Chapter 4

The American and Saudi Cast

Introduction

Based on compact but substantive commentaries and explanations from the U.S. Department of

State and the U.S. White House, the following chapter bridges the discussions of theories in

Chapters 2 and 3 to the analysis of data in the Saudi-U.S. case in the remaining chapters. The

chapter discusses the doctrines of American presidents and provides background information on

key U.S. Department of State officials who interacted with the Saudi government during the period

1941-1973. Likewise, the chapter discusses Saudi kings and state officials who interacted with the

U.S. presidents and U.S. Department of State officials.

On the Saudi side, this student believes that Ibn Saud’s realist views and those of his

successors', vis-à-vis the realist face of U.S. positions in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia

dominated the decisions and actions of the Saudi state in forming its relations and alignment with

the American state. The genesis and critical formation of Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment

happened during the reign of Ibn Saud, a king whose rise to power happened in realist scenarios

dominated by military campaigns, acquisition and consolidation of territory by force, fears of

invasion, and overriding concerns about the survival and security of the new Saudi state. Ibn Saud

became the Saudi leader during an era dominated by conflict, struggle, power, influence and

manipulation. Because of this, one can easily conclude that Ibn Saud was more of a realist. He

viewed neighbouring states as imminent threats to his Kingdom. He quickly understood the

demands and impact of international power politics on the new state of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud’s

views persisted through his successors. They engaged in foreign relations and formed alignments

along the same realist track that guided Ibn Saud. Realists explain that Saudi Kings acted to

protect and secure their multi-dimensional national and international interests, which include
deriving national income and building national wealth from oil resources, seeking political and

economic stability in the Kingdom and the Middle East region, and building military strength and

power. Idealists believe that Saudi idealism promotes and protects Saudi guardianship and

management of Islam’s holiest places of Mecca and Medina and seeks to establish broader

influence and stronger leadership in the community of Islamic nations.

On the U.S. side, one finds a duality in U.S. foreign relations and policies. Realists believe that

the U.S. acts in the Middle East to protect American national and international interests. Realists

explain that the U.S. acts to assure the flow of Middle East oil supplies, continue access to the

massive oil reserves in the region, and maintain strategic military bases in the region to counteract

any threats to security. Idealists say that the U.S. espouses its traditional idealist values. Idealists

explain that the U.S. acts to strengthen its global leadership role by promoting and advancing its

ideal of democracy and its values of freedom, liberty, equality, and peace. This student believes

that in the Saudi-U.S. case, the realist element of U.S. presidential doctrines towards Saudi Arabia

is more evident and dominant than idealism. Given the underlying realist impetus found in the

doctrines of American presidents and the realist upbringing of Saudi kings, the use of the realist

paradigm and realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case becomes more compelling.

Although clothed in idealist/liberalist rhetoric, realist motivations underlay the doctrines of

American presidents. Regardless of how powerful idealist rhetoric clothed the doctrines, a careful

look into them reveals that realist aspects dominated the views and thoughts of American

presidents. World War II and the tensions and conflicts in the post-World War II years occupied

the deliberations, decisions, and actions of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson,

and Nixon in foreign relations and policies. Although economic assistance was a vital tool used by

the U.S. to help rebuild war-ravaged nations and to assist developing nations to modernise, U.S.
military power was a highly-visible tool in America’s quest for global hegemony. Kagan framed

the U.S. positions within the context of U.S. security being dependent on U.S. military power and

reliance on force as tools in international relations.

The U.S. is mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world

where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the
defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of
military might. For the United States, there is nothing timeless about the present
heavy reliance on force as a tool of international relations, nor about the tilt toward
unilateralism and away from a devotion to international law. When the United
States was weak, it practiced strategies of weakness; now that the United States is
powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do (Kagan 2003:3-11).
To more fully understand the Saudi-U.S. relationship and alignment, it is important to view he

U.S. presidents through their doctrines that found expression in U.S. foreign relations and policies.

Although Morgenthau argued that “a realist theory of international politics avoids equating the

foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies” (Morgenthau 1985:7),

Barber argued that a leader’s “worldview consists of his primary, politically relevant beliefs,

particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts of the

time” (Barber 1985 cited Woll 2002: 294). Thus, the doctrines provide vital U.S. leadership

perspectives on international politics. The two drivers are American idealism, which seeks to

spread democracy and capitalism, and American political realism anchored on the use of military

and economic power to support U.S. interests and guard against threats to U.S. national interests

and security (Lipsitz and Speak 1993:75-76). American idealism views the world as

“fundamentally benign and other nations as willing to cooperate for the good of all” (Kegley and

Wittkopf 1987 cited Bardes, Shelley and Schmidt 2003:492). American realism sees the world as

a dangerous environment of nations striving for survival and the U.S. makes its decisions based

solely on what is best for the U.S., without regard for morality (Ibid.). It is often a blend of moral

idealism and political realism that guides U.S. international relations and policies (Ibid: 493).
Perhaps a better characterisation of the U.S. position is that it extols its moral idealism and

understates its realism.

Lipsitz and Speak labeled the American president as ‘the dangerous president’ in the field of

international relations and foreign policy. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the

U.S. Congress, especially the Senate, was more often an equal partner with the U.S. president

foreign relations matters. During Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, the executive branch of the

U.S. government gained more power over U.S. foreign relations and policies, especially on

military issues. The U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936 cited Woll

2002: 311) refers to the “very delicate, plenary, and exclusive power of the president as the sole

organ of the federal government in the field of international relations, a power which does not

require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.” Justice Sutherland represented the majority

view and explained U.S. presidential power in international relations.

It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations,

embarrassment, perhaps serious embarrassment, is to be avoided and success for
our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is made effective through
negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
president a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would
not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved (Ibid: 312).

The U.S. Congress and the judiciary gave the American president wide latitude. Because of this

wide latitude, a president can abuse power and do wide damage by “exploiting public fears,

playing on popular stereotypes, and offering facile solutions to tough problems” (Lipsitz and Speak

1993:539, 547, and 550).

The American Cast

Roosevelt (1933-1945)

By the mid-1920s, overall feelings of economic uncertainty strengthened U.S. leanings toward

isolationism. In the 1930s, isolationists argued that bankers and munitions traders with business

interests in Europe drove U.S. involvement in World War I. The growing isolationist movement of

the 1930s contended that the U.S. should remain neutral, avoid financial dealings with countries at

war, and thus avoid engagement in future wars. Keeping the nation out of the escalating tensions

in Europe and Asia became a key foreign policy goal. While the threat of international fascism

grew, America seemed to focus most of its attention on the severe economic depression that

engulfed the United States.

