Conceptual Scheme Decision Model For Mechatronic Products Driven by Risk of Function Failure Propagation

sustainability
Article
Conceptual Scheme Decision Model for Mechatronic
Products Driven by Risk of Function
Failure Propagation
Liting Jing 1,2 , Qingqing Xu 1 , Tao Sun 1 , Xiang Peng 1 , Jiquan Li 1 , Fei Gao 2
and Shaofei Jiang 1, *
1 College of Mechanical Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China;
jinglt0805@zjut.edu.cn (L.J.); xuqingqing301@gmail.com (Q.X.); stevensunkiki@gmail.com (T.S.);
pengxiang@zjut.edu.cn (X.P.); lijq@zjut.edu.cn (J.L.)
2 College of Computer Science & Technology, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China;
feig@zjut.edu.cn
* Correspondence: jsf75@zjut.edu.cn

Received: 21 July 2020; Accepted: 28 August 2020; Published: 1 September 2020
Abstract: Reliability is a major performance index in the electromechanical product conceptual design
decision process. As the function is the purpose of product design, the risk of scheme design is easy to
be caused when there is a failure (i.e., function failure). However, existing reliability analysis models
focus on the failure analysis of functions but ignore the quantitative risk assessment of conceptual
schemes when function failures occur. In addition, design information with subjectivity and fuzziness
is difficult to introduce the risk index into the early design stage for comprehensive decisions. To fill
this gap, this paper proposes a conceptual scheme decision model for mechatronic products driven
by the risk of function failure propagation. Firstly, the function structure model is used to construct
the function fault propagation model, so as to obtain the influence degree of the subfunction failure.
Secondly, the principle solution weight is calculated when the function failure is propagated, and the
influence degree of the failure mode is integrated to obtain the severity of the failure mode on the
product system. Thirdly, the risk value of failure mode is calculated by multiplying the severity
and failure probability of failure mode, and the risk value of the scheme is obtained based on the
influence relationship between failure modes. Finally, the VIKOR (Višekriterijumska Optimizacija
i kompromisno Rešenje) method is used to make the optimal decision for the conceptual scheme,
and then take the cutting speed regulating device scheme of shearer as an example to verify the
effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed decision model.
Keywords: conceptual design; reliability analysis; function failure propagation; program risk value;
multi-objective decision-making (MODM)
1. Introduction
Conceptual design decision is a major part of new product development (NPD). It seeks the value
of schemes by decision objectives, judges, and rank candidate schemes with the help of multi-objective
decision models to obtain the optimal scheme. The current mainstream decision model uses numerical
methods to consider multiple design factors (i.e., cost, quality, reliability, etc.) to achieve the optimal
decision of the conceptual scheme (CS) [1–3]. With the rapid development of technology, the rapid
change of users’ requirements urges enterprises to develop a new product with a shorter cycle and lower
cost [4]. However, this involves uncertainty and design risks, especially for complex electromechanical
products such as aviation equipment and coal mine machinery equipment, the reliability of CS should
be considered. Nowadays, the research of reliability analysis mainly focuses on the modeling of
Sustainability 2020, 12, 7134; doi:10.3390/su12177134 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability

Sustainability 2020, 12, 7134 2 of 28
design risk propagation models [5], and the analysis of structural system failure modes in detailed
design [6], which leads to concept design failure risk not being considered effective, and effective
reliability evaluation data cannot be provided in CS decision process.
Since Stone et al. [7] introduced failure modes and risks in the function analysis stage, reliability has
been extensively studied in conceptual design, mainly including three aspects, namely functional
reliability analysis, failure risk identification, and principle solution reliability evaluation. In functional
reliability analysis, Kurtoglu et al. [8] performed failure reasoning on functional failures to avoid the
problem of functional failure. To reduce the impact of failure propagation on the system, Short et al. [9]
proposed a function failure design method that sacrificed non-critical subsystems to maintain core
functions, which could help designers complete primary mission objectives despite failure events.
Later, based on the functional dependency network analysis model [10], Guariniello et al. [11] used
system operational dependency analysis (SODA) to consider the internal state of the design system and
better accounted for stochasticity to improve the efficiency of functional failure analysis. Although the
methods above are helpful to improve functional reliability and support decision-making [12] and
propose two strategies of prevention and sacrifice to ensure the realization of system functions,
the qualitative dependence between functions will cause state changes of different failure models,
making it difficult to provide quantifiable risk data for the decision process of CSs.
In the failure risk identification, Xiao et al. [13] analyzed multiple failure modes in FMEA
(failure mode and effects analysis), which can be provided to other designers to prevent the hidden
dangers caused by the failure mode. Then, in order to improve the reliability of the redesign,
Ma et al. [6] used FMEA to identify the failure causal relationship between components and proposed
a fuzzy permanent function to measure the internal failure effect of the conceptual scheme to ensure
customer satisfaction. However, traditional FMEA is affected by cognitive preferences. For this reason,
Baykasoğlu et al. [14] integrated fuzzy cognitive maps and FMEA to reliably obtain risk priority
indexes. In addition, Hamraz et al. [5] proposed a multidomain engineering change propagation model
based on the function-behavior-structure (F-B-S) linkage model to reduce the uncertainty of design risk.
The above risk identification models mainly focused on the overall failure mode risk calculation in the
scheme and considered the failure mode dependency to reduce the risk of the product. However, most
pertinent studies did not analyze the failure risk of the principle solution in each CS, which cannot
guarantee the reliability of the selected scheme.
In the principle solution reliability evaluation, O’Halloran et al. [15] analyzed the functional
components with high risk and improved them to ensure the scheme’s reliability. Ma et al. [16]
used the multi-objective decision model in a morphological matrix to seek the appropriate principle
solution and combined with the reliability index to determine the optimal scheme. Due to the abstract
nature of the principle solution, Aydoğan et al. [17] combined with the Z-axiomatic design theory to
obtain the decisionmaker’s risk attitude about the scheme, thereby eliminating unreliable principle
solution to enhance the success for a better decision. Besides, as far as possible to ensure customer
needs on the premise of reducing the risk of principle solutions, Ma et al. [18] introduced fuzzy QFD
(quality function deployment) and failure risk analysis model to identify principle solutions to be
improved to redesign complex products. Although the above-mentioned decision model considers the
influence of reliability indicators on the value of the scheme, it cannot identify the principle solution of
the failure to the scheme risk. This limitation motivates the study as well.
For this purpose, how to analyze the impact of function failure propagation on the risk of CSs and
integrate the scheme risk data in the decision process is still one of the most significant works to ensure
the robustness and reliability of the CS, several shortcomings are found and listed as follows:
• The issue of ignoring the risk identification of dangerous functions and principle solution in the
function failure propagation analysis process deserves to be well explored.
• The failure risk analysis method relies on experts’ evaluation of the probability for each failure
mode and ignores the comprehensive analysis of the scheme risk of failure mode interaction.
• The process of scheme risk assessment in case of function failure involves subjectivity, a fuzzy
logic model is necessary to be adopted to reduce the uncertainty of decision results.
It can be seen from the above that the traditional reliability decision model of CS does not
consider the process of function failure analysis and reasoning, and ignores the risk impact of
the failure of principle solution on the overall scheme value. To this end, the decision model for
the mechatronic product conceptual scheme based on the function failure propagation analysis
is proposed. After that, a function failure propagation analysis model and multiple propagation
modes are constructed. Next, the risk propagation path of the CS is analyzed though the mapping
process of requirement-function-principle solution (RFP), and the CS with the lowest risk value is
determined. The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the related works.
The conceptual scheme decision model-based function failure relay analysis framework is proposed in
Section 3. A cut speed regulating device of shearer as a case study to verify the proposed approach is
taken in Section 4, and the paper ends with a conclusion and future work in Section 5.
2. Related Works
2.1. Conceptual Design Decision

Conceptual design decision plays a key role in subsequent design activities, which will directly
affect the performance, manufacturing process, and cost objective of the product. Due to its importance
in NPD, the decision-making of CS has always been an attractive topic among researchers. To effectively
compare the value of different schemes, many numerical decision methods have been developed to
select the optimal design scheme, as shown in Figure 1.
As a typical MODM problem, many decision models are used to integrate the value information of
candidate schemes under multiple objectives to complete the ranking. Ma et al. [16] integrated customer
needs and risk analysis to build a multi-objective optimization model to seek the appropriate principle
solution. Saaty [19] proposed ANP (network analysis process) to construct the judgment matrix and
calculate the weight of the evaluation objective. Ma et al. [1] used TOPSIS (the technique for order
of preference by similarity to ideal solution) to analyze the sustainability of the product to formulate
the optimal end-of-life strategy. Tiwari et al. [20] used VIKOR based on rough set (Višekriterijumska
Optimizacija i kompromisno Rešenje) to find the optimal design scheme between cost and benefit
objectives under uncertainty. Lo et al. [21] used QFD (quality function deployment) to construct 3D
morphology diagrams in product variant design, so as to quickly generate CSs. Jing et al. [22] used
fuzzy DEMATEL (decision making trial and evaluation laboratory) to analyze the causality between
different objectives in the decision process, and form the game strategy to achieve the optimal decision
of the scheme. In addition, the evaluation information mainly depends on the subjective judgment
by experts, which makes decision results affected by factors such as expert knowledge background
and skills, leading to uncertainty in the decision environment. Thus, researchers introduce rough
sets, interval number, and fuzzy numbers to capture the uncertainty from the subjective judgment
of experts. Ayağ [23] integrated fuzzy numbers and AHP (analytic hierarchy process) to evaluate
the conceptual scheme. Zhu et al. [4] proposed a hybrid decision approach of TOPSIS and AHP and
integrated fuzzy rough numbers to process evaluation data under uncertainty. Pamučar et al. [24]
proposed a novel DEMATEL-ANP model based on interval rough numbers, and a new multi-attribute
technique was applied to evaluate the design scheme.
Of course, as design data becomes more abundant and decision problems become more
complicated, some decision algorithms are used for intelligent decision of products. For instance,
Ferreira and Paulo [25] used the prediction ability of artificial neural networks to analyze
multi-parameter problems, which could improve the quality of the decision result; Kang and Tang [3]
used ant colony optimization model to automatically generate feasible schemes based on design
structure matrix; Sibois et al. [26] used reliability-based stochastic Petri Net approach to realize the
verification of engineering system to drive innovation concept design. The product conceptual scheme
decision applications are also summarized as a picture at the end of this section.
In summary, most of the methods above mainly consider how to analyze the “value” differences
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 28
between candidate schemes, and integrate evaluation data to achieve the optimal decision.
However, existing focuses
existing research researchonfocuses on product
product design
design risk risk prediction
prediction [27] or[27] or function
function failure
failure risk [28]
risk [28] but
but ignores the impact of the PRF of the risk path on scheme reliability in the conceptual
ignores the impact of the PRF of the risk path on scheme reliability in the conceptual design process, design process,
which
which also
also promotes
promotes the the research
research in
in this
this paper.
paper.
Components in redesign of a large

Interval number
tonnage crawler crane (Ma et al. [29])
Fuzzy information Cutting device of shearer scheme

Fuzzy number
processing decision (Jing et al. [22])
The heat exchanger of the automotive

Rough number
air-conditioning (Zhu et al. [4])
Analytic Hierarchy The hot runner manufacturing system
Process (AHP) (Ayağ et al. [23])
Multi-attribute utility Quality Function Rapid generation of computer mice

analysis Deployment (QFD) (LO et al. [21])
The portfolio selection problem

PROMETHEE
Conceptual design (Vetschera et al. [2])
decision applications
Testing rig machine concept decision
VIKOR
(Tiwari et al. [20])
Multi-criteria decision
value synthesis
The EOL strategy of rEfrigerator
TOPSIS
(Ma et al. [1])
Intelligent search The transmission mechanism of loading

algorithm platform (Kang et al. [3])
Intelligent reasoning
decision problem A decision support tool based on a feed
Artificial neural
forward artificial neural network
networks
(Ferreira and Gil [25])
Figure Figure 1. A classification

1. A classification of conceptual
of conceptual schemescheme
decisiondecision applications.
applications [1–4,20–25,29].
2.2. Conceptual Design

