MELECIO DOMINGO v. SPS. GENARO MOLINA AND ELENA B.

MOLIN

Facts: The spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18,164
square meter parcel of land. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses
Molina). 10 years after Flora's death, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The sale to the
spouses Molina was annotated at the OCT of the subject property In 1986, Anastacio died.

In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio's interest was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title and transferred the entire one-half undivided
portion of the land to the spouses Molina. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999.

Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed .
Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora's consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the
sale. Melecio also claims that Genaro Molina must have falsified the document transferring Anastacio and Flora's one-half undivided interest over
the land. Finally, Melecio asserts that he occupied the subject property from the time of Anastacio's death up to the time he filed the Complaint.
Melecio presented the testimonies of the Records Officer of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac, and of Melecio's nephew, George Domingo (George).

The Records Officer testified that he could not locate the instrument that documents the transfer of the subject property ownership from Anastacio
to the spouses Molina. The Records Officer also testified that the alleged sale was annotated at the time when Genaro Molina's brother was the
Register of Deeds for Camiling, Tarlac.

George, on the other hand, testified that he has been living on the subject property owned by Anastacio since 1986. George testified, however,
that aside from himself, there were also four other occupants on the subject property.The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the
title to the subject property to answer for his debts and told the spouses Molina that they already own half of the land. The spouses Molina have
been in possession of the subject property before the title was registered under their names and have religiously paid the property's real estate
taxes.

The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow money. The last
loan was even used to pay for Melecio's wedding. Finally, the spouses Molina asserted that Melecio built his nipa hut on the subject property only
in 1999, without their knowledge and consent.

The spouses Molina presented Jaime Garlitos (Jaime) as their sole witness and who is one of the occupants of the subject lot. Jaime testified that
Elena Molina permitted him to build a house on the subject property in 1993. Jaime, together with the other tenants, planted fruit bearing trees on
the subject property and gave portions of their harvest to Elena Molina without any complaint from Melecio. Jaime further testified that Melecio
never lived on the subject property and that only George Domingo, as the caretaker of the spouses Molina, has a hut on the property. Meanwhile,
the spouses Molina died during the pendency of the case and were substituted by their adopted son, Cornelio Molina.

Issues: Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora's consent is valid and legal

Ruling:

Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina is void without Flora's consent. We do not find Melecio's argument
meritorious.Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Flora's death. There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo
married before the Family Code's effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership. The conjugal partnership of
Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968.

Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership liquidation,... Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death,
the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.If no judicial
settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within
one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. x x x

While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership shall
be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.

An implied co-ownership among Flora's heirs governed the conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition.

An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora's surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to Flora's share of the conjugal
partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his
share, but this is an undivided interest.

Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without an actual partition being first done either
by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.
The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.

At the time of the sale, Anastacio's undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-half of the entire conjugal properties; and (2)
his share as Flora's heir on the conjugal properties.

Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently,
Anastactio's sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio's rights or a portion thereof
were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.

Melecio's recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject property, is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court. As held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., "it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action
for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court."
PNB vs. Jose Garcia

FACTS: Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) acquired a parcel of residential land with all its improvements located in in Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela registered
under his name with a TCT No. T-44422 during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987.

The marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya produced the following children: Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, all surnamed Garcia, who are the
respondents in the present case.

Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the petitioner, Philippine National Bank
(petitioner bank), initially for P150,000.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their property covered by TCT No. 177585. The
spouses Garcia increased their loan to P220,000.00 and eventually to P600,000.00. As security for the increased loan, they offered their property
covered by TCT No. 75324 and the subject property covered by TCT No. T-44422.

Jose Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subject property as additional collateral security for the latters increased loan.
For this purpose, Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) expressly authorizing the Spouses Garcia to apply for, borrow, or secure any
loan from the petitioner bank, and to convey and transfer the subject property by way of mortgage. Jose Sr. also executedan Amendment of Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage are both inscribed on TCT No. T-44422. All
of these transactions, however, were without the knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.s children.

