr. v. Parentela, Jr.,
of Peace at the time of his appointment and even
9 SCRA 601 at the time his appointment was con irmed. He
JIL AILIL GIAN TALLER SOLIS didn’t spend at least 3 years in the practice of law
in the Philippines. Petitioner was admitted to the
DOCTRINE: In quo warranto proceedings, the legal profession on May 9, 1959. Thus, he merely
person suing must show that he has a clear right has 2 years, 7 months and 4 days spent in the
to the of ice or to use or exercise of the of ice legal profession.
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. Since the petitioner didn’t have a clear title to the
position, Quo warranto should not be granted.
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed by President
Garcia as Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, ad Caraan-Medina v. Quizon
interim. He took oath in Dec 1961 and his
appointment was con irmed by the Commission GR L-23162 | October 29, 1966
on Appointments in May 1962. KEVIN SOON
However, when there was a change in the DOCTRINE: In quo warranto proceeding, the
administration, the then new president, Pres. person suing must show that he has a clear right
Diosdado Macapagal appointed respondent, to the of ice allegedly usurped or unlawfully held
Parentela, Jr., in the same position, ad interim. He by another.
took over the of ice on Oct. 19, 1962 and his
appointment was con irmed by COA in May 1963. FACTS:
Caraan-Medina iled a petition for quo warranto
Petitioner then iled this Quo warranto asking that she be declared as the rightful
contending that respondent wrongfully took over occupant of the position “third assistant
the position. provincial iscal (APF)” of Batangas and to declare
the appointment of Quizon to the said position
null and void since she was already occupying the
ISSUES: Whether or not the Quo Warranto should said position and it was not vacant.
be granted.
Batangas was entitled to 3 assistant provincial
Whether the petitioner has a legal right to the said iscals which was subsequently increased to 4 (in
position. 1955) and then 5 (in 1957). There is a difference in
pay for the 1st, 2nd APF vs the 3rd, 4th and 5th hence
this was an issue.
RULING: Ruling: No. Petitioner is not entitled to
the said of ice.

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Lota was appointed as the 4th APF pursuant to the only be litigated in a quo warranto action
increase while Caraan-Medina was appointed as according to the authorities.
the 5th pursuant to the increase in the number of
APF. In 1961, Quizon was appointed “acting APF” FACTS
to ill in the vacancy of the previous third ranking ● Petitioner Lota, Mayor of Taal Batangas
APF. In 1963 a new law was passed increasing the allegedly ousted Moises from of ice.
salaries of 1st, 2nd and 3rd APF. Quizon was ● Petitioner Lota contents that Moises was
formally appointed as 3rd APF in 1964. unlawfully occupying the position of
cemetery caretaker and that Moises
Caraan-Medina argues that when the previous 3rd abandoned its job.
APF left, it was Lota and her that “ranked up” and ● Moises iled an action for him to be
automatically assumed the higher posts and thus, reinstated back to his employment.
the 3rd APF is now Lota and she is now the 4th APF. Petitioner argued the remedy available to
Lota however is not participating in the petition said Moises is mandamus.
and hence this is just Caraan-Medina who is
insisting to be the 3rd APF TN: additional facts are explained extensively in the
ruling.
ISSUES:
WON Caraan-Medina automatically assumed the ISSUE: What is the nature of the action iled by
3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Batangas position Moises?
when it was vacated.
RULING
RULING: The instant action is clearly one of quo warranto,
No. In quo warranto proceeding, the person suing although mandamus is also invoked therein as an
must show that he has a clear right to the of ice ancillary remedy.
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by another.
Caraan-Medina’s argument that when the former The facts show that respondent Moises "was
3rd APF vacated his position, she automatically holding the position of cemetery caretaker from
assumed the vacant position cannot stand since it 1951 until he was extended a new appointment
was Lota who is next in line as the 4th APF and not on July 1, 1955”; And "until then he had not
her. resigned nor intended to abandon the of ice".
Also, succession in of ice to the next higher rank

And on February 13, 1956, the petitioner Lota,
or position is not automatic but requires of icial
appointed defendant Jose as cemetery caretaker
action by the authorities concerned.
of Taal to take Moises’ place, and that Jose claims
to be the duly appointed caretaker of said
Lota v. Court of Appeals municipal cemetery.
GR No. L-14803, June 30, 1961
HONEY TAGALOG It also appears that Moises alleges in his
complaint that he had the right to the possession
DOCTRINE: The present action is one whose and enjoyment of said of ice to which he had
purpose is to try the right of title to a public of ice legally been appointed, and asks that Jose
and oust the alleged unlawful holder from its Sangalang, who is occupying it unlawfully, be
enjoyment. Such proceeding and remedy could ousted.

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The present action, therefore, is one whose for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer
purpose is to try the right of title to a public of ice for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction,
and oust the alleged unlawful holder from its Damages and Issuance of TRO against the
enjoyment. Such proceeding and remedy could Calleja et al. (Calleja). Panday alleged Calleja,
only be litigated in a quo warranto action incorporators and stockholders of St. John
according to the authorities. Hospital, forcibly and with the aid of armed
men usurped the powers which supposedly
According to the jurisprudence, any person belonged to Panday, Hospital’s board of
claiming to be entitled to a public of ice may bring directors and of icers.
an action of quo warranto without the
intervention of the Solicitor-General or the Fiscal; 2. Initially, RTC-Br. 58 issued an order
and that only the person who is in unlawful transferring the case to the RTC in Naga City
possession of the of ice, and all who claim to be where the Panday are residents of Naga City
entitled to that of ice, may be made parties in pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66. However, RTC-
order to determine their respective rights thereto Naga City judge refused to receive the case
in the same action. folder of the subject case for quo warranto,
stating that improper venue is not a ground
Thus, the argument of Petitioner that the for transferring a quo warranto case to
Municipality of Taal should have been impleaded another administrative jurisdiction. As a
is of no moment. The municipality of Taal, is not result, RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and
an essential, nor even a necessary party, to this serve summons but it was contested by
action. Calleja for lack of jurisdiction and wrong
remedy.
Calleja v. Panday
3. On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 ordered the case
GR No. 168696, Feb. 28, 2006
be remanded to RTC Br. 23, Naga City which
JARVIE ANNE RIVERA TANZO
under A.M. No. 00-11-03- SC has been
designated as a special court to try and decide
DOCTRINE:
intra-corporate controversies under R.A.
The present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo
8799.
warranto against persons who usurp a public
of ice, position or franchise; public of icers who
4. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme
forfeit their of ice; and associations which act as
Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
corporations without being legally incorporated
despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. Therefore,
ISSUE:
actions of quo warranto against persons who
WON quo warranto cases against persons who
usurp an of ice in a corporation, which were
usurp an of ice in a private corporation is
formerly cognizable by the SEC under PD 902-A,
applicable under Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of
as amended have been transferred to the Regional
Civil Procedure.
Trial Court designated as Special Commercial
Courts.
RULING:
No. Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
FACTS:
is no longer applicable to quo warranto cases
1. Panday et al. (Panday) iled a petition with
against persons who usurp an of ice in a private
the RTC San Jose, Sur Camarines (RTC-Br. 58)
corporation.

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Topacio v. Ong
Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads “An
GR No. 179895, Dec. 18, 2005
action for the usurpation of a public of ice,
SZAIFFA LEYA JOSE TAYONG
position or franchise may be commenced by a
veri ied petition brought in the name of the
DOCTRINE: The person instituting Quo Warranto
Republic of the Philippines against (a) A person
proceedings on his own behalf, under Section 5,
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be
exercises a public of ice, position or franchise;
able to show that he is entitled to the of ice in
dispute. Without such averment or evidence of
As explained in the Unilongo v. Court of Appeals,
such right, the action may be dismissed at any
Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no
stage.
longer contains the phrase "or an of ice in a
corporation created by authority of law" which
FACTS:
was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present
1. Petitioner Ferdinand Topacio implored
Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto
the Of ice of the Solicitor General (OSG)
against persons who usurp a public of ice,
to initiate post-haste a quo warranto
position or franchise; public of icers who forfeit
proceeding against Gregory Santos Ong.
their of ice; and associations which act as
2. H e p o i n t s o u t t h a t n a t u ra l - b o r n
corporations without being legally incorporated
citizenship is also a quali ication for
despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799.
appointment as a member of the
Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to
It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure
meet the citizenship requirement.
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under
3. Ong, on the other hand, avers that the
R.A. No. 8799 which applies to the petition for quo
RTC already granted his petition and
warranto iled by respondents before the trial
recognized him as a natural-born citizen.
court since what is being questioned is the
4. The decision having become inal, he
authority of herein petitioners to assume the
caused the corresponding annotation
of ice and act as the board of directors and
thereof in his Certi icate of Birth.
of icers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
5. The OSG informed Topacio that it cannot
favorably act on request for the iling of a
Under Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that
quo warranto petition until the RTC case
the petition should be commenced and tried in
shall have been terminated with inality.
the RTC that has jurisdiction over the principal
Topacio assails this position of the OSG as
of ice of the corporation. It is undisputed that the
being tainted with grave abuse of
principal of ice of the corporation is situated at
discretion.
Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No.
00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, Regional
ISSUES:
Trial Court designated as Special Commercial
1. W/N the OSG committed grave abuse of
Courts in Camarines Sur shall have jurisdiction
discretion in deferring the iling of a petition for
over the petition for quo warranto iled by herein
quo warranto. [NO]
respondents. Hence, the RTC-Br. 58 is bereft of
jurisdiction over respondents' petition for quo 2. W/N the action for certiorari and prohibition
warranto. was proper. [NO]
RULING:

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1. NO, there is no grave abuse of discretion on While denominated as a petition for certiorari
the part of the OSG. and prohibition, the petition partakes of the
nature of a quo warranto proceeding with
The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to
much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in declare null and void his appointment as an
deferring action on the iling of a quo warranto Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being
case until after the RTC case has been terminated unconstitutional. While the petition professes to
with inality. be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner
even adverts to a "quo warranto" aspect of the
A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse petition.
of discretion simply because the affected party
disagrees with it. The Solicitor General is the Being a collateral attack on a public of icer’s title,
counsel of the government, its agencies and the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
instrumentalities, and its of icials or agents. must be dismissed. The title to a public of ice may
not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally,
must see to it that the best interest of the even though mandamus or a motion to annul or
government is upheld within the limits set by law. set aside order. Even if the Court treats the case as
In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor one for quo warranto, the petition is, just the
General may suspend or turn down the institution same, dismissible.
of an action for quo warranto where there are just
and valid reasons. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal
remedy to determine the right or title to the
Upon receipt of a case certi ied to him, the contested public of ice and to oust the holder
Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the from its enjoyment. It is brought against the
management of the case. He may start the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded
prosecution of the case by iling the appropriate into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public
action in court or he may opt not to ile the case at of ice, and may be commenced by the Solicitor
all. He may do everything within his legal General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be,
authority but always conformably with the or by any person claiming to be entitled to the
national interest and the policy of the government public of ice or position usurped or unlawfully
on the matter at hand. held or exercised by another.
It appears that after studying the case, the Nothing is more settled than the principle, which
Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor,
same issue of Ong‘s citizenship in the quo reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v.
warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, Villasin, that for a for a quo warranto petition to
not to mention the consequent risk of forum- be successful, the private person suing must show
shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally a clear right to the contested of ice. In fact, not
write inis to the issue as it merely advised even a mere preferential right to be appointed
petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case. thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to
proceed with the action.
2. NO, the present action of petition for
certiorari and prohibition iled by Topacio was In the present case, petitioner presented no
improper. suf icient proof of a clear and indubitable

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franchise to the of ice of an Associate Justice of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, while respondent
the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that he Liwanag Herato obtained the highest number of
was never entitled to assume the of ice of an votes for the position of Barangay Kagawad.
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Notably, Mayor Enrilo Villas was the incumbent
Mayor of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro at the time
In actions for Quo Warranto to determine title of the barangay elections.
to a public of ice, the complaint, to be
suf icient in form, must show that the plaintiff After the elections, the Commission on Elections
is entitled to the of ice. (COMELEC) proclaimed Mendoza as the duly-
elected Punong Barangay of Balatasan. Thus, the
In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the person losing candidate, Thomas Pajanel, iled a petition
instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own for quo warranto with the Municipal Trial Court
behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of (MTC) of Mansalay-Bulalacao which was docketed
Court, must aver and be able to show that he is as Election Case No. 407-B. The MTC issued a
entitled to the of ice in dispute. Without such Decision dated February 23, 2008, disqualifying
averment or evidence of such right, the action Mendoza and declaring that Herato was entitled
may be dismissed at any stage. to succeed him as Punong Barangay with Herato
garnering the highest number of votes as a
Clearly then, it becomes entirely unwarranted
Barangay Kagawad. Mendoza appealed the MTC
at this time to pass upon the citizenship of
Decision to the COMELEC.
Ong. The Court declares that Ong may turn out to
be either a de jure of icer who is deemed, in all
On February 28, 2008, Villas administered the
respects, legally appointed and quali ied and
Oath of Of ice to Herato. Then, Villas issued
whose term of of ice has not expired, or a de facto
Memorandum No. 2008-03-010 dated March 3,
of icer who enjoys certain rights, among which is
2008, directing all department heads of the
that his title to said of ice may not be contested
Municipal Government to act only on documents
except directly by writ of quo warranto, which
signed or authorized by Herato.
contingencies all depend on the inal outcome of
the RTC case.
Meanwhile, Mendoza sought the advice of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government
Mendoza v. Villas (DILG) as to who should exercise the powers of
GR Nos. 187256, February 23, 2011 Punong Barangay of Balatasan given the
IRVIN NERI CHIU prevailing controversy.
DOCTRINE: In a letter dated April 11, 2008, DILG

Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero responded to
The principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed Mendoza’s inquiry informing Villas that Mendoza
require that recourse should be made to the lower should occupy the post of Punong Barangay as
courts before they are made to the higher courts. there was no Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of
the MTC Decision dated February 23, 2008.
FACTS:
N e ve r t h e l e s s , t h e B u l a l a c a o M u n i c i p a l
In the 2007 barangay elections, Mendoza Administrator, Edezer Aceron, by the authority of
obtained the highest votes for the position of Villas, issued a letter dated April 23, 2008 to
Punong Barangay of Barangay Balatasan, respondent Marlon de Castro, Manager,

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Pinamalayan Branch, Land Bank of the Philippines SPA-07-243-BRGY was attached. This case
(LBP), requesting that transactions entered into originated from a disquali ication case against
by Mendoza in behalf of Barangay Bulalacao Mendoza iled with the COMELEC by Senen
should not be honored. In the same letter, Aceron Familara before the conduct of the 2007 barangay
dismissed the DILG letter dated April 11, 2008, elections. In the Resolution, the COMELEC
saying that it is merely advisory and not binding disquali ied Mendoza as a candidate for Punong
on the municipal government of Bulalacao and the Barangay of Barangay Balatasan in the 2007
LBP. barangay elections for having already served
three (3) consecutive terms for the same position.
In response, de Castro issued Villas and Mendoza In response, Mendoza presented a Certi ication
a letter dated April 24, 2008, advising both parties dated February 27, 2009 from the COMELEC
that the LBP shall not honor any transaction with which stated that COMELEC Case No. SPA-07-243-
regard the accounts of Barangay Balatasan. BRGY is still pending with the Commission.
Thereafter, petitioners iled a Petition dated May In an attempt to clarify the issues on the matter,
5, 2008 for Mandamus with Damages and Prayer Mendoza again sought the opinion of the DILG
for the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, regarding the controversy. Thus, the DILG issued
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 08-10 another letter, denominated as DILG Opinion No.
pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 5, Series of 2009 dated January 2009, reiterating
in Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. Petitioners prayed its stance that the MTC Decision dated February
that the LBP be directed to release the funds of 23, 2008 has not yet become inal and executory.
Barangay Balatasan to them in order to render Nevertheless, the RTC issued the assailed order
necessary, basic public services to the inhabitants dated February 2, 2009 dismissing the petition on
of the barangay. the strength of the COMELEC Resolution dated
September 8, 2008 disqualifying Mendoza from
Thus, Villas and Herato iled an Answer dated May running in the 2007 elections. As stated,
16, 2008 interposing the following af irmative petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
defenses: (1) that the petition for mandamus was Order dated February 2, 2009 was denied in an
defective, being directed against two or more Order dated March 17, 2009.
different entities and requiring to perform
different acts; and (2) that Mendoza does not have From such orders the petitioners went directly to
any clear and legal right for the writ of the Supreme Court.
mandamus.
On the other hand, the LBP also iled its Answer ISSUES:
dated June 5, 2008, stating that its decision of
withholding the barangay funds was a mere act of WON recourse to the Supreme Court is proper.
prudence given the controversy surrounding the
true Punong Barangay of Balatasan while RULING:
manifesting that it will release the funds to whom
the Court directs it to. No. Although the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
Thereafter, Villas and Herato iled a Motion to concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
Dismiss dated November 7, 2008. In the Motion, a prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
copy of the COMELEC Resolution dated corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
September 8, 2008 in COMELEC Case No.
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give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a
of court forum. supervening event has transpired that has
rendered this case moot and academic and subject
Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts, to dismissal.
decisions, inal orders or resolutions of an MTC
should be appealed to the RTC exercising CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE V. SEC. OF
territorial jurisdiction over the former. On the AGRARIAN REFORM
other hand, RTC judgments, inal orders or
GR No. 183409, June 18, 2010
resolutions are appealable to the CA through
KATHLEEN MARIE DILAG
either of the following: an ordinary appeal if the
case was originally decided by the RTC; or a
DOCTRINE: Primarily, although the Court of
petition for review under Rule 42, if the case was
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
decided under the RTC's appellate jurisdiction.
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
taken for a review of the decisions, inal orders or
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
resolutions of the RTC, but only on questions of
choice of court forum.
law.
FACTS:
In this instant petition, petitioners did not cite the

This case is a Petition for Certiorari and
rule under the Rules of Court by which the
Prohibition (with application for TRO and/or writ
petition was iled. If the petition is to be treated as
of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65.
a petition iled under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the petition must be dismissed outright for
Petitioner CREBA is a private non-stock, non-
having been iled prematurely.
pro it corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
Thus, the Court shall exercise liberality and
is the umbrella organization of individuals and
consider the instant petition as one iled under
entities directly or indirectly involved in land and
Rule 45. In Artistica Ceramica, Inc. v. Ciudad Del
housing development.
Carmen Homeowner’s Association, Inc., citing
Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court noted that
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform on the other
it has the discretion to determine whether a
hand is named respondent duly appointed as the
petition was iled under Rule 45 or 65 of the Rules
head of the DAR whose administrative issuances
of Court:
are subject of the petition.
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the

1) The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
in 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, entitled
the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a
“Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
petition for certiorari as having been iled under
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
Rule 45, especially if iled within the reglementary
Agricultural Uses,” which consolidated all
period for iling a petition for review.
existing implementing guidelines related
to land use conversion.
Nevertheless, even providing that the petition was
2) Subsequently, in 1999, it issued DAR AO
not iled prematurely, it must still be dismissed for
No. 01-99, entitled “Revised Rules and
having become moot and academic. With the

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Regulations on the Conversion of writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice

Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural of court to which application therefor will be
Uses,” amending and updating the directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
previous rules on land use conversion. courts...A direct invocation of the Supreme
3) In 2002, it issued another Administrative Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these
Order, DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled “2002 writs should be allowed only when there are
Comprehensive Rules on Land Use special and important reasons therefor,
Conversion,” which further amended DAR clearly and speci ically set out in the petition…
AO No. 07-97 and 01-99 and repealed all
issuances inconsistent therewith. The The rationale for this rule is two-fold:
aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all (a) It would be an imposition upon the
applications for conversion from precious time of this Court; and
agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to (b) It would cause an inevitable and resultant
another agricultural use. delay, intended or otherwise, in the
4) To address the unabated conversion of adjudication of cases., which in some
prime agricultural lands for real estate instances had to be remanded to the
development, the Secretary further lower court as the proper forum; the SC is
issued Memorandum No. 88 in 2008, not a trier of facts.
which temporarily suspended the
processing and approval of all land use In the case at bench, petitioner failed to
conversion applications. speci ically and suf iciently set forth special
and important reasons to justify direct
By reason thereof, petitioner CREBA claims that recourse to this Court and why this Court
there is an actual slow down of housing projects, should give due course to this petition. The
which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, present petition should have been initially iled in
unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the CA in strict observance of the doctrine of
the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is suf icient
and its members but more so of the whole nation. cause for the dismissal of this petition.
ISSUES: Moreover, although the instant petition is styled

WON the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction over as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it seeks the
lands that have been reclassi ied as residential, d e c l a r a t i o n b y t h i s C o u r t o f t h e
commercial, industrial, or for other non- unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned
agricultural uses. D A R A O N o . 0 1 - 0 2 , a s a m e n d e d , a n d
Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the
RULING: nature of a Petition for Declaratory Relief.
YES.
Petitioner failed to meet the requisites for the
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari
v. Cuaresma, under Rule 65. Such petition is a special civil
This Court’s original jurisdiction to action that may be invoked only against a
issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is tribunal, board, or of icer exercising judicial
shared by the RTC and with the CA. This functions. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal,
taken as according to parties seeking any of the board, or of icer exercising judicial or quasi-
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judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement Operations. When Mendoza iled for motion for
of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, execution of its decision, it was denied because
and Memorandum No. 88 were done in the Godofredo Olores was appointed to take Allas’ old
exe rc i s e o f h i s q u a s i - l e g i s l a t ive a n d position. CA af irmed the decision.
administrative functions and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Moreover, the writ of ISSUES: Whether or not a petition for quo
certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable warranto extends to a successor in of ice
as a matter of right, “never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion.” RULING: No. The SC held in this case that a
petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant determine the right of a person to use or exercise
Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. of a franchise or of ice and to oust the holder from
its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or
Mendoza v. Allas if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public of icer in
GR No. 131977, Feb. 4, 1999
regard to a public right binds his successor in
EDWARD PETERKIM CAMBA YU
of ice. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo
warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does
DOCTRINE: A judgment in quo warranto does not
not bind the respondent's successor in of ice, even
bind the respondent's successor in of ice, even
though such successor may trace his title to the
though such successor may trace his title to the
same source
same source
It is always directed to a person such as in this
case, Allas. Hence, Olores had never become part
FACTS: In this case the petitioner joined the
of it. It was iled against Allas hence the decision
Bureau of Customs in 1972, several years after he
cannot extend to him. Even though assuming
rose from the ranks and received promotions
arguendo it will be granted, it will also be useless
from the positions of Port Security Chief, Deputy
since Mendoza has reached the age of retirement,
Commissioner of Customs, Acting Commissioner
he cannot be reappointed he cannot also claim
of Customs fand Customs Operations Chief I until
from Allas his back wages, nor compel the Bureau
he became Director III of the Customs Intelligence
of Customs to pay said back wages.
and Investigation Service.
He was then designated as Acting District
Galano, et. al. v. Roxas
Collector in Cagayan de Oro City, in his place,
GR No. L-31241, Sept. 12, 1975
respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting
XANTHE DAPHNE VALERIE AQUINO ALCASID
Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new
assignment as Acting District Collector, however,
DOCTRINE: A petition for quo warranto and
he continued to receive the salary and bene its of
mandamus affecting titles of of ice must be iled
the position of Director III.
within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is
In 1994, a letter was sent to petitioner, stating
ousted from his position.
that he is terminated from the services of the
Presence of indispensable parties to quo warranto
Bureau of Customs. He iled a petition for quo
proceedings is fatal to the authority of the Supreme
warranto against Allas, which the court granted.
Court to exercise judicial power.
Allas appealed, but became moot and academic
w h e n A l l a s w a s a p p o i n t e d a s D e p u t y
FACTS:
Commissioner of Customs Assessment and

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● Roxas was the newly elected mayor and (the replacements) have a vital
thereafter, almost all the members of the interest in the outcome of the
p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t i l e d t h e i r petition. Consequently, the case
resignations. Respondent accepted the cannot be decided without giving
resignations, made the corresponding them an opportunity to be heard.
payments on petitioners' applications for They are indispensable parties to
leave, and appointed replacements for those proceedings and their
petitioners. Subsequently, petitioners absence is fatal to the authority
addressed separate letters to the Police of the Supreme Court to act, their
Commission and the Civil Service "presence being a sine qua non
C o m m i s s i o n , c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t of the exercise of judicial power.”
respondent mayor threatened them into 2. A petition for quo warranto and
iling those "courtesy resignations.” mandamus affecting titles of of ice must
● Civil Service Commission disapproved the be iled within one (1) year from the date
appointments made by respondent and the petitioner is ousted from his position.
ordered him to reinstate petitioners. This period is not interrupted by the
● As respondent would not comply with the prosecution of any administrative
CSC’s order for reinstatement, petitioners remedy. Accordingly, after said period
led the instant petition for mandamus, had lapsed the remedy of the aggrieved
but actually one for quo warranto. party, if any lies exclusively with
administrative authorities.
ISSUES: ○ he who claims the right to hold a
1. WON the case can be decided without the public of ice allegedly usurped
replacements of petitioners as parties by another and who desires to
(NO) seek redress in the courts,
2. WON the case was iled on time (NO) should ile the proper judicial
action within the reglementary
RULING: period
1. Where a petition for mandamus or quo ○ While it may be desirable that
warranto would seek to have the administrative remedies be irst
Supreme Court sanction the action of the resorted to, no one is compelled
CSC of disapproving the appointments of or bound to do so; and as said
those who have replaced petitioners their r e m e d i e s n e i t h e r a r e
jobs, the removal of the replacements prerequisite to nor bar the
would be a necessary consequence if the institution of quo warranto
Supreme Court would hold petitioners' proceedings
resignation to be illegal and void.
○ In either case, whether the Madrigal v. Lecaroz
matter of disapproval of the
GR No. L-46218, Oct. 23, 1990
a p p o i n t m e n t s o f s a i d
JEZREEL EZER BASE ARCHIVAL
r e p l a c e m e n t s i s t r e a t e d
independently or a corollary of
DOCTRINE: Section 16, Rule 66 of the Revised
t he Cou rt 's a c t ion on t he
Rules of Court on Quo Warranto states that
resignation of petitioners, the
nothing contained in the rules shall be construed
plain fact would remain that they

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to authorize an action against a public of icer or The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction
employee for his ouster from of ice unless the is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto
same be commenced within one (1) year after the and mandamus affecting titles to public of ice
cause of such ouster or the right of the plaintiff to must be iled within one (1) year from the date
hold such of ice or position arose. the petitioner is ousted from his position.
FACTS: Persons claiming a right to an of ice of which they

In 1971, public respondents, Governor Lecaroz, are illegally dispossessed should immediately take
Vice Governor Zoleta, two (2) Provincial Board of steps to recover said of ice and that if they do not
Marinduque members, abolished petitioner do so within a period of one year, they shall be
Madrigal’s position as a permanent construction considered as having lost their right thereto by
capataz in the of ice of the Provincial Engineer. abandonment.
The abolition was allegedly due to the poor
inancial condition of the province and that his It is not proper that the title to public of ice
position was no longer essential. should be subjected to continued uncertainty, and
the peoples' interest requires that such right
Petitioner appeared to the Civil Service should be determined as speedily as practicable.
Commission (CSC) which declared its removal
illegal. Respondents moved to reconsider but CSC This one (1) year period is not interrupted by the
denied his MR. Petitioner requested the Provincial prosecution of any administrative remedy. It is
Board for his reinstatement pursuant to the CSC fundamental that in a case where pure questions
resolution but the latter denied because his of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of
position no longer existed. administrative remedies cannot apply because
issues of law cannot be resolved with nality by the
Petitioner iled a petition before the CFI against administrative of icer. In this case, only a legal
public respondents for mandamus and damages question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not
seeking for the restoration and reinstatement of the abolition of Madrigal's position was in
his abolished position and payment of his back accordance with law. Hence, Sec. 16, Rule 66 of
salaries plus damages. CFI dismissed the petition the Revised Rules of Procedure should apply.
on the ground that the cause of action was barred
by laches as it took the petitioner four (4) years
from his separation from service before iling the Hon. Luis Mario M. General v. Hon.
case before the CFI. Alejandro Urro
GR No. 191560, March 29, 2011
The lower court’s ruling was inspired by the
JUNEFAIR AIRENE MIRA BADDONG
provision of Section 16, Rule 66 of the Revised
Rules of Court on Quo Warranto providing a one
DOCTRINE: The person instituting the quo
(1) year prescriptive period for iling the action
warranto proceedings in his own behalf must
for reinstatement.
show that he is entitled to the of ice in dispute;
otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any
ISSUES:
stage.
WON the dismissal of the case based on laches
was proper. YES
FACTS:
RULING:

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PGMA appointed petitioner Atty. Mario as acting RULING: NO. PETITION IS DISMISSED for lack of
NAPOLCOM Commissioner (in place of Roces who merit.
had been appointed from 2004-2006) and
Escueta as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner, The Rules of Court requires that an ordinary civil
designated as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman. action must be based on a cause of action (an act
or omission of one party in violation of the legal
Later, PGMA appointed Urro in place of Mario, de right of the other which causes the latter injury)
Guzman in place of Leones, and Escueta as While a quo warranto is a special civil action, the
permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urro’s existence of a cause of action is not any less
appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010; while required since both special and ordinary civil
the appointment papers of De Guzman and actions are governed by the rules on ordinary civil
Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010. actions subject only to the rules prescribed
speci ically for a particular special civil action.
After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory
letters issued to respondents, the petitioner iled Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with
the present petition questioning the validity of the respect to the title to a public of ice. Generally, quo
respondents’ appointments mainly on the ground warranto proceedings are commenced by the
that it violates the constitutional prohibition Government as the proper party-plaintiff.
against midnight appointments. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court, an individual may commence such action if
After respondents took their oath of of ice, the he claims to be entitled to the public of ice
newly elected President Aquino III issued E.O. No. allegedly usurped by another. The person
2 "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his
A p p o i n t m e n t s I s s u e d b y t h e P r e v i o u s own behalf must show that he is entitled to the
Administration in Violation of the Constitutional of ice in dispute; otherwise, the action may be
Ban on Midnight Appointments." dismissed at any stage. Section 6, Rule 66
requires the petitioner to state in the petition his
Before the court are consolidated petitions for right to the public of ice and the respondent’s
Quo Warranto, and Certiorari and/or Prohibition unlawful possession of the disputed position.
with urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/
or preliminary injunction iled by Atty. Mario A petition for quo warranto to be successful, the
(petitioner) who seeks to declare unconstitutional suing private individual must show a clear right to
the appointments of Urro, de Guzman and Escueta the contested of ice. His failure to establish this
(respondents) as Commissioners of the right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of
NAPOLCOM, and to prohibit then Executive cause of action; it is not even necessary to pass
Secretary Mendoza and DILG Secretary Puno from upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of
enforcing the respondents’ oath of of ice. his appointment, continues in the undisturbed
Particularly, the petitioner asks that Urro be possession of his of ice.
ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be
allowed to continue in of ice. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting
appointment (and an expired one at that), he
ISSUES: clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain
WON the petitioner Atty. Mario General has a the present petition. The essence of an acting
cause of action to institute and maintain a petition appointment is its temporariness and its
for quo warranto against respondent Urro. consequent revocability at any time by the

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appointing authority. The petitioner in a status DepEd). However, no VSS was appointed. Instead
q u o w a r r a n t o p r o c e e d i n g w h o s e e k s PNS principal was designated in as Of icer-in-
reinstatement to an of ice, on the ground of Charge (OIC) of the PINS, who eventually retired
usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his and the position as Secondary School Principal of
clear right to the of ice for his suit to succeed; the PNS was taken over by petitioner who was
otherwise, his petition must fail. also designated by then DECS-Region IV Director,
as OIC of the PINS. Then, there was a change of
From this perspective, the petitioner must irst DECS Regional Director, petitioner was instructed
clearly establish his own right to the disputed to turn over the administration and supervision of
of ice as a condition precedent to the the PINS branches or units for the reasons that
consideration of the unconstitutionality of the PINS will be under the direct supervision of the
respondents’ appointments. The petitioner’s Schools Division Superintendent of Palawan. With
failure in this regard renders a ruling on the this, another OIC of the PINS was designated.
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s ra i s e d c o m p l e te ly
unnecessary. On October 2, 2003, petitioner iled the Petition
for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of
Arquero v. CA Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunctive
Writ21 before the RTC of Palawan and argued that
GR No. 168053, September 21, 2011
the designation of private respondent deprived
JUPERT JOHN MERCADER REMOLLO
her of her right to exercise her function and
perform her duties in violation of her right to
DOCTRINE:
security of tenure. Considering that petitioner was
In quo warranto, the petitioner who iles the
appointed in a permanent capacity, she insisted
action in his name must prove that he is entitled
that private respondent’s designation as OIC of
to the subject public of ice. In other words, the
the PNS is null and void there being no vacancy to
private person suing must show a clear right to
the position.
the contested position. Otherwise, the person who
holds the same has a right to undisturbed
The RTC held that considering that the integrated
possession and the action for quo warranto may
school failed to offer post-secondary technical-
be dismissed.
vocational courses, the VSS position became
functus of icio. The PNS, therefore, remains to be a
FACTS:
general secondary school under the jurisdiction of
Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 6765, or
the DepEd. Consequently, supervision of the
"An Act Integrating Certain High Schools in the
integrated school was automatically vested with
City of Puerto Princesa and in the Province of
the principal of the PNS without the necessity of
Palawan with the Palawan National School and
appointment or designation.
Appropriating Funds Therefor." Under the law,
schools were converted into national schools and
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision,
integrated with the Palawan National School
dismissing the petition for quo warrants iled by
(PNS) in the City of Puerto Princesa. The law also
appelee, Rebecca T. Arquero.
provides that the Palawan Integrated National
Schools (PINS) shall be headed by a Vocational
School Superintendent (VSS) who shall be chosen
ISSUES:
and appointed by the Secretary of the Department
WON the quo warranto petition should stand. NO
of Education, Culture, and Sports (now the

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RULING: of an acting appointment is its temporariness and

It is undisputed that the petitioner was appointed its consequent revocability at any time by the
as the principal of the PNS. In addition, she was appointing authority.
designated as the OIC of the PINS. Said
designation was, however, withdrawn. Private Thus, under RA 6765, petitioner can only insist on
respondent was, thereafter, designated as the new her security of tenure as principal of the PNS but
OIC. This prompted the petitioner to ile the quo not as OIC of the integrated school. Clearly,
warranto petition. petitioner failed to establish her right to the
contested position. Therefore, the dismissal of her
In quo warranto, the petitioner who iles the quo warranto petition is in order.
action in his name must prove that he is entitled
to the subject public of ice. In other words, the Republic vs. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
private person suing must show a clear right to
GR No. 237428, May 11, 2018
the contested position. Otherwise, the person who
ERICKA HARRIET MERCADO CABALLES
holds the same has a right to undisturbed
possession and the action for quo warranto may
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
be dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass
An impeachment complaint was initiated in the
upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of
House of Rep against Sereno for failure to declare
his appointment, continues in the undisturbed
her SALNs. OSG also iled a petition for the
possession of his of ice.
issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare Sereno’s appointment as
The CA was correct to observe that the law
Chief Justice void (Rule 66).
created two positions the VSS and the principal or

secondary school head teacher of each of the units
SC ruled that:
or branches of the integrated school. The
(1) A quo warranto petition is allowed against
legislators clearly intended that the integrated
impeachable of icials and SC has jurisdiction.
schools shall be headed by a superintendent.

