Military Role in the Political

Life in Turkey
Relations with Greece

7/1/2011
International Hellenic University
Georgios Dimitriadis
 1. Military and Politics

The political role and influence of the military at the decision taking
procedures of the state, are of a wide range, from the direct undertaking of
full political control to the total subjection of the armed forces to the
official political institutions. However, military can avoid the direct control
undertaking and succeed its targets by other, smarter means. In fact, a
coup usually proves the incapability of the army to use other ways to get
to their political objectives or the rigid political structure of the country
that leads to this action. In any case, nowadays, military prefers indirect
influencing, due to the bad image of the army coups internationally and
usually, it acts like one of the many pressure groups 1, using plenty of
methods and trying -like every group- to react when its demands are
rejected.
The role of the military in politics depends on two main variables:
The nature of the army and the nature of the political system2. The nature
of the army refers to its professionalism, social background and technical
and ad ministrative skills to control the decision taking. The nature of the
political system in which the army acts is about the prestige and the
stability of the governments, facts that will lead or not , to military control
of the political life of the country.

2. Civil – military relations in Turkey

The decade 1950-60 was a period during which Turkish military elite
started to realize that its traditional role as a political decision taking
group started to fade. The transition of the political status from one -party

1
As A. R. Ball and F. Millard say, pressure groups are social aggregates that have a degree of
consistency and some common goals and try to exercise influence to the procedure of political decision
taking.(Pressure politics in industrial societies, p. 33-34)
2
Σφγχρονη πολιτική και διακυβζρνηςη, Alan R. Ball & Guy Peters, p. 366-367.
to multiparty during the post-war period, has led to a unique chance for
free expression of the will of the oppressed anti-kemalists. The Democrat
Party of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes , was the main receiver of the
votes of these people and groups, making clear to the military of Turkey
that the latter and any political party related to their ideology had no
possibility of gaining the power through the fair way. And this situation
would go on if the country followed the democratic procedures of the
West 3.
The coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 seem to be the efforts of
the military to both influence the political route of the country and keep
the corps united. The changes of the Constitution that took place by the
military in 1924, 1961, 1971 and 1982 were aiming to reduce the political
power of the Parliament. The next step was of great importance. The
formation of powerful extra-parliamentary institutions was turning the
intervention of the military in the political life of the country into not just
attainable but also constitutionally approved . The most important of these
institutions was the National Security Council (MGK)4 which was under the
control of the military. The jurisdiction of the MGK, as it is defined by the
law, is “the protection of state’s constitutional order and the national
entity and integrity…” and “the protection of national security and achieve
of national goals […] internal, external and defensive” 5. In order to
understand the power of MGK, a good example is that -after a change of
the Constitution by coup president Evren in 1980- MGK has the right to
notify its opinions and objections about decision taking to the Ministry
Council and the latter has to give priority to the decisions that MGK judges

3
Many years later, Suleiman Demirel as President of Turkey, declares that “if we apply democracy
as the Europeans asks us to, then we will fall apart”. (Cumhuriyet, 3/6/1995)
4
MGK: Milli Guvenlik Kurulu
5
Η ςφγχρονη Τουρκία – Η αβάςταχτη ελαφρότητα τησ πολιτικήσ κυριαρχίασ των ςτρατιωτικών
ςτην Τουρκία: Η θεςμική διάςταςη , Γερ άςιμοσ Καραμπελιάσ, (ΕΛΙ ΑΜΕΠ), p.246.
as necessary for the integrity, the independence of the country and the
calm and safety of the population 6.
Combining the Constitution c hanges by the military and the -many-
institutions like MGK with the fact that from 1960 to 2000 the majority of
the Turkish governments were unstable coalitions, we can assume that the
governance of Turkey was -and probably is- mainly a work of the extra-
parliament military elite.
However, the year 2010 is a period that civil authorities and military
are clashing, with the first to be more determined than ever. The
“Sledgehammer Plan” that came to light, initially by the Turkish newspaper
Taraf, and after by official investigations, indicate intentions for a new
coup that was planned by many members of the military leadership. A fact
that proves that history repeats itself, with the army to have lost its
previous influence due to the democratic reforms of the last years,
promoted by the EU.

3. Turkish foreign policy towards Greece – Military role

As long as the role of the military in the Turkish political life is

proven, it is logical to assume that this fact extends to the foreign policy
towards Greece. In addition, the traditional rivals have been involved in a
number of incidents, most of which -not to say all- included military
presence.
One of the most important incidents that reached to the limits of
war was the one about Imia islets. In January 1996, Special Forces of both
countries debarked on each one of the two islets and Greece was then
called to face the most difficult crisis after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus.
Greece was aiming to avoid a conflict. Of course we must not forget the

6
For more examples like this: Η ςφγχρονη Τουρκία – Η αβάςταχτη ελαφρότητα τησ πολιτικήσ
κυριαρχίασ των ςτρατιωτικών ςτην Τουρκία: Η θεςμική διάςταςη, Γερ άςιμοσ Καρ αμπελι άσ, (ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ),
p.249
main role of United States of America. During this episode between the
two countries, all the decisions and actions for the Turkish side were
mainly taken and planned by the military elite. A recorded interview of
Greek Foreign Affairs Minister Theodoros Pagkalos to the journalists A.
Ellis and M. Ignatiou between hi m and the USA Assistant Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Richard Holbrooke some hours after the incident started is
revealing:

HOLBROOKE: Ok, we have a deal; we have a deal

with Ciler.
PAGKALOS: Alright.
HOLBROOKE: Of Course you have to understand that
the situation is very difficult and I want to ask you to
make an extra procedural stage. The Turkish Military
Chief, (US Military Chief) Jo hn Shalikasvili 7 and Greek
Military Chief should have a talk.
PAGKALOS: No. Greek Military Chief does not come
to international agreements in the name of the
country and does not act politically. I am going to
talk. Why this is needed?
HOLBROOKE: Because the political situation in
Turkey is different. You know… Do not ask from me
to…8

Right after, Pagkalos has a talk with the Military Chiefs of USA and
Turkey, Shalikasvili and Karadayi. The Greek Minister considers that the
Turkish general had no objection, he just wanted to intervene so the role
of the military to be validated. He mainly wanted to show that although
Ciler is the prime minister, the agreements are closed by the army.
7
American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993-1997.
8
Ίμια – Τα απόρρητα ζγγραφα των Αμερικανών, Αιανάςιοσ Έλλισ – Μιχάλησ Ιγνατίου, p. 161-162.
 On the other hand , the Greek side had a totally different way of
thinking, ignoring the military. Ad miral Lymberis, the Military Chief of
Greece says about the same night: “There [in the prime minister‟s office] I
hear the prime minister saying to Mr. Pagkalos „Theodore, how are the
negotiations going?‟ and I am shocked. I am the Chief of the Greek Armed
Forces and I am not informed that there are negotiations going on.” 9
The aforementioned issue of “Sledgehammer Plan” (Turkish Balyoz),
is the most recent organized plan of Turkish military that intended to
intervene in the civil status. Until the moment these lines are being written,
the scandal of this plan is ongoing, with many senior military officers to be
suspended and arrest warrants to have been issued against others. The
trial of about 200 military officers, both serving and retired, has started in
December 2010, with twenty eight of the accused to be serving generals or
officers of equivalent rank. Some of the most important documents
revealed, indicate that a main part of the “Sledgehammer Plan” was an
artificial crisis with Turkey’s traditional rival, Greece, in order to give the
military the opportunity to seize the country’s (Turkey) governance. More
detailed, the plan aimed at “short range conflicts” following the invasion of
Turkish armed forces in Eastern part of Evros and the support to these
troops from the Turkish Air Force. Another way of pushing this situation -
found in the aforementioned documents- was the planting of bombs in
mosques in order to blow them up and accuse Greek Air Force for air
strike. Finally, the famous “dogfights” between the two Air Forces would
be provoked by Turkish aircrafts shoot-downs by their own pilots and put
the blame to Greeks.
During the revelations of these plans, Turkish military top rank
officers, either fully denied these accusations or presented these plans as
“just hypothetical scenarios” for the programmed military plans. However,
the Commander of the 1 st Armored Brigade, Yurdaer Olcan have said in a

9
Ίμια – Τα απόρρητα ζγγραφα των Αμερικανών, Αιανάςιοσ Έλλισ – Μιχάλησ Ιγνατίου, p. 164.
military seminar that “…to make this possible and to ensure and
strengthen the solidarity and unity between people throughout the country
will have to resort to minor conflicts with Greece […] conflicts that will
provide psychological support to our operatio n. […] I believe that these
incidents can be caused by our Air Force and our Navy, even (our army) at
the borders with Greece, incidents that we can spread to the public even
through the media, in order to assure the clustering of the people…”10
In the same speech, the director of the Section of Operating Plans,
Colonel Albay Tuncay referred to the basis of the ejection plan for the
Greek population of Imvros island, which included a mission of a unit of
gendarmerie commandos (jandarma komado), the conversion of the island
in an open prison -with many criminal prisoners transferred there and left
free- and some other actions of the state services. All these led to the total
ejection of the Imvros Greek population.
For all the above, although they happened or happen during periods
of peace or even just tension -not war- between the two countries, it is
clear that the decisions for operations that took or was planned to take
place were taken exclusively by the Turkish military.

4. Changing the situation

Although it seems that it is a long way to the reality of a true , stable

and in the standards and requirements of European Union civil-controlled
democracy in Turkey, steps are being taken towards this direction. Of
course the obstacles are not easy to be skipped and the leaders of the
route to westernization of the state are going to face a lot of enemies.

10
Based on the recorded speech of the Commander Yurdaer Olcan during the Operating Plans
st
Seminar of the 1 Army in Istanbul, 2-5 March 2003.
 A great transition of the political control status started during the
governance of Tugut Ozal,11 whose government clashed with the
established tradition of the military’s role as “protector” of the Kemalist
policy. These changes are going on by the successor of Ozal, Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is the one who faces the military
corps with bravery during the -aforementioned- recent and ongoing
scandal of the “Sledgehammer Plan” that aimed to overthrow his
government. But as mentioned before, this is just the beginning of this
race for political control between civil and military.

“The direct control of the governance by top rank military officers or

military juntas is just a clumsy indication of the role of the Armed Forces in
a particular period of time, because the men in uniform have a thousand
ways to make their desires known.” 12

11
High level civil servant who was Prime Minister of Turkey from 1983 to 1989 and President of
Turkey from 1989 to 1993.
12
The military and Society in Latin America, John Johnson, p. 7.
Bibliography:

Σφγχρονη πολιτική και διακυβζρνηςη, Alan R. Ball & Guy Peters (Εκδ.
Παπαζθςη, 2001).
Η ςφγχρονη Τουρκία – Η αβάςταχτη ελαφρότητα τησ πολιτικήσ κυριαρχίασ
των ςτρατιωτικών ςτην Τουρκία: Η θεςμική διάςταςη, Γεράςιμοσ
Καραμπελιάσ, *ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ+ (Εκδ. Παπαζθςη, 2002).
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Ιγνατίου (Εκδ. Λιβάνη, 2009).
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http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE60K1GB
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