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1NC

Saudi Arabia is restrained right now because of Trump’s greenlight of Turkish behavior
NYT 19, 10-14-2019, "The Syrian War: Today’s Top Developments," No Publication,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/turkey-syria.html#link-356521d3

Saudi Arabia has spoken out publicly for the first time about President Trump’s abrupt decision to pull American
forces out of northern Syria, with one top diplomat calling the results “a disaster for the region.” That was the
response Monday from the kingdom’s newly arrived ambassador to London, Prince Khalid bin Bandar bin Sultan. The decision “ does not
give one incredible confidence,” the ambassador said when asked whether the pullout had altered the kingdom’s
assessment of Mr. Trump’s reliability as an ally . “We are concerned, no question,” he said. Prince Khalid, speaking
in a public discussion with the BBC newscaster Frank Gardner at the Royal United Services Institute, addressed the Syria withdrawal and the
upheaval that followed with unusual candor for a diplomat from the kingdom. Official public communications there are usually highly formal
and tightly restricted, and Saudi Arabia had studiously avoided criticizing the United States’ Syria policy. “The last
thing we need in the region is another front of chaos, and I think we just got it,” he said.

The plan increases Saudi perception of US support- especially towards Iran


SC, 19- journal of IR( Strategic Comments, “The Saudi–Turkish antagonism,” , 25:5, iv-vi, DOI:
10.1080/13567888.2019.1635344)

The antagonism has affected its two major players’ relations with the US and Russia and, in turn,
Washington and Moscow must take it into account when formulating their own policies. Erdogan’s
persistent attempts to undermine Muhammad bin Salman after the Khashoggi murder were unwelcome
to the Trump administration given that, along with Israel, the prince is the main supporter of a more
assertive policy towards Iran. There has been considerable anger in Erdogan’s government at what it
considered to be Washington’s attempts to protect the prince, strengthening an actor Ankara sees as
one of the most determined obstacles to increased Turkish regional influence.

As Riyadh has strengthened its ties with the Trump administration, Ankara has moved closer to Russian
President Vladimir Putin. In turn, Putin is aware that Saudi Arabia’s vast defence procurement from the
US and general investment in its relationship with Washington make an alignment with Erdogan a
more natural one for Russia. Moreover, peeling a NATO member away from the Alliance is a more
tempting prize. For Riyadh, Erdogan’s perceived closeness to Putin is another reason to be wary of
courting Moscow, in addition to the fear of antagonising Washington.

Political antagonism has acted as a drag on Saudi–Turkish commercial ties, but these have not been
suspended. Saudi investment funds have continued to invest in Turkish markets. Despite a temporary
decline following the Khashoggi murder when they were banned from visiting Turkey, Saudi tourists
have since returned and Saudi citizens remain among the largest foreign buyers of Turkish real estate.
Even though the number is undoubtedly lower than if relations had been more cordial, Turkish
construction companies have continued to win contracts in Saudi Arabia. The UAE and Saudi Arabia
remain among the largest markets – ranking first and third respectively in 2014–18 purchases – for
Turkey’s growing defence industry.

Nevertheless, the failure of Erdogan’s attempts to use the Khashoggi murder to marginalise Muhammad
bin Salman domestically and isolate him internationally in a meaningful way has added a personal edge
to the national hostility and reduced the possibility of reconciliation while either remains in power .
Events in Sudan have demonstrated that the fallout from the Khashoggi murder has not deterred Riyadh
from continuing to pursue an assertive foreign policy, particularly when it comes to curtailing Ankara’s
influence. In contrast, Erdogan is looking increasingly beleaguered: beset by an ailing economy and
declining popular support at home and facing a growing gap between his ambitions and his capabilities
abroad, particularly in Syria.

While the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) wields little practical power, Saudi Arabia’s
assumption of the OIC chairmanship from Turkey in May 2019 means that it can now curb Erdogan’s
attempts to use the organisation to raise his profile – and publicise his outlook – in the Muslim world.
The apparent impending crisis in Turkish–US relations over the S-400 looks set to strengthen Riyadh’s
relative advantage over Ankara in exerting influence in Washington – especially as it comes at a time
when Saudi Arabia and the Trump administration are already closely aligned on the perceived need for a
more assertive policy towards Iran.

Causes US- Iran War


Schemm and Loveluck 9-19, Paul Schemm is Overnight foreign editor based in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, Louisa Loveluck is a reporter in The Washington Post's Beirut bureau, focusing on Syria, “Iran
warns U.S. of ‘all-out war’ if attacked,” 9/19/19,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-warns-us-of-all-out-war-if-
attacked/2019/09/19/26c04864-da4c-11e9-a1a5-162b8a9c9ca2_story.html //ott

DUBAI — Iran warned Thursday that military action by the United States or Saudi Arabia would result in “all-out
war,” as the Trump administration weighs its response after blaming Iran for crippling strikes on the kingdom’s oil infrastructure. Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo condemned the remarks, insisting that the United States and its allies were seeking a peaceful resolution, while increasing
pressure on Iran to curtail its activities. In an interview with CNN, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif denied that Tehran was
involved in the attacks and warned that retaliatory strikes risked causing significant bloodshed on Iranian soil. “I am
making a very serious statement that we don’t want to engage in a military confrontation,” Zarif said. “But we
won’t blink to defend
our territory
1NC
Russian arms sales are capped now---that limits the capacity for Russian expansionism
Bershidsky 3-12-2019 – founding editor of the Russian business daily Vedomosti and founded the
opinion website Slon.ru. (Leonid, “Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales. Russia is losing
market share despite Vladimir Putin's international military adventures.,” Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/u-s-is-no-1-in-arms-sales-as-russia-loses-
market-share)//BB

Global arms sales are on the increase , consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The
U.S. and its allies have been the main beneficiaries. Russia, by contrast, is on the decline , a sign that Vladimir
Putin’s geopolitical bets aren’t turning into long-term influence. The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has
been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts in recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in
eastern Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just some examples. The number of fatalities has increased even more
dramatically, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Between 2011 and 2017, the average annual death toll from conflict neared
97,000, three times more than in the previous seven-year period. That helps to explain the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers
from 2014 to 2018 compared with the previous five-year period seen in the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, the global authority on the weapons trade. The Middle East has been absorbing weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments
to the region rocketed by 87 percent in the last five years. Russia
took an active part in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but
it doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales . It was the only one of the world’s top five
exporters, which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in market share. It remains the world’s second-biggest
arms exporter. SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military value of the equipment
traded rather than on its market price. But in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S. Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of
the defense industry, said last month that Russia “steadily reaches” $15 billion in arms exports a year and hopes to retain that amount.
This suggests officials believe sales have
hit a ceiling. By contrast, the U.S. closed $55.6 billion of arms deals in
2018, 33 percent more than in 2017 , thanks to the Trump administration’s liberalization of weapons exports. According to the
SIPRI figures, U.S. exports were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through 2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year period. For
the U.S., Middle Eastern countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major
irritant, Qatar. Some 52 percent of U.S. weapons sales were to the Middle East in the last five years. Under President Donald Trump, the
relationship with Saudi Arabia became even more lucrative for the defense industry. For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16
percent of its weapons exports over the same period, with most going to Egypt and Iraq. Its major trade
partners were India, China
and Algeria – but sales to India dropped significantly as its government sought to diversify suppliers and bought more from
the U.S., South Korea and, most painfully for the Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing key aircraft tenders in India to the
U.S. This, along with the economic collapse of another major client, Venezuela, and the current potential
for regime change in Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian sales look unlikely. Arms sales are perhaps the
best reflection of a major military power’s international influence. The market isn’t all about price and
quality competition; it’s about permanent and situational alliances . The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in
exports shows that Putin’s forays into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the
region. Although Putin’s warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran, which
has a lot of influence over Iraq, are paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost
elsewhere. The U.S.’s allies, France, Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share, too. That’s a
rarely mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling arms to
countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, European Union member states need markets for their defense industries, which employ about
500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less desirable partners – that is, in most of the world.
Many tears have been shed in the U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order. But if
you take arms sales as a proxy
for influence, the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient. In a more conflict-prone, competitive world, America is doing
rather well while its longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.
Russia fills in for U.S. arms vacuums to exploit the tension between Turkey and the
U.S.
Bekdil and Bodner, 10/24 – reporter at Defense News (Burak Bekdil, Matthew Bodner, reporter
focusing on Russia at Defense News ‘No obliteration: Western arms embargo has little impact on Turkey
as it looks east’, October 24 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-
africa/2019/10/24/no-obliteration-western-arms-embargo-has-little-impact-on-turkey-as-it-looks-
east/)//hecht

Turkey boasts that it locally produces most hardware and ammunition required for the campaign. Turkish
officials claim local production currently meets 70 percent of the military’s requirements, compared with 20
percent 15 years ago. Demir said most systems used in the operation including helicopters, smart ammunition,
rockets, infantry rifles, armored vehicles and electronic warfare systems are supplied by the local
industry. However, the Turkish military did experience a temporary shortage of ammunition, a Turkish security official told Defense News on
the condition of anonymity. “Some ammunition stocks we normally bought from the West ran short but was
quickly replaced by Russian supplies,” he said. Alternative suppliers and ice cream An Ankara-based defense analyst pointed to
Ukraine, Belarus, Pakistan, South Korea and China as alternative sources for ammunition . “Especially China
would volunteer to sell almost every weapons system,” he said. It also wouldn’t be difficult to imagine Russia filling the
void left by a lack of high-tech Western systems . After the U.S. suspended Turkey’s partnership in the
multinational Joint Strike Fighter program in retaliation for Turkey’s $2.5 billion purchase of Russian-
made S-400 air defense systems, Ankara turned to Moscow for a stopgap solution to bolster its fighter fleet. Erdogan visited the
MAKS air show in Russia this year with President Vladimir Putin. No deal was announced, but the two leaders ate ice cream together and
Erdogan took a photo with Russia’s Su-57 stealth fighter. “Possibly, they [the Turkish government] will make a choice in favor of our combat
aviation, nothing can be ruled out,” Russia’s deputy premier, Yuri Borisov, said Oct. 20. Meanwhile Turkey is trying to design and
develop its first indigenous fighter jet. But officials privately admit the country will likely miss its original deadline of 2023 to fly
the planned aircraft. Moscow’s courting of Ankara is likely to increase following the latter’s spat with Washington over the fate of the Kurds in
northern Syria, and fewthings are more attractive to the Kremlin right now than spoiling America’s
relations with its NATO allies, according to Russian political analyst Vladimir Frolov. “It makes sense to sell Erdogan
just about anything he wants, so long as it further deepens the strains between Turkey and U.S. and
NATO,” Frolov said, noting that nuclear weapons are off the table.