Admittedly, petitioner did not possess the
(2) Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and
quali ications to hold the position and she was
impeachment proceeding is not forum shopping
merely designated by the DepEd as the OIC of the
and is allowed.
PINS. At that time, she held in a concurrent

capacity, the permanent position of principal of
(3) Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by
the PNS. Having been appointed as OIC without
which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
the necessary quali ications, petitioner held the
impeachable of icial may be removed from of ice;
position only in a temporary capacity. The
hence, Sereno may be a respondent to the quo
purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is
warranto proceedings.
to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of of icial

functions by authorizing a person to discharge
(4) The Supreme Court’s exercise of its
those functions pending the selection of a
jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
permanent or another appointee. An acting
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
appointee accepts the position on the condition

that he shall surrender the of ice once he is called
(5) The petition cannot be outrightly dismissed on
to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore,
the ground of prescription as prescription does
his term of of ice is not ixed, but endures at the
not lie against the State.
pleasure of the appointing authority. The essence
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interviewed or considered for nomination.”

(6) Sereno is a de facto of icer removable through Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she
a quo warranto. resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a
private practitioner, she was treated as coming
DOCTRINE: from the private sector and only submitted 3
Quo warranto, as a remedy to oust an ineligible SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an
public of icial, may be availed of when the subject Associate Justice.
act or omission was committed prior to or at the
time of appointment or election relating to an Sereno likewise added that “considering that most
of icial’s quali ications to hold of ice as to of her government records in the academe are
render such appointment or election invalid. more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to
consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those iles,”
FACTS: and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and
Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no
UP College of Law from 1986-2006. While being record that the letter was deliberated upon.
employed at the UP Law (October 2003-2006) Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was
Sereno was concurrently employed as legal said to have “complete requirements.” On August
counsel of the Republic in two international 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.
arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a
Deputy Commissioner of the CHR. On August 2017, Atty. Larry Gadon iled an
impeachment complaint against Sereno, alleging
The Human Resources Development Of ice of UP that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in
(UP HRDO) certi ied that there was no record on her SALNs. The House of Representatives
Sereno’s ile of any permission to engage in proceeded to hear the case for determination of
limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of probable cause, and it was said that Justice
her 20 years of employment, only 9 Statement of Peralta, the JBC Chairman then, was not made
Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on aware of Sereno’s incomplete SALNs. Other
the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she indings were made: such as pieces of jewelry that
attached a copy of a 10th SALN, which she were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was
supposedly sourced from the “ iling cabinets” or declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’
“drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no SALNs; failure of her husband to sign one SALN;
record of any SALN iled by Sereno. The JBC has execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003, and
certi ied to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for other indings.
20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On February 2018, Atty. Mallari wrote to the OSG,
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding
Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed against Sereno. The Republic, through the OSG,
the applicants to submit documents, among which iled the petition for the issuance of the
are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as
for those in the government and “SALN as of void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to
December 31, 2011” for those from the private oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
sector. The JBC announcement further provided
that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al.,
d o c u m e n t a r y re q u i re m e n t s w i l l n o t b e intervened.

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OSG’S ARGUMENTS: removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available Impeachment was chosen as the method of
remedy because what is being sought is to removing certain high-ranking government
question the validity of her appointment, while of icers to shield them from harassment suits that
the impeachment complaint accuses her of will prevent them from performing their functions
committing culpable violation of the Constitution which are vital to the continued operations of
and betrayal of public trust while in of ice. government. Sereno further argues that the word
“may” on Section 2 of Article XI only quali ies the
OSG contends that it is seasonably iled within the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial,
one-year reglementary period under Section 11, i.e., removal from of ice. Sereno contends that
Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came since the mode is wrong, the SC has no
to light during the impeachment proceedings. jurisdiction.

M o r e o v e r, O S G c l a i m s t h a t i t h a s a n Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG
imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto are not in all fours with the present case because
petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit the President and the Vice President may, in fact,
regi (“no time runs against the king”) or be removed by means other than impeachment on
prescription does not operate against the the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987
government. The State has a continuous interest Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be
in ensuring that those who partake of its the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the
sovereign powers are quali ied. Even assuming quali ications of the President and the Vice-
that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, President. There is no such provision for other
considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG impeachable of icers. Moreover, on the rest of the
will have no other means by which to know the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that
disquali ication. quo warranto may be allowed.

The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo
obligation, should have disquali ied Sereno from warranto may be iled before the RTC, such would
being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to result to a conundrum because a judge of lower
hold the of ice. Good faith cannot be considered as c o u r t wo u l d h ave e f fe c t ive ly exe rc i s e d
a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt d i s c i p l i n a r y p o w e r a n d a d m i n i s t ra t ive
Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct supervision over an of icial of the Judiciary much
and Ethical Standards for Public Of icials and higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and
Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests
thus governed by the concept of malum upon the SC disciplinary and administrative
prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
completely immaterial. Sereno likewise submits that if a Member of the
SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated
SERENO’S CONTENTIONS: by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC
Sereno contends that an impeachable of icer may through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
only be ousted through impeachment, citing
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already
jurisprudence is clear that the intention of the time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a
framers of the Constitution was to create an petition for quo warranto must be iled within one
exclusive category of public of icers who can be
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(1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from

the “discovery” of the disquali ication. (3) Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable
of icer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove
presume that she failed to ile her SALNs because an impeachable of icer is impeachment. (Yes)
as a public of icer, she enjoys the presumption
that her appointment to of ice was regular. OSG (4) Whether to take cognizance of the quo
failed to overcome the presumption created by warranto proceeding is violative of the principle
the certi ications from UP HRDO that she had of separation of powers. (No)
been cleared of all administrative responsibilities
and charges. Her integrity is a political question (5) Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible
which can only be decided by the JBC and the on the ground of prescription. (No)
President.
RULING:
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends (1) A quo warranto petition is allowed against
that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give impeachable of icials and SC has jurisdiction.
rise to the inference that they are not iled. The
fact that 11 SALNs were iled should give an The SC has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA
inference to a pattern of iling, not of non- iling. and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs,
including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the
INTERVENORS’ ARGUMENTS: SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent allowed when there are special and important
upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to
possessed the integrity required by the SC is justi ied considering that the action is
Constitution; rather, the onus of determining directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that
whether or not she quali ied for the post fell upon the petition is likewise of transcendental
the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a importance and has far-reaching implications, the
constitutional requirement; what is only required Court is empowered to exercise its power of
is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing
likewise contend that “quali ications” such as an impeachable of icer’s appointment is a clear
citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable renunciation of a judicial duty. An outright
while “characteristics” such as competence, dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
integrity, probity, and independence are mere Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is
subjective considerations. a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle
actual controversy squarely presented before it.
ISSUES: Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial
(1) Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction in character – it calls for the exercise of the
and give due course to the instant petition for quo Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to
warranto. (Yes) decide cases and settle actual controversies. This
constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or
(2) Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any
quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the other branch of the government including the
fact that an impeachment complaint has already Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court
been iled with the House of Representatives. through the Senate.
(Yes)
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To differentiate from impeachment, quo Sereno legally holds the public of ice and thus, is
warranto involves a judicial determination of an impeachable of icer, the only issue being
the eligibility or validity of the election or whether or not she committed impeachable
appointment of a public of icial based on offenses to warrant her removal from of ice.
predetermined rules while impeachment is a
political process to vindicate the violation of the Moreover, the reliefs sought are different.
public’s trust. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding
shall be adjudged to cease from holding a
In quo warranto proceedings referring to of ices public of ice, which he/she is ineligible to
illed by appointment, what is determined is the hold. Meanwhile, impeachment, a conviction for
legality of the appointment. The title to a public the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to
of ice may not be contested collaterally but only the removal of the respondent from the public
directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Usurpation of ice that he/she is legally holding. It is not
of a public of ice is treated as a public wrong and legally possible to impeach or remove a person
carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall from an of ice that he/she, in the irst place, does
be commenced by a veri ied petition brought in not and cannot legally hold or occupy.
the name of the Republic of the Philippines
through the SolGen or a public prosecutor. The Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because
SolGen is given permissible latitude within his the impeachment proceedings before the House is
legal authority in actions for quo warranto, not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a
circumscribed only by the national interest and d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e . T h e
the government policy on the matter at hand. impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the
iling of the Articles of Impeachment before
(2) Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no
impeachment proceeding is not forum shopping pending impeachment case against Sereno. The
and is allowed. process before the House is merely inquisitorial
and is merely a means of discovering if a person
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed may be reasonably charged with a crime.
independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) (3) Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by
applicable rules pertaining to initiation, iling and which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
dismissal, and (4) limitations. The test for impeachable of icial may be removed from of ice.
determining forum shopping is whether in the
two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of The language of Section 2, Article XI of the
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto
sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo action against impeachable of icers:
warranto proceedings is the determination of
whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief “Section 2. The President, the Vice-
Justice position to be considered as an President, the Members of the Supreme
impeachable of icer in the irst place. On the Court, the Members of the Constitutional
other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s Commissions, and the Ombudsman may
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. be removed from of ice on impeachment
Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public for, and conviction of, culpable violation
of ice is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
impeachment necessarily presupposes that

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and corruption, other high crimes, or offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto
betrayal of public trust.” conclusively pronounce such culpability. The
Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
The provision uses the permissive term “may” warranto proceedings does not preclude
which denotes discretion and cannot be Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of
construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative determining probable cause for impeachment,
of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment,
nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y c o m m i t t e d p o w e r o f
offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those impeachment.
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for
impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the However, logic, common sense, reason,
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete practicality and even principles of plain
statement of the causes of removal from of ice. If arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an
other causes of removal are available, then other unquali ied public of icial should be removed
modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To from the position immediately if indeed
subscribe to the view that appointments or Constitutional and legal requirements were not
election of impeachable of icers are outside met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a
judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or legal controversy simply because of perceived
election of any possible defect pertaining to the availability of another remedy, in this case
Constitutionally-prescribed quali ications which impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation
cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment of a process speci ically intended to be long and
proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an arduous and compel the entire membership of the
absurd situation where the appointment of an Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their
impeachable of icer cannot be questioned even legislative duties to focus on impeachment
when, for instance, he or she has been determined proceedings for the possible removal of a public
to be of foreign nationality or, in of ices where Bar of icial, who at the outset, may clearly be
membership is a quali ication, when he or she unquali ied under existing laws and case law.
fraudulently represented to be a member of the
Bar. (5) Prescription does not lie against the State.

(4) The Supreme Court’s exercise of its The rules on quo warranto provides that
jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. “nothing contained in this Rule shall be
construed to authorize an action against a
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an public of icer or employee for his ouster
action for quo warranto involving a person who f ro m o f i c e u n l e s s t h e s a m e b e
would otherwise be an impeachable of icial had it commenced within one (1) year after the
not been for a disquali ication, is not violative of cause of such ouster, or the right of the
t h e c o r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n t h a t petitioner to hold such of ice or position,
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and arose”.
decided by the Senate. Again, the difference
between quo warranto and impeachment must be Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has
emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not been applied in cases where private individuals
try a person’s culpability of an impeachment asserting their right of of ice, unlike the instant
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case where no private individual claims title to the On whether Sereno violated the Constitution by
Of ice of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the failing to ile her SALNs
government itself which commenced the
present petition for quo warranto and puts in Sereno failed to properly and promptly ile her
issue the quali ication of the person holding the SALNs, in violation of the Constitutional and
highest position in the Judiciary. statutory requirements . Failure to ile a truthful,
complete and accurate SALN would likewise
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that amount to dishonesty if the same is attended by
malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make
“the Solicitor General or a public false statements. It is clear that Sereno failed not
prosecutor, when directed by the only in complying with the physical act of iling,
President of the Philippines, or when but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack
upon complaint or otherwise he has good of integrity, honesty and probity.
reason to believe that any case speci ied
in the preceding section can be On whether Sereno’s ineligibility can be cured
established by proof must commence by her nomination and appointment as Chief
such action.” Justice

It may be stated that ordinary statutes of Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity
limitation (civil or penal) have no application to cannot be cured by her nomination and
quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. Well-
public right. There is no limitation or prescription settled is the rule that quali ications for public
of action in an action for quo warranto, neither of ice must be possessed at the time of
could there be, for the reason that it was an action appointment and assumption of of ice and also
by the Government and prescription could not be during the of icer’s entire tenure as a continuing
pleaded as a defense to an action by the requirement.
Government.
On Sereno’s status as Chief Justice
That prescription does not lie in this case can also
be deduced from the very purpose of an action for Sereno is a de facto of icer removable through
quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to quo warranto.
end a continuous usurpation, no statute of
limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, For lack of a Constitutional quali ication, Sereno is
no prudent and just court would allow an ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and
unquali ied person to hold public of ice, much is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto.
more the highest position in the Judiciary. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of
Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for an impeachable of icial and her removal from the
questioning Sereno’s quali ication· for of ice only of ice, other than by impeachment, is justi ied.
upon discovery of the cause of ouster because Therefore, the remedy of a quo warranto at the
even up to the present, Sereno has not been instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from
candid on whether she iled the required SALNs the appointive position of Chief Justice.
or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was
therefore not discernible, but was, on the
contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

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Rule 67 - UPV, iled a complaint for eminent domain against

EXPROPRIATION Legaspi, et al. seeking con irmation of its right of
condemnation as well as the ixing of the just
compensation for the property. The RTC issued an
order of condemnation upholding UPV’s right to
Republic v. Legaspi, Sr., expropriate three parcels forming part of the
GR No. 177611, April 8, 2012 subject lot at the same time moving for the
EDWARD DOMINIC ESTOY EMILIO continuation of the condemnation proceedings
insofar as the remaining seven parcels were
DOCTRINE: Expropriation or the exercise of the concerned. Without resolving the motion,
power of eminent domain is the inherent right of however, the RTC went on to issue the just
the state and of those entities to which the power compensation for the three parcels of land.
has been lawfully delegated to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just The RTC eventually issued a condemnation order
compensation. The proceedings therefor consist upholding petitioner's authority to expropriate
of two (2) stages: (a) the condemnation of the the remaining seven lots comprising the property
property after it is determined that its acquisition but excluding the area occupied by the Villa
will be for a public purpose or public use; and, (b) M a r i n a B e a c h . U P V i l e d m o t i o n s f o r
the determination of just compensation to be paid reconsideration on the ground that the exclusion
for the taking of private property to be made by of the Villa Marina Beach Resort area from the
the court with the assistance of not more than condemned lots is bereft of legal basis and
three commissioners. contrary to the evidence presented in the case
which showed that the same is an integral part of
FACTS: the UPV’s developmental plan.
Rosalina Libo-on sold property to University of On the other hand, respondents also iled their
the Philippines in the Visayas (UPV) and as a m a n i f e s t a t i o n a n d p a r t i a l m o t i o n f o r
consequence, UPV immediately took possession of reconsideration of the same order alleging that
the property. UPV started building thereon, the seven parcels of land for which expropriation
eventually intending further use and development was granted actually included the area occupied
of the property. by Villa Marina Beach Resort.
Rosalina informed UPV that she wanted to rescind The RTC ruled for the respondents and denied the
the sale of the property on the ground that she expropriation of the seven subject parcels.
was no longer the owner of the property at the
time she sold it to UPV. Prior to the execution of UPV iled a petition for certiorari and mandamus
the deed of sale in favor of UPV, she had already under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals,
conveyed it by way of barter in favor of Legaspi, et assailing the RTC’s order on the ground that grave
al. abuse of discretion attended the denial of the
expropriation of the subject lots after the right to
The subject lot was subdivided into ten parcels expropriate the same was earlier upheld The CA
and separately registered under the name of denied the petition on the ground that, of the
Legaspi, et al. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the proper remedy
from said assailed orders was an ordinary appeal
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which, once lost, cannot be substituted by a Rule lawfully delegated to condemn private property to
65 petition for certiorari and mandamus public use upon payment of just compensation.
ISSUES: Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the

proceedings consist of two (2) stages: (a) the
Whether or not an ordinary appeal, under Rule condemnation of the property after it is
67, can be substituted by a Rule 65 petition for determined that its acquisition will be for a public
certiorari and mandamus. purpose or public use; and, (b) the determination
of just compensation to be paid for the taking of
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of private property to be made by the court with the
discretion. assistance of not more than three commissioners.
RULING: T h e i r s t s t a g e i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
ON AVAILABILITY OF CERTIORARI exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
Yes, in certain instances. While certiorari cannot involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
be generally used as a substitute for a lapsed dismissal of the action, "of condemnation
appeal, this rule had been relaxed on a number of declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
occasions where its rigid application will result in take the property sought to be condemned, for the
a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be
The issuance of a writ of certiorari despite the determined as of the date of the iling of the
availability of appeal where the latter remedy is complaint."
not adequate or equally bene icial, speedyand
suf icient or there is need to promptly relieve the An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would
aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the be a inal one since it inally disposes of the action
acts of an inferior court or tribunal. and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court
on the merits. So, too, would an order of
UPV has demonstrated that the RTC’s issuance of condemnation be a inal one for "no objection to
the assailed orders was attended with grave abuse the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the
of discretion which manifested as early in the propriety thereof) shall be iled or heard.
assailed order where, without giving any rationale
therefor, and while it upheld petitioner’s right of The second phase of the eminent domain action is
expropriation over the seven parcels of land, it concerned with the determination by the Court of
excluded the area occupied by the Villa Marina "the just compensation for the property sought to
Beach Resort owned and operated by respondent be taken." This is done by the Court with the
Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. a ssi st a n c e of n ot m ore t ha n t hree ( 3)
commissioners. The order ixing the just
ON EXPROPRIATION compensation on the basis of the evidence before,
and indings of, the commissioners would be inal,
Expropriation or the exercise of the power of too. It would inally dispose of the second stage of
eminent domain is the inherent right of the state the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the
and of those entities to which the power has been Court regarding the issue.

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This means that if one of the parties may believe by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y.
the order to be erroneous, such party may seek a Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, passed
reversal of the order by taking an appeal. In the Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to
same manner that the order of expropriation may Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 260,
be appealed by any party by iling a record on declaring the land to be a national historical
appeal, a second and separate appeal may landmark. The resolution was approved by the
likewise be taken from the order ixing the just Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. At the
compensation. Jurisprudence recognizes the same time, respondent Republic iled an urgent
existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to
expropriation because of said two stages in every take immediate possession of the property. The
action for expropriation. motion was opposed by petitioners. After a
hearing, the trial court issued an order ixing the
Here, the RTC split the determination of UPV’s provisional market and assessed values of the
right of expropriation over the ten lots. The property and authorizing the Republic to take
assailed RTC order here, while upholding UPV’s over the property once the required sum would
right of expropriation over said seven parcels of have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer
land, ordered the exclusion of the portion of Taguig, Metro Manila.
occupied by Villa Marina Beach Resort. However,
acting on the motions for reconsideration of said Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the
order iled by petitioner, UPV and respondents, ground that the intended expropriation was not
however, the RTC issued the second assailed order for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act
altogether denying said right of expropriation. would constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, bene it, or
In sum, the RTC gravely abused its discretion support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
when it issued the condemnation order excluding contrary to the provision of the Constitution.
the area occupied by the Villa Marina Resort from Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a
petitioner’s exercise of its right of expropriation. suspension in the implementation of the August 3,
The RTC likewise gravely abused its discretion 1989 order of the trial court. On 15 February
when it issued the second assailed order which 1990, following the iling by respondent Republic
reconsidered its irst assailed order and of its reply to petitioners’ motion seeking the
a l to g e t h e r d e n i e d p e t i t i o n e r ’ s r i gh t o f dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its
expropriation. denial of said motion to dismiss. Five days later,
or on February 20, 1990, another order was
Manosca v. Court of Appeals issued by the trial court, declaring moot and
academic the motion for reconsideration and/or
GR No. 106440, January 29, 1996
suspension of the order of August 3, 1989 with
KATHRYN SUZANNE RODRIGUEZ ENRIQUEZ
the rejection of petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
Petitioners’ motion for the reconsideration of the
DOCTRINE: on the term “public use”.
February 20, 1990 order was likewise denied by
the trial court. Petitioners then lodged a petition
FACTS:
with the Court of Appeals which the appellate
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P.
court dismissed for failure to show any grave
Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila, with
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional
an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492)
competence on the part of the trial court. A
square meters. When the parcel was ascertained

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motion for the reconsideration of the decision was for the exercise of the power of eminent domain"
denied subsequently by appellate court. when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would
bene it?
ISSUES: Whether or not the "public use"
requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the This attempt to give some religious perspective to
attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492- the case deserves little consideration, for what
square-meter parcel of land so declared by the should be signi icant is the principal objective of,
National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national not the casual consequences that might follow
historical landmark. from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in
setting up the marker is essentially to recognize
RULING: Yes. the distinctive contribution of the late Felix
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather
Eminent domain, also often referred to as than to commemorate his founding and
expropriation and, with less frequency, as leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
condemnation, is, like police power and taxation,
an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be City of Manila v. Tan Te
clothed with any constitutional gear to exist;
GR No. 169263, Sept. 21, 2011
instead, provisions in our Constitution on the
BEULAH ALANAH RIVERA ESPIRITU
subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to
grant, the exercise of the power.
DOCTRINE: The expanded de inition of “public
Eminent domain is generally so described as "the use or purpose” encompasses projects for
highest and the most exact idea of property socialized housing. It is accurate to state then that
remaining in the government" that may be at present whatever may be bene icially employed
acquired for some public purpose through a for the general welfare satis ies the requirement
method in the nature of a forced purchase by the of public use.
State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion
over property within the state for public use or to FACTS:
meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential 1. The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
part of governance even in its most primitive form 7951 which authorized Manila City
and thus inseparable from sovereignty. Mayor to expropriate certain pieces of
real property along Maria Clara and
The only direct constitutional quali ication is that Governor Forbes Streets where low-cost
"private property shall not be taken for public use housing units could be built and then
without just compensation." This proscription is awarded to bona >de residents therein.
intended to provide a safeguard against possible 2. Among the properties sought to be
abuse and to protect as well the individual against expropriated was owned by Melba Tan
whose property the power is sought to be Te.
enforced. 3. Te claimed that the expropriation should
not be allowed for it is based on an
Petitioners ask: ordinance was an invalid exercise of
imminent domain and violated the rule
"(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the against taking private property without
expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace just compensation.
become so vital as to be a public use appropriate
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4. She also asserted that the supposed MICHELLE LASTIMOSO FUENTES

expropriation was not for a valid public
use or purpose. DOCTRINE:
Essential elements in the taking of property under
ISSUES: W/N Socialized housing comes within the t h e p o w e r o f e m i n e n t d o m a i n : ( 1 ) t h e
de inition of public purpose expropriator must enter a private property; (2)
the entrance into private property must be for
RULING: Yes, socialized housing comes within the more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into
expanded de inition of public use or purpose. the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted
Before, the requirement of taking private property to a public use or otherwise informally
for public use or purpose was taken very literally. appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
It meant that whatever project is undertaken utilization of the property for public use must be
must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not him of all bene icial enjoyment of the property.
allowable.
FACTS
The same is no longer true. Now, As long as the 1.Republic iled a complaint for eminent
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of domain against defendantappellee, Carmen
eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to M. vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of
state then that at present whatever may be the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi,
bene icially employed for the general welfare over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of
satis ies the requirement of public use. The term San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, and
now encompasses even indirect public bene it or against Maria Nieves Gozun, over two parcels
advantage. of land. Trial court ixed the provisional value
of the lands at P259,669.10.
Urban renewal or development and the 2.Castellvi alleged, among other things, that
construction of low-cost housing are recognized the land under her administration, being a
as a public purpose, not only because of the residential land, had a fair market value of
expanded concept of public use but also because P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total
of speci ic provisions in the Constitution. The market value of P11,389,485.00; that the
provisions are (1) Art. II, Sec. 9 on providing Republic, through the Armed Forces of the
a d e q u a t e s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , p ro m o t e f u l l Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air
employment, a rising standard of living and an Force, had been, despite repeated demands,
improved quality of life for all and (2) Art. XIII, illegally occupying her property since July 1,
Sec, 9 on undertaking programs for urban land 1956, thereby preventing her from using and
reform and housing which will make available at disposing of it, thus causing her damages by
affordable cost decent housing and basic services way of unrealized pro its..
to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban 3. After the Republic had deposited with the
centers and resettlement areas. Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the
amount of P259,669.10, the trial court
ordered that the Republic be placed in
Republic v. De Castelvi possession of the lands. The Republic was
actually placed in possession of the lands on
GR No. L-20620, Aug. 15, 1974
August 10, 1959.

