Stephen Naylor Thomas

hird Edition is5>5 mi^.
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INNATURAL
LANGUAGE
Stephen Naybr Thomas
'RD EDITION
ProcticQl
Reasoning
in
NQturoi
Language
STEPHEN NAYLOR THOMAS
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07632
A
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Thomas, Stephen N. (dale)

Praclical reasoning in natural language.
Includes index.
1. Reasoning. I. Title
BC177.T5 1986 160 84-26403

ISBN 0-13-692153-1
Editorial/production supervision and

interior design: Barbara Alexander
Manufacturing buyer: Harry P. Baisley
To Camden M. Hall
© 1986, 1981, 1977, 1975, 1974, and 1973 by Stephen N. Thomas
No part of this book may be

All rights reserved.
reproduced, in any form or by any means,
without permission in writing from the publisher.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8
ISBN a-ia-bêisa-i di
Prentice-Hall International (UK) Limited, London

Prentice-Hall of Australia Pty. Limited, Sydney
Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., Toronto
Prentice-Hall Hispanoamericana, S.A., Mexico
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Prentice-Hall of Japan, Inc., Tokyo
Prentice- Hall of Southeast Asia Pte. Ltd., Singapore
Editora Prentice-Hall do Brazil, Ltda., Rio de Janeiro
Whitehall Books Limited, Wellington, New Zealand
Contents
PREFACE TO THE INSTRUCTOR vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi
INTRODUCTION 1
i BASIC ANALYSIS OF REASONING 9
1-1 What is Reasoning 9

Exercises 1-1 A 25
Exercises 1-1 B 27
Exercises 1-1 C 31
1-2 Reasons and Conclusions 37
Exercises 1-2 A 49
Exercises 1-2B 51
Exercises 1-2C 5L
1-3 Determining the Logical Structure of a Reasoned Discourse 57
Exercises 1-3 75
1-4 Analyzing the Structure of Longer and More
Complicated Reasoning 83
Exercises 1-4A 95
Exercises 1-4B 99
Exercises 1-4C 105
BASIC EVALUATION OF REASONING 111
2-1 What Is Good Reasoning? Ill
Exercises 2-1 A 141

Exercises 2-\B 145
Exercises 2-1 C 151
2-2 Semantic Clarification 155
Exercises 2 -2 A 175
Exercises 2-2B 181
Exercises 2-2C 185
Exercises 2-2D 189
2-3 Conditional Relationships 191
Exercises 2-3 199
A
r iv Contents
2-4 Some Valid Steps of Reasoning Using Conditional and Other

Relationships 203
Exercises 2- 4 A 223
Exercises 2-4B 229
Exercises 2-4C 237
2-4D
Exercises 245
2-5 The How and Why of Supplying Suppressed Premises 253
Exercises 2 -5 A 265
Exercises 2-5B 269
CLARIFYING OBSCURE REASONING 273
3-1 Analyzing Muddy Reasoning or Confused Exposition 273

Exercises 3-1 295
PRACTICAL DECISION MAKING 303
4-1 Making Decisions Logically: Reasons For Actions and Reasons

Against Actions 303
Exercises 4-1 A 324
Exercises 4-1 B 325
4-2 Reasons Against the Validity of Other Reasons 327
Exercises 4-2 A 349
Exercises 4-2B 353
Exercises 4-2C 355
Exercises 4-2 D 357
TRADITIONAL TOPICS 361
5-1 Some Informal Fallacies 361

Exercises 5-1 A 373
Exercises 5-1 B 377
Exercises 5-lC 381
ANALYZING MEDIA EDITORIALS 385
6-1 Analyzing Reasoning Expressed in Contemporary Editorial Style 385

Exercises 6-1 A 407
Exercises ^-X'R 409
Exercises 6-1 C 411
I
V Contents 1
ANALYZING PHILOSOPHICAL REASONING 413
7-1 Analyzing Long Linked Arguments 413

Exercises 7-1 A 423
Exercises 7- IB 431
7-2 Analyzing Disorganized or Confused Complex Philosophical
Reasoning 437
Exercises 7-2 443
APPENDIX I Limitations in Formal Approaches to the Analysis and

Evaluation of Reasoning in Natural Language 447
APPENDIX II On the History and Theory of the Linked-Convergent

Distinction 457
APPENDIX III On the Definition of Validity in Natural Logic 463
INDEX 465
L
Preface
to the Instructor
This basic manual- workbook differs radically from other logic textbooks.
Written expressly for beginners, it shows students how to analyze and
evaluate passages of reasoning or argument as they actually occur, ex-
pressed in a natural language. A general method of "natural logic" is
presented, by which any reasoning (scientific, philosophic, mathematical,
political, religious, ethical, legal, "inductive," "deductive," modal, se-
mantic, syntactic, evidentiary, etc.) can be cast into a standard dia-
grammatic form and evaluated without needing first to translate it into
the symbolic notation of an artificial language. This text develops a
—
method based on the work of Gentzen, Schiitte, Wittgenstein, and oth-
ers— by which any arguments's logical structure can be represented
graphically, and its degree of support evaluated, without employing the
kinds of formal apparatus traditionally employed in logic textbooks. (For
example, truth-tables, Venn diagrams. Mill's methods, formal notation,
or extensionalist presuppositions.) Anyone who reads this text and does
the exercises diligently will be prepared thereby to handle most instances
of reasoning, simple or complex, appearing in books, articles, essays,
speeches, editorials, conversations, or other natural-language contexts.
By the traditional definition of an "inductive argument" as "an ar-
gument involving the claim not that its premises give conclusive grounds
for the truth of its conclusion, but only that its premises provide jom^ sup-
port for its conclusion," more than half of the arguments analyzed and
evaluated in this textbook qualify as "inductive," since they involve the
claim not that their premises give conclusive grounds for the truth of their
conclusions, but only that their premises provide some support for their
conclusions. In Chapter 2, students learn how to determine the degree
to which such nonconclusive premises support such conclusions, and eval-
uate many examples examples have properties
in the exercises. (If these
fundamental induction-
conflicting with the traditional theory of a sharp,
deduction dichotomy, this is probably because that assumption does not
fit representative samples of undoctored cases, the data, from natural
language.) Thus, by a traditional definition of "induction," this is, in

viii Preface
large part, a textbook on inductive reasoning (although philosophers who

recognize treatments of induction only when they stumble over Hume's
problems surely will miss this fact).
The explanations in this text are addressed primarily to students,
and not to the instructor. This is a student's book, concentrating on the real
problems that beginning students face in studying and learning logic. It
attempts to reach students on their own level, in language they will com-
prehend, rather than focusing on the conceptual problems and paradoxes
in traditional logical theory. As explained in the appendices and in the
instructor's manual, this shift in emphasis is facilitated by natural logic's
relative freedom from most of these traditional difficulties. Because to-
day's college students unfortunately often need to be taught how to read —
—
and especially, how to read reasoned discourse closely, carefully, and
accurately before much can be done to inculcate valuable logical skills,
this text attempts to develop necessary linguistic abilities simultaneously
with basic logical skills, beginning at almost a secondary-school level in
Chapter 1, and gradually accelerating in pace, difficulty, and sophisti-
cation until, by the final chapters, students are dealing with reasoned
discourses of a level of complexity formerly beyond the abilities of all but
graduate students. The slow initial pace at the beginning of the text also
functions to give the inevitable students who have serious difficulty un-
derstanding what reasoning is and discriminating reasons from conclu-
sions, extra time and opportunity to comprehend these essential concepts
(something they probably never understood previously, and undoubtedly
a source of many of their other problems). It also permits students en-
rolling late to catch up without placing a burden on the instructor.
The explanations of essential points sometimes are repeated delib-
erately in the text in various forms also for pedagogical reasons. Tests of
these instructional materials on typical classes of university students
showed that while the strongest, of course, usually grasped crucial points
on the initial explanation, weaker students understood only after some
repetition, and the weakest students required additional repetitions.
Written evaluations by typical college students of prototypes after these
trials showed that while the strongest students naturally suggested dele-
tion of repetitions as redundant and unnecessary, weaker students often
gave such responses as, "After reading almost the same thing over and
over again in different form, it was easy understanding," "Saying things
twice is useful because many students lose their train of thought and need
to read again," and "The continual repetition helped me to understand
the material and really stressed how important it is. " True, some students
asserted that the repetitions impeded their comprehension, and com-
L
Preface
plained that they understood better after the initial explanation than after
the repetitions, but upon quizzing students who said this, I generally found
that actually they had misunderstood the material on the first explanation
but mistakenly thought that they had understood it, and that the sub-
sequent explanations functioned to uproot their misunderstandings and
get them onto the right track, an experience that they subjectively mis-
interpreted as becoming confused about something they already had
understood. It always is difficult to decide what segment(s) of a class to
address in one's teaching, and of course, the answer may vary with the
course content and intended level, but for other reasons besides the dem-
ocratic ones, I have concluded that in core courses teaching fundamental
skills as essential as basic reasoning abilities (and especially in courses
offered partly as a service to other departments), it is good to reach as
many of the students as possible. Consequently, I have attempted to struc-
ture this text so that it will be well comprehended by almost all of the
students in an average class. Admittedly, it is regrettable to bore out-
standing students with repetitious explanations in a text, but I think it
is far worse to frustrate the weakest students because they cannot un-
derstand the readings and instead bore the outstanding students in class
when they must endure oral re-explanations to weaker students of basic
points that ideally should have been mastered from reading the text; for,
after all, outstanding students can, if they wish, at their discretion, skim
over or skip repetitions in the text, while they cannot escape them in class.
Likewise, intentional textual repetitions will not bore instructors, who
need not reread the text with each use. (Besides, instructors are not the
intended audience.) Thus, all things considered, incorporating necessary
repetitions in the text is the best solution I could find to this inevitable
pedagogical problem. As elsewhere, the goal here has been that the text-
book should perform for instructors the repetitive, wearysome aspects of
teaching, leaving to them all the exciting, creative, and pleasurable aspects
of teaching a course with these new methods.
This new edition improves on earlier editions in a number of ways.
The more natural term "reasoning," whose extension in ordinary lan-
guage already approximates the scope and range of applicability of this
text's methods, has replaced the previous awkward use of the word "ar-
gument" as a generalized technical term; the explanation of the difficult
distinctionbetween "convergent" and "linked" patterns of inference has
been amplified; a new Section 2-2 explains how to clarify reasoning after
analysis and prior to evaluation, with additional notation and exercises
added for this purpose. Since many decision problems require use of the
techniques for clarifying muddy reasoning, the previous material on these
Preface
clarificatory techniques has been converted into a new Chapter 3 and

advanced to a position preceding the newly expanded chapter on reasons
for actions and practical decision making, which now contains additional
exercises as well as improvements in the notation and method for ana-
lyzing reasons against the validity of other reasons. The treatment of rea-
soning in editorials written in contemporary media style has been ex-
panded into a new Chapter 6, with new exercises. The treatment of
complex philosophical reasoning has been abbreviated and made into its
own special Chapter 7 at the end of the text, and many additional im-
provements appear throughout.
Improvements made earlier in the second edition remain: the ex-
planation of the methods of natural logic has been simplified and expanded
in scope; passages from introductory college textbooks, trade books,
newspapers, magazines, and other popular sources have replaced the
more difficult academic and philosophic examples used as illustrations and
exercises in the first edition; the less controversial phrase "degree of sup-
port" has superceded the phrase "degree of validity" (although the con-
cept remains the same); an orienting introduction was added to answer
such questions as "What is logic?", "Why study logic?", "What practical
value does the study of logic have?", and "What is the relationship be-
tween logic and language?"; and the workbook format with tear-out pages
has been retained to facilitate uniform grading of exercises and to spare
students from "busy work."
A word is about special footnotes. Where the textual ex-
in order
planation warrants a special comment or remark to advanced readers but
no need exists for students to read the same comment, or it presupposes
a special technical background, I have labeled the footnote "Note to Ad-
vanced Readers " . Whether to offer students the additional explanation nec-
essary to understand these footnotes, or simply to advise students to dis-
regard them, is left to the discretion of the instructor.
The Manual (available separately) contains further dis-
Instructor's
cussion of relevant theoretical issues, as well as the complete answer key.
It reproduces the exercises in large type to serve as master copies from
which transparencies can be made for display in class on an overhead

projector, making it easier to discuss homework in class, explain correct
answers, illustrate alternative acceptable solutions, respond to students'
questions, and meet the special needs of strong or weak students.
Acknowledgment s
On the surface, this is an elementary, democratic textbook endeavoring
to teach the rudiments of reasoning to beginning logic students. The ob-

viousness of this aspect causes but a few readers to overlook the fact
all
that at a deeper level it is a theoretical work, presenting a new, nontra-

ditional model of the nature of reasoning in natural languages. This model
draws on insights from various logicians and philosophers among them: —
Charles S. Peirce, and subsequent philosophers of science, who intro-
duced and developed the Hypothetico-Deductive Model of Scientific Ex-
planation, which permits (for certain purposes) the unitary treatment of
explanations and justifications and who recognized the pragmatic aspect
of truth; Rudolph Carnap, who distinguished between semantics and
logicalsyntax in a n:idnnei that facilitated (paradoxically) the subsequent
recognition of the inadequacy of extensionalist artificial languages for the
formalization or modeling of inference in natural languages; Bernard
Bosanquet and W. V. O. Quine, who (each in his own way) recognized
two mutually exclusive
that the totality of truths cannot be divided into
subsets
— "analytic statements" (true, supposedly, purely in virtue of the
meanings of their constituent terms) and "synthetic statements" (true,
supposedly, in virtue of their relationship to extralinguistic facts) but —
rather that each true statement depends for its truth, in general, on a
combination of both meaning and extralinguistic fact, and that even so-
called "necessary truths" ultimately are empirically justified; Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Burton S. Dreben, who revealed the inadequacy of ex-
tensionalist logics, artifical formal languages, and Warsaw^ semantics as
models of reasoning in natural languages, a revelation that motivated
development of thi« text's alternative "natural-logic" approach; Gerhard
Gentzen and Kurt Schtitte, who pioneered the use of tree diagrams to
formalize proofs in artificial formal languages; and Monroe Beardsley,
who first used such trees for the direct representation of reasoning in a
natural language. Amending and supplementing these ideas yielded a
methodology and conceptualizing structure that could be employed gen-
uinely to analyze and evaluate accurately any arbitrarily chosen instance
of reasoning in natural language.
XI
xii Acknowledgments
In addition, I would like to thank Howard Kahane, who permitted

the use of four examples of reasoning cited in his Logic and Contemporary
Rhetoric, and Howard Pospesel who allowed me to quote seven examples
of reasoning in natural language collected in his Arguments: Deductive Logic
Exercises. I am also indebted to Professors Myron Anderson, Paul An-
derson, Robert Barnes, David Boyer, Morry Lipson, Howard Pospesel,
Edward Regis, Jr. and Frank Williams
, for their valuable suggestions in
the revision of this work.
Stephen Naylor Thomas
L
Introduction
What is logic? Basically, logic is the study of the nature and characteristics
of good reasoning, and the differences between good ("correct") and bad
("incorrect") iTasoning. Ordinary language makes some of the same dis-
tinctions as logic, tor example:
Rational vs. hrational

Logical I's. Illogical
Reasonable vs. Unreasonable
Correct vs. hiconect
True I's. False
\'alid i\s. hi\alid
Sound I'S. Unsound
In logic the two pairs of terms have more exact technical meanings as
last
will be seen in Chapter 2.
Good reasoning tends toward correct answers, judgments, and deci-
sions. Bad reasoning cannot be relied on to lead to correct answers, judg-
ments, and decisions. Sound reasoning tends to lead only to conclusions
that are true and that actually work in practice when applied to the real
world. L'nsound reasoning, in contrast, is more likely to end ujd with con-
clusions that are false or imrcliablc.
Whv One reason for studying logic is its value for us in
study logic?
our own lives. how to reason logically will help us to arrive at
Learning
true conclusions and make the best decisions. There are. of course, other ap-
proaches. One can flip a coin, consult a fortune teller, or follow his or her
instincts or impulses of the moment. This textbook does not tell you how
to li\e your life. But if vou would like to gain mastery of effective methods
1
Introdutlioii
of thought, you will find the tools of logical reasoning here at your dis-
posal. Whether or not you choose to use these methods, you can always be
certain of their reliability.
Why do logical methods work? Not simply because logicians say that
certain steps of reasoning are "correct." Rather, logicians try to discover
and clarify the kinds of reasoning that actually do tend to lead to correct
results. Logic follows certain pattern of reasoning were unreli-
facts. If a
able, then logic would reject it.
Logic is not an enemy of feeling, emotion, and passion. If it is true, as
the philosopher Pascal said, that "the heart has reasons of its own," logic
can take these reasons into account and work with them too. Instead of op-
posing the heart's desires, logic can help the heart achieve them. Thus, for
example, if I wanted to live as a mystic, or a hermit, or a shepherd, or in
some nonrational state of consciousness, and by sound logical reasoning I
concluded that this way of life would indeed really be best, then I could
—
follow my chosen path with heart reinforced by logical judgment!
Although logic and emotion do not automatically oppose each other,
conflicts do sometimes exist. Plato and other philosophers have pointed
out that the human character contains many different inclinations that can
run counter to each other, and that sometimes it is best tor logical reason-
ing to control and restrain passions or emotional impulses when they are
contrary to everyone's best interests. It is easy, for example, to imagine cir-
cumstances in which I might desire to hit another person who is making
me angry, but in which it might actually be in my own best interests (and
more rational) not to do so, but to do something else instead. The same is
true with lots of other impulses. So logic, right reason, and good judgment
sometimes can be highly valuable in dealing with situations in which blind
passion or emotional impulses might lead to actions contrary to our own
good.
Also, although reason and emotion frequently agree with each other
and logic often helps in reaching the heart's desires, situations can arise
in which one wants to believe something when there is no justification for
it and the belief would be false. In such cases, reason and emotion can op-
pose each other, and the use of logic is necessary if one wishes true knowl-
edge rather than false belief.
Logic is highly valuable (and sometimes absolutely necessary) as a
means of finding the truth not only in philosophical and theoretical rea-
soning generally, but often also in practical matters and daily common-
place concerns, including decision making. Actions taken after careful de-
liberation, using reason and logic, are usually actions that one is happiest
about later on, whereas decisions made on an unsound logical basis often
are regretted later.
Introduction
Someone may "But what's the point of studying logic when other
ask,
people are so illogical? You
can't con\ ince people with logical argument."
Yes, it is sad but true that people often are swayed by emotional appeal,
flattery, advertising (including all the "hidden persuaders"), propaganda,
and in extreme situations, by brainwashing, torture, air raids, and other
forms of terrorism. But it is true too that sound logical arguments some-
times are highly useful in persuading people of truths which they did not
formerly believe. Also, the beliefs produced by emotions often are variable
and transitory, whereas a sound argument is objective and often produces
beliefs that are more permanent. Beliefs produced by good arguments fre-
quently are more firmly held and defensible than beliefs produced by non-
logical means. But even if there are other, more effective, ways of moving
people than bv sound arguments, there still is good reason for studying
logic. For logic helps to distingi»ish truth from error in science, engineer-
ing, politics, economics, government, law. business, philosophy, and in
personal life. Logic can help us to clarify our own thinking and writnig,
with far-reaching benefits for our lives. Logical thinking, unlike irrational
thmking, gi\es us more accurate ideas of what we can expect from life, of
our own shortcomings and abilities, of what we should pursue and what
we should avoid, and of what strategies and tactics we should use to obtam
the good, and livt well, and be happy, thereby helping us to succeed in the
great adventure and drama of living. The best reason for studying logic
probably is not for its use in winning arguments and convincing other peo-
ple of the truth of our beliefs, but rather as a means of discovering for our-
selves what the truth really is.
Knowing the truth generally helps a person to live well and be happy.
Thus, a primary reason for studying logic is that it is in one's own personal
best interests to do so. Logic is useful for gaining genuine knowledge and
using it to live well and be hapj:)y.
There are also social and political reasons for encouraging others to
study logic. In societies where voting citizens make crucial political choices
that affect the lives and well being of ALL the citizens (including ourselves)
obviously it is in everyotie's best interests (including our own) to educate
as many citizens as possible to a le\el of rational thinking that will mini-
mize the likelihodd of their being led to false conclusions, incorrect judg-
ments, and unwise decisions by propaganda, irrational emotional appeals,
and bad logic, and that will maximize their chances of reaching true con-
clusions and making the best decisions. For, if other citizens are irrational
in their thoughts and hazardous to us as well as to them (for
actions, this is
example, the danger of nuclear warfare, contamination or destruction of

the environment, massive economic collapse, etc.). Illogical thinking can,
and often does, lead people into disastrous actions that are contrary to ev-
Inlioduclion
eryone else's best interests and well being, as well as their own. This is one
of the reasons why it is rational to attempt to help other people raise the
level of their rationality as much as possible. Rational persons will recog-
nize that it is in their own when living in a democracy, for
best interests,
everyone to be capable of thinking rationally and reasoning logically. Con-
sequently, if one sees a student having difficulty learning logic, one should
not become impatient, resentful, or angry. Even if the situation were con-
sidered only from a purely selfish personal standpoint, with no social con-
sciousness and no concern for other people's well being, one should try to
help that person learn to reason logically with the best methods available.
This is all the more true, obviously, when this education is viewed from
the standpoint of a concern for the well being and happiness of other per-
sons. The old notion that the subject of logic is suitable for study only by a
small elite group "with high mental horsepower" is philosophically shal-
low, thoughtless, and shows bad logic.
Logic and Language
Reasoning more often than not involves using language (with some
nonverbal exceptions in painting, mechanics, geometry, and some instinc-
tive, spontaneous behavior). Usually when people reason, their thinking
involves language, whether they speak out loud or in a silent internal
monologue. Because of the intimate relationship between reasoning and
language, logic examines reasoning expressed in language. In particular,
our study will focus on certain important relationships between "reasons"
and "conclusions" in the English language so that we can learn to distin-
guish between logical and illogical combinations of statements. Although
some knowledge of grammar is helpful, everything you need to know will
be explained as we go along.
In the first chapters, you will acquire the fundamental concepts and
basic linguistic skills that will prepare you to apply logic. However, the
details of the methods will not be as important as the underlying abilities
you will acquire, which will remain at your ser\ ice for the rest of your life.
Some of the details in this textbook resemble the extra training wheels
sometimes attached to beginners' bicycles: once the desired skill has become
automatic, they no longer are needed.
Natural and Artificial Languages
This book is about reasoning in natural languages. A natural lan-

guage is one that has developed historically as a means of communication.
5 Introduction
English, French, German, Dutch, Spanish, Chinese, Swahili, and Hopi

are examples of natural languages. An artificial language, on the other
hand, is a "man-made" language that was deliberately and intentionally
constructed to serve some special purpose. Computer languages, such as
Fortran and Cobol, are examples of artificial languages; these languages,
of course, are not spoken, but are used to write computer programs. During
the past century, logicians and philosophers have developed a number of
artificial formal languages that use symbolic and mathematical notation
for the study of logic and other special purposes. They are not used for con-
versation. A typical sentence in one of these artificial languages looks more
like amathematical formula. For example: '(x)( 3y)(Fxyy. (Translated into
English, this formula reads: 'For each entity, x. there exists some entity,
y, such that x stands in the relation F to y.") For the purposes of logic, a
method based on artificial as contrasted with natural languages has both
advantages and disadvantages. In this book we will enjoy the ad\antages
of working with a natural language.
The Two Traditional Approaches to Logic
Logic can be approached in different ways. Formal logic, one tradi-

tional approach, studies reasoning expressed in certain artificial languages.
Some advocates'"of this approach believe that: (1) It is possible to translate
any reasoning in a natural language into the symbols of an artificial formal
language; (2) it is possible to gi\e a precise evaluation of the corresponding
reasoning in the artificial language using certain standard logical proce-
dures; and (3) the results of this evaluation then can be carried back to the
original reasoning in natural language. I'nfortimately. however, the re-
quired initial translation of natural-language sentences into artificial for-
mal language in many of the more important cases is, at best, possible only
in principle, as even the most enthusiastic advocates of formal logic now
generally admit. In actual practice, the translations often turn out to be
too difficult to make. Indeed, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-
1951), in his later writings, suggested that because of basic differences be-
tween natural and artificial formal languages, often such translations are
not even possible in principle. Whether or not this criticism is correct, many
logicians now agree that the methods of formal logic are of little practical
usefulness in dealing with much reasoning encountered in real-life situa-
tions. Another difficulty with formal logic is that the necessary artificial
languages must be learned beforehand, and they take a long time to master
because they are extremely complicated (like higher mathematics). Another
problem is that deep irremediable theoretical flaws appear to exist in the
Introtliu tion
crucial assumptions of the formal approach.' These are some of the rea-
sons we will not take that approach. But after studying this text, if you
have the time and opportunity, and are interested, I certainly urge you to
—
go on also to study formal ("symbolic") logic as well as the philosophy
of logic —
so that you can benefit from it, and can judge for yourself its
strengths and weaknesses.
Another traditional approach to logic is the "informal fallacies" ap-
proach. In this approach, samples are examined of various kinds of incor-
rect reasoning that occur commonly in natural languages. Students learn
the special name of each kind of mistake (for example, "the fallacy of argu-
ing from ignorance") and are taught to recognize these specific kinds of
errors and to avoid them. However, one limitation of this approach is that
the list of informal fallacies covers only a very small percentage of all the
different mistakes that are possible in reasoning. As a result, the informal
fallacies approach does not provide a universally applicable
to logic way
of separating correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning.
Although we will not use the informal fallacies approach in this text-
book, some of the most infamous kinds of informal fallacies are examined
inChapter 5. which treats them as examples of defective arguments that
can be evaluated by the methods presented in earlier sections.
The Advent of Natural Logic

The problems and difficulties with traditional approaches to logic
led to thedevelopment of what I call "natural logic." which is a particular
new method and underlying model for the direct analysis and evaluation
of reasoning as it actually occurs in a natural language (in this case. En-
glish). No translation into an artificial language is involved in natural
logic, and both the language talked about (the object language) and the
language used for this talk (the metalanguage) are natural. This is a text-
book in natural logic.
Do not confuse natural language with ordinary (or everyday) lan-
guage. Highly advanced, complex theoretical statements can be made in
natural language. In fact, specialized scientific and other technical state-
ments are made in a natural language more often than in an artificial lan-
guage. Consequently, the methods of natural logic in this book will work
well not only on ordinary everyday reasoning, but also on any kind of theo-
K\'olr to Advanced Readers: The problems (oik eni not formal logic's use of symbolism per se — sym-
, ( —
bolism often is a very gcKxJ tiling, and natural logi( of ourse. uses symbolism itself but ratber con-
cern formal logic 's exlensionalist presup|)ositions. and its assimij)tion tliat ihe nature ol \ali(l reason-
ing in natural language can be explained and modeled purely extensionally. For further explanation,
see Appendix I.
Introduction
retical, technical, legal, political, economic, or scientific reasoning. For the

same reason, the study of natural logic will help you in readings, discus-
sions, papers, and exams in other areas.
Another important advantage of natural logic is that its methods and
concepts apply not only to natural languages, but also to the artificial lan-
guages used in formal symbolic logic. So. if you later decide to take another
course based on a formal logic approach, your previous study of natural
logic Avill help you.
Whatever your long-range reasons for studying logic, this textbook
will help you to develop your own thinking and reasoning, and to under-
stand and critically evaluate better what you read and hear. Chapter 1 ex-
plains how to analyze reasoning, and Chapter 2 shows ho\\' to recognize
good and bad reasoning. Exercises follow each section of text. It is impor-
tant to complete and review these exercises before going on to the next
section.
Enjoy the book.
L
CHAPTER i
Basic Analysis
of Reasoning
1-1 WHAT IS REASONING?
\Vhene\ei you hear someone speak, when you read a book, newspaper, or
magazine article, or very often when you just ponder some matter, what
you hear, look at. or say silently to yourself is a series of sentences. As you
probably know, grammarians distinguish different kinds of sentences (in-
terrogative sentences ask questions, imperatixes are used to gi\e orders,
exclamations express emotions, etc.). Most of the sentences with which we
shall deal in this book will be declarative sentences or sentences of other

kinds that are performing a declarative function —
that is, sentences mak-
ing claims or assertions. Occasionally we will encounter interrogative sen-
tences functioning to make statements (for example, rhetorical questions),
but when this happens, we will simply replace them with declarative sen-
tences saying the same thing. Also, we sometimes will see reasons given
for actions that are ordered or recommended by imperati\e sentences; when
this happens, we can leave these sentences in the imperative form, or re-
place them with corresponding declarative sentences.
Simple complete sentences joined together with coordinating con-
junctions form compound seiitences. Here are some examples:
1 She is mucholder than he. yet she fascinates him.
2. John would report the accident, but he never did.
said he
3. He did not return the money; moreover, he said he was not going to.
Sometimes semicolons (;) and even colons (:) also are used to join sentences
into compound sentences. For the purposes of this chapter, let us call the
10 Basic Analysis of Reasoning
entire sequence of words from a beginning capital letter to a period at its

end a "sentence." And the simple declarative elements joined together
in a compound sentence will be called the "statements" it contains. So
the sentence in the first example makes these two statements:
(a) She is much older than he.