New arms markets are key to all facets of Russian expansionism


Connolly and Sendstad 17 - *associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House.
He is also a senior lecturer in political economy and director of the Centre for Russian, European and
Eurasian Studies (CREES) at the University of Birmingham. He is the author of numerous articles on the
political economy of Russia. **Cecilie Sendstad is the research manager for the Cost Analysis research
programme at the Department of Analysis at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). She
has authored numerous published studies on Russian and Norwegian defence-economic issues, and has
also conducted research on defence acquisitions and lifecycle costing for the Norwegian government
(Richard and Cecilie, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms
Exports for Russia,” Chatham House,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-
exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf)//BB

This last potential challenge illustrates that the arms trade is as much driven by developments in the
geopolitical marketplace as it is by commercial concerns. In turn, the multidimensional nature of the
arms trade suggests that Russia will make great efforts to ensure that it remains successful in this
industry for decades to come. This is likely to involve a concerted effort to ensure that sufficient
domestic investment in productive capabilities will take place to guarantee that new weapons systems
emerge. It is also likely to involve policymakers attempting to wield arms exports as a component of
wider foreign policy. Indeed, it is this final point that deserves greater attention by researchers in the
future. If, as Keith Krause has argued, arms exports serve as an important tool wielded by states in
pursuit of other foreign policy objectives, then it is plausible that Russia’s strong position in the global
arms market might be expected to boost the country’s position in international affairs more widely.90 In
addition to the economic motives behind arms sales, Krause suggests that arms exports can help states
both in the pursuit of victory in war and in the broader pursuit of power in the international arena.91
Both motives appear to lie behind Russian arms exports in a number of cases. For Krause, arms exports
can help the exporting country achieve several objectives in the pursuit of the beneficiary country’s
victory in war. They include: guaranteeing independence of arms supply to ensure military security;
acting as a quid pro quo for military base/landing rights; assisting friends and allies in maintaining an
effective (and/or common) defensive posture against external threats; substituting for direct military
involvement; and providing testing for new weapons systems. It is not difficult to find at least prima
facie evidence for these motives playing some role in motivating Russian arms exports to Armenia, Syria
and Tajikistan. When looking at the role arms exports play in supporting the exporter’s pursuit of
geopolitical power, Krause states that the sale of weaponry can help to: provide access to and influence
over leaders and elites in recipient states in pursuit of foreign policy objectives; symbolize commitment
to the recipient’s security or stability against internal or external threats; create or maintain a regional
balance of power; create or maintain a regional presence; and provide access to scarce, expensive or
strategic resources. It is likely that at least some of these motives are present in Russia’s sales to
countries all over the world. Moreover, the zeal shown by Russian firms in expanding arms exports to
countries beyond their traditional client base – such as to Saudi Arabia, Turkey or the Philippines – is
surely as much to do with the possibility of weakening ties between those countries and their traditional
allies in the West. It is in this respect that Russia’s future performance as an arms exporter might have
truly strategic significance. If Russia is able to expand its influence beyond its traditional markets, we
should expect to see Russia’s broader political influence in those regions rise. In this sense, the motives
underlying the strenuous Russian efforts to expand arms exports might well go beyond simple
commercial concerns or a desire to place the defence-industrial complex at the centre of efforts to
modernize the Russian economy.

The impact is 1AC Grey


1NC
The logic of security necessitates complete and total eradication of the threat, causing
endless conflict and lashout – the alternative is to reject existential framing, which de-
legitimizes the logic of continual violence.
Wilhelmsen ’16 (Julie; 5/13/2016; PhD in political science, conducts research in fields of critical security studies, Russian foreign and
security policies, and the radicalization of Islam in Eurasia, senior research fellow at the Norweigan Institute of International Affairs, editor of
the Scandinavian-language journal Internasjonal Politikk, wide outreach to the Norwegian public on issues related to Russia and Eurasia through
frequent public talks and media comments; “How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist foundation of
securitization theory,” http://journals.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0010836716648725; Date Accessed: 7/10/2017; DS)

While ST is both lauded and criticized for its ambitions of combining theoretical perspectives and expanding the study of security to include new
issues, this article has engaged post-structuralist insights to create a framework that takes ST back to the core of security studies: the study of
war and how it becomes a legitimate undertaking. Re-focusing ST back to the ‘grammar of security’ via post-structuralist insights
means that the centre of analysis becomes how a securitizing multi-layered discourse shapes the
understanding of the objects of which it speaks, and the material practices made logical and legitimate
by this understanding. Several explications of core concepts and relations in ST stand out as a result of this theoretical re-reading. First,
representations of threat can be placed on a scale with differing degrees of danger and Otherness
attached to them. While some link the object to descriptors that do not indicate danger or Otherness in negative terms, other
constructions are so radical on these two accounts that the object emerges as an existential threat .
Moreover, the level of threat implied in the representation delineates a boundary between the threat and
the threatened, but also a boundary for acceptable action. A threat representation that can be placed at
the top of the scale in terms of danger logically fits together with policy proposals that are equally
radical or violent. For securitization in war this suggests that the type of representation that becomes
dominant during the process of securitization has effects on how the war is waged . While it is impossible to rank
different wars according to the degree of ‘cruelty’ along an objective standard, some wars are clearly more violent than
others in terms of how massive and indiscriminate the violence is, and how long it can be carried out
and still be acceptable. Securitizing narratives in war that cast the enemy as extremely dangerous and
different make massive and indiscriminate violence possible and acceptable. Second, expounding ST through
post-structuralist insights brings material practices back into the spotlight of empirical study. By engaging a post-structuralist concept of
discourse, which suggests that linguistic and material practices are intertwined and co-constitutive, securitizations are not merely
words. They manifest themselves quite literally in extraordinary security practices such as detention,
bombing, torture and killing. Moreover, there is a recursive effect of these material practices; they confirm
and constitute the identity assigned to threat and referent object in the securitizing narrative. Surely, the
original authors of the theory hardly intended that securitization should be reduced to the study of rhetorical machinations. The emergency
practices that are enabled by securitizing talk are a key part of the process, and studying them gives the
theory both political and critical salience. Third, re-engaging post-structuralist insights implies loosening up the fixed
understanding of the ‘securitizing actor’ and the ‘referent object’. The securitizing discourse does more than form and disempower the object
that is said to be threatening. It also empowers the ‘referent object’ by producing a threatened subject and positioning it ‘above’ the
threatening object, as well as producing a ‘securitizing actor’ by creating such a subject position from which action can be taken. In particular,
the urgent focus and discursive detailing of the threat which a securitizing attempt in war can elicit will
produce a new articulation of the Self that is said to be threatened . It might be argued that this re-articulated Self in
times of war is negatively constituted, that it is more through what it is not than through what it is that the Self becomes re-defined and united.
Nevertheless, no social group wages an acceptable war and remains the same. There will always be some benefit in
terms of social cohesion. Finally, when the ‘audience’ is re-conceptualized in a post-structuralist fashion, ‘audience acceptance’ becomes a joint
act. It
should be understood as an intersubjective process of legitimation whereby boundaries are
established between the threat and the threatened as well as the ‘way out’, making ‘emergency
measures’ acceptable. Conversely, this also means that securitization can unravel, through a similar
intersubjective and discursive process whereby a discourse that attaches a lower level of threat to the
object is gradually negotiated: the issue is de-securitized, and emergency measures then become
unacceptable. Even in wars that have become acceptable, discourses that negate the representation of
the enemy as radically different and dangerous, and represent the victims of war as fellow human
beings, can emerge to challenge the legitimacy of continued violence. A perhaps controversial claim that follows
from this explication is that when war becomes acceptable it is thanks to the discursive efforts of many. Both what Buzan et al. (1998) refer to
as the ‘securitizing actor’ and ‘the audience’ contribute. By emphasizing securitization as an intersubjective process of legitimation, as
suggested in this article, the spotlight is broadened beyond the war-mongering leadership to shed light on how the political opposition, experts,
generals, police and especially the media not only accept but contribute to the construction of the object as an existential threat and to making
war a legitimate undertaking.
1NC
The United States federal government should
- Reintroduce a small battalion of troops 10km from the Turkey border in Syria in
noncombat roles in support of the SDF,
- Begin negotiations with Turkey, Russia, the Syrian Arab Republic and major
rebel groups over eventual withdrawal of Turkish forces and a powersharing
agreement favorable to the Syrian Arab Republic and the SDF,
- Threaten economic and political reprisal of Turkey if these negotiations fails,
- And, Continue material support and increase consultation with the SDF
surrounding ISIS containment.
Their cards conclude it solves the AFF
Crisis Group 19, 3-12-2019, "Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria,"
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-
resurgence-iraq-and-syria

Preventing ISIS’s resurgence requires, first and foremost, either halting or mitigating
the impact of a Turkish intervention
against the SDF. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from their positions on the Syrian-Turkish border, there
are no longer American lives on the line to discourage a Turkish attack . Still, Trump has threatened to target
Turkey’s economy if Ankara engages in “unforced or unnecessary fighting” against the U.S.’s Kurdish allies in Syria, and vowed that a
Turkish incursion could do lasting damage to Turkish-U.S. bilateral relations. Washington’s Coalition allies have condemned Turkey’s offensive
and called on Turkey to stop. The U.S. and its Coalition allies should further urge Turkey to pause its attack, an attack for which
Ankara could pay a high price diplomatically and that could even risk new violence inside Turkey, if the PKK resumes its own attacks. If Turkey
can be convinced to reel in its invasion , or at a minimum to stop after establishing a limited beachhead, there may be time for
the U.S. to broker some new compromise arrangement . It could also use any such respite to encourage a deal for the north
east that could withstand an eventual U.S. exit , namely one between the SDF and the Syrian regime that gradually reintegrates the
area into unitary, state-led Syria on the basis of decentralised governance. The U.S.-led Coalition should work with the SDF to
devolve governing and security responsibility to local Arab actors in order to consolidate post-ISIS gains. If Turkey
can be dissuaded from pushing further into the north east, the SDF will still need near-term Coalition assistance to pursue ISIS elements and
stabilise areas taken from the group. The U.S.-led Coalition should work with the SDF to devolve governing and security responsibility to local
Arab actors in order to consolidate post-ISIS gains. Yet those local Arab partners also need continued assistance from the SDF
and its international partners, including materiel and logistical support, if they are to defend themselves
against ISIS. Coalition countries should also help reinforce the SDF detention facilities now holding ISIS-linked
foreigners, even if they are unable to build new ones. If it looks as if the U.S. cannot or will not deter Turkey, then the best and only
remaining option for the YPG will be to negotiate directly with the Syrian regime for the return of Syrian state sovereignty to Syria’s north east.
In this situation, Russia could mediate between the regime and YPG, and also intercede with Turkey, backing the redeployment of regime forces
to Syria’s Turkish border even as it assures Turkey that the regime’s return will be substantive, not just symbolic. Russia has previously argued
for reactivating Syria and Turkey’s 1998 Adana Agreement, which gives
Turkey the right to conduct “hot pursuit” counter-
terrorism operations inside Syria even as it entails mutual bilateral recognition. The YPG’s bargaining position would be weak,
as Turkey would be bearing down on the north east. Still, for the YPG, even a bad deal with Damascus seems preferable to Turkey reproducing
the Afrin experience in an extended border zone that includes nearly every Kurdish population centre in Syria. Damascus, too, has at least some
incentive to be flexible, lest Turkey occupy large sections of Syria’s east for the long term. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on 9
October that Russia is encouraging dialogue between Damascus and “representatives of the Kurds”, a statement
to which the SDF’s civilian governing authority responded positively. As a Ninewa security official said: If Syria gets a cough,
Iraq gets the flu. As the situation in Syria’s north east evolves quickly, countries such as France and Germany whose nationals are now in the
north east’s camps should repatriate as many as seems feasible. They should prioritise the repatriation of children, whether orphans or minors
who are themselves blameless but may be attached to ISIS-affiliated mothers who represent a security concern. Repatriation of ISIS-affiliated
civilians is politically controversial and, in some cases, may be risky in security terms. Yet leaving children to be engulfed by oncoming conflict is
irresponsible. If eastern Syria spins into chaos, Iraq will invariably suffer, as fighters and materiel again flow across the border. As a Ninewa
security official said: “If Syria gets a cough, Iraq gets the flu”. So far, Iraqi
security forces have seemed capable of
containing ISIS and potentially degrading it further. Maintaining that progress will require concerted efforts by Iraqis and
their international partners, particularly if the situation in Syria deteriorates . To that end, Iraq and its international
partners should be careful not to allow U.S.-Iranian or Israeli-Iranian tensions to spill into Iraq . Iraqis are keen that
their country not become an arena, once more, for outsiders’ score settling.
1NC
Interp – the cutoff for substantial is between 8% (3/36) and 17% (14/79)- affs that
reduce less than 8% definitely aren’t topical
Theohary 16 - Specialist in National Security Policy and Information Operations at the Congressional Research Service
(Catherine, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-2015” CRS Report, 12/19,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44716.pdf

The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2015 was $65.2 billion, a substantial
decrease from the $79.3 billion total in 2014 (Figure 1) (Table 1) (Table 3) (Table 4). In 2015, the value of all arms
deliveries to developing nations ($33.6 billion) decreased slightly from the value of 2014 deliveries ($36.2
billion). Deliveries since 2008 peaked in 2014 (Figure 7 and Figure 8) (Table 2) (Table 15).