On maturity of the loan on April 20, 1994,the spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite repeated demands.

Respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage, Damages with Preliminary Injunction against
the spouses Garcia and the petitioner bank. They claimed that the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage was null and void as to respondents Nora,
Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they were not parties to the contract.

The respondents alleged that the subject property was a conjugal property of Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya, as they acquired the subject
property during their marriage; that upon Ligayas death, Jose Sr., together with his children Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law, became
owners pro indiviso of the subject property; that the real estate mortgage executed by Jose Sr. could not bind his children as they did not give their
consent or approval to the encumbrance; and that the real estate mortgage was also void as to Jose Sr. since he never benefitted from the loan.

In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was indebted to them in the amount of P133,800.00. To settle this indebtedness, Jose Sr.
volunteered to give the subject property as additional security for their (the Garcias) loan to the petitioner bank.
The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage was made in good faith and for value, and maintained that the respondents
complaint stated no cause of action against it.
The CA upheld the trial courts finding that the subject property was conjugal, but reversed and set aside its ruling in so far as it declared valid and
binding the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage between the petitioner bank, on one hand, and the spouses Garcia and Jose Sr., on the other
hand, with respect to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy. Relying on the Courts ruling inNufable v. Nufable, 369 Phil. 135, the CA ruled
that the encumbrance Jose Sr. made over the entire conjugal property, without his childrens conformity, was null and void because a mere part
owner could not alienate the shares of the other co-owners.

The CA also declared that the conjugal property could only be liable to the extent of Jose Sr.'s shares; Jose Sr.s acts could not affect his children's
pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. It disagreed with the trial courts estoppel theory and held that their execution of the SPA should not be
construed as acquiescence to the mortgage transaction. Lastly, it ruled that Jose Sr. could not escape liability from the mortgage since he
voluntarily bound himself as the Spouses Garcia's accommodation mortgagor.

ISSUE: Did the CA decide the case erroneously?

HELD: Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, their property relations were governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Because of the petitioner banks failure to rebut the allegation that the subject property was acquired during the formers marriage to Ligaya, the
legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this property. Proof of the subject
property’s acquisition during the subsistence of marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. Go v. Yamane, 522 Phil. 653, 663
(2006).

Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property
was acquired. The registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the
property appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable
consideration during marriage. It retains its conjugal nature. xxx

Upon the death of the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and terminated. Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted
into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other. This resulting
ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code.

Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or
mortgage it except when personal rights are involved. Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or
mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.

As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr. right in the subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal partnership as well as his
share as an heir on the other half of the estate which is his deceased spouses share. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends
to the undivided shares of his children because they did not give their consent to the transaction.

Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his co-owners consent is not
necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr.
in the event of a division and liquidation of the subject property. AFFIRMED.
Tan vs. Andrade

Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the registered owner of four parcels of land which she mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed by one
Simon. When the redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject
properties.8 Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr. (Proceso, Jr.), for ₱100,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute.

On July 26, 1983, Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties in
consideration of ₱50,000.00. The Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry Andrade (Henry), one of Rosario’s sons, as instrumental
witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of Proceso.
When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and the TCTs therefor were issued in his name.

On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against. They
alleged that the transaction between Rosario and Bobby (subject transaction) was not one of sale but was actually an equitable mortgage which
was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the subject properties were inherited by them from
their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their
respective shares therein. In this light, they argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties together with Bobby, despite the
issuance of the TCTs in his name.

Issue

In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of
the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.

In this case, there is no evidence to indicate when the property was acquired by petitioner Josefina. Thus, we agree with petitioner Josefina’s
declaration in the deed of absolute sale she executed in favor of the respondent that she was the absolute and sole owner of the property. In this
case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 19784 while the
transfer certificates of title over the subject properties were issued on September and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age,
widow, Filipino."

Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the
coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the absolute owner of the
disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, the subject
properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner -versus- VENANCIO REYES, JR.,

FACTS:
Venancio married Lilia in 1973. They purchased 3 lots in Bulacan, which were later mortgaged to petitioner bank to secure a loan. When the
spouses failed to pay their loan, petitioner foreclosed the 3 properties. Venancio filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and real
estate mortgage against petitioner, Lilia and the Sheriff of Bulacan. He claimed that the mortgage constituted over the properties was void because
Lilia undertook the loan and mortgage without his consent and falsified his signature on the PNs. The RTC ordered the annulment of the mortgage
and directed Lilia to reimburse petitioner the loan amount with interest. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUES: Whether the real estate mortgage is void; and Whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan contracted unilaterally
by Lilia.

RULING:

The real estate mortgage is void for want of consent from respondent. The Reyes Spouses were married before the Family Code took effect. Hence,
their property regime is Conjugal Partnership of Gains. The applicable provision is Article 124 of the Family Code, which states that any disposition
or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one spouse must be consented to by the other; otherwise, it is void . Here, respondent presented clear
and convincing evidence that his signature, as it appeared on the mortgage contract, was forged.

The conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan. There are two scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in this case, the wife,
contracts a loan to be used for the family business and the other is when she acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a mere surety or guarantor,
evidence that the family benefited from the loan need to be presented before the conjugal partnership can be held liable. On the other hand, if the
loan was taken out to be used for the family business, there is no need to prove actual benefit. The law presumes the family benefited from the
loan and the conjugal partnership is held liable.

Here, the loan was used as additional working capital for respondent's printing business. There is thus a presumption that it redounded to the
benefit of the family; hence, the conjugal partnership may be held liable for the loan amount. There is no need to prove actual benefit to the
family.

Here, the real estate mortgage is void and legally inexistent because it was an encumbrance attached to a conjugal property without the consent of
the other spouse. Although petitioner cannot foreclose the mortgage over the conjugal property in question, it can still recover the loan amount
from the conjugal partnership. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the liability, the husband is solidarily liable with the wife for the
unpaid balance. Petitioner can recover the remaining unpaid balance from the separate properties of either respondent or his wife Lilia.

Pelayo vs. Perez

G.R. No. 141323

Facts: David Pelayo through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed a deed of sale and transferred to Melki Perez two parcel of agricultural lands. Loreza
Pelayo and another one whose signature is eligible witnesses such execution of deed. Loreza signed only on the third page in the space provided
for witnesses, as such, Perez application was denied. Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and should pages of the deed of sale but she refused.
He then filed a complaint for specific performance against the Pelayo spouses. The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground for lack
of marital consent as provided by art166 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was null and void for lack of marital consent.

Held: Under Art 173, in relation to Art166, both of the NCC, W/C was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed,
the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract viol of initio but Merely violable. Said provisions of
law provide:

Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non-compass mentis or a spedthriff, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a lepresarium, the
husband connot alienate or encumber any real property not the Longugal property w/o the wife’s consent. It she refuses nreasonable to give her
consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art 173. The wife may during the marriage and w/in 10 years the transaction questioned, ask the court for the annulment of any contract of the
husband w/c tends to defraud her or impair interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right she her heir,
after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
ERLINDA AGAPAY VS CARLINA PALANG

FACTS;
Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his second marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he
had a son. The couple purchased a parcel of agricultural land and the transfer certificate was issued in their names. She also purchased a house and
lot in Binalonan, where the property was later issued in her name. Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation, wherein they agreed to donate
their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.

Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda. They sought to
get back the riceland and house and lot allegedly bought by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered
the respondents to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda.

RULING:
No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda. The sale of the rice land was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage. The marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and
unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision,
in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed
to persuade SC that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, when she
was only around 20 of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is
unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary
public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed
that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with
Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and Carlina Palang.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

As regards to the donation of their conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of their daughter, was also void. Separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for
separation of property and should not be so inferred.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, Petitioner, -versus- SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 132529, FIRST DVISION, February 2, 2001, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS: During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with
whom he had two offsprings, and the second was with respondent Susan Yee Cariño, with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation. SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away under the
care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses.

Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the
wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that there is
no record of such marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to settle claims to death benefits. (NO)

RULING: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity,
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. Presumed validity of Nicdao’s marriage w/ the deceased cannot stand as there is no marriage license, burden of proof
of validity was w/ her. It does not follow however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death
benefits” would now be awarded
to Yee. As stated earlier, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Considering then that the marriage of
Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid,
the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code govern as they were both legally
capacitated. The difference bet 147 and 148 is that wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation period will be split equally
between them even if only one party contributed in 147, whereas in 148 wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
So under Art 147, Susan Nicdao is entitled to half of the remunerations and the other half belong to the legal heirs of Santiago, who are in this case,
the children of Susan Nicdao.
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, petitioner, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO, respondent.

FACTS: In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property
situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over
the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3. Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had
already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC
lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE: Whether or not there should be partition of the property (YES)

RULING: The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido's marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129 provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers he effects of void marriages on the spouses'
property relations. This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other,
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.

Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Here, the former spouses both
agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in
question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names
of the former spouses, said document of sale does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a
document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document, making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly
authenticated.
Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper.
Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato andBarrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on
co-ownership.

ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ

FACTS: Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal case or arson pending before the RTC. The accused was petitioner
Maximo Alvarez, stranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was called to the witness stand
as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the
presentation of the other witnesses. On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from
further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other
assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the
assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the objection of her estranged husband on the ground of marital privilege.

HELD:

Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court has its exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved. The acts of
the petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the State has an interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the
innocent, and must have the right to offer the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of her husband.

Yes. The offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied
in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals: The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing
fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of
marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing
the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so
strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-
existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castaneda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital
Disqualification Rule.

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was
already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that
the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the
innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because it was the
latter himself who gave rise to its necessity (Alvarez vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005)
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner, vs. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, in his

FACTS: On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and
Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of
mortgage
contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in
conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of
mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.

On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code
wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint
does not contain any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should
be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out and to Declare Defendants in Default. He argues that in
cases where one of the parties is not a member of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to allege in the
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss. Alberto asserts that since three of the party defendants are not members of his family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to
Dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable. Alberto also prayed that defendants be declared in default for their failure to file their answer on time.
Petitioner filed a Reply, private respondent filed his rejoinder.

ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff is correct that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case considering
that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family. (YES)

RULING:
Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.

Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit: No suit shall be
filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.

The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken explains: [I]t is difficult to
imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made
toward a
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates
deeper bitterness than between strangers. In Magbaleta v. Gonong, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of
the subject property. The Court, taking into consideration the explanation made by the Code Commision in its report, ruled that: [T]hese
considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for
the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not always
that one who is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the or among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor
fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any
right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves.

Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that
earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. In the subsequent case of De Guzman v. Genato. the case involved
spouses and the alleged paramour of the wife. The Court ruled that due to the efforts exerted by the husband, through the Philippine Constabulary,
to confront the wife, there was substantial compliance with the law, thereby implying that even in the presence of a party who is not a family
member, the requirements that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted must be complied with, pursuant to Article 222 of the
Civil Code, now Article 151 of the Family Code.

While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle enunciated in the Magbaleta is the one that now prevails because it is reiterated in
the subsequent cases of Gonzales v. Lopez, Esquivias v. Court of Appeals, Spouses Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City, and the
most recent case of Martinez v. Martinez. Thus, Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among
family members. Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between
brothers. However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in the
abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his wife, as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family
Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits involving "members of the same family" as contemplated
under Article 150 of the Family Code and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and (4) Among brothers and
sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

ART. 217. Family relations shall include those:(1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their
descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters.

Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the same
family as respondent, may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code. Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the
requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the same family,
it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.
Eulogio, et. al. vs. Bell, Sr., et al., G.R. # 186322, July 2015

Facts: The Bell siblings are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell sought the annulment of the
contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by
petitioners by virtue of the Deed.

The RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents' property... was levied on execution. Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code,
they posited that the current market value of the property exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a
commercial... area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million.

The RTC... set the case for hearing to determine the present value of the family home... and directed the commissioners to canvass prospective
buyers of their house and lot. Respondents filed a Petition... before the CA... the CA rendered its Decision granting respondents' Petition for
Certiorari... the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution sale of the subject family home after
finding that its present value exceeded the statutory limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160,... according to the
appellate court, is its actual value at the time of its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court's order was contrary to
law.

Issues: Whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

Ruling: Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code. Unquestionably, the family home is exempt
from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code. It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment.
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4)
For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.

ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable
grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court... which
rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of
the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value... exceeds the
maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family
home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.

ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of three hundred thousand pesos in
urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by... law.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at... the time of its
constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its
value exceeding the statutory limit.[45] Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a... forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit
is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.

To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase
in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting... the family
home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.

During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - much less proven - by petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the Deed
of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an... equitable
mortgage.
PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner, v. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino
Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-
school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or less.

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT
No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R- 213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate
the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffle to Branch 78.

ISSUE: Whether or not partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a
minor beneficiary still resides in the said home. (NO)

RULING:
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be
partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long
as the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent insists that even
after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property continues to be
considered as the family home considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home, still
resides in the premises.

On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only
up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private
respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the death of their father, hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of.

The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one's lifetime.9 It is the dwelling
house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such
and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.

The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That
which is "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
"beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,
who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three
requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and
(3)
they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless
the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. The rule in Article 159
of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for
10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following
the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his
or her separate property as family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until that
minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he
reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself.

However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154
of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. The Court then
resolved the issue now of whether or not Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary
under Article 154 of the Family Code.

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family;
and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term
"descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must
necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos. Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V.
Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the
family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are
capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV's parents, especially his father, herein
private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent
on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father.

Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property. The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as
oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every available opportunity to divide their
coowned property to prevent these situations from arising.
Salazar vs. Felias, G.R. # 223972, Feb.5, 2018

The Antecedent Facts

On February 28, 1990, private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera (Heirs of Nivera) filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against the Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa Lastimosa (Fe1isa). The former
sought to recover from the latter four parcels of land located in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan (subject property). On March 3, 1997, during the trial of
the case, Romualdo died.

RTC Branch 55 rendered a Decision, declaring the Heirs of Nivera as the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby ordering
the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender possession thereof.

Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar (Felicitas), daughter of Romualdo, along with Recto and Rizalina filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June
22, 2006 with the CA. Felicitas sought the nullification of the RTC Branch 55's Decision dated March 16, 2004, and the corresponding Writs of
Execution and Demolition issued pursuant thereto.[7] In her Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Felicitas claimed that she was deprived of due
process when she was not impleaded in the case for Recovery of Ownership, before the RTC Branch 55.[8]
Meanwhile, the Heirs of Lastimosa filed with the RTC Branch 55 an Urgent Motion to Order the Sheriff to Desist from Making Demolition dated
April 24, 2010. The Motion to Desist was premised on the fact that the Sheriff cannot execute the lower court's decision considering that Felicitas
had an aliquot share over the property, which had not yet been partitioned.[12]

At about the same time, the Heirs of Nivera filed a Motion for Execution and Demolition dated May 28, 2010. The Motion for Execution was
anchored on the fact that the Decision dated March 16, 2004, in the case for recovery of ownership, possession and damages had long attained
finality.[13]

Issue: Whether the CA erred in ordering the execution of the Decision dated March 16, 2004.

Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land
on which it is situated. It confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties.[34] It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain
special cases.