(b) She fascinates him.
Simple sentences will also be called "statements." Statements that are joined
together by "and" or an equivalent conjunction in a compound sentence
will be called "conjuncts."
When you listen, read, speak, or think, sentences come one after an-
other in a sequence or series. Any such series of sentences will be called a
"discourse." You are at this moment reading a discourse. A single sen-
tence standing by itself also counts as a "discourse." So a discourse is
a sentence or sequence of sentences.
We are interested in discourses that contain reasoning. These dis-
courses consist of one or more sentences containing some statements that
are set forth as making probable, proving, justifying, or explaining other
statements in the same discourse. So, a discourse containing reasoning
is one in which certain claims or alleged facts are offered as a justification
or explanation of something. It will help you in doing the exercises later
ifyou recognize and remember that a discourse that contains reasoning
may also contain some statements that are not part of the reasoning.
Discourses containing statements that are set forth as supporting,
pro\ ing, or making probable what is said in other statements also are called
"arguments." The word "argument." as used here, has a technical meaning
that differs from its ordinary, common meaning. In ordinary language, the
word "argument" often refers to a quarrel or disagreement (for example,
"He got into a terrible argimient with his girlfriend"). In this text, and in
logic generally, the word "argument" is used to refer to any discourse hav-
—
ing a certain logical structure namely, a structure containing reasoning in
which some statements are presented as supporting, making probable,
or perhaps explaining what is said in other statements. An "argument"
in the common meaning of "quarrel" might contain no reasoning at all
(for example, the two parties might just scream "Yes!" and "No!" back
and forth at each other, with neither giving any reason or support for what
he or she is saying). In the sense in which the term is used in logic, ar-
guments are discourses containing some statements that are given to sup-
port or back up other statements, and no special quarrel with anyone else
need be involved.
To understand the distinction between discourses that contain rea-
soning (or argument), and discourses that do not. consider the following
L
11 1-1 What Is Reasoning?
pair of examples.^ Although both are about the same topic (namely, tariffs),
only the second discourse contains reasoning.
. The Smoot-Hawlev Tariff Act. passed in June. 1930. raised im{X)n duties
. .
on many goods considerably abo\e the alreadv high le\els. But the Demo-
craticAdministration w hich took o\xx in 1933 began, in 1935. to sponsor the
Hull system of bilateral trade agreements. In the following years, many of
the unfortunate effects of Republican high-tariff laws were alleviated. World
trade was expanding somewhat in 1939. when the Second \Vorld War. . . .
(Sot reasoning)
... In the short run. a high tariff on high-quality shoes seems to benefit shoe-
makers in America by keeping British shoes out of effective competition. But
in the long run. the tariff works to evenone's disad\antage. For it keeps the
price of shoes higher, and therefore absorbs money which consumers could
—
be spending on other things money which would increase production in
other goods and lower then price. Moreo\er it keeps the shoemakers em-
ployed in work that is economically unsound, when they could be making
other things that the United States can provide more efficiently than other
countries. . . . (Reasoning)
Notice that m the first discourse, no reason or justification is given for the
assertions. The aiuhor simplv makes a number of statements w ithout sup-
porting them. In contrast, in the second discourse two reasons are cited to
support the claim that high tariffs on quality shoes w ork to e\eiyone's dis-
advantage in the long run. (These reasons are. first, that such tariffs keep
the price of shoes higher, absorbing money that might otherw ise be spent
on other items, increasing their production and lowering their cost, and
second, that high tariffs keep workers emploved in inefficient industries.)
A"reason" is any statement given in support, justification, or ex-
planation of some fact, claim, expectation, prediction, or assertion."
Sometimes the reasons gi\en by an author actually explain or justify his
claim or expectation, sometimes they do not: but in either case they still
are called "reasons." In Chapter 2, when we turn from analyzing rea-
soning to evaluating it. you will learn how to distinguish reasons that
really support a person's claim ('"good reasons") from reasons that do
not really support a person's claim ("bad reasons"). Whether or not an
author's reasons really support his claim, however, thev still are called
his "reasons."
Any statement that an author or speaker tries to support or explain bv
reasons in a discourse will be called a "conclusion.'' In the preceding
'Adapted from Monroe C. Beardsley. Prar/ifa/Z-ogif (Englewood Cliffs. .\.J.: Prentice-Hall. Inc.. 1930).
-Readers acqiiainied with formal deducti\e logic will perceive the concept of a "reason" as we are using
it to be related to the concept of a "premise" as it is used in deductive Ifjgic. except ha\ ing a wider range
of application. The premises of a deductively \-alid argument are one species of reason, but reasons are
also involved in other kinds of reasoning.
example, one conclusion is: "in the long run, a high tariff on high-quality
shoes works to everyone's disadvantage." In applying the term "con-
clusion," we will consider only the author's apparent intentions; whether
or not the conclusion is actually supported by the reasons given will not
matter to this term's application. Thus, for example, we may say of a
speaker, "His conclusion is not justified by his reasons."
Using the words "reason" and "conclusion" we may now define
"reasoning" as any discourse in which some statement is given as a reason for
some conclusion. To accept some claim as true on the basis of supporting
reasons, or to offer or consider reasons in support or explanation of some-
thing, is to engage in reasoning. So arguments contain reasoning.
The English language contains a number of words and phrases that
function to indicate that one statement in a discourse is being given as a
reason for another. These are called "inference indicators." (The term
"inference" refers to a step of reasoning.) Those listed below generally, but
not always, indicate that the statement following them is a reason.
Partial list of words or phrases that often function as

inference indicators PRECEDING REASONS
as . . . (many exceptions) seeing that . . .
since . . (many exceptions)

. for the reasons that . . .
for . . . (many exceptions) in view of the fact that . . .
because ... on the correct supposition that . . .
as shown by . . . assuming, as we may. that . . .
as indicated by . . . may be inferred from . . .
follows from . . . may be deduced from . . .
being that . . . may be derived from . . .
being as . . . whereas . (in legal docutnents)

. .
inasmuch as . . . in the second place . . .
in the first place . . . secondly . . .
firstly . . .
Thus, for example, the word 'Tor" at the beginning of the third sentence of
the shoe tariff argument signals that the statement following it is being
presented as a reason for an earlier statement in the discourse.

The words or phrases in the next group generally signal that what
follows them is a conclusion drawn from some other statement in the
discourse.
Partial list of words or phrases that often function as inference

indicators PRECEDING CONCLUSIONS
consequently . . . points to the conclusion that . . .
therefore . . . allows us to infer that . . .
which shows that . . . suggests very strongly that . . .
(List continued on next page.)
I
^
proves that . . . leads me to believe that . . .
hence . . . bears out the point that . . .
so . . . thus . . . (frequent exceptions)

you see that . . . demonstrates that . . .
implies that ... it follows that . . .
entails that ... in this way one sees that . . .
accordingly . . . then .{u-itfwut preceding

. .
'if; has
I conclude that . . . exceptions)
The words in this group generally, but not always, indicate that the state-
ment following them is a conclusion.
Explanations and Justifications
The word "because." like many other inference indicators, can ap-
pear both in contexts of explanation (in terms of "causes'" or otherwise)
and in contexts of justification. Although in either context we will cate-
gorize the discourse in which it appears as reasoning, the distinction be-
tween "explanation" and "justification." vague as it may be. is worth men-
tioning. To justify a claim or assertion is to give grounds, evidence, or
reasons of any other sort designed toconvinceothers (or persuade ourselves)
of its truth. To" explain a state of affairs or an occurrence is to make clear
or tell why it exists or happened. The intended distinction is illustrated
by the following examples:
The uord "because" in a fcausal) explanation:
The eight-ball mo\ed because the cue ball struck it.
The mixture exploded because it became too hot.

Oscar is neurotic because of the events that happened during his childhood.
The uord "because" in a justification:
When you have a headache, you should take Brand Z aspirins because they
are safeand effective.
Democracy is the best form of government because it involves majority rule
and gives everyone a voice in decisions.
In the examples in the first group, the word "because" is used in giving an
explanation: in the examples in the second group, the word "because"" is
used in giving a justification.
This duality in the word "because" actually makes the following dis-
course ambiguous:^
Harry believes that God exists because his mother often said so.
'Note: The word "otherwise" is not an inference indicator.

*
"Ambigtwus " : having more than one possible meaning or interpretation.
II Basic Analysis of Reasoning
Docs it mean that Haiiy supports his bcHef in the existence of God by his
mother's authority? (which would be a justification, but a rather weak
one), or does it mean that Harry's mother was the initial cause or source of
his belief? (which would make it an explanation).
For our purposes, the important fact is that both justifications and
explanations contain reasoning. An artist has tried to picture the relation-
ship of "justification" and "explanation" to "reasoning" in Figure 1,
which is supposed to represent two sets with fuzzy boundaries that overlap
each other. Much reasoning involves giving evidence, grounds, or reasons
with the intention of proving a claim that someone did not previously
believe (justification). But people also often engage in reasoning in order
to explain the occurrence of some state of affairs that was already known
to exist (explanation). Indeed, the two purposes or functions of reasoning
are often so intermixed that we cannot even separate one from the other.
Fortunately, however, this will not be a problem for us in this textbook,
because we are concerned with every kind of reasoning, and our universal
definitions and methods work for both explanations and justifications
equally well. In fact, the methods and concepts presented in this textbook
will not even require that you try to separate explanations from justi-
fications, because they apply to both.
The belief that evaluating explanations is not an important or proper
Uses of Reasoning
Justifications Explanations
15 I-l What Is Reasoning?
task of logic (because, supposedly, logic is chiefly concerned with "argu-

ments," and explanations are not "arguments"^ is confused and mistaken.
As most contemporary philosophers of science now recognize, explanations
(especially scientific explanations) generally involve showing how a pre-
diction of the event being explained could have been justified by logically
deducing it from statements of universal natural laws, or general principles
and hypotheses, plus descriptions of the particidar conditions that pre-
ceded or surrounded the event. In other words, a good explanation of an
occurrence will gi\e reasons that woidd have justified predicting it. (Even
the reasons given in an explanation of past event (s) that everyone already
knows occurred can usually be exaluated the same as if the> had been rea-
sons gi\en before the occurrence of the event to justify expecting or pre-
dicting that it would happen.) This view is part of the "Hypothetico-De-
ductive Model of Scientific Explanation." In light of this model, some
philosophers of science even extend the use of the word "argument" to re-
fer to causal explanations as well as other types of reasoning.^ and natural
logicians sometimes do likewise.
'Whether or not this model is correct, happily for us. the universal
methods of natural logic in this textbook are applicable to both justifica-
tions and explanations, so we will not need to worry about the problem of
distinguishing-between justifications and explanations, or the problem of
trying to decide whether a given reasoned discourse is a justification or a
nonjustificatory explanation before applying these methods.^ This is an-
other advantage of natural logic over procedures in traditional logic text-
books that would require their users to determine whether a discoinse is a
justification ("argument") or nonjustificatory explanation before pro-
ceeding to the next steps of analysis and evaluation. Because of the uni-
versal applicability of our methods, we will not be tormented by the dif-
'E.g.. in Psvchology in Phvsical Language." in Logical Posith'istn. ed. A. J. Aver

Rudolf Cainap.
(New York: The Free Press. 1959). p. 195. calls ihem "causal arguments." .See also Richard Rudner.
Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs. .\.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.. 1966), p. 63.
^\ole to Advanced Readers: Some coniemporary philosophers of science maintain that all explana-
tions actually can be viewed as "justifications." so. according to them, the class of nonjustificatory ex-
planations is empty. This is one problem for the distinction. .Apparently unaware of the implications
of this, howe\er, mapy introductory logic textbooks continue to ad\ise their readers from the begin-
ning that, because "explanations" are "nonarguments" (in the common sense of that word as referring
to a "discourse designed to persuade"), and the subject matter of logic is "arguments, "explanations fall
outside the scope of logic. L'nfortunately, these authors do not e\en check whether their principles cor-
res|3ond to the facts ihe> are supposed to fit. Conscciuentlv, when one examines the ensuing examples
of natural-language discourses that they explicitly categorize as "arguments" in their exercises and
even subsequent textual illustraticjns, many are found to be "explanations" of the kind supposedly out-
side the pur\iew of logic by their earlier paradigms of "nonarguments." The principle they would in-
culcate thus conflicts e\en with their own categorizing practices, and their aprioristic model fails to
fit their own data set of instances by reasoning drawn from actual natural-language contexts. But
this is not a problem with the natural-logic approach.
(
fi( 111 tics associated with trying to separate the two. I have mentioned this
distinction to acquaint everyone with it (such as it is) and also to indicate
clearly from the start the full scope and range of the discourses to which
the methods in this text apply, and to respond to possible questions and
special concerns that readers exposed to some traditional texts in logic
might have. In this edition, I have tried to restrict use of the word "ar-
gument" only the range of discourses that both traditional and natural
to
by that name, using other less controversial terms
logic ians agree in calling
(like "reasoning") for the disputed range of cases (nonjustificatory ex-
planations), in an effort to please everyone. (This does not, of course,
debar natural logicians from continuing to use the term "argument" in
a generalized technical sense.)
Some emphasize that explanations and justifications may
logicians
be judged by somewhat different standards, and stress that the require-
ments that an explanation must meet may differ somewhat from the re-
quirements that a justification must meet. It is equally true that justifica-
tions in different fields and subfields are evaluated by somewhat different
criteria. For example, ciualities that make for "goodness" in political or
legal arguments may be somewhat different from some qualities desired in
good philosophical or mathematical arguments. (Likewise for explana-
tions in different fields —
e.g.. physics as contrasted with history.) However,
logicians do not think that, because of this fact, logic cannot treat of jus-
tifications of these various kinds at the same time, or that logic textbooks
must be segregated intcj separate sections dealing with each of the different
types, purposes, or applications of justification individually. (How many
sections would there be?) Although there are textbooks focusing exclu-
sively on justifications in only one field or subfield (in law. in ethics, in
philosophy, etc.), it is also possible for universal texts and logical theories
to deal with the common properties of all justifications, in general, for
there are certain important c}ualities that all sound justifications must ha\e
in common. In fact, all acceptable reasoning,'\nc\\id\ng both justifica-
tions and explanations, should possess certain properties. (Two of these
are: (1) the statement(s) given as the reason(s) should be true, and (2) the
logical relationship between the statement(s) given as the reason (s) and
the statement(s) or conclusion (s) they are claimed to support or explain
must be su( h that the truth or reliability of the latter would be made highly
likely by the truth of the reason(s). if the reason(s) were true.) This text
focuses on e\aluating how well reasoning meets these two essential condi-
tions—especially the second requirement concerning the logical connec-
tion or relationship that must exist between the reason (s) and the conclu-
sion (s). rnderstanding these key requirements, and their relationships to
each other, is necessary for understanding and being able to evaluate any
type of reasoning. In short, this text deals with universal properties whose
presence or absence, in general, makes reasoning (whether explanatory or

justificatory) "illogical" or "logical."A single set of methods and con-
cepts is thus presented that applies to both justifications and explanations.
Difficulties Recognizing Reasoning
There are some possible difficulties about which you should be

forewarned:
A. Tlie presefice in a discourse of a word or phrase from either of the lists

of inference indicators given earlier is a good clue that it contains reason-
ing, but there are tjwny exceptions. The word "since." for example, is often
used to express a relationship in time rather than a logical relationship.
Compare the following examples, hi the first the word "since" means
"because" or "inasmuch as"; this discourse expresses reasoning. In the
second, "since" functions as a temporal word, not as an inference indi-
cator; no reasoning is involved.
h should be considered as armed robbery since he carried a gun. (Reasoning)

It has been fi\e years since he carried a gun. {Xot reasoning)
The word "since" is commonly used as a preposition

expressing a relation-
ship in time (for example. "He's been gone since Tuesday"). Many of the
other words in these lists can also perform other linguistic jobs. For ex-
ample, the word "for" is frequently used as a preposition (as in "she used
a newspaper for a sunshade").
B. Conditional ("if-then" sentences, ) in themselves (especially in printed

discourses), are not instances of reasoning. Sentences of the form "If A', then
Y" (for example. "If it gets warmer, then the snow will melt") are not in-
stances of reasoning in themselves (although they may be part of an argu-
ment, together with other sentences, in the larger discourse in which they
appear). The word "then" usually does not function as an inference indi-
cator when the word same sentence. By themselves,
"if" precedes it in the
simple if-then sentences do not automatically imply that what is said in
the then-clause follows logically, or is supported by, what the if-clause
says. No step of reasoning is made when someone merely asserts an if-then
sentence. Simple if-then sentences merely say that the occurrence of one
situation depends on the occurrence of another situation. They do not say
that one statement follows logically from the other.' ("If-then" or "condi-
tional" sentences will be treated in detail in Chapter 2.)
In trying to determine whether a discourse is or contains argument,

you shoidd be aware of several other possible sources of difficulty.
'iVo/f to Advanced Readers: Inference indicators frequently are confused with conditionals. For fur-
ther discussion of the difference see "Theoretical Notes" in the Instructor's Guide.
18 Basit Analysis ol Reasoning
C. Some reasoned discourses contain XO inference-indicator words. For

example:
It's going to rain. You should take an umbrella.
Although inference indicators are absent, the first sentence of this discourse
presumably gives the speaker's reason for asserting the second. Nothing
makes this explicit, but the fact that one could insert the word "therefore"
between the two sentences without changing the sense of the discourse
shows that this reading is reasonable.
When you encounter a discourse that contains no inference indicators
but that you think may nevertheless contain reasoning, stop and consider
very carefully whether such an interpretation is really justifiable. Don't go
overboard and think nou see reasoning in every passage you read. VV'hen
attribiuing reasoning to passages in which inference indicators or other
explicit signals of reasoning are absent, proceed very cautiously and con-
servatively. A good rule to follow is the "Principle of Charity." In general,
the Principle of Charity says this: When analyzing reasoning, always ana-
lyze it in the way that interprets it as the strongest possible reasoning com-
patible with the inference indicators in the discourse.^ That is, when the
language of a given discourse leaves the structure or nature of the discourse
open to various interpretations, choose the interpretation that results in
the strongest possible reasoning —
that is, choose the strongest or logically
best (rather than a weaker or logically inferior) interpretation of it. This
principle has two important consequences, which can be roughly stated as
follows. (1) Given a choice between categorizing a discourse as "bad rea-
soning" or "nonreasoning," categorize it as the second (nonreasoning).
(2) If a discourse contains reasoning and you must choose between several
different analyses or interpretations of the reasoning, choose the one that
results in the strongest reasoning. These principles will now be discussed
in more detail.
As you develop skills in analyzing reasoning, you will be able to fol-
low the following important consequence of the Principle of Charity: If
a given discourse contains no inference indicators or other definite signs
of reasoning, and if the only reasoning that could possibly be attributed to
it would be obviously then categorize the discourse as no^?rea-
illogical,
soning. In other words, unclear whether an author is giving reasons
if it is
for a conclusion at all, and if the only reasoning you can attribute does not
make sense logically, then do not attribute any reasoning at all. (Notice
that the Principle of Charity does not prevent you from remarking or com-
Advanced Readers: For a historiral and theoretical discussion of the Principle of Charity, see
'^Xote to
Ralph H. Johnson. "C:haiiiy Begins ai Home." Irijormal Logic Newsletter, 3 (June 1981), 4-9; also
see Irudy Ciovier. "Incharitahle I hou^hts About Charity, ibid.. 3 (November 1981), 5-6.
"
plaining about such a discourse that it contains no logical reasoning what-

soever, or from doing so loudly, clearly, and publicly.) So. if a certain state-
ment in a discourse would not follow logically from some other statement(s)
in the discourse, then do not interpret that statement as a conclusion sup-
ported or explained by those other statements unless the author has ex-
plicitly indicated with an inference indicator phrase, or in some other way,
that this statement is supposed to be supported or explained by the other(s).
The Principle of Charity makes sense not only in terms of kindness
and perhaps, fairness, to authors (because we do not attribute bad reason-
ing to them unless they are clearly guilty of it), but also in terms of our own
personal self-interest. Speaking at least for myself, my aim in studying
logic is not so much to refute other people's arguments as it is to find the
truth through reasoning. This consideration justifies the general Principle
of Charity because if one gi\ es some reasoning an interpretation on which
it comes out weak and worthless, when actually it would have been strong
and sound if interpreted another way. then one may o\erlook. and fail to
obtain, a valuable treasure — namely, the opportunity to learn a new truth,
with all the benefits that may come with it (for example, the power to
achieve our heart's desires and obtain what is good). This consideration
also justifies a consequence that follows logically from the general prin-
ciple and is of special interest to us in this section of the text — namely, that
if a discourse contains neither a structure that indicates reasoning, nor any
inference indicator, and if no statement in the discourse can serve even as
at least asomewhat plausible reason for any other, then do not regard or
categorize the discourse as containing reasoning. For there is no point in
going to extremes to reasoning in a discourse if you already can see
""find""
that in your next step, when you

e\aluate the reasoning, you will reject
it and discard it as worthless. Doing so only wastes time and energy. Re-
member, however, that when inference indicators explicitly appear and

the author clearly intends an argument, then the discourse is categorized
as "reasoning" ei'en if it is bad reasoning.
If is found in a discourse, how can you
no inference indicator word
tellwhether the discourse contains reasoning or not? And if it contains rea-
soning, how can you tell which of its statements express the reasons and
which express th^ conclusions? The answer is that this can be done by pay-
ing close attention to the content of the statements to see whether any trans-
ference of belief or acceptance between statements is justified or suggested
bv what the statements say. ^Consider, for example, the following discourse:
That exhaust pipe is very hot. so you should not touch it with your bare hands.
'This formulation is due to Edward Regis. Jr.

20 Basic Analysis ol Reasoning
A Step of reasoning lakes place when a belief in the first statement ("tfiat
exhaust pipe is very hot") leads one to believe the second ("you should not
touch it with your bare hands"). The content of these statements would be
suffi( ient to justify this transfer of belief even if no inference indicator
were present in the discourse.
That exhaust pipe is \ ci y hot. \'()u should not touch it with your bare hands.
In discourses that do not contain reasoning, however, no such trans-

ference of belief from statement to statement is suggested or justified. Con-
sider the following nonreasoning:
hiJune 1970, a group of young couples joined in a symposium in St. Louis.

They were all in their mid or late twenties and had been married for less than
two years. The group was made up of teachers, lawyers, doctors, and skilled
craftspeople.
All of these statements relate to the same topic, but each statement reports
a separate piece of information and none of these statements should cause
one to believe any of the others. Because no transference of belief among
the statements in this discourse is justified or intended, there is 710 step of
reasoning here.
On reading or hearing some statement in a dis-
the other hand, if
course is clearly intended to cause you to believe another statement in the

discourse, then the discourse contains the one statement as a reason and the
other statement as a conclusion, even if the discourse contains no inference
indicator word. But if no transference of belief is justified or intended,
then the discourse should be categorized^s nonreasoning.
D. Reasoning, including both reasons and conclusions, may be contained

in a single sentence. Consider this example: '°
Since it took the contractor over a year to finish the post office building in
which, moreover, the plaster shortly began to crack and the heating system to
break down, it is obvious that somebody was taking bribes.
Replacing the inference indicator "since" with a simple "therefore" and

rewriting the discourse in individual sentences that separate the conclusion
from the reasons, we get:
1. h took the contractor over a year to finish the post office building.
2. The began to c rac k (shortly after it was completed).
plaster (in the building)
.S. The heating system ( in the building) began to break down (shortly?) (after
itwas completed).
4. Therefore, somebody was taking bribes.
'"From BtaidslcN. Praduul Logic.

21 l-l What Is Reasoning?
(Incidentally, thisan example of an argument in which the reasons pro-

is
vide some support for the conclusion without establishing it decisively.

This form of argumentation is called "giving evidence.")
E. The conclusion is sometimes omitted from a reasoned discourse. Con-

sider the following:
The more c arefullv a beer is brewed, the better it tastes, and Brand A is the
most carefully brewed beer in the world.
Presumably the authors of this discourse intend their audience to draw the
conclusion that Brand A is the best-tasting beer in the world. When they
consider it ob\ ious. authors often omit an intended conclusion. The omis-
sion of conclusions is also a popular device among writers of emotionally
charged discourses and political propaganda, where the fact that the con-
clusion does not logically follow might become too obvious if that conclu-
sion were stated explicitly.
F. A sentence or discourse that does not itself contain reasoning may

quote, directly or indirectly, a discourse that does contain reasoning. For
example:
Bryan says he felt very little sympathy for older pensioners who suffered from
the post-war inflation because most of these same older people supported the
war that caused the inflation in the first place. 'They re the ones who wanted
the \'ietnam War," he
says, "so it's fair that they should bear its long-run
cost. They though: thev had an escalator clause built right into the
didn't,
Social Security Law. Consequently, it worked to their advantage, and they
passed the costs along to our generation."
What Bryan reported as having said in\olves reasoning, but the discourse
is
which reports that he said this does not engage in reasoning. The speaker
or writer of it merely reports that Bryan said he does not himself argue
this;
for the correctness of Bryan's position (or for anything else). (Of course, if
you were asked to analyze Bryan's reasoning quoted in this passage, you
would proceed to the portion in quotes.)
G. The difference between reasoning and nonreasoning is not always

clear-cut; some
discourses are borderline. In the following examples, notice
how the substitiuion of a single word or phrase changes the discourse from
nonreasoning to reasoning.
\ot
Reasotuug . . . TheSmoot-Hawley Tariff Act, passed in June. 1930, raised im-
port duties on many goods considerably abo\e the already high
levels. But the Democratic Administration which took o\er in
1933. began, in 1935. to sponsor the Hull system of bilateral trade
agreements. Many of the unfortunate effects of Republican high-

tariff laws were in subsecjuent years alleviated. World trade was
expanding somewhat in 1939, when the Second World War. . . .
Borderline . . The .Smoot-IIawley Tariff Act, passed in June 1930, raised

.
import duties on many goods c onsiderably above the already high

le\els. But the Democratic Administration which took over in
1933, began, in 1935, to sponsor the Hull system of bilateral trade
agreements. Then many of the unfortunate effects of Republican
high-tariff laws were alleviated. World trade was expanding some-
what in 1939, when the .Second World War. . . .
Reasoning
(explanation) . . . The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, passed in June, 1930, raised
import duties on many goods considerably above the already high
levels. But the Democratic Administration which took over in
1933, began, in 1935, to sponsor the Hull system of bilateral trade
agreements. As a result, many of the unfortunate effects of Repub-
lican high-tariff laws were alleviated. World trade was expanding
somewhat in 1939, when the Second World War. . . .
The firstparagraph merely narrates a sequence of events; the third offers

an explanation (notice the inference indicator "As a result") of how or why
the effects of high-tariff laws were alleviated. The middle paragraph sits on
the fence between reasoning and nonreasoning (compare "Then" with "As
a result") and is therefore a borderline case.
Categorizing a discourse as "borderline" does not mean simply that
you yourself are subjectively uncertain how it should be categorized; rather,
it means that it is objectively indeterminate whether or not it contains rea-
soning (a fact about which you might befluite certain). In terms of Figure
1, it means that the discourse lies somewhere on the narrow fuzzy outer
boundary of the two overlapping sets.