Roosevelt became president during the Great Depression when the U.S. and international

economies were in shambles. Roosevelt sought neutrality legislation to keep the U.S. out of World

War II. The U.S. Congress legislated neutrality acts to try to prevent U.S. engagements in

international conflict. By 1940, U.S. policy began to shift from neutrality to non-belligerency. In

1941, the early years of World War II, Roosevelt continued to espouse America’s idealist/liberalist

values through his declaration of the ‘Four Freedoms’: freedom of speech and expression, freedom

of religion; freedom from want; and freedom from fear. Felice emphasises that the four freedoms

were the “global moral framework used to base a restructuring of international relations after

World War II” (Felice 2005: par.5). Similar to Wilson after World War I, an idealist but pragmatic

Roosevelt believed that “national security and economic prosperity depended upon the creation of

a cooperative world system based on ethical principles (Ibid). Roosevelt explained that, “sole

focus on the assertion of military power could not result in security and stability” (op.cit, par.7)

and that “constant fear did not create secure rule but instability and insecurity” (Ibid). Instead of

militarism, Roosevelt sounded the liberalist creed of freedom and democracy to ensure global
security. Roosevelt’s idealism appeared to be a political response to domestic pressures for the

U.S. to be more isolationist and neutral. On the other hand, there also was pressure on Roosevelt to

help its ally Great Britain with the war in Europe. Rosmaita explained the idealist-realist dilemma

that faced the U.S. president and how he resolved it.

While Hitler promised to bring to the world a "new order" at the barrel of a gun,
FDR offered an alternative vision of a new order--one predicated upon hope, rather
than fear, opportunity rather than enslavement, free expression rather than
repression, and cooperation rather than domination. The strength of the United
States lay not merely in its geographic remoteness from the European battlefield but
in the philosophic gulf that separated American liberty from European despotism,
tyranny, and greed. The primary interests of European powers stemmed from their
imperial and despotic ambitions, which were not those of the United States. Thus,
America restrained itself from alliances with any European power, lest the United
States become the unwitting instrument of a foreign government's self-interest.
FDR saw the war that erupted in 1939 as an ideological struggle which struck the
very foundations of democracy itself. FDR fervently maintained that the threat of
fascism was not limited to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of European
nations; it also threatened the elaborate extra-territorial empires of the major
European powers. FDR concluded that the US had an inherent obligation, which
overrode the dictates in the U.S. to actively aid Britain in its struggle against
fascism. FDR's calculation, however, while valid, overemphasized the ideological
variable, to the detriment of the catalytic constant of European politics: the
promotion and preservation of self-interest through the exercise of realpolitik
(Rosmaita 1994: pars.4-5).

On December 7, 1941, seemingly without provocation, the Japanese attacked the U.S. naval and air

bases at Hawaii’s Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt had no choice but to engage in war. At that moment,

realist concerns about survival and security, military power, territory and spheres of influence

trumped Roosevelt’s idealist dreams. As World War II ended, meetings among the victorious

Allied powers created the framework for the postwar world. Two major issues were important in

postwar U.S. foreign policy: the prevention of another global conflict and the impact of nuclear

weapons on the international balance of power. Towards the end of the war, the great powers,

U.S., Great Britain, and Russia, promoted the idea that nations united against common enemies

would assure a more peaceful society and avoid the dangers of falling back on a ‘balance of
power’ system. At the 1945 Yalta Conference, Roosevelt seemingly enunciated the idealist

position of cooperation and abandonment of realist positions. Roosevelt wanted a structure of

“arrangements for mutual action against aggressors” (U.S. White House 2009, Franklin D.

Roosevelt 1933-1945: par.8).

Roosevelt emphasised that the U.S. [Great Britain and Russia] “have to take responsibility for

world collaboration...or bear the responsibility for another world conflict” and that “unilateral

actions, exclusive alliances, spheres of influence, and balances of power have been tried for

centuries and have always failed” (Roosevelt 1945 cited Denson 2007:par.39). However,

according to Denson, Roosevelt was a ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ leader, promoting peace and cooperation

on one hand while allowing Machiavellian designs to lurk underneath liberalist rhetoric on the

other hand. Denson reached this conclusion based on another account of the Yalta negotiations. In

that account, Roosevelt suggested that the ‘Big Four World Policemen’ would be America, Great

Britain, Soviet Russia and China. Apparently, Roosevelt stated privately to his key advisers that

Soviet Russia and America would be the two super powers and would actually be in charge of the

proposed United Nations organisation (Hoopes and Brinkley 1997 cited Denson 2007: pars.32-33).

This tied in closely to Walter Lippman’s 1943 realpolitik argument that the formula for peace was

not a new League of Nations but a basic alliance of the United States, Britain and Russia. Hoopes

and Brinkley emphasised Lippman’s contention that,

No other nations were serious factors in the world power equation. China and
France were not great powers. Only Britain and Russia were strong enough to
threaten U.S. security, but given America’s close ties to Britain, there was no risk
from that quarter. The only real danger was a falling out with Russia, but peace and
stability required that this be avoided at all costs, for an Anglo-American alliance
against Russia would set the stage ‘inexorably’ for a third world war (Ibid).

Truman (1945-1953)
 At the end of World War II, the United States and Soviet Russia in fact were the military,

economic, and political superpowers of the world. As the Soviets became the dominant power in

Eastern Europe, the U.S. led the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a

Western alliance to balance against the increased power and influence of the Soviets. In 1947, as a

response to the perceived threat and danger posed by the Soviet Union in Turkey and Greece,

Truman enunciated his ‘doctrine’. The doctrine certainly was idealist at face value but driven by

concerns about dangers and threats to the survival, security, and stability of the West and its allies,

which are basic realist motivations.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the
creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way
of life free from coercion. We shall not realize these objectives unless we are
willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national
integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian
regimes. This is a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes undermine the
foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. Our
way of life is based upon the will of the majority and is distinguished by free
institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual
liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression
(Truman 1947 cited Gettleman and Schaar 2003:246).

Truman used the ideological argument that the Cold War was a choice between freedom and

oppression. The 1947 Truman doctrine viewed “communism as a monolithic force controlled by

Russia and threats of totalitarianism engulfing the world” (Gettleman and Schaar 2003:246).

The U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, explained the intricacies of the Truman

doctrine that clearly has roots in realist considerations. From the U.S. view, decisions and actions

by the Soviet Union posed threats and instability in the region. According to the Office of the

Historian, four realist considerations worsened U.S. views and relations toward the Soviet Union.

First was the failure of the Soviets to abide by the 1943 Tehran Declaration to withdraw their

troops from northern Iran in early 1946. Second were Soviet efforts to pressure Iran to grant oil
concessions to the Soviets while supposedly fomenting irredentism by Azerbaijani separatists in

northern Iran. Third were Soviet efforts to force Turkey to grant the Soviets base and transit rights

through the Turkish Straits. Fourth was the Soviet rejection of the Baruch plan for international

control over nuclear energy and weapons (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian,

Milestones: 1945-1952, The Truman Doctrine: par.3). Just as important, Truman used the decline

of British power and influence, represented by the withdrawal of British military and economic

assistance to Greece, as the catalyst for reorienting U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis U.S. national

security and U.S. interests.