2.2. Conceptual Design Failure
Failure Risk
Risk Analysis
Analysis
Reliability analysis approach
Reliability analysis approach in in NPD
NPD mainly
mainly include
include PRA
PRA (probabilistic
(probabilistic risk risk assessment)
assessment) [30],[30],
RBD (reliability block diagram) [31], FTA (fault tree analysis) [32] and FMEA
RBD (reliability block diagram) [31], FTA (fault tree analysis) [32] and FMEA [13]. Since the FMEA is [13]. Since the FMEA
is a qualitative
a qualitative analysisand
analysis andevaluation
evaluationmethod methodthat thatanalyzes
analyzesthe thepotential
potential failure
failure modes
modes of of each
each
component
component unit of the product to avoid high-risk failure modes, which has been widely used in the
unit of the product to avoid high-risk failure modes, which has been widely used in the
conceptual
conceptual design
design process.
process. Peeters
Peeterset etal.
al.[33]
[33]integrated
integratedFTA FTAand
andFMEAFMEAinina arecursive
recursivemanner,
manner, which
which is
used to to
is used evaluate
evaluate critical
criticalsystem-level
system-level failure modes
failure modes to ensure
to ensureproduct
productsystem
systemoperation.
operation.To reduce
To reduce the
uncertainty of risk assessment, Gu et al. [34] proposed an improved
the uncertainty of risk assessment, Gu et al. [34] proposed an improved method of TOPSIS-based method of TOPSIS-based failure
mode
failuresequencing
mode sequencing and solved the ambiguity
and solved of riskof
the ambiguity calculation. Chen Chen
risk calculation. et al. [35]
et al.combined with QFD
[35] combined with
and FMEA to develop a fuzzy linear programming model. In order
QFD and FMEA to develop a fuzzy linear programming model. In order to improve the accuracy of to improve the accuracy of failure
analysis, Xiao et al.
failure analysis, Xiao[13]etproposed a weighted
al. [13] proposed risk priority
a weighted risknumber
prioritytonumber
calculatetothe risk value
calculate theof multiple
risk value
failure modes in FMEA. Ma et al. [29] used a directed failure causality network
of multiple failure modes in FMEA. Ma et al. [29] used a directed failure causality network to quantify to quantify the failure
risk of eachrisk
the failure component
of each and selectedand
component the scheme
selected with lower risk.
the scheme withZammori
lower risk. et al. [36] identified
Zammori the
et al. [36]
interaction between failure modes to calculate the risk priority number, which
identified the interaction between failure modes to calculate the risk priority number, which can solve can solve the correlation
problem in the problem
the correlation CS evaluationin theprocess.
CS evaluation process.
Function is the essence of
Function is the essence of conceptualconceptual design,
design, andand connecting
connecting design
design requirements
requirements and and principle
principle
solutions.
solutions. Reliability research on the product function can identify risks more efficiently [18].etStone
Reliability research on the product function can identify risks more efficiently [18]. Stone al. [7]
proposed a function afailure
et al. [7] proposed design
function method,
failure andmethod,
design constructed anda constructed
morphological matrix of function-failure
a morphological matrix of
modes,
function-failure modes, using historical failure data to identify functions withfailure;
using historical failure data to identify functions with a higher risk of a higher Huang et failure;
risk of al. [37]
used load-strength theory for reliability design at the conceptual design
Huang et al. [37] used load-strength theory for reliability design at the conceptual design stage. stage. Subsequently, to better
Subsequently, to better assess of the risk of the CS when the function fails, Chen et al. [38] analyzed
the failure risk based on the functional failure dependency and realized the quantitative risk
assessment of the function failure; Yontay and Pan [39] used Bayesian network model to calculate the
conditional probability between function and component failure and focused on the core function for
risk analysis.
assess of the risk of the CS when the function fails, Chen et al. [38] analyzed the failure risk based on
the functional failure dependency and realized the quantitative risk assessment of the function failure;
Yontay and2020,
Sustainability Pan12,
[39] used
x FOR Bayesian
PEER REVIEW network model to calculate the conditional probability between 5 of 28
function and component failure and focused on the core function for risk analysis.
For function
functionfailures
failuresandand
propagation problems,
propagation Krus and
problems, Grantham
Krus [40] analyzed
and Grantham [40]theanalyzed
propagation the
of failures through
propagation function
of failures failure
through chains
function to improve
failure chains to design defects;
improve designKurtoglu
defects;etKurtoglu
al. [41] proposed
et al. [41]
an FFIP (function
proposed an FFIP failure
(function propagation mode) to analyze
failure propagation mode) to theanalyze
three elements
the threeofelements
functional modeling,
of functional
behavior
modeling,simulation and failure and
behavior simulation reasoning;
failure Wang et al. Wang
reasoning; [42] proposed
et al. [42]a proposed
failure propagation path search
a failure propagation
approach
path search forapproach
electromechanical systems; Mehrpouyan
for electromechanical et al. [43] introduced
systems; Mehrpouyan anintroduced
et al. [43] MFIP (model-based
an MFIP
failure identification and propagation) framework in avionics systems to identify
(model-based failure identification and propagation) framework in avionics systems to identify security issues caused
by environmental
security disturbances
issues caused and subsystem
by environmental failures.and subsystem failures.
disturbances
The published
publishedliterature
literaturecancaneffectively
effectivelysolve the failure
solve propagation
the failure propagationmodelmodel
of the product system,
of the product
and propose the evaluation model to judge the system risk. However,
system, and propose the evaluation model to judge the system risk. However, how to apply how to apply the function failure
the
propagation
function failure model to the calculation
propagation model to of thethe system impact
calculation of the degree
system whenimpactthe function
degree when failure occurs,
the function
and quantify
failure occurs,theandrisk value the
quantify of the
riskprinciple
value of solution in the
the principle RFP mapping
solution in the RFP process
mappingunder uncertainty,
process under
which all have
uncertainty, not been
which considered
all have not beeninconsidered
the existinginliterature.
the existing literature.
3. Proposed Method
3. Proposed Method
Figure
Figure 22 shows
shows the
the decision
decision framework
framework of the mechatronic
of the mechatronic product
product conceptual
conceptual scheme
scheme based
based on
on
functional failure propagation analysis, which is mainly divided into five parts. The specific solution
functional failure propagation analysis, which is mainly divided into five parts. The specific solution
steps
steps are
are as
as follows.
follows.
Conceptual scheme set; design

requirements; subfunction
structure model
Method Method
Sub-requirement-
subfunction matrix Build the correlation matrix between Step A1 FMD data base
The risk value of failure mode is Step A4
function and requirements, and then calculated by combining the failure
Subfunction calculate the importance of function NPRD reliability rate and the severity of failure mode
autocorrelation data base
matrix
LeaderRank
algorithm Build functional fault propagation
directed network model, and obtain Step A2 VIKOR model
The risk value F for each scheme is Step A5
Failure propagation the node influence degree, then the calculated, and then the optimal
analysis weight of the principle solution is scheme is decided by VIKOR model
Influence relationship
obtained of failure mode
Function structure
model
Bayesian network
model The fuzzy importance is calculated Step A3 Overall optimal scheme
by bayesian network Model, then the considering the risk value
Weights of principle severity value is obtained

solutions
Figure 2.
Figure 2. The
The framework
framework of
of the
the proposed decision model.
proposed decision model.
Step A1:A1:Sub-requirement-subfunction
Sub-requirement-subfunction correlation
correlation matrix
matrix and subfunction
and subfunction autocorrelation
autocorrelation matrix
matrix
are are constructed,
constructed, and the sub-requirement
and the sub-requirement weight (rw) weight ( 𝑟𝑤
̅̅̅̅ ) isinto
is transformed transformed
the functioninto the function
importance ( f w).
importance ̅̅̅̅
Step A2:(𝑓𝑤The ). propagation path of function failure is analyzed, and the function structure model is
Step A2:into
transformed Thea propagation path of
directed weighted functionnetwork
functional failure is analyzed,
model. Then,and thethe function
influence structure
(LR) model
of subfunction
is transformed
nodes into graph
in the directed a directed weighted
is calculated functional
by using network model.
the LeaderRank algorithm Then,
[44].the influence
Next, (LR) of
the importance
subfunction
(η) of functionnodes in the directed
is transformed intograph is calculated
the weight by usingsolution
(w) of principle the LeaderRank
throughalgorithm
the house[44]. Next,
of quality
the importance
(HOQ) [32] and (𝜂̅ ) of function
fuzzy is transformed into the weight (𝑤
number [23]. ̅) of principle solution through the
house of quality
Step (HOQ)network
A3: Bayesian [32] andmodel
fuzzyisnumber [23].
used to analyze the importance (I) of multiple failure modes to
Step A3:solution
the principle Bayesian(i.e.,
network model isofused
the influence to analyze
failure modes on thethe
importance
principle (I) of multiple
solution). Then,failure modes
the severity
to the principle solution (i.e., the influence of failure modes on the principle solution). Then, the
severity (𝑆̅) of the failure mode is calculated by combining the weight (𝑤 ̅) and the importance (I) on
the principle solution.
Step A4: The failure rate (𝑂̅) of each failure mode is obtained from the database, and the risk
value (𝑅̅) of failure mode is calculated by integrating the rate (𝑂̅) and the severity of failure mode (𝑆̅).
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̅̅̅̅
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to (O)toofcalculate
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(𝑃𝑅value)the
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optimal thenby the
optimal isoptimal
integrating
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the is decided
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and
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VIKOR
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relationship [45].matrix
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(𝐹 ) of the overall
Step A5:scheme,
By and then
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interaction is decided
between failure bymodes,
the VIKOR influencemethod
̅̅̅̅the [45].
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of the failure mode is constructed to calculate the principle solution risk value (𝑃𝑅) and the risk value
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3.1.(𝐹̅Function
the 3.1.
Function
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scheme, Failure
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then the Model
to Model
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optimal CS theisprinciple
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by the VIKOR risk value method (PR) [45].
and the risk value (F)
3.1. Function Failure Propagation Model
of theThe overallThe scheme,
purpose and then
of product the optimal
conceptual CS is decided
design is CS by
to obtainthe VIKOR
the method
CSmore [45].
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one or more functions,
and, and,
The purposepurpose of product of product
conceptual conceptual
design design
is to obtainis tothe
obtain the CS
with one withor one more functions,
and,
The
3.1. Function
under purpose
Failure
under of
the product
Propagation
RFP mappingconceptual
Model design
relationship, is to
failureobtain the
analysis CS with
around one
functionor more
solvingfunctions,
process and,
can effectively
under the 3.1. RFPthe RFP mapping
mapping relationship, relationship,
failure failure analysis
analysis around aroundfunctionfunction solving solving
processprocess can effectively
can effectively
theFunction
underidentify RFP
identify
Failure
mapping
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Propagation
relationship,
faults. faults.
Thus,
Model
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Thus,
by analysis
by around
constructing
constructing a function
a
failure failure solving
propagation process
propagation model can effectively
model to analyze
the the
identifyThe purposefaults.
potential of product Thus, conceptual
by constructing design is ato failure
obtain the CS with one
propagation or more
model analyzeanalyze
to functions,to and,
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propagation
relationship path ofthe
between thesubfunction
function failure and in thethe system,flow
function and in to evaluate
the function the impact
structure of the
model,failure theon the
relationship
propagation between path the
of subfunction
the function and
failure the
in function
the system, flowand into the function
evaluate the structure
impact of model,
the failure the
the product
propagation propagation
propagation system,
modes modes
of modes
which
function of function of
isfailuresfunction
failures
an important failures
are divided are are
partdivided
of the
into divided
into into
risk 3with
3 types types
assessment3 types
with of
respect with
respect
to the respect
failure to
to propagation
CS. failure on the the
failure
Based propagation on
propagation
propagation
product modes
path,system, of
as shown function
which is
in Tablean failures
important are divided
part of into
the 3
risk types
assessmentwith
1. and the function flow in the function structure model, respect
of the CS.to failure
Based onpropagation
the relationship
path, aspath,
relationship
shown as shown
between
in Table in1. Table
the 1.
subfunction the
path, between
as shownthe in subfunction
Table 1. and the function flow in the function structure model, the propagation modes
propagation modes of function failures are divided into 3 types with respect to failure propagation
of function failures are divided Table into 3
Table
1.
path, as shown in Table 1. Table 1. Function failure propagation modes. types
1.
Function with
Function
failure respect
failure to failure
propagation
propagation modes. propagation
modes. path, as shown in
Table 1. Table 1. Function failure propagation modes.
Propagation Propagation
Propagation
Mode ModeMode Definition Definition Definition
Propagation Mode Table 1. Function failure propagation Definition
modes.
Table 1. Function failure propagation modes.
Propagation Mode Definition Flow 1 Flow 1
FlowProviding
1
I I Mode Providing Providing Control oilControl oil pressure
pressure
I Propagation Providing
hydraulic Flow 1power
Definition
hydraulic
power Control oil pressure
I hydraulic power
e.g., e.g., Control oil pressure
e.g., hydraulic power
e.g., Providing Flow 1
I I hydraulic power
Control oil pressure
e.g.,
e.g., 1 FlowTransfer
1
II II Converting
ConvertingConverting
electrical toelectrical
electrical
energy energy
Flowto 1 Flow
energy to
Transfer Transfer
II Converting electrical mechanical
mechanicalenergy to
energy Flow 1
energy Transfertorque torque
II II mechanical
e.g.,
e.g., mechanical energy torque
e.g., energy torque
e.g.,
e.g., Converting electrical energy to Flow 1 Transfer
II
mechanical energye.g., torque
e.g.,
III III IIIIII Flow 1Separation
Separation Separation Mixed 1 Flow
FlowliquidsMixed 1 liquids
Flow
Mixed liquids
Flow 2 Flow
2 Converting 2 Converting
Converting
the mixture the thetomixture to
to mixture
III Flowmixture
Separationmixture 1 and
Mixed and gases
gasesliquids Flowand2 gases
Converting mixturechemical
chemical
the energy
to energy
e.g.,
mixture
e.g., e.g.,
mixture and gases
chemical energy
chemical energy
e.g.,
III Separation Flow 1 Mixed liquids Flow 2 Converting the mixture to
mixture and gases chemical energy
indicates
indicates
indicates the starting
the
the starting e.g.,
point
starting
point
indicates the starting point of the failure; of of the
point
the offailure;
the failure;indicates
failure; thethe
riskrisk
indicates
indicates caused
the by failure
risk
caused caused propagation.
by failure
by failure propagation.
propagation.
indicates the risk caused by failure propagation.
indicates the starting point of the failure; indicates the risk caused by failure propagation.
The definition
indicates
The
The definition
of definition
thethe of the
function
starting
of
point
the
function
failure function
failurefailure
propagation
of the failure;
propagation
propagation
mode
indicates mode
ismode mode
is caused
is
as follows:
the risk as is as
as follows:
follows: follows:
by failure propagation.
The definition of the function failure propagation mode is as follows:
1. Propagation
1. 1. Propagation
1. Propagation mode I:mode
Propagation mode
the failure
mode theI:failure
I:I: the the failure
propagation
failure propagation
propagation path
path propagates
propagation path
path propagates inpropagates
propagates in inparallel
a direction
in aa direction
a direction direction parallel
to the
parallel parallel
to theto the
to the
1. Propagation
The definition mode
of
function the I: the
function
flow; failure
failure propagation
propagation pathmode propagates
is as in
follows: a direction parallel to the
functionfunction
flow; flow;
function flow;
function 2. flow;
Propagation mode II:failure
thepropagation
failure propagation path the propagates
1. 2.
2. Propagation
2. Propagation
Propagation mode
mode II:
Propagation mode
I:the
mode theII:II: the
failure
failure
the propagation
propagation
failure propagationpath
path path path
propagates
propagates propagates
propagates intheafailure
direction
failure inthe
the failurethe failure
in the
parallel
the opposite
opposite toinopposite
the opposite
the
direction
2. Propagation
direction mode
direction
to the II:
to the function
the
function failure
flow; propagation
flow; path propagates the failure in the opposite
function
direction flow;
totothe
thefunction
functionflow; flow;
direction 3. tomodethe function
Propagation flow;
mode III: the failure propagation path indirectly propagates
3.
3. Propagation
3. 2. Propagation
Propagation
Propagation mode mode
III:
modeII:
the III:
the
failure
III: the
failure failure
thepropagation
failure propagation
propagation path
propagation path path
indirectly
path indirectly
propagates
propagates
indirectly propagates
the failure
failures
propagates in thefailures
failures
along
failures along or along
opposite
two
along two
two or
two or
or
3. Propagation
more mode
more III:
continuous the failure
function propagation
flow. flow. path indirectly propagates failures along two or
direction
more tocontinuous
continuous
more thefunction
function
continuous function
flow;
flow.
function
more continuous function flow. flow.
3. Propagation mode III:to thethefailure propagation path indirectly propagates failures along two
will or
According to According
According to the
the propagation
According
propagation
topropagation
the propagation
propagation
mode ofmode mode
functional
mode
of functional
of functional
failure,
of functional
failure, failure,
the propagation
failure,
the of
the propagation
the propagation
propagation
failure of will of
failure failure
change
of failure
will change
change
will change
According
more
the influence to
continuous
the the
influence
of function
of
function function
onflow. mode
the on the
system,of functional
system,
so it isso failure,
it is
necessary the
necessary
to propagation
to
analyze analyze
the ofthefailure
failure failure will change
propagation
propagation path to
the influence of function
the influence on the system,
of function onsystem, so it is necessary
the system, sonecessary to analyze
it is necessary the failure
to analyze the propagation
failure path to path to
propagation
path
to
the influence
obtain of
obtain function
the
the influence on
influence the
degree degree
(ηmode (η so)
j) of function
it
of is
function
failure. to
failure.
For analyze
For
this this the failure
purpose, propagation
this paper path
constructs to a directed
According
obtain the influence
obtain to degree
the propagation
the influence (η j) of function
degree
j of functional
failure. For this failure,
purpose, thepurpose,
propagation
this paper thisconstructs
paper constructs
of failure awill a directed
change
directed
obtainfunctional
the influence
functional
networkdegree
network
diagram of(ηfunction
(ηj) diagram j ) of function
(DFND) failure.
(DFND) [29]
failure.
to For
[29] to
convert
For
this this
purpose,
convert
the
purpose,
the this
functional
this paper
paper
functional constructs
structure
constructs
structure
model ato
model
a directed
directed
DFND totoDFND
and and
the influence
functional network
functional of function
diagram
network on the
(DFND)
diagram system, [29]
(DFND) so
to it is
convert
[29] necessary
the
to convert to analyze
functional the
structure
the functional failuremodel
structure propagation
to DFND
model path
and
to DFND and
functional
analyzes network
analyzes
the diagram
the
failure failure (DFND)
propagation propagation [29] to
type of convert
type
a of a
certain the
certain functional
subfunction.
subfunction. structure
Next, Next,
based model
based
on the to
on DFND
the
DFND, DFND,
theand the
impact impact
obtainanalyzes
analyzes influence
the failurethe degree
propagation
failure (ηj)type
propagation of function
of type
a certain failure.
of a For subfunction.
subfunction.
certain this purpose,
Next, based this on
Next, paper the constructs
based DFND,
on the theaimpact
DFND, directed
the impact
analyzes the failure propagation type of a certain subfunction. Next, based on the DFND, the impact
of the
of functional
the fault is of theisfault
fault
network
analyzed, is analyzed,
analyzed,
diagram
thereby thereby
(DFND)
reducing thereby
reducing
[29] reducing
to
the design the design
convert
the Risk,
the
the design
as Risk, Risk,
as
functional
shown as in
shownas shown
in Figure
structure
Figurein 3.
in Figure
model 3. to 3. DFND and
of theoffault
the fault
is is analyzed,
analyzed, thereby thereby
reducing reducing the design design
Risk, Risk,
as shown shown
in Figure Figure
3. 3.
analyzes the failure propagation type of a certain subfunction. Next, based on the DFND, the impact
of the fault is analyzed, thereby reducing the design Risk, as shown in Figure 3.
l12, fl(1,2)
k1 k2 kα-1
l31 ,
fl(
lα-1α, fl(α-1,α)
3
l23, fl(2,3)
,1)
l14, fl(1,4)
l 24, fl (2,4)
k4 l43, fl(4,3)
k3 … kα
Figure 3. Directed
Directed functional network diagram (DFND).
DFND can be described as DF = (K, L,