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4. The trial court, on May 26, 1961, rendered 10.The motion of appellees, Castellvi and
its decision stating that it found the Toledo-Gozun, dated October 6, 1969,
u n a n i m o u s re c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e praying that they be authorized to mortgage
commissioners of P10.00 per square meter the lands subject of expropriation, was
for the three lots of the defendants subject of denied by this Court or October 14, 1969.
this action is fair and just and ordered
plaintiff to pay 6% per annum on the total ISSUES:
value of the lands of Gozun and also an Whether the lower court erred in holding that the
interest at 6% per annum to be paid to taking of the properties under expropriation
Castellvi. commenced with the iling of the complaint in this
5. The republic iled a motion for a new trial case.
and/or reconsideration that the decision was
not supported by the evidence, and that the RULING:
decision was against the law. No. The lower court did not commit an error
6. Defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun iled when it held that the "taking" of the property
not only a joint opposition to the approval of under expropriation commenced with the iling of
the Republic's record on appeal, but also a the complaint in this case. The "taking' of the
joint memorandum in support of their Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of
opposition. The Republic also iled a the year 1947 when the Republic irst occupied
memorandum in support of its prayer for the the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and
approval of its record on appeal. that the just compensation to be paid for the
7. On December 27, 1961 the trial court issued Castellvi property should not be determined on
an order declaring both the record on appeal the basis of the value of the property as of that
iled by the Republic, and the record on year.
appeal iled by defendant Castellvi as having
been iled out of time, thereby dismissing A number of circumstances must be present in the
both appeals. "taking" of property for purposes of eminent
8. On January 11, 1962 the Republic iled a domain. First, the expropriator must enter a
"motion to strike out the order of December private property. This circumstance is present in
27, 1961 and for reconsideration", and the instant case, when by virtue of the lease
subsequently an amended record oil appeal, agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took
against which motion the defendants possession of the property of Castellvi. Second, the
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun iled their entrance into private property must be for more
opposition. than a momentary period. The word "momentary"
9. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an when applied to possession or occupancy of (real)
order, stating that "in the interest of property should be construed to mean "a limited
expediency, the questions raised may be period" — not inde inite or permanent. The lease
properly and inally determined by the contract was for a period of one year, renewable
Supreme Court," and at the same time it from year to year. The entry on the property,
ordered the Solicitor General to submit a under the lease, is temporary, and considered
record on appeal containing copies of orders transitory. Third, the entry into the property
and pleadings speci ied therein. In an order should be under warrant or color of legal
dated November 19, 1962, the trial court authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may
approved the Republic's record on appeal as be considered as present in the instant case,
amended. because the Republic entered the Castellvi

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property as lessee. Fourth, the property must be never been under lease to the Republic, the
devoted to a public use or otherwise informally Republic was placed in possession of said lands,
appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be also by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959.
conceded that the circumstance of the property The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be
being devoted to public use is present because the reckoned as of June 26, 1959, the date of the iling
property was used by the air force of the AFP. of the complaint for eminent domain.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and Masikip v. The City of Pasig
deprive him of all bene icial enjoyment of the
GR No. 136349, Jan 23, 2006
property.
VANESSA SABALBERINO GO
In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into
DOCTRINE:
the property and its utilization of the same for
public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her
The right to take private property for public
of all bene icial enjoyment of the property.
purposes necessarily originates from "the
C a s t e l lv i re m a i n e d a s o w n e r, a n d wa s
necessity" and the taking must be limited to such
continuously recognized as owner by the
necessity.
Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease
contract from year to year, and by the provision in The very foundation of the right to exercise
the lease contract whereby the Republic eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that
undertook to return the property to Castellvi necessity must be of a public character. Moreover,
when the lease was terminated. Neither was the ascertainment of the necessity must precede
Castellvi deprived of all the bene icial enjoyment or accompany and not follow, the taking of the
of the property, because the Republic was bound land.
to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed
monthly rentals until the time when it iled the Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain
complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959. is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the
adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, of the taking,and (c) the public use character of
the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the purpose of the taking.
the date of the iling of the complaint. SC ruled
that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement FACTS
of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the iling of the complaint for 1. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is
eminent domain, the just compensation should be the registered owner of a parcel of land
determined as of the date of the iling of the located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City,
complaint. Metro Manila.
2. City of Pasig, respondent, noti ied
Thus, the "taking" of the Castellvi property for the petitioner, through a letter of its intention
purposes of determining the just compensation to to expropriate a portion of her property
be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, to be used for the "sports development
1959 when the complaint for eminent domain and recreational activities" of the
was iled. As for the two parcels of land of Toledo- residents of Barangay Caniogan pursuant
Gozun, also sought to be expropriated, which had to an ordinance.
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3. Respondent wrote another letter to by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of

petitioner, but this time the purpose was Court.
allegedly "in line with the program of the
Municipal Government to provide land The motion to dismiss contemplated under this
opportunities to deserving poor sectors Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading
of our community." which takes the place of an answer to the
4. Petitioner sent a reply to respondent complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the
stating that the intended expropriation of pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff
her property is unconstitutional, invalid, to expropriate the defendant's property for the
and oppressive, as the area of her lot is use speci ied in the complaint.
neither suf icient nor suitable to "provide
land opportunities to deserving poor What the trial court should have done was to set
sectors of our community." D5 the case for the reception of evidence to
5. Subsequently, respondent iled with the determine whether there is indeed a genuine
trial court a complaint for expropriation, necessity for the taking of the property, instead of
and prayed that the trial court, issue an summarily making a inding that the taking is for
order for the condemnation of the public. This is especially so considering that the
property. purpose of the expropriation was squarely
6. Petitioner iled a Motion to Dismiss the challenged and put in issue by petitioner in her
complaint which was denied by the RTC motion to dismiss
on the ground that there is a genuine
The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its
necessity to expropriate the property for
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 on October 31,
the sports and recreational activities of
after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect,
the residents of Pasig.
is of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule at the
7. Petitioner iled with the Court of Appeals
time petitioner iled her motion to dismiss should
a special civil action for certiorari, but
govern.The new provision cannot be applied
was dismissed for lack of merit.
retroactively to her prejudice.
ISSUES:
1. WON Court of Appeals erred in holding 2. NO. City of Pasig has failed to establish that
that the motion to dismiss iled by petitioner there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts petitioner's property.
alleged in the complaint.
The basis for the passage of Ordinance
2. WON there is a "genuine necessity" to authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
justify the expropriation. intended bene iciary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-pro it
organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
RULING:
The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and
1.YES. Petitioner iled her Motion to Dismiss the categorically public. The necessity has not been
complaint for expropriation on April 25,1995. It shown, especially considering that there exists an
was denied by the trial court on May 7, 1996. At alternative facility for sports development and
that time, the rule on expropriation was governed community recreation in the area, which is the
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Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig National Power Corporation v. CA
City, including those of Caniogan.
GR No. 106804, Aug 12, 2004
TRISHA MAE BORROMEO GUZMAN
The power of eminent domain is de ined as "the
right of a government to take and appropriate
DOCTRINE: on power of eminent domain may be
private property to public use, whenever the
delegated
public exigency requires it, which can be done
only on condition of providing a reasonable
FACTS
compensation therefor."
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the 1. Antonio Pobre owns a land which he
legislative branch of the government. It delegates developed into a resort subdivision,
the exercise thereof to local government units, beneath which is thermal mineral water
other public entities and public utility and steam. For one year, Pobre leased to
corporations, subject only to Constitutional NPC eleven lots from the approved
limitations. Local governments have no inherent subdivision plan. To own the land for
power of eminent domain and may exercise it industrial purposes, NPC iled an
only when expressly authorized by statute. expropriation case against Pobre, during
the pendency of which the former
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain dumped waste materials beyond the site
is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the agreed upon by the parties. Then NPC
adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity iled its second expropriation case
of the taking, and (c) the public use character of against Pobre to acquire an additional
the purpose of the taking. area of the property. In his motion to
dismiss the complaint, Pobre prayed for
The right to take private property for public just compensation of all the lots affected
purposes necessarily originates from "the by NPC’s actions and for the payment of
necessity" and the taking must be limited to such damages. But NPC itself iled a motion to
necessity. The very foundation of the right to dismiss the second expropriation case on
exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity the ground that NPC had found an
and that necessity must be of a public character. alternative site and that NPC had already
Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must abandoned in 1981 the project within the
precede or accompany and not follow, the taking Property due to Pobre’s opposition.
of the land. 2. The trial court ruled that because of the
pollution generated by NPC’s geothermal
As ruled by the Court, "necessity within the rule plants NPC had rendered Pobre’s entire
that the particular property to be expropriated Property useless as a resort-subdivision.
must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but The Property has become useful only to
only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre’s
would combine the greatest bene it to the public entire Property and pay for it. But NPC
with the least inconvenience and expense to the insists that it has the right to move for the
condemning party and the property owner automatic dismissal of its complaint,
consistent with such bene it." relying on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964
Rules of Court (the Rules in effect at that
time).

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ISSUES: SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An

action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
Whether or not NPC has the right to automatically without order of court by iling a notice of
dismiss complaint for eminent domain (NO) dismissal at any time before service of the
answer or of a motion for summary
RULING:
judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the
notice, the dismissal is without prejudice,
It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of
except that a notice operates as an
Court that is applicable to this case but Rule 67 of
adjudication upon the merits when iled by
the same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on
a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a
expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal
competent court an action based on or
of civil actions in general while Rule 67
including the same claim. A class suit shall
speci ically governed eminent domain cases.
not be dismissed or compromised without
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the approval of the court.
state, as sovereign, to take private property for
While Section 1, Rule 17 spoke of the "service of
public use upon observance of due process of law
answer or summary judgment," the Rules then did
and payment of just compensation. The power of
not require the iling of an answer or summary
eminent domain may be validly delegated to the
judgment in eminent domain cases. In lieu of an
local governments, other public entities and
answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the
public utilities such as NPC. Expropriation is the
defendant to ile a single motion to dismiss where
procedure for enforcing the right of eminent
he should present all of his objections and
domain. "Eminent Domain" was the former title of
defenses to the taking of his property for the
Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court. In the 1997
purpose speci ied in the complaint. In short, in
Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on 1
expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67,
July 1997, the prescribed method of expropriation
the motion to dismiss took the place of the
is still found in Rule 67, but its title is now
answer.
"Expropriation."
The records show that Pobre had already iled and
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court
served on NPC his "motion to dismiss/answer"
provided the exception to the general rule that the
even before NPC iled its own motion to dismiss.
dismissal of the complaint is addressed to the
NPC iled its notice of dismissal of the complaint
sound discretion of the court. For as long as all of
on 2 January 1985. However, as early as 10
the elements of Section 1, Rule 17 were present
December 1984, Pobre had already iled with the
the dismissal of the complaint rested exclusively
trial court and served on NPC his "motion to
on the plaintiff's will. The defending party and
dismiss/answer." A certain Divina Cerela received
even the courts were powerless to prevent the
Pobre's pleading on behalf of NPC. Unfortunately
dismissal. The courts could only accept and
for NPC, even Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules
record the dismissal.
of Court could not save its cause.
A plain reading of Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964
NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17
Rules of Court makes it obvious that this rule was
of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his
not intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same
right under this rule to move for the immediate
Rules. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of
dismissal of the complaint once the defendant had
Court, provided that:
served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for
summary judgment before the plaintiff could ile

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his notice of dismissal of the complaint. Pobre's 2. MTC dismissed the Complaint on the
"motion to dismiss/answer," iled and served way ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that
ahead of NPC's motion to dismiss, takes the case eminent domain is an exercise of the power to
out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same take private property for public use after
applies. payment of just compensation. In an action
for eminent domain, therefore, the principal
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as
cause of action is the exercise of such power
the plaintiff’s matter of right to automatically
or right. An action for eminent domain is
dismiss the complaint precisely because the
therefore within the exclusive original
landowner may have already suffered damages at
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
the start of the taking. If the propriety of the
taking of private property through eminent 3. RTC – dismissed the complaint and held
domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the that the action for eminent domain affected
dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial title to real property; hence, the value of the
inquiry because private rights may have suffered property to be expropriated would determine
in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or the jurisdiction of the case. It concluded that
abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be the action should be iled with the MTC since
made arbitrarily. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 the value is less than P20,000.
Rules of Civil Procedure no longer makes the
dismissal of the complaint automatic. The right of ISSUES:
the plaintiff to dismiss his action before the Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over
defendant has iled his answer or asked for cases for eminent domain or expropriation where
summary judgment must be irst con irmed by the assessed value of the subject property is
the court in an order issued by it. below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?
RULING:
Barangay San Roque, Talisay Cebu v. Heir The RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
of Francisco Pastor
GR No. 138896, June 20, 2000 The SC held that an expropriation suit is incapable
MA. ANGELINE CARI O JAPITAN of pecuniary estimation. Where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of
DOCTRINE: The subject of an expropriation suit money, or where the money claim is purely
is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. relief sought, this Court has considered such
Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
subject property. cognizable exclusively by courts of irst instance.
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not

FACTS:
involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it
1. Petitioner iled before the Municipal Trial deals with the exercise by the government of its
Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a authority and right to take private property for
Complaint to expropriate a property of the public use.
respondents.
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In National Power Corporation v. Jocson , the the court is duty-bound to determine the just
Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have compensation for it. This, however, is merely
two phases: incidental to the expropriation suit.

Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty
“The irst is concerned with the
Corporation
determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent GR 127820, July 20, 1998
domain and the propriety of its exercise APRIL NYL HAMOY PAMERON
in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. It ends with an order, if not of DOCTRINE: on requisites for LGU to exercise the
dismissal of the action, of condemnation power of eminent domain; not barred by res
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful judicata.
right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose FACTS:
described in the complaint, upon the 1. Under a city council resolution, the
payment of just compensation to be Municipality of Para aque iled on
determined as of the date of the iling of September 20, 1993, a Complaint for
the complaint.” expropriation against Private Respondent
V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels
of land of 10,000 square meters. The city
"The second phase of the eminent previously negotiated for the sale of the
domain action is concerned with the property but VM didn’t accept.
determination by the court of the just 2. The trial court issued an Order dated
compensation for the property sought to February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner
be taken. This is done by the Court with to take possession of the subject property
the assistance of not more than three (3) upon deposit with its clerk of court of an
commissioners. The order ixing the just amount equivalent to 15 percent of its
compensation on the basis of the fair market value based on its current tax
evidence before, and indings of, the declaration.
commissioners would be inal, too.” 3. According to the respondent, the
complaint failed to state a cause of action
The primary consideration in an expropriation because it was iled pursuant to a
suit is whether the government or any of its resolution and not to an ordinance as
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites required by RA 7160 (the Local
for the taking of private property. Hence, the Government Code); and (b) the cause of
courts determine the authority of the government action, if any, was barred by a prior
entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the judgment or res judicata. Petitioner
observance of due process. In the main, the claimed that res judicata was not
subject of an expropriation suit is the applicable.
government's exercise of eminent domain, a 4. The trial court dismissed the case. The
matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA
af irmed.
It is true that the value of the property to be
expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for ISSUES:
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1. Whether or not a resolution duly property. Eminent Domain can reach

approved by the municipal council has every form of property which the State
the same force and effect of an ordinance might need for public use whenever they
and will not deprive an expropriation need it.
case of a valid cause of action. While the principle of res judicata does
2. Whether or not the principle of res not denigrate the right of the State to
judicata as a ground for dismissal of case exercise eminent domain, it does apply to
is not applicable when public interest is speci ic issues decided in a previous case.
primarily involved. 6. In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled
that the power of the State or its agent to
RULING: exe rc i s e e m i n e n t d o m a i n i s n o t
1. No to 1st Issue and Yes to 2nd Issue. diminished by the mere fact that a prior
Petition dismissed. inal judgment over the property to be
2. No. The power of eminent domain is expropriated has become the law of the
lodged in the legislative branch of case as to the parties. The State or its
government, which may delegate the authorized agent may still subsequently
exercise thereof to LGUs, other public exercise its right to expropriate the same
entities and public utilities. An LGU may property, once all legal requirements are
t h e re fo re exe rc i s e t h e p owe r to complied with.
expropriate private property only when 7. Thus, petition is hereby DENIED without
authorized by Congress and subject to the prejudice to petitioner's proper exercise
latter’s control and restraints, imposed of its power of eminent domain over
“through the law conferring the power or subject property.|||
in other legislations.
3. In the case at bar, the local chief executive
sought to exercise the power of eminent Bardillon v. Barangay Masili, Calamba,
domain pursuant to a resolution of the Laguna
municipal council. Thus, there was no
GR No. 146886, April 30, 2003
compliance with the irst requisite that
MARC HILARION MANGINSAY PE A
the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance.
DOCTRINE: An expropriation suit is incapable of
4. YES. As correctly found by the Court of
pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within
Appeals and the trial court, all the
the jurisdiction of regional trial courts, regardless
requisites for the application of res
of the value of the subject property.
judicata are present in this case. There is
a previous inal judgment on the merits in
FACTS:
a prior expropriation case involving
identical interests, subject matter and
1. Two complaints for eminent domain
cause of action, which has been rendered
were iled by the Barangay Masili(PR)
by a court having jurisdiction over it.
to expropriate a 144-square meter parcel
5. Be that as it may, the Court holds that the
o f l a n d o w n e d b y D e v o r a h
principle of res judicata, which inds
Bardillon(BARDILLON) in Bgy. Masili,
application in generally all cases and
Calamba, Laguna to provide a multi-
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the
purpose hall.
State or its agent to expropriate private

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2. In 1998, the irst complaint was iled

with the MTC which was subsequently To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the
dismissed "for lack of interest" for failure jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of
of respondent to appear at the pre-trial. the land, because the subject of the action is the
3. In 1999, the second complaint was government's exercise of eminent domain — a
iled with the RTC. Petitioner moved to matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
dismiss the case before the RTC on the
ground of res judicata, but it was denied Republic v. Holy Trinity Realty
on the ground that the MTC which Development Corporation
ordered the dismissal of irst complaint
GR No. 172410, April 14, 2008
has no jurisdiction over the said
STEFFI ANGELA ROMBLON PI OL
expropriation proceeding.
4. The RTC subsequently issued an order for
DOCTRINE:
the issuance of the writ of possession in
favor of the PR.
A deposit of the amount representing the 100%
5. The CA af irmed the assailed orders of
value of the property expropriated in compliance
the RTC.
with RA No. 8974 transfers the ownership of the
amount deposited to the owner of the property
expropriated and any interest which accrues to
ISSUES: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over
the deposited amount belongs to the said
the expropriation case
property owner.
RULING:
FACTS:
NO. An expropriation suit does not involve the
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
the exercise by the government of its authority Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), iled with the RTC a
and right to take property for public use. As such, Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against
it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should landowners whose properties would be affected
be iled with the regional trial courts. In Barangay by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion
San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor: of the North Luzon Expressway. Respondent Holy
Trinity Realty and Development Corporation
It should be stressed that the primary (HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners.
consideration in an expropriation suit is
whether the government or any of its TRB iled an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
instrumentalities has complied with the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that
requisites for the taking of private it deposited a suf icient amount to cover the
property. Xxx True, the value of the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the
property to be expropriated is estimated affected properties, in the total amount of
in monetary terms, for the court is duty- P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the
b o u n d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e j u s t Philippines, South Harbor Branch (LBP-South
compensation for it. This, however, is Harbor) in compliance with the provisions of
merely incidental to the expropriation Section 4 of RA No. 8974 in relation to Section 2 of
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. The issuance of the
only after the court is satis ied with the writ of possession then becomes ministerial on
propriety of the expropriation the part of the RTC.

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RTC subsequently issued an Order for the RULING:

Issuance of a Writ of Possession, as well as a Writ
of Possession itself. HTRDC iled with the RTC a Under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the right of
Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the accession is conferred by ownership of the
respondent or its duly authorized representative principal property. The principal property in this
be allowed to withdraw the amount of case is the deposited amount in the expropriation
P22,968,000.00, out of TRB's advance deposit of account of DPWH which pertains particularly to
P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor, including HTRDC.
the interest which accrued thereon.
The critical factor in the different modes of
RT C g r a n t e d r e s p o n d e n t ’ s m o t i o n a n d effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the
subsequently conducted a hearing on the accrued act is the actual intention to deliver on the part of
interest. It ruled that the ownership of the interest the party making such delivery. The intention of
that had accrued on the amount deposited by the TRB in depositing such amount through
DPWH in expropriation current account with LBP- DPWH was clearly to comply with the
South Harbor. requirement of immediate payment in RA No.
8974 so that it could already secure a writ of
However, RTC reversed its decision pertaining to possession over the properties subject of the
t h e i n t e r e s t u p o n T R B ’ s m o t i o n f o r expropriation and commence implementation of
reconsideration. So, the respondent sought the project.
recourse to the Court of Appeals which ruled in its
favor. A close scrutiny of TRB's arguments would
further reveal that it does not directly challenge
TRB pointed out that there are two stages in the t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s ' d e t e r m i n a t i v e
expropriation proceedings which are: 1.) the pronouncement that the interest earned by the
determination of the authority to exercise amount deposited in the expropriation account
eminent domain and 2.) the determination of just accrues to HTRDC by virtue of accession. TRB only
compensation. The TRB argues that it is only asserts that HTRDC is "entitled only to an amount
during the second stage when the court will equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated
appoint commissioners and determine claims property, nothing more and nothing less.
for entitlement to interest.
SC agreed in TRB's statement since it is exactly
The TRB further argued that the expropriation how the amount of the immediate payment shall
account with LBP-South Harbor is not in the name be determined in accordance with Section 4 of
of HTRDC, but of DPWH. Thus, the said Republic Act No. 8974, i.e., an amount equivalent
expropriation account includes the compensation to 100% of the zonal value of the expropriated
for the other landowners. properties. However, TRB already complied
therewith by depositing the required amount in
the expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-
ISSUES: South Harbor. By depositing the said amount, TRB
is already considered to have paid the same to
WON the CA erred in holding the respondent as HTRDC, and HTRDC became the owner thereof.
owner of the deposit and therefore entitled to the The amount earned interest after the deposit;
interest? NO hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of
the principal who is already determined as used as a school site for Lapaz High
HTRDC. School.
3. Respondent iled his Answer where he
HTRDC is determined to be the owner of only a admitted ownership of the Subject
part of the amount deposited in the expropriation Property but denied the petitioner’s
account, in the sum of P22,968,000.00. Hence, it is avowed public purpose of the sought-for
entitled by right of accession to the interest that expropriation, since the City of Iloilo
had accrued to the said amount only. already had an existing school site for
Lapaz High School.
Lastly, the SC disagreed with TRB’s argument that 4. Petitioner iled a Motion for Issuance of
the issue on the interest is merely part and parcel Writ of Possession, alleging that it had
of the second stage of the proceedings only. The deposited the amount with the Philippine
case it cited in support of the said arguments National Bank-Iloilo Branch. Petitioner
pertains to interest as damages for delay of claimed that it was entitled to the
payment of just compensation. immediate possession of the Subject
Property.
City of Iloilo v. Hon. Lolita Contreras- 5. Respondent iled an Opposition to the
Besana Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
GR No. 168967. 12 February 2010. Possession.
SHANELE VALDEVILLA PURA 6. The trial court issued an Order which
granted petitioner’s Motion for Issuance
DOCTRINE: Just compensation is to be of Writ of Possession and authorized the
ascertained as of the time of the taking, which petitioner to take immediate possession
usually coincides with the commencement of the of the Subject Property.
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution 7. Thereafter, a Writ of Possession was
of the action precedes entry into the property, the issued in petitioner’s favor, and petitioner
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the was able to take physical possession of
time of the iling of the complaint. t h e p ro p e r t i e s . . At n o t i m e h a s
respondent ever denied that the Subject
FACTS: Property was actually used as the site of
Lapaz National High School. Aside from
1. This is a Petition for Certiorari under the iling by the private respondent of his
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a Amended Answer, the expropriation
prayer for the issuance of a temporary proceedings remained dormant.
restraining order seeking to overturn the 8. Sixteen years later, respondent iled an Ex
three Orders issued by the RTC of Ilo-ilo Parte Motion/Manifestation, where he
City, Branch 32. alleged that when he inally sought to
2. Petitioner iled a Complaint for eminent withdraw the amount allegedly deposited
domain against private respondent and by the petitioner, he discovered that no
Southern Negros Development Bank, the such deposit was ever made. Private
latter as mortgagee. The complaint respondent thus demanded his just
sought to expropriate two parcels of land compensation as well as interest.
registered in respondent’s name to be Attempts at an amicable resolution and a
negotiated sale were unsuccessful.

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9. Private respondent iled a Complaint Whether or not the correct reckoning point for
against petitioner for Recovery of the determination of just compensation is at the
Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental time the expropriation complaint was iled in
and Damages. Private respondent alleged court.
that since he had not been compensated
for the Subject Property, petitioner’s RULING:
possession was illegal, and he was
entitled to recovery of possession of his YES. Just compensation is to be ascertained as of
lots. the time of the taking, which usually coincides
10. Petitioner iled its Answer, arguing that with the commencement of the expropriation
respondent could no longer bring an proceedings. Where the institution of the action
action for recovery since the Subject precedes entry into the property, the just
Property was already taken for public compensation is to be ascertained as of the time
use. Rather, private respondent could of the iling of the complaint.
only demand for the payment of just
compensation. When the taking of the property sought to be
11. Both parties jointly moved to consolidate expropriated coincides with the commencement
the expropriation case and the case for of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
recovery of possession which motion was subsequent to the iling of the complaint for
granted by the trial court in an Order. A eminent domain, the just compensation should be
commission was created to determine the determined as of the date of the iling of the
just compensation due to the respondent. complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964
12. Private respondent iled a Motion/ Rules of Procedure, under which the complaint for
Manifestation claiming that before a expropriation was iled, just compensation is to be
commission is created, the trial court determined "as of the date of the iling of the
should irst order the condemnation of complaint."
the property, in accordance with the
Rules of Court. He likewise insisted that Here, there is no reason to depart from the
the fair market value of the Subject general rule that the point of reference for
Property should be reckoned from the assessing the value of the Subject Property is the
da te when t he cou rt orders t he time of the iling of the complaint for
condemnation of the property, and not expropriation.
t h e d a te o f a c t u a l t a k i n g , s i n c e
petitioner’s possession of the property Concededly, respondent also slept on his rights for
was questionable. over 18 years and did not bother to check with
13. The RTC issued an Order. Among other the PNB if a deposit was actually made by the
things. it stated that parties and counsels petitioner. Evidently, from his inaction in failing to
must be bound by the Commissioner’s withdraw or even verify the amounts purportedly
Report regarding the value of the deposited, private respondent not only accepted
property not at the time it was the valuation made by the petitioner, but also was
condemned but at the time this order was not interested enough to pursue the expropriation
issued. case until the end. As such, private respondent
may not recover possession of the Subject
ISSUE: Property, but is entitled to just compensation.
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National Transmission Corp. v. Lacson-De prospective buyers for perceived

Leon radiation and electrocution risks.
GR 221624, July 4, 2018
MICHELLE MAY RAMA ISSUES: Whether just compensation must be
determined at the time of taking or the date of
DOCTRINE: The payment of just compensation iling the complaint.
must be determined as of the date of the taking of
the property or the iling of the complaint, RULING: The payment of just compensation
whichever came irst. must be based on the date of iling of the
complaint, since it came irst. This complies
FACTS: with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Here,
1. NAPOCOR iled a complaint against Maria the petitioner iled with the trial court the
Te r e s a L a c s o n D e L e o n f o r t h e complaint on 28 February 2002, and was issued a
expropriation of a parcel of land writ of possession on 12 December 2003. Thus,
measuring 39,347 square meters located just compensation must be determined as of
in Barangay Vista Alegre, Bacolod City. February 28, 2002. Although the Narrative Report
2. R e s p o n d e n t s a r g u e d t h a t t h e of the commissioners was undated, the valuation
expropriation was con iscatory because of the property could safely be presumed to have
the property was valued as agricultural been made by the commissioners not later than
even if it was classi ied as residential by October 7, 2004, or two years and seven months
both national and local governments. after the iling of the complaint. Assuming that the
3. Furthermore, they manifested that the valuation of the property was not made on the
same issues shall be submitted to the date of iling of the complaint, to the mind of the
appointed commissioners. Court, no signi icant change in the fair market
Commissioners’ indings: value could have happened between 28 February
a. Based on the Certi ication issued 2002 and 7 October 2004, or less than three
by t h e C i t y P l a n n i n g a n d years. Hence, the Court sees no reason to deviate
Development Of ice, the property from the recommendation and factual indings of
is classi ied as residential. the board of commissioners.
b. They did not consider the zonal
va l u a t i o n by t h e B I R a n d
r e c o m m e n d e d i n s t e a d
PhP722.50 per square meter as
the fair market value of the
property based on the average
raw land value of the three
s u b d iv i s i o n s ( w h i c h w e r e
classi ied as residential and
commercial)
c. They estimated that about one-
third of the total area was
p r e j u d i c e d d u e t o t h e
construction of high-tension
transmission lines shunning

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Rule 68 - FORECLOSURE 7. Antonia, wanted to transfer of ownership to the
bank annulled, and reconvened back to her.
OF REAL ESTATE
ISSUE:
MORTGAGE 1. WON FEBTC-BPI had the right to extra judicially
foreclose the mortgage and transfer ownership to
itself
Dela Pena v. Avila
665 SCRA 553 (2012) HELD:
JUPERT JERICHO MERCADER REMOLLO 1. Yes, Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the
necessary consequence of non-
DOCTRINE: A mortgagee in good faith has the payment of the mortgage debt, FEBTC-BPI was,
right to foreclose the mortgage immediately upon likewise, acting well within its rights as
the failure of the Mortgagor to pay the principal mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate
obligation. mortgage on the property upon Gemma's failure
to pay the loans secured thereby.
FACTS: 2. Executed on 26 November 1997, the mortgage
1. 1996: Antonia Dela Pena( Antonia), who was predated Antonia's iling of an Adavit of Adverse
married to Antegono Dela Pena (Antegono), Claim with the Register of Deeds of Marikina
obtained a loan from Aguila Sons and Co.( ASC) As March 1998 and the annotation of a Notice of Lis
a security for the payment of the said loan, Pendens on TCT on 1999. "The mortgage directly
Antonia executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and immediately subjects the property upon
in favor of Aguila on their residential lot in which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may
Marikina. be, to the ful illment of the obligation for whose
2. 1996: However, Antonia also executed a Deed security it was constituted." When the principal
Of absolute sale in favor of Avila over the same obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee
property because of Antonia’s failure to pay her consequently has the right to foreclose the
obligation from Aguila. mortgage, sell the property, and apply the
3. 1997: Avila also mortgaged the same property proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the
to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC-BPI) unpaid loan
to secure a loan from the bank. 3. Finally, the resolution of this case cannot be
4. 1998: Antonia, together with her son Alvin affected by the principles that banks, like FEBTC-
John, iled against Gemma praying for the BPI are expected to exercise more care and
annulment of the said deed of sale. Thus, Antonia prudence than private individuals in that their
iled of an Adavit of Adverse Claim with the dealings.
Register of Deeds 4. The validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
5. 1999: the notice of lis pendens was annotated executed by Antonia in favor of Gemma having
on the TCT of the property. been upheld, FEBTC-BPI's supposed failure to
6. Avila failed to pay and the Real estate mortgage ascertain the ownership of the property has been
was foreclosed by FEBTC-BPI, and FEBTC-BPI also rendered immaterial for the purpose of
emerged as the highest bidder. Thus, they had the determining the validity of the mortgage executed
property in its favor as well as the subsequent extrajudicial
registered in their name. foreclosure thereof.