There is 1 topical country aff- it’s Saudi

Vote neg for limits and ground--- we sell arms to 180 countries, their interp multiplies
every weapon system or service by 98 AND unlinks the only topic generics like fill in
Notifications chart – Saudi Arabia, Japan, Qatar, UK, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Italy, Poland,
Australia, South Korea meet
data available at: http://securityassistance.org/data/country/arms/country/2014/2018//Global//all –
sorted into descending order by notifications by sara ann brackett //sab

*global is also included because SAM doesn’t separate bilateral aid by country //sab

Fiscal Year 14-18

Country Notifications Authorizations Deliveries

TOTAL 366,000,000,000.00 346,000,000,000.00 105,000,000,000.00

Saudi Arabia 58,000,000,000.00 33,600,000,000.00 16,000,000,000.00

Japan 39,700,000,000.00 53,900,000,000.00 6,080,000,000.00

Qatar 26,500,000,000.00 11,400,000,000.00 1,620,000,000.00

United Kingdom 23,200,000,000.00 17,300,000,000.00 2,490,000,000.00

Iraq 19,600,000,000.00 5,440,000,000.00 7,130,000,000.00

United Arab Emirates 17,700,000,000.00 12,400,000,000.00 4,700,000,000.00

Kuwait 15,900,000,000.00 3,680,000,000.00 2,110,000,000.00

Italy 13,200,000,000.00 7,980,000,000.00 1,140,000,000.00

Poland 12,900,000,000.00 1,250,000,000.00 678,000,000.00


Global 11,800,000,000.00 80,600,000,000.00 6,900,000,000.00

Australia 10,800,000,000.00 12,300,000,000.00 6,280,000,000.00

South Korea 10,000,000,000.00 22,600,000,000.00 3,040,000,000.00

Israel 7,210,000,000.00 11,500,000,000.00 3,510,000,000.00

Canada 6,730,000,000.00 5,000,000,000.00 1,460,000,000.00

Belgium 6,640,000,000.00 1,170,000,000.00 320,000,000.00

Germany 6,350,000,000.00 2,100,000,000.00 1,040,000,000.00

India 6,220,000,000.00 7,170,000,000.00 1,610,000,000.00

Bahrain 5,530,000,000.00 602,000,000.00 252,000,000.00

Turkey 5,340,000,000.00 4,910,000,000.00 1,610,000,000.00

Romania 5,150,000,000.00 554,000,000.00 237,000,000.00

Norway 4,850,000,000.00 1,510,000,000.00 721,000,000.00

Sweden 4,460,000,000.00 1,890,000,000.00 320,000,000.00

Mexico 4,280,000,000.00 3,900,000,000.00 1,260,000,000.00

Singapore 3,880,000,000.00 5,980,000,000.00 1,110,000,000.00

Taiwan 3,590,000,000.00 1,870,000,000.00 5,160,000,000.00

Slovakia 3,510,000,000.00 276,000,000.00 27,923,436.00

Netherlands 3,410,000,000.00 2,640,000,000.00 932,000,000.00

Greece 3,320,000,000.00 2,020,000,000.00 468,000,000.00

Spain 2,660,000,000.00 987,000,000.00 581,000,000.00

Egypt 2,510,000,000.00 2,380,000,000.00 3,220,000,000.00

Pakistan 2,300,000,000.00 2,090,000,000.00 1,070,000,000.00

Morocco 1,520,000,000.00 1,490,000,000.00 322,000,000.00

New Zealand 1,480,000,000.00 506,000,000.00 157,000,000.00

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1,430,000,000.00 25,209,920.00 0.00

Brazil 1,310,000,000.00 916,000,000.00 379,000,000.00


Finland 1,110,000,000.00 602,000,000.00 414,000,000.00

Lebanon 1,040,000,000.00 680,000,000.00 329,000,000.00

France 1,010,000,000.00 2,380,000,000.00 1,050,000,000.00

Tunisia 825,000,000.00 810,000,000.00 199,000,000.00

Peru 787,000,000.00 148,000,000.00 57,321,055.00

Algeria 745,000,000.00 1,150,000,000.00 113,000,000.00

Kenya 671,000,000.00 100,000,000.00 68,597,178.00

Lithuania 654,000,000.00 84,587,392.00 28,405,884.00

Libya 600,000,000.00 45,402,404.00 4,433,593.00

Nigeria 593,000,000.00 46,970,463.00 60,755,360.00

Czech Republic 575,000,000.00 125,000,000.00 72,767,363.00

Jordan 522,000,000.00 1,950,000,000.00 913,000,000.00

Oman 486,000,000.00 1,000,000,000.00 1,150,000,000.00

Argentina 459,000,000.00 437,000,000.00 209,000,000.00

Thailand 403,000,000.00 1,050,000,000.00 475,000,000.00

Philippines 360,000,000.00 1,980,000,000.00 333,000,000.00

Brunei 344,000,000.00 285,000,000.00 175,000,000.00

Chile 320,000,000.00 406,000,000.00 273,000,000.00

Denmark 320,000,000.00 1,030,000,000.00 576,000,000.00

Indonesia 262,000,000.00 867,000,000.00 684,000,000.00

Malaysia 214,000,000.00 457,000,000.00 297,000,000.00

Latvia 201,000,000.00 41,961,931.00 36,746,623.00

United States 195,000,000.00 0.00 0.00

Switzerland 165,000,000.00 317,000,000.00 262,000,000.00

Ukraine 90,198,600.00 245,000,000.00 98,413,859.00


Georgia 75,000,000.00 84,721,772.00 59,874,544.00

Kazakhstan 62,235,949.00 25,045,332.00 14,059,663.00

Afghanistan 60,000,000.00 2,310,000,000.00 648,000,000.00

Estonia 55,000,000.00 90,497,988.00 41,859,572.00

Honduras 6,150,000.00 61,972,370.00 13,475,330.00

Colombia 3,910,198.00 781,000,000.00 519,000,000.00

Cote d'Ivoire 2,475,000.00 4,883,605.00 3,404,604.00

Panama 2,191,000.00 83,855,939.00 15,637,584.00

El Salvador 1,581,880.00 22,961,217.00 14,080,419.00

Albania 0.00 8,842,159.00 9,507,502.00

Andorra 0.00 3,564.00 2,782.00

Angola 0.00 10,455,585.00 10,658,318.00

Anguilla 0.00 14,729.00 14,845.00

Antigua and Barbuda 0.00 1,799,515.00 389,435.00

Armenia 0.00 9,990,402.00 9,984,266.00

Aruba 0.00 267,729.00 247,123.00

Austria 0.00 70,993,752.00 65,715,956.00

Azerbaijan 0.00 19,708,851.00 9,301,904.00

Bahamas 0.00 39,761,334.00 2,218,917.00

Bangladesh 0.00 41,492,612.00 25,650,149.00

Barbados 0.00 22,343,232.00 5,552,316.00

Belarus 0.00 0.00 0.00

Belize 0.00 5,187,300.00 3,313,126.00

Benin 0.00 4,864,609.00 1,751,151.00

Bermuda 0.00 174,320.00 138,770.00


Bhutan 0.00 18,985.00 17,127.00

Bolivia 0.00 6,937,078.00 1,375,499.00

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.00 13,825,334.00 8,183,703.00

Botswana 0.00 13,727,176.00 4,274,613.00

British Virgin Islands 0.00 62,196.00 61,764.00

Bulgaria 0.00 32,418,280.00 32,519,435.00

Burkina Faso 0.00 1,375,457.00 1,329,384.00

Burma 0.00 0.00 21,000.00

Burundi 0.00 1,036,871.00 901,387.00

Cambodia 0.00 2,595,960.00 2,561,814.00

Cameroon 0.00 77,631,869.00 3,926,322.00

Cape Verde 0.00 349,425.00 376,492.00

Cayman Islands 0.00 45,106.00 45,040.00

Central African Republic 0.00 6,064,816.00 1,678,141.00

Chad 0.00 53,775,362.00 7,092,761.00

China 0.00 0.00 267,053.00

Costa Rica 0.00 6,830,858.00 7,824,715.00

Croatia 0.00 69,236,937.00 32,580,666.00

Curacao 0.00 6,500.00 9,220.00

Cyprus 0.00 0.00 2,392,097.00

Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) 0.00 59,941.00 427,890.00

Djibouti 0.00 17,352,653.00 9,591,480.00

Dominica 0.00 1,706,388.00 312,075.00

Dominican Republic 0.00 28,147,604.00 6,965,505.00

Ecuador 0.00 36,346,151.00 14,683,206.00


Eritrea 0.00 0.00 30,000.00

Ethiopia 0.00 17,643,305.00 17,066,315.00

Europe Regional 0.00 62,591,057.00 0.00

Fiji 0.00 494,000.00 12,000.00

French Guiana 0.00 17,563,401.00 2,250,000.00

Gabon 0.00 3,866,606.00 9,609,550.00

Gambia 0.00 0.00 34,000.00

Ghana 0.00 7,687,788.00 4,326,232.00

Grenada 0.00 1,797,000.00 237,000.00

Guatemala 0.00 28,385,628.00 12,698,125.00

Guinea 0.00 4,813,476.00 133,665.00

Guyana 0.00 3,664,600.00 2,575,106.00

Haiti 0.00 12,579,875.00 4,790,877.00

Holy See 0.00 30.00 10.00

Hong Kong 0.00 8,615,830.00 3,633,425.00

Hungary 0.00 209,000,000.00 44,256,634.00

Iceland 0.00 430,827.00 711,124.00

International Organizations 0.00 358,000,000.00 417,000,000.00

Ireland 0.00 13,807,903.00 12,134,892.00

Jamaica 0.00 11,866,394.00 7,724,421.00

Korea 0.00 0.00 10,200,000,000.00

Kosovo 0.00 20,307,152.00 15,360,254.00

Kyrgyzstan 0.00 6,860,400.00 1,185,400.00

Lesotho 0.00 0.00 273,000.00

Liberia 0.00 16,068,851.00 10,599,500.00


Luxembourg 0.00 220,000,000.00 52,726,258.00

Macau 0.00 0.00 18,376.00

Macedonia 0.00 6,153,240.00 9,884,465.00

Madagascar 0.00 1,504,600.00 816,000.00

Malawi 0.00 600.00 382,000.00

Maldives 0.00 720,000.00 116,000.00

Mali 0.00 8,735,763.00 2,126,333.00

Malta 0.00 3,414,063.00 516,865.00

Mauritania 0.00 33,837,146.00 22,094,404.00

Mauritius 0.00 719,181.00 338,213.00

Micronesia 0.00 150.00 0.00

Moldova 0.00 14,906,968.00 8,956,008.00

Mongolia 0.00 6,529,400.00 10,366,000.00

Montenegro 0.00 2,908,075.00 4,327,996.00

Montserrat 0.00 8,910.00 8,910.00

Mozambique 0.00 3,263,034.00 302,393.00

Namibia 0.00 169,545.00 1,193,264.00

Nepal 0.00 3,504,181.00 7,942,867.00

Nicaragua 0.00 7,451,340.00 7,071,613.00

Niger 0.00 55,897,978.00 25,543,660.00

Papua New Guinea 0.00 295,241.00 160,656.00

Paraguay 0.00 6,721,220.00 1,826,021.00

Portugal 0.00 456,000,000.00 115,000,000.00

Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) 0.00 4,727,310.00 56,000.00

