Islam and Peace A Survey of The Sources of Peace in The Islamic Tradition by Ibrahim Kalin

Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in the Islamic Tradition
Author(s): IBRAHIM KALIN

Source: Islamic Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 327-362
Published by: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20838977 .
Accessed: 17/06/2014 13:21
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad is collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Islamic Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 188.72.127.112 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:21:09 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Islamic Studies 44:3 (2005) pp. 327-362
Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in

the Islamic Tradition
IBRAHIMKALIN
Introduction
Is religiona source of violence?

This question haunts theminds ofmany people concerned about religion
in one way or another.For the criticsof religion,the answer is usually in the
affirmative,and it is easy to cite examples fromhistory.From Rene Girard's
depiction of ritual sacrificesas an evidence of violent proclivities in religions1
to the exclusivist claims of differentfaith traditions,one can easily conclude
that religionsproduce violence at both social and theological levels.As often
done, one may take the Crusades or the inquisition inmedieval Europe or
jihad movements in Islamic history and describe the respectivehistories of
these traditions as nothingmore than a history of war, conflict,violence,
schism, and persecution. The premeditated conclusion is unequivocal: the
more religious people are, themore violent they tend to be. The solution
therefore lies in the de-sacralization of the world. Religions, and some among
them in particular,need to be secularizedandmodernized to rid themselvesof
theirviolent essence and violent legacy.2
At the other end of the spectrum is the believer who sees religious
violence as an oxymoron at best and themutilation of his/her religiousfaithat
worst. Religions do not call forviolence. Religious teachingsare peaceful at
1
Rene Girard, Violence and theSacred, tr. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins
University, 1979).
2
This is the gist of Bernard Lewis* attackson "Islamic fundamentalism,,in a number of highly
publicized essays including "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly (September
1990), 47-60 and "Islam and Liberal Democracy," TheAtlanticMonthly (February, 1993). Lewis
considers "Islamic fundamentalism,"which he equates occasionally with terrorism,as arising
out of the overtly religious and intolerant traditions of Islam. I have dealt with Lewis'
arguments inmy "Roots ofMisconception: Euro-American Perceptions of Islam Before and
After 9/11* in Joseph Lumbard, ed. Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition
(Bloomington, IN:World Wisdom, 2004), 143-187.

328 IBRAHIM K?LIN
theirbase,meant to re-establishtheprimordialharmony between heaven and

earth,between theCreator and the created.But specificreligious teachingsand
feelingsaremanipulated to instigateviolence for political gains. Violence is
committed in the name of religion but not condoned by it.The only valid
criticism the secularist can raise against religion is that religions have not
developed effectiveways of protecting themselvesfrom suchmanipulations
and abuses.As Juergensmeyer has shown in his extensive surveyof religious
violence in themodern period, violence does not recognize religious and
cultural boundaries and can easily find a home in themost sublime and
innocuous teachingsofworld religions.3At any rate, religions are vulnerable
when they fail to findways of preventingtheuse of force in theirnames. This
becomes especially acutewhen theyfall shortof inculcatinga consciousnessof
peace and non-violence in theminds and hearts of their followers. In short,
se cannot be seen as a source of violence. some of its bad
religions per Only
can be held accountable.
practitioners
Both views have strongcases andmake importantpoints about religion
and violence. Both, however, are equally mistaken in resorting to a fixed
definitionof religion.And both views reduce the immensevariety of religious
to a tradition and, furthermore, to a faction or
practices particular particular
historic moment in that tradition. In speaking of Islam and violence or
Hinduism and war, the usual method is to look at the sacred scripturesand
compare and contrast them with historical realities that flow from their
practice, or lack thereof.We highlight those moments where there are

discrepanciesbetween textand historyas thebreakingpoints in thehistoryof
that religion,viz., themoments when the communityhas not livedup to the
standardsof the religionas demanded by the text.
Although there is some benefitto be gained fromthisapproach, it fails to
see theways inwhich religious textsare
interpretedandmade part of theday
to-day experience of particular religious communities. Instead of looking at
how religiously binding texts are read, revealed and enrichedwithin the
concrete of the community, we text from and
experiences separate history
somehow assume historical immunityfor the text and/or textualbasis forall
history.
This isnot to deny the centralityof the scripture.In the case of Islam, the
Qur'?n, togetherwith theSunnah of theProphet of Islam (peace be on him), is
and remains themain source of the IslamicWeltanschauung.After all, the
numerous interpretationsthatwe may talk about are
interpretationsof the
Qur'?n, the one text that is the subjectof variant readings from the Sufis and
3
Cf. Mark Juergensmeyer,Terror in theMind ofGod: The Global Rise of
Religious Violence
(Berkeley andNew York: University ofCalifornia Press, 2000).

ISLAMAND PEACE
329
Hanbal?s to theWahh?b?s and themodernists. The fact that the Prophetic

Sunnah is part of the Islamicworldview and religious life,without which we
cannot a can be seen as
understand good part of the Qur'?n, confirming the
significanceof reading the scripturewithin the concrete experiences of the

Muslim community.This was in facthow the first Muslims, who became the
spiritual and moral examples for later generations, learnt about the Qur'?n
under the guidance and tutorshipof theProphet (peace be on him).
In this sense, Islamic history isnot alien to the idea of reading religiously
binding textsprimarilywithin the contextof a livingand 'evolving' tradition.
This iswhy the Sunnahwas part of the Islamic law from the outset and this is
how the tradition of transmittedsciences (al-'ulum al-naqliyyah), dealing
primarilywith 'religious sciences,' came about, viz., by looking at how the
previous generations of Muslims understood the Qur'?n and theHad?th.
Taken out of this context, Qur'?nic verses become abstruse, abstract, and
impenetrable for the non-Muslim, or for anyone who is indifferentto this

traditionand, by virtue of this,may be misled into thinkingthat a good part
of Islamic historyhas come about in spiteof theQur'?n, not because of it.
OOO
I deemed itnecessary to insertthese fewwords of caution and 'methodology'

here for the following reasons.Much of the currentdebate about Islam and
violence is beset by the kind of problems thatwe see in the secularistand
sources of Islam. Those who consider
apologetic readings of the scriptural
Islam as a religion that essentiallycondones violence for its theologicalbeliefs
and political aims pick certainverses from theQur'?n, link them to cases of
communal and political violence in Islamic history, and conclude that
Qur'?nic teachingsprovide justificationforunjust use of violence.While the
same can be done practicallyabout any religion,Islam has enjoyedmuch more
fanfarethan any other religionfor the last thousandyears or so.The apologist
makes the samemistake but in a different way when he rejects all history as
see theways inwhich theQur'?n, or the Bible or the
misguided, failing to
to resort to intra-and inter
Rig-Vedas, can easily, ifnot legitimately,be read
text (in the sense of
religiousviolence. This iswhere thehermeneuticsof the
both tafsirand ta'wif)becomes absolutelynecessary: it isnot that the text itself
isviolent but that it lends itselftomultiple readings,some ofwhich are bound
to be peaceful and some violent.
The second problem is the exclusive focusof the currentliteratureon the
in Islam. Use of violence,
legal and juristic aspects of peace and violence
conduct of war, treatment of combatants and prisoners of war, international
law, etc. are discussedwithin a strictlylegal context, and the classical Islamic

IBRAHIM
K?LIN
330
literatureon the subject is called upon to provide answers.Although this is an

importantand useful exercise, it falls shortof addressingdeeper philosophical
and spiritual issues thatmust be included in any discussion of religion and
peace. This is trueespecially in the case of Islam formainly two reasons.First
of all, the legal views of peace and violence in the classical period were
articulatedand applied in the lightof theoverall teachingsand aims of Islamic
law (maq?sid al-sharVah).The maq?sid provided a contextwithin which the
strict legality of the law was blended into the necessities and realities of
communal Ufe. Political conflictscouched in the language of juridical edicts
remained as political conflictsandwere never extended to a war of religions
between Islam or Christianity,Judaism, Hinduism orAfrican religions,which
Muslims encountered throughout theirhistory. It should come to us as no
surprisethat thefatw? of a juristof a particular school of law allowing theuse
of forceagainst a Christian rulerwas not interpretedas an excuse forattacking
one's Christian or Jewishneighbour.
Secondly, the spiritualand ethical teachingsof theQur'?n and theSunnah
underpin everythingIslamic inprinciple, and this appliesmutatismutandis to
the question of peace and violence. The legal injunctions (ahk?m) of the
Qur'?n concerningpeace andwar are part of a largersetof spiritualandmoral
principles.The ultimate goal of Islam is to create a moral and just society in
which individualscan pursue a spiritualUfe and the toll of Uving collectively,
from economic exploitation and misuse of poUtical authority to the
suppression of other people, can be brought under control to the extent
possible in any human society.Without taking into account this larger
picture,we will fail to see how Islam advocates a positive concept of peace as
opposed to a merely negative one and how its political and legal precepts,
which are exploited sowildly and irrationallyby both the secularand religious
fundamentalistsof our day, lead to the creation and 5ustainingof a just and
ethical social order.
With thesecaveats inmind, thispaper has two interrelatedgoals. The first
is to analyze theways inwhich the Islamic traditioncan be said to advocate a
positive concept of peace. This will be contrastedwith 'negativepeace' defined
conventionally as absence ofwar and conflict. ItwiU be argued thatpositive
peace involves thepresenceof certainquaUties and conditions thataim tomake
peace a principal stateof harmony and equilibrium ratherthan amere eventof
political settlement.This requires a close examination of the philosophical
assumptions of the Islamic traditionwhich have shaped the experience of
Muslim societies vis-?-vis the peoples of other faiths and cultures. These
philosophical suppositions are naturally grounded in the ethical and spiritual
teachingsof Islam, andwithout consideringtheirrelevance for the culturaland

ISLAMAND PEACE
331
political experience ofMuslims with the 'other',we can neither do justice to

the Islamic tradition,which spans througha vast area in both space and time,
nor avoid the pitfallsof historical reductionismand essentialism,which is so
rampant in the currentdiscussionsof the subject.
This bringsus to the second goal of the'paper.Here I will argue that an
adequate analysis of peace andwar in the Islamic traditionentailsmore than
fixatingtheviews of someMuslim juristsof the 9th and 10th centuriesas the
definitiveposition of 'orthodox' Islam and thus reducing the Islamicmodus
operandi of dealingwith non-Muslims to a concept of 'holywar'. With some
exceptions,4the ever growing literatureof Islam and peace has been concerned
predominantlywith the legal aspects of declaringwar (Jihad) againstMuslim
and/or non-Muslim states, treating the dhimmls under the SharVah, and
expanding the territoriesof the Islamic state.This has obscured, to say the
least, the larger contextwithin which such legal opinions were discussed,
interpreted and evolved from one century to the other and from one cultural
political era to theother.

Therefore I propose to look at the concept of peace in the Islamic
tradition in four interrelatedcontexts.The first is themetaphysical-spiritual
context inwhich peace galani) as one of the names of God is seen as an
essentialpart ofGod's creation and assigned a substantivevalue. The second is
thephilosophical-theologicalcontextwithin which thequestion of evil (sharr)
is addressed as a cosmic, ethical, and social problem. Discussions of theodicy
among Muslim theologians and philosophers provide one of the most
mishap, violence and their
profound analyses of thequestion of evil, injustice,
in the 'great chain of being'. I shall provide a brief summary to show
place
how a proper understandingof peace in the Islamic tradition is bound to take
us to the largerquestions of good and evil. The third is the political-legal
context,which is the proper locus of classical legal and juristicdiscussions of
war, rebellion, oppression, and political (dis)order.This area has been the
exclusive focus of the current literatureon the subject and promises to be an
engaging and long-standingdebate in theMuslim world. The fourth is the
socio-cultural context,which would reveal the parameters of theMuslim
experienceof religious and culturaldiversitywith communitiesof other faiths
and cultural traditions.
As itwill become clear in the following pages, all of these levels are
interdependentand call for a largercontextwithin which the questions of
4
One such exception to the rule isRichard Martin's essay "The Religious Foundations ofWar,
Peace, and Statecraft in Islam* in JohnKelsay and JamesTurner Johnson, eds. JustWar and
Jihad:Historical and TheoreticalPerspectivesonWar and Peace inWestern and Islamic Traditions
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 91-117.

332 IBRAHIM K?LIN
peace and violence have been articulated and negotiated by a multitude of

scholars, philosophers, jurists,mystics, political leaders, and variousMuslim
communities. The Islamic tradition provides ample material for contemporary
Muslim societies to deal with issues of peace, religious diversity and social
needless to say, attention.
justice, all of which, require urgent Furthermore,
thepresent challenge ofMuslim societies is not only to deal with these issues
as internalaffairsbut also to contributeto the fosteringof a global cultureof
peace and coexistence. Before to the Islamic tradition, however, a few
turning
words of definitionare inorder to clarifythemeaning of positive peace.
Peace as a Substantive Value
Peace as a substantive and positive concept entails the presence of certain

conditions thatmake it an enduringstateof harmony, integrity,contentment,
equilibrium, repose, and moderation. This can be contrastedwith negative
peace that denotes the absence of conflictand discord. Even thoughnegative
peace is indispensable to prevent communal violence, border disputes or
international conflicts, substantive-positive peace calls for a comprehensive
outlook to address the deeper causes of conflict,hate, strife,destruction,
and violence. As Steven Lee states, it also a
brutality, provides genuine
measure and setof values bywhich peace and justicecan be establishedbeyond
the short-terminterestsof individuals,communitiesor states.5This is critical
for the construction of peace as a substantive value because as
defining peace
the privation of violence and conflict turns it into a concept that is
instrumental and accidental at best, and relative and irrelevant at worst. In
addition, the positive-substantivenotion of peace shifts the focus from

preventing conflict, violence, and strife to a willingness to generate balance,
and coexistence as the terms of a
justice, cooperation, dialogue, primary
discourse of peace. Instead of definingpeace with what it is not and force
common sense logic to its limit,we may well opt for generating a
philosophical ground based on the presence and endurance, rather than
absence, of certain and conditions that make peace a substantive
qualities
realityof human life.6
Furthermore, relegatingthe discourse of peace to social conflict and its
prevention runs the riskof neglectingthe individual,which is the sinequa non
of collective and communal peace. This iswhere the 'spiritualindividualism'
of Islam versus its social collectivismentersthepicture: the individualmust be
5
Cf. Steven Lee, "A Positive Concept of Peace" inPeter Caws, ed. The Causes ofQuarrel: Essays
onPeace,War, and ThomasHobbes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 183-4.
6
Gray Cox, "The Light at theEnd of theTunnel and theLight inWhich We May Walk: Two
Concepts of Peace" inPeter Caws, The Causes ofQuarrel, 162-3.

ISLAMAND PEACE
333
endowedwith thenecessaryqualities thatmake peace an enduring realitynot

only in thepublic spherebut also in theprivatedomain of the individual.The
Qur'?nic ideal of creatinga beautiful soul that is at peace with itselfand the
larger reality of which it is a part (Qur'?n 79: 27-30) brings ethics and
spiritualityright into the heart of the discourse of positive peace. Peace as a
substantivevalue thus extends to thedomain of both ethics and aestheticsfor
it is one of the conditions thatbring about peace in the soul and resiststhe
temptationsof discord, restlessness,ugliness, pettiness,and vulgarity.At this
point, we may remember that the key Qur'?nic term ihs?n carries the
meanings of virtue, beauty, goodness, comportment, proportion, comeliness,
and 'doingwhat is beautiful' all at once. The active participlemuhsin denotes
thepersonwho does what is good, desired,and beautiful.7
In this regard,peace isnot amere stateof passivity.On the contrary,it is
being fullyactive against themenace of evil,destruction,and turmoil thatmay
come fromwithin or fromwithout. As Collingwood points out, peace is a
a constant state of
'dynamic thing,'8 and requires consciousness and vigilance,
awareness thatone must engage in spiritualand intellectualjihad to ensure that
differencesand conflictswithin and across the collective traditionsdo not
become grounds for violence and oppression. Furthermore, positive peace
involves the analysis of various forms of aggression including individual,
institutional and structural violence.
Peace as a substantiveconcept is also based on justice (radl) for peace is
predicated upon the availability of equal rightsand opportunities for all to
realize theirgoals and potentials.One of themeanings of theword justice in
Arabic is to be 'straight' and 'equitable', i.e., to be straightforward,
trustworthy, and fair in one's dealings with others.9 Such an attitude brings
about a state of balance, accord, and trust,and goes beyond the limits of
formal justicedispensed by the juridicalsystem.Defined in thebroadest terms,
a vast domain of relations and interactions from taking
justice encompasses
care of one's body to internationallaw.Like peace (sal?m)yjustice is one of the
Divine names and takes on a substantive importance in view of its central role
in Islamic theology aswell as law. Peace can be conceived as an enduring state
of harmony, trust,and coexistence only when coupled and supportedwith
7
The celebrated had?thfilmi confirms the sameQur'anic usage: "Ihsan is toworship God as if
you were to seeHim; even ifyou seeHim not,He seesyou." For an extensive analysisof ihsan
as articulated in the Islamic tradition,see SachikoMurata andWilliam Chittick, The Vision of
Islam (New York: Paragon House, 1994), 265-317.
8
R. G. Collingwood, TheNew Leviathan (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971), 334.
9Ibn Manz?r, Lisan al-'Arab (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al^flmiyyah, 1993), 13:457-8 and
Muhammad 'Ali al-Tah?naw?,Kashsh?f Istil?h?t al-Fun?n (Beirut:Dar al-Kutub al-'flmiyyah,
1998), 3: 288-9.

IBRAHIM
K?LIN
334
justice because it also means being secure from all that ismorally evil and
Thus theQur'?n combines justicewith ihs?nwhen it commands
destructive.10
its followers to act with "justice and good manner" (b?l-'adl wa'tihs?n)
(Qur'?n 16: 90).u
The Spiritual-Metaphysical Context: God as Peace (al-sal?m)
The conditions that are conducive to a state of peace mentioned above are
primarily spiritualand have largerimplicationsfor the cosmos, the individual,
and the society.Here I shall focuson threepremises that are directlyrelevant
to our discussion. The first pertains to peace as a Divine name
(al-sal?m)
(Qur'?n, 59: 23). The Qur?'nic concept of God is founded upon a robust
monotheism, and God's transcendence (tanztb) is emphasized in both the
canonical sources and in the intellectualtradition.To this absolutely one and
transcendent God belong "all thebeautifulnames" (Qur'?n, 7: 180, 59: 24), i.e.,
the names of beauty (jam?l),majesty (jal??),and perfection (kam?l). It is these
names thatpreventGod frombecoming an utterlyunreachable and "wholly
other" deity. Divine names represent God's face turned towards the world and
are thevessels of findingGod in and through
His creation.
The names of beauty takeprecedence over thenames ofmajesty because
God says that "Mymercy has encompassed everything"(Qur'?n, 7:156) and
"God has written mercy upon Himself" (Qur'?n, 6: 12, 54). This is also
supportedby a famous had?tbof theProphet (peace be on him) according to
which "God is beautiful and loves beauty." In this sense,God is as much
transcendent, and as He is immanent,
incomparable beyond comparable
(tashb?h)and close.12As the ultimate source of peace, God transcends all
10
Cf. Muhammad Asad, TheMessage of theQur'an (Lahor:Maktabah Jaw?hir al-'Ul?m, n.d.),
179, n. 46 commenting on theQur'?n 6: 54: "And when thosewho believe inOur messages
come unto thee, say: "Peace be upon you. Your Sustainerhas willed upon Himself the law of
grace andmercy so that if any of you does a bad deed out of ignorance, and thereafterrepents
and livesrighteously,He shall be [found]much-forgiving,a dispenser of grace."
11
On the basis of thisverse, the 10th centuryphilologistAbu Hil?l al-'Askar? considers justice
and ihs?n as synonyms. Cf. his al-Fur?q al-Lughawiyyah, 194, quoted in Franz Rosenthal,
"Political Justice and the Just Ruler" in Joel Kraemer and Dai Alon, eds. Religion and
Government in theWorld ofIslam (Tel-Aviv:Tel-Aviv University, 1983), 97, n. 20.
12
Like other Sufis,Ghaz?l? subscribes to the notion ofwhat Ibn al-4Arabiwould later call the
"possessor of the two eyes" (dhu -'aynayn),viz., seeingGod with the two eyes of transcendence
(tanzih) and immanence (tashb?h).Cf. Fadlou Shehadi, Ghazal?s Unique Unknowable God
(Leiden: E. J.Brill, 1964), 8-10 and 51-5. For Ibn al-'Arabi's expression of the "possessor of the
two eyes," seeWilliam Chittick, The SufiPath ofKnowledge (Albany: StateUniversity ofNew
York Press, 1989), 361-2. The Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite theologians have a long history of
controversyover the threemajor views ofDivine names and qualities, i.e., tanzih, tashb?h,and
ta'til ('suspension'). Cf. Michel Allard,L?probl?me des atmbutesdivins dans la doct?ne d'al-As'ari

ISLAMAND PEACE
335
opposites and tensions, is the permanent stateof repose and tranquillity,and

callsHis servantsto the "abode of peace" (daral-sal?m) (Qur'?n, 10: 25). "It is
He who fromhigh on has sent [sends]down innerpeace and repose (saktnah)
upon thehearts of thebelievers", says theQur'?n (48: 4). The proper abode of
peace is the hearts (quliib),which are "satisfiedonly by the remembranceof
God (dhikrAlialo)" (Qur'?n, 13: 28). By linking the heart,man's centre, to
God's remembrance, theQur'?n establishes a strong link between theology
and spiritualpsychology.
In addition to theQur'?nic exegetes, the Sufis in particular are fond of
explaining the 'mysteryof creation' by referringto a 'sacred saying' (hadith
quds?) attributedto the Prophet of Islam: "I was a hidden treasure.I wanted
(lit. 'loved') to be known and created theuniverse (Ut. 'creation')".13The key
words 'love' (hubb,mahabbalo) and 'know' (ma'rifah)underlie a fundamental
aspect of the Sufimetaphysics of creation:Divine love and desire to be known
is the raisond'etre of all existence. Ibn al-'Arabi says thatGod's "love forHis
servantsis identicalwith the originationof their engendered existence ... the
relation of God's love to them is the same as the fact thatHe iswith them
wherever they are [Qur'?n, 57: 4],whether in the state of theirnonexistence
or the state of theirwuj?d ... they are the objects of His knowledge. He
witnesses them and loves themnever-endingly."14 Commenting on the above
saying,D?w?d b. Mahm?d al-Qaysar? (d. 751/1350), the 8th/14th century
Turkish Sufi-philosopher and the firstuniversity president of the newly
establishedOttoman State, says that "God has written love upon Himself.
There is no doubt that thekind of love that is related to themanifestation of
[His] perfectionsfollows from the love ofHis Essence, which is the source of
the love of [His Names and] Qualities thathave become the reason for the
unveiUng of all existents and the connection of the species of spiritual and
corporeal bodies."15
The second premise is related to what traditionalphilosophy calls 'the
great chain of being' (d?'irat al-wuj?d). In the cosmic scale of things, the
universe is the 'best of all possible worlds' because, first,it is actual,which
impUes completion and plenitude over against potentiality, and, second, its
built-inorder derives its sustenancefrom theCreator. The naturalworld is in
etdes sespremiersgrands disciples (Beyrouth:Editions Del L'Impirimerie Catholique, 1965), 354

364.
13
'Ali b. SultanMuhammad al-Haraw? al-Q?r?, al-Masn?*fi Ma'Hfat al-Hadith al-Mawd?* (Al
Riy?d: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1404ah), 1:141.
14
Quoted inWilliam Chittick, The Self-DisclosureofGod: PHnciples of Ibn al-'Arabi's Cosmology
(Albany: StateUniversity ofNew York Press, 1998), 22.
15
D?w?d al-Qaysari,Ris?hh ftMa'Hfat alMahabbat alHaqiqiyyahy in his al-Ras?% ed.Mehmet
Bayraktar (Kayseri:KayseriMetropolitan Municipality, 1997), 138.

IBRAHIM K?LIN
336
a constant state of peace because, to the Qur'an, it is 'muslim'

according (with
a smallm) in that it surrenders(tasltm)itselfto thewill ofGod and thus rises
above all tension and discord (3: 83, 9: 53, 13: 15, 41: 11). In its normative
of natural the Qur'an talks about stars and trees as
depiction phenomena,
"prostratingbeforeGod" (55: 6) and says that "all that is in theheavens and on
earth extolsHis glory" (59: 24). By acknowledgingGod's unity and praising
?
His name, man joins the natural world in a substantive way a process that
underscores the essential link between the anthroposand the cosmosor the
microcosm and the macrocosm. The intrinsic commonality and unity between
the human as 'subject' and the universe as 'object' has been called the
"anthropocosmic vision."16The thrustof thisview is that the anthroposand
the cosmos cannot be disjoined from one another and that the man-versus
nature dichotomy is a false one. Moreover, theworld has been given to the
children of Adam as a 'trust' (am?nah) as they are charged with the
responsibilityof standingwitness to God's creation,mercy, and justice on
earth. Conceiving nature in terms of harmony, measure, order, and balance
to a common and attitude towards the non-human world in
points persistent
Islamic thought,and has profound implicationsfor the constructionof peace
as a of the cosmos.17
principle
The thirdprinciple pertains toman's natural state and his place within
the larger context of existence. Even though the Qur'an occasionally describes
the fallen nature of man in gruesome terms and presents man as weak,
forgetful, treacherous, hasty, ignorant, ungrateful, hostile, and egotistic (cf.,

interalia, Qur'an 14: 34, 17: 11, 18: 54, 22: 66, 33: 72, 43: 15, and 100: 6), these
are considered deviations from man's essential nature
qualities eventually
who has been created in the "most beautiful form" (ahsan taqw?m)
(fitrah),
(Qur'an 95: 4), both physically and spiritually.This metaphysical optimism
defineshuman beings as "God's vicegerenton earth" (khalifat Allahfi -ard)as
theQur'an says (see 2: 30), or, to use a metaphor fromChristianity, as the
"pontifex,"the bridge between heaven and earth.18 The fitrah (Qur'an 30: 30),
16
The termhas firstbeen used byMircea Eliade and adopted by Tu Weiming to describe the
philosophical outlook of the Chinese traditions.For an application of the term to Islamic
thought,seeWilliam Chittick, "The Anthropocosmic Vision in IslamicThought" inTed Peters,
Muzaffar Iqbal and Syed Nomanul Haq, eds. God, Life, and theCosmos (Aldershot:Ashgate,
2002), 125-152
17
Cf. SeyyedHossein Nasr, Religion and theOrder ofNature (Oxford:Oxford University Press,
1996), 60-63.
18
The classical Qur'an commentaries are almost unanimous on interpretingthis 'khal?fah*as
Adam, i.e., humans in the generic sense.Cf. Jal?l al-D?n al-Mahall? and Jal?l al-D?n al-Suy?t?,
Tafsir al-Jal?layn (Beirut:Mu'assasat al-Ris?lah, 1995), 6;Muhy? -D?n Ibn al-'Arabi, al-Fut?h?t
al-Makkiyyahy ed.M. 'Abd al-Rahm?n al-Mar'ashl? (Beirut:Dar Ihy?' al-Tur?th al-'Arabi, 1997),
1: 169.

ISLAM AND PEACE
337
the primordial nature according to which God has created all humanity, is
essentially a moral and spiritual substance drawn to the good and "God
consciousness" (taqwa) whereas its imperfections and "excessiveness" (fuj?r)
(Qur'?n 91: 8) are 'accidental' qualities to be subsumed under the soul's
struggleto do good (al-birr)and transcend its subliminaldesires throughhis
intelligenceandmoral will.
Context:Evil and theBest ofAll

The Ph?osophical-Theological
PossibleWorlds
In the contextof theologyand philosophy, questions of peace and violence are
treatedunder the rubric of good and evil (husn/khayrand sharr/qubh). War,
conflict,violence, injustice,discord, and the like are seen as extensionsof the
general problem of evil.The Muslim philosophers and theologianshave been
interestedin theodicy from thevery beginning,and for good reasons because
thebasic question of theodicygoes to theheart of religion:how can a justand
perfectGod allow evil and destruction in a world which He saysHe has
created in perfect balance, with a purpose, and for thewell-being of His
servants? We can the question in the present context as follows:
rephrase why
is there somuch violence, turmoiland oppression ratherthanpeace, harmony
and justice in theworld? Does evil, ofwhich violence is as an offshoot,belong
to the essential nature of thingsor is it an accident that arises only as the
privation of goodness?
These questions have given rise to a long and interesting
debate about evil
among the theologians.One particular aspect of this debate, known as the
"best of all possible worlds" (ahsan al-niz?m) argument,19 deserves closer
attention as it is relevant to the formulation of a of peace.
positive concept
The classical statementof theproblem pertains toDivine justiceand power on
the one hand, and theGreek notions of potentiality and actuality, on the
other.The fundamentalquestion iswhether thisworld inwhich we live is the
best thatGod could have created.Since, fromamoral point of view, theworld
is imperfectbecause there is evil and injustice in it,we have to either admit
was not able to create a better and more or concede
that God perfect world
19
Another formulation is laysafi -imk?nabda( mimma k?n. Loosely translated, it states that
"there is nothing in the world of possibility more beautiful and perfect than what is in
actuality."This sentence, attributedtoGhaz?l?, has led to a long controversy in Islamic thought.
For an excellent survey of this debate in Islamic theology, see Eric L. Ormsby, Theodicy in
Islamic Thought: The Dispute over al-Ghaz?lVs "Best of All Possible Worlds" (Princeton,NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1984). Cf. also Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazal?, Ihy?'Vl?m al
D?n (Cairo: Mu'assasat al-Halab?, 1968), 4: 321. The earliest formulation of the problem,
however, can be tracedback to Ibn Sina. See my "WhyDo Animals Eat Other Animals: Mull?
Sadr? on Theodicy." (Forthcoming).

IBRAHIM K?LIN
338
thatHe did not create a betterworld bywill as part of theDivine economy of

creation. Obviously, the first alternative calls into question God's
omnipotence (qudrah)whereas the second jeopardizesHis wisdom and justice
('adalah). Following another line of discussion inKal?m, we can reformulate
the question as a tension betweenGod's nature andwill: can God go against
His own nature,which is just, ifHe wants to, orHis will cannot supercede
His nature? Still, can God contradictHimself? If we say 'yes,' thenwe
attributeimperfectiontoGod and ifwe say 'no,' thenwe limitHim.
Even themost modest attempt to analyze these questions within the
contextofKal?m debateswill takeus too fara field. What isdirectlyrelated to
our discussion here ishow the concepts of evil, injustice,oppression and their
variations are seen as the 'accidentaloutcomes' of theworld of contingencies
in which we live. True, the weaknesses and frailties of human beings
contributeenormously to the creation and exacerbationof evil, and it is only
reasonable to take a 'situationaPposition and attributeevil to ourselves rather
than to theDivine. In fact, this iswhat theQur'?n holds vis-?-visevil and
man's accountability: "Whatever good happens to you, it is fromGod; and
whatever evil befallsyou, it is fromyour own self/soul"(4: 79; cf. also 3: 165).
The best of all possible worlds argument,however, shifts the focus from
particular instancesof individualor structuralviolence to thephenomenon of
evil itselfwhereby we gain a deeper insight into how evil arises in the first
place.
We may reasonably argue that evil is part of theDivine economy of
creation and thus necessary. In a moral sense, it is part of Divine economy
because it iswhat we are testedwith (cf.Qur'?n 21: 36; 18: 9).Without evil,
there will be no accountability and thus no freedom.20Mulla Sadr?
(d. 1059/1649) calls this a necessity ofDivine providence (al-'inayah)and the
"concomitant of the ultimate telosof goodness (alghayah al-khayriyyah)."21 In
an ontological sense, it is a necessity because the world is by definition
imperfect,the ultimate perfectionbelonging to God, and theworld is not
God. That iswhy God has not created "all beings as pure goodness."22Evil as
limitation and imperfection is an outcome of the first act of separation
20
Plantinga's "freewill defence" is based on this premise. Cf. Alvin Plantinga, "The FreeWill
Defence" inMax Black, ed. Philosophy inAmerica^ reprintedin Baruch A. Broody, ed. Readings
in thePhilosophyofReligion: An AnalyticalApproach (NJ:Prentice-Hall, 1974), 187. See also his
"God, Evil, and theMetaphysics of Freedom" inMarilyn M. Adams and Robert M. Adams, eds.
The Problem ofEvil (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1990), 83-109.
21
Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Sh?r?z? Mulla Sadr?, al-Hikmat al-Muta'?liyahfi -Asfaral-'Aqliyyah
al-Arba'ah (cited hereafter as Asfar) (Beirut:Dar Ihy?' al-Tur?th al-'Arabi, 1981), Safar ,Juz 3,
P. 72.
22
Ibid., 78.

ISLAMAND PEACE
339
between theDivine and the non-divine or what Muslim theologians call m?

siw? 'll?h ("all that is other thanGod"). Ultimately, however, "all is from
God" (Qur'?n 4: 78). This implies thatevil as the "contrastivemanifestationof
the good"23 ceases to be evil and contributesto the "greatergood", which is
what the best of all possible world argumentasserts. In a ratherparadoxical
way, one cannot object to the existenceof evil itselfbecause it iswhat makes
theworld possible. But thisdoes not absolve us of themoral duty of fighting
against individual cases of evil.Nor does itmake evil an essential nature of
thingsbecause itwas God's decision to create theworld with a meaning and
purpose in the firstplace. In short,evil remains contingentand transient,and
this assumption extends to the next world.24
The notion of evil as an ontological necessity-cum-contingencyhas

importantimplicationsforhow we look at theworld and its 'evil' side.From
a psychological point of view, the acceptance of evil as a transientyet
necessaryphenomenon preventsus frombecoming petty and bitter in the face
of all that is blemished,wicked, imperfect,and tainted.25It gives us a sense of
moral securityagainst the onslaught of evil,which can and must be fought
with a firmbelief in theultimate supremacyof the good. It also enables us to
see theworld as it is and forwhat it is, and strivetomake it a betterplace in
termsofmoral and spiritualperfection.From a religiouspoint of view, this
underscores the relativenature of evil: somethingthatmay appear evil to us
may not be evil and vice versa when everything is placed within a larger
framework.Thus theQur'?n says that "itmay well be thatyou hate a thing
while it is good (khayr)foryou, and itmay well be thatyou love a thingwhile
it is bad (sbarr)foryou. And God knows, and you know not" (2: 216).Mull?
Sadr? applies this principle to 'natural evils,' and says that even "death,
corruption (al-fas?d)and the like are necessary and needed for the order of the
world (al-niz?m)when theyoccur 'bynature and not by forceor accident.'"26
23
Frithjof Schuon, In theFace of theAbsolute (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom Books, 1989),
39.
24
This is themain reason why a good number of Sufis, philosophers, and some theologians
believe that the hell firewill be terminatedwhereas paradisewill remain eternal.For thedebate
between theMu'tazilites and theAsh'arites on this issue, see Sa'd al-D?n al-Taft?z?n?,Sharh al
Maq?sid (Beirut: '?lam al-Kutub, 1989), 5:131-140.
25
Cf. the following verse: "Man never tiresof asking for the good [thingsof life]; and if evil
fortune touches him, he abandons all hope, givinghimself up to despair. Yet whenever We let
him taste some ofOur grace afterhardship has visited him, he is sure to say, "This is butmy
due!"? and, "I do not think that theLast Hour will ever come: but if [it should come, and] I
should indeed be brought back unto my Sustainer, then,behold, the ultimate good awaitsme
with Him" (41: 49-50;M. Asad's translation).
26
Sadr?,Asfar, : 3, 92-3; see also 77.

IBRAHIM K?LIN
340
The best of all possible worlds argument is also related to the schemeof
actuality and potentialitywhich theMuslim philosophers and theologians
have adopted fromAristotle. The argumentgoes as follows. This world in
which we live is certainlyone of thepossibilities that theDivine has brought
into actuality. In this sense, theworld is pure contingency (imk?n) and hung
between existence and non-existence. From the point of view of its present
actuality,however, theworld is perfectand necessarybecause actuality implies

and perfection whereas potentiality is privation and non-existence.27
plenitude
The sense of perfection in thiscontext is both ontological and cosmological. It
is ontological because existence is superior to non-existence and whatever is in
the sphere of potentiality remains so until it is brought into actualityby an
agentwhich itselfis already actual. It is cosmological because, as statedbefore,
theworld has been createdwith care, order, and beauty,which theQur'?n
invitesits readers to look at as the signsofGod (?y?tAllah or vestigiaDei as it
was called by the Scholastics).The perfectstateof the cosmos is presentedas a
model for the establishmentof a just social order. It then follows thatevil is a
phenomenon of thisworld but not somethingthatdefines the essentialnature
of things.
An important outcome of this point of view is to identifyevil as a
rationallydiscernible phenomenon. This may appear to be a simple truism.
Nevertheless, it is a powerful position against the notion of evil as a
mysterious, mythical
or even
cosmological fact over which human beings have
no control.Evil is somethingthatcan be discernedby the intellectand correct
reasoning and, of course,with the help of the revelation,28and this places
tremendous on our shoulders vis-?-vis the evil that may come
responsibility
fromwithin or fromwithout. One may disagreewith Mu'tazilite theologians
27
Cf. Plotinus, The Enneads, V, IX: 5, p. 248, and Mull? Sadr?, Asf?r, I: 3, 343-4. B?qill?n?
considers the potential (bi -quwwah)as non-existent.See his Kit?b al-Tawhtd) 34-44, quoted in
Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant:The Concept ofKnowledge inMedieval Islam (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1970), 216.
28
As the "leader of the skeptics" (imam al-mushakkikin),Fakhr al-D?n al-R?z? disagrees.His
objection, however, clarifies another aspect of the discussion of theodicy in Islam. As al-R?z?
are good and some others bad.
points out, there is no dispute over the fact that some actions
The question is "whether this is because of an attribute that belongs [essentially] to the action
itselfor this is not the case and it is solely as an injunction of the SharVah [that actions and
things are good or bad]." Al-R?z? hastens to add that theMu'tazilites opt for the firstview and
"our path", i.e., theAsha'rites believe in the second. Cf. Fakhr al-D?n al-R?z?,al-Arba?nfi Usili
al-D?n (Cairo: Maktabat al-KuUiyat al-Azhariyyah, 1986), 1: 346. For a defence of the same
Ash'arite position, seeTaft?z?n?, Shark alMaqasidy 4: 282where it is asserted thathuman reason
is in no place to judgewhat is good (al-husn)andwhat is evil (al-qubh).For Sabziw?r?'s defence
of theMu'tazilites, the philosophers, and the "Im?miyyah,,on the rationalityof good and evil,
see his gloss on Sadr?'sAsfar, : 3, 83-4.

ISLAM AND PEACE
341
for pushing the sovereigntyof human freedom to the point of endangering

God's omniscience and omnipotence. In fact, thiswas what had prompted
Ab? -Hasan 'Ali b. Ismail al-Ash'ar? (d. 324/936),once aMu'tazilite himself,
to carryout his own ?tizal and lay the foundationsofAsha'rism. He and his
followers believed that good and evil were ultimately determined by the
Divine law (al-sharVah),leaving no space for the independent judgmentof
human reason (al-'aqt).Paradoxically, however, themoral voluntarism of the
Ash'arites agreeswith Mu'tazilite rationalism in underscoring the relativeand
contingentnature of evil:whether determinedby reason or revelation,evil is
theprivation of good and does not representthe essentialnature of things.
The Muslim philosophers assert the same point throughwhat we might
call the ontological argument. In addition to the fact that actuality is
perfectionover potentiality,existence (al-wuj?d) ispure goodness (khayr mabd,
summun bonum). All beings that exist partake of this ontological goodness.
Since God is the onlyNecessary being (w?jib al-wuj?d) by its essence and "in
all regards,"thisperfectionultimatelybelongs toHim. According toAb? 'Ali
al-Husayb 'AbdAllah Ibn S?n? (d. 428/1037), evil has no enduring essence and
appears only as theprivation?adam) of goodness:
Every being that is necessary by itself is pure goodness and pure perfection.
Goodness (al-khayr), in short, is that which everything desires and by which
no essence; it is either the
everything's being is completed. But evil has
nonexistence of a substance or the nonexistence of the state of goodness (sal?h)
for a substance. Thus existence is pure goodness, and the perfection of existence
is the goodness of existence. Existence is pure goodness when it is not
accompanied by nonexistence, the nonexistence of a substance, or the

nonexistence of something from that substance and it is in perpetual actuality. As
for the existent contingent by itself, it is not pure goodness because its essence
does not necessitate its existence by itself. Thus its essence allows for
nonexistence. Anything that allows for nonexistence in some respect is not free
from evil and imperfection in all respects. Hence pure goodness is nothing but
existence that is necessary by its own essence.29
Elaborating on the same idea,Mulla Sadr? argues that good and evil
cannot be regarded as opposites for "one is the nonexistence of the other;
thereforegoodness is existence or the perfectionof existence and evil is the
absence of existence or the nonexistence of the perfectionof existence."30
By
defininggood and evil in terms of existenceand nonexistence, Sadr? shiftsthe
focus from a moralistic to a primarilyontological framework.Like Ibn S?n?,
29
Ibn Sina,Kit?b al-Naj?t, ed.Majid Fakhry (Beirut:Dar al-?f?q al-Jad?dah,1985), 265; cf. also
Ibn S?n?,?-Mubahath?t, ed.Muhsin B?darfar(Qom: Intish?r?t-iB?d?r, 1413ah), 301.
30
Sadr?,Asfar,E: 1,113.

IBRAHIM K?LIN
342
Sadr? defines goodness as the essentialnature of thepresentworld-order for it

is an existent,viz., something positive. This leads Sadr? to conclude that
goodness permeates theworld-order at its foundation.In spiteof the existence
of such natural evils as death and famine,"what ismore and permanent is the
desired goodness in nature."31 Once evil is relativized,it is easier to defend this
world as the best of all possibleworlds. This iswhat Sadr? does when he says
that "the universe in its totality(bi-kulliyatiht)is themost perfectof all that
may be and themost noble of all that can be conceived."32
The Political-Legal Context: Law and ItsVicissitudes
The SharVah rules concerningwar, peace, jihad, religiousminorities, and the

religio-politicaldivisions ofDar al-Isl?m,Dar al-Sulh,D?r al-'Ahd, andDar al
Harb constitutean importantcomponent of the Islamic law of nations. Their
contextual and historical interpretationpresents a significantchallenge to the
modern scholars of Islam on the one hand, and theMuslims themselves,on
the other. In analyzing the views of the juristson these issues from the 2nd
Islamic centuryonward, an extremelycommon tendency is to fixate specific
legal rulingsby certain juristsas the 'orthodox'view of Islam applicable to all
times and places.While it is granted that Islamic law is based on theultimate
authorityof theQur'?n and theSunnah, theSharVahas legalcode is structured
in such a way as to allow considerable freedom and leeway forMuslim
scholars and communities to adjust themselves to different times and
circumstances.The early generations of Muslim scholars, jurists (fuqah?),
Qur'?nic commentators (mufassir?n), traditionists (muhaddith?n), and
historians have made extensiveuse of this simple fact,paving theway for the
rise and flourishingof various schools of law and legalopinions in Islam.This
'adoptionist' and resilient nature of the SharVah, however, has been grossly
overlooked and understatednot only inWestern scholarshipbut also in the
Islamic world. In the present context, this has led to the oft-repeated
conclusion that the teachingsof theSharVah and, by derivation, Islam itselfdo
not warrant a substantive notion of peace and a culture of coexistence.33
31
Sadr?,Asfar, : 3, 76. The intrinsicgoodness of things in theirnatural-ontological statehas
given rise to a number of popular formulationsof the problem, themost celebrated one being
Merkez Efendi, the famousOttoman scholar.When asked ifhe would change anythingwere he
to have the 'centre*of theworld at his hands, he replied thathe would leave everythingas it is,
hence the name 'merkez' (centre).
11 : 2, 114. See also ibid., : 2, 114, : 1, 256, : 2, 106-134. Sadr? employs two
Sadra,Asf?r,
arguments to defend the best of all possible worlds which
argument, he calls the 'ontological*
(innt) and 'causal* (limmi) methods (manhaj).
33
This iswhat Tibi claims in his essentialistgeneralizations and oversimplifications about the
Islamic pathos of peace and war. Cf. Bassam Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam" inTerry Nardin,

ISLAM AND PEACE
343
To analyze the legal-political aspects of traditional SharVah rulings

concerningwar and peace, I shall limitmyself to three interrelatedissues.The
first is theMuslim community's right to defend itselfagainst internal or
externalaggressionand the transitionof the firstMuslim communityfromthe
overt 'pacifism'ofMakkah to the 'activism'ofMad?nah. This issuenecessarily
raises thequestion of jihad as an offensiveor defensivewar and its relation to
what is called jus ad bellum in theWestern tradition.The second is thepolitical
contextof the legal injunctionsof certain jurists,namely ImamMuhammad b.
Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Sahl
Idris al-Sh?fi'?(d. 204/820) and theHanafi jurist
al-Sarakhsi (d. 483/1090), concerning the legitimacy of the territorial
ofMuslim states on Some contemporary scholars
expansion religious grounds.
have disproportionately overstated Sh?fi'?'s justificatory remarks about
launching jihad against non-Muslim territorieson the basis of their belief
system.The third issue is the treatmentof religiousminorities, i.e., the
dhimmtsunder the Islamic law and its relevance for religious diversity and
culturalpluralism in the Islamic tradition.
To beginwith the first,amajor concernof theProphet of Islam (peace be
on him) inMakkah was to ensure the securityand integrityof the nascent
Muslim community as a religio-politicalunit. This concern eventually led to
the historicmigration of theProphet (peace be on him) and his followers to
Mad?nah in 622 after a decade of pressure, sanctions, persecution, torture, and
a foiled attempt to kill the Prophet (peace be on him) himself.During this
period, the community's rightto defend itselfagainst theMakkan polytheists
was mostly exercised inwhat we would call today pacifist and non-violent
means of resistance.Even though theProphet (peace be on him) was in close
contactwith theMakkan leadersto spreadhismessage aswell as to protecthis
smallyet highly dedicated group of followers,his tirelessnegotiations did not
mitigate the aggressivepolicies of theMakkans against the growingMuslim
community. The transition from the robust pacifism of Makkah to the
was
political activism ofMad?nah took place when the permission to fight
givenwith theverses 22: 38-40:
Verily,God will ward off[all evil] fromthosewho attainto faith:[and]verily,

God does not love anyone who betrays his trust and is bereft of gratitude.
Permission[to fight]is given to thoseagainstwhom war is beingwrongfully
?
waged and, verily, God has indeed the power to succor them-: those who have
been driven from their homelands against all right or no other reason than their
not enabled people to defend
saying, "Our Sustainer is God!" For, ifGod had
ed. The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996), 128-145.

IBRAHIM K?LIN
344
themselves against one another, [all] monasteries and churches and synagogues
? would
and mosques ?in [all of] which God's name is abundantly extolled
surely have been destroyed. (M. Asad's translation).
This and other verses (2: 190-3) define clearly the reasons for takingup
arms to defend religious freedom and set the conditions of justwar (jus ad
bellum) in self-defence.
That theverse, revealed in the firstyear of theHijrah,
to
refers the gravewrongdoing againstMuslims and their eviction from their
homeland for professing the new faith confirms that themigration of the
Prophet (peace be on him) was the last stage of the forcefulexpulsion of the
Muslim community fromMakkah. This was a turningpoint for the attitudes
and ensuing tactics of the Prophet (peace be on him) and his followers to
protect themselves against the Makkans. The subsequent battles fought
between theMakkans and theMadinans fromBadr to Khandaq until the
Prophet's triumphantreturntoMakkah were based on the same principlesof
religious freedom, collective solidarity,and political unity. In addition to
enunciating the conditions of justwar, the above verse defines religious
freedomas a universal cause forall the threeAbrahamic faiths.Like any other
political unit, communities tiedwith a bond of faithhave the right and, in
fact, the responsibilityof securing their existence and integrityagainst the
threatsof persecution and eventual extinction.As I shall discuss below, this
ecumenical attitudetowards the religiousfreedomof all faithcommunitieswas
a major factor in theProphet's signingof a number of treatises with theJews,
Christians and Zoroastrians of theArabian Peninsula aswell as the treatment
of religiousminorities under theSharVab.M
The constructionof jihad as armed struggleto expand the borders ofDar
al-Isl?m and, by derivation, subsume all Dar al-Harb under the Islamic
dominion is found in some of the juristsof the 9th and 10thcenturies.Among
those,we canmention Sh?fi'?and Sarakhs?who interpretedjihad as the duty
of theMuslim ruler to fightagainst the landsdefined as the "territoryofwar."
Shafi'i formulatedhis expansionisttheoryof jihad as a religiousduty at a time
when Muslim stateswere engaged in prolongedmilitary cofiflicts with non
Muslim territoriesand had become mostly successful in extending their
borders.While these juristshad justifiedfightingagainst non-Muslims on
account of their disbelief (kufr) rather than self-defence,they were also
34
Concerning theZoroastrians and Sabeans and theirbeing part of thePeople of theBook, Abu
Y?suf narrates a number of traditionsof the Prophet (peace be on him) to show that they
should be treatedwith justice and equality as the other dhimm?s. The inclusion of the
Zoroastrians among the dhimm?s is inferredfrom the fact that the Prophet (peace be on him)
had collected jizyah from theMaj?s ofHajar. Cf. Taxation in Islam:Abu Yusufs Kitab al-kharaj,
tr.A. Ben Shemesh (Leiden: E. J.Brill, 1969), 88-9.

ISLAM AND PEACE
345
adamant on the observation of jus in bello norms, i.e., avoiding excessiveness,

accepting truce,sparingthe livesof noncombatants,women, children,etc.35In
spiteof theseconditions, theviews of Sh?fi'?and his followersrepresenta shift
from theQur'?nic notion of self-defence to armed struggleto bring about the
conversion of non-Muslims. Having said that, two points need to be
mentioned.
First of all, the views of Sh?fi'? and Sarakhs? do not represent the
majority, let alone the 'orthodox,' stanceof the jurists.The common tendency
to present this particular definition of jihad as themainstream position of
Islam not only disregards the views of Im?mAbu Han?fah Nu'm? b. Th?bit
(d. 150/767),Malik ibn Anas (d. 179/795),Ab? Y?suf Yu'qub b. Ibrahim
(d. 182/798), Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Shayb?n? (d. 189/804), 'Abd al
Rahm?n b. 'Amr al-Awz?'? (d. 157/774),Muhammad b. Ahmad Ibn Rushd
(d. 595/1198), Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Hal?m Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328),
Muhammad b. Abi Bakr Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah(d 751/1350)36and others
but also ignores the historical and contextualnature of such juridical rulings.
The same holds true forMuslim political philosophers and theologianswho
take a differentposition on the bifurcationistframework of Dar al-Isl?m
versusDar al-Harb?7Moreover, these rulingswere by and large the jurists'
response to the de facto situationof themilitary conquests ofMuslim states
ratherthan theircause.Certain juristsbegin to stresssuch reconciliatoryterms
as Dar al-(Ahd ("the land of the covenant") and Dar al-Sulh ("the land of
peace") during and after the 11th and 12th centurieswhen theMuslim states
were confrontedwith political realities other than unabated conquest and
victories. This in tone and emphasis, however, was not a
resounding change
completely novel phenomenon for the concept ofDar al-Sulh can be traced
35
Some of these stipulations can be followed from Shayb?n?'s Siyar; English, tr.Majid
Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shayb?nVs Siyar (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1966), 75-94; also Muhammad Hamidullah, The Muslim Conduct of State
(Lahore: S. Ashraf, 1961), 205-8.
36
Cf. "Sulh",Encyclopedia ofIslam2,9-845a.
37 a see Sa'd al-D?n al-Taft?z?n?,Shark al-Maq?sid,
As representativetextof theAshcarite kalam,
5: 232-320 where the long discussion of the im?mate contains no references to jih?d as
conquering non-Muslim territories.See also Ibn Khald?n, Muqaddimah, tr. Franz Rosenthal,
abridged byN. J.Dawood (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1969), 158-160 and Fakhr al
D?n al-R?z?, alArbaln fi Usui al-D?n, 2: 255-270. The Muslim philosophers, especially Ab?
Nasr al-F?r?b?,define jih?d as justwar and stresses the virtues of the 'city* (madinah) or the
human habitat. Cf. Joel L. Kraemer, "The Jih?d of theFal?sifa," JerusalemStudies inArabic and
Islam, 10 (1987), 293 and 312. Butterworth holds the same view about al-F?r?b?'s notion of
warfare in his "Al-F?r?b?'s Statecraft:War and theWell-Ordered Regime" in JamesTurner
Johnson and JohnKelsay, eds. Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justificationand Limitation of
War inWestern and Islamic Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 79-100.

IBRAHIM K?LIN
346
back to the treaty that the Prophet (peace be on him) had signedwith the
Christian population ofNajr?n when he was inMadinah.38 As I shall discuss
below, this treaty,whose text has been preserved, lays the foundations of
making peace with non-Muslim communities.In addition, thepolicy of giving
am?n i.e., contractual to non-Muslims or
(safe-conduct), protection residing
travelling in Muslim territories, was a common
practice. Such people
were
known as musta'min, and to grant them this status was not
only the
prerogative of head of state or 'ulama' but also individuals,both men and
women.39
Secondly, the idea of bringing theworld under the reignofDar al-Isl?m

bymilitarymeans and territorialexpansion should be seenwithin the context
of the geo-political conditions of the classical Islamic world. The medieval
imperialworld order, ofwhich Muslim stateswere a part,was based on the
idea of continuously expanding one's borders because 'conquest' (fath)
provided economic, political and demographic stability.In this sense, asHitti
points out, "the Islam thatconquered thenorthern regionswas not the Islamic
...
religion but the Islamic state itwas Arabianism and notMuhammadanism
that triumphed first."40 In a world inwhich one was either a 'conqueror' or
'conquered,' the triumphant Muslim statesdepended heavily on the expansion
of their territoriesagainstboth theirMuslim rivals and non-Muslim enemies.
The historicmarch ofMuslim armies into territoriesonce under non-Muslim
rulewas not jihad in the religious sense of the termbut an outcome of the
power struggletowhich all political establishments, Muslim or non-Muslim,
were
subject.
This is furthermade clear by the fact that territorialexpansion and

military conquest did not always and necessarily mean conversion. Beginning
with the early history of Islam, conversion throughpersuasion and 'calling'
(da'wah)was encouraged, and a multitude ofmethods were put in place to
facilitate the conversion of individuals and masses through peacefulmeans.
Conversion by force,which would make Islam a proselytizing religion,
however, was not imposed as a policy either by the 'ulama3or the rulers.
Furthermore, conversionwas not a condition to become part of theMuslim
community to gain religiousfreedom,receiveprotection,and possess property
38
Cf. ?Dar al-SiuV EP, 2: 131a.
39
Shayb?ni, Siyar, 158-194; also "Aman,"EP, 1: 429a.
40
Philip K. Hitti, History of theArabs (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1970), 145.Dozy makes a
similarpoint when he says that "the holy war is never imposed except only when the enemies
of Islam are the aggressors.Otherwise, ifwe take into account the injunctions of theQur'an, it
is nothing but an interpretationof some theologians."R. Dozy, Essai sur l'histoirede l'Islamisme
(Leiden: Brill, 1879), 152.

ISLAMAND PEACE
347
under the Islamic law. The considerably protean concept of the dhimml
allowed religious minorities to maintain their traditions and resist any
attempts at forceful conversion. Since Islam does not ordain a
missionary
establishment, the agents of conversion responsible for the enormously
successfuland unprecedented spread of Islamwere multifarious and extended
from the Arab traders and the Sufis to Islamic communal institutions.41
Otherwise we cannot
explain the en masse conversion of various ethnic,
religious and cultural communities to Islam by themilitary prowess of a
handfulofMuslim groups inAnatolia, Iran,Africa or India.
Paradoxically, thepolicies of religioustolerance securedboth the rightsof

religiousminorities and the loyaltiesof new converts. In a manner thatwas
simplyunimaginable in theChristian kingdoms of Europe at the time,Jews,
Christians, Sabeans, and Hindus had access to considerably high state posts
from the time of Mu'?wiyah (r.41-60/661-680) to the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire at the beginningof the 20th century.Jewish and Christian
scientists, physicians, accountants, counselors and statesmen were employed
at
Ummayad courts. St. John theDamascene (Yuhann? al-Dimashq?,d. 131/749)

one of the most influentialfiguresof Eastern Orthodox Church and the
author of the earliest anti-Islamicpolemics, and his fatherIbnMans?r, held
positions under the caliph 'Abd al-Malik (r.65-85/685-705).42During the
Buwayhid era in Persia, the vizier of the powerful Persian king cAdud al
Dawlah (r. 337-372/949-982), Nasr ibnH?r?n was a Christian.43We find
similarcases in India and theOttoman Empire where theverticalmobility of
religious minorities in state affairs was a common
phenomenon. Even the
devshirmesystemof theOttomans, which has been criticized and labelled as a
form of forced conversion, provided religiousminorities with unfettered
access to the highest governmentpositions. Three grand viziers of Suleiman
theMagnificent (r.926-974/1520-1566), themost powerfulOttoman sultan,
were ofChristian origin: the famous "Maqbul" (later"Maqtul") IbrahimP?sh?
of Parga (d. 1536),was a Greek and an able diplomat and commander;Rustem
[Rustam]P?sh? (d. 1561)was a Bulgarian and had handled the treasurywith
utmost competence; and the celebrated SokulluMehmet [Muhammad] P?sh?
(d. 1579)was a Slav fromBosnia and had served inhis youth as an acolyte in a
41
Cf. Richard Bulliet, "Conversion to Islam and theEmergence of aMuslim Society in Iran" in
Nehemia Levtzion, ed. Conversion to Islam (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc.,
1979), 30-51. See also the introductionby the editor, 9.
42
Cf. Daniel J. Sahas, John ofDamascus on Islam: The "Heresyof theIshmaelites" (Ledien: E. J.
Brill, 1972).
43
T. W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam (Delhi: Renaissance PublishingHouse, 1984; originally
published in 1913), 63-4.

IBRAHIM K?LIN
348
Serbian church.44Among these, the case of Sokullu is probably themost

interestingfor it shows the extent towhich thedevshirmesystemeventually
worked to the benefitof theChristian communitiesunder theOttoman rule.
Although Sokullu embraced Islam and became one of themost powerfulmen
of his time, he kept close contactwith his brotherwho was an important
religiousfigureinBosnia and helped himwith his statusas thegrandvizier.
In the lightof thesepoints,we have tomake a distinctionbetween jih?d
as "justwar" and jih?d as "holywar,"45which bringsus to our thirdissue.Just
war refers to a community's right to defend itselfagainst aggression and
oppression. It is defensive in nature whereas "holy war" entails converting
everybody else into one's religion by force, armed struggle, territorial
expansion, and othermeans. In the firstsense,jih?d is an extension of thejus
ad bellum traditionand can be seen as a necessity to protect justice,freedom
and order. In this regard,the position taken by theQur'?n and theProphet
(peace be on him) concerning theuse of force againstoppression byMuslims
and non-Muslims alike46is essentiallya realistone and aims at putting strict
war and using force.The guidingprinciple is thatof
conditions for regulating
fightingagainst aggression,which is "to fightin theway ofGod", and not to
be the aggressors: "Fight (q?til?, Ut. "kill") in theway of God against those
who fightagainstyou, but do not transgressthe limits.Verily, God does not
love aggressors"(2: 190;Cf. also 4: 91 and 9: 36). Both the classical andmodern
commentators not to "transgress" as
have interpreted the command (la ta'tadu)
avoidingwar and hostilities in the firstplace, resortingto armed struggleonly
to defend one's freedom, and, once forced to fight, sparing the Uves of
noncombatants that include women, children, and the elderly.47
Contrary to what Khadduri claims,48the global bifurcationof D?r al
44
Cf. Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries:The Rise and Fall of theTurkishEmpire (New York:
Morrow Quill, 1977), 259.
45
Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, "The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation andHistory" in
Johnson andKelsay, eds. Cross,Crescent,and Sword, 36.
46
On the question of rebellion and irregularwarfare (ahk?m al-bugh?t) in Islamic law, see
Khaled Abou el Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge:Cambridge University
Press, 2001). For a shorter synoptic account, see idem, "Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular
Warfare and
theLaw ofRebellion in Islam" in Johnson andKelsay, eds. Cross,Crescent,and Sword, 149-176.
47
Imam Shawk?nl, Fath alQad?r, abridgedby Sulaym?n 'AbdAllah al-Ashqar (Kuwait: Shirkat
Dh?t Sal?sil, 1988), 37; Le Coran: "Viola le Livre..." French translation and commentary by
Yahy? 'Alaw? and JavadHad?d? (Qom: Centre pour la traductiondu SaintCoran, 2000), 318-9;
Muhammad Asad, TheMessage of theQur'?n, 41; ShaykhMuhammad al-Ghazali, A Thematic
Commentary on theQur'?n, tr.A. Shamis (Herndon: International Instituteof IslamicThought,
2000), 18-9.
48
In his War and Peace in theLaw of Islam (Baltimore:The JohnsHopkins Press, 1955)Majid
Khadduri goes so far as to translatejih?d as 'warfare*(p. 55) and 'permanentwar* (p. 62), and

ISLAM AND PEACE
349
Islam and Dar al-Harb does not translate into a "holy war" nor a
'permanent
stateofwar' betweenMuslims and non-Muslims.No figurecan illustratethis
point better than Ibn Taymiyyahwhose views have beenwidely distortedand
exploited to lend legitimacyto extremistinterpretations
of the classical Islamic
law of nations. Even though Ibn Taymiyyah lived through the destruction
wrought upon the Islamic world by theMongols and could have been
expected to take a more belligerent stance against the 'infidels,'he was
unequivocal in statingthatMuslims could wage war only against thosewho
attacked them.The idea of initiatingunprovoked war to convert people to
Islam, namely to engage in 'holywar,' belies the religion itselfbecause,
according to Ibn Taymiyyah, "if the unbelieverwere to be killed unless he
becomes aMuslim, such an actionwould constitutethe greatestcompulsion in
no
religion,"which would be contraryto theQur'?nic principle that "there is
compulsion in religion" (2: 256).49 Ibn Taymiyyah's famous student Ibn
Qayyim al-Jawziyyahreiteratesthe sameprinciplewhen he says that "fighting
war (barb), not on account of disbelief
(qit?l) is permitted on account of
{kufi)."50
This extendedmeaning of jihad as jus ad bellum, i.e., armed strugglein
self-defence can also be seen in the anti-colonialist resistance movements of the
modern period. In the 18th and 19th centuries, calls for jihad were issued
across the Islamicworld to fightagainst colonialism. For the anti-colonialist
resistancemovements of this period, jihad functioned,first,as the religious
basis of fightingagainst colonialism and, second, as a powerful way of
mobilizing people to join the resistanceforces.Among others, SayyidAhmad
(d. 1831) and his followers in India, Shaykh Sh?mil (d. 1871) in Chechenya,
*Shaykh'Abd al-Q?c?r al-Jaz?i'r?(d. 1883) inAlgeria, theMahd? family in the
Sudan, Ahmad 'Ur?b? (d. 1911) inEgypt, and the San?siyyah order in Libya
fought against European colonial powers.51 It was during this period of
resistance that jihad took a cultural tone in the sense that the fightagainst
colonial was seen as both a and
powers military religio-cultural struggle.
Despite the enormous difficulties faced by Muslim scholars, leaders,
claims that "the universalism of Islam, in its all-embracingcreed, is imposed on the believers as a
continuous process ofwarfare, psychological and political, ifnot strictly military" (p. 64). This
belligerent view of jih?d will be hard to justifyin the light of both the legal and cultural
traditionsof Islam discussed below.
49Ibn Taymiyyah, "Qa'idah fi Qit?l al-Kuff?r" inMajm?'at al-Ras?% 123, quoted inMajid
Khadduri, The Islamic Law ofNations, 59.
50 -
IbnQayyim al-Jawziyyah, Ahk?m ahi alDhimmah, ed. Subhi al-S?lih (Beirut:Dar al-'Ilm Ii
Mal?yin, 1983), 3rd edition, 1:17.
51
Cf. John Voll, "Renewal and Reform" in John Esposito, ed. The Oxford History of Islam
(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2000).

IBRAHIM K?LIN
350
merchants, and villagers inEgypt,Africa, India and otjier places, thejihad calls
against the European armies did not lead to an all-outwar against the local
non-Muslim communities.Even in caseswhere theMuslim population had to
bear the full brunt of colonialism, extreme carewas taken not to label local
non-Muslims as the enemy because of their religious and cultural affiliation
*
with European colonial powers.When, for instance,the San?s? call for jih?d
all unbelievers' caused a sense of urgency among the Christians in
against
Egypt,Muslim scholars responded by saying thatjih?d inLibya was directed
at the Italian aggressors, not allWesterners or Christians.52
was foughtagainst the invasion of European

Since jihad as armed struggle
powers, it was not difficult for it to take religious and cultural tones.
Napoleon's attempt to paint himselfas a 'defenderof Islam'when he invaded
Egypt in 1798, for instance,was seen by the celebrated Egyptian historian
'Abd al-Rahm?n al-Jabart?(1158-1240/1754-1825) as no more than outright
lies expected only from an 'infidel' (kafir).In his letter to local Egyptian
leaders, imams and scholars,Napoleon said thathe "more than theMamluks,
? ?
serve[s]God may He be praised and exalted and revere[s]His Prophet
Muhammad and the gloriousQur'?n" and that the "French are also faithful
Muslims."53 For Jabart? and his generation, this was yet another fact
confirmingthe necessity of launchingjih?d against the 'afranj' (theFrench,

i.e., Europeans). This sense of jih?d as anti-colonialist struggle has not
completely disappeared from theminds of someMuslims in the post-colonial
period. In fact, themodern calls for jih?d as 'holywar' by suchMuslim
extremists as 'Abd al-Sal?m who wrote the celebrated al-Fartdah al
Faraj
Gh?'ibah ("TheNeglected Duty")54 presumably justifyingthe assassinationof
Anwar S?d?t in 1401/1981,andOsama bin Laden are asmuch theproduct of
theirstrictand a-historicalreadingof the classicalSharVah sources as the legacy
of colonialism.
Lastly, I would like to turn briefly to the statusof religiousminorities

under Islamic law. As mentioned before, the dhimm? status granted the
52
Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: TheDoctrine ofJihad inModern History (The Hague:
Mouton Publishers, 1979), 86. Peters' work presents an excellent survey of how jihad was
reformulated as an anti-colonialist resistance idea in themodern period. For the struggleof
Muslim jurists to continue the traditionof Islamic law under the French colonial system, see
also,Allan Christelow, Muslim Law Courts and theFrenchColonial State inAlgeria (Princeton:
PrincetonUniversity Press, 1985).
53Al-Jabart?Al-JabartVsChronicle of theFrench Occupation, tr. Shmuel Moreh (Princeton:
Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997), 26.
54
Faraj's treatisehas been translatedby JohannesJ.G. Jansen,TheNeglectedDuty: The Creed of
Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in theMiddle East (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1986), 160-230.

ISLAM AND PEACE
351
religiousminorities and especially Jews and Christians under Muslim rule

somemeasure of economic and political protection,freedomofworship, right
to own property, and, in some cases, access to high government The
positions.
religious-legalbasis of the notion of thedhimml goes back to the time of the
Prophet (peace be on him).While the statusof dhimmlwas initiallygiven to
Jews, Christians, Sabaeans and Zoroastrians, its scope was later extended to
include all non-Muslims livingunder Islam.55A similar course of actionwas
followed in Indiawhen Muhammad b. al-Q?sim (d. 98/717), the first Muslim
commander to set foot on Indian soil in the 8th century,comparedHindus to
Jews,Christians and Zoroastrians and declared them as part of theAhi al
Dhimmah.50 This decision,which was later sanctioned by theHanaf? jurists,
was a momentous event in the development of the Muslim attitude towards
the religions of India. This politico-legal ruling could be seen as laying the
foundationsof theHindu-Muslim mode of cultural coexistence,which I shall
discuss below.
That the Prophet (peace be on him) and his Companions were lenient
towards the People of the Book is attested not only by the communal
relationships that developed betweenMuslims and non-Muslims inMad?nah
but also recorded in a number of treatisessignedby theProphet (peace be on
him). The "Madman Constitution" (wathlqat al-madlnah), for instance,
recognizes the Jews of Ban? 4Awf, Ban? al-Najj?r,Ban? Tha'labah and others
as a distinct communitywith "theirown religion."57 Another treatisesigned
as
with thePeople of theBook ofNajr?n reads follows:
They [Peopleof theBook] shallhave theprotectionofAllah and thepromiseof

Muhammad, theApostle of Allah, that they shall be secured their lives, property,
lands, creed, those absent and those present, their families, their churches, and all
that they possess. No bishop or monk shall be displaced from his parish or
monastery no priest shall be forced to abandon his priestly life.No hardships or
humiliation shall be imposed on them nor shall their land be occupied by [our]
55
There is a consensus on thispoint among theHanafi andM?liki schools of law aswell as some
Hanbal? scholars. For referencesinArabic, seeYohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in
Islam: InterfaithRelations in theMuslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 85-86. For the inclusion of Zoroastrians among the People of theBook, see ibid., 72-76.
Sh?fi'i considers the Sabaeans, a communitymentioned in theQur'?n, as a Christians group.Cf.
IbnQayyim al-Jawziyyah, Ahk?m Ahl al-Dhimmah, 1: 92.
56
The incident is recorded in Bal?dhuri's Fut?h al-Buld?n. Cf. Friedm?nn, Tolerance and
Coercion, 85.
57
The text of theMadman treatise is preserved in Ibn Hisham's Sirah. It is also published in
Muhammad HamiduUah, Documents sur la Diplomatie a l'Epoque du Proph?te et des Khalifes
Orthodoxes (Paris:G.P. Masionneuve, 1935), 9-14. For an English translation, see Khadduri,
War and Peace, 206-9.

IBRAHIM
K?LIN
352
army. Those who seek justice, shall have it: there will be no oppressors nor
oppressed.58
The privilegesgiven to thedhimm?s included thingsthatwere prohibited

forMuslims such as breeding pork and producing alcohol, which were not
outlawed forChristians. The religious tax called jizyahwas themain economic
responsibilityof the dhimm?s under the SharVah.Contrary to a common
belief, the primary goal of the jizyah taxwas not the 'humiliation' of the
People of the Book. While many contemporary translationsof theQur'?n
translatethewords wa hum al-s?ghir?nas "so that theywill be humiliated,"
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, who has written themost extensivework on the
People of theBook, understands it as securingthe allegiance of thePeople of
theBook to the laws pertainingto them (ahk?mal-millah). Instead,wa hum al
s?ghir?nshould be understood, says IbnQayyim, asmaking all subjectsof the
stateobey the law and, in the case of thePeople of theBook, pay thejizyah.59
According toAb? Y?suf, one of the foremostauthoritiesof theHanaf?
school of law, jizyahwas "48 dirhams on thewealthy, 24 on themiddle class
and 12 dirhams on the poor ploughman-peasant and manual worker.
According to Shafi'?, thejizyah is one dinar for the poor and fourdinars for
the rich."60It is collected once a year andmay be paid in kind, i.e., as "goods
and similarpropertywhich is accepted according to itsvalue."61Those who
cannot affordto pay it are not forced to do so.62The exempted also include
women, children, the elderlyand the sick.63 To the best of our knowledge, the
tax was not a source of income for the state,64 and it
jizyah significant
exempted the dhimm?s frommilitary service. In some cases, the jizyah was
postponed or abandoned altogetherby thehead of the stateaswe see in India
under the reigns of Akbar (r.963-1014/1556-1605), Jah?ng?r (r. 1014
1037/1605-1628) and Shah Jah?n (1037-1068/1628-1658).65The jizyahwas a
58
Quoted inKhadduri, War and Peace in theLaw ofIslam, 179.The original textof theNajr?n
treatiseis quoted inAb? Y?suf, Kit?b al-Khar?j and Bal?dhuri,Fut?h al-Buld?n (Cairo:Maktabat
al-Tij?riyyahal-Kubr?, 1959).
59
IbnQayyim al-Jawziyyah, Abkam Ahl al-Dhimmah, 1: 24.
60
Ibid., 1:26.
61
Ab? Y?suf, Kit?b al-Khar?j, 84. Cf. Shayb?ni,Siyar, inKhadduri, War and Peace, 143.
62
IbnQayyim, Ahk?m Ahl al-Dhimmah, 1: 32ff.
63
Ibid., 42 and 49!
64
This is not to deny that therewere examples to the contrary.When one of the governors of
'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Az?z asked permission to "collect huge amounts of jizyah owed by Jews,
Chrsitans andMaj?s of al-H?rah before theyaccepted Islam,* 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz responded
by saying that "God has sent the ProphetMuhammad (peace be on him) to invitepeople to
Islam and not as a tax collector."This letterisquoted in 'Ab? Y?suf, Kit?b al-Khar?j, 90.
65
Cf. Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment (Oxford: Oxford

ISLAM AND PEACE
353
compensation for the protection of thedhimmlsby the state against any type
of aggression fromMuslims or non-Muslims.This is attestedby the fact that
thepoll-taxeswere returnedto thedhimmlswhen theMuslim statewas unable
to provide the securityof itsnon-Muslimminorities.66Inmost cases, thejizyah
was imposed not as individual tax like the khar?j but as collective tributeon
eligibledhimmls!37
While IbnQayyim al-Jawziyyah'sfamouswork on thedhimmls contains
a view of non-Muslims
many rulings that present condescending and advocates
policies of humiliation against them,68 many other juristswere insistenton

treatingthedhimmlswith equity and justice.As people "under theprotection
of theProphet," Jews,Christians and other religiousminoritieswere not to be
forcedto paymore than theycould affordnor to be intimidatedand oppressed
because of their religious affiliations.Advising H?r?n al-Rash?d (r. 170
193/786-809), the famousAbbasid caliph, on the treatmentof the dhimmls,
Ab? Y?suf exhortshim to "treatwith leniency thoseunder the protection of
our Prophet Muhammad, and not allow thatmore thanwhat is due to be
taken from them or more than they are able to pay, and thatnothing should
be confiscated from theirpropertieswithout legal justification."69 In making
this strongadvice to theCaliph, Abu Y?suf narratesa traditionof theProphet
(peace be on him) inwhich he says that "hewho robs a dhimml or imposeson
him more than he can bear will have me as his opponent." Another well
known case is the execution on theorder of theProphet (peace be on him) of a
Muslim who had killed a dhimml. In response to this incident, the Prophet
(peace be on him) has said that "it ismost appropriate that I liveup fully to
my (promiseof) protection."70
These and other rules concerning the dhimmls show that Islam accepts
the realityof the 'religiousother' in termsof a de jure realityratherthan as a
matter of political exigency.The underlyingprinciple behind this attitudeof
accommodation is that the interests of human are served better in peace
beings
University Press, 1964), 80-1.

66
Ab? Y?suf mentions the case ofAbu 'Ubaydah returningthe jizyah to the dhimm?sofHims
when he was not able to provide protection for them against theRoman emperorHeraclius. Cf.
the letterby Abu 'Ubayadahmentioned byAb? Y?suf, Kit?b al-Khar?j, 150.
67
Cf. Khadduri, War and Peace, 188-9.
68
These include some restrictiverulingson what the People of the Book could wear and what
religious symbols they could display. Cf. A. S. Tritton, The Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim
Subjects (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), chaptersVII and V??1. As Tritton notes,
however, such rulingswere not implemented strictlyand displayed considerable variety across
the Islamicworld. A case in point,which Tritton mentions (p. 121), is Salah al-D?n al-Ayy?b?
who had someChristian officersworking forhim without following any strictdress code.
69
Khadduri, War and Peace, 85.
70
Quoted inFriedmann, Tolerance and Coercion, 40.

IBRAHIM K?LIN
354
than in conflict.To reveal the extent of the Islamic theology of peace and
culturalpluralism,we need to look at the cultural attitudesand practices of
Muslim societies vis-?-vis other communities, to which we now turn.
The Socio-Cultural Context: Confrontation, Coexistence and Peace
Islam does not prescribe a particular formof cultural identity.There are both
doctrinal and historical reasons for this.The absence of a central religious
authority or clergy in the Islamic traditionpreempts authoritarianismas a
model of negotiating religiousaffairsin the public sphere.This is attestedby
themultiplicity of schools of law as well as the notorious differencesof
opinion among them.This fact,often statedbyMuslims with a senseof pride,
however, does not negate thepresence of establishedand commonly accepted
views in the Islamic tradition.Assuming that there is a set of beliefs and
as
practices thatwe may legitimatelyconsider mainstream and orthodox, it is
based on the consensus of the community over the generations rather than a
centralized body of legal rulings. The incrementalprocess of establishing
orthodox etiquettes isnot themonopoly of the 'ulama \Rather, it is shapedby
a multitude of social agents that includemen of letters,dervishes, saints,
'heretics/bards and folk singers,storytellers,
political leaders,rulers,scientists,
artists,traders,diplomats, philosophers, and theologians.While it is true that
the dissemination of religious authorityon the one hand and themalleability
of cultural expressions in Muslim societies on the other has challenged
centralism and authoritarianism, it has also raised the question of legitimacy
and authenticity.Some, including thosewho are calledWahh?b?s and some
Orientalists have called this a deviation from the norms of the religion,
not so much 'Islamic' as antin?mi?n.
arguing that Islamic history has been
Even ifwe admit that there are presumably overt discrepancies between what
as a of
the 'ulama3 envision perfect Shari'ah society and the cultural practices
Muslim societies, it is a healthy tension and functions as a mechanism of
checks and balances against the strictlytext-based,relatively abstract, and
reductivelylegalisticapproach of the jurists.
In creating their cultural orthopraxies,Muslim communities were
functioningwithin the frameworkof the ethical universalism of theQur'?n
and theSunnah. The Qur'?nic call to enjoinwhat is good and praised (ma'r?j)
and forbidwhat ismorally evil and disliked (munkar) (3: 104 and 110) isnot a
culture-specificinjunction. It is addressed to all peoples regardlessof their
religious affiliations.The Prophet (peace be on him) is considered a perfect
example (uswahhasanab) forall humanity inhis fightagainst all that is evil and
oppressive and in defence of all that is praiseworthy and virtuous,whatever
their origin might be. The notion of the "middle community" (ummah

ISLAM AND PEACE
355
wasatah; Qur'?n 2: 143) supportsthe same ethicaluniversalism: "And thusWe

willed you to be a communityof themiddle way, so that [withyour lives]you
might bear witness to the truthbefore all mankind, and that the Apostle
might bear witness to it beforeyou" (M. Asad's translation).The aim of this
ethical-spiritualuniversalism is to create an open society based on moral
values, not on the received traditionsof one tribe,city, or nation. This is in
tandemwith the fact that theQur'?n positions itself against the cultural
localism and tribalparochialism of pre-IslamicArabia ? a rule thathas been
an invariable factor in the rapid spread of Islam outside theArabic cultural
zone. Once established as major cultural units,Muslim societies articulated
this ethical universalism intovarious societalmechanisms by which the ideal
of creatinga virtuous and justhuman habitat could be realized.The politics of
gaining statusand social ascendancy in the Islamic context is thusbased on the
acquisition of two universal qualities: knowledge ('?/m)and virtue (fadtlahand
ihs?n).Both of these qualities are implicit in theQur'?nic notion of taqw?
(God-consciousness) (49: 13), which is the ultimate criterion of 'nobility'
among people. In a broad sense, this formsthe basis of an Islamicmeritocracy
whereby everymember of the society isurged to contribute to the creationof
a moral and just social order. As the few examples below will show, the
Muslim philosophers and scientistsregardedseekingknowledge and leading a
virtuous Ufe as thebasis of theirinterestin other culturesand traditions.
Historically, as the borders of the Islamicworld expanded outside and
beyond the Arabian Peninsula, Muslims became heir to all of themajor
cultural traditions of the time. The Graeco-Roman heritage through the
Byzantine Empire and thePersian culture through the Sasanidswere the first
two important traditions thatMuslims encountered in less than a century after
the death of the Prophet (peace be on him). This was followed by
Mesopotamian, Indian, black African, centralAsian, Chinese, and finally
Malay-Indonesian civilizations in the 15th and 16th centuries.71The rapid
establishmentof thedifferentculturalzones of the Islamicworld went hand in
71
The major and minor religions that the Islamic world encountered throughout its history
make up a long list: the religious traditionsof the pre-Islamic (j?hiliyyah)Arabs, Mazdeans in
Mesopotamia, Iran, and Transoxania, Christians (of differentcommunions likeNestorians in
Mesopotamia and Iran,Monophysites in Syria, Egypt and Armenia, Orthodox Melkites in
Syria, Orthodox Latins in North Africa), Jews in various places, Samaritans in Palastine,
Mandaeans in south Mesopotamia, Harranians in north Mesopotamia, Manichaeans in
Mesopotamia and Egypt, Buddhists and Hindus in Sind, tribal religions inAfrica, pre-Islamic
Turkic tribes,Buddhists in Sind and the Panjab, Hindus in the Panjab. Cf. J.Waardenburg,
"World Religions as seen in theLight of Islam" inA. T. Welch and P. Cachia, eds. Islam Past
Influenceand PresentChallenge (Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press, 1979), 248-9. See also J.
Waardenburg, Muslims and Others: Relations in Context (Berlin and New York: Walter de
Gruyter, 2003).

356 IBRAHIM KAUN
hand with the rise of the numerous schools of law,Kal?m, philosophy, and
Sufi orders, generatinga remarkable tapestryof cultural diversitywithin and
across theDar al-Isl?mJ2In spite of occasional sectarianconflicts such as the
mihnah incident in the 3rd/9thcentury73or theKadizade movement in the
Ottoman Empire in the 10th/16th century,74traditionalMuslim societies
succeeded in creatinga stable and peaceful habitat inwhich bothMuslim and
non-Muslimmembers of the ummah contributedto the cultivationof aworld
civilization in such diverse fieldsas arts, sciences, trade and architecture.The
notion of cultural and religiousco-existencethatcame about in thismilieu was
not merely based on the temporary absence of conflict and confrontation
between Islamic and non-Islamic elements. Its positive character was nurtured
and sustainedby the inclusivistattitudeofMuslims towardsother culturesand
religious traditions,which makes Islamic civilization simultaneously both
Islamic and 'Islamicate.'75
There is a plethora of examples in the history of Islam to illustratethe

cultural ecumenism ofMuslim societies.We may beginwith the attitudeof
Muslim philosophers towardspre-Islamic traditionsof learning.For the early
Muslim philosophers, scholars, and scientists,the search for truthwas both
within and beyond religiousboundaries. The Prophet's famous exhortations
to "seek knowledge even if it is in China"76 and "wisdom isMuslim's lost
were frequentlyreferredto
[treasure].He takes itwherever he finds it"77 by
72
The six cultural zones of the Islamicworld compriseArabic, Persian, Turkish/Turkic, Indian,
Malay-Indonesian, and African spheres of culturewhere the expression of Islam as a religious
and cultural identityhas been more heterogeneous and complex than theChristian,Hindu or
Chinese worlds. For a discussion of these zones, see S. H. Nasr, The Heart of Islam (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 2003), 87-100.
73
See fordetails,M. Hinds, "Mirina" inEncyclopaedia ofIslam, 2nd edn., 7: 26.
74
See SemiramisCavusoglu, The Kadizadeli Movement: An Attempt at Seri'at-MindedReform
in the Ottoman Empire" (Unpublished Dissertation; Princeton University, 1990). Also see
Madeline C. Zilfi, "Vaizan andUlema in theKadizadeli Era," Proceedingsof theTenthCongress of
theTurkishHistorical Society (Ankara: 1994), 2493-2500.
75
Marshall Hodgson's suggestionof the term 'Islamicate*to express thehybrid andmultifaceted
nature of Islamic civilization is not completelywithout justificationas many previously non
Islamic elementswere found theirway into Islamic civilization in a relatively short period of
time.Cf. his The Venture oflsUm (Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 1974).
76
See,?l-Rabi* b. Habib al-Basari, Vilm wa Talabih wa Fadlih.
Musnad allmarn al-RabV,B?b f?
This is also narrated by Ab? Bakr Ahmad b. 'Amr al-Bazz?r in his al-Bahr al-Zukhkh?r aka
Musnad al-Bazz?r (Beruit:Mu'assasat 'Ul?m al-Qur'?n, 1409 ah), 1:175, where he claims that
there isno foundation (asl) for thishad?th.
77
Ab? 'IsaMuhammad b. ?s? al-Tirmidh?,Sunan al-Tirmidh?, Kit?b al-'Ilm 'anRas?l Allah, B?b
m? ]V fi Fadl al-Fiqh 'ala al-'Ib?dah;Ab? 'AbdAll? Muhammad b. Yazid al-Qizwini IbnM?jah,
Sunan IbnM?jah, Kit?b al-Zuhd, B?b al-Hikmah. This had?thhas been transmittedinmany
had?th books with some variations.

ISLAM AND PEACE
357
the philosophers of the intellectual sciences ('ul?m 'aqliyyah) interestedin

Greek-Alexandrian thought as well as the scholars of transmittedsciences
?ul?m naqliyyah) specialized in such disciplines as Hacttth, Qur'?nic
commentary,and jurisprudence(Fiqh).Even though some later scholarshave
opposed philosophical sciences,especially its strictly
Aristotelian version, and
defined knowledge (al-'ilm) as 'religious science,' this did not obstruct the
steadydevelopment of philosophy and science in the Islamicworld. Contrary
toGoldziher's attemptto present the criticalviews of certainHanbalite jurists
on the 'ancient sciences' ((ul?m al-aw?'il), meaning Greek philosophy and
science, as the 'orthodox' Muslim anti-intellectualism remained
position,78
largely parochial to the traditionists(al-muhaddith?n)who were as much
opposed to the lore of pre-Islamictimesas toKal?m and doctrinal Sufism.For
the overwhelmingmajority of theMuslim intelligentsia,the universality of
truthwas the guiding principle and ground of theirquest forknowledge.No
one has statedthispoint better thanYa'q?b b. Ish?q al-Kind? (d. 260/873), 'the
philosopher of theArabs:'
owe great thanks to those who have us even a small measure of
We imparted to
truth, let alone those who have taught us more, since they have given us a share
in thefruitsof theirreflection thecomplexquestionsbearingon
and simplified
the nature of reality. If they had not provided us with those premises that pave
the way to truth, we would have been unable, despite our assiduous lifelong
investigations, to find those true primary principles fromwhich the conclusions

of our obscure inquiries have resulted, and which have taken generation upon
generation to come to light heretofore.79
That al-Kindfs attitude in the above quote was emblematic of his

generation and laterMuslim scholars is attestedby S?'id b. Ahmad al-Andalus?
(d. 462/1070)who has divided nations (umani) according to theircontribution
to knowledge and science (al-?lm).He states thispoint in unequivocal terms
when he says that:
We have determined that all nations, in spite of their differences and the
diversities of their convictions, form tabaqatayn [two categories]. One tabaqah
has cultivated science, given rise to the art of knowledge, and propagated the
various aspects of scientific information; the other tabaq?t did not contribute
enough to science to deserve the honor of association or inclusion in the family
78
Ignaz Goldziher, "The Attitude ofOrthodox IslamToward the "Ancient Sciences*" in Studies
on Islam, tr. and ed.M. L. Swartz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 185-215. For an
importantcriticismofGoldziher's conceptualization, seeDimitri Gutas, Greek Thought,Arabic
Culture (London: Routledge, 1998), 166-171.
79
Ya'q?b b. Ish?q al-Kindl,Ras?'il, 1: 97 quoted inMajid Fakhry,A History ofIslamicPhilosophy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 70.