= (K, L, FL),
FL), where K represents the set of all nodes, the nodes
correspond to the subfunctions in the functionstructure
correspond to the subfunctions in the function structure model,
model, andand K= K (k = 1(k, 1k,2k, 2.,.…,
. , kkαα),), G
G== {1, 2,.…,
{1, 2, . . , α}
α}
L represents a set of directed edges, and the directed edges correspond to the path of function failure
propagation,
propagation, are are shown
shownininEquation
Equation(1). (1).FL FLrepresents
representsthe the setset of of
flowsflows onon thethe directed
directed edge so that
edge the
so that
DFND
the is converted
DFND into an
is converted into adjacency
an adjacency matrixmatrix FL with FLα×αwithelements,
α×α elements, as shown as shown in Equations (2) and (3).
in Equations (2)
and (3). (
lab , (a, b) ∈ G, the connection between node ka and kb
L= lab ,  a, b   G, no

0, theconnection
connectionbetween betweennodes node ka and kb (1)
L (1)
( 0, no connection between nodes
f l(a,b) , (a, b) ∈ G, the connection between node ka and kb
FL(a,b) = (2)
0, no connection between nodes
 fl a ,b  ,  a, b   G, the connection between node ka and kb
FL a ,b      (2)
0,  FL(1,1) FL no (connection
1,2) · · · between
FL(1,α nodes
) 
 FL(2,1) FL(2,2) ··· FL(2,α) 
FL = 

.. .. ..
 (3)
  FL 

. 1,1 FL . 1,2 FL(a,b) FL .1,  

  
 
FL(FL α,1)2,1 FLFL ··· FL
(α,2 2, )
)
 2,2 FL(α,α
FL    (3)
 Based on Function FL a ,b  
3.2. Calculation of Principle Solution Weight Failure Propagation Model
 FL FL ,  
  ,1 FL ,2
3.2.1. Analysis of the Propagation Model
In the process of function failure propagation analysis, the direct impact of functional failure
3.2. Calculation of Principle Solution Weight Based on Function Failure Propagation Model
(i.e., propagation mode I) needs to be considered first, which has the highest frequency and is the
main Analysis
3.2.1. way in failure
of thepropagation.
PropagationWhen Modelthe failure of a subfunction is judged to have a direct impact,
the corresponding subfunction flow in the function structure model is transformed into the directed
edgeIn inthe
the process
directedofweighted
function network
failure propagation
diagram. Basedanalysis, thetransfer
on the direct impact of functional
of subfunction flowfailure
in the
(i.e., propagation mode I) needs to be considered first, which has
function structure model, the flow of DFND directed edge is obtained. In this paper, the the highest frequency andflow
is the
of
main way in flow
subfunction failureis propagation.
set as “1” andWhen the failure
“2”, which of a subfunction
respectively is judged
indicate that to have
they are a directand
important impact,
very
the corresponding
important subfunction
to the normal operationflowof in
thethe function
system [46],structure model is
and the specific transformed
flow into the directed
value is determined by the
edge in the
design experts. directed weighted network diagram. Based on the transfer of subfunction flow in the
function structure the
For instance, model, the flow
function of DFND
structure of thedirected
thin-filmedge
solariscell
obtained.
example In described
this paper,inthe flow4 of
Figure is
subfunction flow is set as “1” and “2”, which respectively indicate that they
divided input power (SF1), separate mixture (SF2), conduct vacuum (SF3), convert electrical energy are important and very
important
into thermal toenergy
the normal
(SF4), operation of the system
and heat mixture [46],
(SF5), and andairthe
pilot specific
(SF6). It canflow value
be seen is the
that determined
subfunction by
the
SF5design
depends experts.
on the three function streams of SF2, SF3, and SF4, and the subfunction SF6 depends
For instance,
on the function stream the function
of SF5. structure
When theofsubfunction
the thin-filmSF3solar cell
fails example
(i.e., described of
the conduction in CdTe
Figurefails),
4 is
divided
or SF4 failsinput
(i.e.,power
cannot (SF1), separate to
be converted mixture (SF2),will
heat), both conduct
cause vacuum (SF3), convert
the sub-function SF5 toelectrical energy
fail. In addition,
into thermal energy (SF4), and
the failure of SF5 will directly affect SF6. heat mixture (SF5), and pilot air (SF6). It can be seen that the
subfunction SF5 depends on the three function streams of SF2, SF3, and SF4, and the subfunction SF6
depends on the function stream of SF5. When the subfunction SF3 fails (i.e., the conduction of CdTe
fails), or SF4 fails (i.e., cannot be converted to heat), both will cause the sub-function SF5 to fail. In
addition, the failure of SF5 will directly affect SF6.
Waste
Waste
Air Kinetic energy
Air Separate mixture Kinetic energy
Electric Separate mixture
(SF2)
Electric Pure Heat
energy (SF2) Steam Heat
Electric energy Pure
gas Heat mixture Steam Pilot air energy
Electric
energy Input gas Heat(SF5)
mixture Pilot air energy
Input CdTe Conduct vacuum (SF6)
energy power CdTe (SF5) (SF6)
power Conduct vacuum
(SF3) CdTe
(SF1)
(SF1) (SF3) CdTe
Electric Convert electrical
Electric
energy Convertinto
energy electrical
thermal Heat
energy energy into(SF4)
energy thermal Heat
energy
energy (SF4) energy
Figure 4. Function structure
Figure 4. structure model
model of
of thin
thin film
film solar
solar cell
cell case.
case.
Figure 4. Function structure model of thin film solar cell case.
In
In the
the DFNF
DFNF of of Figure
Figure 5,5, when
when thethe SF2
SF2 failsfails (i.e.,
(i.e., cannot
cannot realize realize the
the separation),
separation), the
the SF5
SF5 will fail.
will fail.
In the DFNF
Therefore,
Therefore, a of Figure
directed
a directed 5, when
weighted
weighted the SF2
network
network is fails (i.e., cannot
determined
is determined along realize
along the the separation),
direction
the direction of the the SF5
function
of the function willinfail.
chain
chain in
the
Therefore,
the directed
directed a directed
weighted
weighted weighted
network
network network
diagram.
diagram. isThen,
Then, determined
thethe flowflow along
rate rateofthe direction
ofthe
the directed
directed ofedge
the
edgefunction
can be
can chain in the
be obtained
obtained by
by
directed
combining weighted
these twonetwork diagram.
functional flows, Then,
as shown the
combining these two functional flows, as shown in Equation (4). flow
in rate
Equation of the
(4). directed edge can be obtained by
combining these two functional flows, as shown in XEquationk (4).
f l(a,bfl) a=
,b 
 f lflkkka ,b σ k (4)
fl a ,b    k 1 fl
(a,b) k
 a , b 
(4)
(4)
k=k 11
where flk(a,b) represents the flow of k-th associated functional flows to be merged, and σk represents the
where flkk(a,b)
importance(a,b)represents
represents
of the
theflow
flow
the functional of
ofk-th
flows.k-thassociated
associatedfunctional functional flows flows toto be
be merged,
merged, and σ σkk represents
represents the
importance of the functional flows.
1 Separate mixture 2
1 Separate mixture
(SF2) 2
(SF2)
Input electric 1 1
Conduct vacuum 1
Input electric
energy (SF1) 1 Heat mixture (SF5) Pilot air (SF6)
Conduct vacuum
(SF3)
energy (SF1) Heat mixture (SF5) Pilot air (SF6)
(SF3)
1 Convert electrical 1
1 Convertinto
energy electrical
thermal 1
energy into(SF4)
energy thermal
energy (SF4)
Figure 5. DFND of thin film solar cell case (the ”1” and “2” in the subfunction flow respectively
Figure 5. DFND of thin film solar cell casecase
(the(the
“1” and
”1”to“2” in the in
subfunction flow respectively indicate
indicate5.that
DFND theyofare
thin film
importantsolar
andcell
very important and
the “2”
normalthe subfunction
operation of the flow respectively
system).
that they are important and very important to the normal operation of the system).
indicate that they are important and very important to the normal operation of the system).
Further analysis
Further analysis of of failure
failure back-propagation
back-propagation(i.e., (i.e., propagation
propagationmode mode II),
II), back-propagation
back-propagationis is that
that
the Further
failure ofanalysis
the ofsubfunction
latter failure back-propagation
reversely (i.e.,the
affects propagation
previous mode II),
subfunction.back-propagation
When it is is that
judged that
the failure
the failure ofof the
the latter
latter subfunction
subfunction reversely
reversely affects
affects the
the previous
previous subfunction.
subfunction. When it
When it is
is judged
judged that
that
the failure
the failure
failure of of a certain
of aa certain subfunction
certain subfunction
subfunction will will
will bebe back-propagated,
be back-propagated, a
back-propagated, aa directeddirected edge
directed edge opposite
edge opposite
opposite to to the
to the direction
the direction
direction
the
of function flow is added in the directed weighted network diagram.
of function
of function flowflow isis added
added in in the
the directed
directed weighted
weighted network
network diagram.
diagram. mode III) is considered. In this
Finally, the
Finally, the indirect
indirect effect
effectof offunction
function failure(i.e.,
failure (i.e.,propagation
propagation mode III) is considered. In this
this
Finally,
propagation the indirect
mode, for effect
example, of function
when the failure
failure (i.e.,
mode propagation
of subfunctionmode III)is
(SF4) isthat
considered.
the In
output heat
propagation mode,
propagation mode, for example,
example, when when the the failure
failure mode
mode of of subfunction
subfunction (SF4)
(SF4) isis that
that the
the output
output heat
heat
energy is
energy suddenlyfor
is suddenly high or
high or low,
low, itit will
will bebe transferred
transferred alongalong SF5 to
SF5 to SF6,
SF6, causing
causing the failure
the failure ofof SF6.
SF6.
energy
Thus, a isdirected
suddenly edgehighfromor SF4
low,toitSF6willisbe transferred
shown in Figure along
5. SF5 to SF6, causing the failure of SF6.
Thus, a directed edge from SF4 to SF6 is
Thus, a directed edge from SF4 to SF6 is shown in Figure 5. shown in Figure 5.
3.2.2. Influence
3.2.2. Influence Degree
Degree of of Function
Function Node
Node in in DFND
DFND
3.2.2. Influence Degree of Function Node in DFND
By analyzing
By analyzing the the propagation
propagation pathpath ofof functional
functional failures,
failures, itit is
is necessary
necessary to to obtain
obtain the
the degree
degree of of
By of
impact analyzing the
functionfailurespropagation
failures onthe path of system.
theproduct
product functionalthe failures, it is necessary to obtain the degree of
impact of function on system. InInthe DFND,
DFND, failure
failure propagation
propagation cancan
be be regarded
regarded as
impact of function failures on the product system. In the DFND, failure propagation can be regarded
aasrandom
a random propagation
propagation process.
process. ThereThere is a mutual
is a mutual coupling coupling
betweenbetween subfunction
subfunction nodes. Thenodes.
randomThe
as a random
random propagationpropagation process. There is a mutual coupling between subfunction nodes. The
propagation events ofevents of each
each node willnode
changewillthechange the influence
influence of the surrounding
of the surrounding nodewhich
node failure, failure,
is
random
which ispropagation
easy to formevents
large of each node will In
calculation change the influence of the surrounding node failure,
easy to form large calculation data. In thisdata.
paper, the this paper,
LeaderRank the algorithm
LeaderRank algorithm
of web of web
page ranking page
[44] is
which
ranking is [44]
easy istoused
formto large calculation
calculate the data. In this
influence of paper, the
function LeaderRank
failure after a algorithm
random of web
walk. Thus, page
the
used to calculate the influence of function failure after a random walk. Thus, the Leaderank algorithm
ranking
Leaderank [44]algorithm
is used toincalculate
DFND can thebeinfluence of function
used to ensure failure after
the realization a random
of core walk. Thus,
subfunctions the
to reduce
Leaderank algorithm in DFND can be used to ensure the realization
the risk of design. The calculation steps of LRj of the sub-function node are as follows: of core subfunctions to reduce
the risk of design. The calculation steps of LRj of the sub-function node are as follows:
in DFND can be used to ensure the realization of core subfunctions to reduce the risk of design.
The calculation steps of LRj of the sub-function node are as follows:
Step B1: The probability of node ka random walk towards node kb is pk(a,b) , and its relationship
with the flow into node kb is shown in Equation (5). Through random walk events, a transformation
matrix PK is obtained, as shown in Equation (6).
f l(a,b)
pk(a,b) = α
(5)
P
f l(a,b)
a=1
h i
PK = pk(a,b) (6)
α×α
Step B1: The probability of node ka random walk towards node kb is pk(a,b), and its relationship
with fl(a,b)
wherethe flow represents
into nodethe
kb flow valueinbetween
is shown Equation (5). kThrough
node a and node kb . walk events, a transformation
random
Step B2: By adding a public node on
matrix PK is obtained, as shown in Equation (6). the basis of the original DFND and constructing the edge
between the public node and other nodes, as shown in Figure 6. Then, the adjacency matrix FL’ is
fl a ,b 
constructed by adding a node in the matrix FL, pk aas shown in Equations (7) and (8).
,b  
(5)