Russia 0.00 8,278,852.00 5,660,597.00


Rwanda 0.00 330,160.00 47,000.00

Sao Tome and Principe 0.00 400,000.00 94,000.00

Senegal 0.00 6,762,617.00 3,962,919.00

Serbia 0.00 5,501,543.00 4,919,260.00

Seychelles 0.00 485,004.00 1,213,003.00

Sierra Leone 0.00 270,000.00 2,435,457.00

Slovenia 0.00 4,840,535.00 7,000,066.00

Solomon Islands 0.00 5,712.00 5,711.00

Somalia 0.00 20,375,575.00 18,596,677.00

South Africa 0.00 51,505,474.00 20,840,488.00

South Sudan 0.00 3,160,411.00 1,700,003.00

Sri Lanka 0.00 2,208,007.00 5,312,188.00

St. Kitts and Nevis 0.00 1,842,577.00 139,970.00

St. Lucia 0.00 19,563.00 0.00

St. Maarten 0.00 250.00 0.00

St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.00 2,821,000.00 153,400.00

Sudan 0.00 45,854.00 0.00

Suriname 0.00 449,081.00 824,659.00

Swaziland 0.00 0.00 349,495.00

Syria 0.00 150,000.00 0.00

Tajikistan 0.00 16,772,722.00 15,567,783.00

Tanzania 0.00 4,419,671.00 303,307.00

The Gambia 0.00 0.00 1,000.00

Timor-Leste 0.00 940,842.00 105,206.00

Togo 0.00 1,269,488.00 804,788.00


Tonga 0.00 1,026,423.00 1,048,636.00

Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 49,009,887.00 9,191,301.00

Turkmenistan 0.00 5,596,697.00 1,214,386.00

Turks and Caicos 0.00 60,265.00 47,903.00

Uganda 0.00 17,985,067.00 11,034,484.00

United Nations 0.00 1.00 0.00

Uruguay 0.00 5,314,050.00 2,349,080.00

Uzbekistan 0.00 32,293,385.00 26,756,810.00

Venezuela 0.00 0.00 458,654.00

Vietnam 0.00 51,859,038.00 24,132,873.00

Yemen 0.00 33,057,565.00 12,092,077.00

Zambia 0.00 5,947,452.00 1,813,182.00

Deliveries chart –Saudi Arabia, Korea, Iraq, Australia, Japan, Taiwan, UAQ, Israel, Egypt,
and South Korea meet
data available at: http://securityassistance.org/data/country/arms/country/2014/2018//Global//all –
sara ann sorted by deliveries //sab

*global is also included because SAM doesn’t separate bilateral aid by country //sab

Fiscal Year 14-18

Country Notifications Authorizations Deliveries

TOTAL 366,000,000,000.00 346,000,000,000.00 105,000,000,000.00

Saudi Arabia 58,000,000,000.00 33,600,000,000.00 16,000,000,000.00

Korea 0.00 0.00 10,200,000,000.00

Iraq 19,600,000,000.00 5,440,000,000.00 7,130,000,000.00

Global 11,800,000,000.00 80,600,000,000.00 6,900,000,000.00

Australia 10,800,000,000.00 12,300,000,000.00 6,280,000,000.00

Japan 39,700,000,000.00 53,900,000,000.00 6,080,000,000.00


Taiwan 3,590,000,000.00 1,870,000,000.00 5,160,000,000.00

United Arab Emirates 17,700,000,000.00 12,400,000,000.00 4,700,000,000.00

Israel 7,210,000,000.00 11,500,000,000.00 3,510,000,000.00

Egypt 2,510,000,000.00 2,380,000,000.00 3,220,000,000.00

South Korea 10,000,000,000.00 22,600,000,000.00 3,040,000,000.00

United Kingdom 23,200,000,000.00 17,300,000,000.00 2,490,000,000.00

Kuwait 15,900,000,000.00 3,680,000,000.00 2,110,000,000.00

Qatar 26,500,000,000.00 11,400,000,000.00 1,620,000,000.00

India 6,220,000,000.00 7,170,000,000.00 1,610,000,000.00

Turkey 5,340,000,000.00 4,910,000,000.00 1,610,000,000.00

Canada 6,730,000,000.00 5,000,000,000.00 1,460,000,000.00

Mexico 4,280,000,000.00 3,900,000,000.00 1,260,000,000.00

Oman 486,000,000.00 1,000,000,000.00 1,150,000,000.00

Italy 13,200,000,000.00 7,980,000,000.00 1,140,000,000.00

Singapore 3,880,000,000.00 5,980,000,000.00 1,110,000,000.00

Pakistan 2,300,000,000.00 2,090,000,000.00 1,070,000,000.00

France 1,010,000,000.00 2,380,000,000.00 1,050,000,000.00

Germany 6,350,000,000.00 2,100,000,000.00 1,040,000,000.00

Netherlands 3,410,000,000.00 2,640,000,000.00 932,000,000.00

Jordan 522,000,000.00 1,950,000,000.00 913,000,000.00

Norway 4,850,000,000.00 1,510,000,000.00 721,000,000.00

Indonesia 262,000,000.00 867,000,000.00 684,000,000.00

Poland 12,900,000,000.00 1,250,000,000.00 678,000,000.00

Afghanistan 60,000,000.00 2,310,000,000.00 648,000,000.00

Spain 2,660,000,000.00 987,000,000.00 581,000,000.00


Denmark 320,000,000.00 1,030,000,000.00 576,000,000.00

Colombia 3,910,198.00 781,000,000.00 519,000,000.00

Thailand 403,000,000.00 1,050,000,000.00 475,000,000.00

Greece 3,320,000,000.00 2,020,000,000.00 468,000,000.00

International Organizations 0.00 358,000,000.00 417,000,000.00

Finland 1,110,000,000.00 602,000,000.00 414,000,000.00

Brazil 1,310,000,000.00 916,000,000.00 379,000,000.00

Philippines 360,000,000.00 1,980,000,000.00 333,000,000.00

Lebanon 1,040,000,000.00 680,000,000.00 329,000,000.00

Morocco 1,520,000,000.00 1,490,000,000.00 322,000,000.00

Belgium 6,640,000,000.00 1,170,000,000.00 320,000,000.00

Sweden 4,460,000,000.00 1,890,000,000.00 320,000,000.00

Malaysia 214,000,000.00 457,000,000.00 297,000,000.00

Chile 320,000,000.00 406,000,000.00 273,000,000.00

Switzerland 165,000,000.00 317,000,000.00 262,000,000.00

Bahrain 5,530,000,000.00 602,000,000.00 252,000,000.00

Romania 5,150,000,000.00 554,000,000.00 237,000,000.00

Argentina 459,000,000.00 437,000,000.00 209,000,000.00

Tunisia 825,000,000.00 810,000,000.00 199,000,000.00

Brunei 344,000,000.00 285,000,000.00 175,000,000.00

New Zealand 1,480,000,000.00 506,000,000.00 157,000,000.00

Portugal 0.00 456,000,000.00 115,000,000.00

Algeria 745,000,000.00 1,150,000,000.00 113,000,000.00

Ukraine 90,198,600.00 245,000,000.00 98,413,859.00

Czech Republic 575,000,000.00 125,000,000.00 72,767,363.00


Kenya 671,000,000.00 100,000,000.00 68,597,178.00

Austria 0.00 70,993,752.00 65,715,956.00

Nigeria 593,000,000.00 46,970,463.00 60,755,360.00

Georgia 75,000,000.00 84,721,772.00 59,874,544.00

Peru 787,000,000.00 148,000,000.00 57,321,055.00

Luxembourg 0.00 220,000,000.00 52,726,258.00

Hungary 0.00 209,000,000.00 44,256,634.00

Estonia 55,000,000.00 90,497,988.00 41,859,572.00

Latvia 201,000,000.00 41,961,931.00 36,746,623.00

Croatia 0.00 69,236,937.00 32,580,666.00

Bulgaria 0.00 32,418,280.00 32,519,435.00

Lithuania 654,000,000.00 84,587,392.00 28,405,884.00

Slovakia 3,510,000,000.00 276,000,000.00 27,923,436.00

Uzbekistan 0.00 32,293,385.00 26,756,810.00

Bangladesh 0.00 41,492,612.00 25,650,149.00

Niger 0.00 55,897,978.00 25,543,660.00

Vietnam 0.00 51,859,038.00 24,132,873.00

Mauritania 0.00 33,837,146.00 22,094,404.00

South Africa 0.00 51,505,474.00 20,840,488.00

Somalia 0.00 20,375,575.00 18,596,677.00

Ethiopia 0.00 17,643,305.00 17,066,315.00

Panama 2,191,000.00 83,855,939.00 15,637,584.00

Tajikistan 0.00 16,772,722.00 15,567,783.00

Kosovo 0.00 20,307,152.00 15,360,254.00

Ecuador 0.00 36,346,151.00 14,683,206.00


El Salvador 1,581,880.00 22,961,217.00 14,080,419.00

Kazakhstan 62,235,949.00 25,045,332.00 14,059,663.00

Honduras 6,150,000.00 61,972,370.00 13,475,330.00

Guatemala 0.00 28,385,628.00 12,698,125.00

Ireland 0.00 13,807,903.00 12,134,892.00

Yemen 0.00 33,057,565.00 12,092,077.00

Uganda 0.00 17,985,067.00 11,034,484.00

Angola 0.00 10,455,585.00 10,658,318.00

Liberia 0.00 16,068,851.00 10,599,500.00

Mongolia 0.00 6,529,400.00 10,366,000.00

Armenia 0.00 9,990,402.00 9,984,266.00

Macedonia 0.00 6,153,240.00 9,884,465.00

Gabon 0.00 3,866,606.00 9,609,550.00

Djibouti 0.00 17,352,653.00 9,591,480.00

Albania 0.00 8,842,159.00 9,507,502.00

Azerbaijan 0.00 19,708,851.00 9,301,904.00

Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 49,009,887.00 9,191,301.00

Moldova 0.00 14,906,968.00 8,956,008.00

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.00 13,825,334.00 8,183,703.00

Nepal 0.00 3,504,181.00 7,942,867.00

Costa Rica 0.00 6,830,858.00 7,824,715.00

Jamaica 0.00 11,866,394.00 7,724,421.00

Chad 0.00 53,775,362.00 7,092,761.00

Nicaragua 0.00 7,451,340.00 7,071,613.00

Slovenia 0.00 4,840,535.00 7,000,066.00


Dominican Republic 0.00 28,147,604.00 6,965,505.00

Russia 0.00 8,278,852.00 5,660,597.00

Barbados 0.00 22,343,232.00 5,552,316.00

Sri Lanka 0.00 2,208,007.00 5,312,188.00

Serbia 0.00 5,501,543.00 4,919,260.00

Haiti 0.00 12,579,875.00 4,790,877.00

Libya 600,000,000.00 45,402,404.00 4,433,593.00

Montenegro 0.00 2,908,075.00 4,327,996.00

Ghana 0.00 7,687,788.00 4,326,232.00

Botswana 0.00 13,727,176.00 4,274,613.00

Senegal 0.00 6,762,617.00 3,962,919.00

Cameroon 0.00 77,631,869.00 3,926,322.00

Hong Kong 0.00 8,615,830.00 3,633,425.00

Cote d'Ivoire 2,475,000.00 4,883,605.00 3,404,604.00

Belize 0.00 5,187,300.00 3,313,126.00

Guyana 0.00 3,664,600.00 2,575,106.00

Cambodia 0.00 2,595,960.00 2,561,814.00

Sierra Leone 0.00 270,000.00 2,435,457.00

Cyprus 0.00 0.00 2,392,097.00

Uruguay 0.00 5,314,050.00 2,349,080.00

French Guiana 0.00 17,563,401.00 2,250,000.00

Bahamas 0.00 39,761,334.00 2,218,917.00

Mali 0.00 8,735,763.00 2,126,333.00

Paraguay 0.00 6,721,220.00 1,826,021.00

Zambia 0.00 5,947,452.00 1,813,182.00


Benin 0.00 4,864,609.00 1,751,151.00

South Sudan 0.00 3,160,411.00 1,700,003.00

Central African Republic 0.00 6,064,816.00 1,678,141.00

Bolivia 0.00 6,937,078.00 1,375,499.00

Burkina Faso 0.00 1,375,457.00 1,329,384.00

Turkmenistan 0.00 5,596,697.00 1,214,386.00

Seychelles 0.00 485,004.00 1,213,003.00

Namibia 0.00 169,545.00 1,193,264.00

Kyrgyzstan 0.00 6,860,400.00 1,185,400.00

Tonga 0.00 1,026,423.00 1,048,636.00

Burundi 0.00 1,036,871.00 901,387.00

Suriname 0.00 449,081.00 824,659.00

Madagascar 0.00 1,504,600.00 816,000.00

Togo 0.00 1,269,488.00 804,788.00

Iceland 0.00 430,827.00 711,124.00

Malta 0.00 3,414,063.00 516,865.00

Venezuela 0.00 0.00 458,654.00

Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) 0.00 59,941.00 427,890.00

Antigua and Barbuda 0.00 1,799,515.00 389,435.00

Malawi 0.00 600.00 382,000.00

Cape Verde 0.00 349,425.00 376,492.00

Swaziland 0.00 0.00 349,495.00

Mauritius 0.00 719,181.00 338,213.00

Dominica 0.00 1,706,388.00 312,075.00

Tanzania 0.00 4,419,671.00 303,307.00


Mozambique 0.00 3,263,034.00 302,393.00

Lesotho 0.00 0.00 273,000.00

China 0.00 0.00 267,053.00

Aruba 0.00 267,729.00 247,123.00

Grenada 0.00 1,797,000.00 237,000.00

Papua New Guinea 0.00 295,241.00 160,656.00

St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.00 2,821,000.00 153,400.00