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Asiatrust Development Bank v. Tuble Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of

real estate mortgage over his property.
677 SCRA 519 (2012)
6. The Petition was based only on his real
estate loan, which at that time amounted
to P421,800. His other liabilities to the
DOCTRINE: In foreclosure proceedings, the
bank were excluded.
mortgaged property is subjected to the
7. The foreclosure proceedings terminated,
satisfaction of the obligation, in case of default.
with the bank emerging as the purchaser
Once the proceeds from the sale of the property
of the secured property.
are applied to the payment of the obligation, the
8. However, Tuble, redeemed the property
obligation is already extinguished. Subject to the
for around 1.3M.
option to exercise the right to redemption.
9. Despite the payment made by Tuble, he
q u e s t i o n e d h o w t h e f o r e c l o s u r e
FACTS:
ballooned from about 400K to about 1.3M
1. Respondent, Carmelo H. Tuble (Tuble), in a matter of 1 year, with this he iled a
was the vice-president of, Asiatrust complaint for recovery of sun of money
Development Bank, petitioner. He availed and damages before the RTC.
himself of car incentive plan (CIP) and 10. The bank explained that this redemption
loan privileges offered by the bank. He price included the Nissan Vanette's book
was also entitled to the bank's Senior value, the salary loan, car insurance,18%
Managers Deferred Incentive Plan (DIP). annual interest on the bank's redemption
2. Tuble was able to acquire a Nissan price of P421,800, penalty and interest
Vanette through the car incentive plan. It charges on the Promissory Note, and
was made to appear as a lease agreement, litigation expenses. From these items, the
requiring respondent to only pay for the amounts that remained to be collected,
monthly rentals and the lease would be are (1) the 18% annual interest on the
terminated in case of the employee’s redemption price and (2) the interest
resignation or retirement before the full charge on Promissory Note
payment of the price of the car. 11. RTC: ruled in favor of Tuble, stating that
3. As regards the loan privileges, Tuble the redemption price was excessive and
obtained three separate loans. The irst, a arbitrary. According to the trial court, the
real estate loan, a consumption loan and value of the car should not have been
a salary loan. included, considering that the bank had
4. On March 30, 1995, he resigned, with the already recovered the Nissan Vanette.
full payment of the car still NOT The obligations arising from the salary
completed. He was given an option to loan and car insurance should have also
return the car or pay the its remaining been excluded, for there was no proof
book value. that these debts existed. The interest and
5. In order to recover the Nissan Vanette, penalty charges should have been
the bank led a Complaint for replevin deleted, too, because Promissory Note
against Tuble. In which the bank obtained No. 0142 did not indicate any interest or
a favorable decision. Then, to collect the penalty charges. Neither should litigation
liabilities of respondent, it also led a expenses have been added, since there
was no proof that the bank incurred
those expenses.
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12. CA af irmed the decision of the RTC Real Estate Mortgage Contract itself was silent on
the computation of the redemption price.
ISSUES: 2. The second loan agreement, or the Promissory

WON the bank is entitles to include these items in Note, referring to the consumption loan makes no
the redemption price (1)the 18% annual interest reference to the earlier loan with a real estate
on the bid price of P421,800; and (2) the interest mortgage. Neither does the bank make any
charges on the Promissory Note allegation that it relied on the security of the real
estate mortgage in issuing the consumption loan
RULING: to Tuble.
1. With regard the foreclosure proceedings the
bank only foreclosed the mortgage secured by the It must be remembered that Tuble was
real estate loan of P421,800. It did not seek to petitioner's previous vice-president. Hence, as
include, in the foreclosure, the consumption loan one of the senior of icer, the consumption loan
under Promissory Note or the other alleged was given to him not as an ordinary loan, but as a
obligations of respondent. Therefore, the Real form of accommodation or privilege. The bank's
E s t a t e M o r t g a g e C o n t ra c t wa s a l r e a dy grant of the salary loan to Tuble was apparently
extinguished and the obligation of Tule was not motivated by the creation of a security in
already satis ied. What remained was the right of favor of the bank, but by the fact the he was a top
redemption granted by law. Petitioner can no executive of petitioner. Thus, the bank cannot
longer rely on the Real Estate Mortgage or invoke claim that it relied on the previous security in
its provisions, including the dragnet clause granting the consumption loan to Tuble. For this
stipulated therein. Furthermore, the bank cannot reason, the dragnet clause will not be extended to
refer to the 18% annual interest charged in the cover the consumption loan. It follows, therefore,
Promissory Note to be applied to the redemption that its corresponding interest — 18% per annum
price. — is inapplicable. Consequently, the courts did
not gravely abuse their discretion in refusing to
The right of redemption of foreclosed properties apply an annual interest of 18% in computing the
is a statutory privilege which has the force of law, redemption price. A inding of grave abuse of
and the purchaser in the public auction is bound discretion necessitates that the judgment must
to accept it, should the redemptioner wish to have been exercised arbitrarily and without basis
exercise such right. in fact and in law.
In any event, assuming that the Real Estate Lastly, the promissory note contained no
Mortgage Contract subsists, we rule that the stipulation as to interest payments therefore the
dragnet clause does not justify the imposition of that should be applied is the 12% per annum
an 18% annual interest on the redemption price. interest rate not the 18% as alleged by the bank.
Through a dragnet clause, a real estate mortgage
contract may exceptionally secure future loans or
Fortaleza v. Lapitan
advancements. But an obligation is not secured by
a mortgage, unless, that mortgage comes fairly 678 SCRA 469 (2012)
within the terms of the mortgage contract. There JARVIE ANNE RIVERA TANZO
was no speci ic mention of interest to be
added in case of either default or redemption. The DOCTRINE: Unless a case falls under recognized
exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence,

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courts should maintain the ex parte, non- they were entitled to its possession pursuant to
adversarial, summary and ministerial nature of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
the issuance of a writ of possession.
Spouses Fortaleza questioned the validity of the
Not discussed in the case but related to Rule 68, real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale.
Sec. 3(2): Upon the inality of the order of Later, for repeated failure of spouses Fortaleza to
con irmation or upon the expiration of the period appear at the scheduled hearings, the RTC
of redemption when allowed by law, the allowed spouses Lapitan to present evidence ex
p u r c h a s e r a t t h e a u c t i o n s a l e o r l a s t parte. The court ordered the issuance of a writ of
redemptioner, if any, shall be entitled to the possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty
possession of the property unless a third party is of the court especially since the redemption
actually holding the same adversely to the period had expired and a new title had already
judgment obligor. The said purchaser or last been issued in the name of the spouses and the
redemptioner may secure a writ of possession, Court of Appeals af irmed the RTC decision.
upon motion, from the court which ordered the
foreclosure. ISSUE:
WON RTC erred in the issuance of writ of
FACTS: possession against spouses Fortaleza, debtor-
Spouses Fortaleza obtained a loan from the mortgagor, without deciding the case on its
creditors, respondents’ parents, in the amount of merits.
P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum
and issued a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over RULING:
their residential house, as security. No. The duty of the trial court to grant a writ of
possession in such instances is ministerial, and
When they failed to pay the indebtedness the court may not exercise discretion or
including the interests and penalties, the creditors judgment.
applied for extrajudicial foreclosure and set in for
public auction. The property was sold to the In Barican, the court held that the obligation of a
spouses Lapitan, who emerged as the highest court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be
bidders and then issued a Certi icate of Sale. ministerial if there is a third party holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor. Where
The one-year redemption period expired without such a third party exists, the trial court should
the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his
Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an af idavit of adverse possession. And in Cometa, there was a
consolidation of ownership and a new certi icate pending action where the validity of the levy and
of title was issued in their names. sale of the properties in question were directly
put in issue which this Court found preemptive of
Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza resolution. For if the applicant for a writ of
refused spouses Lapitan's formal demand to possession acquired no interest in the property by
vacate and surrender possession of the subject virtue of the levy and sale, then, he is not entitled
property. Consequently, spouses Lapitan iled an to its possession... Thus, equitable considerations
ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of motivated this Court to withhold the issuance of
possession with RTC of Calamba City stating that the writ of possession to prevent injustice on the
as new registered owners of the subject property, other party.

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In the case, there are no third parties holding to ile an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ
the subject property adversely to the of possession.
judgment debtor. It was spouses Fortaleza
themselves as debtors-mortgagors who are Town and Country Enterprises v.
occupying the subject property. They are not Quisumbing, Jr.
even strangers to the foreclosure proceedings
682 SCRA 128 (2012)
in which the ex parte writ of possession was
BIANCA RODRIGUEZ
applied for. Signi icantly, spouses Fortaleza did
not ile any direct action for annulment of the
foreclosure sale of the subject property.
DOCTRINE: It has been consistently ruled that
there is no reason to withhold said writ after the
Accordingly, unless a case falls under
expiration of the redemption period when no
recognized exceptions provided by law and
redemption is effected by the mortgagor. The rule
jurisprudence, SC maintains the ex parte, non-
is settled that the right of the purchaser to the
adversarial, summary and ministerial nature
possession of the foreclosed property becomes
of the issuance of a writ of possession as
absolute after the redemption period, without a
outlined in Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended
redemption being effected by the property owner.
by Act No. 4118 which provides:
Since the basis of this right to possession is the
purchaser's ownership of the property, the mere
In any sale made under the provisions of this Act,
iling of an ex parte motion for the issuance of the
the purchaser may petition the Court of First
writ of possession would suf ice, and no bond is
Instance of the province or place where the
required.
property or any part thereof is situated, to give him
possession thereof during the redemption period,
FACTS:
furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use
Town and Country Enterprises, Inc. (TCEI)
of the property for a period of twelve months, to
borrowed P12 million from Metrobank, and said
indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the
loan was secured by a mortgage over 20 parcels of
sale was made without violating the mortgage or
land. Unable to pay upon demand, TCEI lost the
without complying with the requirements of this
properties to Metrobank due to foreclosure and
Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and
auction. When TCEI held on to the properties,
iled in form of an ex parte motion . . . and the
Metrobank asked the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that
to issue a writ of possession in the bank's favor.
a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff
Meanwhile, in a separate corporate rehabilitation
of the province in which the property is situated,
proceeding, TCEI successfully asked the Securities
who shall execute said order immediately
and Exchange Commission (SEC) for a stay order
on the payment of its obligations. Based on that
Notably, in this case, the one-year period for the
stay order, TCEI asked the RTC which is hearing
spouses Fortaleza to redeem the mortgaged
the writ of possession case to suspend the said
property had already lapsed. Furthermore,
proceedings, which the RTC granted. On review by
ownership of the subject property had already
the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed the
been consolidated and a new certi icate of title
decision and ordered the RTC to continue with the
had been issued under the name of the spouses
writ of possession case. The RTC later granted
Lapitan. Hence, as the new registered owners of
Metrobank's petition and issued a writ of
the subject property, they are even more entitled
possession. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
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af irmed the RTC's decision, after which TCEI's It does not matter, then, if Metrobank only had
land titles were then cancelled in exchange for the certi icate of sale registered before the Deed
new titles in the name of Metrobank. TCEI sought of Registry a couple of months later, and had
remedy before the SEC, the rehabilitation court consolidated its ownership over a year later.
which had earlier issued the stay order, to annul "The mortgagor loses all interest over the
the said cancellation and transfer of titles. foreclosed property after the expiration of the
Petitioners argue that the subject properties were redemption period and the purchaser becomes
placed in custodia legis upon approval of TCEI's t h e a b s o l u te ow n e r t h e re o f wh e n n o
rehabilitation plan and that the grant of the writ redemption is made."
of possession in favor of Metrobank was
Thus, having acquired ownership of the said
tantamount to taking said properties away from
properties, Metrobank can simply ile an ex-
the rehabilitation receiver.
parte motion for issuance of the writ of
Nov 7, 2001 - Public auction
possession - "the issuance of which has been
Dec 13, 2001 – Certi icate of Sale issued to
held to be a ministerial function which cannot
Metrobank
be hindered by an injunction or an action for
Feb 6, 2002 – vested ownership
the annulment of the mortgage or the
April 10, 2002 – cert of sale registered
foreclosure itself." There is an exception to this
April 25, 2002 – consolidated its ownership
rule, however, and that is where the property is
October 8, 2002 – stay order issued
held by a third party claiming a right adverse to
that of the judgment debtor. But, on the other
ISSUES: whether or not the granting of the Writ of
hand, the rehabilitation receiver's claim is far
Possession by the RTC in favor of Metrobank is
from adverse. He is an of icer of the court who is
valid, in view of the stay order issued by the SEC
appointed to protect the interests of TCEI's
in the rehabilitation proceeding. YES
investors and creditors, not the interests of
TCEI per se or its of icers and directors.
RULING:
Metrobank's acquisition of the subject properties
The granting of the Writ of Possession is valid
would still pass muster even if tested alongside
because the subject properties are no longer
the longer on year redemption period provided
within the scope of the corporate rehabilitation
under Act 3135 over the three-month redemption
proceeding.
period under Section 47 of RA 8791 where the
property being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial
The purpose of corporate rehabilitation is to
foreclosure is owned by a juridical person.
enable an insolvent company to gain a new
Despite the shorter redemption period provided
lease on life and eventually pay its loans. To
under RA 8791, Metrobank also executed an
allow this to happen, a stay order is issued to
af iavit of consolidation of ownership over the
defer all present claims against the company
subject realties on 25 April 2003 or after the lapse
until the time of its projected recovery. In this
of the one-year redemption period provided
case, however, Metrobank had already acquired
under Act 3135.
ownership over the mortgaged parcels of land
when TCEI started its petition for corporate
rehabilitation. No doubt Metrobank acquired Preduntial Bank v. Alviar
ownership over the properties when TCEI failed 464 SCRA 353
to redeem these within the three-month period FLORAMIE OLASIMAN ROMERO
prescribed by Section 47 of Republic Act 8791.

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books and records of the Mortgagee, the

DOCTRINE: "dragnet clause" operates as a Mortgagor does hereby transfer and convey by
convenience and accommodation to the way of mortgage unto the Mortgagee, its
borrowers as it makes available additional funds successors or assigns, the parcels... of land which
without their having to execute additional are described in the list inserted on the back of
security documents, thereby saving time, travel, this document, and/or appended hereto, together
loan closing costs, costs of extra legal services, with all the buildings and improvements now
recording fees,... et cetera existing or which may hereafter be erected or
constructed thereon, of which the Mortgagor
FACTS: declares that he/it is the... absolute owner free
from all liens and incumbrances. . . .”
Respondents, spouses Don A. Alviar and Georgia
B. Alviar, are the registered owners of a parcel of
land in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by On 27 December 1976, respondent spouses
Transfer Certi icate of Title (TCT) No. 438157 of executed for Donalco Trading, Inc., of which the
the Register of Deeds of Rizal. On 10 July 1975, husband and wife were President and Chairman
they executed a deed of real... estate mortgage in of the Board and Vice President, respectively,
favor of petitioner Prudential Bank to secure the covering P545,000.000.
payment of a loan worth P250,000.00. This
mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No. On 15 January 1980, petitioner moved for the
438157. extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the
property covered by TCT No. 438157. Per
On 4 August 1975, respondents executed the
petitioner's computation, respondents had the
corresponding promissory note, covering the said
total obligation of P1,608,256.68, covering the
loan, which provides that the loan matured on 4
three (3) promissory notes,... Respondents iled a
August 1976 at an interest rate of 12% per annum
complaint for damages with a prayer for the
with a 2% service charge, and that the note is
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with
s e c u r e d b y a r e a l e s t a t e m o r t g a g e a s
the RTC of Pasig,claiming that they have paid their
aforementioned. Signi icantly, the real... estate
principal loan secured by the mortgaged property,
mortgage contained the following clause:
and thus the mortgage should not be... foreclosed.

“That for and in consideration of certain loans,
Petitioner maintains that the "blanket mortgage
overdraft and other credit accommodations
clause" or the "dragnet clause" in the real estate
obtained from the Mortgagee by the Mortgagor
mortgage expressly covers not only the
and/or ________________ hereinafter referred to,
P250,000.00 under PN BD#75/C-252, but also the
irrespective of number, as DEBTOR, and to secure
two other promissory notes included in the
the payment of the same and those... that may
application for extrajudicial foreclosure of... real
hereafter be obtained, the principal or all of which
estate mortgage. Thus, it claims that it acted
is hereby ixed at Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
within the terms of the mortgage contract when it
(P250,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as well
iled its petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
as those that the Mortgagee may extend to the
real estate mortgage.
Mortgagor and/or DEBTOR, including interest

and expenses or any other... obligation owing to
For their part, respondents claim that the
the Mortgagee, whether direct or indirect,
"dragnet clause" cannot be applied to the
principal or secondary as appears in the accounts,
subsequent loans extended to Don Alviar and

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Donalco Trading, Inc. since these loans are such loan was made in reliance solely on the
covered by separate promissory notes that original security with the "dragnet clause," but
expressly provide for a different form of security. rather,... on the new security given. This is the
They reiterate the holding of the trial court that "reliance on the security test."
the "blanket mortgage clause" would apply only to
loans obtained jointly by respondents, and not to Bustamante v. Rosel
loans obtained by other parties. Respondents also
319 SCRA 413. DATE
place a premium on the inding of... the lower
CAMILLE NICA CALONZO ROQUE
courts that the real estate mortgage clause is a
contract of adhesion and must be strictly
DOCTRINE: A scrutiny of the stipulation of the
construed against petitioner bank.
parties reveals a subtle intention of the creditor to
acquire the property given as security for the
ISSUES:
loan. This is embraced in the concept of pactum
commissorium, which is proscribed by law.
Whether or not the "blanket mortgage" clause
elements of pactum commissorium are as follows:
applies even to subsequent advancements for
(1) there should be a property mortgaged by way
which other securities were intended
of security for the payment of the principal
obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation
RULING: for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the
thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the
The court ruled in the af irmative, thus, contrary principal obligation within the stipulated period.
to the inding of the Court of Appeals, petitioner (PACTUM COMMISSORIUM)
and respondents intended the real estate
mortgage to secure not only the P250,000.00 loan FACTS: Respondent Rosel entered into a loan
from the petitioner, but also future credit facilities agreement with petitioner spouses Bustamante
and advancements that may be obtained by the wherein the latter borrowed P100,000 payable in
respondents. The terms... of the above provision 2 years. To guarantee payment, the spouses put as
being clear and unambiguous, there is neither collateral 70 sq m of their lot inclusive of the
need nor excuse to construe it otherwise. apartment therein. In the event of borrowers
default, contract states the lender has the option
The parties having conformed to the "blanket to buy or purchase the collateral for P200,000.
mortgage clause" or "dragnet clause," it is When the loan was about to mature on March 1,
reasonable to conclude that they also agreed to an 1989, respondents proposed to buy the said
implied understanding that subsequent loans portion at the pre-set price. Petitioners, however,
need not be secured by other securities, as... the refused and requested for extension of time to pay
subsequent loans will be secured by the irst the loan. On the due date, petitioners tendered
mortgage. In other words, the suf iciency of the payment of the loan to respondents which the
irst security is a corollary component of the latter refused to accept. On March 4, 1990,
"dragnet clause." But of course, there is no respondents sent a demand letter asking
prohibition, as in the mortgage contract in issue, petitioner to sell the collateral pursuant to the
against... contractually requiring other securities option to buy embodied in the loan agreement.
for the subsequent loans. Thus, when the Prior to that, they iled with the RTC an action for
mortgagor takes another loan for which another speci ic performance in February.
security was given it could not be inferred that

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ISSUES: Is the respondent justi ied in compelling

petitioners to sell the portion of the lot pursuant
to the stipulation in the loan?
RULING: No as doing so is tantamount to pactum

commissorium. The elements of pactum
commissorium are as follows: (1) there should be
a property mortgaged by way of security for the
payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there
s h o u l d b e a s t i p u l a t i o n f o r a u t o m a t i c
appropriation by the creditor of the thing
mortgaged in case of non-payment of the
principal obligation within the stipulated period.
In this case, the intent to appropriate the property
given as collateral in favor of the creditor appears
to be evident, for the debtor is obliged to dispose
of the collateral at the pre-agreed consideration
amounting to practically the same amount as the
loan. In effect, the creditor acquires the collateral
in the event of non payment of the loan. This is
within the concept of pactum commissorium. Such
stipulation is void.

Rule 69- PARTITION property as there was no partition yet

among the heirs of Alipio.
● In addition, Eusebio’s heirs contend that
their father could not have validly sold
the 1/3 portion of the property to Sps.
Marcos v. Bangi
Bangi since their father supposedly
GR No. 2014 inherited the entire property through a
ALLJUN NIC BAJAO SERENADO donation propter nuptias from their
grandfather Alipio, and such donation
DOCTRINE: Every act which is intended to put an was ictitious since Alipio died years
end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or before the supposed donation was made.
devisees is deemed to be a partition.
ISSUES: WON the sale by Eusebio to Sps. Bangi of
FACTS: the 1/3 portion of the subject property is valid
● Sps. Bangi, bought from the Eusebio (YES).
Bangi, a 1/3 portion of a parcel of land
registered to his father, Alipio. Thereafter, RULING:
they took possession of the subject ● Partition is the separation, division and
property until they passed away. Their assignment of a thing held in common
heirs then took possession of the same. among those to whom it may belong.
● Later on, the Bangi heirs learned that the Every act which is intended to put an end
title to the subject property, including the to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
p o r t i o n s o l d to S p s . B a n g i , wa s or devisees is deemed to be a partition.
transferred to petitioners by Alipio with ● P a r t i t i o n m a y b e i n f e r r e d f r o m
the consent of his wife. circumstances suf iciently strong to
● The Bangi heirs claimed that the said support the presumption. Thus, after a
Deed of Absolute Sale is a forgery since long possession in severalty, a deed of
Alipio and his wife already died years partition may be presumed.
prior to the date indicated in said Deed.
● The evidence presented by the parties
● On the other hand, petitioners contend indubitably show that, after the death of
that they, as Alipio’s grandchildren (and Alipio, his children had orally partitioned
their husbands) from his son Eusebio, his estate, including the subject property,
acquired title over the property after which was assigned to Eusebio.
Alipio’s children executed a deed of ● Further, it is quite suspect that Alipio’s
extrajudicial partition with quitclaim children executed the said Deed of
wherein they waived their rights over the Extrajudicial Partition, wherein they
subject property in their favor. waived their rights over the subject
● However, they insinuate that the subject property in favor of Eusebio's children
property, at the time of the sale, was still only after almost 40 years after their
owned in common by the children of parents’ death. That only several months
Alipio because no Deed of Extrajudicial thereafter, the subject property was
partition was effected by them befor such supposedly sold to the spouses of
sale. As such, Eusebio could not validly Eusebio's children and, later, to herein
sell the 1/3 third portion of the subject petitioners.

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● As pointed out by the CA, the execution of Hence, petitioner iled before the RTC a complaint
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with for judicial partition of the said properties.
Quitclaim is but a ruse to defeat the rights
of the respondents over the one-third Respondent contended that the properties were
portion of the subject property. If at all, acquired out of his own personal funds without
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with any contribution from petitioner. He denied
Quitclaim executed by Alipio’s children cohabiting with petitioner.
merely con irms the partition of Alipio's
estate that was earlier had, albeit orally, RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
in which the subject property was
assigned to Eusebio. ISSUES: Whether an action for partition precludes
a settlement on the issue of ownership;
Lacbayan v. Samoy Whether the Torrens title over the disputed

properties was collaterally attacked in the action
GR No. 2011
for partition; and
JIL AILIL GIAN TALLER SOLIS
W h e t h e r re s p o n d e n t i s e s t o p p e d f ro m
DOCTRINE: : A partition agreement cannot be repudiating co-ownership over the subject
given effect if it involves co-ownership issues. realties.
Unless this issue of co-ownership is resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties. RULING:
1) No.
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met each other
Although the complaint is for partition,
through a common friend sometime in 1978.
petitioner’s contention was premised on the
Despite respondent being already married, their
existence of co-ownership.
relationship developed until petitioner gave birth
to respondent's son on October 12, 1979.
Petitioner insists that she is a co-owner pro
indiviso of the ive real estate properties based on
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and
the TCTs covering the subject properties. Hence,
re s p o n d e n t , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h re e m o re
partition cannot be settled unless the court will
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower
decide on the issue of co-ownership. It would also
services company.
be prejudicial to the respondent’s lawful spouse if
Petitioner and respondents lived together despite the court will just rule based on parties extra-
the fact that respondent was married. During judicial agreement. The contents of the Partition
their illicit affair, they established manpower Agreement requires prior settlement of questions
service company and bought 5 parcels of land of law as it involves legal matters. Before it can be
under their name. Their relationship had ups and given effect, the question of whether parties are
downs which led to their separation. They then legally allowed to freely divide the properties
decided to end the business and agreed to divide among themselves should be irst settled.
the properties. However, they didn’t reach an
2) No.
agreement. Lacbayan wanted additional demands
to be included in the agreement but refused.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the granted a separate trial upon motion, and in that
certi icate of title and not the title itself. hearing her property were excluded from the writ
Ownership is different from a certi icate of title of possession previously granted to Binan. This
because the latter only serves as the best proof of decision was declared inal and executory by the
ownership over a piece of land. Mere issuance of RTC since it ruled that Binan’s MR was iled out of
the certi icate of title in the name of any person time (15 days).
does not foreclose the possibility that the real Binan argues that multiple appeals are allowed
property may be under co-ownership with due to the separate trial granted to Francisco and
persons not named in the certi icate, or that the the thus the period for their appeal is 30 days and
registrant may only be a trustee, or that other not 15 days.
parties may have acquired interest over the
property subsequent to the issuance of the ISSUES:
certi icate of title. WON multiple appeals are allowed
WON the MR of Binan was iled out of time and
3) Respondent is not allowed by law to waive his hence judgement became inal and executory
rights to the properties as it will prejudice his
legal spouse’s interest over the properties. RULING:
The Municipality’s MR was timely iled. Actions
Also, since the petitioner herself admitted that for eminent domain, as in actions for partition,
she did not assent to the Partition Agreement since no less than 2 appeals are allowed by law,
after seeing the need to amend the same to the period of appeal from an order of
include other matters, she cannot anymore insist condemnation is 30 days and not the ordinary
on the contents of an agreement she intentionally period of appeal of 15 days.
refused to sign.
A decision or order of partition is not inal
because it leaves something more to be done in
Municipality of Binan v. Garcia
the trial court for the complete disposition of the
G.R. NO. 69260. DATE case, i.e, the appointment of commissioners, the
KEVIN SOON proceedings for the determination by said
DOCTRINE: commissioners of just compensation, the
submission of their reports, and hearing thereon,
The rules on partition applies on an action for and the approval of the partition that a judgment
eminent domain. for recovery of property with accounting is not
inal, but merely interlocutory and hence not
A two-phase feature is found in the special civil
appealable until the accounting is made and
action of partition and accounting under Rule
passed upon
69 of the Rules of Court and thus a decision on
the irst phase may be appealed while the Also, In an action against several defendants, the
second phase proceeds. This allows for multiple court may, when a several judgment is proper,
appeals and thus the reglementary period for render judgment against one or more of them,
appeal is 30 days. leaving the action to proceed against the others.
FACTS:
Francisco is just one of several defendants in the
This is a case for expropriation iled by Binan
case at bar. Thus where a single complaint was
against respondents for a new site of a public
iled against several defendants having individual,
market. One of the defendants, Francisco was
separate interests, and a separate trial was held

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relative to one of said defendants after which a Godofredo alleged that the above-described land
inal order or judgment was rendered on the used to be intact but the petitioners, taking
merits of the plaintiff 's claim against that advantage of his absence, took possession of
particular defendant, it is obvious that in the portions of his land thereby reducing it to barely
event of an appeal from that separate judgment, 13,000 sq.m.
the original record cannot and should not be sent
up to the appellate tribunal. Petitioners denied having encroached on
Godofredo’s land, contending that Godofreedo
Notarte v. Notarte instituted this complaint to increase the actual
size of his land at the expense of the adjoining
679 SCRA 378. DATE
owners. Petitioners asserted that they have been
HONEY TAGALOG
in actual, notorious, public and exclusive
possession of their respective parcels for a very
DOCTRINE: Every act which is intended to put an
long time even before Godofredo bought his
end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be
property from Patrocenia.
a partition even though it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.
Godofredo pointed out that he had purchased a
P a r t i t i o n m a y t h u s b e i n f e r r e d f r o m
portion with a de inite area of 27,604.714 sq.m.
circumstances suf iciently strong to support the
which is within the 1/7 share of Bernardo
presumption.
Notarte.
FACTS
The CA ruled in favor of Godofredo. CA ruled that
Godofredo (Respondent) bought from Patrocenia
there had been partition long before Godofredo
a parcel of land (29, 482 sqm), as evidenced by
bought the land, thus he rightfully owned the land
the Deed of Absolute Sale.
that he bought, and that the possession of
petitioners had been interrupted.
The land bought by Godofredo was part of the
land covered by Original Certi icate of Title No.
Petitioners argue that there is no partition.
48098, Pangasinan.
Petitioners emphasize that the issue of whether
the whole parcel of land covered by OCT No.
Godofredo declared the land in his name under
48098 has been legally partitioned is material to
Tax Declaration No. 982 for the year 1985,
Godofredo’s claim that the portions of land
indicating its area as 29,482 sq.
allegedly encroached by petitioners belong to him.
They argue that a partition must be a concerted
Godofredo initially iled in the MTC a complaint
act of all the heirs and not only individual acts of
for "Partition, Subdivision Survey and Recovery of
each of the co-heirs.|
Possession With Damages" against Petitioners.
But this was denied.
ISSUE: WON there was partition? YES
Godofredo claimed that his land was acquired by

RULING
Patrocenia (seller) from Procopio and Desiderio
SC sustained the RTC and CA in inding that the
who acquired the same from Emiliano who in turn
property covered by OCT No. 48098 had already
a cq u ired it from B ern a rdo in sep a ra te
been partitioned long before the respondent
transactions and conveyances in writing.
purchased his lot.