American national security now depended upon more than just the physical security
of American territory. In a sharp break with its traditional avoidance of extensive
foreign commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere during peacetime, the
Truman Doctrine committed the United States to assist in preserving the political
integrity of democratic nations when deemed to be in the best interest of the United
States (Ibid, par.6).

According to the Office of the Historian, Truman argued that a Communist victory in the Greek

Civil War would endanger the political stability of Turkey, which would undermine the political

stability of the Middle East, a region of immense strategic importance to U.S. national security.

The doctrine argued further that, “the spread of authoritarianism would undermine the foundations

of international peace and hence the security of the United States (Ibid: pars.4-5).

The U.S. Department of State concluded that the Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S.

foreign policy: “away from its usual position of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly

involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts by providing

political, military and economic assistance to democratic nations under threat from external or

internal authoritarian forces” (Ibid, par.1).

The Truman Doctrine was not just about ‘containment’ but also challenged Soviet ambitions.

The Truman Doctrine and foreign policy grew out of Kennan’s argument, which is characterised as
realist, that the U.S. should follow a policy of ‘containment’ to stop Russian expansion of power.

Kennan argued for the "adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly

shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet

policy" (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: Kennan and Containment,

1947:par.2). Counter-force would "promote tendencies, which must eventually find their outlet in

either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power" (Ibid). Kennan considered the

Soviet threat to be primarily political and advocated for the use of economic assistance

psychological warfare. The Office of the Historian pointed out two opposite criticisms of

Kennan’s position.

Dulles criticised Kennan's policy as being too defensive. Dulles argued for the
‘rollback’ of Soviet power and the eventual ‘liberation’ of Eastern Europe. Nitze
saw the Soviet threat primarily in military terms and interpreted Kennan's call for
"the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force" to mean the use of military
power (Ibid, par.3).

However, the Office of the Historian concluded that “despite all the criticisms and various policy

defeats that Kennan suffered in the early 1950's, each succeeding administration after Truman's,

until the collapse of communism in 1989, adopted a variation of Kennan's containment policy and

made it their own” (Ibid, par.4).

In the Middle East, despite strong opposition from his advisers and Arab states such as Saudi

Arabia, Truman decided to support the partition of Palestine and the new state of Israel. This

single decision started a conflict between Arab states and Israel, which persists through today and

finds the U.S. caught in the horns of a dilemma. Despite continuous efforts to find a solution, a

lasting peace in the Middle East does not exist. The threat of war continues.

Other major foreign relations decisions by Truman reflected the prevalence of conflict, which

resulted in realist decisions. In 1948, the massive U.S. airlift of supplies to West Berliners made
the Russians back down from their blockade of West Berlin. In 1949, Truman negotiated the

creation of NATO, a military alliance to protect Western nations. In 1950, Truman spoke strongly

against communist aggression by North Korea: “whatever had to be done to meet this aggression

had to be done; there was no suggestion from anyone that either the United Nations or the United

States could back away from it” (United States White House 2009, Harry S. Truman: pars.10-11).

Eisenhower (1953-1961)

Concerns about the growing power of the Soviet Union and the international spread of

communism dominated most foreign policy decisions during the Eisenhower administration (U.S.

Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones1953-1960: Entrenchment of a Bi-Polar

Foreign Policy, par.1). He faced challenges on how to ease the conflicts, threats and tensions of

the Cold War, especially threats to both the U.S. and Soviet Russia, and the world because of the

development of American and Russian hydrogen bombs. Similar to Roosevelt and Truman,

Eisenhower negotiated from a realist position of military strength in seeking the idealist goal of

world peace. Eisenhower wanted to halt any socialist tendencies in the U.S. and to blunt

communist advances abroad.

Similar to Truman who use the Greek crisis as the catalyst for his doctrine, Eisenhower used the

1956 Suez Crisis as the catalyst to advance his doctrine. The Suez Crisis forced the U.S. to enter

the Middle East arena in a substantial manner. The use of military power and force by France,

Great Britain, and Israel, all of whom were recognised U.S. allies, resulted in greater Arab hostility

towards the West. According to the Office of the Historian, Eisenhower believed that Great

Britain and France lost prestige and power in the region and left “a power vacuum in the Middle

East” (Ibid, par.2), which opened the door for the Soviet Union to gain regional influence,

especially through Egypt and Syria. Eisenhower had no choice but to espouse his doctrine and rush
to fill the power vacuum perceived by the U.S. The 1957 doctrine came at the time when the “U.S.

emerged as the uncontested Western power in the Middle East” (Gendzier 1997 cited Gettleman

and Schaar 2003:248). The doctrine addressed U.S. fears of links between communism and radical

nationalism in the Middle East. In trying to neutralise the advances and threats of communism in

the region, Eisenhower linked the realist notion of U.S. national security with the security of

nations friendly to and allied with the U.S.

The national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own security.
The United States has manifested in many endangered areas its purpose to support
free and independent governments and peace against external menace, notably the
menace of international communism. We have helped to maintain peace and
security during a period of great danger. It is now essential that the United States
manifest our determination to assist those nations of the Mid-East area, which
desire that assistance (Eisenhower 1957 cited Ibid).
Eisenhower proposed the development of economic power and strength and power in Middle

East countries to protect against the threat of international communism. However, reflecting realist

considerations in his decisions, he authorised programs of military assistance and cooperation and

the use of U.S. armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political

independence of Middle East nations that requested such aid. Eisenhower singled out the Soviet

threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. forces "to secure and protect the

territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt

armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism" (U.S. Department of

State, Office of the Historian, Milestones 1953-1960: The Eisenhower Doctrine 1957: par.1). The

Eisenhower doctrine sought containment of the radical Arab nationalism of Nasser who the

Americans believed stood strongly with Soviet Russia. By offering military and economic aid and

U.S. protection to Arab states, the U.S. wanted Arab governments to align or ally with the U.S.,

isolate Nasser, and blunt any Soviet attempts to dominate the Middle East region.
 What differentiated the Eisenhower Doctrine was its concept of massive military retaliation, a

hard realist position. The doctrine emphasised the use of nuclear weapons to contain communism,

threatening any Soviet aggression or spread of communism with massive retaliation.

In order to counterbalance the Soviet threat, President Eisenhower supported a

doctrine of massive retaliation, which called for the development of technology
necessary to match and even surpass Soviet nuclear capability. Recognizing that
nuclear war was a last resort, U.S. officials supported engaging in conventional
limited wars. In an effort to prepare for potential military conflicts, President
Eisenhower exercised unprecedented executive authority in deploying the U.S.
military abroad, without specific authorization from the U.S. Congress (U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones1953-1960: Entrenchment
of a Bi-Polar Foreign Policy: par.2).

Kennedy (1961-1963)

Kennedy, a liberalist thinker, sought to bring back America’s sense of idealism to the world

arena. Kennedy believed that the global issue was ‘freedom under God against a ruthless godless

tyranny’. He devised programs such as the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps to assist

developing nations. Kennedy felt that America had lost ground and international prestige during

the Eisenhower administration. However, he showed realist concern about the balance of

economic and military power, pointing out that the Soviets were narrowing the U.S. economic lead

and that Eisenhower had allowed the Soviets to get ahead in installing intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBMs), which created a ‘missile gap’. Kennedy de-emphasized Eisenhower's massive

retaliation doctrine. For Kennedy, the realist doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ proved too stringent

and binding. He devised the doctrine of ‘flexible response’, which aimed to give the U.S.

president other options to fight communism. Kennedy wanted an option other than all out nuclear

war or humiliation. The options retained a realist orientation. He favored a policy of

strengthening the nation's capacity to fight wars with conventional arms because he believed that

the Soviets would use indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation, subversion, and internal
revolution to erode the free world steadily through limited wars (Bagby 1999:218, 222). Decisions

and actions by Kennedy reflect substantial realist positions. He supported a failed effort by Cuban

exiles to use military invasion and force to overthrow Cuban President Castro. In 1962, facing a

clear threat of nuclear war, Kennedy decided to quarantine all offensive weapons bound for Cuba,

which forced the Russians to remove its offensive missiles in Cuba. When the Soviet Union

erected the Berlin Wall, a symbol of Soviet pressure in Central Europe, Kennedy reinforced the

Berlin garrison and increased U.S. military strength. Kennedy signed a nuclear test ban treaty in

1963 that reinforced Kennedy’s idealist vision of peace, one which is "a world of law and free

choice, banishing the world of war and coercion" (United States White House 2009, John F.

Kennedy par.10).

During Kennedy’s short-lived presidency, he faced three main issues relative to the Middle East

and Saudi Arabia. Clearly, they tended toward realist considerations: Iran’s internal security and

stability, Israel’s push for more U.S. military arms and weapons systems, and a desire to improve

U.S. relations with the Arab world, particularly with a militant Nasser. However, “the

administration moved slowly to establish a new policy toward these countries, accepting the

traditional U.S. approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute pursued during the Eisenhower

administration” (U.S. Department of State, 95/01/17 Foreign Relations, Vol XVII, 1961-63, Near

East: par.1). Recognising the potential danger of the collapse of the Shah of Iran, which would

disrupt the balance of power in the region, Kennedy continued U.S. support of the Shah but urged

him to initiate economic and social reform. After Israel’s reprisal attack on Syria in March 1961,

Israel strongly claimed threats to its security relative to its claim of sovereignty over the Lake

Tiberias territory and water project. This eventually led to Kennedy’s decision to sell advanced

missile systems to Israel. This resulted in the U.S. becoming Israel’s main major arms supplier
and an acceleration of an ‘arms race’ between Israel and Arab states. Kennedy moved to improve

relations with Nasser through an “expansion in various forms of U.S. assistance in order to develop

a relationship of economic cooperation” (Ibid, par.35). The U.S. wanted to shift Nasser’s attention

to Egypt’s and the UAR’s domestic problems and away from troublesome military and political

adventures that threatened the stability and security of the region. The UAR broke apart in

September 1961, which triggered U.S. fears of war. The U.S. watched if Nasser suppressed the

rebellion by force: “Egyptian troop movements were detected, the United States kept close watch

over Egyptian ports; however, the U.S. refrained from remonstrating with Nasser; it pleased the

U.S. when Nasser decided to avoid bloodshed” (Ibid, par.47).

Johnson (1963-1969)

The Vietnam War preoccupied Johnson, especially during the final years of his presidency.

Additionally, the U.S. invaded the Dominican Republic and intervened in that nation, which forced

Johnson to explain U.S. intervention and set forth his doctrine. Fearing another communist state in

close proximity to the U.S., Johnson drew on the notions of containment, collective security, and

the defeat of the international communist movement to explain the U.S. position and his doctrine.

Johnson declared in his May 1965 speech that the U.S. will not allow the establishment of another

Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. However, by intervening in the Dominican

Republic, the U.S. set aside Roosevelt’s ‘good neighbor’ policy and undermined Kennedy’s

idealistic vision of hemispheric partnership. Johnson’s efforts to maintain ‘collective security’

caused great controversy in the U.S. and the world. The Vietnam War and the intervention in the

Dominican Republic exposed a deep contradiction between U.S. beliefs in democracy and self-

determination and overt U.S. intervention in other nations’ civil wars.

 The U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, identified two goals of U.S. policy in the

Near East during Johnson’s administration: “to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence in

the strategically located and oil-rich region; to promote peace and stability and avoid being drawn

into either inter-Arab or Arab-Israeli disputes” (United States Department of State, Office of the

Historian, FRUS Vol. XXI, Near East Region, 1964-1968: par.1). The eruption of the June 1967

War in the Middle East and the failure to find a lasting solution to the Arab-Israel conflict

worsened the international problems faced by the Johnson administration: “U.S. policy objectives

in the Middle East were to participate in efforts to salvage an enduring peace from the war, limit

the flow of arms to the area, and discourage Israel from adding the significant new element of

nuclear arms into the mix” (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, FRUS Volume XX

Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968: 2).

The United Nations mediation effort with strong U.S. support achieved nothing,
despite the sustained efforts of UN Special Representative Jarring. Behind the
scenes negotiations between Israel and Jordan, also fostered by the United States,
proved sterile. U.S. determination to sharply limit the flow of U.S. weapons to
potential combatants crumbled. Israel and Jordan rearmed their forces with U.S.
weaponry; the U.S. emerged as the primary source of military supplies for Israel
(Ibid, 3).

U.S. influence waned as Arab states identified America with Israel, while the Soviet Union took

advantage of the situation to champion the Arab cause. Added to the mix, Palestinian ‘freedom

fighters’, ‘terrorists’ according to Israel and the West, attacked Israel from their bases in Syria and

Jordan. Terrorist attacks happened outside of the Middle East, in places like Rome and Athens.

Nixon (1969-1974)

Nixon entered office during a time of deep national division in the U.S. caused by the

Vietnam War. Nixon sought resolution of the Vietnam War by decreasing the number of

troops on the ground; however he extended air raids into Cambodia and Laos (U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1969-1976 Détente, par.1). This

further deepened American anxieties and fears about total entrapment in a war that had no

end in sight. Nixon wanted a political solution that shifted the responsibility of the war

from the U.S. to the South Vietnamese, which allowed the United States to gradually

withdraw its troops from Vietnam. This solution was not successful. However, in 1973,

the United States was able to negotiate a peace agreement with communist North Vietnam.