 FL(1,1) FLa(1,2
1 fl a ,b · · · FL 1

 ) (1,α) 

 FL(2,1) FL(2,2) ··· FL(2,α) 1 

i  ..PK   pk ..  .. .. 
0 h 
FL = f l0 ( j,j0 ) =  .  .a , b    (a,b)
FL . .  (6)
(7)
 
 FL
(α,1) FL(α,2) ··· FL(α,α) 1 


where fl(a,b) represents the flow value between  node ka and node kb. 
1 1 ··· 1 0

Step B2: By adding a public node on the basis of the original DFND and constructing the edge
between the public node and other G0 =nodes,
{1, 2, · · as shown
· , α, α+1} in and Figure
( j, j0 ) 6.∈ Then,
G0 the adjacency matrix FL’(8) is
constructed by adding a node in the matrix FL, as shown in Equations (7) and (8).
Public node
kα+1
l12, fl(1,2)
k1 k2 kα-1
l31 ,
fl(
lα-1α, fl(α-1,α)
3
l23, fl(2,3)
,1)
l14, fl(1,4)
l 24, fl (2,4)
k4 l43, fl(4,3)
k3 … kα
Figure 6. DFND
DFND with
with the
the public
public node.
Step B3: Since a public node is added, and this node in DFND is related to other nodes, the adjacency
 FL1,1 FL1,2 FL1,  1 
matrix in the random walk process changes, and  the matrix PK’ is obtained, as shown  in Equations (9) and (10).
 FL 2,1 FL02,2 FL 2,  1 
 f l ( j,j0 ) 
FL   flj , j   
pk0 ( j,j0 ) = FL a ,b   (7)
(9)
αP
+1
 FL fl 0 
  ,1 jFL =1
 ,2  ( j,j0 ) FL ,  1 
 1 0 
0
 h i1 1
0
PK = pk ( j,j0 ) (10)
(α+1)×(α+1)
G  1, 2, ,  ,  +1 and  j, j    G (8)
Step B3: Since a public node is added, and this node in DFND is related to other nodes, the
adjacency matrix in the random walk process changes, and the matrix PK’ is obtained, as shown in
Equations (9) and (10).
flj , j 
pkj , j    1
(9)
Step B4: Initialize the influence value of function node j (1 ≤ j ≤ J) and public node, as shown in
Equation (11).
(
1/α, j ∈ G
LR j (0) = (11)
0, j = α+1
Step B5: After t iterations, the matrix PK0 will remain stable, and the LRj (k) of the function node
kj is equal to the value of all other function nodes flowing into this node after being evenly divided.
The iteration formula is shown in Equation (12).
α +1
X LR j0 (t − 1)
LR j (t) = f l( j0 ,j) (12)
j0 = 1
χout
j0
where fl(j0 ,j) is the flow from node kj 0 to node kj in the matrix, and χout
j0
is the out-degree of node kj 0 .
Step B6: When the algorithm converges, the value of the public node is evenly distributed to
the subfunction nodes, and the final value of each node is the LeaderRank value (LRj ), as shown in
Equation (13). LRj represents the influence degree of the function node, and the larger the value,
the more influential it is in the propagation model.
LRα+1 (tc )
LR j = LR j (tc ) + (13)
α
where LRj (tc ) is the value of the node kj in the steady-state, LRα + 1 (tc ) is the value of the public node in
the steady-state, and α is the number of nodes in the DFND excluding the public node.
3.2.3. Calculation of Influence Degree of Function Failure

Product design requirements are composed of multiple sub-requirements i with various weights
(rwi , 1 ≤ i ≤ I), which will directly affect subfunctions and indirectly affect other subfunctions [47].
To this end, the correlation between sub-requirements and subfunctions is expressed by constructing
the sub-requirement–subfunction matrix. Therefore, the weight of the customer requirement (rwi ) can
be effectively transformed into the importance (fwj ) of the subfunction.
However, the relationship between requirements is fuzzy and it is difficult to judge accurately.
To this end, linguistic terms {very strong (VS), strong (S), medium (M), weak (W), and very weak (VW)}
are used to express the relationship. Then the linguistic terms can be transformed into triangular fuzzy
numbers (e x = (xl , xm , xu )), where xl ≤ xm ≤ xu , and the triangular fuzzy numbers corresponding to the
five linguistic terms are described in Table 2. The algebraic operation of the fuzzy value is shown in
Equation (14).
x2 = xl1 + xl2 , xm
x1 ⊕ e
e 1
+ xm 2
, xu1 + xu2

e x2 = xl1 × xl2 , xm
x1 ⊗ e 1
× x m , xu × xu
2 1 2

e x2 = xl1 − xl2 , xm
x1 − e 1
− x m , xu − xu
2 1 2
(14)

x2 = xl1 /xl2 , xm
x1 ÷ e /xm , xu /xu
1
2 1 2
e

ρex1 = ρxl1 , ρxm1
, ρxu1 ρ ∈ R+
Table 2. Definition linguistic terms of fuzzy numbers.
No. Linguistic Terms Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFN)

1 Very Weak (VW) xVW (1,1,3)
e
2 Weak (W) xW (1,3,5)
e
3 Medium (M) xM (3,5,7)
e
4 Strong (S) exS (5,7,9)
5 Very Strong (VS) exVS (7,9,9)

The judgment matrix between sub-requirements is constructed by using the AHP method [19] and
its eigenvalues
proposed by Ayağ are obtained.
[23], and by Ondefining
the premise of meeting
the interval of the theconfidence
consistency index
level CR,fuzzy
β, the the weight
number value
can
r
(f w ) of sub-requirement is calculated by Equation (15). Meanwhile,
be transformed into an interval value by Equation (16). Thus, the fuzzy weight 𝑟𝑤
i using the approach proposed by
̃ i of the sub-
Aya ğ [23], and by defining the interval of the
requirement can be transformed into interval value 𝑟𝑤 confidence level β, the fuzzy number can be transformed
̅̅̅̅i. Generally, to keep a moderate attitude, β is
into an interval value
used to select 0.5 [48]. by Equation (16). Thus, the fuzzy weight rf wi of the sub-requirement can be
transformed into interval value rwi . Generally, to keep a moderate attitude, β is used to select 0.5 [48].
I
xib
rwi I  I
I x
Xb 1 e
ib xbi
(15)
rfwi = (15)
PIb 1
b=1 I · xbi
e
b=1
  [0,1] x h  xl , xi u  h x m  x l    xl ,   xu  x m    xiu  (16)
∀β ∈ [0, 1] xβ = xlβ , xuβ = xm − xl β + xl , −(xu − xm )β + xu (16)
where xib represents the relative importance between sub-requirement i and b.
whereIt xcan
ib represents
be seen that the relative importance
the greater between sub-requirement
the requirement’s weight is for the i and b.
functions associated with
requirements, the more serious the consequences of the failure of corresponding functions [15].with
It can be seen that the greater the requirement’s weight is for the functions associated For
requirements,
this reason, it is the more serious
necessary the analyze
to clearly consequences the impactof theoffailure
functionalof corresponding functions
failures on product [15].
systems.
For this
Then, thereason, it is necessary to clearly analyze
sub-requirement-subfunction correlation the matrix
impactand of functional
subfunction failures on productmatrix
autocorrelation systems.
is
Then, the sub-requirement-subfunction
constructed through the RFP mapping process. correlation matrix
Later, the and fuzzysubfunction
evaluationautocorrelation matrixby
number transformed is
constructed
Equation (16)through the RFPvalue,
is the interval mapping process.
as shown Later, 7,
in Figure the wherefuzzy𝑦̅evaluation number transformed by
ij represents the interval correlation
Equation
value between(16) issub-requirement
the interval value, as shown
i and subfunction in Figure 7, where
j, and yij represents
ν̅ja represents the interval
the interval correlation
correlation value
value between sub-requirement
between the subfunction j and a. i and subfunction j, and ν ja represents the interval correlation value
between the subfunction j and a.
Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub-