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Under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, every act damages against her sister Hermogena and the
which is intended to put an end to indivision latter spouse. Nestoria alleged that she bought
among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition even one half portion of an unregistered property from
though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, her sister Hermogena. On the said property, their
or any other transaction. Partition may thus be father constructed a residential/commercial
inferred from circumstances suf iciently strong to building, which he leased to a third party during
support the presumption. his lifetime. However, after his death, Nestoria
asserted that petitioners deprived her of her
In this case, the original registered owners had rights over the property. Hence, in her complaint,
either mortgaged or sold their respective 1/7 she prayed that she be declared one-half owner of
shares, in whole or in part. the land in question as well as the building
thereon and that petitioner spouses be ordered to
Petitioners introduced improvements on their render an accounting of the rentals derived from
respective lots, and have also exercised acts of the lease of the property. Petitioners' only ground
ownership thereon. That these respective shares for the dismissal of the complaint was that
of the original registered owners were merely respondents failed to allege that earnest efforts
designated orally — their individual portions towards a compromise had been made.
having been simply pointed to them, as testi ied to
by Godofredo and Patrocenia — is immaterial. After the trial court ordered the respondent to
amend her complaint in order to indicate whether
The validity of an oral partition is already well- efforts towards compromise were made, the court
settled. In another case, we have held that after decided in favor of the respondent. The Court of
exercising acts of ownership over their respective Appeals dismissed the appeal and validly upheld
portions of the contested estate, petitioners are the indings of fact of the trial court.
estopped from denying the existence of an oral
partition. ISSUE:
WON Hermogena is required to deliver to spouses
de la Cruz one-half (½) of the building standing
Engreso v. Dela Cruz on Lot No. 10561.
401 SCRA 217. DATE

RULING:
JARVIE ANNE RIVERA TANZO
No. Although Nestoria is indeed the sole owner of
a speci ied portion of the disputed parcel of land
DOCTRINE: [There is no partition yet until their
she only co-owns the structure standing thereon.
respective portions are properly determined;
therefore Rule 69 is not discussed]
A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete,
speci ic or determinate part of the thing owned in
Not discussed but related to Rule 69 Sec. 1
common because until division is effected his
provides that a person having the right to compel
right over the thing is represented only by an
the partition of real estate may do so as provided
ideal portion. As such, the only effect of an
in this Rule...
action brought by a co-owner against a co-
owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-
FACTS:
ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded
Respondent Nestoria iled an action for
from a speci ic portion of the property because as
declaration of ownership, possession and
a co-owner he has a right to possess and the

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plaintiff cannot recover any material or area for priority development for urban
determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts land reform under Proclamation Nos.
a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of 1967 and 2284. As a result, the tenants
one-half (½) of the building in favor of and occupants of the said lots offered to
respondents. purchase those lots from respondents but
the latter refused.
Petitioner Hermogena and respondent Nestoria 3. On November 7, 1996, the petitioner
were declared co-owners of the residential/ Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of
commercial building standing on their lot. They M a n d a l u y o n g a u t h o r i z e d M a y o r
were given the right to exercise the right of Benjamin Abalos through a resolution to
dominion over the structure until they effect its initiate action for the expropriation of the
partition and until their respective portions were subject lots and the construction of a
properly determined. medium-rise condominium for quali ied
occupants therein.
City of Mandaluyong v. Aguilar 4. Mayor Abalos sent a letter to respondents
offering to purchase the said lots, but the
350 SCRA 4. JAN 29, 2001
latter did not answer. Thus, Mayor Abalos
SZAIFFA LEYA JOSE TAYONG
iled a complaint for expropriation before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168 of
DOCTRINE: The rights of the co-owners to have
Pasig City.
the property partitioned and their share in the
5. In their answer, respondents alleged that
same delivered to them cannot be questioned for
the expropriation of their land is
"[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
arbitrary and capricious and is not for
co-ownership." The partition was merely a
public purpose. Moreover, the subject lots
necessary incident of the co-ownership; and
are their only real property and are too
absent any evidence to the contrary, partition is
small for expropriation.
presumed to have been done in good faith.
6. Petitioner then iled an Amended
Complaint. It reduced the area sought to
FACTS:
be expropriated to two parcels of land
1. Respondents Antonio, Francisco, Thelma,
only totalling 1,636 square meters. At the
Eusebio and Rodolfo, all surnamed
preliminary hearing, Antonio Aguilar
Aguilar, were the registered owners of
testi ied and presented documentary
three adjoining parcels of land with an
evidence to support their claims while
aggregate area of 1,847 square meters
the petitioner did not present any
located at 9 de Febrero Street, Brgy.
evidence.
Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong. Several
7. Respondent Antonio Aguilar testi ied that
decades ago, on a portion of the said lots,
he and the other registered owners are
respondents constructed residential
all siblings who inherited the subject
houses which they leased out to tenants
property by intestate succession from
and on the vacant portion, other families
their parents. Their father died in 1945
also constructed residential structures
and their mother in 1976. Both TCT's
which they likewise occupied.
were issued in the siblings' names on
2. In 1983, those lots were classi ied by the
September 2, 1987.
Board of the Housing and Urban
8. In 1986, however, the siblings agreed to
Development Coordinating Counsel as an
extrajudicially partition the lots among

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themselves, but no action was taken by a third party independently of the other co-
them to this end. owners. The effect of any such transfer is limited
9. It was only eleven (11) years later, on to the portion which may be awarded to him upon
November 28, 1997 that a survey of the the partition of the property.
two lots was made and on February 10,
1998, a consolidation subdivision plan In the instant case, the titles to the subject lots
was approved by the Lands Management were issued in respondents' names as co-owners
S e r v i c e o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f in 1987—ten (10) years before the expropriation
Environment and Natural Resources. The case was iled in 1997. As co-owners, all that the
co-owners signed a Partition Agreement respondents had was an ideal or abstract quota or
on February 24, 1998 35 and on May 21, proportionate share in the lots. This, however, did
1998, TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767 were not mean that they could not separately exercise
cancelled and new titles issued in the any rights over the lots.
names of the individual owners pursuant
to the Partition Agreement. Each respondent had the full ownership of his
10. Petitioner argues that the consolidation undivided interest in the property. He could freely
of the subject lots and their partition was sell or dispose of his interest independently of the
made more than six (6) months after the other co-owners. And this interest could have
complaint for expropriation was iled on even been attached by his creditors. The partition
August 4, 1997, hence, the partition was in 1998, six (6) months after the iling of the
made in bad faith, for the purpose of expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership
circumventing the provisions of R.A. by converting into certain and de inite parts the
7279. respective undivided shares of the co-owners. 47
11. The trial court dismissed the Amended The subject property is not a thing essentially
Complaint. indivisible. The rights of the co-owners to have
the property partitioned and their share in the
ISSUES: WN the partition was done in bad faith. same delivered to them cannot be questioned for
"[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
RULING: NO, the partition is presumed to be co- ownership." The partition was merely a
done in good faith absent any contrary necessary incident of the co- ownership; and
evidence. absent any evidence to the contrary, this partition
is presumed to have been done in good faith.
During the existence of the co-ownership, no
individual can claim title to any de inite portion of In the instant case, the titles to the subject lots
the community property until the partition were issued in respondents' names as co-owners
thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the co- in 1987—ten (10) years before the expropriation
owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or case was iled in 1997. As co-owners, all that the
proportionate share in the entire land or thing. respondents had was an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the lots. This, however, did
Before partition in a co-ownership, every co- not mean that they could not separately exercise
owner has the absolute ownership of his any rights over the lots. Each respondent had the
undivided interest in the common property. The full ownership of his undivided interest in the
co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage property. He could freely sell or dispose of his
his interest, except as to purely personal rights. interest independently of the other co-owners.
He may also validly lease his undivided interest to
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And this interest could have even been attached • Respondents took steps to perfect their appeal;
by his creditors. but after submitting their record on appeal, they
iled a motion for reconsideration and new trial,
The partition in 1998, six (6) months after the which the trial court denied.
iling of the expropriation case, terminated the co-
ownership by converting into certain and de inite • When respondents sought to revive their earlier
parts the respective undivided shares of the co- appeal, Judge Mendoza disallowed the same,
owners. The subject property is not a thing holding that respondents had abandoned their
essentially indivisible. The rights of the co-owners proposed appeal where they iled a motion for
to have the property partitioned and their share reconsideration.
in the same delivered to them cannot be
questioned for "[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to • Respondents then iled a petition with the
remain in the co-ownership." Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to annul Judge Mendoza's order
The partition was merely a necessary incident of disallowing their appeal.
the co-ownership; and absent any evidence to the
contrary, this partition is presumed to have been • The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the
done in good faith. petition and remanded the case on
• the premise that Judge Mendoza's decision
Miranda v. CA which required petitioners to render an
GR NO. L-33007. JUNE 18, 1976 accounting, is interlocutory because it did not
JUSTIN NIEL (TIN) VILLANUEVA dispose the case in its entirety but left something
to be done to complete the relief sought, and
DOCTRINE: therefore is not appealable until after the
rendition of the accounting.
FACTS:
• In a settlement of estate of Hilarion Dydongco, • Back in the court of origin, the parties iled
deceased, (a Philippine resident who died in several motion. The petitioners iled a motion for
China sometime in 1941) petitioner Vicente partial execution, while the respondents iled
Miranda was appointed as administrator. motions for reconsideration.

• Petitioners sued private respondent for recovery • Judge Tantuico, who succeeded Judge Mendoza
of decedent’s properties alleged to have been as the presiding judge, in resolving the motions in
fraudulently and in bad faith and in breach of effect reversed his predecessor's original decision
their iduciary trust, concealed appropriated and of July 26, 1965, by excluding certain valuable
converted as their own by respondent properties from the estate of the decedent and
absolving certain respondents from the obligation
• After the protracted trial, Judge M. Mendoza of turning over the possession to petitioner.
rendered a decision ordering respondents to
deliver to petitioner all properties found by the • In an action for certiorari petitioner assailed
court to belong to the estate, to render an Judge Tantuico's authority to issue such amended
accounting of the fruits of such properties, and to decision substantially changing his predecessor's
pay damages. original decision. The Court of Appeals, to which
the action was referred by the Supreme Court,
held, in a split decision, that since Judge

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Mendoza's original decision of July 8, 1965 was the accounting shall not be stayed, unless
still "interlocutory" Judge Tantuico had authority otherwise ordered by the trial court. Thus, if the
to amend the same to make it conform to law and judgment directing an accounting is upheld or
justice. appeal, there would be no time lost and the
accounting as rendered could be passed upon the
ISSUES: trial court at the stage of execution of judgment;
WON the appeal is premature. (NO) and if the judgment were reversed on appeal,
reimbursement of the actual expenses incurred by
RULING: the successful appellant in rendering the
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's accounting could be awarded.
decision, holding that when the Supreme Court in
1968 held respondents' proposed appeal as The Court considers that where the primary
"premature" and remanded the case for purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine
implementation of the accounting phase as a mere who between plaintiff and defendant is the true
incident, so that a single appeal could be taken owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the
from both aspects of the judgment for recovery of disputed property, "the judgment . . . rendered by
properties and accounting, it was not reopen the the lower court [is] a judgment on the merits as to
case all over and have respondent judge assume those questions, and (that) the order of the court
reviewing if not appellate authority over his for an accounting was based upon, and is
predecessor's judgment but to have respondent incidental to the judgment on the merits. That is
judge enforce, and act on the accounting for the to say, that the judgment . . . (is) a inal judgment
completion of relief. …that in this kind of a case an accounting is a
mere incident to the judgment; that an appeal lies
The Court also declared as abandoned the from the rendition of the judgment as
doctrine of Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso and rendered . . ." (as is widely held by a great number
adopted the opposite rule that judgments for of judges and members of the bar, as shown by the
recovery with accounting are inal and appealable cases so decided and iled and still pending with
without need of awaiting accounting and would the Court) for the fundamental reasons therein
be inal and executory if not appealed within the stated that "this is more in harmony with the
reglementary period. administration of justice and the spirit and intent
of the [Rules].
Rule 39, section 4 which speci ically governs
actions for accounting expressly provides that If on appeal the judgment of the lower court is
"unless otherwise ordered by the courts a armed, it would not in the least work an injustice
judgment or order directing an accounting in an to any of the legal rights of [appellee]. On the
action, shall not be stayed after its rendition and other hand, if for any reason this court should
before an appeal is taken or during the pendency reverse the judgment of the lower court, the
of an appeal. accounting would be a waste of time and money,
and might work a material injury to the
The pertinent rule accordingly recognizes that in [appellant]; and — that accordingly, the contrary
actions involving the rendition of an accounting ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso which
(as in the case at bar), an appeal may be taken expressly reversed the Heacock case and a line of
from the judgment ordering the accounting and similar decisions and ruled that such a decision
directs that during the pendency of the appeal or for recovery of property with accounting "is not
even before the appeal is taken, the rendition of inal but merely interlocutory and therefore not

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appealable" and subsequent cases adhering to the except statutory liens and those noted on the
same must be now in turn abandoned and set certi icate.
aside.
FACTS:
It must be especially noted that such rule Cañada vs. Jabutay (Civil Case R-1630 for
governing partitions is now so expressly provided Partition)
and spelled out in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, Juan Jabutay was the owner of a lot in
with special reference to sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and Cebu. He sold one-half pro-indiviso portion of the
11, to wit, that there must irst be a preliminary subject lot to Eustaquio Paraiso. However, Jabutay
order for partition of the real estate (section 2) continued to occupy Paraiso’s one-half portion as
and where the parties-co-owners cannot agree, lessee of Paraiso
the court-appointed commissioners make a plan 22 years later, without informing Jabutay,
of actual partition which must irst be passed Paraiso sold his one-half undivided portion to
upon and accepted by the trial court and Vicente Ca ada
embodied in a judgment to be rendered by it Ca ada then iled an action for partition
(sections 6 and 11). against Jabutay to recover one half portion of the
lot.
In partition cases, it must be further borne in The trial court declared Ca ada and
mind that Rule 69, section 1 refers to "a person Jabutay as co-owners of the lot and ordered that it
having the right to compel the partition of real be partitioned between them in equal parts.
estate", so that the general rule of partition that Jabutay appealed. During the pendency of
an appeal will not lie until the partition or the appeal and without notice to Ca ada, Jabutay
distribution proceedings are terminated will not iled an application for registration of the entire
apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership subject lot in his name only. After the title was
of the whole property and denies the adverse issued to him, he then sold the entire lot to
party's right to any partition, as was the ruling in Gochan Corporation.
Villanueva vs. Capistrano and Africa vs. Africa, Unaware of the pendency of the partition
supra, Fuentebella's express reversal of these between between Ca ada and Jabutay, as no
cases must likewise be deemed now also notice of lis pendens was recorded on the back of
abandoned. Jabutay’s title, Gochan paid the stipulated
consideration and took possession of the lot.
Gochan and Sons Realty Corp.v. Canada Subsequently, Jabutay’s OCT was cancelled and a
TCT was issued to Gochan.
G.R. No. L-49686 .August 31, 1988
Cañada vs. Gochan and Jabutay (Civil Case
JANDILYN JAMORA YANG
R-6130 for annulment of sale)
Upon discovering that the lot had been
DOCTRINE: One’s claim under the decision for
registered in Jabutay’s name, Ca ada iled an
partition is extinguished by the registration of the
action against Jabutay and Gochan for the
lot under the Torrens System. Said decision may
annulment of the sale, cancellation of Gochan’s
not be executed against an innocent purchaser of
title and have a new title issued to him. Ca ada
the land for value. The registration of the lot
also caused a notice of lis penden to be annotated
under the Torrens system extinguished all claims,
on Gochan’s title.
liens, and encumbrances on the land asserted
prior to the issuance of the decree of registration
Cañada vs Jabutay CA-GR 22909-R

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The CA af irmed the decision of the trial summoned in the case and no notice of the
court in the partition case between Jabutay and pendency of said case had been annotated on the
Ca ada. vendor Jabutay’s title.
Reyes was substituted for Ca ada in this Jabutay's title was clean and free from
case (long story, not important). Reyes then iled a liens and encumbrances when Gochan purchased
motion for execution of the Civil Case R1630 for the lot. Gochan received a clean title too. Notice of
partition. Such motion was granted but was the pendency of the Civil case for partition was
returned unsatis ied on the ground that there is only recorded, at Ca ada’s instance, on Gochan’s
still a pending case between Ca ada and Gochan title 5 years after the judgement had been
(Civil Case R-6130) rendered by the trial court.
Gochan opposed the motion for execution The Court of Appeals' resolution
alleging that it is the registered owner of the lot impleading Gochan as an additional defendant in
and that it was not impleaded nor summoned in CA-G.R. No. 22909-R on August 26, 1970 by a
the civil case for partition (R-1630), the court mere resolution of said Court changing the title of
therefore did not acquire jurisdiction over it. the case more than six (6) years after it had
It had not been duly heard in the case. rendered judgment therein, was null and void for
The decision therein was neither binding nor lack of jurisdiction. The Appellate Court's
enforceable against it. It argued that the Court of jurisdiction ceased after its judgment in the case
Appeals did not, and could not, by merely had become inal and executory.
changing the title of the already decided case, Impleading Gochan as an additional
acquire jurisdiction over Gochan defendant in the execution stage of the case,
The motion for execution was thereafter violated Gochan's right to due process. The Court
denied on the ground that Gochan had been the of Appeals ignored the fact that Gochan was the
registered owner of the lot 3 years before the registered owner of the entire lot as evidenced by
notice of lis pended was recorded on its title. its TCT, that Gochan was not a party in Civil Case
Reyes iled a motion to include Gochan in the CA No. R-1630 for partition, and that it did not have a
case and iled another motion for execution chance to be heard therein or to defend its title.
thereafter. The fact cannot be overemphasized that
The court then appointed commissioners the registration of lot under the Torrens system
for the partition to which Gochan opposed. extinguished all claims, liens, and encumbrances
on the land asserted prior to the issuance of the
decree of registration except statutory liens and
ISSUES: WON Gochan is bound by the decision in those noted on the certi icate.
the Partition case? NO Ca ada’s claim to one-half of the land
under the decision in the Civil Case for partition
RULING: was extinguished by the registration of the entire
The rule on lis pendens is that, when a lot in Jabutay’s name. Said decision may not be
case is commenced involving any right to lands executed against an innocent purchaser of the
registered under the Land Registration Law, any land for value, which Gochan claims to be.
decision therein will bind the parties only, unless Reyes’ remedy, as Ca ada’s successor-in-
a notice of the pendency of such action is interest, lies in an independent action against
registered on the title of the land, in order to bind Gochan for reconveyance of her one-half share of
the whole world as well. Lot 6733. In that action, Gochan may defend its
Gochan was not bound by the decision in title and prove that it purchased the land in good
the Civil Case for partition for it was never faith and for value with a title superior to Reyes'

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unregistered claim. Or, Reyes may ile a claim for declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and
damages against Ca ada's estate to recover the Pascual Oils as proof that there was a subdivision
consideration that she supposedly paid for his of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas
one-half share of the land. Maglucot, respondents' predecessors-in-interest,
took active part in the partition as it was he, in
Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot fact, who commenced the action for partition.
G.R. No. 132518, MARCH 28, 2000

The court applied Article 1431 of the Civil Code
EDWARD PETERKIM CAMBA YU
which states that through estoppel an admission
or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
DOCTRINE: Partition may be inferred from
person making it, and cannot be denied or
circumstances suf iciently strong to support the
disproved as against the person relying thereon."
presumption. Thus a parol or oral partition
Applying said provision of law, it held that while
happens after a long possession in severalty and
there was no court order showing that Lot No.
each exercises acts of ownership recognizing
1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be
existence of partition--a deed of partition may be
used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his
presumed.
successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an
approved partition against the other co-owners
FACTS: This case is about the issue of partition of
who claim that there was one. However it must be
Lot No. 1639. Petitioners iled in the RTC a
noted that there was a prior oral agreement of
complaint for recovery of possession and
partition and the parties occupied the respective
damages alleging that they are the owners of Lot
lots pursuant thereto.
No. 1639-D. The said lot was originally part of lot

1639 which was titled under the names of
Private respondents also claimed that there was
Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot et al.
no partition hence, they are co-owners of Lot No.

1639-D. It was then found out that despite the
On 1952 Tomas Maglucot iled a petition to
order of partition of the court there was no
subdivide lot no. 1639. The CFI of Negros Oriental
sketch/subdivision plan submitted to the then
then directed the parties to subdivide the said lot
Court of First Instance for its approval or that a
into 6 portions. Few years after Guillermo
decree or order was registered in the Register of
Maglucot rented a portion of lot no. 1639-D.
Deeds.
Subsequently Leopoldo and Severo Maglucot
rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969
ISSUES: WON a partition was indeed effected
each paying rentals. The respondents in this case
built houses on their leased lots. The respondents
RULING: Yes. The facts of the case show that there
paid rentals to Mrs. Salma who represented the
was a prior oral agreement to partition Lot No.
heirs of Roberto Maglucot , petitioner’s
1639. By virtue of this agreement, the original co-
predecessors-in-interest..
owners occupied speci ic portions of Lot No.

1639. It was only in 1952 when the petition to
The problem aroused in 1992 when respondents
subdivide Lot No. 1639 was iled because two of
stopped paying the rentals and claimed
the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs
ownership over the subject lot which leads to the
of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided
iling of a complaint by the petitioners. After trail,
and have separate certi icates of title.
the lower court rendered judgment in favor of

petitioners. The RTC found the existence of tax

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Signi icantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the Espina v. Abaya

parties in this case by themselves and/or through
196 SCRA 313 (1991)
their predecessors-in-interest occupied speci ic
XANTHE DAPHNE VALERIE AQUINO ALCASID
portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the
sketch plan. Such possession remained until this
DOCTRINE: An oral agreement for the partition of
case arose which is more or less 40 years.
the property owned in common is valid and
enforceable upon the parties.
The court also held that a party to a partition is
barred from avoiding partition when he has
FACTS:
received and held a portion of the subdivided land
especially in this case where respondents have ● Marcos Espina’s estate comprised of 4
enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a
parcels of land and was survived by her
long time.
spouse and children.
● 2 of her children (respondents) were in
The court also found out that the records show
possession of the subject lot.
that respondents were paying rent for the use of a ● The spouse and the other children
portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of the
(petitioners) demanded the partition of
belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot
the subject lot but the respondents
No. 1639 they would not have paid rent. The
refused to accede.
payment of rentals by respondents reveals that ● Respondents alleged that Marcos and his
they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of
wife made a temporary verbal division
respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a
and assignment of shares among their
holder and not in the concept of an owner.
children which was thereafter inalized

after the death of Marcos.
O n e w h o p o s s e s s e s a s a m e r e h o l d e r ● The heirs took immediate possession of
acknowledges in another a superior right which
their respective shares on April 20, 1952.
he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be
Respondents took actual physical
right or wrong. Since the possession of
possession of their respective shares
respondents were found to be that of lessors of
including the portions ceded to them by
petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter
Simprosa upon their payment of P50.00
were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the
each per quarter starting April, 1952
concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the
until the latter's death pursuant to their
present.
contract of cession.
● Petitioners maintain that the present
It must be noted that there was a prior oral
action is not for reconveyance but one for
partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition
partition. Hence, the rule insisted by the
was initially tentative, the actual possession of
private respondents on prescriptibility of
speci ic portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance
an action for reconveyance of real
with the oral partition and the continuation of
property based on an implied trust is not
such possession for a very long period indicate
applicable in the case at bar. In addition,
the permanency and rati ication of such oral
p e t i t i o n e r s , a r g u e t h a t p r i v a t e
partition. The validity of an oral partition is
respondents cannot set up the defense of
already well-settled.
prescription or laches because their

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possession of the property no matter how
long cannot ripen into ownership
● Respondents stress that "any supposed
right of the petitioners to demand a new
division or partition of said estate of
Marcos Espina has long been barred by
the Statute of Limitations and has long
prescribed
ISSUES:
1. WON the oral agreement for partition is
valid (YES)
2. WON the imprescriptibility of the action
for partition can be invoked (NO)
RULING:
1. An agreement of partition may be made

orally or in writing. An oral agreement for
the partition of the property owned in
common is valid and enforceable upon
the parties. The Statute of Frauds has no
operation in this kind of agreements, for
partition is not a conveyance of property
but simply a segregation and designation
of the part of the property which belong
to the co-owners."
2. The imprescriptibility of the action for
partition cannot be invoked because two
of the co-heirs, possessed the property as
exclusive owners and their possession for
a period of twenty one (21) years is
suf icient to acquire it by prescription.
Hence, from the moment these coheirs
claim that they are the absolute and
exclusive owners of the properties and
deny the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of
partition but of ownership.

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Rule 70- FORCIBLE Respondents prayed for the restoration of their

possession and for the issuance of a permanent
ENTERY & UNLAWFUL injunction against the petitioner as well as
damages.
DETAINER
Petitioner contends that the MTCC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the said
Estel v. Heirs of Diego complaint. She also averred that the MTCC did not
663 SCRA 1. DATE acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of
JEZREEL EZER BASE ARCHIVAL respondents to speci ically allege facts
constitutive of forcible entry. Petitioner argues
DOCTRINE: that the MTCC should have dismissed the
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly complaint motu proprio.
provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction MTCC ruled in favor of respondents. It issued a
of the municipal courts. TRO against the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to
RTC and CA but both denied the former’s petition.
In actions for forcible entry, two allegations are
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire ISSUES:
jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must allege his WON MTCC had jurisdiction over the case. YES
prior physical possession of the property. Second,
he must also allege that he was deprived of his RULING:
possession by any of the means provided for in A review of the records shows that petitioner did
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, not raise the issue of jurisdiction or venue in her
namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and Answer led with the MTCC. The CA correctly held
stealth. that even if the geographical location of the
subject property was not alleged in the Complaint,
FACTS: petitioner failed to seasonably object to the same
Respondents alleged that they entered into a in her Af irmative Defense, and even actively
contract of sale of a parcel of land with petitioner participated in the proceedings before the MTCC.
and after receiving the downpayment, petitioner In fact, petitioner did not even raise this issue in
voluntarily delivered the physical and material her appeal led with the RTC. Thus, she is already
p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t p ro p e r t y t o estopped from raising the said issue in the CA or
respondents. Respondents argued that they had before this Court. Estoppel sets in when a party
been in actual, adverse and uninterrupted participates in all stages of a case before
possession of the subject of lot since then and that challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.
petitioner never disturbed nor annoyed
respondents with respect to their possession over One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower
the property. court's decision after voluntarily submitting to its
jurisdiction, just to secure af irmative relief
However, one morning, petitioner, together with against one's opponent or after failing to obtain
her seven (7) other persons, uprooted the fence such relief. The Court has, time and again,
surrounding the disputed lot, entered its premises frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party
and then cut and destroyed the trees and plants. submitting a case for decision and then accepting
the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it Heirs of Maligaso v. Encinas

for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
674 SCRA 215. DATE
JUNEFAIR AIRENE MIRA BADDONG
In any case, since the Complaint is clearly and
admittedly one for forcible entry, the jurisdiction
DOCTRINE: Forcible entry and Unlawful detainer
over the subject matter of the case is, thus, upon
are summary proceedings. Thus, whether the
the MTCC.
petitioners have a better right to the contested
area and whether fraud attended the issuance
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly
title over the subject lot are issues that are
provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer
outside the jurisdiction and competence of a
cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction
trial court in actions for unlawful detainer and
of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
forcible entry.
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Hence,
as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action.
FACTS:
The question whether or not the suit was brought Spouses Encinas are the registered owners of Lot
in the place where the land in dispute is located No. 3517 (2,867 square meters), covered by TCT
was no more than a matter of venue and the court, No. T-4773. The subject matter of this controversy
in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, is a portion of Lot No. 3517 with an area of 980
could determine whether the venue was properly square meters, which the Heirs of Jose Maligaso,
or improperly laid. Sr. (petitioners) continue to occupy despite having
received two notices to vacate from the
As to respondents' supposed failure to allege facts respondents.
constitutive of forcible entry, it is settled that in
actions for forcible entry, two allegations are Lot No. 3517 was previously covered by OCT No.
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire 543, issued in the name of Maria, the petitioners’
jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must allege his aunt. In 1965, Maria sold Lot No. 3517 to Virginia.
prior physical possession of the property. Second, Three years later, Virginia sold the same lot to the
he must also allege that he was deprived of his respondents, resulting to the cancellation of OCT
possession by any of the means provided for in No. 543 and issuance of TCT No. T-4773.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court,
namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and Approximately 30 years from the time they
stealth. purchased Lot No. 3517, the respondents issued
two demand letters to the petitioners, asking
It is clear that respondents suf iciently alleged in them to vacate the contested area within thirty
their Complaint the material facts constituting (30) days from notice. The petitioners refused to
forcible entry, as they explicitly claimed that they leave, claiming that the subject area was the share
had prior physical possession of the subject of their father, Jose Maligaso, Sr, in their
property since its purchase from petitioner, who grandparents’ estate.
voluntarily delivered the same to them. In the
instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that Thus, the respondents iled a complaint for
respondents suf iciently alleged that the unlawful detainer against them with the MTC,
possession of the subject property was wrested alleging that the petitioners’ occupation is by
from them through violence and force. mere tolerance and had become illegal following
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their refusal to vacate the property despite being of peace and order in the community. The said
demanded to do so twice. objectives can only be achieved by according the
proceedings a summary nature. However, its
The petitioners denied that their possession of being summary poses a limitation on the nature of
the disputed area was by mere tolerance and issues that can be determined and fully ventilated.
claimed title thereto on the basis of their father’s It is for this reason that the proceedings are
successional rights. That the petitioners’ concentrated on the issue on possession. Thus,
occupation remained undisturbed for more than whether the petitioners have a better right to
thirty years, attacked the validity of OCT No. 543 the contested area and whether fraud
and TCT No. T-4773 (alleging that it was attended the issuance of Maria’s title over Lot
registered by fraud), moved for the dismissal of No. 3517 are issues that are outside the
the complaint, and that laches had already set in jurisdiction and competence of a trial court in
view of the respondents’ failure to assail their actions for unlawful detainer and forcible
possession for more than 30 years. entry. This is in addition to the rule that a Torrens
title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which an
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the ejectment proceeding, is not an exception.
Rules of Court of the Decision and Resolution of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775 reversing and In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E.
setting aside the Decision of the RTC which Concepcion, a similar allegation – possession of
af irmed the Decision of the MTC dismissing the the property in dispute since time immemorial –
Spouses Encinas’ (respondents) complaint for was met with rebuke as such possession, for
unlawful detainer. whatever length of time, cannot prevail over a
Torrens title, the validity of which is presumed
ISSUES: and immune to any collateral attack.
WON the respondents have the right to evict the
petitioners from the subject property. In this case, the trial court found that respondent
owns the property on the basis of TCT No. 12892,
RULING: which was "issued in the name of Arsenio E.
Concepcion, xxx married to Nenita L. Songco." It is
No. Between the petitioners’ unsubstantiated self- a settled rule that the person who has a Torrens
serving claim that their father inherited the title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
contested portion of Lot No. 3517 and the Hence, as the registered owner of the subject
respondents’ Torrens title, the latter must prevail. property, respondent is preferred to possess it.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are As registered owners of the lots in question, the
summary proceedings designed to provide for an private respondents have a right to eject any
expeditious means of protecting actual possession person illegally occupying their property. This
or the right to the possession of the property right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed
involved. The objective of actions for forcible that they were aware of the petitioners’
entry and unlawful detainer, which have occupation of the property, and regardless of the
purposely been made summary in nature, is to length of that possession, the lawful owners have
provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means a right to demand the return of their property at
of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of any time as long as the possession was
property from unjustly continuing his possession unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This
for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance right is never barred by laches.