The U.S. military withdrew from South Vietnam, which soon fell to the North. In effect,

the U.S. suffered a serious military, political, and ideological defeat at the hands of the

communist North Vietnamese.

While the Nixon administration worked to end the Vietnam War, National Security Adviser and

Secretary of State Kissinger worked toward achieving détente with the Soviet Union. A realist in

his quest for world stability, Nixon nevertheless engaged diplomatic means to improve relations

with the Soviet Union and China. In 1972, he visited Beijing and Moscow and reduced tensions

with both states. Summit meetings with Russia’s Brezhnev resulted in a further treaty to limit

strategic nuclear weapons. Arms limitation talks with the Soviets reduced military spending,

established formal commitments to future discussions between the two powers, and increased the

overall sense of global security (Ibid, par.2). The U.S. State Department Office of the Historian

explained that the Nixon doctrine of détente was the president’s response to shifts in the global

balance of power. The doctrine was in response to multi-polarity and a perceived decline in U.S.

power. Kissinger’s ‘hard’ realism, anchored on the ‘balance of power’ concept, was the main

influence on policy throughout the Nixon administration. Nixon and Kissinger believed that

national interests, rather than ideals, measured in terms of security and power should govern

international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. Realism provided Nixon and Kissinger with an
understanding of geostrategy and a negotiating approach that fueled their pursuit of détente with

the Soviet Union. The Nixon doctrine stated that détente depended upon a mutual recognition of

power and national interest.

The Middle East was unsettled and dangerous as the situation in Vietnam when Nixon became

U.S. president. Despite being able to achieve an end to the Vietnam War and his success in using

détente to thaw relations with the Soviet Union and China, the Nixon administration continued to

face tension, conflict, and the continued threat of war in the Middle East. In October 1973, the

Yom Kippur War erupted followed by a crippling Arab oil embargo.

United States Secretaries of State

The following abbreviated information on the U.S. State Secretaries came from the Department

History section of the U.S. Department of State. These are the Secretaries of State who served

during the focus years of this research: 1941-1973.

Cordell Hull (1933 March 4 to 1944 November 20) achieved prominence as an advocate of

trade liberalisation and the United Nations. A firm believer in Wilson’s vision of liberal

internationalism, Hull believed that free trade promoted international peace and prosperity.

Roosevelt greatly circumscribed Hull’s role in foreign policy.

Edward Stettinius, Jr. (1944 December 1 to 1945 June 27) served Roosevelt and Truman. He

oversaw the end of World War II in Europe and the creation of the United Nations. Stettinius had

extensive foreign policy experience, which he gained from roles in war production, national

defense, and his work as chief Lend-Lease administrator and Special Assistant to the President.

James Byrnes (1945 July 3 to 1947 January 21) led the Department of State during the

transition from World War II to the Cold War. A skilled policymaker, Byrnes spent much of his
time away from Washington meeting with foreign leaders. Being uncertain of his own aptitude in

foreign policy, Truman initially placed a great deal of confidence in Byrnes. However, Byrnes’

influence and control over U.S. foreign policy waned because of disagreements with Truman over

how forceful the U.S. should be against the Soviet Union. Byrnes was a proponent of using the

atomic bomb against Japan. It was during Byrnes’ tenure that Kennan published his famous 1946

“Long Telegram,” which advocated a change in policy towards the Soviets. Byrnes and Truman

and Byrnes implemented changes swiftly and laid the foundations of the policy of ‘containment’

against the Soviets.

George Marshall (1947 January 8 to 1949 January 20) earned a strong reputation as an

administrator who successfully transformed a small peacetime army into a strong wartime force

while coordinating Allied operations. Marshall was adept at negotiating with Congress and other

members of the executive branch. He led the effort to formulate and secure congressional support

for the massive Marshall Plan aid package for Western Europe in post World War II. During his

tenure as Secretary of State, the U.S. negotiated the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Marshall served Truman without

objection except for a critical disagreement with Truman on recognising the new state of Israel.

Dean Acheson (1949 January 21 to 1953 January 20) supported the ‘containment’ of

communism and the tenets of the Truman Doctrine. Characterised as a realist, he recognised that

the Soviet Union was not only an ideological opponent, but also a viable global power that posed a

serious geopolitical challenge to U.S. interests.

John Foster Dulles (1953 January 21 to 1959 April 15) served under Eisenhower and left an

indelible mark upon U.S. foreign policy, which included close cooperation between the

Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and a focus upon international
mutual security agreements or alliances to contain communism. During his tenure, the consensus

in U.S. policy was that containment of communism would maintain peace. This allowed Dulles

and Eisenhower to secure international mutual security agreements while reducing the number of

troops in the U.S. military and the production of conventional weapons. Dulles confronted many

foreign policy challenges, including the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. One of his last directives was the

formulation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in response to the Suez Crisis and the balance of power in

the Middle East. The Eisenhower Doctrine used key tenets of Dulles’ foreign relations and policy

views: containment and international mutual security agreements or alliances reinforced by

economic aid.

Christian Herter (1959 April 22 to 1961 January 20) helped oversee U.S. diplomacy during

the 1958 invasion of Lebanon. Prior to becoming Secretary of State, he chaired the congressional

committee that initiated proposals that led to the Marshall Plan. He founded the Middle East

Institute in 1947, and served as a trustee of the World Peace Foundation.

Dean Rusk (1961 January 21 to 1969 January 20) served under Kennedy and Johnson. Prior

to being Secretary of State, he headed the Rockefeller Foundation from 1952 to 1961. Rusk

perceived the world of the 1960s as one of revolutionary changes that established new nations. He

believed that U.S. foreign policy should provide emerging nations with technical and humanitarian

assistance to speed them nations along the path toward modernity and democracy. Rusk advocated

‘dignified diplomacy’ that emphasised civility and communication between the United States and

the Soviet Union. Rusk’s diplomatic orientation and his ability to evaluate and judge competing

points of view defused tensions during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and contributed

toward the successful negotiation of the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
 William Rogers (1969 January 22 to 1973 September 23) served under Nixon. Rogers

promoted a cease-fire in the Middle East in 1970 that held until the 1973 war. Rogers tried hard to

broker a lasting peace settlement between Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the Palestinian refugees.

In 1969, Rogers unveiled the “Rogers Plan” that called for collective action on the part of the U.S.,

the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France to implement U.N. Resolution 242 that ended the

Third Arab-Israeli War. The concerned parties were unable to agree on a suitable framework for

implementing Rogers’ initiative, which led to the outbreak of the Fourth Arab-Israeli War or Yom

Kippur War in October 1973.

Henry Alfred Kissinger (1973 September 21 to 1977 January 20) served under Nixon as

both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, the first person to hold both positions

simultaneously. The October War of 1973 played a major role in shaping Kissinger’s tenure as

Secretary of State. He worked to ensure that Israel received an airlift of U.S. military supplies,

which helped Israel turn the war in its favor. However, it also led the Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) to initiate a crippling oil embargo against the U.S. and its allies.