St. Kitts and Nevis 0.00 1,842,577.00 139,970.00

Bermuda 0.00 174,320.00 138,770.00

Guinea 0.00 4,813,476.00 133,665.00

Maldives 0.00 720,000.00 116,000.00

Timor-Leste 0.00 940,842.00 105,206.00

Sao Tome and Principe 0.00 400,000.00 94,000.00

British Virgin Islands 0.00 62,196.00 61,764.00

Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) 0.00 4,727,310.00 56,000.00

Turks and Caicos 0.00 60,265.00 47,903.00

Rwanda 0.00 330,160.00 47,000.00

Cayman Islands 0.00 45,106.00 45,040.00

Gambia 0.00 0.00 34,000.00

Eritrea 0.00 0.00 30,000.00

Burma 0.00 0.00 21,000.00

Macau 0.00 0.00 18,376.00

Bhutan 0.00 18,985.00 17,127.00

Anguilla 0.00 14,729.00 14,845.00

Fiji 0.00 494,000.00 12,000.00


Curacao 0.00 6,500.00 9,220.00

Montserrat 0.00 8,910.00 8,910.00

Solomon Islands 0.00 5,712.00 5,711.00

Andorra 0.00 3,564.00 2,782.00

The Gambia 0.00 0.00 1,000.00

Holy See 0.00 30.00 10.00

Belarus 0.00 0.00 0.00

Europe Regional 0.00 62,591,057.00 0.00

Micronesia 0.00 150.00 0.00

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1,430,000,000.00 25,209,920.00 0.00

St. Lucia 0.00 19,563.00 0.00

St. Maarten 0.00 250.00 0.00

Sudan 0.00 45,854.00 0.00

Syria 0.00 150,000.00 0.00

United Nations 0.00 1.00 0.00

United States 195,000,000.00 0.00 0.00

Authorizations chart –Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, UK, UAE, Australia, Israel, and
Qatar meet
data available at: http://securityassistance.org/data/country/arms/country/2014/2018//Global//all –
sara ann sorted by authorizations //sab

*global is also included because SAM doesn’t separate bilateral aid by country //sab

Fiscal Year 14-18

Country Notifications Authorizations Deliveries

TOTAL 366,000,000,000.00 346,000,000,000.00 105,000,000,000.00

Global 11,800,000,000.00 80,600,000,000.00 6,900,000,000.00

Japan 39,700,000,000.00 53,900,000,000.00 6,080,000,000.00


Saudi Arabia 58,000,000,000.00 33,600,000,000.00 16,000,000,000.00

South Korea 10,000,000,000.00 22,600,000,000.00 3,040,000,000.00

United Kingdom 23,200,000,000.00 17,300,000,000.00 2,490,000,000.00

United Arab Emirates 17,700,000,000.00 12,400,000,000.00 4,700,000,000.00

Australia 10,800,000,000.00 12,300,000,000.00 6,280,000,000.00

Israel 7,210,000,000.00 11,500,000,000.00 3,510,000,000.00

Qatar 26,500,000,000.00 11,400,000,000.00 1,620,000,000.00

Italy 13,200,000,000.00 7,980,000,000.00 1,140,000,000.00

India 6,220,000,000.00 7,170,000,000.00 1,610,000,000.00

Singapore 3,880,000,000.00 5,980,000,000.00 1,110,000,000.00

Iraq 19,600,000,000.00 5,440,000,000.00 7,130,000,000.00

Canada 6,730,000,000.00 5,000,000,000.00 1,460,000,000.00

Turkey 5,340,000,000.00 4,910,000,000.00 1,610,000,000.00

Mexico 4,280,000,000.00 3,900,000,000.00 1,260,000,000.00

Kuwait 15,900,000,000.00 3,680,000,000.00 2,110,000,000.00

Netherlands 3,410,000,000.00 2,640,000,000.00 932,000,000.00

Egypt 2,510,000,000.00 2,380,000,000.00 3,220,000,000.00

France 1,010,000,000.00 2,380,000,000.00 1,050,000,000.00

Afghanistan 60,000,000.00 2,310,000,000.00 648,000,000.00

Germany 6,350,000,000.00 2,100,000,000.00 1,040,000,000.00

Pakistan 2,300,000,000.00 2,090,000,000.00 1,070,000,000.00

Greece 3,320,000,000.00 2,020,000,000.00 468,000,000.00

Philippines 360,000,000.00 1,980,000,000.00 333,000,000.00

Jordan 522,000,000.00 1,950,000,000.00 913,000,000.00

Sweden 4,460,000,000.00 1,890,000,000.00 320,000,000.00


Taiwan 3,590,000,000.00 1,870,000,000.00 5,160,000,000.00

Norway 4,850,000,000.00 1,510,000,000.00 721,000,000.00

Morocco 1,520,000,000.00 1,490,000,000.00 322,000,000.00

Poland 12,900,000,000.00 1,250,000,000.00 678,000,000.00

Belgium 6,640,000,000.00 1,170,000,000.00 320,000,000.00

Algeria 745,000,000.00 1,150,000,000.00 113,000,000.00

Thailand 403,000,000.00 1,050,000,000.00 475,000,000.00

Denmark 320,000,000.00 1,030,000,000.00 576,000,000.00

Oman 486,000,000.00 1,000,000,000.00 1,150,000,000.00

Spain 2,660,000,000.00 987,000,000.00 581,000,000.00

Brazil 1,310,000,000.00 916,000,000.00 379,000,000.00

Indonesia 262,000,000.00 867,000,000.00 684,000,000.00

Tunisia 825,000,000.00 810,000,000.00 199,000,000.00

Colombia 3,910,198.00 781,000,000.00 519,000,000.00

Lebanon 1,040,000,000.00 680,000,000.00 329,000,000.00

Bahrain 5,530,000,000.00 602,000,000.00 252,000,000.00

Finland 1,110,000,000.00 602,000,000.00 414,000,000.00

Romania 5,150,000,000.00 554,000,000.00 237,000,000.00

New Zealand 1,480,000,000.00 506,000,000.00 157,000,000.00

Malaysia 214,000,000.00 457,000,000.00 297,000,000.00

Portugal 0.00 456,000,000.00 115,000,000.00

Argentina 459,000,000.00 437,000,000.00 209,000,000.00

Chile 320,000,000.00 406,000,000.00 273,000,000.00

International Organizations 0.00 358,000,000.00 417,000,000.00

Switzerland 165,000,000.00 317,000,000.00 262,000,000.00


Brunei 344,000,000.00 285,000,000.00 175,000,000.00

Slovakia 3,510,000,000.00 276,000,000.00 27,923,436.00

Ukraine 90,198,600.00 245,000,000.00 98,413,859.00

Luxembourg 0.00 220,000,000.00 52,726,258.00

Hungary 0.00 209,000,000.00 44,256,634.00

Peru 787,000,000.00 148,000,000.00 57,321,055.00

Czech Republic 575,000,000.00 125,000,000.00 72,767,363.00

Kenya 671,000,000.00 100,000,000.00 68,597,178.00

Estonia 55,000,000.00 90,497,988.00 41,859,572.00

Georgia 75,000,000.00 84,721,772.00 59,874,544.00

Lithuania 654,000,000.00 84,587,392.00 28,405,884.00

Panama 2,191,000.00 83,855,939.00 15,637,584.00

Cameroon 0.00 77,631,869.00 3,926,322.00

Austria 0.00 70,993,752.00 65,715,956.00

Croatia 0.00 69,236,937.00 32,580,666.00

Europe Regional 0.00 62,591,057.00 0.00

Honduras 6,150,000.00 61,972,370.00 13,475,330.00

Niger 0.00 55,897,978.00 25,543,660.00

Chad 0.00 53,775,362.00 7,092,761.00

Vietnam 0.00 51,859,038.00 24,132,873.00

South Africa 0.00 51,505,474.00 20,840,488.00

Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 49,009,887.00 9,191,301.00

Nigeria 593,000,000.00 46,970,463.00 60,755,360.00

Libya 600,000,000.00 45,402,404.00 4,433,593.00

Latvia 201,000,000.00 41,961,931.00 36,746,623.00


Bangladesh 0.00 41,492,612.00 25,650,149.00

Bahamas 0.00 39,761,334.00 2,218,917.00

Ecuador 0.00 36,346,151.00 14,683,206.00

Mauritania 0.00 33,837,146.00 22,094,404.00

Yemen 0.00 33,057,565.00 12,092,077.00

Bulgaria 0.00 32,418,280.00 32,519,435.00

Uzbekistan 0.00 32,293,385.00 26,756,810.00

Guatemala 0.00 28,385,628.00 12,698,125.00

Dominican Republic 0.00 28,147,604.00 6,965,505.00

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1,430,000,000.00 25,209,920.00 0.00

Kazakhstan 62,235,949.00 25,045,332.00 14,059,663.00

El Salvador 1,581,880.00 22,961,217.00 14,080,419.00

Barbados 0.00 22,343,232.00 5,552,316.00

Somalia 0.00 20,375,575.00 18,596,677.00

Kosovo 0.00 20,307,152.00 15,360,254.00

Azerbaijan 0.00 19,708,851.00 9,301,904.00

Uganda 0.00 17,985,067.00 11,034,484.00

Ethiopia 0.00 17,643,305.00 17,066,315.00

French Guiana 0.00 17,563,401.00 2,250,000.00

Djibouti 0.00 17,352,653.00 9,591,480.00

Tajikistan 0.00 16,772,722.00 15,567,783.00

Liberia 0.00 16,068,851.00 10,599,500.00

Moldova 0.00 14,906,968.00 8,956,008.00

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.00 13,825,334.00 8,183,703.00

Ireland 0.00 13,807,903.00 12,134,892.00


Botswana 0.00 13,727,176.00 4,274,613.00

Haiti 0.00 12,579,875.00 4,790,877.00

Jamaica 0.00 11,866,394.00 7,724,421.00

Angola 0.00 10,455,585.00 10,658,318.00

Armenia 0.00 9,990,402.00 9,984,266.00

Albania 0.00 8,842,159.00 9,507,502.00

Mali 0.00 8,735,763.00 2,126,333.00

Hong Kong 0.00 8,615,830.00 3,633,425.00

Russia 0.00 8,278,852.00 5,660,597.00

Ghana 0.00 7,687,788.00 4,326,232.00

Nicaragua 0.00 7,451,340.00 7,071,613.00

Bolivia 0.00 6,937,078.00 1,375,499.00

Kyrgyzstan 0.00 6,860,400.00 1,185,400.00

Costa Rica 0.00 6,830,858.00 7,824,715.00

Senegal 0.00 6,762,617.00 3,962,919.00

Paraguay 0.00 6,721,220.00 1,826,021.00

Mongolia 0.00 6,529,400.00 10,366,000.00

Macedonia 0.00 6,153,240.00 9,884,465.00

Central African Republic 0.00 6,064,816.00 1,678,141.00

Zambia 0.00 5,947,452.00 1,813,182.00

Turkmenistan 0.00 5,596,697.00 1,214,386.00

Serbia 0.00 5,501,543.00 4,919,260.00

Uruguay 0.00 5,314,050.00 2,349,080.00

Belize 0.00 5,187,300.00 3,313,126.00

Cote d'Ivoire 2,475,000.00 4,883,605.00 3,404,604.00


Benin 0.00 4,864,609.00 1,751,151.00

Slovenia 0.00 4,840,535.00 7,000,066.00

Guinea 0.00 4,813,476.00 133,665.00

Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) 0.00 4,727,310.00 56,000.00