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As registered owners of the lots in question, the contract between the petitioner and Chua Sing
private respondents have a right to eject any does not affect their right to possess the land, and
person illegally occupying their property. This sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction.
that they were aware of the petitioners’
occupation of the property, and regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have ISSUES: WON the action of unlawful detainer is
a right to demand the return of their property at the proper remedy.
any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This RULING: No. Unlawful detainer is a summary
right is never barred by laches. action for recovery of possession of real property.
This action may be iled by a lessor, vendor,
Petition is DENIED and the DECISION of the CA is vendee, or other person against whom the
AFFIRMED. possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the
Jose v. Alfuerto right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the
686 SCRA 323. DATE
possession of the defendant was originally legal,
ANGELIQUE JANE SULIT BANTIQUETE
as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff
on account of an express or implied contract
DOCTRINE: The court cannot treat an ejectment
between them. However, the defendant’s
case as an accion publiciana or accion
possession became illegal when the plaintiff
reinvindicatoria. The court cannot simply take the
demanded that the defendant vacate the subject
evidence presented before the MeTC in an
property due to the expiration or termination of
ejectment case and decide it as an accion
the right to possess under the contract, and the
publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria
defendant refused to heed such demand. A case
for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year
FACTS: 1. This case is about a dispute involving a
from the unlawful withholding of possession.
parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo
Chua Sing. Sing purchased the land in 1991 and The petitioner’s allegations in the amended
later on leased the said property to the petitioner. complaint run counter to the requirements of
Their contract of lease was neither notarized nor unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer action, the
registered with the Registry of Deeds. possession of the defendant was originally legal
and his possession was permitted by the owner
2. Signi icantly, the respondent already occupied
through an express or implied contract.
the property even before the lease contract was
executed. Soon after the parties signed the lease In this case, the respondents’ occupancy was
contract, the petitioner demanded in writing that unlawful from the start and was bereft of
the respondents vacate the property within 30 contractual or legal basis. In unlawful detainer
days and that they pay the monthly rental until case, the defendant’s possession becomes illegal
they fully vacate the property. only upon the plaintiff ’s demand for the
defendant to vacate the property and the
3. The respondent refused to vacate and to pay
defendant’s subsequent refusal.
the rent. Respondent argued that they have been
in possession of the land long before Sing
acquired the property in 1991, and that the lease

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The petitioner nevertheless insists that he Villondo v. Quijano

properly alleged that the respondents occupied
686 SCRA 694| Dec. 3, 2012
the premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No
ERICKA HARRIET MERCADO CABALLES
allegation in the complaint not any supporting
evidence on record shows when the respondents
DOCTRINE:
entered the property or who granted them the
A person deprived of the possession of any land
permission to enter. Tolerance or permission must
or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
have been present at the beginning of possession;
or stealth may bring an action in the proper MTC
if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
against the person or persons unlawfully
action for unlawful detainer would not be the
withholding or depriving of possession, or any
proper remedy and should be dismissed.
person claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and cost
The petitioner argues that assuming this case

should have been iled as an accion publiciana or
FACTS:
accion reivindicatoria, this Court should still
1. In a case for forcible entry, two parties
resolve the case, as requiring him to properly
assert their alleged right to possess a
re ile the case serves no other ends than to
2.66-hectare government timberland in
comply with technicalities.
Cebu City. Petitioner iled a complaint for
The court cannot treat an ejectment case as an Fo rc i b l e E n t r y w i t h p re l i m i n a r y
accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria. The mandatory injunction before the MTCC in
court cannot simply take the evidence presented Cebu.
before the MeTC in an ejectment case and decide 2. Petitioner claimed that Respondent
i t a s a n a c c i o n p u b l i c i a n a o r a c c i o n Carmen and her farm laborers intruded
r e i n v i n d i c a t o r i a . T h e s e c a s e s a r e n o t her land with the help of three policemen.
interchangeable and their difference constitute far They also destroyed the plants, harvested
more than mere technicalities. the trees, built a hut and fenced off the lot
with a “no trespassing sign” which
The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry prevented Valeriana and her family from
and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary entering the premises.
proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy 3. Valeriana argued that Carmen can never
and expeditious means of preventing an alleged assert ownership over the property
illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking because it is a government land.
and continuing his possession during the long Valeriana based their right of possession
period it would take to properly resolve the issue on Certi icate of Stewardship No. 146099
of possession de jure or ownership, thereby in the name of ‘Daniel T. Villondo,’ which
ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in she claimed to have been awarded to her
the community; otherwise, the party illegally now-deceased husband whose actual
deprived of possession might take the law in his name is ‘Daniel P. Villondo. Said
hands and seize the property by force and Certi icate was issued by the DENR on
violence. 49 An ejectment case cannot be a February 14, 1994. Valeriana further
substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of averred that her family had prior
determining rights of possession or ownership. possession of the land as her husband
started tilling the same even before the
war.
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4. On the other hand, Carmen interposed p e r s o n o r p e r s o n s u n l aw f u l l y

that the alleged "Kasabutan" was never w i t h h o l d i n g o r d e p r i v i n g o f
brought to her attention by her parents. possession, or any person or persons
She tacked her possessory right to that of c l a i m i n g u n d e r t h e m , f o r t h e
her parents who in 1948 purchased a restitution of such possession,
4.51 hectare land in Taop, Pardo, Cebu together with damages and costs.
City covered by Tax Declaration No.
92638. According to her, the said 4.51 In this case, Valeriana is one of those in prior
hectare land includes the disputed area physical possession of the land who was
which her parents also cultivated and eventually dispossessed. Carmen failed to present
developed. Carmen submitted to the evidence that she was in actual physical
court her tax declarations over the land. possession of the land she claims. Her tax
5. Respondents also questioned Valeriana’s declarations are not conclusive proofs of
legal personality to sue contending that ownership, or even of possession. They only
“Daniel T. Villondo,” the named tiller in constitute proof of a claim of title over the
the Certi icate of Stewardship is the real declared property.
party-in-interest and thus should be the
plaintiff, not Valeriana. They further Hence, the MTCC correctly considered Valeriana
refuted the claim that the named tiller as a real party-in-interest. She has a right or
refers to her husband as Valeriana is only interest to protect as she was the one
misleading the court by making it appear dispossessed and thus, she can ile the action for
that she has successional rights from her forcible entry. The fact that Valeriana is not the
husband as a steward. holder of the Certi icate of Stewardship is not in
6. The MTC ruled in favor of Valeriana but issue in a forcible entry case. This matter already
the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. delves into the character of her possession. In
The CA af irmed RTC’s decision. ejectment suits, it does not matter if the party’s
title to the property is questionable.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Valeriana is a real party-in- Absent any evidence of respondents’ prior
interest in the forcible entry case she iled? (Yes) physical possession, Valeriana, who has cogently
convinced the court that she was dispossessed of
RULING: the land by force, is entitled to stay on the
Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court speci ies who property until she is lawfully ejected by others
may be the plaintiff in an action for forcible entry who can prove in a separate proceeding that they
— have a better right.

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, Macaslang v. Zamora
and when. — . . . a person deprived of
G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011
the possession of any land or building
IRVIN NERI CHIU
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth, xxx may, at any time within
DOCTRINE: A complaint suf iciently alleges a
one (1) year after such unlawful
cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states
deprivation or withholding of possession,
the following:
b r i n g a n a c t i o n i n t h e p ro p e r
Municipal Trial Court against the
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(a)Initially, the possession of the property The respondents appealed to the CA, and CA
by the defendant was by contract with or reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and
by tolerance of the plaintiff; reinstated the MTCC’s decision in favor of the
r e s p o n d e n t s . P e t i t i o n e r ’ s m o t i o n f o r
(b)Eventually, such possession became reconsideration was denied, thus, this petition.
illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant about the termination of the ISSUES:
latter’s right of possession;
Whether or not in an action for unlawful detainer,
(c)Thereafter, the defendant remained in where there was no prior demand to vacate and
possession of the property and deprived comply with the conditions of the lease made, a
the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and valid cause of action exists?
(d)Within one year from the making of

RULING:
the last demand to vacate the property on
the defendant, the plaintiff instituted the
A complaint suf iciently alleges a cause of action
complaint for ejectment.
for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
FACTS:
(a)Initially, the possession of the property
by the defendant was by contract with or
On March 10, 1999, the respondents iled a
by tolerance of the plaintiff;
complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC,
alleging that the petitioner sold to them a (b)Eventually, such possession became
residential land located in Sbang, Danao City and illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the
that the petitioner requested to be allowed to live defendant about the termination of the
in the house with a promise to vacate as soon as latter’s right of possession;
she would be able to ind a new residence. They
further alleged that despite their demand after a (c)Thereafter, the defendant remained in
year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the possession of the property and deprived
premises. the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and
Despite the due service of the summons and copy (d)Within one year from the making of
of the complaint, the petitioner did not ile her the last demand to vacate the property on
answer. The MTCC declared her in default upon the defendant, the plaintiff instituted the
the respondents’ motion to declare her in default, complaint for ejectment.
and proceeded to receive the respondents’ oral
testimony and documentary evidence. Thereafter, In resolving whether the complaint states a cause
the MTCC rendered judgment against her. The of action or not, only the facts alleged in the
petitioner appealed to the RTC where the court a complaint are considered. The test is whether the
quo dismissed the complaint for failure to sate a court can render a valid judgment on the
cause of action but allowed the re iling of the case complaint based on the facts alleged and the
in the same Court, by alleging plaintiff’s cause of prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal
action, if any. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Execution of conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered
Judgment of the lower court is rendered moot by for purposes of applying the test.
this judgment.
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Based on its allegations, the complaint suf iciently becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer. ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Firstly, it averred that the petitioner possessed the Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of
property by the mere tolerance of the action that is a ground for the dismissal of the
respondents. Secondly, the respondents complaint but the fact that the complaint state no
demanded that the petitioner vacate the property, cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action
thereby rendering her possession illegal. Thirdly, may be raised at the earliest stages of an action
she remained in possession of the property through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of
despite the demand to vacate. And lastly, the action may be raised at any time after the
respondents instituted the complaint on March questions of fact have been resolved on the basis
10, 1999, which was well within a year after the of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence
demand to vacate was made around September of presented.
1998 or later.
Ocampo v. Dionisio
Yet, even as we rule that the respondents’
complaint stated a cause of action, we must ind GR. NO. 2014
and hold that both the RTC and the CA KATHLEEN MARIE DILAG
erroneously appreciated the real issue to be about
the complaint’s failure to state a cause of action. It DOCTRINE:
certainly was not so, but the respondents’ lack of A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will
cause of action. Their erroneous appreciation not bar an action between the same parties
prevented the correct resolution of the action. respecting title or ownership because between a
c a s e f o r f o rc i b l e e n t r y a n d a n a c c i o n
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of
of action are really different from each other. On action.
the one hand, failure to state a cause of actions
refers to the insuf iciency of the pleading, and is a FACTS:
ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Dionisio iled a complaint for forcible entry
Court. On the other hand, lack of cause of action against Mario and Felix Ocampo. Dionisio sought
refers to a situation where the evidence does not to recover the possession of a portion of his
prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. property situated in Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, alleging
that Mario and Felix built a piggery thereon
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the without his consent.
existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action: In his answer, Mario denied Dionisio’s allegation,
claiming that the disputed parcel of land is owned
1. The legal right of the plaintiff; by his wife Carmelita, who inherited the same
from her father. Mario further claimed that they
2. The correlative obligation of the
have been in possession of the said parcel of land
defendant; and
since 1969.
3. The act or omission of the
The MTC dismissed the complaint, inding that
defendant in violation of said legal right.
Dionisio failed to establish his prior possession of
If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the the disputed parcel of land.
concurrence of these elements, the complaint
Dionisio died. Consequently, his heirs iled a But where there is identity of parties in the 1st
complaint for recovery of possession against and 2nd cases, but no identity of causes of action,
t h e s p o u s e s M a r i o a n d C a r m e l i t a . T h e the 1st judgment is conclusive only as to those
respondents sought to recover the same portion matters actually and directly controverted and
of land subject of the forcible entry case. determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
The MTC dismissed the complaint on the as “conclusiveness of judgment.”
ground of res judicata in the light of the
inality of the decision in the forcible entry For res judicata (bar by prior judgment) to apply,
case. the following requisites must concur:
1) Finality of the former judgment
The RTC reversed, declaring the heirs entitled to 2) The court which rendered it had
possession for being the lawful owners of the jurisdiction over the subject matter and
lands and ordering the spouses to vacate as well the parties
as to pay the heirs 10k. 3) It must be a judgment on the merits
4) There must be, between the irst and
The RTC stressed that a judgment rendered in a second action, identity of parties, subject
forcible entry case will not bar an action for matter, and causes of action
recovery of possession based on title or
ownership since there is no identity of cause The irst 3 requisites are present in this case.
of action as between the 2 cases. The decision in the forcible entry case rendered
by the MTC, a court which has jurisdiction over
The CA af irmed. the subject property and the parties, had long
become inal. The said decision is an adjudication
ISSUES: on the merits. However, the 4th requisite is not
WON the inality of the decision in the forcible present. Although there is identity of parties
entry case constitutes res judicata, which would and subject matter as between the forcible
warrant the dismissal of the respondents’ entry case and recovery of possession case,
complaint for recovery of possession. there is no identity of causes of action.
RULING: The forcible entry case only involves the issue of

possession over the subject property while the
YES. The doctrine of res judicata is laid down recovery of possession case puts in issue the
under Section 47 of Rule 39. It comprehends 2 ownership of the subject property and the
distinct concepts of res judicata: concomitant right to possess the same as an
1) Bar by former judgment attribute of ownership.
2) Conclusiveness of judgment
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as In action for forcible entry and detainer, the
between the 1st case where judgment was only issue is possession in fact, or physical
rendered and the 2nd case sought to be barred, possession of real property, independently of
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and any claim of ownership that either party may
causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove
the irst case constitutes an absolute bar to the prior physical possession in himself, he may
2nd action. recover such possession even from the owner, but,
on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior

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physical possession, he has no right of action for Manalang v. Bacani,
forcible entry and detainer even if he should be
GR. NO. 2015
the owner of the property.
KRIZZA SUPERALES DUMASIG
Thus, the MTC’s determination is only limited

DOCTRINE: In the exercise of its appellate
to the issue of who has “actual prior
jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall
possession” of the property regardless of
decide the appeal of the judgment of the
ownership of the same.
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in unlawful detainer
or forcible entry cases on the basis of the entire
On the other hand, the recovery of possession
record of the proceedings had in the court of
case is actually an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as
to recover possession of a parcel of land as an
may be required by the RTC. There is no trial de
element of ownership. A perusal of the complaint
novo of the case.
iled by the respondent in the recovery of
possession case shows that the heirs, as
FACTS:
successors-in-interest of Dionisio, are asserting
1. Petitioners were the co-owners of Lot No.
ownership of the subject property and are seeking
4236 with an area of 914 square meters
the recovery of possession thereof.
of the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Tomasa
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case
B. Garcia. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the
will not bar an action between the same
respondents' Lot No. 4235 covered by
parties respecting title or ownership because
Original Certi icate of Title (OCT) No.
between a case for forcible entry and an
N-216701.
accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of
2. In 1997, the petitioners caused the
causes of action. Such determination does not
relocation and veriBcation survey of Lot
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land;
4236 and the adjoining lots, and the
neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found
result showed that the respondents had
in a case between the same parties upon a
encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the extent
different cause of action involving possession.
of 405 square meters. A preliminary
relocation survey conducted by the Lands
The decision in the forcible entry case is
Management Section of the Department
conclusive only as to the MTC’s determination
of Environment and Natural Resources
that the petitioners are not liable for forcible
(DENR) con irmed the result of the
entry since the respondents failed to prove
encroachment.
their prior physical possession it is not
3. When respondent refused to vacate the
conclusive as to the ownership of the subject
encroached portion and surrender
property. Besides, Section 18, of Rule 70
peaceful possession thereof despite
provides that, “a judgment rendered in an
demands, the petitioners commenced
action for forcible entry or detainer shall be
this action for unlawful detainer on April
conclusive with respect to the possession only
21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua (Civil Case
and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the
No. 3309), and the case was assigned to
ownership of the land.”
Branch 2 of that court.
4. MTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that the case essentially involves

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a boundary dispute, thus should be Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by
p r o p e r l y r e s o l v e d i n a n a c c i o n ordering the conduct of the relocation and
reivindicatoria. veri ication survey "in aid of its appellate
5. On appeal, RTC reversed MTC’s decision jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the
holding that the case involves an surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its
ejectment case. Thus, remand the case to holding of a trial de novo. The violation was
MTC. accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately
6. However, upon remand, MTC dismissed decided the appeal based on the survey and the
the case holding that that the petitioners surveyor's testimony instead of the record of the
failed to adduce clear and convincing proceedings had in the court of origin.
evidence showing that the respondents
had encroached on their property and 2. NO, the CA correctly held that a boundary
had been occupying and possessing dispute must be resolved in the context of accion
property outside the metes and bounds reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The
described in Bienvenido Bacani's OCT No. boundary dispute is not about possession, but
N216701. encroachment, that is, whether the property
7. On appeal, RTC denied the same. CA claimed by the defendant formed part of the
reversed the denial of RTC arguing that plaintiff's property. A boundary dispute cannot be
the RTC, by ordering the relocation and settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of
veri ication survey "in aid of its appellate Court, the proceedings under which are limited to
jurisdiction", had acted as a trial court in unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
complete disregard of the second
paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of the In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully
Rules of Court. withholds the possession of the premises upon
the expiration or termination of his right to hold
ISSUES: such possession under any contract, express or
1. WON RTC violated section 18 par 2 of implied. The defendant's possession was lawful at
Rule 70 of Rules of Court when it ordered the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of
the relocation and veri ication survey of the expiration or termination of his right of
the subject lot. possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the
2. WON a boundary dispute may be defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and
resolved under ejectment case. the issue centers on which between the plaintiff
and the defendant had the prior possession de
RULING: facto
YES. Section 18 par 2 of Rule 70 of Rules of Court
provides:
Javier v. Lumontad
“The judgment or inal order shall be
GR. NO. 203760 (2014)
appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court
EDWARD DOMINIC ESTOY EMILIO
which shall decide the same on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
DOCTRINE: What determines the nature of the
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction
be submitted by the parties or required by the
over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.
Regional Trial Court.”

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FACTS: A forcible entry Complaint was iled by case to the latter court for trial on the merits in an
petitioner Homer C. Javier against respondent a c t i o n f o r r e c o ve r y o f o w n e r s h i p a n d
Susan Lumontad MTC of Taytay, Rizal. possession.cralawred
Petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the RULING: The SC inds that the complaint was
late Vicente Javier. Allegedly, Vicente Javier was indeed one for forcible entry, but the petitioner’s
the owner of a parcel of land where the case nonetheless fails to impress on the merits.
petitioner’s family has lived in since petitioner’s
birth. What determines the nature of the action, as well
as the court which has jurisdiction over the case,
Upon Vicente’s death, the petitioner, together with are the allegations in the complaint. In forcible
his mother, continued their possession over the entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that
land. Eventually, the respondent gained entry into one in physical possession of a land or building
the subject land and started to build a two-storey has been deprived of that possession by another
building on a portion thereof, despite petitioner’s through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
vigorous objections and protests. stealth. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as
long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of
Thus, the petitioner was constrained to ile action for forcible entry, the court acquires
against respondent the instant forcible entry jurisdiction over the subject matter.
complaint. Respondent admitted that during
Vicente’s lifetime, he indeed was the owner and in Petitioner’s complaint alleges that petitioner was
physical possession of the subject land. in prior physical possession of the subject land
Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of the but was eventually dispossessed of a portion
portion where the subject building was being thereof by respondent who, through force and
constructed after acquiring it through sale from intimidation, gained entry into the same and,
another son of Vicente Javier. thereafter, erected a building thereon. The acts of
unlawfully entering the disputed premises,
The MTC dismissed the complaint for a lack of erecting a structure thereon, and excluding
cause of action since the respondent actually therefrom the prior possessor, would necessarily
owned the parcel of land and, in any event, it imply the use of force. Thus, the action is one of
lacked jurisdiction over the case which was forcible entry.
supposed to be an action for recovery of
ownership. This was overturned by the RTC. Nevertheless, petitioner had failed to justify his
However, the CA agreed with the MTC when it right to the de facto possession of the disputed
held that the issue of possession is intimately premises. The supposed document from which
intertwined with the issue of ownership, such that petitioner hinges his right to the de facto
the former issue cannot be determined without possession of the subject land, only covers his
ruling on who really owns such land. Thus, it house and not the entire land itself. Nothing
remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the appears to show that he has the right to the de
merits in the exercise of the latter’s original facto possession of the portion which, on the
jurisdiction in an action for recovery of ownership contrary, appears to be consistent with the claim
and possession. of ownership of respondent in view of the title
covering the same property as registered in her
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA correctly set aside name. With no evidence in support of petitioner’s
the RTC Ruling and ordered the remand of the stance, and the counter-evidence showing
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respondent’s right to the de facto possession of petitioner proved was legal possession, not his
the portion as its ostensible owner, the forcible prior physical possession.
complaint must necessarily fail.
ISSUES:
Mangaser v. Ugay
GR. NO. 2014 WON the issue of ownership is material and
KATHRYN SUZANNE RODRIGUEZ ENRIQUEZ relevant in the issue of possession
DOCTRINE:
Sec. 16, Rule 70 RULING:
The issue of ownership shall be resolved in
deciding the issue of possession if the question of Yes. The Rules of Court in fact expressly allow this:
possession is intertwined with the issue of Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides
ownership. This is allowed only if the question of that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in
possession cannot be resolved without deciding deciding the issue of possession if the question of
the issue of ownership. possession is intertwined with the issue of
ownership. But this provision is only an exception
FACTS: and is allowed only in this limited instance — to
determine the issue of possession and only if the
Petitioner Mangaser iled a complaint for Forcible question of possession cannot be resolved
Entry with Damages against respondent Ugay. He without deciding the issue of ownership.
alleges that he discovered that respondent
stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his The issue of ownership should be provisionally
property by constructing a residential house determined in this case. First, the juridical act
thereon without his knowledge and consent. from which the right of ownership of petitioner
Respondent argues, among others, that in arise would be the registration of the free patent
installing the fence, he was guided by the concrete and the issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789).
monuments which he knew to be indicators of the Apparently, the Torrens title suggests ownership
boundaries of petitioner's property; that while he over the land. Second, respondent also asserts
could not locate some of the monuments, he ownership over the land based on his prior,
based the boundaries on his recollection since he actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive
was around when these were installed; that and peaceful possession in the concept of an
petitioner was never in actual possession of the owner of the property in dispute. Because there
property occupied by him, and it was only on are con licting claims of ownership, then it is
October 31, 2006 when he discovered the alleged proper to provisionally determine the issue of
intrusion. On appeal, the CA set aside the decision ownership to settle the issue of possession de
of the RTC. Its decision states in part that the facto.
petitioner was not in physical possession despite
Court inds that petitioner acquired possession of
the presentation of the OCT No. RP-174(13789)
the subject property by juridical act, speci ically,
and his tax declarations. When the law would
through the issuance of a free patent under
speak of possession in forcible entry cases, it is
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent
prior physical possession or possession de facto,
registration with the Register of Deeds. The
as distinguished from possession de jure. What
issuance of an original certi icate of title to the
petitioner evidences ownership and from it, a
right to the possession of the property lows. 3. In the meantime, the petitioner iled a
Well-entrenched is the rule that a person who has case for quieting of title over the same
a Torrens title over the property is entitled to the parcel of land.
possession thereof. Moreover, his claim of 4. Meanwhile, the decision on the unlawful
possession is coupled with tax declarations. While detainer case was rendered against the
tax declarations are not conclusive proof of petitioner. The decision became inal and
possession of a parcel of land, they are good executory.
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, 5. An order for demolition was issued to
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes demolish the properties of petitioner in
for a property that is not in his actual or the subject lot.
constructive possession.
ISSUES:
Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of W/N the execution of the judgment in the
petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that ejectment case should be suspended before the
he had prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, inal termination of the action for quieting of title
exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept
of an owner, has no leg to stand on. Thus, by RULING:
provisionally resolving the issue of ownership, the Yes. As a general rule, the illing of a case involving
Court is satis ied that the petitioner had prior ownership over a parcel of land does not suspend
possession of the subject property. the decision in an ejectment case. This is so
because said cases for determination of
Vda. De Legaspi v. Avendano ownership are iled merely to delay the
proceedings for ejectment.
GR No. L-40437, September 27, 1977
However in this case, it is a matter of equity that
petitioner's physical possession of the premises in
DOCTRINE: Ejectment suit cannot be abated or
controversy should not be disturbedduring the
suspended by the mere act of iling another action
determination of who actually owns of the subject
raising the ownership of the property as an issue.
land.
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to
await the outcome of a civil action. The Supreme
The special civil action under Rule 70 has been
Court ordered the suspension of the Unlawful
designed to summarily restore possession of land
Detainer proceedings on considerations of equity .
or building to one who has been forcibly deprived
thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the
opposing claims of the parties to legal possession
FACTS:
in the corresponding appropriate proceeding.
1. Private respondents iled a forcible entry
case against the petitioner.
If the action is for unlawful detainer where the
2. It was later on found out that the
issue of right to possession by the plaintiff is
p e t i t i o n e r wa s a c t u a l ly i n p r i o r
seriously put in issue, as compared to forcible
possession of the property and the true
entry, the court where the ejectment case is iled
tenor of the complaint was one of
(whether or not the issue of ownership is raised
unlawful detainer.
therein), is brought to retain the execution of any
decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to

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await the inal judgment in the more substantive 2. The court rendered a decision against the
case involving legal possession or ownership. petitioners and they were ordered to
vacate the premises.
It is only where there has been forcible entry that 3. The petitioners appealed the case to the
as a matter of public policy the right to physical RTC.
possession should be immediately set at rest in 4. Pending appeal, the petitioners also iled
favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact an action for quieting of title and
that the other party might ultimately be found to reconveyance.
have superior claim to the premises involved, 5. Petitioners claim that the proceedings of
thereby to discourage any attempt to recover the appealed unlawful detainer case
possession thru force, strategy or stealth and should be suspended pending 3nal
without resorting to the courts. judgment of the Quieting of Title case.
The Court took into consideration the great peril ISSUES: W/N the proceedings in the unlawful
that may be brought to the petitioners if the detainer case should be suspended pending
execution decision of the unlawful detainer case determination in the action for quieting of title.
w o u l d n o t b e r e s t r a i n e d p e n d i n g t h e
determination of ownership in the case for RULING:
quieting of title iled by the petitioner. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under
Rule 70 are designed to summarily restore
There would be great injustice in a way that if the physical possession of a piece of land or building
demolition order were to be implemented to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived
pending the decision for the case for quieting of thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the
title, then petitioner’s properties would be parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
demolished absent a permanent declaration of the appropriate proceedings.
parties right to ownership.
As a general rule, a pending civil action involving
ownership of the same property does not justify
Amagan v. Marayag the suspension of ejectment proceedings. This is
because the actions are iled merely to delay
G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000
disposition of the ejectment proceeding.
An exception is in a case for unlawful detainer
DOCTRINE: Ejectment suit cannot be abated or
where the right of the plaintiff to recover the
suspended by the mere act of iling another action
premises is seriously put in issue. In Vda. de
raising the ownership of the property as an issue.
Legaspi v. Avenda o , the Court declared:
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to
"...Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal
await the outcome of a civil action. In this case
detainer, as distinguished from one of the forcible
and in Vda. De Legaspi v. Avedano, the Supreme
entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the
Court ordered the suspension of the ejectment
premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper
proceedings on considerations of equity.
judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just
and less productive of confusion and disturbance
FACTS:
of physical possession, with all its concomitant
1. Private respondents iled an unlawful
inconvenience and expenses. The effects of any
detainer case against the petitioners.
order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in
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order to await the inal judgment in the more secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a
substantive case involving legal possession or property located at 7142 M. Ocampo
ownership. Street, Pio del Pilar, Makati City.
2. For petitioners' failure to pay the
The exception is however grounded on strong o b l i g a t i o n , t h e m o r t g a g e w a s
reasons of equity. The mere existence of a judicial extrajudicially foreclosed on December 9,
proceeding putting at issue the right of the 1999 and the property was sold at public
plaintiff to recover the premises is not enough auction and was eventually awarded to
reason to justify an exception to the general rule. respondent as the highest bidder.
3. Having failed to redeem the property,
Like in the Vda. De Legaspi case, the petitioners in petitioners entered into a Contract of
the case would be seriously injured if the decision Lease with respondent, wherein the
on the ejectment case would be implemented former agreed to pay the latter a monthly
while awaiting the decision on the action for re n t a l o f P 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 fo r a n d i n
quieting of title. consideration of their continuing
occupation of the subject property from
The Supreme Court ordered the suspension of the January 16, 2001-January 16, 2002.
ejectment proceedings on considerations of 4. Petitioners further acknowledged
equity. It explained that the ejectment of respondent's valid and legal title to enter
petitioners therein would mean a demolition of into the contract as absolute owner of the
their house and would create confusion, property in question.
disturbance, inconvenience, and expense. 5. Respondent consolidated its ownership
Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time over the property, which led to the
and effort by proceeding to a stage wherein the cancellation of petitioners' title and the
outcome would at best be temporary but the issuance of a new one in respondent's
result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust name. Of the agreed monthly rentals,
and probably irreparable. petitioners only paid a total amount of
P40,000.00.
6. On April 4, 2002, respondent sent a letter
Samonte v. Century Savings Bank to petitioners demanding that the latter
pay their unpaid rentals and vacate the
GR. NO. 2009
leased premises. Petitioners, however,
MICHELLE LASTIMOSO FUENTES
refused to heed the demand. Hence, the
complaint for ejectment.
DOCTRINE:
7. MeTC rendered a decision in favor of
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be
respondent (Century Savings Bank)
abated or suspended by the mere iling of another
8. RTC af irmed the MeTC decision
action raising ownership of the property as an
9. CA af irmed the RTC decision. It
issue.
concluded that the nulli ication of
foreclosure proceedings is not a valid
FACTS:
reason to frustrate the summary remedy
1. Petitioners Danilo T. Samonte and
of ejectment. The CA also refused to make
Rosalinda N. Samonte obtained a loan
a declaration that respondent's right to
amounting to P1,500,000.00 from
possess the subject property would
respondent Century Savings Bank
d e p e n d o n t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e
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nulli ication case as it would be in the suspension of the proceedings solely by reason of
nature of a conditional judgment which is the pendency of the nulli ication case. This case
void. does not fall within the exception. They failed to
10. The CA thus upheld respondent's better show strong reasons of equity to sustain the
right to possess the property subject suspension or dismissal of the ejectment case.
matter of this controversy. Thus, Court adheres to settled jurisprudence that
suits involving ownership may not be successfully
ISSUES: pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment.
Whether the instant ejectment case should be
suspended pending the resolution of the action Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under
for nullity of foreclosure. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court are designed to
summarily restore physical possession of a piece
RULING: of land or building to one who has been illegally
No. Respondent has the better right to possess the or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to
subject property. The Contract of Lease executed the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of
by petitioners and respondent remains valid. juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.
Petitioners failed to comply with the terms These actions are intended to avoid disruption of
thereof by their failure to pay the stipulated rent. public order by those who would take the law in
As lessor of the subject property, respondent has their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed
the right to demand that petitioners pay their right of possession. In these cases, the issue is
unpaid obligations and, in case of their failure, pure physical or de facto possession, and
that they vacate the premises. Considering that pronouncements made on questions of ownership
the lease contract has long expired, with more are provisional in nature. The provisional
reason should respondent be allowed to recover determination of ownership in the ejectment case
the subject property. cannot be clothed with inality.
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be

abated or suspended by the mere iling of another Air Transportation (ATO) v. CA
action raising ownership of the property as an
GR. NO. (2014)
issue. Only in rare instances is suspension allowed
VANESSA SABALBERINO GO
to await the outcome of a pending civil action.
DOCTRINE: Despite the immediately executory

Here, petitioners were the previous owners of the
nature of the judgment of the RTC in ejectment
subject property. However, they lost their right
cases, which judgment is not stayed by an appeal
over the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure
taken therefrom, the Court of Appeals may issue a
of mortgage wherein respondent emerged as the
writ of preliminary injunction that will restrain or
highest bidder. Petitioners, however, remained in
enjoin the execution of the RTC's judgment.
possession thereof as lessees in a contract of lease
executed after the expiration of the redemption
period. For failure to pay the stipulated rents,
FACTS:
respondent commenced an action for ejectment.
Petitioners, in turn, instituted a case for the
The proceedings on the main case of ejectment
nulliEcation of the foreclosure proceedings
involving the same property. When the ejectment
case reached the CA, petitioners sought the

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The ATO iled a complaint for unlawful detainer After the lapse of the TRO, the ATO iled an urgent
against Miaque in the MTCC of Iloilo City: motion for the execution of the RTC Decision,
which the RTC granted pursuant to Section 21,
It sought to permanently vacate and peacefully Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
return to the ATO possession of :
However, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
(a) Refreshment Parlor fronting the New Terminal dated August 18, 2004 ordering the issuance of a
Building-Iloilo Airport; writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining the
ATO and all persons acting in its behalf from
(b) Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Airport enforcing the respective Decisions of the MTCC
Terminal; and and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 is
pending.
(c) all areas occupied or otherwise utilized by
Miaque incident to his operation of the Porterage Thus, after the dismissal of Miaque's petition for
Service within the Iloilo Airport review in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the ATO iled
another urgent motion for execution of the RTC
and that Miaque be ordered to immediately pay
Decision, which was granted by the RTC.
t h e AT O t h e a m o u n t o f n o t l e s s t h a n
P1,296,103.10, representing unpaid space rental. A new case in the Court of Appeals: CA-G.R. CEB-
SP No. 01603
The MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of ATO
and ordered Miaque to vacate the said premises Miaque iled a petition for certiorari (with prayer
for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary
Miaque appealed to the RTC, which af irmed the
injunction) in the Court of Appeals.
MTCC Decision in its entirety.His motion for
reconsideration was denied. He iled a petition for H e p r a y e d , a m o n g o t h e r s , t h a t t h e
review in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA- implementation of the writs of execution be
G.R. SP No. 79439 on September 25, 2003 but was enjoined. It is here where the Court of Appeals
dismissed (while pending, CA issued TRO). His issued the Resolutions being challenged in this
motion for reconsideration was also denied. He case, namely, the Resolution dated March 29,
then brought the case to SC in a petition for 2006 issuing a TRO effective for 60 days, and
review, but was denied as no reversible error in Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ of
the Court of Appeals Decision was suf iciently p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n e n j o i n i n g t h e
shown. The motion for reconsideration of Miaque implementation of the writs of execution
was denied with inality.
The present petition
The proceedings on execution:
The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted
As an incident of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the Court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of Appeals issued or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and
the subsequent writ of preliminary injunction
a TRO on February 27, 2004 effective for a period
through the Order dated March 29, 2006 and the
of 60 days and required Miaque to post a bond in
Resolution dated May 30, 2006, respectively.
the amount of P100,000.00.
ISSUES:
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Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed -Under the amendatory procedure introduced by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or the present Section 21 of Rule 70, the judgment
excess of jurisdiction in granting petitioner's of the RTC shall be immediately executory and
application for the issuance of a writ of can accordingly be enforced forthwith. It shall
preliminary injunction. not be stayed by the mere continuing deposit
of monthly rentals by the dispossessor during
the pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals
or this Court, although such execution of the
RULING: judgment shall be without prejudice to that
appeal taking its due course.
YES. In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting Miaque's -The RTC's duty to issue a writ of execution under
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction which Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and may be
is contrary to Section 21, Rule 70 and other compelled by mandamus. This presupposes that
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court. the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful
detainer case is unsatis ied with the RTC's
judgment and appeals to a higher court. The
rationale of immediate execution of judgment
It ignored the nature of the RTC's function to issue in an ejectment case is to avoid injustice to a
a writ of execution of its judgment in an ejectment lawful possessor
case as ministerial and not discretionary. The RTC
was validly exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to (2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an
Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court when it appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered
issued the writs of execution by the RTC or, in the appellate court's discretion,
suspended or modi ied.