function 1 function 2 … …
function 1 function 2 function J
Sub- Sub-
requirement 1 y11 y12 … y1J 1 v12 … v1J
function 1
Sub-
requirement 2 y21 y22 … y2 J Sub- v21 1 … v2 J
function 2
Sub-
requirement 3 y31 y32 … y3J Sub-
v31 v32 … v3J
function 3
… … … yij …
… … … … …
Sub-
requirement I yI 1 yI 2 … yIJ Sub- vI 1 vI 2 … 1
function J
(a) (b)
Figure 7. (a) Sub-requirement-subfunction correlation matrix; (b) subfunction autocorrelation matrix.
Next, calculate the interval importance

importance of
of subfunctions,
subfunctions, as
as shown
shown in
in Equation
Equation (17).
(17).
JJ
y yij  yyia vvja
P
I I ia ja
fw j  
ij
rwi J a=a 11J
X
f wj = rw (17)
(17)
i=1
P yij P
i 1 i J
J y v
ia ja
j 1yij a 1 yia v ja
j=1 a=1
where ̅̅̅̅
𝑓𝑤j represents the interval importance of subfunction j, and 𝑟𝑤 ̅̅̅̅i represents the interval weight
where f wj representsi. the interval importance of subfunction j, and rwi represents the interval weight
of sub-requirement
of sub-requirement i.
Based on the function failure propagation model in Section 3.1, the propagation path of function
Based
failures is on the function
analyzed, and failure propagation
the influence model
degree LRjinofSection
each 3.1, the propagation
subfunction node ispath of function
calculated by
failures is analyzed, and the influence degree LR
LeaderRank. At the same time, LRj is used to modify j of each subfunction node is calculated by LeaderRank.
the importance of subfunctions by Equation (18)
to obtain the interval influence degree (𝜂̅ j) of function failure.
 j = fw j (1  LR j ) (18)
3.2.4. Calculation of Principle Solution Weight Based on Function Failure Influence Degree
At the same time, LRj is used to modify the importance of subfunctions by Equation (18) to obtain the
interval influence degree (ηj ) of function failure.
η j = f w j (1 + LR j ) (18)
Sustainability
3.2.4. 2020, 12, of
Calculation x FOR PEER REVIEW
Principle Solution Weight Based on Function Failure Influence Degree 12 of 28
The
The HOQ
HOQ of of the
the subfunction-principle
subfunction-principle solutionsolution is
is shown
shown in in Figure
Figure 8. The roof
8. The roof of
of the
the HOQ
HOQ is is
used
used to
to express
express the
the correlation
correlation ofof the
the principle
principle solution
solution of
of the
the failure.
failure. The
The failure
failure relationship
relationship ofof the
the
principle
principle solutions
solutions refers
refers to
to the
the correlation
correlation strength
strength onon the
the physical
physical structure
structure between
between thethe principle
principle
solutions, that is, the interaction between the spatial position and the physical
solutions, that is, the interaction between the spatial position and the physical connection connection between the
between
principle solutions.
the principle In Figure
solutions. 8, gij describes
In Figure the interval
8, g̅ ij describes thecorrelation
interval value between
correlation between thej
the subfunction
value
and the principle solution k (1 ≤ k ≤ K), and
subfunction j and the principle solution k (1 ≤k1k2 u represents the interval correlation value between
k ≤ K), and 𝑢̅k1k2 represents the interval correlation the
value
principle solution
between the k1 and
principle k2 in case
solution of ak2fault.
k1 and in case of a fault.
u1K
u1k u2K
u12 u2k u jK
Principle Principle …
Principle
solution 1 solution 2 solution K
Subfunction 1 g11 g12 … g1J
Subfunction 2 g 21 g 22 … g2 J
Subfunction 3 g31 g32 … g3J
… … … gij …
Subfunction J gI1 gI 2 … g IJ
Figure 8.
Figure 8. The HOQ (house of quality) of subfunction
subfunction and
and principle
principle solution.
solution.
The
The interval weight w𝑤
interval weight ̅k kof
ofthe
theprinciple solutionkkisiscalculated
principlesolution calculatedby
byEquations
Equations(19)
(19)and
and(20).
(20).
K
g jkg jk g jb
K
g ujbkb
ukb
P
g0jk g=jk  K
b=1b=1 (19)
K (19)
P g P
jk gg jb
K K
g
k=1 jk
uukb
b=1 jb kb
k=1 b=1
JJ
wk =  g0jk  j
X
wk = j 1g jk · η j (20)
(20)
j=1
3.3. Failure Mode Risk Analysis of Principle Scheme

3.3. Scheme Based
Based on
on Bayesian
Bayesian Network
Network Model
Model
3.3.1.
3.3.1. Failure Mode Severity for Product
Product System
System Analysis
Analysis
The
The severity
severity of
of the
the failure modenn(1
failuremode (1≤≤ n ≤ N) represents
≤ N) represents the value that leads to a reduction
reduction in
in the
the
safety
safety of
of the
the entire
entire system,
system, loss
loss of
of functions,
functions, and
and performance
performance degradation
degradation whenwhen the
the failure
failure mode
mode
occurs.
occurs. To intuitively analyze the risk of CS when the failure failure occurs,
occurs, it is
is necessary
necessary to
to consider
consider the
the
degree of the principle solution of the failure after the failure mode occurs (i.e., the importance of the
failure mode (Ikn)). Then, combining the Ikn and the 𝑤 ̅ k, the severity (𝑆̅kn) of failure mode to the whole
system can be calculated.
To describe the multiple states of the failure mode, the set {no failure, minor failure, complete
failure} is used to describe the three states of the failure mode, and the set {0, 0.5, 1} is used to represent
degree of the principle solution of the failure after the failure mode occurs (i.e., the importance of the
failure mode (Ikn )). Then, combining the Ikn and the wk , the severity (Skn ) of failure mode to the whole
system can be calculated.
To describe the multiple states of the failure mode, the set {no failure, minor failure, complete failure}
is used to describe the three states of the failure mode, and the set {0, 0.5, 1} is used to represent the
corresponding failure state. Then, based on the Bayesian network model, the influence of failure modes
on the principle solution is analyzed. The root node is represented as the failure mode, and the leaf
nodes are represented as the principle solution. Furthermore, the conditional probability table of each
principle solution about different failure modes is obtained through expert survey data, as shown
in Table 3. For instance, the failure modes x1 , x2 , x3 are the root nodes, and there are 9 (3ˆ3) state
combinations of the failure mode for three nodes.
Table 3. The principle solution of the conditional probability table.
x1 x2 x3 P = (T = 0|x1, x2, x3) P = (T = 0.5|x1, x2, x3) P = (T = 1|x1, x2, x3)

0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0.5 0 0.3 0.6 0
0 1 0 0 0 0.7
.. .. .. .. .. ..
. . . . . .
1 1 1 0 0 1
The Ikn of failure mode (xn ) refers to the average influence of all failure states for the failure
mode (xn ) on the principle solution failure state as T = Tq (i.e., the probability that all failure states of
xn cause the principle solution failure state T = Tq ). The importance calculation of the root node xn is
shown in Equation (21).
ki
Tq 1 Xh a
i
Ikn (xi ) = P T = Tq xi = xi i − P T = Tq |xi = 0 (21)
ki − 1
ai = 1
After the importance, Ikn is calculated and multiplied by the weight wk of the principle solution,
the interval severity Skn of the failure mode to the system is obtained, as shown in Equation (22).
Next, normalize the severity based on Equation (23) to obtain the interval severity S0 kn .
Skn = wk · Ikn (22)
0 Skn
Skn = P P (23)
k =1 n=1 Skn
3.3.2. Calculation of the Risk Value of Each Failure Mode

Step C1: Obtain the failure probability of the principle solution. From the reliability database
of non-electronic components NPRD-95 database [49], the failure rate of each principle solution has
multiple data sources, and the maximum failure rate λk max and the minimum failure rate λk min are
selected to obtain the failure rate of principle solution as shown in Equation (24).
h i h i
λk = λLk , λU
k
= λ min max
k
, λ k
(24)
Step C2: Obtain the failure probability of failure mode. From the failure mode distribution
database of FMD-97 [44], the failure proportion of each failure mode for the principle solution is found.
Then the failure rate ξkn of the failure mode is calculated by multiplying the Equation (25) with the
principle solution of the interval failure rate λk . Then, the relative failure rate O0 kn is obtained by
normalizing the failure rate based on Equation (26).
h i h i
Oki = OLki , OU
ki
= ξki λL
k
, ξ ki λ U
k
(25)
0 Okn
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW
Okn = P P (26)
14 of 28
k =1 n=1 Okn
Step C3: Calculate the relative risk of failure modes. The two major influencing factors of failure
R L severity
mode risk are failure probability and failure
0
L
0

SknL interval
kn  lnThe
exp ln O[50]. 2   (27)
risk value Rkn of failure mode is
calculated according to the probability O kn and severity S kn of failure, as shown in Equations (27)–(29).
U
 exp
RL =Rexp

ln Oln0 Lkn
OknU+ln
ln SS0knUL /2
kn
2

  (28)
(27)
0U U S0 U /2

RU = exp ln RknO knRL+, Rln kn (28)
(29)
h i
L U
Rkn = R , R (29)
3.3.3. Risk Value Assessment of Principle Scheme
3.3.3. Risk Value Assessment of Principle Scheme
In the actual operation process of the product, there are many reasons for the system failure,
which In are
the mutual
actual operation
influence process
betweenofthethe product,
failure modes. there Toare many reasons
consider for the system
this relationship, failure,
this research
which are mutual influence between the failure modes. To consider this relationship,
conducts risk assessment on the correlation between failure modes, and constructs a directed graph this research
conducts
of failure risk
modeassessment
influence on the correlation
relationship, between
as shown failure9.modes,
in Figure and
The grey constructs
box a directed
represents graph
the failure modeof
failure
and itsmode influence
risk value, therelationship,
directed edge as can
shown in Figure
describe the 9.influence
The greyrelationship
box represents the failure
between mode
the failure
and its risk value, the directed edge can describe the influence relationship between the failure modes.
modes.
P21
Fk1  Rk1  Fk 2  Rk 2 
P12
Pk1 P2k
P1k Pk2
… Fkn  Rkn  …
Figure 9. Relationship
Figure 9. Relationship between
between failure
failure modes.
modes.
According
According toto the
the above
above digraph,
digraph, the
the influence
influence relation
relation table
table between
between failure
failure modes
modes is is obtained,
obtained,
as shown in Table 4. In the table, R̅kn represents the interval risk value when the failure mode
as shown in Table 4. In the table, 𝑅kn represents the interval risk value when the failure mode occurs, occurs,
and the weight P
and the weight Pζn on the directed edge indicates the influence intensity of failure mode Fkζ onon
ζn on the directed edge indicates the influence intensity of failure mode F kζ FknF. kn
In.
In addition, P is quantified by a fuzzy number, and the weight is set as {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7,
ζnquantified by a fuzzy number, and the weight is set as {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9}.
addition, Pζn is and 0.9}.
Table 4. Influence the relationship of failure mode.

Table 4. Influence the relationship of failure mode.
Failure Mode Fk1 Fk2 ... Fkn
Failure Mode Fk1 Fk2 … Fkn
Fk1 1 P ... P
Fk2
Fk1 P21
1 P11212 …. . . P1n P1n
2n
.. Fk2 .. P21 ..1 …. . P2n ..
. . . . .
Fkn ⋮ Pn1 ⋮ Pn2 ⋮ ⋱. . . ⋮ 1
Fkn Pn1 Pn2 … 1
Through the relationship of the failure modes in Table 4, the influence relationship matrix V´ of
the failure modes is characterized as:
Fk1 Fk 2 Fk 3 Fkn
Fk1 1 P12 P13 P1n 
Fk 2 P 1 P23 P2 n 
V   21 (30)
Fk 3  P31 P32 1 P3 n 
 
Through the relationship of the failure modes in Table 4, the influence relationship matrix V0 of
the failure modes is characterized as:
F Fk2 Fk3 ··· Fkn

 k1 
Fk1  1 P12 P13 · · · P1n 
 
Fk2  P21 1 P23 · · · P2n 
V= (30)

Fk3  P P32 1 · · · P3n 

 31
..  .
 . .. .. .. .. 
.  . . . . . 

