Petitioner: Aneco Realty and

Development Corporation
Respondent: Landex Development
Corporation
Facts:
1. Fernandez Hermanos
Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the
original owner of a
tract of land in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City and it
subdivided the
land into 39 lots. It sold 22 lots to
Aneco and the remaining 17 to
Landex.
2. Landex started the construction of
a concrete wall on one of its lots. To
stop the construction, Aneco filed a
complaint for injunction with the
RTC in
Quezon City.
3. Landex: Aneco was not deprived
access to its lots due to the
construction
of the concrete wall. Aneco has its
own entrance to its property. The
Resthaven Street access, however,
was rendered inaccessible when
Aneco
constructed a building on said street.
Also, Landex claimed that FHDI
sold
ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to
Aneco based on the express
stipulation
in the deed of sale that FHDI was not
interested in pursuing its own
subdivision project.
4. RTC granted the complaint for
injunction. Landex filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. RTC granted the
motion for reconsideration of
Landex.
RTC Decision:
The property in question never did
exist as a subdivision, the
limitations imposed by Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 440, that no
portion of a subdivision road lot shall
be closed without the approval
of the Court is clearly inappropriate
to the case at bar.
That plaintiff’s property is not
isolated as it is bounded by Miller St.
and Resthaven St. Plaintiff could
easily make an access to a
public road within the bounds and
limits of its own property;
and that the defendant has not yet
been indemnified whatsoever for
the use of his property, as mandated
by the Bill of rights. The
foregoing circumstances, negates the
alleged plaintiffs right of
way.
CA affirmed RTC Decision:
The subject property ceased to be a
road lot when its former owner
(Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) sold it to
appellant Aneco not as
subdivision lots and without the
intention of pursuing the subdivision
project.
The law in point is Article 624 of
the New Civil Code. This provision
allows the continued use of an
apparent easement should the owner
alienate the property to different
persons. The easement that used
to exist on the subject lot ceased
when appellant Aneco and the
former owner agreed that the lots
would be consolidated and
would no longer be intended as a
subdivision project.
Re compulsory easement of right of
way: Aneco failed to prove the
essential requisites to avail such
right:
The essential requisites are:
1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and
has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2) that proper indemnity has been
paid;
3) that the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate;
4) that the right of way claimed is at
a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and in so far as
consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be
the shortest
Issue: Whether or not Aneco may
enjoin Landex from constructing a
concrete wall on its own property
(W/N Aneco should be given the
right of
way – NO)
Ruling: Court dismissed the
complaint for injunction.
What is involved here is an undue
interference on the property rights of
a
landowner to build a concrete wall
on his own property. It is a simple
case of
a neighbor, petitioner Aneco, seeking
to restrain a landowner, respondent
Landex, from fencing his own land.
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives
every owner the right to enclose or
fence his land or tenement by means
of walls, ditches, hedges or any
other means. The right to fence flows
from the right of ownership. As
owner of the land, Landex may fence
his property subject only to the
limitations and restrictions provided
by law. Absent a clear legal and
enforceable right, as here, We will
not interfere with the exercise of an
essential attribute of ownership.
Aneco cannot rely on the road lot
under the old subdivision project of
FHDI
because it knew at the time of the
sale that it was buying ordinary lots,
not
subdivision lots, from FHDI. If
Aneco wants to transform its own
lots into a
subdivision project, it must make its
own provision for road lots
Petitioner: Aneco Realty and
Development Corporation
Respondent: Landex Development
Corporation
Facts:
1. Fernandez Hermanos
Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the
original owner of a
tract of land in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City and it
subdivided the
land into 39 lots. It sold 22 lots to
Aneco and the remaining 17 to
Landex.
2. Landex started the construction of
a concrete wall on one of its lots. To
stop the construction, Aneco filed a
complaint for injunction with the
RTC in
Quezon City.
3. Landex: Aneco was not deprived
access to its lots due to the
construction
of the concrete wall. Aneco has its
own entrance to its property. The
Resthaven Street access, however,
was rendered inaccessible when
Aneco
constructed a building on said street.
Also, Landex claimed that FHDI
sold
ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to
Aneco based on the express
stipulation
in the deed of sale that FHDI was not
interested in pursuing its own
subdivision project.
4. RTC granted the complaint for
injunction. Landex filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. RTC granted the
motion for reconsideration of
Landex.
RTC Decision:
The property in question never did
exist as a subdivision, the
limitations imposed by Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 440, that no
portion of a subdivision road lot shall
be closed without the approval
of the Court is clearly inappropriate
to the case at bar.
That plaintiff’s property is not
isolated as it is bounded by Miller St.
and Resthaven St. Plaintiff could
easily make an access to a
public road within the bounds and
limits of its own property;
and that the defendant has not yet
been indemnified whatsoever for
the use of his property, as mandated
by the Bill of rights. The
foregoing circumstances, negates the
alleged plaintiffs right of
way.
CA affirmed RTC Decision:
The subject property ceased to be a
road lot when its former owner
(Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) sold it to
appellant Aneco not as
subdivision lots and without the
intention of pursuing the subdivision
project.
The law in point is Article 624 of
the New Civil Code. This provision
allows the continued use of an
apparent easement should the owner
alienate the property to different
persons. The easement that used
to exist on the subject lot ceased
when appellant Aneco and the
former owner agreed that the lots
would be consolidated and
would no longer be intended as a
subdivision project.
Re compulsory easement of right of
way: Aneco failed to prove the
essential requisites to avail such
right:
The essential requisites are:
1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and
has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2) that proper indemnity has been
paid;
3) that the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate;
4) that the right of way claimed is at
a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and in so far as
consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be
the shortest
Issue: Whether or not Aneco may
enjoin Landex from constructing a
concrete wall on its own property
(W/N Aneco should be given the
right of
way – NO)
Ruling: Court dismissed the
complaint for injunction.
What is involved here is an undue
interference on the property rights of
a
landowner to build a concrete wall
on his own property. It is a simple
case of
a neighbor, petitioner Aneco, seeking
to restrain a landowner, respondent
Landex, from fencing his own land.
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives
every owner the right to enclose or
fence his land or tenement by means
of walls, ditches, hedges or any
other means. The right to fence flows
from the right of ownership. As
owner of the land, Landex may fence
his property subject only to the
limitations and restrictions provided
by law. Absent a clear legal and
enforceable right, as here, We will
not interfere with the exercise of an
essential attribute of ownership.
Aneco cannot rely on the road lot
under the old subdivision project of
FHDI
because it knew at the time of the
sale that it was buying ordinary lots,
not
subdivision lots, from FHDI. If
Aneco wants to transform its own
lots into a
subdivision project, it must make its
own provision for road lots
Petitioner: Aneco Realty and Development Corporation