Tanzania 0.00 4,419,671.00 303,307.00

Gabon 0.00 3,866,606.00 9,609,550.00

Guyana 0.00 3,664,600.00 2,575,106.00

Nepal 0.00 3,504,181.00 7,942,867.00

Malta 0.00 3,414,063.00 516,865.00

Mozambique 0.00 3,263,034.00 302,393.00

South Sudan 0.00 3,160,411.00 1,700,003.00

Montenegro 0.00 2,908,075.00 4,327,996.00

St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.00 2,821,000.00 153,400.00

Cambodia 0.00 2,595,960.00 2,561,814.00

Sri Lanka 0.00 2,208,007.00 5,312,188.00

St. Kitts and Nevis 0.00 1,842,577.00 139,970.00

Antigua and Barbuda 0.00 1,799,515.00 389,435.00

Grenada 0.00 1,797,000.00 237,000.00

Dominica 0.00 1,706,388.00 312,075.00

Madagascar 0.00 1,504,600.00 816,000.00

Burkina Faso 0.00 1,375,457.00 1,329,384.00

Togo 0.00 1,269,488.00 804,788.00

Burundi 0.00 1,036,871.00 901,387.00

Tonga 0.00 1,026,423.00 1,048,636.00

Timor-Leste 0.00 940,842.00 105,206.00


Maldives 0.00 720,000.00 116,000.00

Mauritius 0.00 719,181.00 338,213.00

Fiji 0.00 494,000.00 12,000.00

Seychelles 0.00 485,004.00 1,213,003.00

Suriname 0.00 449,081.00 824,659.00

Iceland 0.00 430,827.00 711,124.00

Sao Tome and Principe 0.00 400,000.00 94,000.00

Cape Verde 0.00 349,425.00 376,492.00

Rwanda 0.00 330,160.00 47,000.00

Papua New Guinea 0.00 295,241.00 160,656.00

Sierra Leone 0.00 270,000.00 2,435,457.00

Aruba 0.00 267,729.00 247,123.00

Bermuda 0.00 174,320.00 138,770.00

Namibia 0.00 169,545.00 1,193,264.00

Syria 0.00 150,000.00 0.00

British Virgin Islands 0.00 62,196.00 61,764.00

Turks and Caicos 0.00 60,265.00 47,903.00

Democratic Republic of Congo


(Kinshasa) 0.00 59,941.00 427,890.00

Sudan 0.00 45,854.00 0.00

Cayman Islands 0.00 45,106.00 45,040.00

St. Lucia 0.00 19,563.00 0.00

Bhutan 0.00 18,985.00 17,127.00

Anguilla 0.00 14,729.00 14,845.00

Montserrat 0.00 8,910.00 8,910.00


Curacao 0.00 6,500.00 9,220.00

Solomon Islands 0.00 5,712.00 5,711.00

Andorra 0.00 3,564.00 2,782.00

Malawi 0.00 600.00 382,000.00

St. Maarten 0.00 250.00 0.00

Micronesia 0.00 150.00 0.00

Holy See 0.00 30.00 10.00

United Nations 0.00 1.00 0.00

Belarus 0.00 0.00 0.00

Burma 0.00 0.00 21,000.00

China 0.00 0.00 267,053.00

Cyprus 0.00 0.00 2,392,097.00

Eritrea 0.00 0.00 30,000.00

Gambia 0.00 0.00 34,000.00

Korea 0.00 0.00 10,200,000,000.00

Lesotho 0.00 0.00 273,000.00

Macau 0.00 0.00 18,376.00

Swaziland 0.00 0.00 349,495.00

The Gambia 0.00 0.00 1,000.00

United States 195,000,000.00 0.00 0.00

Venezuela 0.00 0.00 458,654.00


Case
1
1NC – No Cred Loss
We wouldn’t lose any alliance credibility- 70 years proves
Doug Bandow 19, 10-24-2019, "Instead of Warmongering, Trump Should Throw Turkey Out of NATO,"
American Conservative, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/instead-of-warmongering-
trump-should-throw-turkey-out-of-nato/

So long as Turkey remains a treaty ally, the United States has an obligation to give its concerns precedence
over those of more recent and less formal partners. Frenzied claims that no one on earth will ever trust America again
if Washington does not defend the Kurds defy history. The U.S. and most other great—and even middling—
powers routinely abandon allies when their interests require doing so. Washington previously “betrayed” the Kurds in the
1970s when Iran shifted from confrontation to accommodation with Iraq. It did so equally ostentatiously two years ago when Iraq’s
autonomous Kurdish territory held an independence referendum; Washington stood by as the Baghdad
government launched a military assault . American officials have abandoned many other allies too: South Vietnam and the
Republic of China (Taiwan), for instance. Afghanistan almost certainly will follow soon.
1NC – Revisionst Signalling
Revisionist states can obviously distinguish signals and its empirically disproven
Julia Ioffe 16, 3-11-2016, "How Russia Saw the ‘Red Line’ Crisis," Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/russia-syria-red-line-obama-doctrine-
goldberg/473319/

But did Obama’s refusal to bomb Syria in 2013 really give Putin the green light in Ukraine ? It is a question Jeffrey
Goldberg poses to Obama, who, of course, swats it away. “Look, this theory is so easily disposed of that I’m always puzzled
by how people make the argument,” Obama says. “I don’t think anybody thought that George W. Bush was overly rational or
cautious in his use of military force. And as I recall, because apparently nobody in this town does, Putin went into Georgia [in 2008] on
Bush’s watch, right smack dab in the middle of us having over 100,000 troops deployed in Iraq.” Obama repudiates the “crazy Nixon”
thesis, which says, essentially: Be crazy, be unpredictably harsh, and geopolitics are your oyster. (Ironically, this is the approach Putin’s
domestic critics accuse their president of using: How do you get back at the West for blacklisting Russian officials involved in the killing of the
Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky? Ban American adoptions of Russian orphans! They’ll never know what hit ‘em!) It’s no surprise that Obama
finds this approach as silly as it is ineffective, but Goldberg’s exploration of the Red Line Moment made me curious about how the Russians see
this common and unexamined refrain: Obama showed weakness on Syria so Putin exploited it in Ukraine. “Wow, it’s kind of a
revelation what you just said,” said a very surprised source from the Russian Foreign Ministry, who was not authorized to
speak on the record, on hearing the question. “It’s not tied to any kind of reality. These things are not
connected to each other in any way.” “It is absolutely made up,” said Fyodor Lukyanov, the equally surprised editor of Russia in
Global Affairs, who has a reputation for channeling the Kremlin view. “You shouldn’t think of Putin as such a primitive guy.
It’s totally clear that the Syrian and Ukrainian crises had nothing to do with one anoth er.” For Lukyanov, it’s
almost insulting to suggest a connection. “Technically, it was possible then for Obama to hit Syria and destroy Damascus,” Lukyanov said. “The n
Syria would have been yet another government that would’ve paid for doing something wrong. But
Russia is a nuclear superpower, and this kind of rationale vis-a-vis Russia is senseless.” That is, Russia sees
itself as a power on par with America, and simply doesn’t group itself with a minor regional power like Syria .
Even if Bashar al-Assad had been punished militarily for using chemical weapons, Putin wouldn’t have
drawn the conclusion that he could be similarly punished for actions in Ukraine. Syria is Syria, and Russia is
Russia, and you don’t punish nuclear superpowers. “In Moscow, they understood clearly what Obama now says openly,” said Lukyanov of
what Obama told Goldberg—that Ukraine is not a NATO country and is always going to be subject to Russian meddling, regardless of what
Washington does. “There are no obligations in the West and the United States to defend Ukraine,” he said. “Risking
war with a
nuclear superpower over Ukraine was just not going to happen. It would’ve been clear even if Obama
had hit Syria. It wouldn’t have changed anything.” And yet Korotchenko was also deeply puzzled by the formulation I
presented. The red line? That was what America crossed in nurturing the protesters on Kiev’s Maidan in the winter of 2013-2014, and, in his
view, ousting legitimate Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. It had nothing to do with Syria. After Yanukovych fled in February 2014,
Korotchenko said, Putin made a “political decision” to let the people of Crimea “decide their political future” and join Russia. “We didn’t know
how America would react, and we examined all scenarios ... including American military intervention,” Korotchenko explained. “Which means
Obama wasn’t seen as a weak president but as a president who can take any action.” Even people like Gleb Pavlovsky, a political scientist who
helped Putin get elected in 2000 and worked with him until 2011, when Pavlovsky went over to the opposition, don’t understand the logical line
drawn between Syria and Ukraine. “Considering the way the Kremlin brain is wired, there
shouldn’t be a connection,” he told
me. The summer and fall of 2013, Pavlovsky pointed out correctly, was a time when Putin flirted with
liberalization. He released political prisoners like the members of Pussy Riot and the oligarch Mikhail
Khodorkovsky from jail, set as he was on sprucing up his image ahead of the Sochi Olympics. “Washington didn’t seem weak then,” Pavlovsky
says. The Syria deal Putin and Obama ultimately struck “was a success for Putin. And he respects his partners when they help him become
successful. I think that during this period, there was a warm feeling toward Obama.” “After
the Syria deal, Putin was flying high, he
was ecstatic, he expected a lot from relations with the U. S.,” Pavlovsky recalled. “The Ukrainian crisis
changed a lot.” An accord mediated by Russia and the West that would have left Yanukovych in power
dissolved soon after it was struck in February 2014, as Yanukovych fled Kiev in response to threats of violence. “The
accord ... was forgotten, and it was seen as betrayal,” Pavlovsky said. “And Putin decided that if that’s how you’re going to play, I’ll play that
way, too. There’s a connection, but it’s not the one you paint.” If anything, in Putin’s view, it was American actions in Kiev, rather than its
inaction in Syria, that prompted Putin to grab Crimea and invade east Ukraine. The source from the Foreign Ministry echoed that sentiment.
The action Obama did take—avoiding a strike on Syria and instead forging a deal with Russia to get rid of Assad’s chemical weapons—
represented not weakness but an unusual moment of reason, in Moscow’s view. “It showed everyone in
the world that, if there is a will in these two countries, any problem can be solved,” the Foreign Ministry
source said. “It was very constructive work. ... Everything was done to help the administration get out of the corner they’d
backed themselves into and to get them back into the zone of international law.” “No one sees Obama as a weak president, and no one saw
that moment as a moment of weakness,” said Igor Korotchenko, the editor of Russia’s National Defense Magazine and a reserve colonel of the
Russian General Staff. He is also a member of the Defense Ministry’s civilian oversight council, and often acts as the ministry’s flame-throwing,
anti-Western id. Yet he was strangely insistent on defending Obama’s honor. The American president’s decision not to enforce the red line, he
said,“was a moment of rare strength.” Lest you think Korotchenko was buttering me up, he spent a few minutes lecturing me on how Assad
never used chemical weapons. “It was a provocation by the rebels and this is well documented,” he told me. “Make sure you note that in your
piece.” (The United Nations investigation of the August 2013 chemical-weapons attack outside Damascus strongly suggests otherwise.
Prolif D: 1NC