However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's
hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such
property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and
proved.[36]

In fact, in Ramos, et al. v. Pangilinan, et al.,[37] the Court, citing Spouses Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., et al.,[38] laid down the rules relative
to the levy on execution of the family home, viz.:

No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family
home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family
actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The
actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.
[39]
In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates that the occupancy of the family home, either by the owner
thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or
that which is merely presumptive or constructive.[40]

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential tenets, it becomes all too apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her
family home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must be backed with evidence
showing that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as a family home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head
of a family, (iii) resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the properties of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family,
and (v) has an actual value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php 200,000.00 in rural areas.

A perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her bare allegation, Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the
property sought to be executed is indeed her family home. Undoubtedly, Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a
family home, is an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the binding nature of a final and executory judgment. Thus, the Writ of Execution
and Demolition issued by the RTC Branch 55 must perforce be given effect.

SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,
SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS, Respondents.

FACTS: This involves a parcel of land registered under Araceli’s name. The petitioners jointly purchased the subject property on April 17, 1984 while
they were still merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was later constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter
occupied as their family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.

Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Claudio) in the amount of ₱100,000.00, which was secured by a
mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio. When the
check was presented for payment, it was dishonored as the account from which it was drawn had already been closed. The petitioners failed to
heed Claudio’s subsequent demand for payment.

Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with the Prosecutor's Office of Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22)
against the petitioners. On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a Decision acquitting the petitioners but ordering them to pay Claudio the amount
of ₱100,000.00 with legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.
On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte (Sheriff Samonte) levied upon the subject property. On March
9, 1994, the subject property was sold on public auction; Claudio was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to
him.
Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the subject property to the petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito) for a monthly rent of
₱5,500.00. However, the petitioners and Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent and as of October 3, 1998, their total accountabilities to
Claudio amounted to ₱170,500.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). (NO)

RULING:
The petitioners maintain that the subject property is a family home and, accordingly, the sale thereof on execution was a nullity. In Ramos v.
Pangilinan, this Court laid down the rules relative to exemption of family homes from execution: For the family home to be exempt from execution,
distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment
debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either
judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the
filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is
located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument
which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a
judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute
extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one
spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where
it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988)
are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either
judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and
thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were
thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.

The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Despite
the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, we nevertheless rule that the CA did not
err in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA that the petitioners should have
asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from
execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale
of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right
of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at
the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter; "In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption)
must be made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable time, or promptly, or before the creditor
has taken any step involving further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale,
or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority." Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment
debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and
proved to the Sheriff. x x x.

Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at public auction, the
petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption. Indeed, the family home is a
sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that the
family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment.

The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases. However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the
time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject property is a family home
and its exemption from execution and forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject property to be levied upon and the
public sale to proceed.
One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s Torrens title
was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudio’s name, still, the petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the subject
property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.

EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC., Petitioner, vs. OJ-MARK TRADING, INC. and SPOUSES OSCAR AND EVANGELINE MARTINEZ, Respondents.

The factual antecedents:

Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the aggregate amount of Four
Million Forty-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (₱4,048,800.00). As security for the said amount, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was executed
over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, Pasig City, Metro Manila where the spouses are residing. Respondent Oscar Martinez
signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. The
REM was annotated on Condominium Certificate of Title No. PT-21363 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.2

Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation. They offered to settle their indebtedness "with the assignment
to the Bank of a commercial lot of corresponding value" While petitioner’s officers held a meeting with respondent Oscar Martinez, the latter
however failed to submit the required documents such as certificates of title and tax declarations so that the bank can evaluate his proposal to pay
the mortgage debt via dacion en pago. Consequently, petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage by filing an ex
parte petition before the Office of the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.

On January 23, 2003, respondents filed Civil Case No. 69294 for "Temporary Restraining Order (‘TRO’), Injunction and Annulment of Extrajudicial
Foreclosure Sale" in the RTC of Pasig City. On January 27, 2003, the trial court granted a TRO effective for twenty (20) days.

