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Beebower
Determinants ef PortfeHe
Perfermance n: An Update
This article presents a framework for determining the contributions of different aspects of the
investment management process—asset allocation policy, active asset allocation, and
security selection—to the total return of investment portfolios. Data from 82 large pension
plans indicate that asset allocation policy, however determined, is the overwhelmingly
dominant contributor to total return. Active investment decisions by plan sponsors and
managers did little on average to improve performance over the 10-year period December
1977 to December 1987. The performance attribution framework is also extended to account
for actual and synthetic cash holdings within asset classes.
Security Selection
cation involves anticipating price moves (market Actual Passive
timing) or reacting to market disequilibria (fun-
damental analysis), it results in the under or
overweighting of asset classes relative to the IV II
5 (Wai • Rai) X(Wai •Rpi)
normal weights identified by policy.^ The aim of 1
active allocation is to enhance the return and/or
reduce the risk of the portfolio relative to its
policy benchmark. The policy and active asset
allocation return is computed by applying the III 1
actual asset class weights to their respective <l X (Wpi • Rai)
I
2 (Wpi •Rpi)
1
passive benchmark returns.
Quadrant III presents the returns to a portfo-
lio attributable to policy and security selection.
'Vlpi = poiicy weight for asset class i; Wai = actual weight for asset
Security selection involves active investment class i; Rpi = passive return for asset class U Rai = actual return
decisions concerning the securities within each for asset class i.
Summary of Holdings
Standard
Average Maximum Minimum Deviation
Equity 53.0% 79.1% 26.0% 10.8%
Bond 24.5% 53.1% 4.0% 10.4%
Cash 12.1% 24.1% 3.0% 4.6%
Other 10.5% 65.4% 0.1% 12.0%
Summary of Holdings Excluding "Other"
Standard
Average Maximum Minimum Deviation
Equity 59.6% 83.9% 36.5% 10.5%
Bond 26.9% 54.0% 5.6% 10.2%
Cash 13.6% 24.3% 3.5% 4.9%
normal weights) as the 10-year average of the culated returns based on the policy weights in
plan's asset class weights. These funds did not effect in each period.
necessarily favor a "typical" mix of assets (such
as 60/40 stocks/bonds), although, as Table II Results
shows, the average mix was very close to 60 per In addition to the actual reported return for each
cent equity and 40 per cent fixed income. Figure plan, we defined three return series—policy,
D shows that the observed combinations of policy and active asset allocation, and policy
equity and bond weights cover almost the and security selection. The policy return is the
whole range of possibilities. passive portfolio benchmark return, calculated
Some plans showed evidence of a change in as the sum of the policy weighted passive asset
policy over the 10 years, either by a clear up- class returns, using the 10-year average asset
ward or downward frend in the weight of an class weights (as discussed above) and a suitable
asset class or a sudden and apparently perma- passive index for each asset class. The S&P 500,
nent shift in the level of the quarterly weights. the Salomon Broad Investment Grade (BIG)
We attempted to account for this in the analysis. bond index and 30-day Treasury bills were used
In cases where there appeared to be a policy as the passive indexes for the equity, bond and
shift, we divided the 10-year period into two cash components, respectively.
periods—prechange and postchange—and cal- The poUcy and active asset allocation return is
60
50 -
BondWBight
40 **• • •
30 . • * •
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Equity Weight
16
Less Risk
Than Pblicy
14
More Risk
Than Policy
10 12 14 16
Active Risk
of the correlation coefficient between two jointly both stock and bond components over the entire
distributed random variables. It is used to de- 10 years.
scribe the amount of variability in one variable There are several possible explanations for
that can be accounted for by another variable. In these irregularities. First, the arialysis did not
this instance, we are concerned with the per- account for the liability exposure of each plan.
centage of variability in actual returns that is The inclusion of a liability proxy might shift
accounted for by policy, by policy and active these perfonnance statistics. Second, the use of
asset allocation, and by policy and security 10-year average weights for the passive bench-
selection. mark may have created an inefficient bench-
Figure G shows that, on average, policy re-
turns accounted for 91.5 per cent of the variance
of actual returns. Being conditionally distrib-
Figure G ftrcentage of Variation Explained,
uted on the policy returns, active asset alloca-
1977-1987
tion and security selection combined could have
accounted for only a small residual portion of
the variance of actual returns. In fact, policy and
active asset allocation combined accounted for Security Selection
Actual Passive
93.3 per cent and policy and security selection
combined accounted for about %.l per cent.
Again, the dominance of investment policy is rv u
dear.^ 100.0% 93.3%
mark. While the impact was probably not great, simple 60/40 stock/bond mix as a passive bench-
some bias was infroduced. mark for all the funds resulted in virtually the
It is difficult, given these data, to determine same average results as indicated in Figure G.
conclusively which asset classes generated good Given the average portfolio composition in Ta-
or bad relative performance. It should be noted, ble II, this is not too surprising.
however, that 76 of the 82 equity funds under- Finally, we do not know the actual number of
performed the S&P 500 on an equity-only basis. different money managers used by these 82
A complete 10-year bond performance was not pension plans. While it is highly unlikely that
avfulable for several funds, because their bond the data represent only a few managers, the
weights were zero for several quarters. For the study does refiect the performance of individual
70 cases with complete bond histories, almost managers, not necessarily pension fund perfor-
two-thirds outperformed the passive bond mance in general. Furthermore, we know noth-
benchmark. Of those plans that underper- ing about the styles of the managers or their use
formed their policy benchmarks, over 75 per of futures and options. Some almost certsiinly
cent underperformed in the bond component. altered intemal risk positions by hedging during
As one would expect, the median cash manager the last quarter of 1987; this is indicated by the
outperformed the 30-day T-bill index. positive equity returns at a time when the
market as a whole was down by almost 25 per
Limitations cent. The issue of hedging, and the broader
Our analysis lacks some precision because of issue of risk positioning, is treated in more
perfonnance data limitations. First, as noted, depth below.
the composition of the "other asset" category
was unknown; in many cases, however, this
category constituted only a small percentage of Internal versus External Risk Positioning
the total portfolio. Second, policy portfolios Besides shifting asset class weights—^i.e., exter-
were inferred from the long-term average asset nal risk p(»itioiiii^—a manager or sponsor can
class weights, and there is no assurance that change exposure to an asset class within a
they reliably represent the actual benchmarks. portfolio component-—intemal risk position-
In terms of assessing the importance of the ing. Intemal methods include altering tiie com-
benchmark to investment returns, however, ponent's beta or duration by using long or shorf
this is probably not a serious proUem. Adjust- futures positions, carrying cash or hedging the
ing for apparent shifts in policy weights had currency component. Looking at any single risk-
very little effect on the analysis. In fact, using a positioning activity, external or internal, will not