Proliferation won’t happen or cause war


Mueller 17---Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University & Senior Fellow at the Cato
Institute & Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio
State University [John Mueller, 2-21-17, “76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism,” Cato
Institute, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-
policymakers/2017/2/cato-handbook-for-policymakers-8th-edition-76_0.pdf, Date Accessed: 3-31-17--|]

Nuclear Proliferation

Except for their effects on agonies, obsessions, rhetoric, posturing, and spending, the consequences of
nuclear proliferation have been largely benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used”
them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, nuclear powers
have found the weapons to be a notable waste of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have
quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to
time. If the recent efforts to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons have been successful, those
efforts have done Iran a favor. There has never been a militarily compelling reason to use nuclear
weapons, particularly because it has not been possible to identify suitable targets—or targets that
couldn’t be attacked as effectively by conventional munitions. Conceivably, conditions exist under which
nuclear weapons could serve a deterrent function, but there is little reason to suspect that they have
been necessary to deter war thus far, even during the Cold War. The main Cold War contestants have
never believed that a repetition of World War II, whether embellished by nuclear weapons or not, is
remotely in their interests. Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be crucial status symbols. How
much more status would Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal
more attention to Britain or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or much less if they had
none? Did China need nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth or its Olympics?
Those considerations help explain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of
nuclear proliferation. Most famously, in the 1960s, President John Kennedy anticipated that in another
decade “fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons.” Yet, of the dozens of
technologically capable countries that have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, very few have done
so. Insofar as most leaders of most countries (even rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons,
they have come to appreciate several drawbacks of doing so: nuclear weapons are dangerous, costly,
and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as the University of Southern California’s Jacques Hymans has
demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult for administratively dysfunctional
countries to obtain—it took decades for North Korea and Pakistan to do so. In consequence, alarmist
predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points
of no return have proved faulty. Although proliferation has so far had little consequence, that is not
because the only countries to get nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. Large, important countries
that acquired the bomb were run at the time by unchallenged—perhaps certifiably deranged—
monsters. Consider Joseph Stalin, who, in 1949, was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union
by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong, who, in 1964, had just carried out a bizarre social experiment
that resulted in an artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished. Some also fear that a
country might use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” its area. That argument was used with dramatic
urgency before 2003 when Saddam Hussein supposedly posed great danger, and it has been frequently
applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination is to be carried out is never made clear. The notion,
apparently, is this: should an atomic rogue state rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the area,
suitably intimidated, would bow to its demands. Far more likely, threatened states would make
common cause with each other and with other concerned countries (including nuclear ones) against the
threatening neighbor. That is how countries coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s
region-threatening invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet another concern has been that the weapons will go
off, by accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process: the weapons exist in the
thousands, sooner or later one or more of them will inevitably go off. But those prognostications have
now failed to deliver for 70 years. That time period suggests something more than luck is operating.
Moreover, the notion that if one nuclear weapon goes off in one place, the world will necessarily be
plunged into thermonuclear cataclysm should remain in the domain of Hollywood scriptwriters.
T/
U.S. extended deterrence isn’t credible-causes nuclear entrapment and escalation
through regional crises-only Japanese and South Korean prolif solve
Layne and Gates 16 (Christopher Layne, University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs,
and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at Texas A&M University, "Hillary Clinton and Nuclear
Weapons: More Dangerous Than Trump? No ally's fate is important enough for the United States to risk
a nuclear war", The National Interest, October 31 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/hillary-
clinton-nuclear-weapons-more-dangerous-trump-18241?nopaging=1)

If the United States sticks to its present alliance relationships with Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan (which is a de facto U.S. security protectorate), the risk of being entrapped by its alliance commitments in a
nuclear conflict with North Korea, or - far more concerning - China is all too real. The rising Sino-Japanese
antagonism is worrisome because of the security treaty between the United States and Japan .
Because of its obligations, the United States almost inevitably would find itself involved in a nuclear

conflict arising out a military clash between China and Japan . Here, the rival claims asserted by Beijing and Tokyo to the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands well could provide the spark. In October 2010, this once obscure dispute became a front page story when a Chinese trawler illegally fishing
in Japanese controlled waters rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel - thus setting off a major diplomatic row between the two big Asian powers. If the fate of
these islands only concerned China and Japan, it would not be the potential cause of a grave geopolitical crisis. But it’s not just about them; it’s
also about the United States because of Washington’s security treaty with Japan. As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, on several occasions, explicitly
stated that the United States is obligated by treaty to come to Japan’s assistance if war with China breaks out because of the two powers’ competing claims to
sovereignty over the islands. This is not just worst-case scenario thinking. Since the fall of 2010 hardly a week has gone by without some kind of Sino-Japanese crisis
concerning these islands. During the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson referred to North Vietnam as a “piss ant” country. By this definition, the
Daioyu/Senkaku Islands are a bunch of piss ant rock piles in the East China Sea. They may be important symbolically (or, if speculation about undersea mineral
resources is correct, economically) to Beijing and Tokyo. But they have no intrinsic value to the United States, and it is the height of folly to commit the United
States to risk a possible nuclear war to defend them. The fact that Hillary Clinton has done so raises troubling questions about her foreign policy judgment. The fate
of Taiwan also poses the risk of a Sino-American War. Although not formally tied by treaty to Taiwan’s security, the United States in practice is
committed to defend Taiwan from China. In 1996, there was a crisis when China started lobbing missiles just off Taiwanese controlled waters to influence the
Taiwanese elections. The United States responded to Beijing’s actions by sending two aircraft carrier battle groups through the Straits of Taiwan, which resulted in a
Chinese climb-down. But few recall is what happened afterward. A senior Chinese official told the American diplomat Chas. W. Freeman that in a future Sino-
American crisis, the United States would never repeat its 1996 show of force. As the Chinese official noted, China was growing ever stronger militarily,
and in the future, the risks to the United States of challenging it would rise steeply. The United States would not run those risks the Chinese
official said, because future Washington policymakers would “care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.” As the late football coach
George Allen was fond of saying at the start of every season, the future is now. Twenty years have passed since the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, and in both nuclear
and conventional capabilities, China is rapidly closing the gap military gap with the United States. Indeed, as Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work
recently observed, “China and Russia are developing battle networks that are as good as our own. They can see as far as ours can see; they can
throw guided munitions as far as we can.” In East Asia today, all of the Cold War nightmares about extended deterrence have come back with a
vengeance. Donald Trump has taken lots of flak for suggesting that South Korea and Japan acquire their own nuclear weapons. For sure, Trump lacks the
intellectual framework to articulate why such a policy actually is eminently sensible - and Hillary Clinton’s foreign policy thinking is too ossified to understand the
logic underlying such a policy. Others, however, have articulate the reasons why the United States should get out of the extended deterrence business, and devolve
the primary responsibility for defending themselves to the United States’ security dependents. And the more insightful recipients of those guarantees understand
full well that, faced with the real possibility of nuclear war, the United States would not honor them. Certainly, Charles de Gaulle, one of the twentieth century’s
towering statesmen, and an astute student of geopolitics, realized this. Understanding that the United States could not be trusted to commit suicide for Western
Europe, he grasped the implications of this insight: France needed to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. Today, in South Korea and Japan, a similar discussion among
policymakers is taking place. And every now and then it rises to the surface in newspaper stories and journal articles that detail the growing sentiment in official

circles that both of these states need to go nuclear because neither can continue to rely on American promises to risk nuclear conflict on their behalf. The idea
of any nuclear proliferation is, of course, anathema to the hidebound U.S. foreign policy establishment. For them, the response to endangered allies in East Asia and

that the United States should step up its efforts to “reassure” its security
the Baltic States is

dependents. This is exactly the wrong policy for two reasons. First, it ultimately will not work.
States that have the wherewithal to adopt strategies of direct deterrence, like Japan and South
Korea, increasingly are aware that the U.S. strategy of extended deterrence is not credible.
Second, giving unconditional security guarantees to other states raises potential strategic moral
hazard issues. Several years ago at a conference in Sweden, a senior Estonian diplomat was asked whether his government was concerned that its
discriminatory policies toward its minority ethnic Russian population might prompt Moscow to intervene militarily. His answer was that Estonia neither needed to
worry about Russia, nor change its policies because the United States would protect it come what may. When asked during the October 2010 Sino-Japanese crisis in
the East China Sea what Tokyo would do a decade or two hence if fiscal and domestic political pressures caused the United States to retrench in East Asia., a senior
foreign ministry official said that Japanese leaders did not think about such hypotheticals, because the United States would always protect Japan. This is not the kind

Washington should adopt a policy of de-


of thinking American policy should encourage. Rather than a policy of reassurance,

assurance and make it clear to our security dependents that they need to do a lot more to
defend themselves, even if that means acquiring nuclear weapons. Rather than perpetuating
European, Japanese, South Korean dependence on the United States, the United States should
be nudging them down the path of a more independent strategic posture. Although it may sound
counterintuitive to non-experts, some prominent scholars have argued that the world would actually be more stable if Washington re-considered its blanket

Kenneth Waltz - perhaps the most preeminent U.S. thinker about international politics of the
opposition to nuclear proliferation. Decades ago, the late

post World War II era - compellingly argued that a world of more nuclear-armed states could be safer and

more stable than a world of fewer nuclear weapons states. The reason, he said, is that direct
deterrence is credible but extended deterrence is not. Waltz did not advocate promiscuous, indiscriminate, uncontrolled
proliferation. But states like Japan and South Korea today meet his criteria. They are modern, wealthy,

politically stable states that can build, and maintain, survivable nuclear deterrent forces. And they
are not Pakistan; they can safeguard their nuclear forces and ensure they don’t fall into the hands of

terrorist groups.
2
1NC – Turkey Russia War
Impossible- they work together
Elias Groll, Lara Seligman 19, 11-3-2019, "No Cease-Fire in Syria as Joint Russian-Turkish Patrols
Begin," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/04/security-brief-no-cease-fire-in-syria-as-
joint-russian-turkish-patrols-begin/

Violence Continues in Syria Despite Agreement Russian and Turkish troops, drones, and armored vehicles began joint
patrols in northeastern Syria on Friday, as part of an agreement designed to halt a violent Turkish offensive
against Syrian Kurdish fighters that has so far killed almost a thousand civilians and soldiers and wounded hundreds more. Turkey
looks to expand its gains. Under the agreement, brokered by Russian President Vladimir Putin last month, Moscow and
Ankara will jointly patrol two sections of the Syrian border to the west and the east of the Turkish incursion. But though
Syrian Kurdish fighters completed their withdrawal to 20 miles from the border last week, clashes continued throughout the region as Turkey
sought to expand the planned “safe zone” deeper into Kurdish territory. Deadly
attack in border town. At least 13 civilians
were killed over the weekend when a car bomb exploded at a market in the border town of Tal Abyad,
which Turkey seized control of last month. So far no one has claimed responsibility for the attack; the
Kurds blamed Turkish-backed forces, while Turkey blamed the Kurdish militia. Aid worker killed. The Free Burma
Rangers is one of the few humanitarian aid groups left on the ground in the region and has been on the front lines helping treat and evacuate
the wounded since the fighting began. Over the weekend, a medic with the group, Zau Seng, was killed by a mortar strike from Turkish forces
near the town of Tel Tamir. A spokesman for the Syrian Democratic Forces tweeted out the loss: “They have been bravely putting their lives on
the line to help wounded here I’m so sorry. RIP hero.” Kurds call on U.S. to block Syrian air space. Ilham Ahmed, president of the Syrian
Democratic Council, last week called on the Pentagon to block Turkey from the air
space over northeastern Syria, in an attempt
to prevent the Turkish drone strikes that she says have been ravaging the region. She said the Kurds would hold the Pentagon
responsible for Turkish war crimes if they do nothing to protect the air space.
1NC – End of War Inev
End of War now- Putin brokered a Turkish pullout
Bethan Mckernan 19, 10-22-2019, "Turkey and Russia agree on deal over buffer zone in northern
Syria," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/22/turkey-and-russia-agree-deal-over-
buffer-zone-in-northern-syria

The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,


and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, have agreed on the parameters of
a proposed Turkish “safe zone” in Syria, a development that could bring an end to Ankara’s offensive against
Kurdish forces over the border by severely curtailing their control of the area. The two leaders were locked in marathon
talks for more than six hours in the Russian Black Sea city of Sochi, emerging just two hours before a five-day ceasefire brokered by the US
expired at 10pm local time. Erdoğan hailed the deal as “a
historic agreement” while addressing reporters alongside
Putin. “According to this agreement, Turkey and Russia will not allow any separatist agenda on Syrian territory,” he said.
1NC – No ISIS
US pull out doesn’t effect the situation
Bernard Hudson 19, 10-24-2019, "U.S. Withdrawal From Syria Was Inevitable," Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-withdrawal-syria-was-
inevitable-0

While the current administration’s handling of the withdrawal of U.S. troops was poorly executed (to say the least), it was inevitable the
United States would withdraw. No prior U.S. administration ever considered advocating for or interceding on behalf of the YPG. As
the Syrian government begins to reassert control over more of the country and the Turks became more frustrated with the growth of YPG
capabilities, keeping American forces in Syria would require taking on great risks as these regional
powers seek to jockey for advantage in a fight they consider has existential consequences. While there is a
rump terrorist insurgency in the northeast of the country and thousands of ISIS prisoners are held there by the Syrian Kurds, the U.S.
withdrawal will have little impact on either issue . ISIS, in its current form, will not survive the arrayed forces of
Turkey, Syria and Iraq, all of which are committed to its eradication. While a continued U.S. presence in northern Syria might
have continued to pursue ISIS’ holdouts, it is hard to argue ISIS will fare better once its regional enemies have
unfettered access to pursue them. As for the ISIS prisoners held by the Syrian Kurds, the vast majority of them were in a
state of legal limbo, held as they were by a Kurdish militia unable to detain them long-term, and a global community that
was content to kick this particular issue down the road to some other date. No doubt some of these
prisoners will escape and rejoin the ranks but a large percentage of those will come to a violent end as
the Syrian and Turkish security forces consolidate their positions. What the U.S. withdrawal does highlight is the
growing sense by most regional powers that, whatever the reason, the United States is no longer willing or able to play the role of grand
security architect when it comes to this part of the world. While
the current American administration has done things to
accelerate this perception, it did not start the process.

They have no motive and their authors have an incentive to hype the threat.
Weiss 15 (Leonard, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford
University, USA, and a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation in Washington, DC, former staff director of the US Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs and its Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71(2) 75–87)

What about highly organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist, that have acquired enough
territory to enable them to operate in a quasigovernmental fashion, like the Islamic State (IS)? Such
organizations are certainly dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for
building and sustaining a new caliphate that would restore past glories of Islamic society, especially
since, like any organized government, the Islamic State would itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack ?
Building a new Islamic state out of radioactive ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups. However,
now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin at any
time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS.
1NC
Syrian offensive destroys the Iran Turkey Alliance
Cafiero 19- CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk
consultancy. In addition to LobeLog, he also writes for The National Interest, Middle East Institute, and
Al Monitor. From 2014-2015, Cafiero was an analyst at Kroll, an investigative due diligence consultancy. 
(Giorgio ,"Iran’s View on Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring ," LobeLog, https://lobelog.com/irans-
view-on-turkeys-operation-peace-spring/ OCTOBER 14, 2019)// gcd

Yet such claims are too simplistic and misleading. Tehran’s interests in the Kurdish parts of northern Syria are
complicated and the Iranian government officially and strongly opposes the Turkish incursion into northern
Syria. Shortly before Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called on Ankara to have
“respect for Syria’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty.” Two days later, the Iranian military began holding drills close
to the Iranian-Turkish border, while Tehran was warning Ankara not to move ahead with its plans in northern Syria.
According to the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), the drills entailed army helicopters, rapid reaction units, and mobile and offense
brigades. Iranian army chief Major General Abdul Rahim Mousavi, who oversaw the drills, hailed their results as positive, stating that they were
meant to “measure the readiness, mobility and speed” of Iranian forces near Turkey. Mousavi added: “The message to the enemies is that if
they make the wrong calculations, they should know that the childrenof this land are ready to resist with their full power
at any time and place.” Iran’s parliamentary speaker, Ali Larijani, had a trip planned to the Turkish capital which he cancelled after
Turkey launched its Syria operation. Iran’s Foreign Ministry called for an “immediate end to the attacks and
for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian soil” after the Turkish assault began. The ministry also emphasized that while Tehran
understands Ankara’s “security concerns,” Iran’s position is that Turkey’s “military action would not only not diminish that country’s security
concerns, but also cause financial and humanitarian damages.” Ultimately, Ankara’s military campaign leaves Tehran in a difficult situation. On
one hand, Iran wants to see the Astana peace process (involving Iran, Russia, and Turkey ) succeed in terms of
resolving the Syrian crisis, particularly in Idlib, thus Tehran desires a continuation of good relations with Ankara. Similarly, Moscow doesn’t want
its conflicts of interests with Turkey to upset the Astana process. On the other hand, as a supporter of the Syrian government, the Islamic
Republic is deeply unsettled by the fact that Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring relies so heavily on anti-Assad rebel forces
from northern and/or eastern Syria. Indeed, Iranian and Iranian-aligned forces have fought those rebels throughout the Syrian civil war.
Turkish-backed groups, including the Sultan Murad Division, Faylaq al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, etc., which have fought the Assad regime under
the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA)—now rebranded the Syrian National Army (SNA)—are central to Turkey’s Syria operation. Some of
the 14,000 rebels in these groups entered Syria from Turkey with the Turkish military while others were already in Syria, near the towns where
the Turks have targeted the YPG this month. These forces are on the frontlines doing much of the heavy lifting in the fight against
Ankara’s Syrian Kurdish enemies and Turkey will count on them to guard towns taken from the YPG. Naturally, Iran does not want to
see these Sunni groups—some of which previously received U.S. support—to gain new life in the Syrian war, which now
appears to be happening because of the Turkish incursion. On October 11, protests took place in Iranian Kurdistan one day
before hundreds of Iranians gathered at Turkey’s embassy in Tehran to express their staunch opposition to Ankara’s military campaign. Such
public displays of anger directed against Turkey underscore how domestic as well as regional/international politics are also impacting Tehran’s
response to Operation Peace Spring. Within the context of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, officials
in Tehran have sought to improve the Islamic Republic’s relationship with Iranian Kurdish communities.
Fearful of the U.S. military presence in the Gulf as well as Salafist-jihadist groups operating in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, allegedly with
U.S. and Saudi support, the leadership in Tehran wants to prevent
outside forces from exploiting opportunities to use
militant Iranian Kurdish groups as proxies in any campaign to weaken Iran’s government. Doing so requires engaging Iranian
Kurdish factions in a dialogue, which has been taking place in Norway since May, while also addressing socio-economic and political
problems in northwestern Iran, which for many years have fueled Kurdish resentment toward the Iranian government.

Absent that, the Astana Alliance causes regional war- US Russia draw in
Upadhayaya 19 9-30-2019(Venus "Emerging Russia-Iran-Turkey Axis Can Be Dangerous for US:
Expert," theepochtimes, https://www.theepochtimes.com/emerging-russian-iran-turkey-axis-can-be-
dangerous-for-us-expert_3098741.html
According to Sathasivam, the emerging Russia-Iran-Turkey connection is more an alignment of interests and not a true
alliance and he suggests that Trump keep the lines of communication open with both Russia and Turkey. “But Turkey still has
significant differences with Russia and Iran on Syria and the Kurds . And of course Turkey remains a NATO member, and
as such cannot enter into a potentially rival alliance without having to leave NATO. “As for potentially sparking a war, what I mean is
that Iran, for example, may overestimate Russia’s alignment with Iran and as a result be more willing or
emboldened to push the red lines of Saudi Arabia or Israel or even the U.S., and this then may result in a war
of miscalculation,” he said.
AC
Or alt causes overwhelm
Uri Friedman 19, 11-14-2019, "What America’s Allies Really Think About Trump’s Syria Decision,"
Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/11/trumps-green-light-moment-in-syria-
shook-the-world/601963/

Arguing that there is a


“direct line” from Obama’s unenforced red line in Syria to Vladimir Putin’s invasion of
Ukraine and China’s land grabs in the South China Sea—a disputable claim—he reflected on how “the
decisions we’re making today [are] affecting the perception of American power.” Allies have had
misgivings about American consistency and reliability across multiple U.S. administrations, he allowed, but “I do think
it’s reaching a dangerous point here where there’s too much misunderstanding and doubt.” In his Economist interview, Macron plumbed the depths of that doubt.
Citing the total absence of internal coordination as two NATO members—Turkey and the United States—took actions in Syria that threatened to undermine other
members’ security, Macron declared the “brain death” of the 70-year-old military alliance . “The ultimate guarantor, the
umbrella which made Europe stronger, no longer has the same relationship with Europe,” Macron said of the United States, which means that Europeans

need to rethink how they preserve their safety and sovereignty. Yet he traced the cause of death back further than
Trumpism. Obama’s failure to respond to chemical-weapons use in Syria was, he said, “the first stage in the collapse of the Western bloc.”
Cyber D: Terror

Cyber-terrorism is too costly


Lindsay & Gartzke 16—Jon Lindsay is an Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at
the University of Toronto; Erik Gartzke is an Associate Professor at UC San Diego [“Coercion through
Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited,” in K. M. Greenhill & J. P. Krause eds. The Power
to Hurt: Coercion in Theory and in Practice, Oxford University Press, Forthcoming]

[Modified for ableist language]

Revolutionary Myths: Low Costs, High Rewards

In contemporary defense policy discourse there are three influential narratives of mounting cyber peril,
corresponding roughly to the three operational modes of attack, exploitation, and defense. The most
dangerous scenarios envision the paralysis [shutdown] of industrial control systems or military
command and control through surprise attack by anonymous hackers. The imagined aggressor may be a
revisionist state like China or Iran or a non-state anarchist or terrorist empowered by the information
revolution. A second narrative offers an alternative to the shock of sudden catastrophe, warning instead
of the long term erosion of economic and military competitiveness drained away through persistent
computer espionage. The relentless theft of vital secrets stored on corporate and government networks
produces a “death by a thousand cuts” as states give their firms an unfair commercial advantage and
equip their military forces with potent countermeasures to U.S. strengths. In both of these scenarios,
commercial hacking tools and ubiquitous connectivity give weaker states and terrorists provide a potent
means to exploit and attack the expanding attack surface of digitally-dependent advanced industrial
states. A third threat narrative concerns the transformation of internet architecture to decisively benefit
one political group at the expense of the other. At one extreme, the growth of flexible social media
enables connected protesters to overwhelm and overthrow authoritarian regimes.15 At the other
extreme, authoritarian governments censor internet content and reconfigure internet governance to
undermine the internet’s potential for innovation and freedom. State paranoia about the threats of
paralysis and erosion thus leads to digital lockout or “the end of the internet” as we know it.16

Threats of catastrophic attack, omniscient exploitation, and unassailable defense are myths because
they imagine major rewards for little cost. The actual rewards of any given cyber campaign are rarely so
great and the costs are rarely so trivial. Potential benefits of attack are discounted by uncertainty about
the true value of the target to the adversary and the ability for the attacker to take advantage of it.
Operative costs include the bureaucratic resources, development and testing requirements, human
capital, and intelligence experience required to plan and run an effective covert cyber campaign . Setting
aside the myths of low costs and high rewards (no free lunch), there are a variety of more realistic cyber
operations with significant variation in their operative costs and benefits. A set of higher cost, and,
potentially, higher reward complements enhance the capabilities of stronger actors who can master
them. A much larger set of low cost, low reward irritants are available to weaker actors or even solitary
individuals, but they provide only a small marginal return on a small investment.