- This reinforces the irst charaterisric. The
Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is
enforceable upon its rendition and, upon
Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court
motion,immediately executory notwithstanding
of Appeals or Supreme Court. — The judgment of
an appeal taken therefrom.
the Regional Trial Court against the defendant
shall be immediately executory, without prejudice The execution of the RTC's judgment is not
to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. discretionary execution.
There are 2 signi icant characteristics of the RTC As a rule, the judgment of the RTC, rendered in
judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it: the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, being
sought to be executed in a discretionary execution
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the
is stayed by the appeal to the Court of Appeals
defendant-appellant is immediately executory,
pursuant to Section 8 (b), Rule 42 of the Rules of
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be
Court.
taken therefrom; and
On the other hand, execution of the RTC's
- This is emphasized by the fact that no resolutory
judgment under Section 21, Rule 70 is not
condition has been imposed that will prevent or
discretionary execution but a ministerial duty of
stay the execution of the RTC's judgment.
the RTC.
It is not covered by the general rule, that the Alconera v. Pallanan

judgment of the RTC is stayed by appeal to the
GR. NO. 2014
Court of Appeals under Section 8 (b), Rule 42 of
TRISHA MAE BORROMEO GUZMAN
the Rules of Court, but constitutes an exception to
the said rule.
DOCTRINE: In ejectment cases, the rulings of the
courts are immediately executory and can only be
In connection with the second characteristic of
stayed via compliance with section 19, Rule 70 of
the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed
the Rules of Court.
to it, the consequence of the distinctions between
discretionary execution and the execution of the
FACTS:
RTC's judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to
Rafols was a defendant in an unlawful detainer
the Court of Appeals is that the former may be
case of which Alconera is his counsel. MTCC ruled
availed of in the RTC only before the Court of
against Rafols. Rafols through Alconera appealed
Appeals gives due course to the appeal while the
with RTC. While the appeal is pending, RTC issued
latter may be availed of in the RTC at any stage of
a writ of possession upon the motion of the
the appeal to the Court of Appeals . But then
complainant in the ejectment suit. Alconera iled a
again, in the latter case, the Court of Appeals
motion for reconsideration assailing the writ of
may stay the writ of execution issued by the
possession issued. On March 17, 2011, herein
RTC should circumstances so require.
Respondent Sheriff Palanan enforced the writ of
Despite the immediately executory nature of execution against Rafols. During the enforcement
the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, of the writ, Alconera and the Sheriff had a verbal
which judgment is not stayed by an appeal taken disagreement over the phone as the former is
therefrom, the Court of Appeals may issue a asserting that the writ should not be enforced
writ of preliminary injunction that will pending the resolution of his motion for
restrain or enjoin the execution of the RTC's reconsideration. On April 6, 2011, Alconera went
judgment. In the exercise of such authority, the to RTC Br. 36 with his daughter to confront
Court of Appeals should constantly be aware that respondent sheriff. The face-off escalated into a
the grant of a preliminary injunction in a case heated argument was recorded on video.
rests on the sound discretion of the court with the Alconera iled an administrative complaint for
caveat that it should be made with great caution Grave Misconduct and Making Untruthful
Statement against the respondent sheriff for
In this case, the decisions of the MTCC, RTC and of before Supreme Court and was referred to Of ice
the Court of Appeals in unanimously recognized of the Court Administrator on April 6, 2011.
the right of the ATO to possession of the property Respondent iled his comment where he averred
and the corresponding obligation of Miaque to that the duty of a court sheriff in enforcing a writ
immediately vacate the subject premises. This of execution is ministerial, and without a TRO
means that the MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of enjoining it, a sheriff is duty bound to implement
Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any it.
right to continue in possession of the said
premises. In the absence of proof of a legal right ISSUES: Whether or not a motion seeking the
and the injury sustained by one who seeks an reconsideration of the court in issuing a writ of
injunctive writ, an order for the issuance of a writ possession in an unlawful detainer suit would
of preliminary injunction will be nulli ied. stop the enforcement of the writ.
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RULING: negligence which prevented the defendant from

posting the supersedeas bond or making the
The answer is in the negative. In ejectment cases, m o n t h ly d e p o s i t , o r t h e o c c u r re n c e o f
the rulings of the courts are immediately supervening events which brought about a
executory and can only be stayed via compliance material change in the situation of the parties and
with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. which would make the execution inequitable.
Under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a But whether or not these obtain in the case at bar
forcible entry and detainer action is made is an issue best left to the court that issued the
immediately executory to avoid further injustice writ of execution.
to a lawful possessor. The defendant in such a case
may have such judgment stayed only by
(a) perfecting an appeal; (b) iling a supersedeas Manalang v. Bacani
bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the
GR. NO. 156995, January 12, 2015
rental or reasonable compensation for the use
MA. ANGELINE CARI O JAPITAN
and occupancy of the property during the
pendency of the appeal.
DOCTRINE: In the exercise of its appellate
The failure of the defendant to comply with any of
jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall
these conditions is a ground for the outright
decide the appeal of the judgment of the
execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in unlawful detainer
this respect being ministerial and imperative.
or forcible entry cases on the basis of the entire
Hence, if the defendant-appellant has perfected
record of the proceedings had in the court of
the appeal but failed to ile a supersedeas bond,
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
the immediate execution of the judgment would
be required by the RTC. There is no trial de novo
automatically follow. Conversely, the iling of a
of the case.
supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of
the judgment if the appeal is not perfected.
FACTS:
Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be
iled within the period for the perfection of the
1. Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado
appeal.
Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M.
In the case at bar, complainant lost his client’s
Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis
case and appealed to the RTC. His client has also
Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No. 4236
been periodically depositing rental with the court
with an area of 914 square meters of the
for the use of the property pending appeal.
Guagua Cadastre and declared for taxation
However, as ruled by the RTC, the bond iled did
purposes in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia.
not meet the legal requirements because irst and
foremost, the bond posted was a property bond, 2. The land was covered by approved survey
not cash nor surety. Furthermore, Rafols did not plan Ap-03- 004154. Adjacent to Lot 4236
own the property he posted as bond and besides, was the respondents' Lot No. 4235 covered by
it was also not issued in favour of the plaintiff in Original Certi icate of Title (OCT) No.
the ejectment case. Because of the non- N-216701.
compliance with the requirements under the
above-quoted rule, the execution of the judgment 3. In 1997, the petitioners caused the
was not effectively stayed. relocation and veri ication survey of Lot 4236
The only exceptions to non-compliance are the and the adjoining lots, and the result showed
existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable

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that the respondents had encroached on Lot 1) No, the RTC in an appeal of the judgment in
No. 4236 to the extent of 405 square meters. an ejectment case, shall not conduct a
rehearing or trial de novo. In this connection,
4. When the respondents refused to vacate Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court clearly
the encroached portion and to surrender provides:
peaceful possession thereof despite demands,
the petitioners commenced this action for Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession;
unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the not conclusive in actions involving title or
MTC of Guagua. ownership.
5. On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch The judgment or inal order shall be appealable to
2) dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall
jurisdiction based on its inding that the decide the same on the basis of the entire record
action involved an essentially boundary of the proceedings had in the court of origin and
dispute that should be properly resolved in an such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
accion reivindicatoria. submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court. (7a)
6. the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2),
a n d re m a n d e d t h e c a s e fo r f u r t h e r Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by
proceedings, holding that because there was ordering the conduct of the relocation and
an apparent withholding of possession of the veri ication survey “in aid of its appellate
property and the action was brought within jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of the
one year from such withholding of possession surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its
the proper action was ejectment which was holding of a trial de novo. The violation was
within the jurisdiction of the MTC. accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately
decided the appeal based on the survey and the
7. MTC ultimately dismissed the case on the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the
grounds that the petitioners failed to adduce proceedings had in the court of origin.
clear and convincing evidence showing that
the respondents had encroached on their 2) The action of an unlawful detainer is
property. Another appeal to RTC was made. improper.
RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a
relocation survey to determine their CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be
allegation of encroachment, and also heard resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria,
the testimony of the surveyor. The RTC then not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is
reversed the MTC’s decision. not about possession, but encroachment, that is,
whether the property claimed by the defendant
ISSUES: formed part of the plaintiff ’s property. A
boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily
1) Can RTC in the exercise of its appellate under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
jurisdiction conduct a relocation and veri ication proceedings under which are limited to unlawful
survey of the lot in question? detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer,
the defendant unlawfully withholds the
2) Was an action for unlawful detainer proper? possession of the premises upon the expiration or
termination of his right to hold such possession
RULING:

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under any contract, express or implied. The Rule 70, Section 19 of the 1997 ROC. On the other
defendant’s possession was lawful at the hand, once the RTC has rendered a decision in its
beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under
Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 ROC, be
expiration or termination of his right of immediately executory, without prejudice to an
possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the CA
defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and and/or SC.
the issue centers on which between the plaintiff
and the defendant had the prior possession de THE PRECEDING CASES
facto. All the petitions have for their common genesis
the two cases discussed below:
The MTC dismissed the action because it did not
The 1914 Cacho Case
have jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was
correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of FACTS:
the complaint and the character of the relief
The late Do a Demetria Cacho applied for the
sought by the complaint determine the nature of registration of 2 parcels of land, both located in
the action and the court that has jurisdiction over Iligan City.
the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is an
Lot 1, the smaller parcel, was purchased from
action iled by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
Gabriel Salzos, who in turn bought it from Datto
person against whom the possession of any land Darondon and his wife Alanga, evidenced by a
or building is unlawfully withheld after the deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by
expiration or termination of the right to hold Alanga, on behalf of Datto Darondon.
possession by virtue of any contract, express or
Do a Demetria purportedly purchased Lot 2, the
implied. larger parcel, from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay
claimed to have inherited Lot 2 from his uncle,
However, the allegations of the petitioners’ Datto Anandog, who died without issue. Only the
complaint did not show that they had permitted Government opposed the registration on the
or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their ground that the properties formed part of a
military reservation, know as Camp Overton.
property by the respondents; or how the
respondents’ entry had been effected, or how and HELD:
when the dispossession by the respondents had
1. As to Lot 1: The deed held by Do a Demetria is
started. All that the petitioners alleged was the executed only by Alanga, a Moro and wife of Datto
respondents’ “illegal use and occupation” of the Darondon, which is not permitted either by the
property. As such, the action was not unlawful Moro laws or the Civil Code at the time. At the
detainer. time of application for registration, Datto
Darondon is still alive, and thus he must present a
deed renouncing all his rights in the small parcel
of land in favor of the applicant, Do a Demetria,
before registration can be admitted.
Republic v. Mangotar
2. As to Lot 2: The Court found that Datto Bunglay
GR. NO. 2010 did not have title to the parcel of land as nephew
MARC HILARION MANGINSAY PE A of Datto Anandog, according to the Civil Code and
the "Luwaran Code" of the Moros, which states
that the brothers and sisters of a deceased Moro
DOCTRINE: inherit his property to the exclusion of the more
It is only execution of the MTC’s judgment distant relatives. However, since Datto Anandog's
pending appeal with the RTC which may be stayed sister, Alanga, appeared as a witness for the
by a compliance with the requisites provided in applicant Do a Demetria without having made
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any claim to the land, she was deemed to have stressed that the execution of public documents is
rati ied the sale made by her nephew. entitled to the presumption of regularity and
proof is required to assail and controvert the
3. Only Lot 2 was granted to Doña Demetria for same.
registration, and the Court also ordered a new
survey of the property excluding all the land 4. Thus, the decrees of registration were re-issued
not cultivated by Datto Anandog (the bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for
"southern part”) and application for the rest of the two parcels of land in Do a Demetria’s name.
the land is denied.
FACTS: (The case in point)
The 1997 Cacho Case The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) took
possession of 2 parcels of land in Iligan City where
FACTS:
it built a sub-station(The Overton Sub-station)
Teo ilo Cacho, claiming to be the late Do a and a warehouse(Agus 7 Hydro-Electric Power
Demetria’s son and sole heir, iled before the RTC Plant). For more than 30 years, NAPOCOR
a petition for reconstitution of two original occupied and possessed said parcels of land
certi icates of title (OCTs) over Lots 1 and 2. The pursuant to its charter. The National Transmission
petition was opposed by the Republic, National Corporation (TRANSCO) assumed the functions of
Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan. NAPOCOR with regard to the electrical
transmissions.
The RTC granted the petition, but the CA reversed,
because the re-issuance of the decree for Lot 2 Claiming ownership of the parcels of land where
could not be made in the absence of the new the sub-station and warehouse were apparently
survey ordered by this Court in the 1914 Cacho located, LANDTRADE iled with the MTCC a
case; the heir of a registered owner may lose his Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
right to recover possession of the property and NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
title thereto by laches; and Teo ilo failed to
LANDTRADE alleged that it acquired from
establish his identity and existence and that he
Teo ilo, 2 parcels of land, portions of which
was a real party-in-interest.
were being occupied by the sub-station and
HELD: warehouse of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO through
the tolerance of LANDTRADE. That NAPOCOR
1. The Court found that the decrees of 1914 had in and TRANSCO failed to pay rentals and vacate the
fact been issued and attained inality. Requiring subject properties despite demands.
the submission of a new plan as a condition for
the re-issuance of the decree would render the The MTCC ruled in favor of LANDTRADE.
inality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case Meanwhile, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO iled a joint
nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule notice of appeal. Whereas, LANDTRADE iled a
regarding res judicata. motion for execution asserting that NAPOCOR and
TRANSCO had neither iled a supersedeas bond
2. The Court also ruled that laches cannot bar the with MTCC nor periodically deposited with RTC
issuance of a decree. A inal decision in land the monthly rental, so as to stay the immediate
registration cases can neither be rendered execution pending appeal of MTCC judgement.
inef icacious by the statute of limitations nor by
laches. On appeal to the RTC, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO
iled a Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings citing
3. Finally, the Court was satis ied that Teo ilo's Amagan vs. Marayag which ruled that if
identity was suf iciently established, relying on an circumstances should require, the proceedings in
Af idavit of Adjudication as Do a Demetria’s sole an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever
heir, which he executed before the Philippine stage it may be found. They alleged that the
Consulate General in Chicago, U.S. Teo ilo also ejectment case should be held in abeyance
appeared personally before the Vice Consul in pending the resolution of other cases in which
Chicago to execute a Special Power of Attorney in title over the same properties are in issue(other
favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo (Atty. Cabildo) consolidated cases).
who represented him in this case. The Court

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The RTC denied the Joint Motion, holding that the 2. WON CA erred in denying the application for
pendency of other actions involving the same writ of preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR
parcels of land could not stay execution pending and TRANSCO because of RULE 70 SEC. 21 of
appeal of the MTCC judgment because NAPOCOR ROC provides immediate execution despite
and TRANSCO failed to post the required bond further appeal. YES
and pay the monthly rentals. It then granted
LANDTRADE's Motion for Execution of the MTCC
judgment pending appeal. RULING:
The CA, on the instance of NAPOCOR and 1. Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court lays
T R A N S C O, i s s u e d a T RO e n j o i n i n g t h e down the requirements for staying the immediate
enforcement and implementation of the execution of the MTCC judgment against the
execution. It then held that the public respondents defendant in an ejectment suit (a) Appeal has
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing been perfected;(b) Defendant iles a suf icient
and/or effecting the execution of the MTCC supersedeas bond;(c) Deposits with the appellate
judgment pending appeal, since NAPOCOR and court the amount of rent due from time to time
TRANSCO were legally excused from complying under the contract, if any, during the pendency of
with the requirements for a stay of execution the appeal.
speci ied in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court, particularly, the posting of a supersedeas The Court had previously recognized the
bond and periodic deposits of rental payments. e xe m p t i o n o f NA P O C O R f r o m l i n g a
supersedeas bond. As presently worded, Section
LANDTRADE appealed to the SC via a Petition for
13 of Republic Act No. 6395, the NAPOCOR
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Charter, as amended, reads:
Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 170505.
With the impending lapse of the effectivity of the To enable the Corporation to pay its
TRO, NAPOCOR iled with the CA a Manifestation indebtedness and obligations and in
and Motion praying for the resolution of its furtherance and effective implementation
a p p l i c a t i o n fo r p re l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n . of the policy enunciated xxx Corporation,
Afterwards, LANDTRADE iled an Omnibus including its subsidiaries, is hereby
Motion seeking the issuance of a writ of execution declared exempt from the payment of all
pending appeal. forms of taxes, duties, fees, imposts as
well as costs and service fees including
The CA granted the issuance of a writ of execution iling fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas
in favor of LANDTRADE and denied the bonds, in any court or administrative
application for writ of preliminary injunction of proceedings.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO because Rule 70, Section
21 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that Consistent with the foregoing, the CA rendered its
the RTC judgment in an ejectment case, which is Decision declaring that NAPOCOR was exempt
adverse to the defendant and pending appeal from iling a supersedeas bond to stay the
before the Court of Appeals, shall be immediately execution of the MTCC judgment while the same
executory and can be enforced despite further was pending appeal before the RTC.
appeal. Therefore, the execution of the RTC
judgment pending appeal is the ministerial duty
However, only recently, however, the CA reversed
of the Court of Appeals, speci ically enjoined by
its stance on the exemption of NAPOCOR from
law to be done.
iling fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds.
That is consistent with Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of
ISSUES: the Constitution, on the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court over the rules on pleading,
1. WON LANDTRADE is entitled to the execution practice and procedure in all courts, which
of MTCC Decision even while said judgement includes the sole power to ix the ilingling fees of
was pending appeal before the RTC. YES cases in courts. The Court categorically
pronounced that NAPOCOR can no longer invoke

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its amended Charter as basis for exemption from cases. Second, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO have built
the payment of legal fees. a sub-station and warehouse over which the
execution of the MTCC Decision will have serious
Nevertheless, in this case, the RTC already consequences, primordial of which is the
promulgated its Decision denying the appeal of widespread disruption of the electrical power
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO and af irming the MTCC supply. Lastly, allowing execution pending appeal
judgment against said corporations. Both would result in the payment of an astronomical
presently have pending appeals of the RTC before amount in rentals.
the CA.
NOTE: This case involves 7 consolidated Petitions
In this light, Rule 70, Section 19 of the ROC applies for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for
only when the judgment of the MTCC in an Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of
ejectment case is pending appeal before the RTC. Court, respectively, arising from actions for
When the RTC had already resolved the appeal quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and
and its judgment, in turn, is pending appeal before reversion, which all involve the same parcels of
the Court of Appeals, then Rule 70, Section 21 of land. I only included the petitions which are
the ROC governs. relevant to our discussion on Rule 70. For recits
purposes, I will be providing a brief summary of
"[t]he judgment of the Regional Trial facts of the rest of the petitions over the weekend.
Court against the defendant shall be
immediately executory, without prejudice
to a further appeal that may be taken Penta Paci ic Realty Corporation v. Ley
therefrom." It no longer provides for the Construction and Development
stay of execution at such stage.
Corporation
Thus, subsequent events have rendered the GR. NO. 161589 | November 24, 2014
Petition of LANDTRADE became moot and STEFFI ANGELA ROMBLON PI OL
academic.
DOCTRINE:
2. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO argue that neither the
rules nor jurisprudence explicitly declare that
Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court bars the A case is for unlawful detainer when the
application of Rule 58 on preliminary injunction. possession was originally lawful through a
Regardless of the immediately executory contract, whether express or implied, but became
character of the RTC judgment in an ejectment unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
case, the CA, before which said judgment is
right to possess and the action was instituted
appealed, is not deprived of power and
jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary within 1 year from the last demand to vacate the
injunction when circumstances so warrant. property.
Even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases

are immediately executory, preliminary injunction FACTS:
may still be granted. There need only be clear
showing that there exists a right to be protected
Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract
and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed violate said right. (See Benedicto vs. Court of lease wherein the latter leased from the former
of Appeals) a portion of the 25th loor of the Paci ic Star
Building owner by the petitioner.
Substantial considerations exist herein that
compels the Court to issue a writ of preliminary Three months after, the respondent expressed its
injunction enjoining the execution of the MTCC
intent to purchase the entire premises of the
Decision. First, the two parcels of land claimed by
LANDTRADE are the subject of several other subject property. The parties executed a contract

 
 

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to sell, denominated as a reservation agreement, Petitioner, through its counsel’s letter rejected the
in which they set the purchase price at proposals. In a letter dated February 4, 1999, the
US$3,420,540.00, with the following terms of petitioner’s counsel informed respondent of the
payment: 20% down payment equivalent of cancellation of the reservation agreement and the
US$684,108.00 payable within eight months; and forfeiture of the respondent’s payments and
US$85,513.00/monthly for eight months with demanded that respondent pay rentals of
interest of 9.75%, commencing on the 6th month. P9,782,226.50 and vacate the subject property.
The 80% balance was to be paid in 13
installments beginning on March 1, 1997 until In another letter of May 25, 1999, the petitioner’s
March 1, 1998. The agreement also contained a counsel again informed the respondent of the
forfeiture provision wherein any failure on the cancellation of the reservation agreement and
part of the part of the respondent to pay the full demanded that the respondent vacate the
down payment or the monthly amortization shall premises. A little over a month thereafter,
entitle the petitioner at its option to impose a petitioner iled a complaint for ejectment in the
penalty interest on the outstanding balance or to MeTC following respondent’s failure to comply
cancel the agreement. with the demands to pay and vacate.
After paying US$538,735.00, the respondent Respondent resisted the complaint, arguing that
stop p ed p ay ing t he st ip u l a ted mon t hly the contract of lease was simulated or in the
amortizations. An exchange of letters ensued alternative, had been repealed, negated,
between Janet C. Ley, President of the respondent, extinguished and/or novated by the reservation
or Efren Yap, Assistant to the President of the agreement.
respondent, on one hand, and Jose B.E. Antonio,
Vice-Chairman of the petitioner, and the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner and found that
petitioner's counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Dizon, on the respondent's lawful possession of the property
other. had been by virtue of the contract of lease, but
had become unlawful when the respondent had
In two letters, in the irst one the respondent failed to comply with its obligation to pay the
made proposals to modify the terms of the monthly rentals for the subject property. The RTC
reservation agreement to allow it to purchase on the other hand nulli ied the decision of MeTC
only the subject property (portion of the premises for lack of jurisdiction holding that the
described above which it originally leased). In the appropriate action was either accion publiciana or
subsequent letter, the respondent proposed 1.) accion reivindicatoria over which the MeTC had
that the US$538,735.00 paid under the no jurisdiction. It found that the basis of recovery
reservation agreement be applied as rental of possession by the petitioner was the
payments for the use and occupation of the respondent's failure to pay the amortizations
subject property in the period from March 1997 arising from the violations of the reservation
to February 28, 1998; (2) that the balance of agreement; that the complaint did not speci ically
US$417,355.45 after deducting the rental aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer
payments from March 1997 to February 28, 1998
should be returned to it; and (3) that the
respondent be allowed to lease the subject ISSUES:
property beginning March 1998.
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Whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, independently of any claim of ownership or
or accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria? possession de jure that either party may set forth
Unlawful detainer in his pleading. The plaintiff must prove that it
was in prior physical possession of the premises
RULING: until it was deprived thereof by the defendant.
The principal issue must be possession de facto,
There are three kinds of real actions affecting title or actual possession, and ownership is merely
to or possession of real property, or interest ancillary to such issue. Consequently, any issue on
therein, namely: accion de reivindicacion, accion ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful
publiciana and accion interdictal. detainer is resolved only provisionally for the
purpose of determining the principal issue of
Accion de reivindicacion seeks to recover
possession.
ownership as well as possession of realty. Accion
publiciana proposes to recover the right to In unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege
possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil the following:
proceeding. Accion interdictal on the other hand
refers to recovery of physical or actual possession (a) the defendant originally had lawful
only through a special civil action of either for possession of the property, either by virtue of a
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
If the dispossession is not alleged to take place by (b) the defendant's possession of the property
any of the means provided in Section 1 of Rule 70 eventually became illegal or unlawful upon notice
of the Rules of Court, or if the dispossession by the plaintiff to the defendant of the expiration
allegedly took place by any of such means but the or the termination of the defendant's right of
action is not brought within one year from possession;
deprivation of possession, the action is properly a
plenary action of accion publiciana or accion de (c) the defendant thereafter remained in
reivindicacion. The explanation is simply that the possession of the property and thereby deprived
disturbance of the peace and quiet of the local the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and
community due to the dispossession did not
materialize; hence, the possessor thus deprived (d) the plaintiff instituted the action within one
has no need for the summary proceeding of ye a r f ro m t h e u n l aw f u l d e p riva t i o n o r
accion interdictal under Rule 70. withholding of possession.
A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on The SC ruled that the complaint suf iciently
Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, alleged all the foregoing requisites for unlawful
of which there are two kinds, namely: (1) that detainer as established by the following facts:
iled against a tenant, and (2) that brought against
a vendee or vendor, or other person unlawfully 1. Respondent leased the property from
withholding possession of any land or building petitioner
after the expiration or termination of the right to 2. Respondent decided to purchase the
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express property but started to default in its
or implied. amortization payments
3. Respondent requested from the plaintiff
In an action for forcible entry or unlawful a n d C P M I t h a t t h e R e s e r v a t i o n
detainer, the main issue is possession de facto, Agreement be cancelled and in lieu

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thereof, the abovementioned Contract of manholes underground, which had been

Lease be revived placed there by PLDT, petitioner herein.
4. Respondent failed to pay to the plaintiff These encroached on respondent’s
the rentals for the use of the property property, preventing it from excavating
when they fell due the land.
5. Petitioner also formally made a notarial 3. Petitioner refused to comply with
cancellation of the aforementioned respondent’s demand to remove its
purchase and demanded that defendant underground properties, thus the latter
peacefully vacate the property, but iled a complaint for ejectment.
despite such demand, the respondent has 4. Petitioner argues that there is no cause of
failed and/or refused to peacefully vacate ejectment because the element of prior
the subject property. physical possession of respondent is
absent. It was petitioner who has prior
Moreover, the 1-year prescriptive period to ile physical possession nine (9) years before
the action was complied with as the last demand respondent became the property owner.
was made on May 25, 1999 and after it went 5. Petitioner contends that two elements of
unheeded, the petitioner initiated the suit in the f o rc i b l e e n t r y a re a b s e n t . i r s t ,
MeTC on July 9, 1999, well within the one-year respondent has no prior physical
period. possession of the property; and second,
the action was iled beyond the one-year
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. prescriptive period.
CITI Appliance M.C. Corp.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of ejection of
GR 214546. 20 October 2019.
forcible entry will prosper
SHANELE VALDEVILLA PURA
RULING: NO. The forcible entry suit will not

DOCTRINE: An action for forcible entry must be
prosper.
iled within one (1) year from the date of actual
entry on the land. However, when the entry was Rule 70 of the Rules of Court governs actions for
done through stealth, the one-year time bar is ejectment. There are three (3) elements that must
reckoned from the time the entry was discovered. be alleged and proved for a forcible entry suit to
In contrast to unlawful detainer suits, no previous prosper, which are the following:
demand to vacate is required before an action for
forcible entry may be iled. (a) that they have prior physical possession
of the property;
FACTS:
(b) that they were deprived of possession
1. Respondent owned a parcel of land in either by force, intimidation, threat,
Cebu City, wherein it decided to construct strategy or stealth; and,
a 16 storey commercial building on it.
2. The Cebu City Zoning Board required (c) that the action was iled within one (1)
respondent to construct a one-level year from the time the owners or legal
parking area consisting of 26 parking possessors learned of their deprivation of
slots. In the process of excavation, it the physical possession of the property.
discovered telephone lines, cables, and

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In this case, petitioner contends that two (2)
elements of forcible entry are absent: irst,
respondent has no prior physical possession of
the property; and second, the action was iled
beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
Petitioner’s contentions are meritorious.