Fkn Pn1 Pn2 Pn3 ··· 1

0
V = diag Rk1 , Rk2 , Rk3 · · · Rkζ · V (31)
In order to measure the overall risk situation after all failure modes interact in the principle
solution, the risk value (PRk ) integrated model of the principle solution is calculated by Equation (32).
PN P P 1/2 P P P 1/3
PRk = n=1 Rkn + α β 2 · Rkα Pαβ Rkβ Pβα + α β γ 3 · Rkα Pαβ Rkβ Pβγ Rkγ Pγα
1/z
(32)
P P P
+ · · · + α β · · · ζ z · Rkα Pαβ Rkβ · · · Rkζ Pζα
Z = α, β, · · · , ζ and z = |Z|

The terms of all the sub-parts in Equation (32) is explained as follows:

PN
• n=1 Rkn is the sum of risk values when all failure modes in the current principle solution (k)
occur separately
P P
• α β 2. Rkα Pαβ Rkβ Pβα is the sum of risk values in case of double failure
P P P
1/3 is the sum of the risk values of triple failure
• α β γ 3. Rkα Pαβ Rkβ Pβγ Rkγ Pγα
P P P
1/z is the sum of the risk values of z failures, and z is the
• α β · · · ζ z. Rkα Pαβ Rkβ · · · Rkζ Pζα
number of elements in the set Z.
Based on the mapping relationship between principle solution and subfunction, the interval risk
value F of a conceptual scheme is calculated based on the interval risk value of principle solution k,
as shown in Equation (33).
K  K−1
 
X Y 
F= PRk 1 − PRk 


 (33)
k =1 k =1
3.4. The Optimal Scheme Decision Based on VIKOR Model with Considering the Risk Value
Firstly, the risk value of the CS is taken as one of the evaluation objectives, and other evaluation
objectives ξ (1 ≤ ξ ≤ T) are determined. Then, the experts make a fuzzy judgment on the CSr (1 ≤ r ≤ R)
based on the objective ξ, and integrate the risk value of the CSr , so as to obtain the comprehensive
value of the scheme, and the decision matrix M is shown in Equation (34).
F O1 · · · Oζ · · ·
CS1

F1 m
e11 · · · m
e1ξ · · · 


.. 
 .. .. .. .. .. 
.  . . . . . 
 (34)
= CSr Fr m
er1 · · · m
erξ · · · 

M 

.. 
 .. .. .. .. .. 
. 
 . . . . . 
CSR F1 m
eR1 · · · m
eRξ · · ·

where m
erξ is the evaluation data of conceptual scheme r in the objective ξ.
Later, the decision matrix is standardized by Equation (35). At the same time, with the help of
Equation (16), m
erξ is transformed into the interval number mrξ as shown in Equation (36).
m
e rξ
erξ = s
m (35)
R
P
m
erξ
r=1
h i
mrξ = mm rξ − mlrξ 0.5 + ml rξ , −(mu rξ − mm rξ )0.5 + ml rξ mu rξ (36)
Finally, the VIKOR model is introduced, which is it is a compromise solution close to the ideal
solution [51], and realize the ranking of multiple concept schemes. The steps are as follows:
Step D1: The positive ideal parameter mξ + and the negative parameter mξ - in the normalized
decision matrix N are selected. For benefit objective, mξ + = maxr mU rξ , mξ − = minr mL rξ ; and for cost
objective, mξ + = minr mL rξ , mξ + = maxr mU rξ .

mξ+ = maxmU
rξ
ξ ∈ B or minmL ξ ∈ C .
rξ (37)
r r

m−
ξ = max mL
rξ ξ ∈ B or min mU
rξ ξ ∈ C (38)
r r
where B is the benefit objective set, and C is the cost objective set.
Step D2: Calculate the maximum group benefit Sr and the maximum individual regret Rr , as shown
in Equations (39) and (40).
Xt
Sr = wξ mξ+ − mrξ / mξ+ − m− ξ (39)
ξ=1
h i
Rr = max wξ mξ+ − mrξ / mξ+ − m−
ξ (40)
ξ
where wξ is the weight of the evaluation objective ξ.

Step D3: Calculate the comprehensive index Qr .

Qr = v(Sr − S− )/ S+ − S− + (1 − v)(Rr − R− )/ R+ − R− (41)
where S+ = maxr Sr , S− = minr Sr , R+ = maxr Rr , R− = minr Rr , and we choose v as 0.5 to maximize the
group benefits and minimize the individual regret.
Step D4: The speed regulation schemes are sorted based on Qr , and the rank results are verified
by Equation (42), so as to select the scheme with the best comprehensive benefits and the least risk.
1
Q00 − Q0 ≥ (42)
R−1
where Q00 and Q0 represent the comprehensive index of the first and second schemes respectively.
4. Case Study
The shearer is the most important mechanical equipment in coal mining work [52], and the cutting
part is one of its main mechanisms, as shown in Figure 10. The cutting device in the shearer mainly
undertakes the function of coal cutting, and by adjusting the height of the rocker arm (blue mark in the
figure), the continuous cutting and loading of cutting drum can be realized. The power is output to the
cutting roller of the shearer through the transmission device, and then the core subfunction “cutting
coal” is realized. Nowadays, in order to satisfy the cutting requirements of different coal qualities, it is
necessary to improve the design of the shearer cutting device to achieve the above design requirements.
mainly undertakes the function of coal cutting, and by adjusting the height of the rocker arm (blue
mark in the figure), the continuous cutting and loading of cutting drum can be realized. The power
is output to the cutting roller of the shearer through the transmission device, and then the core
subfunction “cutting coal” is realized. Nowadays, in order to satisfy the cutting requirements of
different coal
Sustainability 2020,qualities,
12, 7134 it is necessary to improve the design of the shearer cutting device to achieve
17 of 28
the above design requirements.
Cutting device

3D model
Figure 10. 3D model of shearer cutting device: including
including cutting
cutting motor,
motor, reduction
reduction gear-box
gear-box of the
rocker arm,
convert height adjusting
electrical cylinder,
energy into planetary
mechanical gearchange
energy, train and cutting
cutting drum
speed by five modules,
speed which
regulating can
device,
convert electrical
and then energy
use cutting into
drum to mechanical energy,
complete coal change
cutting work.cutting speed by speed regulating device,
and then use cutting drum to complete coal cutting work.
4.1. Function Failure Propagation Model of Cutting Speed Regulating Device
4.1. Function Failure Propagation Model of Cutting Speed Regulating Device
Through the analysis of the total demand of shearer “cutting speed change”, the following two
Through the analysis of the total demand of shearer “cutting speed change”, the following
cutting speed regulating devices are obtained: CS1: motor—spur gear—frequency conversion
two cutting speed regulating devices are obtained: CS1 : motor—spur gear—frequency conversion
motor—gear pair—speed control turntable—variable speed gear pair—planetary gear train—roller;
motor—gear pair—speed control turntable—variable speed gear pair—planetary gear train—roller; CS2 :
CS2: Motor—spur gear pair—hydraulic pump—relief valve—directional valve—hydraulic motor—
Motor—spur gear pair—hydraulic pump—relief valve—directional valve—hydraulic motor—differential
differential gear train—planetary gear train—roller, and are shown in Figure 11.
gear train—planetary gear train—roller, and are shown in Figure 11.
CS1 CS2
Figure 11.Schematic
Figure11. Schematicdiagram
diagramof
ofthe
thecutting
cuttingspeed
speedregulating
regulatingdevice.
device.
The
TheCS CS1 1isisa a
cutting
cuttingspeed
speedadjustment
adjustment device based
device on aon
based variable speedspeed
a variable gear pair.
gear Firstly, the gears
pair. Firstly, the
are driven
gears by theby
are driven motor to rotate,
the motor and and
to rotate, different gears
different are are
gears engaged
engagedbybythethe
speed
speedcontrol
controlturntable.
turntable.
Secondly,
Secondly,the thefrequency
frequencyofofthe thefrequency
frequencyconversion
conversionmotor motorisischanged
changedto toobtain
obtaindifferent
differentgear
gearspeeds.
speeds.
Thirdly, the planetary gears are used to reduce the speed and increase the torque.
Thirdly, the planetary gears are used to reduce the speed and increase the torque. Finally, complete Finally, complete the
coal
the cutting
coal cuttingworkwork through the rollers.
through the rollers.
The
The CS22 is a cutting speedadjustment
CS is a cutting speed adjustmentdevice
devicethatthatchanges
changesthe thespeed
speedthrough
throughaahydraulic
hydraulicdrive
drive
differential gear train. Firstly, the gears are driven by the motor to rotate. Secondly,
differential gear train. Firstly, the gears are driven by the motor to rotate. Secondly, the hydraulic the hydraulic output
pressure is drivenisby
output pressure the hydraulic
driven motor tomotor
by the hydraulic complete the movement
to complete of different
the movement transmission
of different gears;
transmission
thirdly,
gears; thirdly, the different speeds are switched based on the differential gear train. Finally,gear
the different speeds are switched based on the differential gear train. Finally, the planetary the
train is usedgear
planetary to output
train istorque
used to and speed,torque
output so thatand
thespeed,
rollers socould
thatcomplete
the rollersthecould
coal cutting
complete work.
the coal
Then,
cutting based on the system design method [47], the subfunction set of cutting speed regulating
work.
deviceThen,
is abstracted,
based onand the the function
system designstructure
methodmodel is constructed.
[47], the subfunctionSubsequently,
set of cutting according to the
speed regulating
relationship between subfunction
device is abstracted, and the function in the functionmodel
structure structure model, the propagation
is constructed. Subsequently, mode of function
according to the
failure is obtained. Due to the length limitation of the article,
relationship between subfunction in the function structure model, the propagation this section takes CS as a case study
2 mode of function to
conduct function failure propagation analysis and risk value calculation, as described
failure is obtained. Due to the length limitation of the article, this section takes CS2 as a case study to in Figure 12.
conduct function failure propagation analysis and risk value calculation, as described in Figure 12.
SF4 SF6
Electric SF1 Control signal
energy Torque Transfer Torque
Converting electrical energy
Control unit torque
into mechanical energy
cutting work.
Then, based on the system design method [47], the subfunction set of cutting speed regulating
device is abstracted, and the function structure model is constructed. Subsequently, according to the
relationship between subfunction in the function structure model, the propagation mode of function
failure is obtained.
Sustainability Due to the length limitation of the article, this section takes CS2 as a case study
2020, 12, 7134 18 of to
28
conduct function failure propagation analysis and risk value calculation, as described in Figure 12.
SF4 SF6
Electric SF1 Control signal
energy Torque Transfer Torque
Converting electrical energy
Control unit torque
into mechanical energy
Control signal Variable speed signal SF5

SF2
Electric
energy Electric Control
Input energy energy pressure pressure
pressure
SF3 SF7 SF8 Torque
Conversion of Variable Control the pressure
electricity to oil speed signal Convert oil
flow
pressure pressure to torque
direction
Flow signal
SF11 SF10 SF9

Torque Torque Torque
Cut coal Transfer
Superimposed torque
seam rotation
Figure
Figure 12. Function
Function structure
structure model
model of
of the
the speed
speed regulation scheme 2 for the shearer.
4.2. Principle Solution Weight Calculation Based on Function Failure Propagation Model
(1) Sub-requirement weight analysis. After confirming with several users, the design sub-requirements
are as follows: output multiple speed (SR1), low cost (SR2), not prone to failure (SR3), and stable power
output (SR4). Through pairwise comparison of sub-requirements, the judgment matrix of cutting
speed regulating device is constructed, as shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Sub-requirement judgment matrix of shearer cutting device.
Sub-Requirement SR1 SR2 SR3 SR4

SR1 Output multiple speed VW W VW S
SR2 Low cost 1/W VW 1/W M
SR3 Not prone to failure VW W VW 1/M
SR4 Stable power output 1/S 1/M M VW
After replacing linguistic terms with triangular fuzzy numbers in Table 2, the fuzzy numbers
are converted into interval values by using Equation (16). The maximum eigenvector λmax = 0.9
and eigenvalue n = 6.5 are calculated by AHP model. At this time, the judgment consistency index
CR ≤ 0.1, which proves that the judgment matrix has satisfactory consistency. Then, the weights
(rwi ) of sub-requirements are calculated by Equations (15) and (16), which are [0.28, 0.34], [0.13, 0.16],
[0.23, 0.29], [0.17, 0.21].
(2) The function importance is calculated. In Figure 9, the subfunctions related to SR1 include
SF3, SF5, SF5, SF8, and SF9. The sub-requirement-subfunction correlation matrix and subfunction
autocorrelation matrix of CS2 are obtained by experts’ evaluation, as shown in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6. Sub-requirement-subfunction correlation matrix of the scheme 2.
Subfunction SF3 SF5 SF7 SF8 SF9

SR1 VS S W VW VS
SR2 W VS S VS W
SR3 S W VW VS M
SR4 VW W S W VS
Table 7. Subfunction autocorrelation matrix of scheme 2.
Subfunction SF3 SF5 SF7 SF8 SF9

SF3 1 M M 0 0
SF5 M 1 S W VW
SF7 M S 1 S 0
SF8 0 W S 1 S
SF9 0 VW 0 S 1
By transforming the linguistic terms in the two correlation matrices into TFN, and calculating the
importance ( f wj ) of subfunctions related to SR1 in CS2 based on Equation (17), as shown in Table 8.
Table 8. The importance values for the subfunction.
Conceptual Importance of the Subfunction

Scheme fw1 fw2 fw3 fw4 fw5
CS1 [0.21, 0.29] [0.11, 0.21] [0.25, 0.35] [0.24, 0.33] None
CS2 [0.12, 0.17] [0.19, 0.27] [0.14, 0.20] [0.21, 0.29] [0.15, 0.27]
(3) The influence degree analysis of function failure. Based on the function failure propagation
model, the subfunctions are transformed into nodes in DFND, the propagation path of function failure
is analyzed.
failure Next, the
is analyzed. function
Next, structurestructure
the function model is model
transformed into a directed
is transformed into aweighted
directedfunctional
weighted
network diagram, as shown in Figure 13.
functional network diagram, as shown in Figure 13.
11 Public node
L11,2,1 L11,4,1 L11,1,1
L1,4,1
4 1 L10,1,1
L4,5,2 L4,6,2 L7,4,1