H. Modal words or phrases ("must," "cannot," etc.) expressing necessity
or impossibility sometimes are used instead of inference indicators to sig-
nal reasoning or argument. For example, consider the following discourse.
"Here it is early January, and suddenly Janet appears with a beautiful sun-
tan. She must have gone somewhere sunny on her winter vacation."
The word "must" second sentence of this discourse fimctions to in-

in the
dicate that Janet's having gone somewhere sunny on her winter vacation
is a conclusion being drawn from the observation of a suntan reported in
the first sentence. As used here, "must" expresses the necessity with which
this conclusion supposedly is being thrust upon us by the fact that Janet
has a suruan. (Presumably, the speaker does not mean that Janet was forced
or compelled to go somewhere sunny on her vacation, or that it was neces-
"
23 ;-/ What Is Reasoning?
sary for her to go.) Here the word "must" simply expresses the fact that the
conclusion is necessitated (supposedly) by the reason cited. The very same
reasoning can be expressed without the word "must" as follows:
"Here it is earh January, and suddenly Janet appears with a beautiful sun-
tan. From this I conclude that she went somewhere sunny on her winter
\acation.'"
In this discourse, the phrase "From this I conclude that" does the same job
as the word "must" did in the original example.
Words like "must," "can." and "cannot" are called "modal words," or
"modal terms." As we have seen, a modal term is sometimes used instead
of an inference indicator to signal that the statement in which it appears is
being drawn as a conclusion from some other statement or statements in
the discourse. In such cases the modal term is used to express the fact that
the conclusion supposedly is forced upon us. or "necessitated." by the rea-
sons. Sometimes, both a modal word and an inference indicator are used
together in the same sentence to indicate reasoning. For instance, in the
example about Janet, the speaker might instead have said:
tan. From thjs I'conclude that shemust have gone somewhere sunny on her
winter \acation.
Be careful. howe\er, because modal words also sometimes are used to show
that some sort of necessity is associated independently with the fact de-
scribed by the statement in which they appear (as. for example, in "Auto-
mobiles must pull over to the side of the road when a siren sounds"), rather
than just the necessity supposedly associated with a step of inference.
I. Somereasoning involves "matters of fact," and some reasoning in-

—
volves "matters of opinion" and some reasoning involves both. Actually,
no sharp line separates "matters of fact" from "matters of opinion" (be-
cause this distinction is really one of degree), but insofar as the distinction
can be drawn, reasoning can involve either (or both). For example:
Plants are able to create food because they utilize chlorophyll to store energy
gotten from sunlight (reasoning involving a matter of fact).
Teenagers should not drink alcoholic beverages because they are not old
enough to control themselves (reasoning involving a matter of opinion).
Probably most people would classify the first example as a "matter of fact,"
and the second as a "matter of opinion," but both discourses involve
reasoning.
21 Basic Analysis of Rtasoiiing
J. The mere fact that a discourse expresses someone's "conclusion" (in
the popular sense) about something is not enough to make the discourse
qualify as "reasoning." For a discourse to be classified as "reasoning," at
least some of the a( tual reasons for the conclusion also must be included
and stated in the discourse. Thus, the first of the following two examples
would not be counted as reasoning, but the second example would:
After farming for five years, I conclude that I was not cut out to be a farmer.
(nonreasoning)
I tried farming for five years and did not like it. From this I conclude that I
was not cut out to be a farmer, (reasoniug)
We are interested in evaluating the goodness cjf the step(s) from reason (s)
to conclusion (s) in reasoning, and to apply the methods of logic to accom-
plish this, we must know what the reason (s) and the conclusion (s) actually
are. In logic, when we categorize a discourse as "reasoning" or "nonrea-
soning," we are not making guesses about the author's hidden thought
processes; rather, we are looking for the existence of a certain kind of rela-
tionship (of reason-to-conclusion) between the statements in the discourse
presented to us. (Of course, we sometimes include in our study conclusions
that are clearly intended but omitted horn the actual discourse.)
L
EXERCISE 1-1A
Place each of the following phrases in one of the three columns below, according
to whether it is a reason indicator, a conclusion indicator, or neither a reason nor a
conclusion indicator. For each word or phrase, assume that it appears before a state-
ment. Is the statement that follows it indicated to be a reason, aconclusion. or neither?
Use the numbers that appear on the left before the word or phrase in the list. (If the
word or phrase is one that has other possible uses in addition to its use as an inference
indicator (like "since"), then for the purposes of this exercise assume that it is being
used as an inference indicator in your answer.)
REASON CONCLISION NEITHER

1. implies that
2. as shown b\
3. since
4. because
5. Hey
6. especially
7. accordingly
8. I conclude that
9. thus
10. I think-^ha't
11. demonstrates that
12. being that
13. for
14. therefore
15. four
16. pro\es that
17. seeing that
18. but
19. so
20. consequently
21. it follows that
22. and
23. while :L
24. follows from
25. nevertheless
26. yet
27. inasmuch as
28. not ir
EXERCISES 1-1B
Read each of the following discourses carefully, and determine whether or not it is
reasoning. Refer back to the text for help, if necessary. {Hint: Ask yourself, "Is there
anything that the speaker or writer is attempting to justify or explain with reasons?"
This should help you to see the reasoning, if there is any.) If the author of the discourse
uses some statement(s) to back up or explain some other statement(s) in the dis-
course, write "Reasoning" in the space BELOW that passage. If the author does not
engage in any reasoning "No reasoning" below the quoted passage. If
at all, write
the discourse lies in a gray or uncertain area between reasoning and nonreasoning,
write "Borderline" for your answer. (Alternatively, you prefer, you can number and
if
listyour answers on a separate sheet of paper.) If the author only quotes or describes
someone else's reasoning, without necessarily endorsing it or agreeing with it, then ca-
tegorize the passage as nonreasoning. (NOTE: If the author supports or explains some
statements by means of others in only part of the discourse, then categorize the dis-
course as "Reasoning," even if some other statements in the discourse are not involved
in the reasoning.)
B -1. "Everybody has needs. You dont fill mine.^Sdi I'm splittin'."
B-2. \\lli en the existence of beta endorphin, the so -called "happitiess hormone."
was discovere d in 1976, jt caused sfreat excitemen i(Decause>t revealed that the hu-
man body produces a substance that can quell anxiety and pain.
" 'Happiness Hormones' May Aid Schizophrenics,"
Spokane Daily Chronicle (August 30. 1979), p. 23.
B-3. Statistical studies establish that the incidence of forced rape_is lowe r in places
where prostitution is tolerated than in places where it is not.QTierefore^ pr ostitu -
tion should be completely decriminalized.
P.N. P.. Chicago. Illinois.
B-4. The long neck\êcause)in its evolutionary development animals

giraffe has a
with necks longer than those of oth ers around them, of their same species, had an
advantage in obtaining food. (^^)a__successio QjTin onger and longer n ecked spe-
cies developed that led ultimately to the giraffe.
P.B.L..\.. Seattle, Washington.
B-5. "It doesn't bother me when people call me a gorill^becausj>t hat's impos-
sible. I don't think man's desce nded from apes. "
Philadelphia XB.\ player.
B-6. The organization of our health services is still in shambles. \Vhv?êcause

AMA [American Medical Association] and its friends in the Health Insurance
27
28 Basic Analysis ol Reasoning
ndustry h av e stood in the way of ever yjnajor step t owards an efficient, effe ctive
i ,
^jTfor dableheahh care syst em for the American people.^

Instead of the scientific and public professional organization it was founded
as. the AMA has turned into a projxiganda organ purveying "Medical politics for
deceiving the Congress, the people and doctors of America themselves."
Senator Edward Kennedy. July 1971.
B-7. She's been married since last June.
B-8. Few immediately indicative of an individual's woodsmanship as the

acts are so
way he goes about lighting a fire, especially without the help of matches.
For fires can be so ignited by any of us, and if one method does not succeed
there is always another ,^H^>thc very fact that success is often elusive and to be
achieved only laboriously is all the more reason for exerting e\ ery reasonable pre-
caution always to have dry matches at hand.
Bradford .\ngier. How to Stay Alive in the Woods
(New York: Collier Books, 1971), p. 107.
B-9. Spinoza argued that(siny God is the only diingiFtat isultimatelv real, the
soul could be nothing else than a mode of God.
"~ " "==--—-
Adapted from .S. E. Frost. Jr.,
The Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &: Co., 1962), p. 164.
Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
B-10. These methods of raising [rose] plants [from seeds] will not produce
. . .
any improved varietiesas. \\ itii selec tion playing such an important part in the
marketing of new roses.^tollows thatj)fr om any chajice^fertilisation of seeds, the
odds are all in favour of the seedlmgs being inferio rto the parenT v^rtetiesT
Leonard Hollis, Roses (London: The Hamlyn
Publishing Group. Ltd.. 1970). p. 89.
B-11. "Of course he's guilty. Didn't he admit that he threatened to kill her?"
Example from Beardsley, Practical Logic.
B-12. Heat the oil in a frying pan with a cover. When hot. add the onion, ginger,
garlic, and salt and pepper and stir fry for minute. Add the cauliflower and
to taste, 1
turn the pieces in the oil in a gentle stir fry for 2 minutes. Add Vegetable Broth,
butter, and milk, and continue to stir fry gently for 2 minutes, until the butter has
melted and the liquid has coated the vegetable and is boiling vigorously. Reduce
the heat to low. and cowv the pan tightly. Allow the contents to simmer gently for
29 Exercises 1-lB
3-4 minutes. Remove cover, adjust seasoning, turn the vegetable around gently a
few times and serve.
Kenneth H. C. Lo, Chinese I'egetarian Cooking
(New York: Pantheon Books. 1974), pp. 29-30.
B-13. We American conflict is a result of the eco-

are convinced that the Central
nomic deficiencies, political backward ness, and social injustice that have afflicted
the countries of the area. Wd^hereforânnot accep its becommgpaiij)Hhe East- t
West confro ntation, nor can we accept reiornis^^nct stru ctural changes being
viewed as a threat to the security of the other countries of the hem isphere^ ~
President Miguel de la Madrid of Mexico
B-14. A
sharp difference between a controlled price and a street price for an illegal
drug is markup of 50 to 100 times, especially for a drug as easy
predictable; but a
to make and smuggle as cocaine, calls for some explanation, and the only expla-
nation seems to be that the illegal market for cocaine is as strictly controll ed as the
legal one. Like diamonds, cocaine is expensive not because it's rare buiiêcau^
it comes jrom a li mited source jêograph ically, and because its productio n and
'
marketing at the source are in very few hands indeed.
r Roger Downey. "Why Cocaine May Be the Next Candidate
""
for Legalization," The Seattle Weekly. 2. no. 3. p. 8.
B-15. The truth is, I have got my hero (or heroine) into such a particularly close
place that do not see how I am ever going to get him (or her) out of it again, and
I
therefore I will wash my hands of the whole business, and leave that person to get
—
out the best way that offers or else stay there. I thought it was going to be easy
enough to straighten out that little difficulty, but it looks different now.
Mark Twain. "A Medieval Romance."
From Sketches New ir Old by Mark Twain,
Harper &: Row. By permission of the publisher.
B-16. The materials of nature (air, earth, water) that remain untouched by human
effort belong to no one and are not property. U_ follows that a thing can become
someone's priYatrTjrDpeny only if he works and labors on it to change its natural
state. From thfs^ concludejthat whatever a man improves by the labor of his hand
and brain belongVlu hmi, and to him only.
John Locke. O/ Property.
B-17. Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of dea frjj^v i ea r n o
evil
,^^ thou arf^vitltTrTe.^
~ —~—___^__^^-. _- - _„ t 1 1 f
Psalm 23.
EXERCISES 1-1C
Read each of the following discourses carefully, and determine whether or not it is
reasoning. Refer back to the text for help, if necessary. {Hint: Ask yourself, "Is there
anything that the speaker or writer is attempting to justify or explain with reasons?"
This should help you to see the reasoning, if there is any.) If the author of the dis-
course uses some statement(s) to back up or explain some other statement(s) in the
discourse, write "Reasoning" in the space BELOW that passage. If the author does
not engage in any reasoning at all,write "No reasoning" below the quoted passage.
If the discourse lies in between reasoning and nonreasoning,
a gray or uncertain area
if you prefer, you may simply num-
write "Borderline" for your answer. (Alternatively,
ber and list your answers on a separate sheet of paper.) If the author only quotes or
describes someone else's reasoning, without necessarily endorsing it or agreeing
with it, then categorize the passage as nonreasoning. (NOTE: If the author supports
or explains some statements by means of others in only part of the discourse, then
categorize the discourse as "Reasoning," even if some other statements in the dis-
course are not involved in the reasoning.)
C-1. In the first place; we may

with a strong presumption that Colonel
start
Openshaw had some very strong reason for leaving America. Men at his time of
life do not change all the^r habits, and exchange willingly the charming climate
of Florida for the lonely life of an English provincial town. His extreme love of
solitude in England suggests the idea that he was in fear of someone or something,
(^soê may assume as a working hypothesis that it was fear of someone or some-
thing which drove him from America.
Sherlock Holmes in The Five Orange Pips"
by A. Conan Doyle.
C-2. Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.
Take my yoke upon you. and learn of me; fop)I am meek and lowly in heart; and
ye shall find rest unto your souls. Fo)r my yoke is easy and my burden is light.
Jesus of Nazareth. Matlheu- 11:28-30.
C-3. Nobody wants corrupt government, and the present administration is the
most corrupt in our nation's history. The only way to restore honest government
is to elect Democrats. -
Campaign speech.
C-4. the jury in the case of the Commonwealth of Kentucky vs. John Wheeler
We.
ei al..have carefully considered the points of the case, and tested the merits of the
several theories advanced, and do hereby unanimously decide thai the game com-
monlv known as old sledge or seven-up is eminently a game of science and not of
31
r
32 Basic Analysis of Rcasonin.n
(haiuc. In (Icinoiistratioii wlicrt'of hereby and herein stated, iterated, reiter-

it is
ated, set fortli. and made during the entire night, the "chance" men
nianitest that,
never won a game or turned a jack, ahhough both feats were common and fre-
quent to the opposition; and furthermore, in support of this our verdict, we call
attention to the significant fact that the "chance" men are all busted, and the "sci-
ence" men have got the money. It is the deliberate opinion of this jury, that the
"chance" theory concerning seven-up is a pernicious doctrine, and calculated to
infli( untold suffering and pec uniary loss upon any community that takes stock
I
in it.
Mark Twain. "Science vs. Luck."

From Sketches !\'eu' ir Old by Mark Twain.
Harper Sc Row. By permission cjf the publisher.
C-5. . . . the I'nited States has acted consistently as a status quo anti-revolutionary
power and in so doing has shaped the very which Central Ameri-
societies against
cans are in rebellion.
This simple formulation, however, has far-reaching implications, for in
protesting against local systems of oppression. Central Americans are in fact re-
belling against the most far-flung and most exposed component of the North
American national system. Re\olution in the region, periodic upheaval and pro-
tracted struggle hence become inevitable, for those systems cannot over the long
run both serve as extension of North American needs and at the same time meet
Central American needs. And when client elites failed to underwrite U.S. hege-
mony, the result became inevitable intervention.
With whom is the I'niied States at war in Central America? It is. in fact, wath
itself, with its past policies, to be more specific. A generation or two ago, U.S.
policymakers borrowed time from the future, and sought short military solutions
for long-standing social and economic problems. \'ast resources, economic and
military, were mobilized to suppress reform movements, many of which were pop-
ular, many of which were moderate.
After a half-century hiatus, the I'nited States has returned to Central America
to discover the fruits of its past policies, and it is a bitter harvest indeed.
Louis A. Perez, Jr., Togo Pinpointed the Enemy in Central America."

Tampa Tnbune-Times (Ajjril 8. 1984), p. 5-C;. col. 4-5.
C-6. Man hating is a defense, a refusal, and an affirmation. It is a defense against

fear, against pain. It is a refusal to suppress the evidence of one's experience. It is
an affirmation of the cathartic effects of justifiable angei What is j:)rimary is the .
possibility of release gained from acknowledging its existence, and the renewal
that can sometimes accompany its expression. (Fo;:) if I say today, "I hate you." it
is in order that tomorrow it might perhaps be easier to say, "I love you."
Ingrid Bengis, Combat in the Erogenous Zone

(New York: Alhed A. Knopf, 1972), p. 5.
33 Exercises 1-lC
C-7. Some illusions are fascinating because they show us in a particularly clear
way theworkings of our own perceptual processes. The works of certain artists,
such as Escher, play on such themes, but most compelling in this respect are the
reversible figures [such as the "necker cube""]. A cube appearing to extend toward
the observer may suddenly switch its orientation and appear to extend away from
him. The observer need not ha\ e performed any particular action and certainly the
cube did not change. Then to what must this change be attributed? Obviously,
some alteration in the observer himself has occurred, implicating a perceptual
process that has at least t^^ o states, each corresponding to a different appearance
of the figure. We expect that such a perceptual process is. in turn, the expression
of an underlying neural mechanism. An understanding of such mechanisms, which
is stillquite remote, can be expected to yield the ultimate explanation of sensory
illusions. In the meantime, they serve as fascinating challenges.
Richard Held. Image. Object, and Illusion

(San Francisco: W. H. Freeman &: Co.. 1974). preface.
C-8. The process of uniting two or more adjacent [school] districts . . . ought to
be commenced at once. . . . The number of teachers in demand would thus be re-
duced, while the rate of compensation might be increased without adding to the
burdens of the people and 4_hus the facilities for obtaining good instructors would
be multiplied in a two-told ratio.
George B. Emerson and .\lonzo Potter.
The School and the Schoolmaster. 1842.
C-9. If. example, we were to take a projection photometer, a telescopic pho-

for
tometer, and scanthe world around us line by line, trying to find the color of the
objects in the world outside —
here we are thinking of color in the Newtonian way
of expecting to find shortwave light from blue objects and longwave light from
red objects —
we would be impressed to find that we can hardly discover the objects
at all. let alone describe their color in terms of distribution of wavelengths. The
trace of the response of the meter after such an experiment would look like peaks
and valleys with a confused interlocking of them as a function of wa\elength: so
it is correct to sav that color does not exist in terms of being defined by wavelength-
concentration distribution.
Edwin H. Land. "Our 'Polar Partnership" with the
World around Is." Hanard Magazine. 80. no. 3. 25.
Copyright ? 1978. Harvard Magazine. Inc.;
Reprinted bv permission.
C-10. The houses were covered with vines bearing bell-shaped flowers playing
coloraturas. The guitars inside of the houses or on the doorsteps took up the color
chromatics and emitted sounds which evoked theflavor of gua\a. papaya, cactus
figs, anise, saffron, and red pepper.
The sun was setting ostentatiously, with all the pomp of embroidered silks
and orange tapestries of Oriental spectacles. The palms had a naked elegance, and
wore their giant plumes like languid feather dusters sweeping the tropical sky of
all clouds, keeping it as transparent as a sea shell.
From Seduction of the Minotaur by Anais Nin.

Copyright £ 1961 by Anais Nin. .-\11 rights reserved.
Ciurrently published by The .Swallow Press, Chicago,
and Peter Owen, London. Reprinted by permission
of the author's representative. Cunther Stuhlmann.
C-11. have worked hard to stop destabilizing first-strike weapons such as

. . . I
the MX. D-5. and Pershing II missiles. They are offensive weapons designed to wage
[possibly initiate] nuclear war, and they will only endanger our own security by
increasing Soviet paranoia and putting the arms race on a hair trigger.
Mike Lowry. Congressman from Washington State,
July report from the 98th Congress, p. 1.
C-12. Cable television today where the general exercise of choice is

is at a stage
still possible. If for no better reason than that there is a history of government reg-
ulation in the field of television, it remains possible by government action to pro-

hibit it, to permit it. or to promote it almost by fiat. Citizens may still take a hand
in shaping cable television's growth and institutions in a fashion that will bend it
to society's will and society's best intentions. It is not as yet encumbered by mas-
sive vested interests, although that day may be no longer remote. It is not as yet so
fixed a part of the national scene, as for example conventional television is, that
it appears almost quixotic to attempt to re-direct its energies. There is. in short,
still lime.
On the Cable: The Report of the Sloan Commission on

Cable Communications (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1971). p. 3.
C-13. Neutron: a neutral uncharged particle of atomic weight approximately

unity. Closely packed neutrons and protons (that is. nucleons) compose the
. . .
nuclei of all atoms. The neutron is slightly heavier than the proton; in the free
state it decays, yielding a proton, with a half life of about 12 min. It has some mag-
netic properties.
G[lenn] T. S[eaborg], "Neutron,"

Harper Encyclopedia of Science. 1963.
C-14. rhis change, dL

can arise from two sources: (1) torques exerted on the
dt,
particles of the system by internal forcesbetween the particles and (2) torques ex-
erted on the particles of the system by external forces.
If Newton's third law holds in its so-called strong form, that is. if the forces
between any two particles not only are equal and opposite but are also directed
35 Exercises 1-lC
along the line joining the two particles, then the total internal torque is zero be-
cause the torque resulting from each internal action-reaction force pair is zero.
Hence the first source contributes nothing. F^
our reference point, therefore,
only the second source remains . . .
Robert Resnick and David Halliday, Physics

(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 267.
C-15. If you're thinking of financing the purchase of a new car, now is the time
and Seattle Trust is the place.
Our standard interest rate is now especially low; we're one of the few banks
that give you up to four years to repay; and we're the only bank that gives a dis-
count to customers who buy energy-conserving cars.
^^
What's more, we'll make you an auto loan before-the-fact,(soôu can have it
"in your pocket" when you shop.

Advertisement.
C-16. In architecture Piranesi followed in the tradition of Italian art, whose su-
preme masters from Giotto through Raphael and Leonardo to Michelangelo so
often combined several skills, among them those of practical architecture. But as
an architect Piranesi could not reach the mastery nor the success of his etchings.
—
Circumstances combined against him Rome, in the second half of the eighteenth
century, was no longer a center of large-scale architectural activity and Piranesi's
growing fame as a graphic artist may have wôrked against him rather than for him
as far as architectural commissions were concerned. Moreover, the proud, hot-
headed, and stubborn Piranesi was hardly the person to encourage overbearing
clients.
Adolf K. Placzek, "The (Classical, Baroque, Romantic,

Modern) \'ision of Piranesi." Howard Magazine. 80, no. 3. 30.
Copyright £ 1978, Harvard Magazine, Inc.;
Reprinted by permission.
C-17. When you push on the brake pedal you move the hydraulic fluid in the mas-
ter cylinder, and. as Archimedes says, the pressure in an interconnected fluid sys-
tem is the same in all parts of the system, soothe pressure you put on the pedal is
transmitted equally to, the four wheel cyliriders, which move the brake shoes into
contact with the brake drums.
John Muir, How to Keep Your Volkswagen Alive

(Santa Fe, N.M.: John Muir Publications. 1969). p. 101.
C-18. The myth of the strong black woman is the other side of the coin of the
myth of the beautiful dumb blonde. The white man turned the white woman into
a weak-minded, weak-bodied, delicate freak, a sex pot, and placed her on a ped-
36 Basic Anal>sis of Reasoning
estal; he turned ihe black woman Amazon and depos-

into a strong self-reliant
ited her in his kite hen— that's the secret of Aunt Jemima's bandanna. The white
man turned himself into the Omnipotent Administrator and established him-
self in the Front Office. And he turned the black man into the Supermasculine
Menial and kicked him out into the fields. The white man wants to be the brain
and he wants us to be the muscle, the body. This is why, when you get down to
. . .
the root of it, the white man doesn't want the black man, the black woman, or the
white woman to have a higher education. Their enlightenment would pose a
threat to his omnipotence.
Haven't you ever wondered why the white man genuinely applauds a black
man who achieves excellence with his body in the field of sports, while he hates
to see a black man achieve excellence with his brain?
Old Lazarus speaking in Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice

(New York: McGravv-Hill, 1968), p. 151. Reprinted by
permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., and
Jonathan Cape, Ltd.
C-19. ar'gyment, n. Archaic. Proof; evidence. 2. A reason or reasons offered

1.
in proof; reasoning. 3. Discourse designed to convince or to persuade. 4. Argu-

mentation; discussion; disputation. 5. The subject matter or topic of anything;
also, an abstract or summary, as of a book. 6. Matter of dispute. 7. Math. One of
the independent variables upon whose value that of a function depends.
ar'gu-men-ta'tion, ti. 1. Act or process of forming reasons, making induc-
tions, drawing conclusions, and applying them to the case in discussion. 2. Writ-
ing based on or embodying such a process. 3. Debate; discussion.
By perfnission. From Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary © 1961 from G. Sc C. Merriam Co.,
Publishers of the Merriam-Webster Dictionaries.
C-20."h is obvious that the jjresent administration isweary and incompetent.

Anyone can see the extent of its inefficienc ies. No one can doubt that it is corrupt,
tired, staggering, and leady to collapse."
Example from Beardsley, Practical Logic.