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Rule 71- CONTEMPT mislead the public as to the proper functioning of
the judiciary. While all citizens have a right to
scrutinize and criticize the judiciary, they have an
ethical and societal obligation not to cross that too
In the Matter of the Allegations Contained important line.
int he Columns of Mr. Amago Macasaet
Published in Malaya
Baculi v. Belen
MICHELLE MAY RAMA
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179. September 24, 2012
JUPERT JERICHO MERCADER REMOLLO
DOCTRINE: The proceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
DOCTRINE: The institution of an administrative
court against which the contempt was committed.
complaint is not the proper remedy for
questioning the propriety by which a judge
FACTS:
decided a contempt case as the proper remedies
1. Macasaet published several articles
are as follows:
containing statements and innuendos
1. For a judgment of direct contempt, Rule
about an alleged bribery incident in the
71, Secs. 2, provides that “ Sec. 2. Remedy
Supreme Court involving Justice Ynares
therefrom. — The person adjudged in
Santiago.
direct contempt by any court may not
2. After an investigation, the committee
appeal therefrom, but may avail himself
recommended that there exist valid
of the remedies of certiorari or
grounds for the Supreme Court to cite
prohibition.
Macasaet for indirect contempt within
2. For a judgment of indirect contempt, Rule
the purview of Sec. 3 (d), rule 71 of the
71 Sec. 11. The judgment or inal order of
Rules of Court.
a court in a case of indirect contempt may
3. Macasaet claimed that his right to due
be appealed to the proper court as in
process was violated because there were
criminal cases.
no formal charges iled against him as
required under Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the
FACTS:
Rules of Court.
1. This case is the story or two administrative
ISSUES: Whether or not the order citing Macasaet
complaints were iled by Prosecutor Baculi
for indirect contempt was proper?
against Judge Belen.
2. In the irst administrative case, Baculi was the
RULING: YES. Under Sec. 4 of Rule 71, the
prosecutor who iled the information for Quali ied
proceedings for indirect contempt may be
theft against Capacete (People v. Capacete case) in
initiated motu proprio by the court against which
RTC.
the contempt was committed, by an order or any
A. The information was dismissed by
other formal charge requiring respondent to show
presiding Judge Belen because according
why he should not be punished for contempt.
to Belen the wrong case was iled by
Baculi. Baculi should have iled a case for
All told, illegitimate and uninformed criticisms
estafa and not quali ied theft.
against the courts and judges, those which cross
B. Baculi’s MR to the dismissal was likewise
the line and attempt to subvert the judicial
dismissed. In the MR, Baculi stated the
process, must be avoided. They do a great
that “ The dismissal of the information by
disservice to the Constitution. They seriously
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the court was motivated by hatred, ill- 1. For a judgment of direct contempt, Rule 71,
will, and prejudice him as a prosecutor” Secs. 2, provides that “ Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom.
C. Baculi, then commented that Belen's — The person adjudged in direct contempt by any
orders reveal his "premeditated, vitriolic, court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail
personal attacks, resentment and himself of the remedies of certiorari or
vendetta” against Baculi. prohibition. Thus, he should have petitioned for
D. Judge belen incorporated the contempt certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65.
case with the case criminal case, then
tried it himself. 2. For a judgment of indirect contempt, Rule 71
5. Baculi was then found guilty of direct contempt Sec. 11. The judgment or inal order of a court in a
for using unethical language, and was cited again case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the
for indirect contempt for his failure to ile his proper court as in criminal cases. So he should
explanation as required by Order of the court. have appealed through rule 41.
6. The contempt decision became inal and
executory. 2. No, Belen was not correct in incorporating it
3. The second case involves the same set of facts, with the criminal case . The proper procedure, as
where prosecutor Baculi also iled another laid down in Rule 71, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court,
criminal case against person named Estacio but in is for the indirect contempt proceedings to... be
relation to a different criminal case, People v. "docketed, heard, and decided separately," unless
Estacio. the court orders the consolidation of the main
action and the contempt proceedings.
ISSUES: 3. Yes, Due to the failure of the complainant here
1. WON the Baculi, was correct to ile an to avail himself of the proper remedies, Judge
administrative complaint against Judge Belen for Belen correctly ruled that the assailed judgments
his orders and decision in the contempt have become inal and executory. They cannot
proceedings. anymore be reviewed by this Court.
2. WON Belen was correct for incorporating the 1. Time and again, We have stressed that
indirect contempt was with the criminal case of disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
People v. Capacete. brought against a judge in relation to the
3. WON the contempt case are now inal and performance of his or her of icial functions are
executory neither complementary nor suppletory to the
appropriate judicial remedies.
RULING: The Court DISMISSES these two 2. They are also not a... substitute to such
administrative complaints against Judge remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved
should resort to these remedies, and exhaust
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen for lack of merit. them, instead of resorting to disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions.
1. No, The institution of an administrative
complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting
the action of a judge alleged to have gone beyond Baculi v Belen
the norms of propriety, where a suf icient judicial
remedy... exists. Baculi should have iled the
following remedies from the judgment of
DOCTRINE: Where the indirect contempt is
contempt.
initiated motu proprio, it shall be commenced by
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an order of the same court or any formal charge that Judge Belen’s 2006 and 2007 Decisions
requiring the respondent to show cause why he violated his right to due process of law, as he
should not be punished for contempt, there’s no was not formally charged, and no notice or
need for a veri ied petition. hearing was conducted to afford him the
opportunity to air his side.
FACTS:
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2234
These 2 cases stem from two separate
administrative complaints iled by Baculi is then a In tihs second complaint, it involves the same
provincial prosecutor in Zambales against Judge parties, and similar direct and indirect contempt
Belen is the presiding judge of RTC Branch 36 proceedings, albeit related to a different case,
Calamba City, Laguna. In both administrative People v. Estacio. Baculi charged Judge Belen with
complaints, Baculi charged Judge Belen with gross committing acts similar to those speci ied in the
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, violation irst complaint in relation to People v. Estacio, then
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, as also pending in RTC Br. 36. In Judge Belen’s
amended, grave abuse of authority, violation of RA decisions dated December 18, 2006 and June 7,
6713, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the 2007, Baculi was also found guilty of direct
public service, oppressive conduct, harassment, contempt and indirect contempt, respectively.
issuance of fraudulent and unjust order/s and Baculi iled the present administrative complaint,
decisions, among other offenses. predicated on substantially similar arguments.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179 The OCA Recommendation
In the irst complaint, Baculi alleged that Judge The OCA found Judge Belen liable for having
Belen committed exculpatory acts in relation to “incorporated” the indirect contempt proceeding
People v. Capacete. Baculi was the prosecutor who with the main case, People vs. Capacete, when the
iled the Information for Quali ied Theft against proper procedure, as laid down in Rule 71, Sec. 4
Capacete. The information was dismissed on his of the Rules of Court, is for the indirect contempt
inding the crime committed was actually Estafa. proceedings to be “docketed, heard, and decided
Baculi’s MR was likewise dismissed. According to separately,” unless the court orders the
Judge Belen, Baculi made statements in his MR consolidation of the main action and the contempt
that attacked the integrity of the Court and is, proceedings. For his failure to follow the
thus, subject to indirect contempt proceedings. elementary rules of procedure, the OCA
recommended that Judge Belen be adjudged
The dismissal of the information by the court was
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
motivated by hatred, ill-will, and prejudice against
Asst. State Prosecutor II Jorge Baculi, the
Investigating Prosecutor at the Preliminary ISSUES:
Investigation. WON the respondent Judge erred in incorporating
the indirect contempt proceeding with the main
In Judge Belen’s December 18, 2006 decision,
case as opposed to the procedure rule laid down
Judge Belen found Baculi guilty of direct
in rule 71, Sec. 4 of ROC - NO
contempt. In his June 7, 2007 Decision, Judge
Belen declared Baculi guilty of indirect
contempt of court, for the contemptuous nature RULING:
of pleadings that Baculi iled in his sala. Baculi Under the ROC there are two ways of initiating
iled an administrative complaint, alleging indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio

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by the court; or (2) by a veri ied petition. In the docket and (2) to hear and decide the case
case of Calilim the court explained that in separately from the main case does not arise,
contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure much less to exercise the discretion to order the
must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the consolidation of the cases. There is no petition
Rules of Court provide the procedure to be from any party to be docketed, heard and decided
followed in case of indirect contempt. separately from the main case precisely because it
is the show-cause order that initiated the
As to the second mode of initiating indirect
proceedings. What remains in any case, whether
contempt proceedings, that is, through a veri ied
the proceedings are initiated by a veri ied petition
petition, the rule is already settled that, in cases
or by the court motu proprio, is the duty of the
where the court did not initiate the contempt
court to ensure that the proceedings are
charge, the Rules prescribe that a veri ied petition
conducted respecting the right to due process of
which has complied with the requirements of
the party being cited in contempt.
initiatory pleadings must be iled. Thus, where
there is a veri ied petition to cite someone in
contempt of court, courts have the duty to ensure Baculi v. Belen
that all the requirements for iling the initiatory 681 SCRA 489
pleadings have been complied with. It behooves BIANCA RODRIGUEZ
them too to docket the petition, and to hear and
decide it separately from the main case, unless the DOCTRINE: administrative complaints cannot
presiding judge orders the consolidation of the substitute for the lost remedies in the judgments
contempt proceedings and the main action. But in of contempt;
indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the court, the above rule doesn’t apply. In contempt proceedings, the prescribed
First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates procedure must be followed: First, there must be
the proceedings, there can be no veri ed an order requiring the respondent to show cause
petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the why he should not be cited for contempt. Second,
duty to inform the respondent in writing, in the respondent must be given the opportunity to
accordance with his or her right to due process. comment on the charge against him. Third, there
This formal charge is done by the court in the must be a hearing and the court must investigate
form of an Order requiring the respondent to the charge and consider respondent's answer.
explain why he or she should not be cited in Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be
contempt of court. punished accordingly. (Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71)
ITCAB, First, since the court itself motu proprio

FACTS: The facts surrounding A.M. No.
initiates the proceedings, there can be no
RTJ-10-2234 are substantially similar to those in
veri ed petition to speak of. Instead, the court
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179. It involves the same
has the duty to inform the respondent in writing,
parties, and similar direct and indirect contempt
in accordance with his or her right to due process.
proceedings, albeit related to a different case (this
This formal charge is done by the court in the
time in relation to PP v. Jenelyn Estacio). Baculi
form of an Order requiring the respondent to
led the present administrative complaint,
explain why he or she should not be cited in
predicated on substantially similar arguments
contempt of court.
presented in A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179. Judge Belen's
Further, when the court issues motu proprio a Joint Comment dated July 1, 2008 is a virtual
show-cause order, the duty of the court (1) to

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substantive repeat of his Comment in the rst hear and decide it separately from the main case,
complaint. u n l e s s t h e p re s i d i n g j u d g e o rd e r s t h e
consolidation of the contempt proceedings and
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the administrative the main action. But when motu proprio initiates
complaint is proper 2. Whether or not Judge Belen the proceedings, there can be no veri ied petition
followed the proper procedure in citing the to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to
complainant in contempt of court inform the respondent in writing, in accordance
with his or her right to due process. This formal
RULING: charge is done by the court in the form of an
I. The Court ruled that administrative cases Order requiring the respondent to explain why he
cannot be resorted to as substitutes for the or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
remedies not availed of in the contempt
proceedings. Rule 71, Secs. 2 and 11 of the Rules In the case at bar, the Orders issued by Judge
of Court lay down the proper remedies from a Belen are in the nature of a show cause order. The
judgment in direct and indirect contempt Orders clearly directed Baculi, as respondent, to
proceedings, respectively. The remedies provided explain within 10 days from receipt of the Order
for in the above-mentioned Rules are clear why he should not be cited in contempt. These
enough. The complainant could have iled an Orders are formal charges suf icient to initiate the
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the respective indirect contempt proceedings. What
Decisions in the indirect contempt cases. For the remains in any case, whether the proceedings are
direct contempt citations, a petition for certiorari initiated by a veri ied petition or by the court
under Rule 65 was available to him. He failed to motu proprio, is the duty of the court to ensure
avail himself of both remedies. He chose instead that the proceedings are conducted respecting the
to question the proceedings and the judgments in right to due process of the party being cited in
the form of motions and manifestations, and contempt. In both modes of initiating indirect
administrative complaints. Due to the failure of contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the
the complainant here to avail himself of these answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the
remedies, Judge Belen correctly ruled that the proceedings end. The court must conduct a
assailed judgments have become inal and hearing, and the court must consider the
executory. They cannot anymore be reviewed by respondent's answer. Only if found guilty will the
this Court. Any party who may feel aggrieved respondent be punished accordingly.
should resort to these remedies, and exhaust
them, instead of resorting to disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions. Garcia Jr. v. Manrique
II. Under the Rules of Court, there are two
683 SCRA 491. DATE
ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings:
FLORAMIE OLASIMAN ROMERO
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a veri ied
petition. In contempt proceedings, the prescribed
DOCTRINE:
procedure must be followed.
Succinctly, there are two kinds of publications

If initiating indirect contempt proceedings is
relating to court and to court proceedings which
through veri ied petition, courts have the duty to
can warrant the exercise of the power to punish
ensure that all the requirements for iling
for contempt: (1) that which tends to impede,
initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It
obstruct, embarrass or in luence the courts in
behooves them too to docket the petition, and to
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administering justice in a pending suit or Whether or not the subject article of Manrique is
proceeding; and (2) that which tends to degrade illustrative of the second kind of contemptous
the courts and to destroy public con idence in publication for insinuating that this Court’s
them or that which tends to bring them in any issuance of TRO in GR NO. 181532 was founded
way into disrepute. on illegal cause?
FACTS:
RULING:
This is a Petition for Indirect Contempt under Yes The pivotal issue in this case is whether the
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court iled against contents of Manrique’s article would constitute
respondent Leo Ruben C. Manrique (Manrique) indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of
for allegedly publishing statements which tend to the Rules of Court which reads:
directly impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
The instant case stemmed. from an article in administration of justice.
Luzon Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation
A reading of the subject article shows that
wherein respondent Manrique is the publisher/
Manrique was not simply passing judgment on an
editor, which allegedly contained disparaging
of icial act of the Court. He was actually intimating
statements against the Supreme Court.
that the petitioners were able to obtain a TRO
through illicit means, with the complicity of this
“Kaya naman hindi maalis ng ilan ang magduda na
Court.
ang taong gipit sa kaso ay maaaring magbayad ng

milyung-milyon piso upang upuan ng Korte
Manrique tries to invoke the protection of the
Suprema ang kaso at manatiling habang buhay
constitutional guaranties of free speech and press,
ang TRO.”
albeit unpersuasively, to extricate himself from
liability. However, said constitutional protection is
In his Comment, Manrique alleged that there was
not a shield against scurrilous publications, which
nothing malicious or defamatory in his article
are heaved against the courts with no apparent
since he only stated the facts or circumstances
reason but to trigger doubt on their integrity
which attended the issuance of the TRO. He
based on some imagined possibilities. Freedom of
likewise denied that he made any degrading
speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be
remarks against the Supreme Court and claimed
balanced with the requirements of equally
that the article simply posed academic questions.
important public interests, such as the
If the article ever had a critical undertone, it was
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and
directed against the actions of the petitioners,
orderly functioning of the administration of
who are public of icers, and never against the
justice.
Supreme Court. At any rate, he asseverated that

whatever was stated in his article is protected by
Therefore,Manrique's article, lacking in social
the constitutional guaranties of free speech and
value and aimed solely at besmirching the
press1âwphi1.
reputation of the Court, is undeserving of the

protection of the guaranties of free speech and
ISSUES:
press.
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Lorenzo Shipping v. Distribution Button
Management Assoc. of the Philippines ISSUES: Whether or not the statements contained
GR. NO. (2011) in the Sea Transport Update constitute or amount
CAMILLE NICA CALONZO ROQUE to indirect contempt of court?
DOCTRINE: Contempt of court has been de ined RULING: The petition for indirect contempt is
as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public dismissed. Petitioners did not suf iciently show
authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a how the respondents’ publication of the Sea
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or Transport Update constituted any of the acts
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an punishable as indirect contempt of court under
interruption of, its proceedings by disorderly Section 3 of Rule 71.
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea
near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive,
impair the respect due to such a body. In its or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of
restricted and more usual sense, contempt decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. In
or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of this regard, then, we need to remind that the
court is generic, embracing within its legal power to punish for contempt of court is
signi ication a variety of different acts. exercised on the preservative and not on the
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct vindictive principle, and only occasionally should
contempt, which is committed in the presence of a court invoke its inherent power in order to
or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the re t a i n t h a t re s p e c t w i t h o u t wh i c h t h e
administration of justice; and constructive or administration of justice must falter or fail.
indirect contempt, which consists of willful
disobedience of the lawful process or order of the Inonog v. Judge Ibay
court GR. NO. 2009
ALLJUN NIC BAJAO SERENADO
FACTS: Petitioners iled a special civil action for
DOCTRINE: A person cannot, for disobedience, be
contempt against the respondents, insisting that
punished for contempt unless the act which is
t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e S e a T r a n s p o r t
forbidden or required to be done is clearly and
Updateconstituted indirect contempt of court for
exactly de ined, so that there can be no reasonable
patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that
doubt or uncertainty as to what speci ic act or
the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and,
thing is forbidden or required.
worse, that the publication unfairly debased the
Supreme Court by making “scurrilous, malicious,
FACTS:
tasteless, and baseless innuendo” to the effect that
● Inonog parked his superior’s vehicle, the
the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be
Cheif of the Business Permit Division of
in luenced by the petitioners as to lead the
Makati City, in the parking space reserved
respondents to conclude that the “Supreme Court
for Judge Ibay.
ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time
● Judge Ibay then initiated proceedings for
is at least 3 to 6 months.” They averred that the
indirect contempt against Inonog on the
respondents’ purpose, taken in the context of the
basis that the promulgation of the
entire publication, was to “defy the decision, for it
Decisions in 4 criminal cases on said day.
was based on technicalities, and the Supreme
Court was in luenced

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● When Inonog failed to show up at the to be deducted from his retirement

hearing for indirect contempt, Judge Ibay bene its.
found him guilty, sentenced him to 5 days
of imprisonment and a P1k ine, and Sanguniang Panlunsod ng Baguio City v.
issued a warrant for Inonog’s arrest. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation
GR. NO. 2014
ISSUES: WON Judge Ibay abused his power in
JIL AILIL GIAN TALLER SOLIS
holding Inonog in contempt.

DOCTRINE: LGUs are not exempted from
RULING:
complying with the orders of the court .
● The act of complainant in parking his car
i n a s l o t a l l e g e d ly re s e r ve d fo r

respondent judge does not fall under the
FACTS: The case is about the parking lots in
wide spectrum of acts that could
Baguio City. Jadewell is the corporation that
constitute indirect contempt.
managed the privatization of the streets in Baguio
● There was no showing that he acted with
converting it to parking lots. However, due to
malice and/or bad faith or that he was
many clamping and towing incidents, many
improperly motivated to delay the
citizens questioned the operation of Jadewell.
proceedings of the court by making use of
Hence, the City Council rescinded the MOA
the parking slot supposedly reserved for
between Jadewell and the City of Baguio.
respondent judge.
● We cannot also say that the said act of Jadewell iled with the RTC of Baguio City a
complainant constitutes disrespect to the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
dignity of the court. In sum, the incident with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
is too limsy and inconsequential to be Preliminary Injunction. The court then issued a
the basis of an indirect contempt writ of preliminary injunction, holding that the
proceeding. rescission of the MOA is unlawful. It directed the
City Mayor or a representative acting on his behalf
● Furthermore, a person cannot, for to immediately open the streets operated by
disobedience, be punished for contempt Jadewell until further orders of the court.
unless the act which is forbidden or However, the City government didn’t comply with
required to be done is clearly and exactly the court’s order. Jadewell then asked the court to
de ined, so that there can be no cite City Mayor and other city of icials in indirect
reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to contempt. City of Baguio issued Executive orders
what speci ic act or thing is forbidden or reiterating its cease and desist order against
required. Here, the act of complainant is Jadewell.
not contrary or clearly prohibited by an
order of the court. ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Jadewell was denied of
● In fact, this is already the 4th time Judge due process when the MOA was
Ibay was charged with grave abuse of rescinded
authority in connection with his misuse
of his contempt power. 2) Whether or not the Baguio City of icials be
● Judge Ibay is found guilty of grave abuse cited in indirect contempt for rescinding the MOA
of authority and ordered to pay a of P40k
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However, the court issued an order directing the

RULING: 1) No. parties to observe the terms of the MOA. Thus,
public respondents were not expressly prohibited
Jadewell was not deprived of due process when to act on their beliefs regarding the validity or
the Sangunnian Panglungsod rescinded the MOA invalidity of the MOA, or, the authority or lack of
because the rescission was not an exercise of authority of Jadewell personnel to perform
judicial or quasi-judicial function. Rather it was governmental functions in the streets of Baguio.
purel legislative or administrative function
because the Sangunnian Panlungsud doesn’t
possess judicial or quasi-judicial powers.
Angeles v. CA
Extrajudicial declaration of rescission is
recognized as a power which does not require GR. NO. (2014)
judicial intervention. KEVIN SOON
DOCTRINE:
Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are
friable only by the court against whose authority
2) No. The court ruled that the said of icials the contempts are charged; the power to punish
are NOT liable for indirect contempt. for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a
court to compel due decorum and respect in its

presence and due obedience to its judgments,
orders and processes and in order that a court
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil
may compel obedience to its orders, it must have
Procedure enumerates the acts constituting
the right to inquire whether there has been any
indirect contempt.
disobedience thereof, for to submit the question
Public of icials can be cited to indirect contempt of disobedience to another tribunal would operate
for (1) irst, disobedience or resistance to a lawful to deprive the proceeding of half its ef iciency.
order of this Court under paragraph (2) second,
unlawful interference with the proceedings of this FACTS:
Court under paragraph (3) third improper Angeles iled a Petition for Contempt with the CA
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to against court employees and sheriff of Pasig City
impeded, obstruct, or degrade the administration RTC branch 268 (not the judge). She alleges that
of justice by this Court. these employees de ied the order of the RTC to
transmit the records of the case to the CA.
It must be noted that what the trial court issued
on 9 February 2005 was the writ of preliminary Angeles was a co-defendant in a reconveyance
mandatory injunction (WPMI) directing Mayor case which she lost in the said RTC. She appealed
Yaranon to perform only one speci ic act: to the decision and the RTC directed to transmit the
reopen, and maintain open, the street and entire record of the case to the CA on November
premises then being occupied and operated by 2005. The RTC however granted a petition for
Jadewell. When he failed to comply with the order execution pending appeal iled by the winning
of the court, he was ined with P10,000 NBI was plaintiff (this was initially denied, but the RTC
ordered to arrest him if he further failed to reversed itself), and a writ of execution pending
comply with the WPMI. appeal was issued on February 2006 .
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Records of the case was only transmitted to the contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
CA on the latter part of February 2006. Angeles court against which the contempt was committed"
was evicted from the subject property on March and "where the charge for indirect contempt has
2006 on the strength of the said writ of execution been committed against a Regional Trial Court or
pending appeal. a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an
of icer appointed by it, the charge may be iled
The CA denied the petition of Angeles. with such court."|||
ISSUES: 3. Lastly, prior to the transmittal of the original

WON the CA committed GAD in dismissing the record, the trial court may order execution
Petition for Contempt iled by Angeles against pending appeal. "The 'residual jurisdiction' of trial
employees and Sheriff of the RTC. courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the
RULING: case or the subject matter involved in the appeal.
No. The SC dismissed the petition. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
1. The CA is correct that unless an order/ records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of
resolution/directive issued by a court of the original records or the records on appeal. In
competent jurisdiction is declared null and void, either instance, the trial court still retains its so-
such orders are presumed valid. The Petitioner called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
did not avail of remedies available to her to assail orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of
the validity of the writ of execution pending indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal,
appeal , hence the same remained valid and and allow the withdrawal of the appeal."
enforceable.
There is no suf icient showing of acts committed Silverio v. Silverio Jr.

by respondents which may constitute contempt, GR. NO. (2014)
such as among others, refusing to obey a lawful HONEY TAGALOG
order of the court or act of disrespect to the
dignity of the court which tends to hamper the DOCTRINE: A hearing is required in order to
orderly proceedings and lessen its ef iciency. The resolve a charge of indirect contempt; the
Respondents do not occupy positions of respondent to the charge may not be convicted on
discretion, but are only subject to the authority or the basis of written pleadings alone.
control of the court a quo. Their functions are
purely ministerial and administrative in character FACTS
and con ined to serving court orders, processes Petitioner Ricardo Sr. is the surviving spouse of
and carrying the same into effect. the decedent Beatriz S. Silverio, with whom he has
children: herein respondent Ricardo Jr., Edmundo;
2. Even for the sake of argument that the Ligaya; and Nelia.
respondents did defy court orders and are to be
punished, the contempt charge should have been Nelia iled a Petition for Certiorari with the CA —
initiated in the court a quo (the RTC) and not in questioning the trial court's October 31, 2006
the CA. Omnibus Order, particularly Ricardo Jr.'s
appointment as the new administrator. CA
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the ROC state,
respectively, that "proceedings for indirect

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granted Nelia’s application for a writ of contempt charge may not be convicted on the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. basis of written pleadings alone.
Ricardo Jr. iled an appeal praying for the reversal One of procedural requisites before the accused
of the decision of CA. may be punished for indirect contempt: there
must be hearing.
Later on, Ricardo Jr. wrote and sent two letters,
one each to petitioners. Ricardo Jr. demanded in In contempt proceedings, the prescribed
the irst letter that Ricardo Sr. cease and desist procedure must be followed. To be sure, since an
from 1) exercising the rights of a stockholder in indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a
PDC; 2) managing PDC's affairs and business; and criminal charge, conviction cannot be had merely
3) transacting with third persons for and in behalf on the basis of written pleadings. The court must
of PDC and to turn over all of its books and set the contempt charge for hearing on a ixed
records. date and time on which the respondent must
make his appearance to answer the charge.
In the second letter, Ricardo Jr. demanded that
Lorna immediately vacate the house at Urdaneta
Village. NPC DAMA v. NPC
GR. NO. (2014)
With this, Nelia (petitioners) urged the Court to
APRIL NYL HAMOY PAMERON
take the initiative in inding Ricardo Jr.
DOCTRINE:
(respondent) guilty of indirect contempt for the
said letters and for attempting to evict them from
FACTS:
their Urdaneta Village home, which acts they
1. National Power Corporation (NPC)
believe amount to a de iance and disobedience of
Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC
the CA'sruling.
DAMA), represented by its President
Roger S. San Juan, Sr., NPC Employees &
Respondent submits that the mere act of writing
Workers Union (NEWU) Northern Luzon,
and sending the letters to petitioners does not
Regional Center, represented by its
make him liable for indirect contempt of court, as
Regional President Jimmy D. Salman, in
they "do not deal directly or indirectly with any of
their own individual capacities and in
the enjoined acts enumerated in the 31 October
behalf of the members of the associations
2006" Omnibus Order.
and all affected of icers and employees of
National Power Corporation (NPC), Zol D.
ISSUE: WON Respondent is guilty of indirect
Medina, Narciso M. Magante, Vicente B.
contempt? NO
Cirio, Jr., and Necitas B. Camama, in their
RULING
individual capacities as employees of
The SC ruled that it is the CA that should properly
National Power Corporation.
try the case involving indirect contempt.
2. On February 9, 2009, the petitioners iled
a Manifestation with Urgent Omnibus
Aside from the fact that the CA is the court against
Motions, praying:
which the alleged contempt was committed, a
To cite in contempt of court the Chairman
hearing is required in resolving a charge for
and Members of NPC, the NPB, and the
indirect contempt. The respondent in an indirect
NPC President for their failure to comply

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with item (1) of the December 10, 2008 our inal rulings; and (3) submit proof of
Resolution, i.e., the submission of a list, its compliance.
under oath, of the names of all NPC Third, the NPC's refusal to give full
personnel/employees terminated and/or cooperation in the implementation by
separated as a result or pursuant to the Atty. Ele and RTC sheriffs of the
nulli ied NPC Board Resolutions Nos. December 2, 2009 Resolution, which
2002-124 and 2002-125; compelled the latter, at their own
3. On March 24, 2009, the petitioners iled a initiative, to procure a copy of the list of
Comment/Manifestation and Urgent the NPC employees affected by our inal
Motions[27] to include for contempt the rulings.
OSG and to summon the NPC Vice- Fourth, the NPC's employment of motions
President for Human Resource and to stay the execution of the December 2,
Administration to attest and certify to 2009 Resolution grounded on issues not
certain of icial documents for failing to timely raised before the inality of our
comply with the December 10, 2008 inal rulings.
Resolution. 2. On this note, Section 3(b) Rule 71 of the
4. In the December 2, 2009 Resolution,the Rules of Court lists the disobedience of or
Court ordered the respondents and their resistance to a lawful writ as one of the
counsel to show cause why they should grounds for indirect contempt.
not be held in contempt of court for their 3. The court GRANT the petitioners'
willful failure to comply with the Manifestation with Ex-Parte Very Urgent
December 10, 2008 Resolution. Motion to Summarily Cite Respondents
and their Counsels in Contempt of Court
ISSUES: dated January 5, 2010. The National
Whether or not Respondent NPC should be held Power Corporation and the Of ice of the
in contempt of court. Solicitor General are separately found
guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and are
RULING: hereby ORDERED to each pay a FINE in
the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
1. Yes. Under the circumstances, no doubt (P30,000.00).
exists that the NPC committed several
acts demonstrating its disobedience to
our inal rulings:
First, the NPC's refusal to comply with the

December 10, 2008 Resolution by
insisting on an interpretation contrary to
the clear import of our inal rulings.
Second, the NPC's refusal to comply with
the December 2, 2009 Resolution which
required it to: (1) submit a list of all NPC
employees, together with the amounts
due them, affected by the nulli ied NPB
resolutions; (2) pay the amounts due to
the affected NPC employees pursuant to

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TABLE

OF CONTENTS: RULE 66-71

Rule 66 - QUO WARRANTO 4

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 1

National Transmission Corp. v. Lacson-De Leon ------------------------------------------------43

Rule 68 - FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE 44

Rule 69- PARTITION 53

Rule 70- FORCIBLE ENTERY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER 67

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 2

Vda. De Legaspi v. Avendano ------------------------------------------------------------------------80

Rule 71- CONTEMPT 97

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 3

Rule 66 - QUO 5. Senators Santiago and Tatad iled a

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 4

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 5

Also, succession in of ice to the next higher rank

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 6

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 7

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 8

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 9

DOCTRINE: In a letter dated April 11, 2008, DILG

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 10

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 11

In this instant petition, petitioners did not cite the

Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 12

Regulations on the Conversion of writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice

ISSUES: Moreover, although the instant petition is styled

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 13

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 14

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 15

FACTS: Persons claiming a right to an of ice of which they

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 16

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 17

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 18

RULING: of an acting appointment is its temporariness and

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 19

interviewed or considered for nomination.”

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 20

OSG’S ARGUMENTS: removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 21

(1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 22

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 23

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 24

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 25

Rule 67 - UPV, iled a complaint for eminent domain against

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 26

ISSUES: Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 27

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 28

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 29

4. She also asserted that the supposed MICHELLE LASTIMOSO FUENTES

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 30

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 31

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 32

3. Respondent wrote another letter to by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 33

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 34

ISSUES: SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 35

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES | JUSTICE YAP | EH-405 | 36