In their Complaint With Application for Temporary Restraining Order,7 respondents sought to enjoin the impending foreclosure sale alleging that
the same was hasty, premature, unreasonable and unwarranted, and also claiming defects in the execution of the REM. Respondents imputed bad
faith on the part of petitioner who did not officially inform them of the denial or disapproval of their proposal to settle the loan obligation by
"dacion via assignment of a commercial property." Respondents maintained that aside from the REM being illegally notarized, incomplete and
unenforceable, the obligation subject thereof had been extinguished by the dacion proposal considering that the value of the property offered was
more than sufficient to pay for the mortgage debt. It was further averred that the subject property is being used and occupied by respondent-
spouses as a family home.

In his Order dated February 17, 2003, Judge Mariano M. Singzon, Jr. granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.8 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied under the Order dated April 21, 2003.9

Petitioner questioned the issuance of preliminary injunction before the CA arguing that the respondents are not entitled to injunctive relief after
having admitted that they were unable to settle their loan obligations. By Decision dated October 29, 2004, the appellate court sustained the
assailed orders, holding that:

...respondent spouses have sufficiently shown that they have a right over the condominium unit which is subject of the mortgage. This proprietary
right over the condominium is what they are trying to protect when they applied for preliminary injunction. As respondent spouses have alleged in
their complaint, the issuance of notice of foreclosure sale is at most premature as there are still several factual issues that need to be resolved
before a foreclosure can be effected. Such already constitute the ostensible right which respondent spouses possess in order for the foreclosure
sale to be temporarily enjoined.10

Issue: Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and public auction of the third-party mortgagor’s
property while the case for annulment of REM on said property is being tried.

Petitioner argued that the appellate court’s conclusion that respondents possess proprietary right over the mortgaged property subject of
foreclosure is utterly baseless, for the following reasons: first, while the condominium unit is supposedly a family home, it is admittedly owned by
respondent corporation and not by the conjugal partnership or absolute community of respondent-spouses; and second, even assuming that OJ-
Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation, respondents’ stance contravenes the established rule that properties registered in the name of the
corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members or stockholders.12
As to the alleged proposal of respondent Oscar Martinez to assign commercial lots by dacion en pago to settle their loan obligations, petitioner
pointed out that the properties offered for dacion are not owned, and much less to be owned by him, but purportedly owned by another
corporation (developer), the president of which supposedly owes him a sum of money. Respondent Oscar Martinez likewise admitted during the
hearings before the trial court his unpaid loan with petitioner. Moreover, with the filing of a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage by petitioner, it serves more than a formal rejection of respondents’ dacion en pago offer.13

On their part, the respondents contended that the petition raises factual issues not proper in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. They asserted
that the trial court correctly found sufficient legal basis to grant the writ of preliminary injunction after conducting a summary hearing in which
both parties actively participated and submitted oral and documentary evidence. Such evidence adduced by respondents, as well as the Affidavit
dated January 24, 2003 of Atty. Oscar Martinez (adopted in the February 7, 2003 hearing) fully supported their application and hence the trial court
did not act precipitately or arbitrarily in granting injunctive relief.14

Respondents argued that they appear to be entitled to the relief demanded by their Complaint "because petitioner was in bad faith when it
proceeded to foreclose while there was still a pending written proposal to pay." They stand to lose a prime property, and thus made a serious and
sincere offer by way of dacion en pago. To show good faith and as required by petitioner to continue the negotiations for dacion, respondent Atty.
Oscar Martinez even paid ₱100,000.00 in October 2002, which petitioner accepted. But petitioner maliciously, fraudulently and hastily proceeded
to foreclose the renovated mortgaged property, apparently motivated by its discovery after re-appraisal that the floor area of the townhouse and
number of its rooms had doubled (from 180.750 sq. m. with three [3] bedrooms, it is now 350 sq. m. with six [6] bedrooms). Respondents
contended that as creditor, it was petitioner’s duty not to sit on respondents’ dacion offer and should have informed them in writing that said offer
is rejected. By hanging on the dacion talks, petitioner thus prevented the respondents’ repayment of the loan, in malicious haste to acquire the
condominium unit as asset.15