Respondent: Landex Development Corporation

Facts:

1. Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City and it subdivided the land into 39 lots. It sold 22 lots to Aneco and
the remaining 17 to Landex.

2. Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To stop the construction,
Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC in Quezon City.

3. Landex: Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due to the construction of the concrete wall.
Aneco has its own entrance to its property. The Resthaven Street access, however, was rendered
inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on said street. Also, Landex claimed that FHDI sold
ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express stipulation in the deed of sale that
FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision project.

4. RTC granted the complaint for injunction. Landex filed a Motion for Reconsideration. RTC granted
the motion for reconsideration of Landex.

RTC Decision:

The property in question never did exist as a subdivision, the limitations imposed by Section 1
of Republic Act No. 440, that no portion of a subdivision road lot shall be closed without the
approval of the Court is clearly inappropriate to the case at bar.

That plaintiff’s property is not isolated as it is bounded by Miller St. and Resthaven St.

Plaintiff could easily make an access to a public road within the bounds and limits of
its own property; and that the defendant has not yet been indemnified whatsoever for the
use of his property, as mandated by the Bill of rights. The foregoing circumstances,
negates the alleged plaintiffs right of way.

CA affirmed RTC Decision:

The subject property ceased to be a road lot when its former owner (Fernandez Hermanos,
Inc.) sold it to appellant Aneco not as subdivision lots and without the intention of pursuing the
subdivision project.

 The law in point is Article 624 of the New Civil Code. This provision allows the continued use
of an apparent easement should the owner alienate the property to different persons. The
easement that used to exist on the subject lot ceased when appellant Aneco and the
former owner agreed that the lots would be consolidated and would no longer be
intended as a subdivision project.

Re compulsory easement of right of way: Aneco failed to prove the essential requisites to
avail such right:

The essential requisites are:

1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to

a public highway;
 2) that proper indemnity has been paid;

3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;

4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest 

Issue: Whether or not Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its own
property (W/N Aneco should be given the right of way – NO)

Ruling: Court dismissed the complaint for injunction.

What is involved here is an undue interference on the property rights of a landowner to build a
concrete wall on his own property. It is a simple case of a neighbor, petitioner Aneco, seeking to
restrain a landowner, respondent Landex, from fencing his own land.

Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or
tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows
from the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only
to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right,
as here, We will not interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.

Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at the
time of the sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. If Aneco wants to
transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own provision for road lots.
German Management Services vs. CA, GR No. 76217 September 14, 1989

Facts:

Spouses Jose are the owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo. They executed a special power
ofattorney authorizing German management Services to develop their property into a
residentialsubdivision. However, the property was being occupied by private respondents and
twenty otherpersons. They were asked to vacate but refused. PR filed an action for forcible entry
andalleged that they are mountainside farmers of the area and have occupied and tilled
theirfarmholdings prior to the promulgation of PD 27. They stated that they have been deprived
oftheir property without due process of law by means of force, violence and intimidation.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR. In forcible entry, ownership isnot an
issue. It may be a fact that the German Management was duly authorised by the ownersto develop
the subject property, the actual possessors of the land, the Prs, can commence aforcible entry case
against the petitioner. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and neverdetermines the actual
title to an estate.
People of the Philippines vs Mamerto Narvaez
121 SCRA 389

Facts:

Mamerto Narvaez awoke to the sounds of construction of a fence that would prevent Narvaez from
getting into his house and rice and rice mill. Narvaez asked David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia if they
could talk things over. The latter refusing, Narvaez shot Fleischer with a shotgun as well as Rubia
who was running towards a jeepney where Fleischer's gun was kept. Narvaez was convicted of
homicde, but Narvaez pleaded that the shooting was justified because he was defending his person
and property.

Issue: WON Narvaez should be acquitted on the grounds that he was defending his person and
property.

Held: No. The victim merely violated his property and not his person which in not under the
requisites of self-defense
People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Retubado
Facts:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s younger brother who was
mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. While
Edwin and his father were having dinner, it exploded. The suspect was their neighbor Emmanuel
Caon, Jr. The matter was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an
investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Caon, Jr. was NOT the culprit. The appellant, however, was
bent on confronting Emmanuel Caon, Jr. Thereafter, the father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o. Emmanuel
Caon, Sr., (pedicab driver) was confronted by Jesus when the former was on his way home.
Emmanuel Sr. ignored Jesus so the latter pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Jesus
followed Emmanuel Sr. to his house. His wife, Norberta Caon was in the balcony of their house,
above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Emmanuel
Sr. demanded to know why he was being followed. Jesus told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to
Emmanuel Jr., but Emmanuel Sr. told the appellant that his son was already asleep. Norberta went
down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husbands shoulder to pacify him. Jesus forthwith
pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the
floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Emmanuel was brought to the Tuburan District
Hospital, but he died shortly thereafter. Jesus surrendered to the police but failed to surrender the
firearm he used to kill the victim.

Jesus admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act
with due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death. He testified that when he
insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding
a handgun. Jesus grabbed Emmanuel’s hand, they struggled for the gun but eventually, Emmanuel
fell on his knees. Jesus pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and the gun suddenly
went off. Jesus then rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table.
When he went back to the dining room his sister told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun
and thrown it into the sea.

Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:
1. WON Jesus was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held
criminally liable for the victims death - No!
2. WON Jesus is liable for murder - No! Homicide only

Ruling:
The phrase state of necessity is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the
classical theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation
of grave peril (un mal), actual or imminent (actual o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse
juridical rights (bienes juridicos) such as right to life, honor, the integrity of ones body, and property (la
vida, la integridad corporal, el pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another. It is
indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of
the party invoking the same.

The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 4
of the RPC. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. Whether
the accused acted under a state of necessity is a question
of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

There is no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the
provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the
victim at close range on the forehead. The court came to this conclusion based on:
1. Norberta Caon’s testimony.
2. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he killed the victim
in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
3. The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.
 There is no treachery in the present case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate
treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution
that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of
evidence to support the confluence of the abovementioned conditions.

The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellant,

Vs

JUAN POSADAS, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands, defendant-appellee. G.R.
No. L-34029 February 26, 1931. 55 Phil 715

FACTS:

Standard is a foreign corporation duly authorized to do business in the Philippines. They delivered in
the Philippines for the use of US Army, fuel oil and asphalt. Collector of Internal Revenue demanded
a tax of one and one-half per cent upon the value of the merchandise by virtue of section 1459 of
the Administrative Code and Act No. 3243 of the Philippine Legislature. During the same period
Standard delivered fuel to US Navy to be paid in New York , and which contract provided that all
internal revenue taxes and charges under 21 the laws of the Philippine Islands were to be assumed
and paid by the United States Navy. Collector collected sales tax which was paid by Standard under
protest. Standard sue for refund.

ISSUE:

Whether sales of merchandise made in the Philippines to the United States Army and the United
States Navy are subject to the sales tax?

HELD:

No. It would be absurd to think that a derivative sovereignty like the Government of the Philippine
Islands, could tax the instrumentalities of the very Government which brought it into existence. If a
sovereign State of the American Union cannot abridge or restrict the activities of the United States
Government, much less can a creature of that Government, as the Philippine Government is, do so.
(Note the well-considered opinion of Attorney-General Wickersham of June 8, 1912, appearing in 29
Opinions, Attorneys-General, United States, 442.)Judgment reversed, and the record ordered
returned to the court of origin for further proceedings, without express finding as to costs in either
instance.