37 1-2 Reasons and Conclusions
1-2 REASONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Once it is established that a discourse contains reasoning, the next step is
to determine its direction. To do this, you must decide which statements in

the discourse are given as reasons for other statements and which state-
ments are conclusions supported by other statements. (Remember that we

are calling any statement given in support of another a "reason," whether
it is a good reason or not; likewise, any statement that an author presents
as justified or explained by some reason in a discourse is termed a "con-

clusion," whether or not the reason really supports or explains it.)
Inference indicators, like those listed in the previous section, will
help you make this determination. Quite simply, the appearance of any
from the first group generally indicates that the statement that follows gives
a reason. And the appearance of any from the second group normally sig-
nals that the statement that follows expresses a conclusion.
Various subtle differences of meaning exist, of course, among the in-
dicators belonging to each group. To say that a certain reason "proves" a
certain conclusion, for example, sounds stronger and more assertive than
to say that it "leads me to believe" this conclusion. But for our logical pur-
poses, this difference is not important. Since we are interested only in the
justificatory or -explanatory relationships among
statements, whenever
any of these inference-indicator words appears, we will simply replace it
with a uniform 'therefore' and rewrite the discourse as follows:
Reason
therefore
Conclusion
For convenience we will replace the word 'therefore' with an arrow:
Reason
\
Conclusion
A diagram like this "arrow diagram." In such diagrams, the

is called an
arrow (which is is always drawn pointing toward a
read as "therefore")
conclusion. Remember that the arrow represents an inference of any kind,
a step of passing from some fact or statement (the reason) to another fact or
r
Statement (the conclusion) that it supports or explains. All of the different

kinds of reasoning that exist' • will be represented by this symbol.
The fact that the arrow is drawn pointing downward is purely a con-
vention. We could just as well construct diagrams with arrows pointing
up or sideways:
Conclusion
Reason —^ Conclusion t Conclusion -^— Reason
Reason
Bin in this draw the arrow pointing downward.

book we will
some conclusions may serve as reasons
In a long chain of reasoning,
for fmiher conclusions. Such statements are called "intermediate conclu-
sions " They operate both as conclusions from prior reasons and as reasons
.
for further conclusions. The diagram of such reasoning might, for exam-
ple, have the following form:
Basic reason Basic reason
Intermediate conclusion Basic reason
Final conclusion
"Basic reasons" are those reasons that are not themselves supported by
other reasons in the discourse. They are the ultimate ground or basis on
which all Conclusions that are not used
the subsequent conclusions rest.
in the discourse to support further conclusions are called "final conclu-

sions." They are what the reasoning attempts to establish or explain. Some
reasoning may have more than one final conclusion. (The final conclu-
sions are not necessarily the most important statements in the reasoning;
they may or may not be the focal point.)
Making a diagram does not mean that one agrees with anything in the
reasoning. The diagram is only a pictme that is made of the reasoning be-
fore going on whether one agrees with it. VVe may or may
to try to decide
not agree with the reasoning. We may even reject it after diagramming it.
When we are trying to locate reasons and to distinguish them from
conclusions, we often run into various kinds of difficulties. One source
",Vo/^ to Advanced Readers: These kinds of reasoninj^ inrlude "deductions." '"inductions." postula-
tions. explanaiioiis. piedic lions, jusiifications. semantic inferences, etc.
of confusion, common in ordinary English, is the use of noun phrases to

stand in place of statements. Here's an example:
The right to speak one's mind freely is legally limited only by laws of obscen-
ity and libel. This limitation implies that political censorship cannot be
justified. '2
Noting the appearance of the inference indicator 'implies that', one cor-
rectly gathers that the statement following it (that is. "political censorship
cannot be justified") is a conclusion. But where is the reason? The gram-
matical subject of the inference indicator verb "implies "
is the noun phrase
"This limitation. "
"But. "
it may be asked, "since only statements can im-
ply anything, how could a limitation', which is not a statement, be a rea-
son for anything? The answer is that this abstract noun phrase stands in
"
place of the entire preceding sentence. The author actually is using the
statement "The right to speak ones mind freely is legally limited only by
laws of obscenity and libel" as a reason to support his position that politi-
cal censorship is unjustifiable. This becomes ob\ ious when we reword the
discourse in the following way:
Since the right to speak one's mind freely is legally limited only by laws of
obscenity and libel, political censorship cannot be justified.
In thisformulation, the inference indicator "implies that" has been

replaced by theword "since, the noun phrase 'This limitation no longer
" "
appears, and the relationship between reason and conclusion becomes ob-
vious, losing the arrow, we may represent the logical structure of this dis-
course as follows:
The right to speak one's mind freely is
legally limited only by laws of obscenity

and libel.
Political censorship cannot be justified.
Be alert for the possible use of noun phrases standing in place of state-
ments in reasoned discourses. Also, noun phrases arc sometimes used in
long discourses to refer back to statements that occurred many sentences
earlier in the discomse. Examples of this will be seen later on.
Another frequent source of difficulty is that the author of a discourse
may fail to slate his conclusion explicitly, leaving it for his audience to
'^Beardsle\ . Practical Logic.

draw, rhis possibility was mcniioned earlier in connection with the fol-
lowing example:
The more carefully a beer is brewed, the better it tastes, and Brand A is the
inost (arcfulKbrewed beer in the world.
When such a situation you simply will have to supply the conclu-
arises,
sion you and evaluate the reasoning on that
take to be the intended one.
basis. (We need not feel overly sympathetic toward authors who afterwards
complain that they have been misinterpreted as a result of our having to
supply their cotk lusions.)
Similar difficulties arise when some or all uijerence indicator words
are omitted in a reasoned discourse. When an author leaves out some or all
of the inference indicator words (like "thus," "therefore," "since," "for,"
dangerously easy to miss the reasoning completely, or to make a
etc.). it is
mistake about its direction. F"or example, consider the following discourse:
The landscapes of the contemporary New \'ork painter Skaggs far excel those
of the nineteenth-century impressionist and post-impressionist artists. De-
pending on the \isual sophistication of the viewer, each painting contains
not one but many distinct possible landscape scenes, somewhat as the psy-
chologist's drawing of a "necker cube" portrays either of two distinct pos-
sible perspective views (except that Skaggs' paintings are infinitely more sub-
tle and refined).
At first, you might not even recognize that there is reasoning going on in
this passage, much less be able to distinguish the reason from the conclu-
sion. Bin you read the discomse thoughtfidly, and carefidly think about
if
what each of the sentences says, with a little practice you will learn to recog-
nize the reasoning and its direction in a passage like this. Go back and re-
read asking yourself these questions: W'hich of these sentences, if either,
it.
might show that the other statement is likely to be true? Which, if either,
could be a reason for the other?
Look at the passage again. Can you tell which sentence is the reason
and which is the conclusion? Do you see the direction of the reasoning? If
not. sometimes it you reread it, to ask yourself whether it still
helps, as
woidd make the sameand be even more clearly "logical," if a con-
sense,
clusion indicator like "thus," or a reason indicator like "for," were in-
serted before each of the statements in the discourse. Try doing this. When
inference indicator words are omitted from a reasoned discourse, the best
way to tell the direction of the reasoning is to ask yourself: (1 what exactly )
each of the statements says, and (2) which, if either, of the statements
might lend to show that the other statement is likely to be true or reliable.
In this example, the first sentence basically makes a value judgment
aboui Skaggs' paintings, claiming that they are better than those of certain
other artists. The second sentence describes how Skaggs' paintings look,
and says that they are visually changing multiple landscapes. The first
sentence probably is not being given as a reason for the second sentence,
because it would not be a good reason. (If all that I knew were that Skaggs'
paintings excel those of the impressionists [first sentence], this would not
be a good reason to believe that Skaggs' paintings were visually changing
multiple landscapes [second sentence].) Believing the first statement should
not cause me to believe the second statement, and the discourse would not
seem to be logical if the conclusion indicator "Therefore" were inserted af-
ter the first sentence to indicate that the second sentence was a conclusion.
Doing this would sound less logical than the passage originally did, as you
can see for yourself (inference indicator words are circled):
The landscapes of the contemporary New York painter Skaggs far excel
those of the nineteenth-century impressionist and post-impressionist art-
ists. ^T-'fu/liXiMlX/ )^ depending on the visual sophistication of the
viewer, each painting contains nc:)i one but many distinct possible landscape
scenes, somewhat as the psychologist's drawing of a "necker cube" portrays

either of two distinct possible perspective views (except that Skaggs' paint-
ings are infinuely more subtle and refined).
The second sentence is not supported by the first sentence: it does not fol-
low logically from the first sentence.
But the passage would make good logical sense interpreted the other
way around, with the first sentence interpreted as the conclusion, and the
second sentence interpreted as the reason given in justification for it. This
interpretation could be expressed clearly and exactly by inserting an in-
ference indicator word like "because" or "For" before the second sentence
so that it will be understood as a reason:
The landscapes of the contemporary New York painter Skaggs far excel those
cjf the ni neteenth-century impressionist and post-impressionist artists.
^0^
\ ) J depending on the visual sophistication of the viewer, each
painting contains not one but many distinct possible landscape scenes, some-
what as the psychologist's drawing of a "necker tube" portrays either of two
distinct possible perspective views (except that Skaggs' paintings are infi-
nitely more subtle and refined).
It is quite plausible and makes sense to interpret the author as intending

the second sentence to be a reason supporting the first sentence. The au-
thor considers Skaggs' paintings to excel those of the impressionists be-

cause they present visually changing landscape scenes.
I liis analysis can be lepiesented by underlining every conclusion in

the discourse, and j)lacing an asterisk before the final conclusion, as follows:
* The landsca{)es of the contemporary New ^'ork jxunter Skaggs far excel
i nth-(eimn\ impicssionist and posi-impressionist artists.
liosc ol the nin('te(
Depending on the \ isual sopliistication of the \ iewer, each painting contains
not one but nian\ distinct possible landscapje scenes, somewhat as the psy-
chologist's drawing of a "necker cube portrays either of two distinct pos-
"
sible perspectixe \iews (except that Skaggs" paintings are infinitely more
subtle and refined).
The second sentence supports the value judgment in the first sentence.
Underlining every conclusion and placing a star before each final
conclusion is a simple technique or mode-of-iepresentation that will be
used in the exercises at the end of this section to show the direction of
reasoning in reasoned discourses. Another, even more powerful, tech-
nique will be introduced in the next section.
To untrained readers, when inference indicator words have been
omitted, it may sometimes appear at first that the author of such a passage
seems to be simply repeating some point when in reality he is giving an
argument for it. An example from John Stuart Mills On Liberty illustrates
this nicely;
The only freedom which deser\es the name is that of pursuing our own good
in our own
way. so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or
impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own
health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gain-
ers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, rather than by
compelling each to li\e as seems good to the rest.
On reading this passage, you may see no argument in it. But now ask
first
yourself: What, if anything, is the author trying to establish, and does he

give any reasons? Rereading the passage, we find him asserting that the only
freedom that genuine and worth having ("which deserves the name") is
is
that in which we aie all permitted to pursue "our own good in our own
way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their
efforts to obtain it" (first sentence). So possibly this is a conclusion. Now,
does the atithor give any reason or pro\ ide any justification for this claim?
Yes, in the third sentence he says that mankind will be "gieaier gainers" if
this sort of liberty exists than if it does not. So the third sentence gives some
reason for the first. Does Mill give any justification for the claim he makes
in that third sentence? Yes; in one possible interpietation, in the second
sentence he says that each individual person is the best ("proper") guardian
ol his or her own welfare. If we suppose that Mill believes that if each indi-
vidual person acts so as to maximize his or her own well-being, the good
of mankind as a whole will also be maximized, then the second sentence
L
pro\ ides a reason for ihe ihird. Let us indicate this analysis by underlinmg
every conclusion (whether intermediate or final) and placing an asterisk
before the final conclusion, as follows:
* The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own
good in our own wav. so long as we do not attempt to depri\ e others of theirs.
or impede their efforts to obtain it Each is the proper guardian of his own
.
health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers
by suffering each other to li\e as seems good to themsehes. rather than by
compelling each to li\e as seems good t(j the rest .
(Other readings are also possible; the responsibility for this ambiguity lies
with the author.) In general, when you encounter a reasoned discourse from
which inference indicators are omitted, consider carefully the content of
each statement and ask yourself whether it could plausibly be taken as
supporting others. Then read the discourse as ha\ ing the best of the logical
interpretations that can be fitted to it. As you can see. although full evalua-
tion can take place only after determination of an argument's structine. ini-
tial evaluative judgments are sometimes requited in order to make that de
termination. In all such cases, apply the Principle of Charity: If a certain

statement would not be a good reason for another statement, then do not
interpret the auflior as giving the one statement as a leason for the other
statement unless he clearly so indicates in the text as iih an exj^licit infer-
ence indicator word.
This argument from Mill is difficult to analyze because it contains no
inference indicator words. If the author had used inference indicator words
to signal that he intended his reasoning to be understood as I have inter-
preted it. for example, the discomse would have been much easier to ana-
lyze. If the omitted inference indicator words weie inserted, the result might
read as follows:
The only freedom Avhich deserves the name is that of pm suing our own good
in our own way. so long as we do not attempt to depri\e others of theirs, or
impede their efforts to obtain it.
CW^^j^ ^^ch is the pr oper guardian of
his own he alth, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. (jX/AjoLjthjUXJl^-
-K^ttAy ) y mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as
seems good to themsehes. rather than bv compelling each to li\e as seems
good to the rest.
In trying to determine the direction of reasoning when inference indi-

cator words are omitted, often it is very helpful to try inserting different
possible inference indicator words to see which of them make the best logi-
cal sense. That supplying inference indicator words that would indi-
is. try
cate the logical direction you believe the reasoning has. and then read it and
^-'^^ ^^^
t X^' -^JA^
•44 Basic Analysis of Reasoning
see il it sounds i ii;ht. Here are some different inference indicator words that
indicate the same logical structure as before in the Mill discourse:
rhe only freedom whith deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good
inour own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or
impede their efforts to obtain it. CÂ/h^ ^ tbiJCOAJUtjC^ each is the proper
guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual,
a^<^ ("5^^K.4£4/A^yi;6^ ; ^ mankind are greater gainers by suf-
fering each other to live as seems'good to themselves, rather than by compell-
ing each to live as seems good to the rest.
If the authorhad put some such inference indicator woids into his dis-
course, his argument would have been much easier to see, and the struc-
ture of the reasoning would have been more obvious and less subject to de-
bate and controversy^
Hints about Inference Indicators
them
Inference indicator~words signal t4=»uth£_itiHfTnents following
are reasons or conclusions. Sometimes they also indicate the approximate
location in the discourse of the statements for which they give reasons, or
from which they draw conclusions. Here are three helpful hints:
1. When the inference indicator "for" introduces a reason, it also indi-

cates that the conclusion was a statement appearing earlier in the discourse.
In other words, 'for' indicates that the statement following it is a reason for
a conclusion stated earlier in the discourse. For example:
I have learned too much of the vanity of human
any felicity
affairs to expect
from public life. But Î am and happy in what-
determined to be cheerful
e\er situation I may be.Q;orÎ have also learned from experience that the
greater part of our happiness or misery depends on our disposition and not
on our circumstances.
— Martha Washington.
The word "for" at the beginning of the last sentence in this discourse shows
that it is a reason bcitig given for something that was said earlier (in the
second sentence) in this discourse.
2. When any of the words "hence." "thus," "consequently," "so." or

"therefore" used as a conclusion indicator, generally it signals that at
is
least some (and possibly all) of the reasons for that ccmclusion appeared
somewhere earlier in the discourse.
3. When any of the words "since," "as," or "because" is used to indicate

a reason, the conclusion being supported usually is stated in another clause
of the x<ery same sentence. For example:
^"Evervti me I see somebody . . . like the National Resour ces Def ense Coun-
ci l come into my court. I sav 'Thank God! ('êcausb I know I am going to
have competent counsel . . . that does not represent any governmental or pro-
prietary interest."
U.S. District Judge Charles Richey in testimony

before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee.
Here the word "because" indicates that what follows it is being given as a
reason why, according to the judge, he is happy to see certain lawyers in
his courtroom, something stated at the beginning of the same sentence.
The conclusion and reason are both in the same sentence. Here is another
example:
înc^ nuclear plants have a life expectancy of under 40 years.^they them-

selves may become the hardest waste disposal problem of all.
"Crisis in the World of Nuclear Power:

Poisons that Last Forever." Life. NS 2. no. 5. 25.
Copyright © Time. Inc. Reprinted with permission.
Here the "nuclear plants have a life expectancy of under 40 years"

fact that
is being offered as a reason for thinking that "they themselves may become
the hardest waste disposal problem of all." which is the conclusion stated
in the second part of the same sentence.
Other Useful Tips
1. Generally, when statements of the form "When A, then B" or "B when
A" are encountered. DO SOT split the "when-A"-c\2iU'ie apart from the
"then-B" -clause. When
such statements function as parts of reasoning,
usually the entire statement ("When A, then B") operates as a single, un-
broken unit (either as a reason or as a conclusion) in the reasoning. So. for
instance, in the following example, only the part underlined is the conclu-
sion, and the entire "When then ." statement is a single statement
. . . . .
giving a reason.
When automobile engines are not allowed to "warm up" before putting the
car into gear; in the first few miles moving parts undergo much more wear
than they would if they were allowed to become completely coated with oil
before starting out. ^|]so^^you should always allow the engine to run for a
few minutes before starting out.
I have underlined the conclusion, and put an asterisk before it, because it
is also the final conclusion.

If an arrow were used to show the structure of the reasoning in this
discourse, the diagram would look like this:
When automobile engines are not allowed to

"warm up" before putting the car into gear, in
the first few miles moving parts undergo much more
wear than they would if they were allowed to become
completely coated with oil before starting out.
You should always allow the engine to run for

a few minutes before starting out.
The conclusion reasoning may contradict the conclusion that some

in this
people draw from reading the operator's manual for new cars. Remember
that categorizing a discourse as reasoning and analyzing it, does not nec-
essarily imply agreement with it. A conclusion is still a conclusion whether
w-e agree with it or not. (Sometimes it will happen, of course, that a piece
of reasoning will show us that something we previously believed was false
and mistaken; in such a case, we have obtained new knowledge.)
In this example, the same reasoning could be expressed using a
statement of the form "If A. then B," rather than '"When A, B." Statements
of the form "If A, then B" normally are treated as one single, unbroken
unit too. If the discourse just analyzed had used an "If A, then B" form in-
stead of the "When A, B" form, it would still be analyzed in the same way,
and have the same final conclusion (which I have underlined and prefaced
with a star or asterisk):
If automobile engines are not allowed to "warm up "

before putting the car
into gear, then in the first few miles moving parts undergo much more wear
than they would if they were allowed to become completely coated with oil
before starting out, (]so]])^you should always allow the engine to run for a
few minutes be fore starting out.
Here is a diagram of the reasoning:
If automobile engines are not allowed to "warm up"

before putting the car into gear, then in the first
few miles moving parts undergo much more wear than
they would ifthey were allowed to become completely
coated with oil before starting out.
You should always allow

\
the engine to
run for a few minutes before starting out.
L
1-2 Reasons and Conclusions
The rule that voii generally should not separate the two clauses of a "When
A. B" or "If A. then B" statement when analyzing reasoning is very im-
portant. If vou fail to follow this rule, vou mav break a reason or conclu-
sion into parts that cannot be connected or related to each other in a coher-
ent logical diagram. Because of the great importance of this point. I will
remind you of it again in Section 1-3. It also will come up in douig the
exercises. Some special exceptions to this rule will be discussed much later
in Section 2-4.
2. .\lwa\s remember the second consequence of the Principle of Charity:

Ifa discourse does definitely contain reasoning but its context and the in-
ference indicators in it leave the analysis of its reasoning open to a variety
of interpretations, choose the interpretation that results in the strongest
possible reasoning.
3. Manv discourses that contain reasoning will also contain other words
and statements that are neither reasons nor conclusions in the reasoning.
That is. there are often statements in a reasoned discourse that are not part
of the reasoning at all.
4. Sometimes ihe conclusions of a reasoned discourse are expressed in

the form of imperati\e sentences rather than as declarati\e sentences. Re-
member that a declarative sentence has the form of a statement asserting.
—
or claiming, that something exists or is true for instance. "There are bis-
cuits on your side of the table." In contrast, imperative sentences have the
form of commands, orders, directives, exhortations, requests, etc. for ex- —
ample. "Pass me the biscuits, please. As will be seen in the exercises, in
"
natural languages, reasons may be given for conclusions having the form
of imperative sentences. For example:
Be ah\ avs joyful on Sunday, for he who is afflicted on Sunday commits a sin.
— From Aristides. Didascalia Apostolorum. third century. A.D.
The claim that "he who is afflicted on Sunday commits a sin" is here pre-
sented as a reason to "be always joyful on Sunday." so this counts as a rea-
soned discourse.
It is always p)6ssible to replace any imperative sentence (for example.
"Be alwavs jovful on Sundavs""l with a corresponding declarative sen-

tence (for example, "You should (or One should) be always joyful on Sun-
day"). We could underline the conclusion after using square brackets to
show the added words in this example in the following way:
[T^CU/ (mj (n^) AJh^XAJi<L'} be always joyful on Sunday, for he who is
afflicted on Sunday commits a sin.

18 Basi< Analysis of Riasoniiig
The sentence occupying the place appropriate to a conclusion now has a

declarative, rather than imperative, form. Many logicians will require
that imperative sentences be transformed into corresponding declarative
sentences first, before counting them Speaking for myself,
as conclusions.
I have no objection to this transformation, but I would also permit imper-
atixe-form sentences to be counted as conclusions, as they stand, in the

imperative form, without first needing to be converted to declarative sen-
tences. However, since the transformation treatment is more universally
accepted, probably it is safest to use it on the exercises.
EXERCISES 1-2A
In those of the following discourses which you judge to contain reasoning,
(a) Circle every inference indicator. Supply and circle any inference indicator word
that is omitted but clearly suggested by the content of the discourse. (Sugges-
tion: Use pencil.)
(b) Supply any omitted final conclusion(s). ."^^^^JG^fe ?>
(c) Underline every intermediate and final conclusion. (Do not underline inference
indicators.)
(d) Place an asterisk before each final conclusion. If a final conclusion is omitted,
supply it yourself and put an asterisk before it.
A-lpTThe po wer struc ture cannot publicly recognize hat the \'ietnamese con flict t
_isa cTvil_war, (because)sucn an acknowledgment would reveal us as an aggressor

intervening on a favored side in a civil conflict. . . .
Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice, p. 113.
A-2?ê glad of life(because }it gi\ es you the chance to lo\ e and to work and to play
and to look up at the stars.
Henry van Dyke.
A-S'A Sonae illusions are fascinating (becaus^ they show us in a particularly clear
way the workings of our own perceptual processes.
Richard Held, Image, Object, and Illusion
(San Francisco: W. H. Freeman Sc Co., 1974), preface.
A-4.în£y ^11 rabbits that I have seen have short tails'Aill rabbits probably have
short tails.
Gi\en as example of inducti\e reasoning in a

Law School Admission Test Study Guide.
A-5T I have to set my hair in the morning^ca usîf I set it in the evening, it's dirty
by morning.
J. A. Z., Mercer Island, ^\'ash.
A-6. ^Becaus^'our front brakes are the leading brakes, and also steer as well as
brake-,^tthe frontshoes wear out much faster than the rear shoes.
John Muir, How to Keep Your Volkswagen Alii'e
(Santa Fe, N.M.: John Muir Publications. 1969), p. 101.
49
J
50 Basic Analysis ol Rtasoiiiiig
A-7. LitUicks aiejhe easiest part of the body to massage.'ôt the least o Tr^
[ s()ns oi TTiis (ac tjjs that he re ahiiost anything you do feeLs good. ;*
George Downing, The Massage Book

\^ (New York: Random House. 1972), p. 83.
lA-8. The materials of nature (air. earth, water) thatjrmain u rôuched by human
u-ffort belong to no one and are not property .^tf ollmvs thap'^ thing can become
^
prope rty only if he works and labors on it to change its natural
gHtiU'one's pri va te .
stat.eTTrom this ^conclude that whatever a man improves by the labor of his hand
and brain belongs to him, and to him only.
John Locke, Of Property.
A-9. ^'ou p vjv ,h''^;f; hyrjt

^^bout submerpîng;^ potsjn the siiik or tub Thi s is goofj
.
ôjjTijsu ^ tîXy ^K'ca u se ^vou re ' sure the pot is Avatered through and through, and at
die _same time vou le wasTTed ouriome excess fertilizer_salts_which migtit have
built up. .^ >
^^c* ^vJoo->^<^'^
\ cAC^'''^ Nancy Roca Laden, House Plants: A Primer for a Dumb Thumb
^^ \<^^ (San Francisco: Apple Pie Press, 1973). p. 6.
A- 10. The f act that any individual's scientific activities are socially conditioned
(^'ntailst hat îence cannot achieve obj ectivity.
"'',':)V^C'^ -^^ "^

Adapted from an example in Richard Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 9.
A-11. The
process of uniting tw o or more a djacent [school] districts ought to . . .
be cojTimcnced at once. The number ofleacHers iri derriancrwouldiflu&beTe^

. . .
duced, while the rate of comj^jensation might be increased without adding to the
burdens of the people yinrl^T^. tbeJiinHtif^^ fox.obt ciining good instructors would
be multiplied in a twq^ foldTatio .
George B. Emerson and Alonzo Potter,

The School and the Schoolmaster (1842).
Hint: In one of its two occurrences in this discourse, the word 'thus' is not an inference indicator.
A- 12. There is something basica ljyjvrong wjth our economv^êcauseji man work-
ing lull time can support his family above the poverty level.
t
George Meany, President American Federation of Labor.

EXERCISES 1-2B
In those of the following discourses which you judge to contain reasoning,
(a) Circle every inference indicator. Supply and circle any inference indicator word
that is omitted but clearly suggested by the content of the discourse (Suggestion:
Use pencil.)
(b) Supply any omitted final conclusion (s).
(c) Underline every intermediate and final conclusion. (Do not underline inference
indicators.)
(d) Place an asterisk before each final conclusion. If a final conclusion is omitted,
supply it yourself and put an asterisk before it.
B-1. A manager is usually broadly trained, and ohupthe skills de\ el oped in one
organization are frequently transferable to another.
Joseph L. Massie and John Douglas.
Managing: A Contemporary Introduction. 2nd ed.
(Engleuood Cliffs. X.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1977). p. 16.
B-2. The positive termijial of the battervîua€i&.^ctrons just as much as the neg-
ative side of the battery repels electrons .y Thereforey t he motion of free electrons iii_
the circuit starts at the same time at the same spe ed in all parts of the circuits
Bernard Grob. Basic Electronics. 4th ed.

(New York: McGraw-Hill. 1977). p. 54.
B-3.^
^Ve woyld ^
to al l y-oppoêjopless daxjciii^^
^
i^ a Biblical admo nuion
that nakedness of women is veryenticmg to tlTe male.
Re\ Eugene C. Knautz. President of the Seattle

.
Association of E\angelicals. reported in The

Seattle Times. October 20. 1974.
between constraints and desires, it is natural

lecause" of the intimate tie to
think of the abridgment of freedom as necessari h' productive o f frustration.
Joel Feinberg. Social Philosophy
(Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1973). p. 5.
B-5. 100°^ \':itii]n] r.p real is crunchier than ordinary cerealjêcausepf ingredient s
such as natural fruits and nuts.^
Printed on boxes of Quaker Oats Companv

100% Natural Cereal.
51
(
B-6. I he senilis of tlu' atom has changed everything save our modes of think-
nig, and<jhu^\ ve ch ifi toward s unparal leled catastro phe.
Albert Einstein.
B-7. In a survey of over one million adults in 25 states, 13 percent of the rnaLes and
26 percent of the females over the age of 30 complained of n son^ n ia .^Thi] t means^ i
Ijcuer "dKi^Ô mill ion Americans reg ularly and unhappily experience jleepless
nights.
"
Ridiard Trubo, "The Complete Sleep Book,

Good Housekeeping, 186, no. 3, 77.
B-8.<jccau.se ^\x_ai(' su rrouruk'd every waking min ute by objects of different sizes,
sh apes, co lors, ancl ltextuiyj^m- are scarcely surprised that we caii telljhemârl:.
Bela Julesz, "Texture and \'isual Perception,"
Scientific Americayi, 202, no. 2. 38.
B-9, Hie bigger the biiig('iû(bcTterjhe burger[T he but gers are bigger a Burger t
-• ^ \L ^ V!?^^ Jin.^lf from a television commercial.

V* cV^"^ (Cited by Pospesel.)
B-10. Cfxaine is expensive not because it's rare bu(( b<,:t,T'sp^t comes from a lim-
ited source geogra{)hic7dly, and(becaijs îts prodirction and marketing at the source
are in very few hands indeed.
Roger Downey, "Why Cocaine May Be the Next
Candidate for Legalization," The Seattle Weekly, 2, no. 3, 8.
B-11. hi writing a collection letter, keep in mind that 95 percent of all the people
who use credj^j^y on time, 4 percent are slow payers, and only 1 percent
their bills
never pay. ^ThuQ m ost
^ collectio n letters you will ever write are to people
be of
who will eventually pa y(So)U is extremelv Tmportarij th atyou nmonlv_persuade
thesejieada^Jjcqia^LbuLlh^^ '*'^<^l perh aps obta innew business from
lh( LS_well.
James M. Reid, Jr. and Robert M. Wendlinger,

Effectwe Letters (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 244.
B-12. The s^^î^^^y ystem on w hLcii thje-U^JSenate opera tesjsastronggimrantee

's
cjj r;irv( foAt places ill jx^sitions of greatest power and responsibility those
dfinfu
best littcd to hold them. ^nc cyt hose who have been irijCiuxigress for the longest
time presumably have had the greatesie>if>e«£^<:^ andîHj^hey tend to be older
and wiser than the rest, they are(consequently ûnd to be more careful and
53 Exercises I-2B
thoughtful in the ^\ay they vote. andChencg less Hkelv to encr;^ge in Hangernus and
thoughtless and reckless legislative experiments.
The system ot giving committee chairmanships to those who have served
longest in Congress, which is the only fair way of rewarding public service, has
often been criticized by those who think that youth is synonymous with progres-
sive and humanitarian ideas. This is a mistake. T he rightness of the svstem i^howjX-
(Svjthe fact that Congress has_u suallv met the needs of the people. The sy stem is
^^^'^''^^^
righ^ ir'sheu ld be continued. 1 - v
^— =-^=-"^ '^' ( '

Be2irds\e\. Practical Logic.
Hint: Insert a conclusion indicator following the semicolon in the last sentence.
B-13. The wav of Greek religion could not but be differ ent from the wavs of reli-
gions dependent not upon each man^s seeking the truth tm himself !^yiV^ f ffs or t
a poet must seek iubut upon an absolute authority to which each man must sub-
mit himselfNfeiGieece there was no dominatine church or creed, but there was a
d(jrnniating ideal which evervone would wanLio purs ue iLhe caugjit sight of it.
Edith Hamilton. The Greek Way (New York:

W" \\". Norton >i; Companv. Inc.. 1930). p. 287.
EXERCISES 1-2C
All of the following discourses contain reasoning. One of them has an omitted
final conclusion, and many of them have omitted inference indicator words.
(a) Supply and circle any inference indicator word that is omitted but clearly sug-
gested by the content of the discourse. Circle every inference indicator word.
(b) Underline every intermediate and final conclusion. (Do not underline inference
indicators.)
(c) Place an asterisk before each final conclusion.
C-1. Se x and p olitics

'
are a lot alike. You don't have to be good at them to enjoy
them?"
'
'^''^^^
1 Senator Barry Goldwater.
C-2. ^Vhe^ the existence o f beta endorphin, t he so-called "happiness hormone,"

wa s discovered in 1 976, it caused great excitementêcaus^ t revealed that the hu-
man body produces a substance that can quell anxiety and pain.
'"Happiness Hormones' May Aid Schizophrenics,"
Spokane Daily Chroiucle (August 30, 1979), p. 23.
C-3. Military production major cause of inflatio n. Pentagon spending pumps

is a
dollars into the economy withoiu adding a comparable volume of consumable
goods, which is a classic formula for inflation.
Ted Weiss, Member of Congress.
Sane Newsletter (February 1979), p. 2.
C-4. Get someone to read the st^jjjr. to yon the first rim e von Ho a [repair] proce-
dure. J[nd even the second^^jêre'^Viothing worse than trying to turn pages with
greasy hands, or trying to read^vmle lying under the car with dirt falling in your
eyes.
John Muir, How to Keep Your Volkswagen Alive

(Santa Fe, N.M.: John Muir Publications, 1969), p. 6.
C-5./^'There's'/alwa:ys_§pmeone who will if I won't. Ijtever sav n o if he asks me."

Woman quoted by George Weinberg, "Getting the
Right Things Out of Sex," Cosmopolitan, 184, no. 6, 120.
Quoted from George Weinburg, Self-Creation
by permission of St. Martin's Press, Inc.
55
>-'~*'''^
56 Basic Analysis of Reasoning "Q
C-6. U vou'ie thinking of fin ancin^the purchase of a new car, now is the jhne
and Sea ttlrT nisi is the {)la(e. î.ê***'**^
(^ ^^ûx^Ân(\Au\jnH^vv^
that give yon uptolrmRrars tc^^
^ low we're one of the few hanks
;
only bank that gives a dis-

count to customers who buy energy-conserving cars.
Advertisement.
lifj- is not a stable path to the promised land.

C-7. _Evt'j:,\oiie.laKn \ -Sjhat Fire . . .
can strike oin houses. Accidents can destroy our cars. Robbery can leave us without
valuable possessions. And many things can cause our premature deaths.
Douglass C. North and Roger L. Miller,
The Economics of Public Issues, 2nd ed.
(New York: Harper Sc Row, 1973).
Hint: llse the Principle of Charity to determine the limits and extent of the conclusion.
C-8. Th migh highly popular at aquariurj;^ dolphins are formidable rivals o f

(ishtTnTen/tâtist^they coTTsuTnenrfgeûantities of fish.
"Whales vs. Dolphins, East Is East, 9. no. 8, 1.
Hint: Use the Principle of Charity to determine the limits and extent of the conclusion.
C-9. Qiriv ing a [destina t ion] sig n [wheiT^ hi tch hikin g] _isâJot like going ixxcoLr
Jegel^Cven though deep down inside it may not mean a thing, it's a convenient way
of explaining to people what you're up to.
Ken Hicks, The Complete Hitch Hiker

(New Canaan: Tobey Publishing Co., 1973), p. 34.
C-10. _ Geothermal is the easiest. -safe.st. m ost feasible, an d best new source of ep -
ergy aîailable today l^ iTtnat is required is to use conventional oil-drilling tech-
nology to bore relatively shallow holes a few miles into the earth, pump water
down, and use the steam that comes up to drive electric turbines(f|rhffi;|^re no
harmful by-products, and there is almost no damage to the environment. It has
been done successfully already in the state of California, and the entire country of
Iceland is powered by energy generated like this from inside the core of the Earth.
And the quantity of energy available here far exceeds our needs.
-11. .SrienjjsK_no ^v b^l'f'vP that in ri^turB^rr^^Jtt^rj^njxat he dp«;trr>yfd without

(xing^coLLLioard "^> rnprgy Not even the tiniest particle can disappear without a
trace. Nature does not know extinction — only transformation. Would God have
less regard for His Masterpiece of creation, the human soul?
VVernher von Braun, "Science Is Helping to Put
a Face on Ciod," The Miami News, August 6, 1966.
(Cited by Pospesel.)
(
\
57 1-3 Determining the Logical Structure of a Reasoned Discourse
1-3 DETERMINING THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE

OF A REASONED DISCOURSE
After you have found that a discourse contains reasoning and have distin-
guished the reasons from the conchisions, the next step is to determine its
overall structure. In some reasoning the structure is obvious:
The room was sealed and empty when we entered. Therefore no one could
have left it. And therefore, the murderer was never in the room.'^
Here the pattern of reasoning is clear. It proceeds straightforwardly from

a basic reason to an intermediate conclusion, and from that to a final con-
clusion. But in much reasoning the structure is less obvious. Inference-
indicator words sometimes are left out; sometimes they are present but the
statements in the discourse appear in a confused or jumbled order; various
reasons for the same conclusion may be scattered about; a conclusion may
precede its justification in one place and follow it in another; the author
may make detours from his main argument; etc. Such cases require careful
study and reflection before the structure of the reasoning can be deter-
mined. (In some cases, where the reasoning is especially complicated and
the relationships within it are unclear, there may be room for reasonable
disagreement about its and the following sections
actual structure.) In this
you will learn a methodology out the structure of the reason-
for figuring
ing in an important class of clear-cut cases. After mastering this technique,
you will be ready to proceed (in Chapter 2) to the final stepof evaluating the
reasoning.
There are four basic reasoning patternsi_s£jiaJ, divergent, inked, ^ nd l
con verg pn A in n g chain of reasoning may involve each of these different

t .
structures at some point.
A. Reasoning. In serial reasoning a single statement operates both

Serial
as a conclusion from a reason and as a reason for a further conclusion in —
other words, the reasoning proceeds via an "intermediate conclusion." The
example cited above is a serial argument. Using arrow notation, we can
diagram it as follows:
The room was sealed and emptv when we entered.
No one could ha\e left it.
The murderer was never in the room.
"Example from Beardslev, Practical Logic.

Longer chains ot serial reasoning are possible too, of course. The term
"serialreasoning" also is applied to the simple case in which a single
arrow leads from one reason to one (onclusion, witli no intermediate
conclusion.
B. Divergent Reasoning. In a divergent inference, the same reason is
given as supporting several different conclusions. For example:
It's going to rain.
/
We'll get wet. The game
\ will be canceled.
A divergent argument also can be treated as two separate arguments (hav-

ing the same basic reason but leading to different conclusions).^''
C. Linked Reasoning. When a step of reasoning involves the logical

combination of two or more reasons, they are diagrammed as linked}^ For
example:
If marijuana were If marijuana could be
legalized, then it commercially processed and

could be commercially made available in a form
processed and + that did not need io be
made available in smoked, then it could
a fcjrm that did not be made safer for
need to be smoked. people's health.
If marijuana were legalized, then it
could be made safer for people's health.
Here the two reasons are connected by a plus sign, with a line drawn under-
neath linking both together. (Alternatively, if preferred, instead of '+',
you could also use the word "and" or the symbol '&', again drawing a
horizontal line underneath to tie the linked leasons together.) Notice that
only one arrow is used, to show that the conclusion is a single inference
irom the combination of both reasons. Reasoning is linked when it in-
volves se\ eral reasons, each of which needs the others to support the con-
clusion. In the marijuana example, each reason needs the other in order
'Ône also could join ilu- two separate conclusions into a single compound sentence ('Well
get wet
and the game w be canceled ") and represent the inference as a simple serial argument with the one
ill
compound sentence as a single conclusion.

'"".X'ote to Advanced Readers: Appendix II c oniains a further discussion of the theory and history of this
concept.
to justify the conclusion. Linked reasoning with more than two combined
reasons is also possible. As vou will learn later, deductively valid reasoning
involving the combination of more than one premise will always be dia-
grammed as linked.
Reasonnig that invokes statistical generalization ("inductive rea-
soning") from several similar items of evidence or data fl/50 is diagrammed
as linked. Consider, for example, the following reasoning:
I and afterwards my face broke out. Likewise, for choco-

ate chocolate bar »1
late bars =2 through =.V. each time after eating the chocolate bar. my face
broke out. Therefore. I conclude that after eating a chocolate bar. my face
\\ill always break out.
Although each individual confirmatory instance (that is, each case of pim-
ples after eating a chocolate bar) by itself provides a little support for the
conclusion, the strength of support is much greater when the instances are
considered in union together, and each reason needs the truth of the others
in order for the conclusion to be supported.
Statistual generaliuition ("inductii>e reasoning") is diagrammed as linked
.\fter After After

eating. eating eating
chocolate + chocolate + . . . + chocolate
bar =1 bar =2 bar =.V
mv face mv face m\ face
broke out. broke out. broke out.
\ 1
Always, after eating a chocolate bar my face breaks out.
This is a proper way to diagram the reasoning, because if no outbreak fol-

lowed eating a chocolate bar in some instances, then the support given the
conclusion by the other positi\e instances w ould be greatly reduced. Each
reason needs the others, or something like the others, in order to supp>ort
the conclusion.
Similarly, in general, suitably related pieces of e\idence that fit to-
gether to support Or justify a given hvpothesis. scientific or otherwise, can
be diagrammed as linked.
Support for a hypothesis is diagrammed as linked
His swimming
. suit ha
His hair is plastered
is wet. down.
He's been swimming.

Here the relationship between the hypôthesis (that he's been swimming)
and the justifying e\idcnce (in the reasons) is that this evidence is just what
one would expect or predict if the hypothesis were true. (People who go
swimming are highlv likely to get their hair and swimming suits wet.) In
other words, turning the reasoning completely around, ?/one assumed that
hypothesis to be true, this would justify expecting the cited observations:
He's been swimming.
His swimming suit is
wet and his hair is

plastered down.
Here the hypothesis is assumed as a reason, and the conclusion is expected

or "predicted" on the basis of this hypothesis. The evidence cited in the
first diagram (wet suit, wet hair) provides a reason or justification for con-
cluding that this hypothesis (he's been swimming) is true, because the
truth of the hypothesis that he has been swimming would lead us to pre-
dict or expect to observe this evidence (wet suit, wet hair), as shown in the
second diagram. ^^
Notice, too, that the roles of reason and conclusion can be reversed
completely in different instances of reasoning, as this example illustrates:
the statements functioning as reasons in the first served as conclusions in
the second, and vice versa.
D. Convergent Reasoning. When two or more reasons do not support a

conclusion in a united or combined way, but rather each reason supports
the conclusion completely separately and independently of the other, the
reasoning is convergent. For example:
I already promised If I go into the part-

Harry Schmedlap that nership with Harry,
I would go into the I probably will make
partnership with him. a lot of money.
I should go into the partnership with Harry Schmedlap
'Wo<e to Advanced Readers: Additional assumptions (called, in such a case, "auxiliary hypotheses"),
which are not stated here explicitly, may be involved too, of course— for example, that he has not
changed clothes or dried his hair. C;hapter 2 begins analyzing additional assumptions.
.\lso, the statements that make up the compound sentence in the one lusion of the second argu-
(
ment could be separated into two distinct simple sentences and the inference diagrammed as divergent
with two arrows.
Notice thai more than one arrow is used to diagram convergent reasoning.
A convergent argument is equivalent to separate arguments (or evidence
coming from separate areas) for the same conclusion.
An important feature of cotnergent reasoning is that the support gi\en
to the conclusion by each separate reason, or line of reasoning, would re-
main unaffected even if the other (separate, independent) reason(s) were
false. In other words, each separate reason still would support the conclu-
sion just as well even if the other (separate, independent) reason(s) were
false, and each separate line of reasoning could still be equally good e\en
if the other lineisi of reasoning happened to be no good. So, if one line of
reasoning in a convergent argument is "shot down" (that is. refuted) be-

cause the reason is false or the line of reasoning is unsound, the remaining
line(s) of reasoning can still be good. The separation of independent lines
of reasoning, as {X)ruayed in a con\ergent diagram, isolates each line and
protects it from refutation or destruction by a successful attack on another
line.
Two separate, independent alleged reasons for some action (or non-
action), for example.
Smoking marijuana is The smoke might be

againsi the law. bad for my lungs.
I shouldnt smoke marijuana.
would be diagrammed Con\ergent reasoning is

as convergent reasoning.
very common in law. politics, Another example of a convergent
and ethics.
argument would be two separate, independent alleged philosophical
proofs of the existence of a god:
The Ontological The Argument from

Proof V. / Design
A god exists.
If either of these alleged proofs is unsound, this fact does not diminish the
strength or force of the other.
Sometimes it is difficult to decide whether to diagram several reasons
for a conclusion as linked or convergent. I know of no simple, mechanical
procedure that always works to determine, in reasoning in natural lan-
guage, whether se\eral reasons are dependent"' on each other (that is.
linked), or "independent" of each other (that is. convergent). .\s in many
and skills, practice is helpful here, and in fact, in the case of some
otlu'i arts
reasoning, diagrams of both kinds are defensible. However, there are some
useful guidelines. If one reason needs another, or something resembling
another (for instance, a statement of the same general type as it), in order
to provide gcjcxl support for the conclusion, then the reasoning should be
diagrammed as linked.^'' That is, when each reason requires the other(s), or
something similar to the other(s), to justify or explain the conclusion, link
these reasons together in the diagram. Also, if one reason eliminates an
imaginable way in which the conclusion could be false even though the
other reason be true, then link these two reasons in your diagram. Also,
if the reasons fit together like the pieces of a puzzle to justify or explain
the conclusion, then these reasons can be linked together in the diagram.
On the other hand,
if neither reason needs the other reason (or anything
like the other) in order to support the conclusion, then the reasoning can
be diagrammed as convergent reasoning.'^ That is, if each reason alone
would be enough, if true, to support the conclusion, and if the falseness
of one reason would not weaken a step of reasoning from the other to the
conclusion, then the reasoning can be diagrammed as convergent. But
if the falseness of a reason would weaken the step from the other(s) to the
conclusion, then link that reason together with the other(s) in the dia-
gram.
In the business partnership illustration, for instance, if it is false that
if go into the partnership with Harry "I probably will make a lot of
I
money." this fact woidd not lessen the support that the statement "I prom-
ised Harry that I would go into the partnership with him" gives to the con-
clusif^n that "I should go into the partnership with Harry." A promise is
a promise, after all, and as such, its force is not diminished if it is not the
case that I probably will make a lot of money from keeping it. Likewise,
the support that "If I go into the partnership with Harry, I probably will
make a lot of money" gives to the conclusion "I should go into the part-
nershij:) with Harry" is not decreased if I have not already promised him
that I will go in. Again, in the (second) marijuana example, e\en if smok-
ing marijuana were legal, this would not weaken whatever support the
statement "The smoke might be bad for my lungs" provides for the con-
clusion "I should not smoke marijuana." And vice versa. Discovering that
marijuana does not harm the lungs probably would not diminish the spe-
Note to Advanced Readers. Please notice that this condition only is given as sufficient.
It is possible to have a correct convergent
diagram in which the result of combining the separated
reasons would (if this were done) be a stronger argument than cither reason provides alone, as
long as the negation or falsity of the various separated reasons would not decrease the support
given by the other(s) to the conclusion.
cial force its illegality has a reason against smoking it. So I have dia-
grammed these inferences as convergent.
Although in practice, it easy to decide whether to diagram
often is
two reasons for a conclusion as linked or convergent, occasionally you may

be in doubt. In difficult cases, in the final analysis, the answer to the ques-
tion " Is it linked or convergent? may ultimately be determined by some-
'
, '
thing that you will learn only later, at the end of Chapter 2 namely, the —
way which unstated background assumptions are filled in. In those
in
cases, whether or not several reasons should be linked together is deter-
mined by the missing parts of the reasoning. In the manner explained later
in Section 2-5, if one goes on to fill in the reasoning, one will be able finally
to determine whether to treat it as convergent or linked. That is, as un-
stated additional assumptions are filled in, it will become clear whether
or not the reasons should be linked together to support the conclusion.
The following illustration is simpler than most discourses, but it serves
as a conveniently simple example to illustrate this point. Suppose that
statement A and statement B have both been given as reasons for con-
clusion C, and that we are trying to decide whether to diagram them as
linked or convergent. If the further statment, ''If both A and B are true,
then C, " were an omitted missing assumption, then the reasoning would
be diagrammecTas linked:
A + B + [If both A and B are true, then C]
But if, on the contrary, the reasoning had the two omitted assumptions,
"If^ is true, then C" and "If jB is true, thenC," it would be diagrammed
as two converging inferences (each of which contained linkage):
A + [UA is true, then C] B + [If^ is true, then C]
But often in real-life cases, the author does not indicate what the ad-
ditional assumptions are, so we ourselves must simply guess what the
intended additional assumptions are, and supply them ourselves, as ex-

plained later at the end of Chapter 2. In fact, often the author has not
even thought it out carefully and decided how exactly he or she would fill
in the rest of the assumptions. In such cases, we simply will have to do
our best to diagram the reasoning in the way that has the greatest li-
kelihood of being sound reasoning, while recognizing that it may be pos-
sible to complete the diagram in several different ways, so that either a
"convergent" or a "linked" diagram is defensible, given the original dis-
course.
The cases about which we can be confident even before filling in back-
ground assumptions are the ones in which we already see, fairly clearly,
whether or not, when other assumptions are finally filled in, the given
reasons will end up needing to be linked together. When it is unclear or
indeterminate whether a step of reasoning should be diagrammed as
linked or convergent, usually a main reason for the uncertainty is that
it is unclear what unstated additional assumptions are operating as the
background assumptions. Then we are unable to decide between "linked"

and "convergent" because the unstated reasons operating in the back-
ground have not been made explicit in the part of the reasoning that was
stated. In such cases, at the early stage of diagramming, no single answer
may even exist to the question, "Linked or convergent?" because several
different possible sets of background assumptions would fit (in different
ways) with the reasons explicitly stated; with one set, the reasons might
be linked, while with another set, the reasons might be convergent. In
such cases, no determinate answer will even exist to the question, "Linked
or convergent?," at least not until the rest of the assumptions are filled
in. With one way of filling them in, the reasoning might be convergent,
while with another way, it might be linked.
When you are really uncertain probably the best policy is to diagram
,
reasons as linked. For you can always separate reasons later if critical eval-
uation at that time reveals them to be independent. But if you mistakenly
separate reasons that should have been diagrammed as linked, then as a
result, during evaluation you might overlook an important connection
between them and wrongly conclude that two weak reasons had separately
been given for the conclusion, when actually a much stronger linked argu-
ment had been given. If you accidentally have linked good (sound) reasons
together with separate, independent bad (unsound) reasons, probably you
will notice this fact when you move to the final step of e\'aluation (dis-
cussed in Chapter 2), and when this happens, you can rediagram the rea-
soning as convergent. So put links in your diagrams when in doubt.
Convergent reasoning occasionally is used when the speaker or writer

wants to support a position with several lines of reasoning that are sepa-
rate and independent, so that to refute the justification, each of the differ-
ent lines of reasoning must be dealt with and refuted separately (so that it is
not enough for an opponent merely to show that one of the basic reasons is
false). When giving an argument, it would be a poor strategy to link good
reasons together with separate and independent bad (unsound) reasons be-
cause then your whole argument might be entirely rejected because just a
part of it (an unnecessary part) is unsound.
Probably you Avill want to separate reasons, and diagram reasoning
as coni'ergent. anytime you suspect that one of the lines of reasoning is
bad, while the other line of reasoning is good. In that case, it is desirable to
diagram the reasoning as con\ergent, rather than linked, so that you do
not discard the good reason at the same time that you throw out the bad
part.*^
The complete diagram of a long and complicated chain of reasoning

may atsome point in\olve each of these fotu inference patterns (serial,
convergent, linked, and divergent). But if the reasoning is good and has
been diagrammed correctly, each inference (that is, each separate arrow)
in the whole diagram should be "good" or should 'follow" when consid-
ered by itself, from the rest of the reasoning. In other words,
in isolation
each subpart of the diagram of good reasoning should be capable of stand-
ing alone without the rest of the reasoning.
The development of skill at analyzing reasoning actually goes hand-
in-hand with the development of skill at evaluating reasoning. This is
why this textbook will move back and forth between the two activities,
whose somewhat artificial separation in the chapters is only a preliminary
simplification for educational purposes to make it easier to develop the
basic, deeper ability to distinguish illogical from logical reasoning.
Diagrattimiug Longer Reasoned Discourses
A step-by-siep procedure \\ ill now be gi\en by ^\hich you can deter-

mine the logical structure of much reasoning, no matter how long and
complex it is. This procedure may seem a little mechanical, but it has the
virtue of taking us a long way toward a correct analysis of much reasoning.
As a rimning illustration, we will use the following example:
".Vo/f to Advanced Readers: See .\pp>endix II for further discussion of the theorv and histor\ of the
linked-convergeni reasoning distinction.
66 Basic Analysis of Rt-asoning
Though people who talk about the "social significance" of the arts don't like
to admit it, music and painting are bound to suffer when they are turned into
mere vehicles for propaganda. For propaganda has to appeal to the crudest
and most vulgar feelings: look at the academic monstrosities produced by
the official Nazi painters. What is more important, art must be an end in
itself for the artist, because the artist can do his best work only in an atmo-
sphere of complete freedom. ô
Before beginning the logical analysis, read through the entire dis-
course carefully. Then proceed as follows.
STEP I. Circle all inference-indicator words. The example contains two:

the word 'Tor" at the beginning of the second sentence (where it functions
as an inference indicator and not as a preposition), and the word "because"
in the last sentence. (The word "though" at the beginning of the discourse
is not an inference indicator.) Circling these indicators yields the following:
Though people who talk about the "social significance" of the arts don't like
to admit music and painting are bound to suffer when they are turned into
it,
mere vehicles for propaganda. (Fon propaganda has to appeal to the crud-
est and most vulgar feelings: look at the academic monstrosities produced by
the official Nazi pai nters. What is more important, art must be an end in
itself for the artist, (^cause]) the artist can do his best work only in an atmo-
sphere of complete freedom.
The inference indicators that you locate in this first step will serve as your
basic guide in subsequently determining the structure of the reasoning. (It
is not expected, of course, that readers will go through their entire lives
circling every inference indicatorword they encounter. The step of cir-
cling inference indicator words serves here as a learning aid designed to
help develop an enduring sensitivity to the significance of these words in
determining the logical structure of reasoning.)
STEP II.Enclose the separate statements constituting the discourse in an-

gle brackets^^ and number them. Remember that a single compound sen-
tence may contain several statements joined together. In our illustration,
this occurs in the first sentence where the conjunction "though" connects
the claim that "music and painting are bound to suffer when they are turned
into mere vehicles for propaganda" with the observation that "people who
^''From Bcardsley. Practical Logic.
^'The introduction of the distinction between the use of angle brackets and square brackets in
natural logic is due to Paul Anderson.
talk about the 'social significance' of the arts don't like to admit it." The
result of applying step II to the first sentence is as follows:
Though n^ ^people who talk about the "social significance" of the arts
i^^^<îusic and painting are bound to suffer when
don't like to admit
they are turned into mere vehicles for propagandaN
The word "Though" is left outside the angle brackets because it is not part
of either statement. Inference indicators, such as 'Tor" at the beginning of
the second sentence, are left outside all brackets for the same reason.
The second sentence of the illustration contains a declarative ele-
ment joined by a colon to an imperative element {"look at the academic
monstrosities . Although
. ."). imperatives supposedly give orders rather
than make assertions presumably the author of this discourse is sim-
of fact,
ply directing his readers' attention to "the academic monstrosities pro-
duced by the official Nazi painters" to support his claim that "propaganda
has to appeal to the crudest and most vulgar feelings." Because of its func-
tion in this discourse, then, this imperative may be treated as equivalent to
"Academic monstrosities were created by the official Nazi
the declarative
painters," and accordingly, enclosed within its own numbered angle
brackets:
(joT) r3)<^ropaganda has to appeal to the crudest and most vulgar feelingsN
(^ <nook at the academic monstrosities created by the official Nazi
painters.
If you prefer, you may rewrite the imperative statement in declarative form,
as "Academic monstrosities were created by the official Nazi painters."
Presence of the indictor "because" in the last sentence of the discourse
shows that this sentence contains at least two statements, one of which is
given as a reason for the other:
Wh at more important/^V^^rt must be an end in itself for the artist^>

is
([because^ (^<^he artist can do his best work only in an atmosphere of

complete freedonv>
The initial phrase "What is more important" could be treated as a separate

statement asserting the importance of the material that follows it, but since
its only function seems to be emphasis, let's not bother.
STEP III. Supply and circle any inference-indicator words that do not ap-
pear but are clearly suiîê.sted. As remarked earlier, the author's reference
to Nazi paintings seems intended to support the preceding statement aboiu
propaganda in general. After inserting the indicator implicit in it, the sec-
ond sentence appears as follows:
( Jor ^ /^ <^propaganda has to appeal to the crudest and most vulgar

feeling^> ^^^Gj) <C[Jook at the academic monstrosities produced
by the official Nazi pamters^>
I find no other inference indicators omitted but clearly suggested in the

discourse.
STEP IV. Set forth the numbered statements of the discourse in an "arrow
diagram," using arrows to show the inferences. In this example, the indi-
cator For' at the beginning of the second sentence shows that statement 3
operates as a reason for statement 2:
(3) Propaganda has to appeal to the crudest

and most vulgar feelings.
(2) Music and painting are bound to suffer

when they are turned into mere vehicles
for propaganda.
The occurrence of "for" after the colon in the second sentence (the infer-
ence indicator supplied in step III above) shows us that 4, in turn, is given
as a reason to support 3:
(4) Academic monstrosities were created

by the official Nazi painters.
(3)
\
Propaganda has to appeal to the crudest
and most vulgar feelings.
(2) Music and painting are bound to suffer

when they are turned into mere \ehicles for
propaganda.
Similarly, the word "because" in the last sentence indicates that statement
6 is a reason for 5:
(6) The artist can do his best work only in an

atmosphere of complete freedom.
(5)
\
Art must be an end in itself for the
artist.
Using only the inference indicators that are contained in the passage (or
supplied by us), this is as far as we can go on a relatively mechanical basis.
\Ve now ha\e two separate serial arguments. Using the numbers to stand
for the corresponding statements, the diagrams are:
(4)
\ (3) and
\ (2)
But wishing not to attribute unconnected reasoning to an author unjustly,

we should, before continuing, carefully consider the content of each state-
ment in the discourse to determine whether any further logical connections
may be intended. When we do so, we note that the fifth statement (Art
must be an end in itself for the artist") could possiblv be intended to sup-
port the second statement ("Music and painting are bound to suffer when
they are turned into mere vehicles for propaganda"), since if art is being
used as an instrumerjt of propaganda, then presumably it is not serving as
an end in itself fcfr the artist. This reading would connect the lines of rea-
soning as follows:
(4) Academic monstrosities were (6) The can do his best

artist
produced by the official Nazi work only in an atmosphere
painters. of complete freedom.
(3)
\
Propaganda has to appeal to (5) Art must be an end in itself
the crudest and most vulgar for the artist.

feelings.
(2) Music and painting are bound

to suffer when they are turned
into mere \ehicles for propaganda.
Other wavs of connecting 2. 3. and 4 \Mth 5 and 6 are also defensible. To

the extent that the intended inferences are unclear from the original dis-
course, the responsibility lies with its author, not you: writers who leave
their reasoning unclear must expect ways that most
to be interpreted in the
naturally occur to readers. Notice, incidentally, that on the above analysis,
statement 1 is not operative in the reasoning. Statement 1 remarks that
certain people dislike admitting the truth of the final conclusion (statement
70 Basi( Analysis ol Rcasoiiiiis
2). but it does not support that conclusion or any other statement in the
reasoning. Logically, it stands simply as a side remark (although, of
(ourse. it might play some role in a larger context in \vhi( h this discourse
aj)peared). In general, discomses that contain reasoning may contain state-
ments that are not part of the reasoning; strictly speaking, the "reasoning"
or "argument" consists only of those statements that serve as reasons or
conclusions.
Oin analysis of the structure of the reasoning in tfiis example has now
been completed. This entire arrow diagram represents the total tbgical
structine of the reasoning in the whole argument. We have now figured
oiu what reasons are being given for what conclusions, and the actual paths
taken by the steps of reasoning. This argument has now been prepared and
set up for the final process of determining how good or bad each of these
steps of reasoning is, and consequently, the goodness or badness of the en-
tire argument as a whole. This second half of the procedure is called "eval-
uating" the reasoning. Evaluation of the reasoning, which is what we have

been getting ready to do by making a diagram, is explained in Chapter 2.
But before doing that, the essential first half of the procedure (that is, the
method of analysis you just learned) probably recjuires additional prac-
tice before can be mastered thoroughly.
it
Let's try to analyze another example, using tfie same procedure. Con-
sider the following passage of reasoned discourse:
Seeking God's Kingdom and his righteousness can contribute toward

first
security e\en in an indirect way. How so? Bee ause a person who applies Bible
principles in his life becomes more diligent at his work. Instead of loafing
on the job, stealing time from his employer, he obeys the counsel at Ephesians
4:28: "Let the stealer steal no more, but rather let him do hard work, doing
with his hands what is good work." Employers will often be reluctant to dis-
miss or la\ off such a worker.
"Can You Find Security amid Economic Gloom?" Awake.

56, p. 5. VVatchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York.
Circling the explicit inference indicators, supplying any omitted ones

that seem clearly intended, and enclosing separate statements in numbered
angle brackets, we obtain the following:
rT) OSeeking first God's Kingdom and his righteousness can contribute to-
ward secinity even in an indirect way7> How so? (Hêcaus?) Toy <â
person who aj)plies Bible principles in his life becomes more diligent at his
workN (3'(yy\ (y^<^\\s{v<\(\ of Icjafing on the job, stealing time from his
employer, neobeys the counsel at Ephesians 4:28: "Let the stealer stealno
more, but rather let him do hard work, doing with his hands what is good
work.^ (^ <^.mployers will often be reluctant to dismiss or lay
off such a W( ikerN
Statement 2 is obviously being given as a reason for statement 1. And state-

ment 3 backs up or explains why 2 allegedly is true. Expressing these facts
in a diagram yields:
(3)
(2)
(1)
What, now, is the role of statement 4 in this argument? One possible in-
terpretation is that statement 4 is supposed to go together with the claim
in statement 2 that "a person who applies Bible principles in his life be-
comes more diligent at his work" to justify or explain the claim in state-
ment 1 that "seeking first God's Kingdom can contribute toward se- . . .
curity ... in an indirect way." How or why? Because diligent workers stand
less chance of being fired by their employers (that is, statement 4). Based
on this interpretation, the argument's final diagram contains a linked in-
ference and looks like this:
(3)
\ (2) + (4)
(1)
(Incidentally, it on a horizontal underline you attach

doesn't matter where
the downward arrow when diagramming linked steps of reasoning you —
can draw it in the middle, or anywhere else that is convenient. But remem-
ber to extend the horizontal line to reach under all of the statements being
linked together.)
Confusions to Avoid
Before doing some exercises, you should be forewarned of two prob-

lems you may encounter: (1) the "if-then" conditional and (2) modal words.
1. The "if-thfn" conditional. When diagramming reasoning, remember

that it is important not to confuse the words "if-then" with inference-indi-
cator words. Consider the following discourse:
If I drive over the speed limit on Main Street, then I will almost certainly get
a ticket, because Main Street is always patrolled.
The correct analysis of this reasoning is as follows:
Main Street is always patrolled.
If I
\
drive over the speed limit on Main Street, then I will almost certainly
get a ticket.
The fact that the street is patrolled is the author's reason for asserting the
entire if-then statement (or "conditional," as it is called). He has not ar-
gued for or asserted what is in the then-clause of the conditional (that is,
he has not claimed that he will almost certainly get a ticket), but only that
IF he drives on Main Street over the speed limit, THEN he'll almost cer-
tainly get a ticket. Remember when inserting angle brackets, DO NOT
SPLIT APART AN IF-THEN STATEMENT!
Conditional statements usually only assert the existence of a connec-
tion or relationship of dependency between two events or situations. Al-
though often they are important bricks in the structure of larger argu-
ments, usually they do not constitute reasoning in themselves. (Reasoning
that involves conditional statements, including some rare exceptions
to this rule, will be studied in greater detail later in Section 2-4.)
2. Modal words. As mentioned in Section 1-1, there are times when a

modal word ("must," "can," etc.) is used in a discourse instead of an in-
ference-indicator word to signal that the statement in which it appears is
a conclusion. The following example was given:
tan.She must have gone somewhere sunny on her winter vacation."
VV^hen diagramming reasoning in which

modal term should
this occurs, the
be replaced in the diagram with a nonmodal form of the verb. For exam-
ple, this reasoning about Janet should be diagrammed as follows:
In early January. Janet suddenly

appeared with a beautiful suntan.
\
Janet went somewhere sunny on
her winter vacation.
Here the modal verb phrase "must have gone" has been replaced with the
nonmodal verb form "went." In contrast, however, if the discourse clearly
shows that the writer means

imply that necessity, compulsion, or im-
to
possibility somehow associated with the conclusion considered as a
is
statement in isolation by itself, then the modal expressions should be re-

tained in the statement of the conclusion in the diagram. This occurs in
the following example:
"Everyone who earned any income last year must file a tax return. John
'
earned some income last year. Therefore, John must file a tax return.
The modal words should be retained in the diagram of this reasoning:
Everyone who earned any John earned

income last year must + some income
file a tax return. last vear.
John must file a tax return.
In this example, the word "must'" is retained in the conclusion (and rea-
son) in the diagram, because some necessity or compulsion is associated
with the concluding statement: John is required to file a tax return: he
must do so.
One final word before the exercises — In diagramming, remember the
second implication of the Principle of Charity, which says: When a
discourse does definitely contain reasoning but the way- the discourse is
written gives you a choice from among se\eral different possible ways of
analyzing (diagramming) it, choose the diagram that analyzes it as the
strongest possible reasoning compatible with what the original gi\en dis-
course savs.
EXERCISES 1-3
For each of the following passages, carry out analytical steps as explained and illus-
tratedin the section of the text you have just read:
(a) Circle all inference indicators. Supply and circle any inference indicators that
are omitted but clearly suggested.
(b) Angle bracket and number each logically significant statement in the discourse.
In your angle brackets, show clearly the statements involved.
(c) Construct a diagram (or diagrams), using circled numbers and arrows, showing
the structure of the reasoning.
Make your answers clear and readable! Unclear or unreadable answers are
unacceptable.
Examples
Example 1: From William G. Grain, Theories of Development: Concepts and Applications (En-
glewood Gliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 49.
. >-/<nn many institutions, babies receive care from several nurses who can
meet their physical needs but whc^ have little time to interact with thein^
(^ QA/ CU JlSLAXXJUtf ^'^ (d\ <Q'requently, no one is around to heed the
babies' cries, to return their smile s, to talk to them when they babble, or to
pick them up when they desire^>(CoI^seqlênllV3)<^t is difficult for the baby
to establish a strong bond to any particular |Dersoi^
Example 2: From Uta W.est, author of // Love Is the Answer. What Is the Question?, quoted by
Helen Gurley Brown in Cosmopolitan. 184, no. 6. 10.
(7) <ôday, though, we've begun to demand that our mates supply all our
need^ and (s ince ) of course, (^ <That isn't possible>(3) <Cp^°P'^ have
started to ask for new, less difficult kinds of alliances.
© + @
@
75
Example 3: From Cihristophei Byron, Gary Lee, and Frederick Ungeheuer. "A Brave New Energy
World: Lower Oil Prices Cause L^nexpected Difficulties for Government and Industry," Time,
119, no. 16. 60.
(jj <X)ver the short term, the softenin g pr ice for oil has certainly been good
news for hard pressed consumer^S (3-(^^y) ^^ <C[[Every $1 per bbl. drop
in petroleum prices gives them $5.5 to $6 billion in increased purchasing
power/> . . . ^pecause^ ^3) <^\\ is by far the most important and
widely used energy resource in the economy, going into everything from au-
tomotive fuel to farm fertilizers, plastics and paints.
Exercises
From Heloise Cruse, "Heloise's Hints," Copyright King Features Syndicate, Inc.,
February 15, 1976:
If you send in negatives cut up into single negativesjj^hoto finishers often charge
extr^êcaiise)^^y are much harder to handl^nd<^sier to lose and damaged

77 Exercises 1-3
FroiTkMarv Shellev, Erajênstein (1818).
eyfonl
\i(5^'i;^^f\Beware;j/foniI am fearless/andCth
fearles ^ ,^ôwerful./
eretor^^
sV
Q
From J«^^ûstcn. Sense and Sen\ihilit\ (181 1 ).
3.Llltrt\îld be inipossibk' to go tomono\vr\Ve owe Mrs. Jennings much more
than civilm), ant tlie comnionesi kind must prevent such a hasty re-
moval as that/j 3
From James M. Reid, Jr. and Robert M. Wendlmger, Effective Letters ('Sew York; McGraw-Hill,
1978). p. 244.
yin writing a collection letter, keep in mind that 95 percent of all the people who
use credit to pay their bills on time, 4 percent are slow payers, and only 1 percent
never pav^hus. Vnost of the collection letters you will ever write are to people who
will eventually paylvSo)it is extremely important that you not only persuade these
readers to pay but keep their goodwill and perfea^s-obtain new business from them
as well
Ll
79 Exercises 1-3
From John Muir, How to Keep Your Volkswagen Alive (Santa Fe, N.M.: John Muir PubUcations,
1969;. ivipi.
5</A\'hen vou push on the brake pedal vou move the hydraulic fluid in the master
cylinderyaind .^^he pressure in an interconnected fluid system is the same in all
.1/^.
parts of the systerr^fefjflhe pressure you put on the pedal is transmitted equally to
the four wheel cylinders.

>
From tltncison and Potter. The School and the Schoolmaster (1842).
6^Tnp^ process of uniting two or more adjacent [school] districts . . . ought to be
commenced at oiu^. . . 1 he niTmoTr of teachers in demand would thus [=thereby]
be reduced, whil(\the rate of compensation might be increased without adding to
the burdens of tlie people/anuMhus phe facilities for obtaining good instructors
would be muliipliecj^n a two-fold raiio^/^
Q ^& +». '-^
-I - -f, ^
JidÂ -QX^X-S^JIx^^xSl-
^\-<SJH.>\'V\£^x _^ X..vJl^v /Vv^^>
r
81 Exercises 1-3
From Fear of Flying by Erica Jong. Copyright ^^ 1973 by Erica Mann Jong. Reprinted
bv permission of Hoh,Jînehart and Winston publishers.tk
7sC AH
^ -^ — -y^
natural disasters are comfortin^mecausev^hey reaffirm our imp>oience^.
^ .
\,^\t times it is strangely sedati\e to know the extent of your own powerlessness^
From 'How Processing .\ffects Grains and Cereals." Organic Gardening and Farming. 25. no. 4.
116.
laêat treatment
S.Qijnas been obser\ ed iha/fieat ir such as toasting employed in the manu-
facture of puffed cereals causes a significant destruction of the essential amino acid
called lysinyf/Sincejlysine is at the outset limited in cereal graiirs^jwh^ heat treat-
ment of cereals] leads to a \ery serious reduction in the nutritional quality of
cereal protein. \
^^
Frc>iTrT)on Thomas, "The Nature of Things," Moneysaver (Fefertfary 2, 1984)1
9/r«Iuclear war is the ultimate environmental disaste^W^âjo tHTticlear exchange
would trigger firestorms that could plunge the earth into two or three months
of darkness^âusing temperatures to drop 36 to 75 degrees Fahrenheiyetopping
photosynthesiSjV^nd destroying much vegetation ng the delicate ocean
food chain that begins with phytoplankton e impact on the
biosphere could lead to the ultimate destruction of the human speciesj
Hint.The second sentence is not a reason for the third sentence.
&
(5
ks^
83 1-4 Analyzing the Structure of Longer and More Complicated Reasoning
1-4 ANALYZING THE STRUCTURE OF LONGER

AND MORE COMPLICATED REASONING
After you have practiced on simple discourses and comfortable with feel
the basic procedure explained in the preceding section, you are ready to
begin analyzing more complicated reasoning. You should realize, how-
ever, that few discourses are so well constructed that you can uncover the
complete structure of their reasoning merely by applying a standard pro-
cedure. All sorts of problems can arise. Reasons and conclusions may be
haphazardly scattered throughout the discourse, with irrelevant material
intermixed; inference indicators may be omitted; the same statement may
be repeated several times with minor variations; reasons and conclusions
may be left Determining the logical structure of complex dis-
out; etc.
courses still requires performing correctly the basic steps of locating every
inference indicator and correctly bracketing or isolating its component
statements. But a mechanical approach must be supplemented with in-
sight, logical judgment, and even an ability to read the author's mind. In
such cases one must pay close attention to the context and probable inten-
tions of the author also.
As an example we will use the following passage from a sermon.
When up every year, and the crime waves come faster and
the divorce rate goes
faster, isn't evident that Americans are suffering from a fundamental lack
it
of discipline? This, in turn, is a proof that a se\'ere moral crisis imperils our
age. "Where there is no faith, the people perish." You can see this lack of
discipline everywhere; in progressive educators who say that children are
being taught to read too early; in churchmen who object to the discipline of
military training; in adolescents who avoid regular church attendance. And
there is no more conclusive evidence of the moral crisis —
which has reached
proportions suggesting the collapse of the Roman civilization than the —
cynical selfishness of the laboring class, as evidenced by their desire to get
more wages for less work, "hi the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat thy
bread."""
After reading through this discourse carefully, let's analyze it sentence by

sentence. The first form of a rhetorical question and the
sentence is in the
phrase "When isn't evident that" is clearly an inference indicator. Let's
. . .
circle it, rewrite the sentence in a declarative form, and enclose the indicated
conclusion in angle brackets:
QVhen the divorce rate goes up every year, and the crime waves come faster
and faster, it is evident that^ <^mericans are suffering from a fundamental
lack of disciplined
^^Cited in Beardsley, Practical Logic.

81 Basic Analysis of Rtascjiiiiig
Notice how tlie rhetorical question has been replaced with a statement ex-
pressing the author's probable intent. The material preceding the circled
words "it is evident that" appârently is intended to support the bracketed
statement.-^ Examination reveals that it consists of twô statements joined by
the conjunction "and." Enclosing the conjuncts^^ in separate brackets,
and numbering each, yields:
(^Vhen (J) <^he di\ orce rate g oes up every year^ and (^ <^he crime
waves come faster and fasterN it is evident thatj)
(^ Âmericans are
suffering from a fundamental lack of discipline>>
It would be logically permissible to put both statement 1 and statement 2

together within a single pair of brackets, but when separate complete sen-
tences are combined to give reasons for a conclusion, bracketing them sepa-
rately is preferable because makes later evaluation
it easier. So the reason-
ing in this sentence is diagrammed as follows:
(1) The divorce rate goes (2) The crime waves come
up every year. faster and faster.
(3) Americans are suffering from a fundamental lack of

,
discipline.
The inference has been diagrammed as linked, because the two facts cited
seemed designed to fit together as evidence to support the general state-
ment concluded.
The second sentence of the discourse reads:
This, in turn, is a proof that a severe moral crisis imperils our age.
The phrase "is a proof that" is an obvious inference indicator, and the
words following it express a complete statement. So we circle, bracket,
and number as folloWs:
This, in turn,^s a proof that) ^j\ <^ severe moral crisis imperils our age.
"I say that the material "apparently is intended to support the bracketed statement," rather than that it
"apparently supports" it. because the second phrase would implv that I thought that the reason given
—
appeared really to support the conclusion drawn in other words, that the reasoning appeared to be
good. I do not say this because! 1) I do not necessarily think, that the reasoning is good, and (2) because we
are only trying to figure out the structure of the reasoning (analysis), and we are not yet saying anything
about whether or not the reasoning is any good. The evaluation of reasoning is not taken up until
Cihapter 2.
^*Con)unct: A shorter clause {or statement) that is connected to others by a conjunction to form a com-
pound sentence.
)
85 1-t Analyzing the Structure of Longer and More Complicated Reasoning
But Avhat about the words preceding this inference indicator? Clearly they
do not comprise a statement. How, then, are they to be treated? Well, the
pronoun "This"' refers to the conclusion of the preceding inference. It
stands in place of a repetition of statement 3. SO WE GI\'E IT THE SAME
XL'MBERI This is very important: failing to notice this fact would make
it difficult or impossible later to connect separate parts of the reasoning.
We have. then, the following:
(3) <CThisS in turn. (jTr^jrooTthaT^ Îh <::^ severe moral crisis im-
perils our age/N
The phrase "in turn" merely signals the reader that vet another step of in-
ference has been made and plays no other role in the argument. So the rea-
soning in this second sentence is diagrammed as follows:
(3) Americans are suftering from a

fundamental lack of discipline.
(4) A severe moral crisis imperils

our age.
(Later, this part of the diagram will be combined with those arising from
the other sentences in the discoiuse. above and below, to obtain a diagram
of the whole argument.
The next sentence is the Biblical quote:
"Where there is no faith, the people perish."
It contains no inference indicators and makes a single complete statement,

so we enclose it within a single numbered pair of angle brackets:
<C/"\Vhere there is no faith, the people perish.'^
Notice that the essential, restrictive relative clause ("\Vhere there is no

faith" ) is treated logically as an integral part of the statement. (Inessential
clauses can be treated as separate statements.) More will be explained about
this later.
The fourth sentence in this discourse reads as follows:
Vou can see this lack of discipline everywhere; in progressive educators who
say that children are being taught to read too early: in churchmen who object
to the discipline of military training; in adolescents who avoid regular church
attendance.
A sentence like this confuses many beginners. They get into difficulty
because they treat the words before the first semicolon as a separate state-
merit and fail to recognize their actual function namely, logically relat- —
ing the subsequent statements about educators, churchmen, and adoles-
cents to the alleged lack of discipline from which Americans supposedly
suffer. The words "this lack of discipline" in this part of the sentence com-
prise a noun phrase referring back to the earlier mention of this alleged
laxity in statement 3; so we bracket this noun phrase and give it the num-
ber 3. And the words "you can see . . . everywhere" function as an in-
ference indicator introducing support for statement 3. We have, then:
( ^\ ou can ^t'c (3) <^his lack of discipline^ e\erywhere:^ (^ <^n pro-

gressive educators who say that children are being taught to read too earlyS
(T) ^Qii churchmen who object to the discipline of military training^

(O) <rhi adcjlescents who avoid regular church attendanceN
Notice that although the words within brackets 6, 7, and 8 constitute,

grammatically speaking, only prepositional phrases whose objects are
modified by relative clauses, logically they function as statements asserting
the existence of the indicated states of affairs and hence giving what the
author cites as evidence of this lack of discipline. The reasoning is
diagrammed as follows:
(6) + (7) + (8)
(3)
The inference is diagrammed as linked because these three reasons seem

designed to fit together as a pattern of evidence, and each of them needs
something like the others to justify the conclusion.
The next sentence of the discourse reads:
And there is no more conclusi\e evidence of the moral crisis which has —
reached proportions suggesting the collapse of the Roman civilization than —
the cynical selfishness of the laboring class, as e\ idenced by their desire to
get more wages for less work.
The key to analyzing this sentence is noticing that it contains two separate
and distinct inference indicators, "there is no more conclusive evidence

of . . . than" and "as evidenced by." Begin by circling them:
And (jLhere is no more conclusive e\ idence of the moral crisis — which has
reach ed proportions suggesting the collapse of the Roman —
civilization
tharT) the cynical selfishness of the laboring class, (]as evidenced bv) their
desire to get more wages for less work.
Examine the three pieces of discourse separated by these two indicators.

Each is a noun phrase doing the job of (that is. standing in place of) a
statement. The references of the second and third are obvious:
"the cynical selfishness \ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ laboring

refers i
of the laboring class" J I class is cynically selfish]
"their desire to get \ ( the fact that [they desire

more wages for less | refers to | to get more wages for less
work" ; I work]
And the noun phrase "the moral back to the moral

crisis," of course, refers
crisis mentioned — the
one the author claims in
earlier in the discourse
statement 4 "imperils our age." So we bracket the phrase "the moral crisis"
and give it the number 4 too. Modifying this noun phrase is the long
inessential or nonrestrictive clause set off between dashes, which makes the
additional statement that this moral crisis has reached proportions sug-
gesting the collapse of Rome. Accordingly, we may write it out in full and
place it in its own set of numbered angle brackets. Replacing the second and
third noun phrases also w ith equivalent sentences yields the following:
And (^there is no more conclusi\e evidence of (^ <^he moral crisi^ —

(^ <^the moral crisi* which imperils our age has r eache d proportions suggesting
the collapse of the Roman civiiizati orT^ — than^ the fact that (Jo) Ohe
laboring class is cynically selfish^ (jis evidenced by*^ the fact that
yn <[They desire to get more wages for less work^
This sentence, then, contains the following reasoning:
(11)
\
(10)
\
(4)
Notice that nothing in this passage explicitly connects statement 9 about the
Roman civilization with any of these three statements.
The final sentence, another Biblical quote, makes the single statement:
U^ \I" ^he sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat thy bread.
"y
No inference indicator relates this statement to the rest of the passage, so we
simply bracket and number it.
^ .
these brackets, circles, numbers, and

With all words inserted, the
original discourse, in its entirety, appears as follows:
(^Vhen (T) <^he duorce rate go es up every. year> and (5) <^he crime
waves come faster and faster]> (^-t^fr4- it>jêvident thaf) (3) <Ameri-
cans are suffering from a fundamental lack of discipline!^ (3) <;[Jhisîn
turn. Js a proof thaj])Q)<a' severe moral crisis im perils our ag e:>
(
(5)<J^\Vhere there is no faith, the people perish.^ ( ypu
can see" (5) <mis
lack of disciplin^ e\ery where?) (V) <îi progressive educators who say
that children are being taught to read too earlf?> (^ <^n churchmen who
object to the discipline of military trainin g5> (^ <jn adolescents who
avoid regular church attendanceN And there is no more conclusi\e evi-
— ^
dence oP) (u) <^he moral crisis^ ^ <^hich has reached proportions
suggesting the collapse of the Roman civil izatioi^>
cynical selfishness of the labormg class^ (âs e\ idenced by^ (//) <êir
—than^
^ y^^
desire to get more wages for less workX Q^ <În the sweat of thy brow
shalt thou eat thy bread.
Combining all the partial diagrams constructed earlier, the following

diagram of the complete structure of the reasoning is obtained:
(1) The (2) The (6) Progressive (7) Churchmen (8) Adolescents
divorce crime educators object to avoid
rate + wa\es + sav that + the dis- + regular
goes up come children cipline of church
every faster are being military attendance.
year. and taught to training.
faster. read too
earh
^ f
(3) Americans are suffering (11) The laboring class desires
from a fundamental lack to get more wages for less
of discipline. work.
(10) The laboring class is cynically

selfish.
(4) A
/
severe moral crisis imperils our age.
I
I 1) and i2j with (6). (7). and (8) in this diagram because they all
linked 1
seem intended to fit together to form one total picture that supports (3).
No connection is made between the Biblical quotes and the rest of the
statements in the authors argument. One might try to fit them in
somewhere, but when nothing shows where they should go. it is better (by
the Principle of Charity) to leave them out. Statement 9 also seems
unconnected with the argument: the author has just slipped it in. Fully
diagrammed, the reasoning in this discourse is ready for critical evaluation,
the topic to which we will turn next in Chapter 2.
As you see. often a reasoned discourse will contain some statements
that play no logical role in its reasoning. (Statements 5. 9. and 12 in the
discourse above appear to be examples of this. Strictly speaking, the )
reasoning in a discourse consists only of those statements that function as

reasons or conclusions in it. So if you wish. ^\ hen doing the exercises that
follow, you can omit brackets and numbers from clauses or sentences that
are not part of the reasoning.
It should be mentioned also that a reasonable alternative analysis of
this same example could link statement (3) with (10) to support final
conclusion (4). In analvzing real-life discourses, conflicting diagrams
sometimes represent permissible alternative interpretations. Occasionally,
reasoning can dênsibh be interpreted in a \ariety of ways. This is
especially true when the author of the discourse fails to make the intended
reasoning fully clear. In this example. I probably would make my final
choice of diagrammatic forms (convergent vs. linked) in combination with
the next stage of the procedure, evaluation (which \\ ill be explained in
Chapter 2). If turned out to be false. I
either statement (3) or statement 1 10 1
would continue shown, in accordance

to treat this step as convergent, as
with the Principle of Charity which says: \\ hen unclarity exists, analyze
reasoning in whatever way gives it the greatest strength. But if both
statements (3) and (10) were discovered to be true, and if their combination
pro\idedstronger support for conclusion (4) than either statement (3) or 10) (
provides alone, then I probablv would re^\ rite the diagram as linked (again
in accordance with the Principle of Charity i.
It is also true that discourses sometimes fail to contain statements
expressing reasons, intermediate conclusions, or final conclusions that the

author is clearly assuming or presupposing. When you feel that there is a
statement that the author clearlv belie\ es and assumes or presupposes in his
reasoning but is not explicitlv contained in the given discourse, vou may
yourself supply this statement in the diagram, but be sure to enclose it m
square brackets, to show that thesiatement was supplied by you. Some of the
90 Basic Analysis of Rt-asoniiig
special limits and restrictions that must be followed in making such

additions will be explained in detail in later sections of this text.
Some Gramttiatical Points
As seen sometimes arises in

in the foregoing analysis, a problem that
diagramming is how to handle complex sentences that contain dependent
clauses performing adjectival or other modifying functions. Such clauses
usually are introduced by words like "where." "when." and "why." or by
relative pronouns such as "who," "whom." and "which." The adjectival
dependent clause in the following example has been italicized.-'
Restrictive
or essential: A teacher who speaks poor English is badly handicapped.
The key to analyzing such sentences correctly is understanding the distinc-

tion between a restrictive (or essential) clause and a nonrestrictwe (or
inessential) cXîW^G.The italicized dependent clause in the illustration above
is modifying clause. This means simply that the presence of this
a restrictive
clause is essential to the meaning of the sentence. If this dependent clause
were dropped from the sentence, themeaningof what remained (namely, "A
teacher ... is badly handicapped") would be distorted or changed. A
nonrestrictive (or inessential) modifying clause, in contrast, adds informa-
tion that is extra and not needed to pick out or identify the thing referred to
by the phrase it modifies. In the following example the italicized dependent
'"
clause is nonrestrictive:
Nonrestrictwe
or inessential: The janitor, wlio used to be a sailor, strapped and tied our parcels.
The fact that the janitor "used to be a sailor" is extra information about him
that is not needed as part of the specification of who strapped and tied the
parcels. dependent clause were omitted from the sentence, although
If this
some information would be lost, what remained ("The janitor strapped . . .
and tied our parcels") would not be distorted or altered in its meaning or
sense. The following examples illustrate this distinction further:
Restrictive
or essential: We have decided to hire a person who knows how to run a mower.
[The sentence says that we have decided to hire a particular sort of
person, one who knows how to run a mower, and no other kind.]
^Êxamplc cited in John M. Kici/ck. The Macrnillan Handbook of English (New York: The Macmillan
Company. 1954). p 52.
^Îbid.
Nonrestrictwe
or inessential: W'e have decided to hire Mr. Smith, who knows how to run a
mower. [The sentence says that we have decided to hire Mr. Smith;
the modifying clause merely adds extra information.]
With the distinction between essential and inessential modifying clauses

understood, here is a rule that applies in logical analysis: When putting
brackets around component statements in a sentence, never separate an
essential or restrictive dependent clause from the rest of the sentence
contairiing the word(s) it modifies. For example:
Right: rj\ ^Jones' Hardware is the store where leather-working tools

are sold^
[The clause is restrictive or essential]
Wrong: (J^ ^Jones'