Respondents further claimed that the extrajudicial foreclosure will cause grave injustice and irreparable injury to respondent-spouses and their
four (4) young children because their family home, in which they were residing since 1997, at least insofar as the unencumbered area in excess of
180.750 sq. m., is exempt from forced sale or execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Petitioner, on the other hand, will not suffer any loss
if the foreclosure will not proceed.16

With respect to the commercial lots offered in dacion, respondents fault the petitioner in deliberately ignoring the fact that the Blue Mountains
Subdivision located at Antipolo City was already approved by the Land Registration Authority; although the subdivided lots have already been
applied, the individual titles had not yet been issued. It was therefore impossible for respondents to deliver these titles to petitioner by October 21,
2002 considering the normal time it takes to secure land titles. Respondents deplored the sudden filing of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure,
which was unfair as the negotiations had already reached the stage when petitioner scheduled an ocular inspection for the appraisal of the lots.
However, for unknown reasons, petitioner did not push through with the inspection.17

We grant the petition.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.—A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance
of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to
the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of
the principal action. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be
entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown.18 A writ of preliminary injunction may
be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.19

The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered
with except in cases of manifest abuse.20 For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of
the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of a writ of injunction constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.21

The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is no ground for an injunction.22 Hence, it is not sufficient for the
respondents to simply harp on the serious damage they stand to suffer if the foreclosure sale is not stayed. They must establish such clear and
unmistakable right to the injunction. In Duvaz Corporation v. Export and Industry Bank,23 we emphasized that it is necessary for the petitioner to
establish in the main case its rights on an alleged dacion en pago agreement before those rights can be deemed actual and existing, which would
justify the injunctive writ. Thus:

We note that the claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family
home and not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the REM.33 Assuming arguendo that the
mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents’ family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same
Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution."
Respondents thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection of the injunctive writ. Clearly, the appellate court seriously erred in
sustaining the trial court’s orders granting respondents’ application for preliminary injunction.

RAMOS etal. v. PANGILINAN (2010)

FACTS: In 2003, herein respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric Inc., a company owned by Ernesto Ramos, the
father of herein petitioners. In 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay respondents
aggregate amount representing backwages, separation pay and other incentive pay.

Having been final, the decision was served by the Labor Arbiter thru a writ of execution on 08 September 2005 which the Deputy Sheriff of the
NLRC implemened by levying a property in Ramos’ name in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property). Alleging that Pandacan property is a family
home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy judgment award, Ramos moved to quash the writ of execution. However, respondents averred that
the Pandacan Property is not the Ramos family home and in fact served as the company’s business address as borne by the company’s letterhead.
Consequently, the Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash.
Ramos appealed to the CA but during the case’s pendency, Ramos died and was substituted by herein petitioners. The latter filed before the NLRC,
as third party claimants, opposition to the case, however, the Labor Arbiter later on denied it holding that petitioners’ substitution as compulsory
heirs will nullify the sale at auction of the Pandacan Property.

Petitioners alleged that the NLRC erred in including Pandacan property in the execution, invoking that at the time Pandacan property was
constituted as family home in 1944, Art. 153 of the Family Code is applicable, hence, no longer had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial constitution
and thus exempted from execution. However, the appeallate court decided that the property in question is not exempted from execution because
Art 153 of the FC has no retroactive effect to family homes deemed to have been constituted prior to the its enactment,

ISSUE: WON the Pandacan Property is exempted frome execution?

RULING: As a general rule, the family home is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on
which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituiting it
and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certin special cases.

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies. Under the Family Code (Art 153), there is no
need to constitute the family home judicially or extra-judicially for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code for they are
already constituted by operation of law. Also, exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
under Art. 154 actually resides therein. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. In both rules, it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely
alleges that such property is a family home. Such claim of exemption must be set up and proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, they must comply with the procedure
mandated under the Civil Code. Having no absolute proof that the Pandacan property was judicially and/or extrajudicially constituted as Ramos’
family home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners.