BAR MATTER NO.

850 months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous
[October 02, 2001] compliance period.chan robles virtual law library

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE) SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. - Members of the IBP not exempt
from the MCLE requirement shall be divided into three (3)
compliance groups, namely:
RESOLUTION

(a) Compliance group 1. - Members in the National Capital

ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING
Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
Group 1.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
.
(b) Compliance group 2. - Members in Luzon outside NCR are
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal assigned to Compliance Group 2.
Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the .
Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the (c) Compliance group 3. - Members in Visayas and Mindanao
Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by are assigned to Compliance Group 3.
the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education
hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the
activity wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward
following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
compliance with the MCLE requirement.

RULE 1
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted
PURPOSE
after establishment of the program. – Members admitted or
readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. – Continuing legal education shall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based
is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or
(IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast readmission.
with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission
law.chan robles virtual law library
shall begin on the first day of the month of admission or
readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other
RULE 2 members in the same Compliance Group.
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. - Within two (2) compliance period after admission or readmission, the member
months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court is not required to comply with the program requirement for the
En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall initial compliance.
commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing .
Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these (b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial
Rules. compliance period after admission or readmission, the member
shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved
continuing legal education activities equal to the number of
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. – Members of the
months remaining in the compliance period in which the
IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3)
member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be
years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education
required to complete a number of hours of education in legal
activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal the next whole number.
ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.
RULE 4
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and
pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit units.
SECTION 1. Guidelines. – CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO
CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of
alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5) the lawyer’s participation in the MCLE activity. The following
credit units. are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting
. documents required therefor:
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates
on substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence
equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
. PROGRAMS/ACTIV CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal ITY DOCUMENTS
writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit
units. 1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA,
. IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS,
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED
international law and international conventions PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
equivalent to two (2) credit units.
. 1. PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATE OF
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to ATTENDEE OF ATTENDANCE WITH
such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE ATTENDANCE NUMBER OF HOURS
Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units. 1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR PHOTOCOPY OF
RESOURCE THE SUBJECT PLAQUE OR
RULE 3 SPEAKER PER SPONSOR’S
COMPLIANCE PERIOD COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION
PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. - The initial compliance 1.3 ½ OF CU FOR CERTIFICATION FROM
period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the PANELIST/REACT THE SUBJECT SPONSORING
adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period OR PER ORGANIZATION
for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of COMMENTATOR/ COMPLIANCE
the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) MODERATOR/ PERIOD
 (a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and
COORDINATOR/
the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive
FACILITATOR
Departments;
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW .
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
2.1 LAW BOOK OF FULL CU FOR PUBLISHED BOOK .
NOT LESS THAN THE SUBJECT (c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
100 PAGES PER Court, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary,
COMPLIANCE incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and
PERIOD incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial
Academy program of continuing judicial education;
2.2 BOOK EDITOR ½ OF THE CU PUBLISHED BOOK .
OF WITH PROOF AS (d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and
AUTHORSHIP EDITOR Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
CATEGORY .
2.3 RESEARCH ½ OF CU FOR DULY (e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
PAPER THE SUBJECT CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED .
INNOVATIVE PER TECHNICAL (f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant
PROGRAM/ COMPLIANCE REPORT/PAPER Government Corporate Counsel;
CREATIVE PERIOD .
PROJECT (g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional
Commissions;
2.4 LEGAL ½ OF CU FOR PUBLISHED ARTICLE .
ARTICLE OF AT THE SUBJECT (h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the
LEAST TEN (10) PER Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of
PAGES COMPLIANCE the Ombudsman;
PERIOD .
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial
2.5 LEGAL 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED functions;
NEWSLETTER/ NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL .
LAW JOURNAL (j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who
EDITOR have teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in
2.6 FULL CU FOR CERTIFICATION OF accredited law schools;chan robles virtual law library
PROFESSORIAL THE SUBJECT LAW DEAN OR BAR .
CHAIR/ PER REVIEW DIRECTOR (k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps
BAR REVIEW COMPLIANCE of Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial
LECTURE PERIOD Academy; and
LAW TEACHING/ .
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. - The following
RULE 5 Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS (a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
.
SECTION 1. Classes of credit units. -Credit units are either (b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval
participatory or non-participatory. of the IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of
requirement - A member may file a verified request setting
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. - Participatory credit forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability,
units may be claimed for: illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law,
etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in
conferences, conventions, symposia, in-house education accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE
programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion. Committee.
.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, SEC. 4. Change of status. - The compliance period shall begin
reactor, commentator, resource speaker, moderator, on the first day of the month in which a member ceases to be
coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.chan exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on
robles virtual law library the same day as that of all other members in the same
. Compliance Group.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. - Non- SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. - Applications for exemption from or
participatory credit units may be claimed per compliance period modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and
for: supported by documents.
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials
published or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an
article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the RULE 8
legal education of the author member, which were not STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
prepared in the ordinary course of the member's practice or
employment. SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. - Subject to the
. implementing regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter. Committee, continuing legal education program may be
RULE 6 granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the
activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the
SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. - Credit hours are provider is specifically mandated by law to provide continuing
computed based on actual time spent in an education activity legal education.
in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. - All continuing
RULE 7 legal education activities must meet the following
EXEMPTIONS standards:chan robles virtual law library

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. - The following (a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or
members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement: practical content.
. SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. - The accreditation of
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of
learning related to legal subjects and the legal profession,
including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or
medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice
law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.
.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.
.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length,
substantive written materials must be distributed to all
participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before
the time the activity is offered.
. PROVIDER
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time
and location so as to be free from interruption like telephone
calls and other distractions.
RULE9
ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. - Accreditation of
providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. - Any
person or group may be accredited as a provider for a term of
two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application.
All providers of continuing legal education activities, including
in-house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers.
Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
.
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
. shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption,
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. - All approved accredited
providers shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity
shall be maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years
after the completion date. The provider shall include the
member on the official record of attendance only if the
member's signature was obtained at the time of attendance at
the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the
member's name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall
identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of
the education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished
the MCLE COMMITTEE.
.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE
in the amount of _______ hours of which _____ hours will apply in
(legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
. (c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved
education activities prescribed by these Rules and such
regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all
participants identifying the time, date, location, subject matter
and length of the activity.
. .
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all
approved continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE
COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or
designees of the Committee and IBPBoard for purposes of
monitoring compliance with these Rules.
. requirements.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the
nature of the activity, the time devoted to each topic and
identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to
each participant a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved
Education Activity Evaluation Form.
.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity
Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after
the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.chan robles
virtual law library
.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity
under this program or issues a spurious certificate in violation
of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be
denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the
requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory
education activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. - The accreditation
of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a
majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing
and for good cause.
RULE 10
FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. - Application for approval of an
education activity or accreditation as a provider requires
payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of
MCLE Fees.
RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. - Each member shall secure from
the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his
compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting
under oath that he has complied with the education
requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the
exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the
Committee not later than the day after the end of the
member's compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. - Each member
copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be
provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section
3© of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a
participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall
also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3
of Rule 5.
RULE12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. - The following
shall constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the
compliance period;
.
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
.
(including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed
period;chan robles virtual law library
.
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish
evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt
of non-compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed
period;
.
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing
or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain
compliance. - Members failing to comply will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be
given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a
response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing
compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain
the following language near the beginning of the notice in
capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS
FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A
DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the
Notice may use this period to attain the adequate number of MCLE Program.chan robles virtual law library
credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this
period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September
compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the
2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be
circulation in the Philippines.
counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.chan robles virtual law library
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02
October 2001
RULE13
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. - A member who, for whatever

reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance
period shall pay a non-compliance fee. BAR MATTERNO. 1922

SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. - A member who fails to

comply with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for Republic of the Philippines
compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member Supreme Court
of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. Manila
The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be
conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact- Sirs/Mesdames:
finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the
Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. - Membership fees shall
continue to accrue at the active rate against a member during "Bar Matter No. 1922 - Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory
the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member. Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All
Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate
of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. - The Court Resolved
.
to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice
RULE14
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Commitee on Legal
REINSTATEMENT
Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the
.
diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE
SECTION 1. Process. - The involuntary listing as a delinquent
requirement program.
member shall be terminated when the member provides proof
of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the
of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary
Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE
credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-
practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed
compliance during the period the member is on inactive status.
before the courts of quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date
These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the
of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
current compliance period requirement. Credit units earned
Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately
during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number
preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required
needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
expunction of the pleadings from the records.
requirement.
The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative publication in a newspaper of general circulation."
process. - The termination of listing as a delinquent member is
administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave.
Committee.
Very truly yours,
RULE 15
COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (Signed)
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
SECTION 1. Composition. - The MCLE Committee shall be
composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the
Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively [A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law
center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES
law schools and/or law professors. BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, respondent.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and