After the implementation of a United Nations sponsored ceasefire, Kissinger launched a series of

‘shuttle diplomacy’ missions, in which he traveled between various Middle East capitals to reach

disengagement agreements between the enemy combatants. These efforts produced an agreement

in January 1974 between Egypt and Israel and between Syria and Israel in May 1974. His efforts

helped OPEC’s decision to lift the oil embargo.

American Envoys, Ministers, and Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia

The U.S. established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia on February 4, 1940 when Bert

Fish presented his credentials as American Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,

accredited to Egypt and resident at Cairo. The U.S. established the American Legation in Jidda on

May 1, 1942, with James S. Moose, Jr., as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim. The Legation became an
Embassy on March 18, 1949, when J. Rives Childs presented his credentials as Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. On Sep 26, 1984, the U.S. Liaison Office in Riyadh became

and Embassy and the Embassy in Jidda became a Consulate General (U.S. Department of State,

Office of the Historian 2010:1). The following list of envoys, ministers, and ambassadors to Saudi

Arabia came from the Department History section of the U.S. Department of State. These were the

persons who occupied the ministerial or ambassadorial positions during the focus years of this

research: 1941-1973.

Bert Fish (1939-1941) Envoy and Minister

Alexander Kirk (1941-1943) Envoy and Minister
James Moose (1943-1944) Minister and Resident/Foreign Service officer
William Eddy (1944-1946) Envoy and Minister
James Childs (April 1946-1949) Envoy and Minister
James Childs (1949-1950) Ambassador
Raymond Hare (1950-1953) Ambassador
George Wadsworth (1953-1958) Ambassador
Donald Heath (1957-1961) Ambassador
Parker Thompson Hart (1961-1965) Ambassador

Hermann Frederick Eilts (1965-1970) Ambassador

Nicholas Gilman Thacher (1970-1973) Ambassador
James Elmer Akins (1973-1975) Ambassador

William Eddy: U.S. Diplomat and Arabist

In the 1940s, Arabists in the U.S. Department of State were “highly professional diplomats who

worked in Arab lands, spoke the language, and brought with them experience and insight into an

exotic civilization unknown to most Americans; being labelled an Arabist denoted diplomatic and

intellectual achievement” (Neff 1995:par.8). According to Neff,

The Arabists were highly trained and sophisticated elite, dedicated and loyal, who
prided themselves on their language skills and meticulous professionalism. Any
balanced review of their various reports and studies over the past half-century
shows how stunningly prescient they often were (Ibid, par.11).

Eddy belonged to this respected group. Considered by many as a consummate ‘Arabist’, Eddy

earned Ibn Saud’s trust and confidence. Eddy forged strong personal relations with Ibn Saud. He
even wore traditional Arab garb at his first meeting with Ibn Saud, in which he displayed

extraordinary knowledge of Saudi culture. Of all the chiefs of mission to Saudi Arabia, Eddy

played the most critical role in communicating and explaining Saudi views and positions to the

U.S. Department of State and U.S. thoughts and policies to the Saudi king. According to Lippman

(2008a) Eddy was an ‘Arabian Knight’. Eddy was a valuable asset in the conduct of Saudi-U.S

relations and helped greatly in the alignment of the two states. Lippman explained that “the State

Department, the War Department and the White House wanted an Arabic speaker with intelligence

experience to go to Saudi Arabia to open a new frontier in American strategic interests. Eddy was

sort of an all-purpose intelligence and State Department political officer. Eddy was already in

place and he became the de facto ambassador in Jeddah” (Lippman 2008b: response to question 3,

par.4). He succeeded the first U.S. resident diplomat in Jeddah, James Moose, because Ibn Saud’s

advisors felt that Moose was not enthusiastic enough about a meeting between Roosevelt and Ibn

Saud.

So they pulled Moose out and they put Eddy in his place. Eddy was already there,
he spoke Arabic, he was known to the King; he was trusted by the State
Department, he had intelligence experience, and he was obviously interested in
Saudi Arabia. They elevated the status of the post to minister counselor, the
equivalent of ambassador (Ibid, response to question 4, par.2).

Lippman provided his insights about Eddy. He showed powerful management and diplomatic

skills in arranging and coordinating the historic meeting. After the meeting, Eddy was a major

contributor to producing the results that both leaders wanted for their states.

Eddy made those things happen. The most immediate was the development of a
strategic airbase for the United States in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. It
became a cornerstone of the relationship between the two countries for decades
after that. The other was establishing a permanent relationship between the United
States and the Kingdom, in which the King came to trust Americans. It made
possible the survival of this relationship after Truman accepted the partition of
Israel and recognized it in 1948 (Ibid, response to question 6, par.2).
 Eddy felt strongly that financial and economic collapse in Saudi Arabia would drive it back to

the British sphere of influence, which probably meant that the U.S. would be excluded from Saudi

oil concessions. He actively participated in negotiating U.S. financial and economic help for Saudi

Arabia, in which U.S. loans to the kingdom were repaid with Saudi oil. Lippman also pointed out

that Eddy broke the British communications monopoly: “he opened the door to the first

introduction into Saudi Arabia of American companies that went out there to build the

infrastructure of the country” (Ibid, par.3).

Eddy objected strongly to British and U.S. support for Israel, which Arabs saw as an illegal and

expansionist state created in Palestine. Within that context, Eddy was a realist. However, he also

spoke as an idealist. Eddy felt strongly that the U.S. should form a spiritual alliance with Islam.

Lippman explained that,

Eddy didn’t see the relationship with Saudi Arabia as a tactical arrangement in
which people would make money and sell weapons. It could be that, but he actually
had a much grander vision of an almost spiritual alliance between the Christian
world and the Muslim world, in which two groups of monotheists would in effect
unite around what they had in common rather than around their differences. Not
only would there not be a clash of civilizations, but there would be a harmony of
civilizations (Ibid, response to question 8, par.1).

The influence of Arabists such as Eddy waned as the U.S. strengthened its relations and support

for Israel. The decline started with Truman’s decision to support the partition of Palestine and the

creation of the state of Israel. Eddy resigned in 1947 because of Truman's decision. The realist in

Eddy warned that an Israel-U.S. alliance in Palestine would inflame the Muslim world. He was

right.

Every major U.S foreign affairs or defense institution: the State Department, the
Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and all of the top foreign
affairs advisers including Secretary of State Marshall, opposed Truman's pro-Israel
policies. Their opposition was not against Israel per se but rather what they
recognized as the realities in the region. They predicted, and history since has
proven, that the realities led to massive bloodshed, decades of turmoil and a
 skewing of U.S. interests after Truman's pro-Israel policies prevailed (Neff 1995:
par.10).