IBRAHIM K?LIN
358
of scientifically productive nations.80
The belief that truth transcends the contingencies of historywas the

conviction of educated classes across the Islamic world as they studied the
countless schools of thought, both Islamic and pre-Islamic, producing an
extensive literatureon thehistoryof ideas.The long listof scholars interested
in intellectualhistory before and afterIslam included, interalia, Ibn al-Qifti
'
Jamal al-D?n Ali (d. 646/1248), al-Mubashshir ibn F?tik Ab? Sulaym?n al
Sijist?ni (d. c. 390/1000), S?'id b. Ahmad' al-Andalus?,Muhammad b. Ish?q Ibn
al-Nad?m (d 438/1047),Ab? 'Uthm?n Amr b. Bahr al-J?hiz(d. 255/869), and
Ibn Ab? Usaybi'ah (d. 669/1270) as well as suchmajor writers of theMilal
tradition such asMuhammad b. 'Abd al-Kar?m al-Shahrast?n?(d. 548/1153),
Ahmad b. 'Al? al-Khat?b al-Baghd?d? (d. 469/1072) and 'Al? b. Ahmad Ibn
Hazm al-Z?hir? (d. 456/1064).81Among these works, the Egyptian amir
Ab? -Waf?'al-MubashshiribnF?tik'sMukhtdr al-Hikamwa Mahdsin al-Kilam
was noticed very earlybymedieval Europeans, translatedintoLatin and other
languages,and, in fact,became the firstbook printed byWilliam Caxton in
England in the 15th centuryas TheDiets and Sayingsof thePhilosophers.*1 The
of
continuity humanity's search for truthhad a normative value formost of
thesewriters in that theirquest forknowledgewas part of a largertraditionto
which every seeker of knowledge belonged. When Hasan ibn Sahl
was
(d. 236/851), for instance, askedwhy he always invoked theviews of those
who came before him (kal?m al-awd'il), he answered that "because it [i.e. those
views] has been passed down beforeus; had itbeen unworthy and imperfect,it
would have never reached us and gained [universal] approval."83
The concept of "perennialphilosophy" (al-hikmatal-khdlidah)enjoyed a
similarprestigedue to the same notion of truthand itspersistence in history.
Shih?b al-D?nYahy? b.Habsh al-Suhraward?(d. 587/1191), the founderof the
made a strongcase for theperennityof certain
school of Illumination (ishrdq)
philosophical questions and the answersgiven of themwhen he said that:
Do not think that wisdom has existed only in these recent times [i.e., the pre
Islamic Persian and Greek philosophers]. No, the world is never bereft of
80
S?'ib b. Ahmad al-Andalusi, Science in the
Medieval World "Book of theCategories ofNations"
(Tahaq?t al-Umam), tr. S. I. Salem andA. Kumar (Austin:The University ofTexas Press, 1991),
6.
81
Cf. Franz Rosenthal, The ClassicalHeritage inIslam (London: Routledge, 1975), 25-51.
82
The Arabic text of al-Mukht?rhas been edited by A. Badawi (Beirut:The Arab Institute for
Research and Publishing, 1980, 2nd edition) and the original English translationby Curt F.
Buhler (London: Oxford University Press, 1941).
83
Quoted inAb? Sulaym?n al-Sijist?ni,Muntakhab Siwan al-Hikmah, ed. D. M. Dunlop (The
Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1979), 3.

ISLAM AND PEACE
359
wisdom and the person who possesses itwith arguments and self-evident proofs.
He is God's vicegerent on His earth, and this shall be so as long as the heavens
and the earth exist.84
Apart from the sublimeworld of the intellectuals,the Islamic concept of

culturalpluralismwas extended to virtuallyallminorities living in the landsof
Islam. The experienceof convivenciaamong Jews,Christians, andMuslims in
Andalusia was a result of the Islamic notion of cultural inclusivism.85While
the Jews of Europe were subject to woeful vilifications and persecutions
during themiddle a
ages, major Jewish intellectualtraditionhad developed
under theMuslim rule and included such prominent figuresof medieval
Jewish thought as Saadiah Gaon al-Fayyumi (d. 942) Solomon Ibn Gabir l
(d. 1058 or 1070) Judah Halevi (d. 1141) Moses Maimonides [M?s? b.
Maym?n] (d. 1204) Sa'd b. Mans?r Ibn Kamm?nah (d. 1284) Bahya Ibn
Paquda (d. 12th century) and Gersonides (Levi ben Gershom) (d. 1344). This
has resulted in a unique interactionbetweenmedieval Jewishphilosophy on
theone hand, and Islamic philosophy,Kal?m, and Sufismon theother.86
In the subcontinentof India, a cultural syncreticismdeveloped between
Hindu and Muslim cultures. From the translationof Indian astronomical
works intoArabic as early as in the 8th centurytoAb? al-Rayh?nMuhamud
b.Ahmad al-B?run?'s(d. 440/1047) historic studyof India andAmir Khusraw's
(d. 725/1325) formulation of an Islamic identity in the Indian cultural
a vast literature came into being, generating a of
environment, unique mode
symbiosisbetween the twoworlds at social, philosophical, and artisticlevels.
Perhaps themost important figure to illustratethis isD?r? Shik?h (1024
1069/1615-1659), the famousMughal prince and son of Sh?h Jah?n.Dar?
Shik?h translatedand authored two importantworks dealingwith Hinduism
froman Islamic point of view.He made a translationof theBhagavatGita and
some fiftyUpanishads into Persian as Sirr-iAkbar ("GreatMystery"), which
he interpretedin lightof the school ofAdvaita-Vedanta or thenon-dualismof
84
Shih?b al-D?n Yahy? b. Habsh al-Suhrawardi,Hikmat allshr?q [The Philosophy of
Illumination], ed. and tr.JohnWalbridge andHossein Ziai (Utah: Brigham Young University
Press, 1999), 2.
85
For Andalusia, see Anwar Chejne, Muslim Spain: ItsHistory and Culture (Minneapolis:
University ofMinnesota Press, 1974) and Salma Khadra Jayyusi andManuela Marin, eds. The
tegacy ofMuslim Spain (Leiden: E. J.Brill, 1992). For the concept of convivencia and theJewish
contributions to Andalusian civilization, see V. B. Mann, T. F. Glick, and J.D. Dodds, eds.
Muslims, and Christians inMedieval Spain (New York: The JewishMuseum,
Convivencia: Jews,
1992).
86
See, among others,Arthur Hyman, "JewishPhilosophy in the IslamicWorld" in Si.H. Nasr
andOliver Leaman, eds.History ofIslamicPhilosophy (London: Routledge, 1996), 1: 677-695 and
Paul B. Fenton, "Judaismand Sufism" in ibid.,755-768.

IBRAHIM
K?LIN
360
Shankaracharya.87Inmaking his case for the translation,

D?r? Shik?h says that
he "read theOld and theNew Testaments and thePsalms ofDavid and other
scripturesbut the discourse on Tawhid found in themwas brief and in a
summaryform."He then turnedto theUpanishads "which isundoubtedly the
firstheavenly Book and the fountain-headof the ocean ofmonotheism, and,
in accordancewith or ratheran elucidationof theKur'an."88D?r? Shik?h also
wrote a treatise calledMajma' al-Bahrayn, referringto the Qur'?nic verse
19: 60, inwhich he attempteda monotheistic interpretationofHinduism. In
tandemwith his 'universalist'outlook, he definedhiswork as "a collection of
the truthand wisdom of two Truth-knowing (haqq-shinas)groups," referring
toMuslims andHindus.89 In addition toD?r? Shik?h,we may also referto the
16th century Persian philosopherMir Ab? -Q?sim F?ndirisk? (d. c. 1050/
1640-1),who is reported to have met a number ofHindu mystics duringhis
travels to India, and translated and wrote a commentary on the Hindu
mystical and philosophical textYoga-Vasishtba.90

Such modes of cultural coexistencewould have been impossiblewithout
the recognition of the diversityof cultures and societies as part of human
existence.The Qur'?n takesup this issue in severalplaces.Working towardsa
common good is made conditional upon the existence of different
communities:
Unto every one of you We have appointed a [different] law and way of life.And
ifGod had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community:
but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test by means of what He has vouchsafed
unto you. Vie, then,with one another in
doing good works! (5: 48; also 11: 118).
This theme is furtherdeveloped in the following verse. This time the

emphasis is on the civic responsibilityof "knowingone another."
O humans! Behold, We have created you all out of amale and a female, and have
made you into nations and tribes so that you might come to know one another.
Verily, thenoblestof you in the sightofGod is theone who ismost deeply

conscious ofHim. Behold, God is all-knowing, all-aware (49: 13).
The examples from the historyof Islamic culture that I brieflyanalyzed
87
Cf. Aziz Ahmad, Studies, 191-6; Annemarie Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent
(Leiden: E. J.Brill, 1980), 99-100.
88
From the Introduction to Sirr-iAkbar quoted inMajma'-ul-Bahrain or the
Mingling of theTwo
Oceans byPrinceMuhammad Dara Shikuh, tr.M. Mahfuz-ul-Haq (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society,
1929), 13.
89
Ibid., 38.
90
FathuUaj Mujtabai, Hindu Muslim Cultural Relations (New Delhi, National Book Bureau,
1978), 82; Edward G. Browne, A LiteraryHistory ofPersia, 4: 257-8.

ISLAMAND PEACE
361
above are neither scare nor contrary to the norm. Even the
though
fundamentalists,for lack of a better term,consider cases of cultural symbiosis
and syncretism in the Islamic world as deviations from an idealized and
essentiallyideological constructof Islam, both the Islamic intellectualtradition
and Muslim societies have peace as a cross-cultural and inter
envisaged
communal value.
0 0 0
I have argued in the preceding pages that a proper discussion of the Islamic
concept of peace takesus beyond theminimal definitionof peace as absence of
conflict, and certainly beyond the limited sphere of law, be it Islamic or
Western. In a broad sense, the Islamic traditionhas articulated a concept of
peace that extends frommetaphysics and cosmology to politics and culture.
We cannot thereforeunderstand the experienceofMuslim societieswith the
cultural and religiousother(s)without taking into account these elements.The
relevance of this tradition for the present day Muslim world requires little
explanation.Today numerousMuslim intellectuals,scholars and leadersfrom
Bosnia, Turkey and Egypt to Iran,Malaysia and theUS are engaged in
constructingan Islamic political ethics that is compatiblewith the Islamic
tradition as well as responsive to the challenges of the modern world.
Questions of war and peace, communal violence, terrorism, international
relations, constitutional and participatory democracy, pluralism, openness,

a
civilityand the attitude towards the religiousother are being discussed from
multitude of perspectives,and theviews expressed are by no means uniform
and homogenous. There is, however, an emerging consensus on
upholding
peace as a value in itselfregardlessof the political state ofMuslim countries
and communities across the globe. There is also a growing awareness that the
Islamic traditioncontains the seeds of a cultureof peace. The richheritageof
traditionalIslam can help contemporary Muslim societiesovercome the state
of spiritualand political impoverishmentinwhich theyfindthemselves.
We can hardly overemphasize the significanceof this consensus in the
context. Muslim can no issues of conflict
present communities longer address
and violence without developing a proper ethics of peace. While there is
or sectarian
legitimateground to believe thatmost of the factional, ethnic
conflicts inMuslim societies can be resolved throughnon-violentmeans, the
lack of a comprehensive discourse of peace supported by a network of
NGOs and stateagencies,preempts the
scholars, intellectuals,leaders,activists,
sense of
possibility of preventing communal strife and fighting.The
dispossession and alienationwhich has plagued theMuslim masses for the last
two centuries continues to fuel the feelingsof disappointment towards the

IBRAHIM
K?LIN
362
modern world. The continuing injustices in theMuslim world makes the

voices of wisdom and justice fade away in the present conflicts,and creates
new formsof disillusionmentand hopelessness.
Conflicts in our age have become both local and global, making the
distinction between the two a blurred one.We can no longer speak of local
and national conflictswithout consideringtheirinternationalimplicationsnor
can we ignore the impact of global trendsand relations on local issues.The
Kashmir problem or the Israeli-Palestinianconflict defies the conventional
notions of inter-stateand/or territorialdisputes. This presents a particular
challenge to contemporary Muslim political thought in its transitionfrom the
large political units of the empire and its constellation states to the current
systemof nation-stateson the one hand, and globalization, on the other. It
remains to be seenwhat theweakening of thenation-statemodel will bring to
Muslim societies in their struggle to cope with the current challenges of
economic and culturalglobalization.Achieving a cultureof peace, however, is
an urgent need forMuslim communities in their inter-communalrelations as
well as for theirrelationswith other societies.
$ $


Islam and Peace A Survey of The Sources of Peace in The Islamic Tradition by Ibrahim Kalin

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Islam and Peace A Survey of The Sources of Peace in The Islamic Tradition by Ibrahim Kalin

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in the Islamic Tradition

Author(s): IBRAHIM KALIN

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.112 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:21:09 PM