L2,1,2 L5,6,2 L6,7,2
2 5 6 7
L2,3,1 L7,8,1
L3,2,1 L10,1,1
L3,8,1 L8,9,1 L9,10,1
3 8 9 10
Figure
Figure 13. Directed weighted
13. Directed weighted functional
functional network
network diagram
diagram of
of scheme
scheme 2.
2.
In
In Figure
Figure 13,
13, aa public
public node
node ofof subfunction
subfunction is
is added
added to
to construct
construct the
the adjacency
adjacency matrix,
matrix, and
and the
the
influence degree LR of each subfunction node is calculated by using the LeaderRank
influence degree LRjj of each subfunction node is calculated by using the LeaderRank algorithm algorithm
(Equations (5)–(13)). Therefore,
(Equations (5)–(13)). Therefore,thetheimportance
importanceof of subfunction
subfunction is adjusted
is adjusted by using
by using Equation
Equation (18), (18),
and
and the influence
the influence degree
degree ηj ofηjsubfunction
of subfunction nodes
nodes SF3,
SF3, SF5,
SF5, SF7,
SF7, SF8
SF8 andandSF9
SF9ininthe
thetwo
twoCSs
CSsisiscalculated,
calculated,
as
as shown
shown inin Table
Table 9.9.
Table 9. The influence degree of each function failure.
Table 9. The influence degree of each function failure.
Influence Degree of Each Function Failure
Conceptual Scheme Influence Degree of Each Function Failure
Conceptual Scheme η3 η5 η7 η8 η9
η3 η5 η7 η8 η9
CS1 [0.33, 0.46] [0.11, 0.22] [0.24, 0.34] [0.27, 0.38] None
CS1CS2 [0.33,
[0.18, 0.46]
0.26] [0.11,0.14]
[0.10, 0.22] [0.24,
[0.11, 0.34] [0.25,
0.15] [0.27,
0.35]0.38][0.20, 0.36]
None
CS2 [0.18, 0.26] [0.10, 0.14] [0.11, 0.15] [0.25, 0.35] [0.20, 0.36]
(4) The principle solution weight recalculation. Construct the HOQ between the subfunctions of
(4) The
CS2 and principlesolution,
the principle solution as
weight
shown recalculation.
in Figure 14.Construct the HOQ
Among them, between
the grid in the the subfunctions
middle of the HOQ of
CS2 and the
indicates thatprinciple solution,
there is no mapping as relationship
shown in Figure 14. Among
between them, theand
the subfunctions gridthe
in principle
the middle of the
solution,
HOQ indicates that there is no mapping relationship between the subfunctions and the
while the lattice on the roof indicates that there is no mapping relationship between subfunctions. principle
solution, while the lattice on the roof indicates that there is no mapping relationship between
subfunctions.
VW
M VS S
Hydraulic Directional Hydraulic Differential

pump Relief valve valve motor gear train
Convert
electricity to oil VS
pressure
Control pressure VS
VW VS
and direction
Transmit
M VS
pressure
Convert pressure
VS
to torque
Superimposed
VW VS
torque
Figure 14. The

The HOQ
HOQ of
of subfunction-principle
subfunction-principle solution.
solution.
transforming the
By transforming the linguistic
linguistic terms
terms in
in the
the HOQ into TFN, the correlation between the
subfunction-principle solution is obtained, and the weight
subfunction-principle solution is obtained, and the w
weight 𝑤
̅ k of the principle solution is calculated
based on Equations (19) and (20), as shown in Table
Table 10.
10.
The weight
Table 10. The
Table weight distribution
distribution of principle solutions in each conceptual scheme.
Weight
WeightofofEach
EachPrinciple Solution
Principle Solution
Conceptual Scheme
Conceptual Scheme
w11
w w
w2 2 w3w3 w4 w4 w5 w5
CS1 CS1 [0.33,0.46]

[0.33, 0.46] [0.14,
[0.14,0.31]
0.31] [0.27, 0.41]
[0.27, 0.41] [0.16, 0.31]0.31] NoneNone
[0.16,
CS2 [0.18, 0.27] [0.08, 0.13] [0.11, 0.18] [0.27, 0.44] [0.15, 0.33]
CS2 [0.18, 0.27] [0.08, 0.13] [0.11, 0.18] [0.27, 0.44] [0.15, 0.33]
4.3. Calculation of Cutting Speed Regulation Scheme Risk Value of Failure Mode
4.3. Calculation of Cutting Speed Regulation Scheme Risk Value of Failure Mode
Step E1: Acquisition of the failure mode of the principle solution. The failure state of shearer
Step E1: Acquisition of the failure mode of the principle solution. The failure state of shearer in
in operation is uncertain, and the principle solution of the failure mode is diverse. In the process of
operation is uncertain, and the principle solution of the failure mode is diverse. In the process of
failure evolution, in addition to no failure state and complete failure state, there are also slight failure
failure evolution, in addition to no failure state and complete failure state, there are also slight failure
states. Based on the Bayesian network model, the influence of failure mode on principle solution is
states. Based on the Bayesian network model, the influence of failure mode on principle solution is
analyzed. The principle solution and corresponding failure mode of leaf node are shown in Table 11.
analyzed. The principle solution and corresponding failure mode of leaf node are shown in Table 11.
Then, the importance of the principle solution of the “overflow valve” failure mode is illustrated as an
Then, the importance of the principle solution of the “overflow valve” failure mode is illustrated as
example, and the risk value of the principle solution is calculated.
an example, and the risk value of the principle solution is calculated.
Table 11. Principle solution and failure mode of each node.
Table 11. Principle solution and failure mode of each node.
Leaf Principle Root Leaf Principle Root
Leaf Failure Mode Failure Mode
Node Principle
Solution Root
Node Leaf Principle NodeRoot
Failure Mode Node Solution
Failure Mode
Node Solution Node
x11 1 Clamping Node Solution x 2Node Internal leakage
11
1 x11
x12 11 Clamping
Winding fault Hydraulic x12 2 x112 Internal
Suction leakage
T1 Motor 1 T1 2 pump 2
x13
x 121 Bearing
Windingdamage
fault Hydraulic 13 2 x122 Contaminated
x Suction oil
T11 Motor x14 1 1 Shock T12 x14 Damaged seal
x13 Bearing damage pump x132 Contaminated oil
x141 Shock x142 Damaged seal
x211 Pitting x212 Valve core stuck
T22 Overflow valve
x221 Fatigue x222 Internal leakage
T21 Gear pair x231 Loss of lubrication x312 Valve core stuck
T32 Reversing valve Balance hole
x241 Wear x322
blocked
Table 11. Cont.
x21 1 Pitting Overflow x21 2 Valve core stuck

T2 2
Gear x22 1 Fatigue valve x22 2 Internal leakage
T2 1 pair x23 1 Loss of lubrication x31 2 Valve core stuck
Reversing
T3 2 Balance hole
x24 1 Wear valve x32 2
blocked
x25 1 Fracture x33 2 Internal leakage
x31 1 Broken scroll key x41 2 Chucking
T3 1 Turntable Hydraulic
Scratches on T4 2
x32 1 motor x42 2 Wear
contact surface
x41 1 Wear x43 2 Leakage
Change x42 1 Fracture x51 2 Wear
T4 1 gear set x43 1 Axial movement x52 2 Clamping
x44 1 Fatigue Differential x53 2 Broken teeth
T5 2
x45 1 Loss of lubrication gear train x54 2 Pitting
x55 2 No lubrication
x56 2 Fatigue
Step E2: Calculation of the risk value for the failure mode. The conditional probability table of the
principle solution is obtained by analyzing the failure performance of the “overflow valve” in similar
products and expert experience, as shown in Table 12.
Table 12. Conditional probability table of overflow valve failure.
x2 21 x2 22 P = (T22 = 0|x221 ,T222 ) P = (T22 = 0.5|x221 ,T222 ) P = (T22 = 1|x221 ,T222 )

0 0 1 0 0
0 0.5 0.3 0.6 0
0 1 0 0 0.7
0.5 0 0.4 0.6 0
0.5 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6
0.5 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0.8
1 0.5 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1
From the above table, the failure mode “valve core stuck” is root node x2 21 , failure mode
“internal leakage” is root node x2 22 , and the failure condition of the overflow valve is leaf node T2 2 .
Then, the risk value of failure mode is obtained based on the Equations (27)–(29), and the results are
shown in Table 13.
Table 13. Risk value of each failure mode.
Root Node Risk Value Root Node Risk Value Root Node Risk Value
x11 1 (0.020, 0.036) x42 1 (0.041, 0.067) x33 2 (0.052, 0.081)
x12 1 (0.019, 0.033) x43 1 (0.036, 0.059) x41 2 (0.026, 0.047)
x13 1 (0.022, 0.039) x44 1 (0.010, 0.016) x42 2 (0.023, 0.042)
x14 1 (0.006, 0.011) x45 1 (0.019, 0.031) x43 2 (0.061, 0.110)
x21 1 (0.003, 0.005) x11 2 (0.059, 0.101) x51 2 (0.007, 0.012)
x22 1 (0.005, 0.008) x12 2 (0.011, 0.019) x52 2 (0.017, 0.029)
x23 1 (0.005, 0.010) x13 2 (0.017, 0.029) x53 2 (0.014, 0.025)
x24 1 (0.006, 0.010) x14 2 (0.006, 0.010) x54 2 (0.003, 0.005)
x25 1 (0.007, 0.013) x21 2 (0.004, 0.008) x55 2 (0.003, 0.005)
x31 1 (0.119, 0.150) x22 2 (0.010, 0.017) x56 2 (0.008, 0.013)
x32 1 (0.084, 0.106) x31 2 (0.014, 0.022)
x41 1 (0.019, 0.031) x32 2 (0.017, 0.027)
Step E3: Calculation of the risk value of the CS. Taking the principle solution of the “hydraulic pump”
as an example, the risk value of the hydraulic pump is calculated by using the risk assessment model
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW
of
22 of 28
the principle solution in Section 3.3.3. The hydraulic pump has four failure modes: “internal leakage”,
“suction”, “contaminated
between failure modes, theoil”causality
and “damaged seal”.
diagram Basedmodes
of failure on the in
influence relationship
the hydraulic pumpbetween failure
is constructed,
modes,
as shown in Figure 15, and the influence relationship between failure modes as shown in Table 14in
the causality diagram of failure modes in the hydraulic pump is constructed, as shown is
Figure
formed.15, and the influence relationship between failure modes as shown in Table 14 is formed.
P21
F11(R11) F12(R12)
P12
P31 P23
P13
F14(R14) F13(R13)
Figure 15. Influence relationship of failure mode in the

the hydraulic
hydraulic pump.
pump.
Table 14. Influence relationship between failure modes.

Table 14. Influence relationship between failure modes.
Failure F 11 2 F112F 12F
Mode Mode
Failure
2
122
F13
F 132
2 2
F142F 14
2
F11 F112 R11 𝑅̅11 S S VS
VS 0 0
F12 2 F122 VW VWR12𝑅 ̅ 12 SS 0 0
F13 2 F132 M
M 0
0 R
𝑅̅13
13 0 0
F14 2 VS 0 M R
2F14 VS 0 M 𝑅̅14 14
After
After obtaining
obtainingthe
therisk valueRkn
riskvalue 𝑅̅knand
andthethe
influence relationship
influence relationshipof failure mode,
of failure the interval
mode, risk
the interval
value of each principle solution can be calculated by using a risk value integrated model.
risk value of each principle solution can be calculated by using a risk value integrated model. Taking Taking the
principle solution
the principle of the
solution hydraulic
of the pump
hydraulic pumpas anas example,
an example,thethe
riskrisk
value R1 R
value of1 the hydraulic
of the pump
hydraulic pump is
calculated byby
is calculated Equations
Equations(30) and
(30) (31),
and as as
(31), shown
shown in Equation (43).
in Equation (43).
R R +n21· R21nR+2
X4 4
11 P 12 R11 +P221·  2
R112PR1311RP13 31  3  R
p p2
p 3
12PP1221R12 13RP1331P+ 3 · 3R1111PP12 R12 23RR1313PP =(0.105, 0.210)
R1 = 2 R 12 P23 = (0 .105, 0 .210) (43)
n=11 1n 12 3131
Similarly,
Similarly, the
the risk
risk value
value of
of each
each principle
principle solution
solution can
can be
be obtained,
obtained, and
and the
the VaR
VaR of
of the
the overall
overall
scheme can be calculated, as shown in Table 15.
scheme can be calculated, as shown in Table 15.
Table 15. The risk value of each principle solution in the CS.
Table 15. The risk value of each principle solution in the CS.
Conceptual Principle Solution
Conceptual Principle Solution F
Scheme R R R F
Scheme R11 R22 R3 3 RR4 4 R55
R
CS
CS1 1 (0.077,
(0.077,0.156)
0.156) (0.027,
(0.027,0.053)
0.053) (0.247,
(0.247,0.387)
0.387) (0.138,
(0.138,0.255)
0.255) None
None (0.417, 0.635)
(0.417, 0.635)
CS
CS2 2 (0.105, 0.210) (0.017, 0.036) (0.092, 0.159) (0.122, 0.520) (0.056,
(0.105, 0.210) (0.017, 0.036) (0.092, 0.159) (0.122, 0.520) (0.056, 0.110) 0.110) (0.341, 0.586)
(0.341, 0.586)
4.4. Optimal Decision of Cutting Speed Regulating Device Based on VIKOR

Through Step E1–Step E3, the risk value of the above two CSs CSs can
can be
be obtained,
obtained, and
and the
the speed
speed
performance objective (PO) and economic objective (CO) can be
control performance set. For the objective CO,
be set.
three experts
experts judge
judge itit by
by fuzzy number, and obtain
obtain the
the average
average value
value ofof multiple
multiple TFNs.
TFNs. For the
objective PO, the physical model-based graphical modeling software AMESim [53] is used to realize
the preliminary
the preliminarysimulation
simulationofofthethe
CS.CS. AMESim
AMESim software
software can can effectively
effectively analyze
analyze the performance
the performance value
value
of ofdesign
early early design
schemes schemes without
without the modeling
the modeling advantage
advantage of detailed
of detailed structural
structural parameters,
parameters, as
as shown
shown
in in 16.
Figure Figure 16.
Sustainability 2020, 12,
Sustainability 2020, 12, 7134
x FOR PEER REVIEW 23
23 of
of 28
28
(a)
(b)
AMESim model
Figure 16. AMESim model implementation
implementationfor
forthe
theSchemes
Schemes1 1and
and2. 2.(a)(a) AMESim
AMESim Simulation
Simulation model
model of
of CS . (b) AMESim Simulation model of CS
CS1 . (b) AMESim Simulation model of CS2 .
1 2.
After that, the relationship between the roller speed and time for the CS simulation model is
analyzed, then the time taken from the fluctuation state of the drum speed to the steady-state is
obtained and used as the evaluation value of the speed
speed control
control performance,
performance, as
as shown
shown in
in Figure
Figure 17.
17.
Time spent (s) for CS1: [0.4, 8]

Time spent (s) for CS2: [0, 13]
CS1:
CS2:
Rotational velocity-time relationship of the two scheme roller.