The label ‘Arabist’ took on more negative connotations and became synonymous with being anti-

Israel. Parker explained that by the time of Nixon’s presidency,

If ever there was a body that was frozen out of the serious policy decisions it was
the Arabists, who were regarded with suspicion by their American colleagues as
well as by American Jews and other supporters of Israel. Not only were the
Arabists a fringe group within a Department of State that was itself largely
powerless on this issue, but they were afraid to speak out for fear of being accused
of anti-Semitism (Parker 1995 cited Ibid, par.4).

The Saudi Cast

Ibn Saud

Peterson (1990:1443) emphasised that it is undeniable that the modern Saudi state exists

because of Ibn Saud. Peterson pointed out that many published materials by Saudi writers such as

Almana (1980) and Prince Torki M. Saud Al Saud (1982) and Western biographers such as Rihani

(1983) and Howarth (1964) praised Ibn Saud and observers of the Middle East, including

Americans, considered Ibn Saud as the outstanding Arab leader of his time. Metz described Ibn

Saud as a political, military, and religious leader.

A traditional Arab clan leader who held the loyalty of various tribes because of his
spectacular successes, Abd al Aziz was also a Wahhabi imam who held the intense
loyalty of the Ikhwan [warriors]. Abd al Aziz took on the responsibilities of
Khadim al Haramayn (servant of the two shrines in Makkah and Madinah) and
assumed an important position in the wider Muslim world. By maintaining his
authority [even while being] under pressure from the Western powers, Abd al Aziz
had become the only truly independent Arab leader after World War I. Thus, he had
a role to play in Arab politics as well (Metz 1992, Nation Building: the Rule of Abd
Al Aziz, 1926-1953: par.1)

Ibn Saud was a consensus builder, relying on a mix of his ability to reason with others and his

reputation as a bold and victorious warrior. Metz cited two examples from which one can draw that

Ibn Saud used both a consultative style and Machiavellian manipulation to accomplish his goals.
 Once the Hijaz was under his control, he submitted to the world Muslim
community, even if only rhetorically, the question of how the area should be ruled.
When he received no response, he held an informal referendum in which the
notables of the Hijaz chose him as their king (Ibid, par.2). Abd al Aziz was careful
not to make more enemies than necessary and he tried to make enemies he had
into friends. One can see this in his handling of two rivals from World War I, the
Rashidi of Hail and the Sharif of Mecca. After conquering Hail, Abd al Aziz
reestablished the marriage links that his ancestor, Turki, first forged between the
two families by marrying three of the Rashidi widows. He made a similar effort to
gain the favor of the Hashemites after taking the Hijaz. Rather than expelling the
family as a future threat, Abd al Aziz gave some of its members large tracts of
land, enabling them to stay in the area and prosper (Ibid, par.6)

Ibn Saud lived the realities of a region subjected to tribal-familial conflicts and foreign military

interventions. War gave birth to the Saudi state. His subsequent experiences and interactions with

the British in the early years of his leadership reinforced Ibn Saud’s concerns with survival,

security, stability, and power. Although Saudi Arabia never became a colony and never

experienced the direct control of any European power, Ibn Saud still saw and felt the colonial and

imperialist policies of Britain or, worse, its ambivalence towards him when he finally took over

Mecca and Medina in 1924 (Ibid, par.7).

Unifying rival and often warring tribes was a major accomplishment for Ibn Saud. He united

Arabia permanently. Ibn Saud and the Saudi state were one. People thought of him as the Saudi

state. Philby described the unified Saudi Arabia as “united as never before, within the utmost

limits practicable in the international circumstances of the time, and exceeding anything which any

of his ancestors had effectively controlled” (Philby1955:292). Van der Meulen explained that,

Following the example of Arabia's greatest son, the Prophet of Islam, Ibn Sa'ud had
used a force that was both religious and political. Once his state had expanded it
proved impossible to keep it shut off from the outside world. Nor did Ibn Sa'ud
wish that it should be. With him there was no reluctance to follow the way he took
(Van der Meulen 1957:248-249).

Ibn Saud was highly confident in his ability and power to lead. However, although Ibn Saud was

“by temperament a democrat familiar with the processes of common consultation, which were an
integral element of Arab life, his new status as an international figure confronted him with

problems of an unfamiliar type” and for which “his past experience provided no guide” (Ibid).

Perhaps, this is why Abir described Ibn Saud as “reluctant to delegate authority and tended to

identify the kingdom with himself” (Abir 1988:64).

Abir believed that the nomadic Saudi society of the past was traditionally democratic; however,

the government after 1930 could be considered “paternalistic and authoritarian rather than, as

described by some authors, a 'desert democracy'” (Abir 1988:64). Abir explained.

Policy decisions were usually adopted through deliberations with the tribal elders or
regional notables rather than unilaterally by the shaykh (amir). Ibn Saud, a strong
leader, once his power was consolidated, often dispensed with this procedure. Yet
in matters of outstanding importance, he did consult tribal and regional leaders and
the ulama in addition to his closest associates, and appeared to follow the prevailing
consensus. As his power grew, the ruler increasingly made major policy decisions
himself or consulted his unofficial majlis al-shura (consultative council) made up of
his most senior kinsmen and devoted friends (Ibid).

Abir offered two reasons for the paternalistic and authoritarian nature of Ibn Saud’s rule. First was

the failure of the 1929-1930 Ikhwan rebellion. The second was the sudden rise in revenues

because of oil resources. The increase from £100,000 in 1915 to £5 million in 1925 after the

conquest of the Hijaz, and to £100 million in 1953-1954 enabled Ibn Saud to start building the

armed forces and to rely less on the military services of tribal and regional amirs. On this latter

point, Abir calls it the “Saudis’ golden rule of buying off rather than fighting the opposition” even

in today’s world (Ibid). Metz explained that the Ikhwan rebellion reflected Ibn Saud’s ability and

skill in forming a domestic constituency as well as his lack of hesitation in using an ‘iron fist’ to

quell any internal problems: “He talked not only to the people who would be fighting with him, but

also to the religious authorities, seeking their advice and approval. When the Wahhabi forces

continued to ignore his authority, he waged a pitched battle and defeated them” (Metz op.cit,

pars.3-4).
 Abir (op.cit, 3) explained that although Ibn Saud unified the kingdom, he consolidated the

power and authority of the aristocracy. Ibn Saud's final victory over the Ikhwan and the

consolidation of Saudi state power through a national army and a centralised administration

deprived the tribal shaykhs and the ulama of the power to intervene, on their own initiative, in the

conduct of state affairs (op.cit, 5). The power and authority of senior tribal amirs declined

gradually. The relatively substantial funds of Ibn Saud enabled him to purchase armaments and

transport, and also to buy the loyalty of the tribesmen and nullify their potential to resist the power

of the Al Saud (op.cit, 6). Metz explained it similarly: “Abd al Aziz assured himself the continued

loyalty of those who had been allied with him by granting them what favors he could (Metz op.cit,

par.7).