integrity. They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a
term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as
may be determined by the Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. - The MCLE Committee shall
administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be
necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It
shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe
a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme
Court. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. - Subject to approval by
the Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such
staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping,
auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. - The MCLE Committee
shall submit to the Supreme Court for approval, an annual
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual
removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his
oath as a lawyer “by manufacturing, flaunting and using a
spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.”
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido
averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty.
James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and
living separately from each other. They have two children –
namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James
Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old – both of whom are in
complainant’s custody. Complainant filed a case for the
annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the
complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before
the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235
entitled, “James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos,
et al.”
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to
complainant’s residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and
demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an
alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which
supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her
that he had not received any motion for temporary child
custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the
alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent
failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the
resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November
12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss,
she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was
with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City,
respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their
children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the
help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the
Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen subsequently
escorted her to the police station where the matter could be
clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station,
respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a
statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally
served on complainant the appellate court’s resolution/order. In
order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the
children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition
that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This
agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City
Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger
Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received
information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent
and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to
another room, where they stayed until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to
custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of
Appeals’ resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the
authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated
January 18, 2002 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such
resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their
children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23,
2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition
was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that
respondent violated his attorney’s oath by manufacturing,
flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals’ Resolution in
and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused
and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was
referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of three years with a warning that another
offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. On June 23,
2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and recommendation of the Commission with the
modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six
years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can
be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt
to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted
in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which
he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied
by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution
several times. As pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by
respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc.
Case No. 3898, which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover
custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was
respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed
to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden
cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at
face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have
to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations
submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition
then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the
defense of a client’s cause, it must never be at the expense of
the truth. Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood;
nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote
or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument
of an opposing counsel, or the text
of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision
already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive
language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her
relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer’s arguments
whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. By calling
complainant, a “sly manipulator of truth” as well as a
“vindictive congenital prevaricator”, hardly measures to the
sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions
for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we
find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead,
suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem
commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on
respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict
C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record
of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
[G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998]
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE
SEELIN, respondents.
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing the execution
of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-9297.
Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that
the issues raised in this second petition for review are but mere
reiterations of previously settled issues which have already
attained finality. We now write finis to this controversy which
has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled in
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City:
“x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits
of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against
any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any
attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound practice demand
that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by
law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.”
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-
spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint
against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing
for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the
name of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297,
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null
and void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement
as to costs."
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and
eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on
November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5,
1992.
The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private
respondents moved for execution which was granted by the
lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision
was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by
herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the
trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between
private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and
registered owner of the lot having bought the same from
Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents’
motion. Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the
trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner,
being the successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing
pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which
read:
“We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no
compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil
Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee
pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by
name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action
or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the
transferor and still be binding on the transferee”
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of
Appeals on February 18, 1993.
On further appeal to this Court, petitioner’s petition for review
on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 109076, was denied in a
resolution dated August 2, 1993. Upon finality of said
resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October
21, 1993.
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the
issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court
which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration.
Petitioner’s motion was initially granted on August 29, 1994 by
the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon
motion of private respondents, the said order was reconsidered
on December 19, 1994 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who
succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution
were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the
second time, filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court
of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter
alia: that the judgment cannot be executed against it because
it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of
the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to
deliver possession of the property to the private respondents;
that certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the
finality of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust,
illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of
execution violates the lot buyers’ freedom of religion and
worship; and that private respondents’ title is being questioned
in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered
judgment dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground
that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long
become final and executory. It ruled, thus:
"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent
Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final
and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and
possession could have been implemented a long time ago if not
for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens.
x x x x Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the
execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually
have been ruled upon by this Court in its earlier case with Us
in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a
mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that
plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a
final judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is
obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment of
double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of
the Revised Rules of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private
respondents, the instant petition has already become moot and
academic as the property in question was already turned over
by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of
execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully,
putting the legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January
30, 1996.
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating
in essence the same line of arguments espoused in their
petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all
the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed
resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter
related to the controversy litigated come to an end.
Petitioner’s argument that the trial court cannot order it and
the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender
and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the
ground that they were never parties to the case between
private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been
resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28797 when it ruled:
“Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property
from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in
Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision
rendered therein by respondent Judge.
“Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee
pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by
name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action
or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the
transferor and still be binding on the transferee.”
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is,
therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.
Further, petitioner’s contention that a determination of the
issue of possession should first be resolved before the issuance
of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in
question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of
the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the
rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by the
private respondents, they do not have to institute another
action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject
realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances
transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. C-
9297 which will render the execution of the said judgment
unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil Case No. C-
11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by
the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for
nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the subject
property. Petitioner argues that the pendency of the said case
provides a reasonable justification why execution of the
aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the subject
property should be permanently stayed or at least held in
abeyance until after the final resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles
filed by the Republic against private respondents will not justify
the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case
No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioner’s title which
originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already
annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which
judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial
court will nullify the said private respondents’ title in Civil Case
No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse
decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner
the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present
petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the
judgment.
Finally, petitioner’s fear that the grave lots will be disturbed,
desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the judgment
proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of
the trial court with regard to the execution of the judgment
reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been
taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and
made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply
protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court,
through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:
"The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely
without recourse or remedy because they can still go after the
original party-defendant or transferor of the property in
question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation
pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should
it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be
placed in possession of the subject property, due to defendant-
petitioners' arguments that the same have already been sold to
burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the
defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiff-
respondents for payment in cash of the property subject of
their complaint to avoid demolition or desecration since they
benefited from the sale of the burial lots."
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was
given, to wit:
"The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to
the plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are given
authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they
can have access to the property. But as to the demolition of the
burial lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant with
the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be
made."
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order
dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following limitation on the writ
of execution, as follows:
"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas
within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many persons
who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots
adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest of
justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of
possession and break open order should be applied only to the
gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side
nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of
the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace
of the resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of
land within the said memorial park."
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue
as to the status of the burial lot owners has been properly
addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and
academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of
Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of
Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the “Sheriff’s Return,”
dated March 31, 1995, with the attached “Turn Over Premises”
indicating therein that private respondents took possession of
the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of
a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of
the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has
thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot has long
been going on, so that by the time this case is finally
terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with
tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real
owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest

of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right,
they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound
to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay
a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes. In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al., we ruled:

"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist

in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge
this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is
burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the
law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be
permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested
judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their
clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do
not deserve the attention of the courts."