Figure 17. Rotational
Finally,
Finally, the
the risk
risk value
value and
and the
the evaluation
evaluation data
data of
of the
the scheme PO and
under PO
scheme under CO are
and CO are integrated,
integrated,
and
and the
the data
data is
is preprocessed
preprocessed using
using Equations
Equations (34)–(36) to form
(34)–(36) to form a
a decision
decision matrix N, as
matrix N, as shown
shown inin
Equation (44).
Equation (44).
F PO11 CO2
PO F CO2
N = Scheme 1  0.417, 0.635  0.468, 0.740  0.359, 0.592
" #
Scheme 1 [0.417, 0.635] [0.468, 0.740] [0.359, 0.592] (44)
(44)
N  Scheme 2  [0.341, 0.586] [0.702, 0.924] [0.561, 0.823] 
Scheme 2 0.341, 0.586 0.702, 0.924 0.561, 0.823 
where F1 , PO1 , and CO1 respectively represent the risk value, performance value, and economic value
where F1, PO1, and CO1 respectively represent the risk value, performance value, and economic value
of the CS1 .
of the CS1.
Determine the ideal value mξ+ and the negative value mξ- in the decision matrix N. Next, the comprehensive
Determine the ideal value mξ+ and the negative value mξ- in the decision matrix N. Next, the
index Qr is calculated by Equation (41) and the optimal CS is selected, and the results are shown in Table 16.
comprehensive index Qr is calculated by Equation (41) and the optimal CS is selected, and the results
are shown in Table 16.Table 16. Scheme optimal decision based on the VIKOR model.
Conceptual
Table 16. Scheme optimal decision based on the VIKOR model.
Sr Rr Qr Rank
Scheme
Conceptual
CS
Scheme Sr
[0.171, 0.406]
Rr
[0.067, 1.00] 0.621
Qr 2
Rank
1
CS
CS2 1 [0.278, 0.298]0.406]
[0.171, [0.289,[0.067,
0.461] 1.00]
0.4150.621 1 2
CS2 [0.278, 0.298] [0.289, 0.461] 0.415 1
It can be seen from Table 16 that the ranking result of the conceptual schemes is: CS2 > CS1 ,
It can
and the be seen from Table
comprehensive design16value
that the ranking
of the schemeresult of the conceptual
is consistent with theschemes
value ofis:risk.
CS2 Therefore,
> CS1, and
the
it comprehensive
can be seen that the design valueofofthe
risk value thescheme
schemeplays
is consistent
a key rolewith the value
in product of risk.
design, andTherefore, it can
the smaller the
be seen
risk thatthe
value, thestronger
risk value
the of the scheme
robustness plays
of the a key in
scheme role in productdevelopment.
subsequent design, and the smaller the risk
value, the stronger the robustness of the scheme in subsequent development.
5. Discussions
5. Discussions
In the case study, the average risk values of the CS1 and CS2 are 0.526 and 0.464, respectively.
It is proved thatstudy,
In the case risk has
the aaverage
great influence onof
risk values thethecomprehensive
CS1 and CS2 arevalue0.526ofand
a design scheme in the
0.464, respectively. It
VIKOR
is proved that risk has a great influence on the comprehensive value2of a design scheme in thesolution
decision model. As stated in Section 4.3 above, although CS has one more principle VIKOR
than
decisionCS1 ,model.
and the Asrisk value
stated in of the hydraulic
Section 4.3 above,pump in CSCS
although 2 is 0.210
2 has one greater
more than that of
principle a motor
solution in
than
CS
CS11, and the risk value of the hydraulic pump in CS2 is 0.210 greater than that of a motor in CS1 is
is 0.156, and the risk value of the reversing valve is increased (0.056, 0.110). The risk value is
reduced
0.156, and onthe
the risk
wholevalue of >the
(0.526 0.464), because
reversing the is
valve hydraulic
increased motors and
(0.056, reversing
0.110). valves
The risk thatis
value undertake
reduced
the main
on the functions
whole (0.526have a low
> 0.464), risk of the
because failure. Then,motors
hydraulic it can beandseen that thevalves
reversing cuttingthat
speed regulating
undertake the
scheme driven by hydraulic pressure is more suitable for the coal mining environment,
main functions have a low risk of failure. Then, it can be seen that the cutting speed regulating which can
scheme
driven by hydraulic pressure is more suitable for the coal mining environment, which can reduce the
possibility of the risk of the scheme. Thus, the proposed risk value integration model of the principle
reduce the possibility of the risk of the scheme. Thus, the proposed risk value integration model of
the principle solution can effectively adapt to the risk propagation environment of interactive failure
mode. One potential avenue of future work is to analyze the influence of engineering system on
external operation behaviors (e.g., human factors, environmental factors, etc.), so as to screen out the
behaviors that are most sensitive to design risks and ensure the maximum decision value of the scheme.
Further discussion of this can be found in Section 6.
Of course, the conceptual scheme decision model based on functional failure propagation can
have a positive impact on the design of complex equipment systems. In these works, functional
failure and risk increase will cause irreparable loss and damage in the subsequent product structural
design, including the conceptual design process of hulls, weapon equipment, vehicle, etc. For example,
the vehicle conceptual decision result with considering function failure propagation has stronger
reliability, and the better the safety performance is. Then, the low-risk principle solution is selected on
the basis of ensuring the function realization to provide effective principle solution strategy for vehicle
robust design, and the key point is to avoid successive iterative optimization.
6. Conclusions and Future Work

With the increasing awareness of concept design decision reliability, the proposed decision method
originally takes function failures into consideration in the risk quantitative calculation process of each
principle solution and constructing a conceptual scheme decision model driven by the risk of function
failure propagation. Firstly, the directed function network diagram (DFND) through function structure
model is constructed; secondly and the LeaderRank algorithm is used to adjust the influence degree of
functional failure; thirdly, the weight of each principle solution is analyzed in the function mapping
process; fourthly, the influence of each failure modes on the principle solution is analyzed, which can
obtain the severity of the failure mode on the product system. Finally, the risk of each CS is calculated
based on the interaction of failure modes and the severity of principle solution, which is one of the
important evaluation objectives to realize the optimal decision. The end decision result of the cutting
speed regulating device scheme is to explain the influence of the scheme risk on the design value in
more depth and understand the influence of different failure modes on the principle solution risk at
the early design phase.
In this study, we calculate the risk value of principle solution in each CS and integrate it into the
risk value of the scheme, which could solve the problem of difficulty and uncertainty in calculating
the risk value. Compared with the previous failure propagation model which can only identify
the propagation path, but cannot quantitatively analyze the risk numerical solution problem of the
principle solution after the function failure propagation [26,27], we use the propagation process of
multi-fault modes with different functions to intuitively calculate the specific principle solution risk
value. More importantly, the fuzzy logic model is used to quantify the subjective information in the
decision process, as well as the construction of the correlation matrix, which can reduce the uncertainty
of decision results. Furthermore, a case study of a cutting speed regulating device scheme of shearer
verifies the proposed approach can effectively solve the conceptual scheme decision problem with
consideration of function risk propagation.
In summary, the contribution of this research is mainly shown in the following three parts: one is
to realize the quantitative analysis of function failure propagation based on FMEA theory and RFP
mapping process and provide risk assessment data for scheme decision. Second is to construct a risk
value integrated model (Equation (32)) of the scheme by analyzing the interaction between the failure
modes, which can comprehensively consider the overall risk of the scheme. Third is to numerically
calculate the risk value of the principle solution after the failure propagation by constructing the
multi-function failure propagation path in the conceptual design stage.
In the future, the development of the proposed method will involve the improvement of the
analysis software for efficiency and usability. By constructing a graphical user interface to support
new users to quickly understand and calculate the risk value of the conceptual scheme. In addition,
human subjective behavior errors are considered to be the main reason for most failures in complex
engineering design, which pose a greater challenge to the conceptual scheme decision. To this
end, the following two aspects may be examined in future studies: (1) consider human factors and
engineering factors to make the design scheme more harmonious; (2) establish a fuzzy risk prediction
technology to evaluate potential human error and propagation paths, and then use the technology to
prevent product failure in the early design stage.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, S.J. and F.G.; Writing—original draft, L.J.; Investigation, Q.X.;
Writing—review and editing, T.S.; Funding acquisition, J.L. and X.P. All authors have read and agreed to
the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was funded by the Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China [under grant
number LY20E050020, LY19E050004] and the National Natural Science Foundation of China [under grant numbers
51875525 and U1610112].
Acknowledgments: The authors acknowledge the anonymous Editor and reviewers for valuable comments
and suggestions.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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Conceptual Scheme Decision Model For Mechatronic Products Driven by Risk of Function Failure Propagation

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sustainability

Sustainability 2020, 12, 7134; doi:10.3390/su12177134 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability

2.1. Conceptual Design Decision

Components in redesign of a large

Fuzzy information Cutting device of shearer scheme

The heat exchanger of the automotive

Multi-attribute utility Quality Function Rapid generation of computer mice

The portfolio selection problem

Intelligent search The transmission mechanism of loading

Figure Figure 1. A classification

2.2. Conceptual Design

Conceptual scheme set; design

Weights of principle severity value is obtained

DFND can be described as DF = (K, L,

3.2.3. Calculation of Influence Degree of Function Failure

Table 2. Definition linguistic terms of fuzzy numbers.

No. Linguistic Terms Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFN)

Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 28

Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub-

Next, calculate the interval importance

Subfunction 1 g11 g12 … g1J

3.3. Failure Mode Risk Analysis of Principle Scheme

Table 3. The principle solution of the conditional probability table.

x1 x2 x3 P = (T = 0|x1, x2, x3) P = (T = 0.5|x1, x2, x3) P = (T = 1|x1, x2, x3)

Skn = wk · Ikn (22)

3.3.2. Calculation of the Risk Value of Each Failure Mode

Table 4. Influence the relationship of failure mode.

F Fk2 Fk3 ··· Fkn

The terms of all the sub-parts in Equation (32) is explained as follows:

where wξ is the weight of the evaluation objective ξ.

Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 17 of 28

Control signal Variable speed signal SF5

SF11 SF10 SF9

Table 5. Sub-requirement judgment matrix of shearer cutting device.

Sub-Requirement SR1 SR2 SR3 SR4

Table 6. Sub-requirement-subfunction correlation matrix of the scheme 2.

Subfunction SF3 SF5 SF7 SF8 SF9

Table 7. Subfunction autocorrelation matrix of scheme 2.

Subfunction SF3 SF5 SF7 SF8 SF9

Table 8. The importance values for the subfunction.

Conceptual Importance of the Subfunction

L4,5,2 L4,6,2 L7,4,1

Hydraulic Directional Hydraulic Differential

Figure 14. The

CS1 CS1 [0.33,0.46]

Table 11. Cont.

x21 1 Pitting Overflow x21 2 Valve core stuck

Table 12. Conditional probability table of overflow valve failure.

x2 21 x2 22 P = (T22 = 0|x221 ,T222 ) P = (T22 = 0.5|x221 ,T222 ) P = (T22 = 1|x221 ,T222 )

Table 13. Risk value of each failure mode.

Figure 15. Influence relationship of failure mode in the

Table 14. Influence relationship between failure modes.

4.4. Optimal Decision of Cutting Speed Regulating Device Based on VIKOR

Time spent (s) for CS1: [0.4, 8]

Rotational velocity-time relationship of the two scheme roller.

6. Conclusions and Future Work

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