After World War II, new social classes and a relatively rigid social structure resulted from the

development of the kingdom's oil industry and the modernisation of Saudi Arabia. The structure

depended more on affiliation to the ruling family, regional or tribal connections, and urban or rural

origin and citizenship. The royal house, tribal amirs, and the ulama comprised the ruling class and

Saudi powerbase. The stability of the regime in Saudi Arabia is largely the result of the delicate

balance of power within the House of Saud, between the rulers and the religious leaders, the ulama,

and between traditional elites and the expanding new middle class, led by the intelligentsia (Abir

op. cit, xvii-xix).

Ibn Saud understood that to function effectively in international politics required knowledge of

Western political, economic, and military power. Ibn Saud groomed his elder sons Saud and Faisal

for their greater responsibilities in the future. Van der Meulen noted that Ibn Saud was the “first

Arab ruler to send his sons to Europe and later to America to strengthen relations with the
governing powers there and to prepare the way for the introduction of European and American

help into his country” (Van der Meulen 1957: 249). However, Philby observed that,

Sa'ud and Faisal were appointed as his official deputies in Najd and the Hijaz
respectively. Faisal also became Foreign Minister. Such appointments were natural
and appropriate enough in view of the great responsibilities, which in the ordinary
course of things would fall upon them in due time. It was always understood that
their functions would be exercised subject to the king's own control in all matters of
vital importance, especially when he was himself present in either of the territories
concerned (Philby 1955:297).

Apart from Amir Saud, Amir Faisal, and Abdullah Sulaiman, all the senior personnel of the State

grouped around the king’s court as his advisers. The only body operating outside the court was the

Advisory Council in Mecca composed of the king’s nominees on behalf of the principal towns and

areas of the Hijaz: “this council did a great deal of useful spade-work in examining and expressing

its opinion on various schemes and proposals emanating from the Minister of Finance or other

sources (Philby 1955:340-341).

Philby believed that Ibn Saud’s “outstanding greatness and self-reliance were obstacles to the

recruitment of a competent political and administrative team” (op. cit, 293). In Ibn Saud’s view,

there were not enough Saudis with the knowledge and skills to help build the new Saudi state.

Except for his Minister of Finance Abdullah Sulaiman, most of the men who became members of

his administration were not of Saudi descent. Abir and Van der Meulen agree about the patriarchal

rule of Ibn Saud. However, Van der Meulen concluded that Ibn Saud’s style showed a weakness

in the Saudi system.

He surrounded himself by a group of assistants who were not of his own calibre and
who were never able to do more than execute detailed orders. No responsible team
was prepared to take over the task when he was no longer there. Many felt that his
sons were not admitted into his full confidence or given a real share of
responsibility. Again too many men from neighbouring Arab countries and too few
Saudis were used in the centre of government. None of the Arab foreigners felt any
sense of responsibility to the future. All were convinced that their own interests and
 those of their children did not lay in Sa'udi Arabia but in their homeland hence their
preoccupation with feathering a distant nest (Van der Meulen 1957: 254-255).

In the face of severe financial difficulties that challenged the new Saudi state, Ibn Saud

successfully used the opportunities for prosperity offered by the British and the Americans. Ibn

Saud succeeded in building the foundations of an economically prosperous Saudi state. Philby

argued that if the growth of urban populations and economic power are “the hallmark of

prosperity, then there is no doubt that at the end of Ibn Saud’s great reign, Sa'udi Arabia was

absolutely more prosperous” (Philby 1955:344). Ibn Saud showed a strong ability and skill to

interact effectively with other states, especially the great powers. The realist in Ibn Saud firmly

believed in the collective power of the Arab League members to strongly influence world opinion

through the UN in matters affecting the interests of the Middle East, and later the wider area of the

Islamic world. Idealistically, he believed in the pan-Arabic unity sought through the Arab League

despite opposing blocs at its inception with “Sa'udi Arabia in the camp of Egypt and Syria in

opposition to the Sharifian States” (op.cit, 339-340). Ibn Saud dealt successfully and productively

with U.S. leaders for twenty-one years, critical years in the shaping of relations and the formation

of the alliance. The most powerful example of the realist in Ibn Saud was in Philby’s contention

that Ibn Sa'ud firmly believed the Great Powers, the U.S. and Great Britain, were headed towards a

third world war against the Soviet Union. Within that context, Philby claimed that Ibn Saud

“found it difficult to understand the reluctance [of the Americans and the British] in coming to

grips with the enemy when they enjoyed an overwhelming advantage over him in the matter of

atomic weapons” (op.cit, 351).

Saud and Faisal

Key Advisors to Ibn Saud, Saud, and Faisal

 Abdullah Sulaiman became Minister of Finance in 1929. He was a Najdi by birth, a trained

accountant, and a close friend of Ibn Saud. He seemed to enjoy the complete confidence of the

King. He was the only member of the Saudi administration who regularly acted on his own

initiative and authority, convinced that his acts would meet with the King’s approval.

He was courageous in his approaches and schemes of reconstruction and development, many of

which produced lasting benefits to the Kingdom. He was an astute financial manager and built a

civil service structure with his own family members occupying the key positions. His elder brother

served as the King’s principal private secretary.

Yusuf Yasin was a Syrian who arrived in Saudi Arabia in 1923. Yasin was one of the

outstanding men of Ibn Saud’s régime. He accompanied Ibn Saud in the Hijaz campaign and

quickly gained Ibn Saud’s confidence. He was named editor of the official Mecca weekly, Umm

al Qura, appointed Ibn Saud’s Political Secretary and later as Minister of State, because of

“extensive network of diplomatic posts spreading almost from China to Peru” (Philby 1955:296

Yasin’s assistant, Rushdi Mulhis, was a refugee from Palestine.

Fuad Hamza was a Palestinian refugee who became Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Hamza represented Saudi Arabia at Vichy and later at Ankara.

Hafidh Wahba was an Egyptian. He was Ibn Saud's Director of Education and became Ibn

Saud’s Ambassador to Great Britain.

Khalid al Qarqani was a Turkish national who lived in Tripoli. He went to Jidda to do

business in the early days of the new régime in the Hijaz. He became a personal advisor to Ibn

Saud.

Shaikh As'ad al Faqih was the Saudi Arabian Minister and Ambassador) to Washington.

Conclusion
 This chapter provided a useful introduction to the individual actors in the Saudi and American

states. This is necessary to more fully understand their deliberations, decisions, and actions that

are in the U.S. Department of State documents discussed in the next chapters. The discussions in

this chapter reflect the duality of realism and idealism in the thinking of both American presidents

and Saudi Kings. However, realism appears to weigh heavier in their collective backgrounds. The

interactions between Ibn Saud and the U.S. administrations of Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower

set in motion a relationship and alignment undoubtedly dominated by realist considerations.

Proving this is the task of the remaining chapters in this research project.