Hardware is the stor^> ^)<where leather-working
tools are solc^
But if a modifying clause is nonrestrictive (inessential), then it is per-

missible (but not, in general, required) to place separate brackets around it.
For example.
Right: ^y^^Tiis car was white, which is the safest color for a car to b^[Nones-
sential modifying clause]
Also right.\Jj^His car was whiteS^J^<^'hich is the safest color for a car to be^>
A complex sentence with a nonrestrictive dependent clause logically can be

thought of as equivalent to a compound sentence with more than one
—
independent clause that is, as the conjoining of several conjuncts, as if
they were all joined together by "and" or some similar conjunction. Here is
the equivalent compound sentence for the above example:
Equivalent
compound: His car was white and white is the safest color for a car to be.
Analysis: ^jîis car was white> and(2)^'hite is the safest color for a car
to be^
(Notice that in the original complex sentence, the relative pronoun
"which" referred to the color white.) Ideally, nonrestrictive or inessential
modifying clauses are supposed to be set off from the rest of the sentence by
commas, while restrictive clauses should never be set off by commas, but
since this punctuation rule is frequently violated (even in published
writings), it is better to go by the meaning or content of what is said rather
than the presence or absence of commas. To.restate the rule: In analysis, it is
permissible (but not usually required) to bracket a nonrestrictive or in-

92 Basil Analysis of Reasoning
essential dependent clause apart from the rest of the sentence, thereby
treating as if it were an ahogether separate statement, but it is NEVER
it
correct tcj place an essential or restrictive dependent clause in brackets

separate from what it modifies in the rest of the sentence.
Hoiv to Organize Your Own Reasoned Discourses
So you have been shown only how to analyze the reasoned dis-
far
courses of other speakers or writers. The paragraphs below contain some
practical tips and suggestions on hcjw to put your own reasoning intf:> the
best possible form.
When you desire to support some claim with reasoning, you must put
your statements in some order or sequence. From studying the arguments of
other people, you may have noticed that the exact order in wliich they set
forth the component statements has a lot to do with the clarity and compre-
hensibility of their reasoning. Of course, no one can say absolutely that you
should always put your reasons first and then your conclusion, or vice versa.
For one thing, it may depend on your intended readership or audience. If
your conclusion is already anticipated (as in a debate), it may save time to
state it first and then follow it with the reasons; on the other hand, if your
conclusion may be resisted or misunderstood unless the audience is pre-
pared for it by acceptable reasons, then it might be wise to state the reasons
first and work up to the conclusion. It all depends on the circumstances.
However, here are two general rules that it is always good to follow: ^^
Rule of Grouping. If you have several reasons for one conclusion,

they should be kept as close together in the discourse as possible. They may
all precede or all follow the conclusion, but other reasons for different
conclusions should not come between.
Rule of Direction. If you have a serial argument, it should always

move in one direction, no matter what direction this is. If you say, "It's
cloudy; therefore, it's going to rain; therefore, we'll get wet." your reasoning
is clear. But if you say. "It's going to rain, because it's cloudy, and therefore,
we'll get wet," your reasoning is harder to follow. In serial reasoning, either
proceed from basic reason(s) to intermediate conclusion to final conclusion,
or vice versa, in the opposite direction, from final conclusion to inter-
mediate conclusion to basic reason.
Look at what happens in even a short passage where these rules are
violated:
^'These originate with Beardsley.
L
It is a fact that (1) people cannot keep their best New Year's resolutions un-
less they change their environment to make it more favorable to good
behavior. For this reason. (2) it is hopeless to try to get people to behave
decently toward one another merely by throwing moral exhortations at them.
Another reason for this is that (3) virtue is an affair of habits, acquired by
doing, and not by listening. So (4) we need fewer self-appointed moralists and
more social scientists to get at the roots of evil, and also (5) we need to spend a
lot more money than we are spending on "the proper study of mankind."
The actual structure of this argument is not clear, but it may be:
(l) + (3)
(2)
/\
(4) (5)
One reason the structure of this argument is more difficult to uncover than
itshould be is that the Rule of Grouping is violated: statements 1 and 3 are
both reasons for 2,Jbuf 2 comes between them in the original discourse. The
Rule of Direction also is violated: statement 2 appears to be an intermedi-
ate conclusion supporting the final conclusions, statements 4 and 5, but
statement 3, a reason for 2, comes between it and the final conclusions. The
same five statements have been rearranged to obey these two rules in the
following discourse:
It is a fact that (1) people cannot keep their best New Year's resolutions
unless they change their environment to make it more fa\orable to good be-
havior. Moreover. (3) virtue is an affair of habits, acquired by doing, and not
by listening. For these reasons, (2) it is hopeless to try to get people to behave
decently toward one another merely by throwing moral exhortations at them.
Therefore. (4) we need fewer self-appointed moralists and more social scien-
tists to get at the roots of evil,and also (5) we need to spend a lot more money
than we are spending on "the proper study of mankind."
Putting reasoning in proper order does not guarantee that it will be good,
but at least it makes it easier to see whether or not it is good.
The more complicated your reasoning is, the more important it is to
follow these two rules. One reason some of the reasoned discourses in the
exercises are so difficult to diagram is that their authors violate one or both
of these rules. If these discourses were rewritten in a way that obeyed both of
these rules, they would be much clearer and easier to understand.
EXERCISES 1-4A
Circle inference indicators, insert numbered angle brackets, and diagram the follow-
ing reasoning:
From G. L. G.. Pensacola. Florida.
A-l.^he term "impotent" should not ]x used in reference to male sexual non-
arousal. Mn the
\ CCi.'^gL
first
t "^^
place. Its use is degrading to the

®
maleybecausejt suggests in-
ability." "weakness/" "lack of strength or \igor." 'powerlessness," even "lack of
ma sculinity ." /Secondly/^ to speak that \say is to think that way. and that way of
thinking is incorrect/For. it imph_es an inability or incapacity to do something
e\en when or if one has a strong desire to do it. rather than the absence of desire o r
inclinatio n, which is the usual situation in cases of male sexual disinterest.
3j>
(^3-v(^^'
95
Exercise from Beardsley, Practical Logic.
A-2. The seniority system on which the U.S. Senate operates is a strong guarantee
of (lenuK ra( y, for it places in positions of greatest power anci responsibility those
best fitted to hold them. Since those who have been in Congress for the longest
time presumably have had the greatest experience, and since they tend to be older
and wiser than the rest, they are consequently bound to be more careful and
thoughtful in the way they vote, hence they are less likely to engage in dangerous
and reckless legislative experiments.
The system of gi\ing committee chairmanships to those who have served the
longest in Congress, which is the only fair way of rewarding public ser\ice, has
often been criticized by those who think that youth is synonymous with progres-
sive and humanitarian ideas. This is a mistake. The rightness of the system is
shown by the fact that Ccjngress has usually met the needs of the people. The sys-
tem is right; it should be continued.

97 Exercises 1-4A
From a Lee Two-stage Maxifilter radio commercial.
A-3. ... If the engine is the most important part of a car, then the oil fiher must be
the second most important part/ since) the oil filter protects the engine.
f
From Fldridge Cleaver, "Initial Reactions on the Assassination of Malcolm X," in Soul on Ice,
pp. 57-58. .\pplv instructions to author's thoughts.
A-4. ... I was thinking that iT Malcolm's w ou nds were not too serious, that if he
recovered, the shooting might prove to be a blessing in disguise: Uwoiild^reate a
wjndfall_^£^sympathyan^ America's black ghe_ttos,
ancrsojput more power into his hands.
V
3
V
EXERCISES 1-4B
ing reasoning:
From Elizabeth Drake and Robert C. Reid. "The Importation of Liquefied Natural Gas. "
Scien-
tijic Af*{erican. 236. no. 24
4. p. 24.
B-1. Tne tanks on a ship carrying liquefied natur al gas rn ust have double walls
and insulation more than a meter thick to reduce the vaporization rate/Accord^
inglpa collision that might lead to a loss of cargo would ha\e to be considerably
severer than it would if the ship were built like a petroleum tanker, where_th£_LaiLk
is the hull of the ship i^selfJJTherefore, a1rriHp pt<; snrh as r qmming :^nrl giQim'^-
ing are hi ghly unlikelv to cause th erelease of cargo from a ship carrying liquefied
natural_gas.
99
From Edear Allan Poe, '

Thf Murders in the Rue Moreue."
B-2. The murderei:^ did- e s cape frota-one of these windows. Therefore, tjiey
iukl not have re-fasiened the sashes from the inside. Yet the sashes were fastened.
I They mw.s^yjhcn^}havejjicjx^ of fasteTiii2g_jhemselyes.|jTh ere was_ noêscape
from tliis conclusion.
From Wayne W. Dver, Your Erroneo us Zqn^^ /C )
B-3.
(0
'
vVorry
.
is
'
.C^SSP ^^^
a waste of timeôu c^n^ spend. itoTyoiir hfe Jiepnrining right
now^_j4^DxryiJig-abautth€futur€Tând no amount of your worry will change a
thing about it. . . .In fact, worry will very likely help you toJ)e less effective
'^
101 Exercises 1-4B
B-4. T here were no skid marks on theroad/sojthe car cannot ha\e been skidding
in the wav she describes. This ^'she has been lyine/Tln a dditiqri^ the car
was found m low gear.tsojjt cannot ha\e been going 50 miles an hour, which is
what she claims she was doing at the time of the acciden t. This agairi[ shows the
she s lyin g, nrhereforp', sheisjpro bablv guiltv of the crim e. anc|fi"'^nce\yLight to be
V ^
^<
F. A. L.. Dayton. Ohio.
B-5. ThvYf are 12,000.000 regular pot smokers in the United States today. This
means 12.000.000 people at periodic inter\als in effect decide that it's better to
break the (nowadays widely unenforced absurd) law than not to. Such regular
lawbreaking cannot do otherwise than foster a general disrespect or even hatred
TforNthe institutions (in many other respects perhaps good and worth having) that
administer and enforce ALL THE OTHER laws. And such general distrust and
disrespect are bad and contrary to the best interests of the society. GTherefbrej
either these laws should be actively enforced and violators prosecuted (if society
is really so foolish as to believe that its interests require the elimination of mar-
ijuana smoking) or else they should be removed from the penal statutes. The
former alternative is impossible. (Prohibition proved this.) The conclusion, my
dear friends, is obvious.

103 Exercises 1-4B
EXERCISES 1-4C
ing reasoning:
From p. ^'y^•• Chicago. 111.
C-1. Statistical_sLu4i cs cstabUdxihailhe incidence of forced rape is lower in places
where prostitution is tolerated than in places where it is not/Therefore) prostitu-
tion should be completely decriminalized. Reduction in the incidence of rape is a
desirable social endiÔ^ ].^\vs Jj^;^t m;ike prnstitntinn ^ rrim inal nffpnse ^jho"!*^-^
repealed.
ci)-r^
105
106 Basil Analysis of Reasoning
From Hugh Sandcman. "Pemex Comes Out of Its Shell. "

Reprinted from the April 10 issue of
Fortune Maga/ine by special permission; ^ 1978 Time. Inc. {Hint: A discourse may contain two
or more separate lines of reasoning.)
C-2. Pt'iiu'x's own drilling news are quite competent onshore, but they have
neither the equipment nor the experience needed for offshore exploration, which
is just getting under way in highly promising formations adjacent to the onshore
fields in \'eracruz and Tabasco. So the drilling ships Pemex [Petroleos Mexicanos]
needs ha\e been supplied by U.S. companies, and though they are manned by
Pemex crews, the number of U.S. "ad\ isers" is reported to be large. The U.S. com-
panies, such as Brown & Root, that are involved in this offshore development have
been asked by Pemex to keep a low profile as part of the bargain. So they generally
work for Mexican companies whose names go on the contracts. . . .

107 Exercises 1-4C
From Jane van Lauick-Goodall, 7^7 the Shadow of Man. Copyright £ 1971 by Hugo and
Jane van Lawick-Goodall. Used by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company, ar
William Collins Sons & Co.. Ltd.
C-3. TRne is [a] shadow that is spreading over the chimpanzee today: (Tfor] with
the spread of agricuhure and forestry, the habitat as well as the life of the chim-
panzee is threatened. Forests are cleared to make way for cultivation and food trees
are poisoned to leave space for better t imber tree s. Moreover(înce hhimps are sus-
ceptible to all the infectious diseases of man7"wHei ever their populations are near
new human settlements the apes are endangered by epidemics.
^
©
From an ediloiial (exercise in Beardsley, Practical Logic). Very difficult.
C-4. The rislit to life, as set forth in the Declaration of Independence, is inalien- _
ahle and inxiolable, because it is the foundation of all other rights. Thus infringe-
ment of it. no matter by what means, can never be justified. Also, of course, in con-
sidering the present situation, we must remember that it is the duty of our country
to preserve all rights as much as possible, so that, no matter how hard it is, we
must keep the power of the government to a minimum. But this latter point is by
tfie way; wliat is most important is that the injustifiability of all taking of life (a
point also further supported by the Christian principle tliat killing is against the
will of God) demonstrates that the present proposals for peacetime military con-
scriptions are indefensible. Tfie duty of preserving all other rights (mentioned
above) bears ota the same point, which cannot be too often or too strongly stated.
Suggestion: (i) Before inserting numbered angle brackets, double-check to make certain that you
have found and circled all inference indicators, and (ii) after inserting brackets, check again to
ensure that no inference indicators have been overlooked. (If an inference indicator appears any-
where inside your angle brackets on this problem, you probably have made a mistake and over-
looked an important logical relationship.)
109 Exercises 1-4C
%
1 10 Special Notes
CHAPTER 2
Basic Evaluation
of Reasoning
2-1 WHAT IS GOOD REASONING?
After determining the structure of some reasoning, the next step is to

evaluate it — that is, it) determine how good or bad it is.Does it succeed in
proving or explaining its conclusions(s)? Can we rely on it?
When a long chain of reasoning contains many steps of reasoning
(each represented by one of the arrows in the diagram), we can determine
how good the reasoning is by examining and evaluating, one by one. each of
these steps individually. In other words, the difficult problem of evaluating
complicated reasoning (with many arrows) can be reduced to several
simpler problems, each of which requires only that we e\aluate a simple
inference with just one step of reasoning. So. let us begin by learning how to
evaluate a single step of reasoning, or a simple argument whose diagram
contains only one arrow. When this skill has been mastered, we can go back
and evaluate any longer chain of reasoning by applying the method, one by
one. to each of the indi\ idual steps of reasoning it contains.
To prove or explain its conclusion, a step of reasoning must fulfill
both of the following two requirements:
1. Truth of reason(s): All the relevant reasons (immediately above the arrow)
must be true.
2. Relationship of the conclusion to the reasonis): The reason(s) and the
conclusion need to be connected, or related, to each other in such a way
that the conclusion follows logically from the reason! s). In particular,
the conclusion needs to be related to the reason(s) in such a way that the
111
112 Basic Evaluation of Reasoning
iiuili ()( the statement(s) given as the reason(s) would make the truth of
the conclusion extremely likely. That is, the relationship must be such
that if the reason(s) are (or were) true, then they would either guarantee,
or at least make highly likely, the truth of the conclusion. (Notice the
"if" clause here!)
It is crucial to recognize, from the start, that these are two separate and
independent requirements. The first condition requires that the reason(s) be
true. The second condition requires that a special relationship exist
BETWEEN the reason(s) AND the conclusion: the conclusion must follow
logically; that is. the step of reasoning, the inference, from the reason(s) to
the conclusion must be logically correct. BOTH tests must be passed in
order for the reasoning successfully to prove or explain its conclusion. If
either condition is not met — that is. if some of the relevant reasons are false,
or if the conclusion does not follow logically from the reason(s) — then the
reasoning prove or explain its conclusion.
fails to
In logic, the word "valid" is used as a special technical term to refer
to the second condition separately from the first condition. Any reasoning
that meets the second condition is called "valid," whether or not it also
satisfies the first condition.' In other words, reasoning satisfying the
second requirement is said to be valid even if it does not also satisfy the
first condition! (This means, of course, that reasoning must be more than
just "valid" in the technical sense to prove or explain its conclusion; it

also must have true reasons.) In the special sense in which the term
"valid" is used in logic, a valid step of reasoning is one in which the
reason(s) ARE RELATED TO the conclusion in such a way that, if the
reason(s) were true, its (or their) truth would guarantee, or make ex-
tremely likely, the truth of the conclusion. In other words, a valid step of
reasoning is one in which, IF the statement(s) given as reason(s) were true,
then they would guarantee, or at least make extremely likely, the truth of
the conclusion. When this relationship exists BETWEEN the reason(s)
and the conclusion, the conclusion follows logically from the reason(s),
and the step of reasoning meets the second condition and is valid.
In logic, the term "valid" applies to steps of reasoning between
statements, and not to statements. Each step of reasoning (represented by
an arrow) may be valid, or it may be invalid. As the term "valid" is used
technically in logic, it is a mistake and a confusion to talk as though
sentences or statements could be valid. Sentences or statements can be
"true" or "false," but they cannot be "valid" or "invalid" in the logician's
special sense of these terms. Only reasoning can be "valid" or "invalid" in
'Readers arquainted with formal deductive logic are forewarned that the application of the term
"valid," as used in this text,
is not restricted to deductively valid arguments.
L
13 2-1 What Is Good Reasoning?
these terms' special sense in logic. Remember that reasoning or a reasoned

discourse consists of more than sentences or statements. It is a group of
statements in which some of the statements are offered as supporting or
explaining others. For the reasoning to be good, a certain relationship
needs to exist between the reason(s) and the conclusion. "Valid" and
"invalid" are special terms in logic for saying whether or not the
conclusion follows logically from the reasons. They are terms for describ-
ing the logical relationship(s) between statements. So, do not make the
mistake of saying that sentences or statements are "valid" or "invalid" in
the logician's sense. In logic, these terms describe logical inter-relation-
ships among statements, rather than the statements themselves. We
use not the terms "valid" and "invalid," but "true" and "false" to talk about
the statements themselves.
is used with a special technical meaning
In logic, the term "sound"
reasoning that passes BOTH requirements (that is, the require-
to refer to
ments of (1) truth of reasons and (2) validity of inference). Reasoning
that satisfies both requirements is called "sound. "^ Sound reasoning
succeeds in justifying or explaining its conclusion; unsound reasoning
fails to do so. Soundness of reasoning involves more than just validity. For
an argument to be sound, the reasons need to be true, and the step of
reasoning needs to be' valid. Thus, reasoning needs to be valid in order to
—
be sound it cannot be sound without being valid but reasoning can be —
valid while failing to be sound. In other words it is possible for a conclusion
to follow logically from false reason(s). In fact, it often happens that
reasoning is valid but unsound.
A major problem for beginners in logic is understanding that valid
reasoning can be based on false reasons or assumptions. (Of course, it then
is unsound.) In fact, a valid argument can have both false reasons and a
false conclusion. What follows is a simple humorous illustration of an

argument that has a false reason and a false conclusion, but is neverthe-
less, valid.
All poodles , All dogs can fly

are dogs. with their ears.
(valid)
w
All poodles can fly with their ears.
"This usage differs from that of some logic textbooks in wfiich "sound"' is used synonymously with
"valid."
1 11 Basic Evaluation of Reasoning
This argument has one false reason, and a false conclusion, yet it is valid.
It is valid because, although it does not pass the first test (since a reason is
false), it does pass the second test. The conclusion follows logically from
the reasons given, even though one of the reasons is false. This is because
the validity (or invalidity) of reasoning depends on the relationship
between the statements in its diagram. The logical connection between the
conclusion and the reason(s) is what makes a step of reasoning valid, and
the lack of the right sort of connection is what makes it invalid. This
logical connection (or the lack of it) is what we are referring to by talking
about the presence or absence of "validity" in reasoning. In the poodle
example, a valid connection exists because if the given reasons were true,
then the conclusion would also be true, and the truth of the reasons, if
they were true, would make the truth of the conclusion extremely likely
or totally certain.
Calling reasoning "valid" in the logician's sense means much the
same as what is meant in ordinary language when one says that "a con-
clusion follows logically from certain assumptions.''' In the poodle example, if
one assumed that "All dogs can fly with their ears" and "Poodles are
dogs," then the conclusion would follow logically that "Poodles can fly
with their ears." (Of course, this conclusion is false, and the reasoning
fails to prove it because one of the assumptions is false.) Even before
studying logic, people often recognize that a conclusion can sometimes
follow logically from false assumptions (or mistaken premises, inaccurate
data, etc.) —
despite the falseness, mistakenness, inaccuracy, etc., of the
assumptions, premises, etc. (This important fact is sometimes even used
to help find and eliminate false assumptions, mistaken premises, etc., by
showing that known falsehoods follow logically from them. This will be
developed later in Section 2-4.) But for now, the important fact to
remember is that the relationship of a conclusion "logically following
from" some reason(s) may exist between false statements, or between
mixed true-and-false statements, as well as between true statements. This
occurs fairly frequently in reasoning.
Of course, an argument with false reasons that is "valid" in the sense
just explained fails to prove its conclusion, due to the falseness of its
—
reasons that is, because it fails the first requirement listed earlier. To
prove or explain its conclusion, reasoning must meet BOTH require-
ments: all relevant reasons need to be true, and the step of reasoning must
be valid. If either requirement is not satisfied, the reasoning fails to prove
or explain its conclusion, and we call it "unsound." So, if a relevant
reason is false, or if the step of reasoning (represented by the arrow) is
invalid, or if both failures occur, the reasoning is said to be "unsound."
L
On the other hand, if the two requirements are met, we call the reasoning
"sound." To prove or explain its conclusion, reasoning needs to be sound.
Using this special terminology, the two requirements that must be
met for a step of reasoning to explain or justify its conclusion may be
simply restated as follows: Reasoning is sound if and only if (1) all
relevant reasons are true, and (2) the step(s) of reasoning from the reason
to the conclusion is (are) valid. This can be abbreviated with the formula:
TRUTH + VALIDITY = SOUNDNESS

where this is understood to mean: TRUTH (of all relevant reasons) +
VALIDITY (of the step(s) of inference) = SOUNDNESS (of the reason-
ing).
Sound reasoning has both true reasons and a valid step of inference.
Here is a schematic picture of a sound argument:
True { Reason(s) A
(I) V } (Valid)
Conclusion X
(In this diagram, I am

using "Reason(s) A" to represent, for example, the
reason(s) in some sound argument, and "Conclusion X" to represent its
conclusion.) For example, the following reasoning is sound:
True { Some mammals are pets. »
I (Valid)
Some pets are mammals.
Reasoning failing the requirement that have true reasons, or failing the
it
requirement that it be valid, or failing both requirements, is unsound.

Here follow pictures of three different unsound situations that can arise.
Notice that the conclusion of unsound reasoning may be true, or it may be
false.
General Situation: Example:
False Reasons and Valid Inference:
Reason(s) B ^ }
— False — { ^ Shakespeare was a woman.
— Valid —
Conclusion Y
\
Shakespeare was female
116 Basil F.valuaiion of Rt-asoning
General Situation: Example:
True Reasons and Invalid Inference:
Reason(s) C } —True— { Alcohol is a fuel.
(III) -Invalid-
^ I I ^
Cone lusion Z My car will run properly on
alcohol.
False Reasons and Invalid Inference:
Reason(s) D } — False — { Wood is heavier than lead.
(IV)
Conclusion W Wood floats on water.
Notice that reasoning can be unsound in any of three ways (false reason(s)
alone, invalid reasoning alone, or both false reasons and invalid reason-
ing). But reasoning can be sound in only one way (having both true
reasons and valid inference).
SUMMARY OF DEFINITIONS
Valid reasoning. Reasoning in which
if they were true, the reasons,
really would conclusion to be true.
justify believing or expecting the
In valid reasoning, the truth of the statement(s) given as the
reason(s) (if they were true) would guarantee, or make extremely
likely, the truth of the conclusion.
Invalid reasoning. Reasoning in which the reasons, even assuming or

supposing they were true, still would not justify believing or
expecting the conclusion to be true.
Sound reasoning. Reasoning in which the steps of reasoning are valid

and all relevant reasons are true.
Unsound reasoning. Reasoning in which either one or more of the

relevant reasons is false, or the reasoning is invalid, or both.
Correctly understanding these concepts, and their relationships to

each other, not only is the key to everything in this text, but also is
absolutely fundamental to the ability to think and reason logically. Many
people mistakenly think they fully understand how to apply these
concepts when actually they do not. One common mistake is confusion of
the two requirements. Given an argument that has true reasons and a
conclusion that "sounds OK" (seems to make sense), some people

automatically think that the conclusion follows logically without evaluat-
ing the reasoning closely or accurately. They mistakenly assume that if the
reasons are true, then the conclusion must follow logically and so, be true,
even when the reasoning is not valid. Consequently, they are led into
erroneous beliefs and actions that are contrary to everyone's good, among
other difficulties. A related problem is the inability to tell when a conclu-
sion follows logically (validly) from false assumptions. Many people are
unable to recognize valid reasoning that has false premises. In other
words, they are unable to "suppose" that certain false statements were true
and then reason out what conclusion(s) would follow logically from those
suppositions (if they were true). Among other problems, this deprives
them of a highly useful and powerful tool for detecting and eliminating
mistaken beliefs. (More about this later in Section 2-4.)
Being able to distinguish valid from invalid reasoning, and to
recognize when a conclusion follows logically and when it does not, is
among the highest achievements of the human mind. This chapter will
increase your ability to do this, but since this skill involves art as well as
science, you should not expect to be given a mechanical recipe or some set
of automatic procedures. (Some inaccurate logic textbooks unfortunately
do misleadingly suggest that some mechanical procedure is possible, but
this is a delusion, untrue even of significantly powerful artificial lan-
guages.) We will take the challenging high road to truth and insight,
triumphing over its apparent difficulties to develop our logical and mental
powers. The journey may be demanding, but it will be an intellectual
adventure that will lead to a great treasure and benefit.
A failure to understand validity, or an inability to distinguish valid
from invalid reasoning, can have disastrous, devastating consequences
in our lives. Therefore, I arn going to return now and explain once again,
in more detail and in slightly different language, the crucial concepts of
validity and soundness, their relationship to truth, and their relationship
to each other. In other words, these concepts are so essential and so
important that I now am going to re-explain them. If the following seems
repetitious, please treat it as a "check-up" review of the material you
already have mastered.
The two different requirements that a step of reasoning must meet in
order to be sound are that (1) the reasons be true and (2) the inference be
valid. Because these two requirements are separate and independent of
each other, reasoning can satisfy either one without satisfying the other.
Here is a simple example of an argument that has true reasons but is
invalid:
] 18 Basic Evaluation of Rt-asoning
AN UNSOUND ARGUMENT (DUE TO INVALID REASONING)

Some roses are red. + Some violets are blue.
{invalid}
Buddy still
T
loves Peggy Sue.
The reasons here are true, but the conclusion does not follow. The step
of reasoning is invalid. It is invalid because it is very possible for the
conclusion to be false even if the reasons are true. The easy possibility of
the conclusion's being false even if the reasons are true makes this
reasoning invalid and unreliable.
On the other hand, here is an example of reasoning that is valid but
proceeds from false reasons:
AN UNSOUND ARGUMENT (DUE TO FALSE REASONS)
Whales are fish. + All fish have gills.
(valid)
Whales have gills.
Here the reasoning is valid; the conclusion follows logically from the
assumptions made. But the argument is unsound because one of the
reasons is false. If the word "fish" is being used in its precise zoological
sense, it is false that whales are fish, and if "fish" is being used in a very
general, loose sense, then it is false that all fish have gills.
As these examples illustrate, the validity of reasoning and the truth or
falsity of its reasons are two separate and independent matters. Reasoning
can fail one requirement while satisfying the other. An argument that cites
false reasons can still be valid, and an argument with true reasons can
proceed invalidly. Of course, an argument also can fail both requirements
simultaneously— have false reasons and be invalid. So the important facts to
keep in mind are that the truth of the reasons and the validity of the
reasoning are two separate matters, and that to prove or explain its
conclusion reasoning must 1 start from true reasons and (2) contain only
( )
valid steps of reasoning.

Let us now focus on the second requirement, and on
especially
learning how to tell, in
real concrete cases, whether or not reasoning is
valid (that is, whether or not the conclusion follows logically from the
given reasons). One reason for this focus is that most students begin
L
—
1 19 2-1 What Is Good Reasoning?
introducion logic courses far more skilled at detecting false assumptions

than at recognizing invalid "illogicari reasoning. This is partly because
(
previous education and exp>erience in life has taught them many truths.
but given them onlv limited instruction in the equallv important skill of
distinguishing \alid from invalid reasoning. And logic courses sp>ecialize
in teaching this important ability. So. we will concentrate primarily on
comp>ensating for previously existing imbalances by developing the other
essential skill needed to evaluate the soundness of reasoning.' (Evaluating
validity alsois something \s-e can do from the comfort of our chans simply
by examining and thinking about our diagrams, without needing to go to

the laboratory, libran. or out into the field.) But although the following
.
discussion A\ill focus on evaluating validitv. remember, at all times

throughout this discussion, in doing the exercises, and in real life that to —
prove or explain its conclusion(s). reasoning must meet both the first
requirement and the second requirement.
Let us now turn in more depth and detail to the question: How can it
be determined whether a conclusion follows logically from the reasons
given? How can we tell whether reasoning is valid? The following sections
will answer this question, explaining what it means for conclusions to
follow logicallv. and showing vou how to tell in particular cases whether
they do.
The Concept of \'alidity
Reasons and conclusions, considered individually in themselves, are

statements that are either "true" or "false. Philosophers have defended
"
various theories of truth, but most agree that true statements are state-
ments that corresp>ond to reality and or are good and reliable guides to
action. 'False statements" are false because thev fail to agree with reality
orfail to work reliably in practice. For example, the sentence "Big Ben is in
London" is true in virtue of the fact that this clock is located in the city
of London: the sentence "Big Ben is in Australia" is false because it does
not correspond to reality. Truth and falsitv are properties of statements
that generally depend, among on their relationship
other things, (or
corresp>ondence to ) a' reality outside themselves and outside language.
'Deep connections exist, of course, between being able lo e\~aluaie the \alidity of reasoning accurately
and being able to recognise and disco\er new truths. In real life, the knowledge of truths and the
ability to recognize \alid reasoning are intimatelv related. The ability to reason i-alidly provides a
powerful means for increasing ones knowledge, as well as for detecting and eliminating false beliefs
previously acquired along lifes uay. distinguishing reliable from erroneous predictions of the future,
and projecting accurately the likely outcomes and usefulness ol various possible actioru one is
considering.
A Step of reasoning (inference) is a movement or passage from som,e

statement(s) (called the "reason(s)") to another statement, called the
"conclusion." Such a step or movement is valid or invalid. Validity
depends on the relationship(s) between the sentence(s) that is (are) the
reason(s) (above the arrow) and the sentence that is the conclusion (below
the arrow) in the diagram. Statements may be true or false; reasoning is valid
or invalid sound or unsound. (It is a confusion and a mistake to speak of an
,
argument, or reasoning, as being true or false.)

summary, then, truth and falsity are characteristics of statements
In
that usually depend on the relationship of the statements to external
reality. Validity and invalidity are characteristics of reasoning that depend
mainly on the internal relationships among the several statements that are
connected together as the reason(s) and conclusion(s) inside the diagram.
The reason(s) and conclusion(s) considered individually are either true or
false. The reasoning [inference(s)] is (are) either valid or invalid.
step(s) of
And souTid reasoning is reasoning in which all the relevant reasons are true,
and the steps of reasoning are all valid.
Validity's Relationship to Truth
The difficult, but crucial, fact to grasp is that although truth and
validity are not the same thing, the two are intimately related in the
following way: In valid reasoning, the reason(s) and conclusion are
connected to each other in such a way that the truth of the reasons
(supposing that they were true) would make the truth of the conclusion at
least extremely likely. So, if reasoning is valid, then it is unlikely or
impossible for: the conclusion to be false IF the reasons are true.^
Therefore, in deciding whether reasoning is valid, ask the following
question: // (that is, supposing that) the statements expresssing the
reason(s) were true, would it be likely or a realistic possibility, in that
case, for the conclusion to be false? In other words, is there any genuinely
possible way in which all the reasons could be true, and yet the conclusion
be false? If the answer to this question is "yes," then the reasoning is
invalid. In the earlier example, for instance, it could be true that "Some
roses are red" and "Some violets are blue," and yet be false that "Buddy
still loves Peggy Sue." The reasons could be true and yet the conclusion be
false; in fact, the truth of the reasons does not make the truth of the
statement given as a conclusion even likely. Hence, the reasoning is
invalid.
Note to Advanced Readers: "What if an argument fias reasons that cannot be true or a conclusion thai
<^nnot be false?" See Appendix III for a reply to this ciuestion.
L
Contrast this with the second example, where the conclusion could
not be falseif the reasons were true. Of course, it is false that "All fish have
gills" and "whales are fish," but ?/ these two statements were true, then it
would also have to be true that whales have gills. And if these two
statements were both true, they would make the truth of the conclusion
extremely likely (in fact, they would guarantee it). So this argument is
valid. It fails to establish the truth of its conclusion only because some of
the reasons are false (that is, because the argument is unsound). The
argument about whales is an example of valid reasoning; the argument
about Buddy and Peggy Sue is an example of invalid reasoning. You can
see, then, that although truth of the reasons and validity of the inference
are different matters, they are closely related to each other. If the reasoning is
valid, then IF the reason(s) were true, its (their) truth would make the truth
of the conclusion at least highly likely.^
The special relationship between reasons and conclusion in valid
reasoning, and the requirement that acceptable reasoning be valid, are
easilyappreciated in view of the use or purpose of reasoning. In
reasoning, one aim is to pass from already known truths to further,
perhaps previously unrecognized, truths, thereby increasing our store of

knowledge. (And this is our aim because, among other reasons, we believe
that knowing the truth will help us accomplish our aims and goals,
evaluate our objectives, and fulfill our desires, so as to live well and be
happy.) So naturally we want our reasoning to carry us from the truths we
already possess only to further truths, and never to falsehoods. It would be
nice if our inferences were always such that if we start from truths, we will
The following image may help convey part of what is meant by logical validity. Imagine that all
possible sentences, both true and false, were written on individual stepping-stones separated by mud
in a giant lake. Some of these stepping-stones have true sentences written on them, others false ones.
In terms of this metaphor, let us think of an inference or "step of reasoning" as a step or move from
one stone or a group of sentence-stones (the reasons) to another (the conclusion). The moves represent
steps of reasoning. Now suppose that I would like to move in such a way that if I begin from stepping-
stones carrying true sentences, I will with high probability step only to other stones that also carry
true sentences. This obviously would be very useful. This condition will exist if my reasoning is valid.
If my steps of reasoning are valid, I am guaranteed that probably the sentences on which I end up will
be true too (assuming that I started out from true sentences). If my reasoning has been valid, then
assuming I start out from true sentences, the conclusion that I reach is at least probably (and
sometimes certainly) true. In contrast, if my step of reasoning is not valid, this means that I could start
from true sentences as reasons yet have little likelihood of ending up on a true conclusion. If my
reasoning is invalid, it is quite possible for me to start from sentence-stones that are true but end up on
sentence-stones that are false. Invalid reasoning is more likely to carry one from true reasons to false
conclusions, whereas valid reasoning must always carry one from true assumptions to other
statements that are probably or certainly true, assuming the reasons are true. (In order to be sure, with
high likelihood, of arriving at true conclusions, it is necessary, of course, to start from true reasons in
the first place. If I start from false sentence-stones as reasons, then valid reasoning might carry me to a
false conclusion. The guarantee that if the reasoning is valid, the conclusions will always be at least
probably true, holds good only if one starts from true reasons.) A valid step of reasoning moves to
another statement that is at least probably true if the starting reasons are true.
never arrive ai a falseliood but short of that, we at least want to arrive always
,
at statements that are probably true if the reasons are true. This is why we
demand that reasoning be valid, which has the consequence that it is un-
likely or impossible to arrive at a false conclusion if we start from true
reasons.
Degrees of Support (Degrees of Validity)
This book from most other logic texts by recognizing that, in

differs
natural language, different reasons can support their conclusions with
different degrees of support. The concept of "degree of support" (or
"degree of strength" as it will also be called) corresponds to what some
philosophers of science call "degree of confirmation" in the context of the
proof or disproof of scientific theories. If, for example, certain assump-
tions and evidence highly confirm a certain hypothesis or conclusion,
then the degree of support of these reasons for that conclusion is "very
strong." The similar phrase "degree of validity" is used by natural
logicians, for the same purpose.** However, some traditional formal
deductive logicians use the term "valid" in a different way and oppose this
new way of using the term. So to avoid controversy and confusion, the
more neutral phrase "degree of support" will be used in this edition to
describe the extent to which given reasons make the truth of a given
conclusion likely or probable.' (If I sometimes forget myself, however,
and speak of the "degree of validity" of reasoning, please replace this, if you
prefer, with "degree of confirmation" or "degree of support.")
In a long chain of reasoning that contains many inferences, the
degree of support associated with each inference or arrow is judged
separately by considering only the reasons appearing directly above the
arrow and the conclusion to which the arrow points. Because each
separate inference is evaluated in isolation, the strength of one inference
may from the strength of another inference. In other words, different

differ
steps of reasoning (even in the same argument) can have different
strengths. In different arguments, or with different steps of reasoning in
the same argument, the reasons can lend different degrees of support to
the conclusion.^
We distinguish five degrees: nil, weak, moderate, strong, and deduc-
tively valid.
Note to Advanced Readers: These concepts are not used in Beardsley's logical system.
Note to Adi'anced Readers: The concept of the "degree of support" of a natural-language argument is
similar in some ways to the concept of "conditional probability" in statistics. (The "conditional
probability" of 'Q' given 'P' is the probability thai 'Q' is true if, or assuming that, 'P' is true.)
Note to Advanced Readers: Direct empirical study of undoctored exmples of reasoning in natural
language shows this clearly. (Natural logic is it has an empirical base.)
not a purely a priori study;
1. At the bottom end of the spectrum comes reasoning in which

Nil.
the reasons provide no support whatsoever for the drawn conclusion. An
example was the argument about Buddy cited earlier. The reasons in it
provide not even the slightest support for the conclusion it draws. The
diagram looks like this:
Some roses are red. + Some violets are blue.
I ml)
Buddy still loves Peggy Sue.
In such an argument the reasons give no support to the conclusion. We

will say that the degree of support is ml.
Notice that the rating "nil" is written beside the arrow. We do this
because the arrow represents the step of reasoning, or inference, which is
what we are here evaluating. We are rating only the extent to which the
reasons if true would render the conclusion probable, and not the probable
truth or falsity of the reasons. We are here rating the strength of the step of
(Remember always, of
reasoning, not the truth or falsity of the statements.
course, that to establish the truth ofconclusion reasoning must have true
its
reasons as well as provide a high degree of support for its conclusion.)

When the reasons do provide some justification for their conclusion,
there are wide differences in the support they do provide.
2. Weak. In some reasoning the reasons provide only weak support for
the conclusion. The post office bribery argument discussed in Chapter 1 is
an example.
It took over a The plaster The heating

year to finish began to crack system
+ +
the post office after it was broke down.
building. completed.
(weak)
Somebody was taking bribes.
Why is this argument weak? Although the reasons provide some evidence
in favor of the conclusion, they fall far short of establishing it. By
applying the test of validity stated earlier, we can show this clearly. To the
proper question, "Could the reasons be true and yet the conclusion be
false?" the answer, obviously, is "Yes, it is quite possible." There are
many imaginable ways in which the statements given as reasons could all
be true without anyone's having taken bribes. For example, perhaps the
workmen were incompetent and consequently took longer than they
should have to finish the building, constructed the walls improperly, and
installed the heating system incorrectly. In that case, the statements giving
the reasons could be true while the conclusion was false. The reasons
provide some slight evidence for the conclusion, perhaps justifying a
preliminary investigation of the charge, but they fall short of proving it.
yVnother example of weak reasoning is an "induction" or statistical
generalization based on insufficient evidence or evidence that is possibly
biased or unrepresentative of what is being generalized about. For
example:
1
All of the six A "Welshman" is
Welshman I have
have , someone from the
known have been
beer country of Wales.
excellent singers.
{weak}
V
All Welshmen are excellent singers.
This reasoning is weak because it draws a conclusion about a very large

group of individuals (all Welshmen) based on knowledge of only six
members of that group. Furthermore, no indication is given that these
individuals were randomly chosen or that they are representative of the
group of Welshmen as a whole. Notice that classifying this step of reasoning
as "weak" does not mean that Welshmen are not all excellent singers. It
still might be true that all Welshmen are excellent singers, but the
evidence cited here prove it. That is all we mean when we say that
fails to
the degree of support is weak.
Although the step of reasoning is weak, it is not completely nil,
because it does contain a tiny bit of evidence of the sort that is relevant to
proving the truth of such a conclusion. But the evidence given in the
reasons falls far short of proving the truth of the broad generalization in
the conclusion. (Later in this section we will see another example of an
induction or statistical generalization that is strong.)
Again the rating "weak" is written beside the arrow because we are
only evaluating the goodness of the STEP of reasoning FROM the reasons
TO the conclusion. This rating is our answer to the question, "How well
does this reasoning meet the second requirement that reasoning must
—
meet in order to be sound that is, the requirement that the step of
reasoning be valid?" The answer is that this reasoning is "weak," and fails
to meet the second requirement. The other, equally important question of
I
125 2-1 What Is Good Reasoning
how well does the reasoning meet the first requirement for soundness
(namely, the requirement that the reasons be true) has not even been
discussed. So far, I have not said anything about whether the reasons are
true or false. For reasoning to be sound, BOTH the requirement that the
reasons be true AND the requirement that the step of inference be valid
must be met. The reasoning in both of these examples is unsound because
the step of inference in each of them is weak, which means that they fail
the validity requirement. VVê can already tell from this fact that the
reasoning is unsound as it stands; we do not even need to go on to the
question of whether the reasons are true or false.
3. Moderate. Other arguments provide moderate support for their

conclusions, For example, back in the 1970s this reasoning was widely
heard:
Many of Nixon's It is unlikely that Nixon has a

top aides have Nixon's top aides long record
admitted attempt- + would engage in + of unscrupulous
ing to subvert the political subversion activities.
democratic process. without his consent
and direction.
{ynoderate)
Nixon was guilty of attempting to

subvert the democratic process.
The specific reasons given in the argument above provide significant

support for the conclusion, but they do not prove it conclusively, or
beyond any possible reasonable doubt. Although perhaps unlikely, it is
still possible (as far as the reasons given above are concerned) that Nixon's
top aides acted as they did without his consent and direction, so that
despite his past behavior he is innocent of the charge. (Notice that the test
of validity given earlier —
if reasoning is valid, there should be no
realistically imaginable way in which the reasons could be true and yet the
—
conclusion be false is here again being applied to make this judgment.)
So although this reasoning provides moderately strong evidence for its
conclusion, more evidence would have to be given to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
"So, should we accept such reasoning or not? In answer to this
"
question, I would say that the cited evidence certainly gives enough
support to the conclusion to justify suspecting Nixon's guilt, but that
these reasons alone, by themselves, give insufficient support to the
conclusion to justify accepting it as true or proven. (Any notion that a
126 Basn K\ahialioij ol Rjaxmini;
of the
(ntain dcuinunaiion of the (ruth or
falsity
...on-
in (IH.niU' (.1
these reasons some more

(,„uh.si(,n could bf reached by applyhig to
evaluation is silly.
powerful or more sophisticated methods of logical
any
Huh- is nothing more regarding Nixon's innocence or guilt that
here. More
meihods ol logic (an sc,uee/e out of the reasons given
determination
information or evidence is required before a more definite
can be made.)
Remember that the rating oi "moderate" here relates only to the
of this reasoning; it is NOT a rating of the
truth, nor of the
validity
likelihood, of the reasons. only a rating of how much the reasons, ?/
It is
true. In other
they be true, would make it likely that the conclusion is
connection between the reasons
words, it is a rating ol the goodness of the
and the cone lusion.
In other reasoning, the reasons provide strong support
for
4. Strong.
the
the conclusion. For example, after a series of clinical trials to test
effectiveness of a treatment for herpes simplex sores involving first
painting the sores with neutral red dye (NA 676) and then irradiating
them with ordinary light, medical researchers reasoned as follows.'^ (In
this example, owing to the length of the sentences, the reasons have been
put in a vertical rather than horizontal list; this makes absolutely no
difference to the reascMiing.)
Of 18 patients previously had recurrences of herpes sores to the same

who
site, after treatment with neutral red dye and exposure to light only two (11%)
had a recurrence lo the same site.
In contrast, in control subjects who were not treated with neutral red dye
1 1
and light (but with a placebo in a double-blind experiment), 83% had

recurrences to the same site.
Numercjus earlier studies had shown that neutral red dye followed by brief
exposure to light completely inactivates the herpes virus in the test tube.
(strong)
Treatment of herpes simplex sores with neutral red dye and light alters or
eliminates the virus at the site treated, rendering it less likely to produce a
new sore at exactly the same site.
''I'roy I). FcIIhi and others. PIiuKkIn nainu inarlivation of Herpes Simplex, Report of a Clinical
I rial." journal of the .imrrKon .\ttdual Associalton, 223, no. 3, 292.
L
127 2-1 Hliai Is Good Reasoning
Here the cited reasons give strong support to the conclusion. They do not,
of course, establish it conclusively, or with total or absolute certainty — the
evidence could imaginably be as described and yet this treatment not be
effective against the virus (the observed results might be due entirely to
chance, or to the action of some other hidden cause). However, this seems
unlikely. Certainly the evidence supports the conclusion strongly enough
to warrant acting as if that conclusion were true (assuming, of course, that
the given reasons are true).
A practical measure of a strong degree of support is that the reasons
be related to the conclusion in such a way that the truth of the reasons, if
they were true, would establish the truth of the conclusion with a degree
of certainty high enough to count on it with confidence for all realistic
purposes.
Statistical generalizations, or "inductions," sometimes also give
strong support to their conclusions. For example:
The fifty marbles The first forty-
in this bag were eight marbles

thoroughly + examined, each chosen
stirred and mixed at random, were all
before sampling. clear glass.
(strong)
The remaining two marbles

are both clear glass.
The large proportion of marbles examined, and the facts that the marbles
were thoroughly stirred before sampling and were chosen at random, all
contribute to the strength of this reasoning. But the reasons do not make
the truth of the conclusion totally certain. It remains possible that one (or
even both) of the two marbles still in the bag is not made of clear glass.
One can imagine the reasons being true, and yet the conclusion being
false. However, this is unlikely. Consequently, the step from these reasons
to this conclusion is rated as strong. But although it is strong, it is still less
than the highest possible degree of strength. Unlikely as it may be, the
logical possibility that a remaining marble is not clear glass (despite the fact
that the first 48 drawn at random were clear glass) makes this step of
reasoning less than 100% certain.
5. At the highest end of the scale comes reasoning in

Deductively valid.
which the reasons are such that, if they are all true, the truth of the
conclusion is 100% guaranteed. Such reasoning is called "deductively
128 B.lî( 1- valuation ol RcaNoiiiiit;
x'dluL" If dcduc lively valid, then it is not even logically

reasoning is
possible for the reas()n(s) to be true and yet the conclusion be false. Here is
a simple example.'"
George has two suitcases.
(deductively valid)
George has some luggage.
Here the conclusion follows with complete logical certainty from the
reason; the support that the reason provides the conclusion is total, or
100%. This means that there is no possible or imaginable way in which the
(()n( lusion could be false if the reason is true. (Do not say, "Yes it could; if
the word 'luggage' had a different meaning in English, then the reason
could be true and the conclusion false." For, during the evaluation, the
meanings of all the words in the reasoning are treated as given and fixed as
they exist in the language being used.) In deductively valid reasoning, it is
an impossible ("logically impossible") state of affairs for the statement
given as a reason to be true and the statement given as a conclusion to be
false. In other words, in deductively valid reasoning, the relationship
between the reason and conclusion is such tfiat once the truth of the
reason is accepted, the truth of the conclusion becomes inescapable.
This reasoning is deductively valid just as it stands, with only the
given reason. No additional reason or premise is necessary to make it
deductively valid. The validity of reasoning in natural language depends
on the meaning, or semantic content, of all the words and phrases (like
"suitcase" and "luggage") that appear in the reason and conclusion. This
is the usual situation that exists in most cases of reasoning in natural
language (in contrast to the usual situation with artificial formal lan-
guages where validity depends only on the meanings of certain key
"logical" words). This meaning or semantic content'^ makes it logically
impossible for the reason to be true and the conclusion to be false.
Notice again that the rating of "deductively valid" does not mean
that the reasons are true. It only means that the step from the reason(s) to
the conclusion is good. It means that the conclusion follows logically
from the reason(s). So, this reasoning passes the second necessary require-
ment for soundness, since it is valid. But in order to be sound, it must also
have true reasons. Nothing has yet been said about whether the reasons are
true or false. It has only been said that the reasoning is valid. If the reason(s)
Adapted lioiii (..K. Mooic.

"And not just the "loi'Kal loim oi "syntax" of the slalements.
129 2-1 What Is Good Reasoning:'
is (are) not true, then this reasoning is unsound, even though it is vaUd. At
the moment, we are only practicing judging vahdity.
Naturally, linked reasoning involving more than one reason also can
be deductively valid. A more complicated example of deductively valid
reasoning is given below^:
(1) Spending for a massive military buildup was the

principal cause of excessive federal deficit spending
during President Reagan's administration.
+
(2) President Reagan deliberately brought about this
federal deficit spending to finance a needless
massive military buildup.
+
(3) Presidents are responsible for the foreseeable
consequences of their deliberate actions.
(4) President Reagan knew at the time that inflation results

ftom the previous creation of extra purchasing
media (money) by excessive federal deficit spending.
{deductively valid)
Reagan is responsible for increases in inflation during,

or immediately after, his term in office, that are due to
his military buildup.
Here again, if one accepts the truth of the reasons, there is no way to avoid
accepting the truth of the conclusion. (This is seen as follows. Suppose the
four reasons to be true. Then statements 1 and 2 assert Reagan's responsi-
buildup and his support for its financing by
bility for a needless military
deficitspending, and statement 4 implies that he knew, or should have
foreseen, that this would cause inflation. So, an increase in inflation after
the military buildup is a foreseeable consequence of actions that Reagan
deliberately performed. From this and statement 3, the conclusion follows
that Reagan is responsible for the resulting inflation.) A deductively valid
inference is no way possible for the reasons to be true
one in which it is in
and yet the conclusion be false. This step of reasoning is deductively valid
because there is no possible way in which the statements giving the
reasons could be true and Reagan not be responsible for inflation
resulting from his actions.
130 Basic Evalualion of Reasoning
1 1 IS show thai a step of reasoning is not deductively valid

possible lo
simply by thinking of some imaginable way in which all the reasons
could be true, and yet the conclusion be false. If, without contradicting
yourself, you can imagine or describe some logically possible world in
which all the statements giving the reasons would be true, but the
conclusion would be false, then no matter how far-fetched it may be, this
is enough to show that this step of reasoning is not deductively valid.
Reasoning with the Words "All" and "Some"
A step of inference from "All f 's have property P" to the conclusion
that "This F has property P" is, But as it
in general, deductively valid.
stands, a step from "This F has property P," or "Some P's have property
P," to the conclusion "All P's have property P" will, in general, be less
than deductively valid (unless more additional assumptions are added to
the reason given, as explained later in Section 2-5).
Traditional logic textbooks normally illustrate deductive validity
with examples of syllogisms such as the following:
All men are mortal. + Socrates is a man.
{deductively valid)
Socrates is mortal.
Obviously, if the reasons given are true, then the conclusion also must be
true. In no possible way could the reasons in this argument be true and the
conclusion false. To dispute or deny the conclusion while agreeing with
the reasons would result in a contradiction, or inconsistency. Anyone who
said, "All men are mortal and Socrates is a man, but Socrates is not
mortal" would be involved in a self-contradiction. Here, as in any other
deductively valid reasoning, if one accepts the truth of the reasons, then
one has no choice but to acknowledge the truth of the conclusion. Few
important arguments are this simple, however.
Miscellaneous Special Points
Qualifying words or phrases like "mostly," "seldom," "perhaps,"

"probably," "primarily," "in essence," "in substance," "maybe," etc., can
make a big difference in the strength of a step of reasoning when they
appear in reasons or conclusions. If the conclusion of the previous
example were changed to "President Reagan is the only one responsible
for the resulting inflation," for instance, the reasoning could no longer be
rated as deductively valid (but v^'ould have to be rated lower), because

nothing mentioned in the given reasons showed that only Reagan was
if the conclusion of the Nixon argument were the
responsible. Similarly,
weaker claim "Nixon is probably guilty of attempting to subvert the
democratic process," then the strength of the inference would have to be
rated as somewhat greater. All words in an argument arc important,
including little words of the sort listed above, so pay attention to all of
them.
Students sometimes ask, "In making judgments about validity, are
we supposed to be evaluating the author's underlying intended reasoning,
or are we just attacking his ability to state it?" Dealing with this question
is difficult, because the answer may vary from case to case, depending on
one's purposes, and furthermore, the distinction is not a clear one. But I
can report the policy I follow. I don't hesitate to rewrite slightly the
author's original statements when putting them in a diagram if by so
doing I can make them better express what I believe to be the author's
intended meaning and raise the degree of support, and I go ahead and
supply, either in my mind or on paper, whatever additional statements I
think are included in the author's unstated background assumptions.'"
Then I evaluate the reasoning as written that way. (Of course, in making
such changes one should show deletions by using ellipses like this ". ." .
and additions by enclosing them in square brackets [like this].) So if you

think an author's intended meaning is somewhat different from the words
actually given, I think it permissible to write the diagram as you thmk the
reasoning intended was meant, and then evaluate this diagram taking
everything very literally. And when you evaluate, look primarily for any
ways you can think of in which the reason(s) could be true yet the
conclusion(s) be false.
Another question that may be asked is, "What about truth? For
reasoning to prove or explain its conclusion, it must be valid and also have
true reasons. As the example about whales illustrated, reasoning that
starts from false reasons but is valid can still end up with a false
conclusion. So it is crucial that the reasons be true. But you have talked
only about judging the validity or degree of support of the reasoning.
What about the important topic of determining the truth or falsity of the
reasons? How can it be judged whether or not the reasons are true? Where
do I learn how to tell whether the reasons are true?" To a large extent, you
have probably already learned the answer to this important question from
your other courses over the years in school and from your previous
''Any reasoning can be made deducti\ely valid if appropriate additional assumptions are added.
(You'll learn how do this in Section 2-5). But it sometfmes is difficult to put the author's actual
to
intended assumptions into words, and often the assumptions you add will be subject to dispute.
132 Basil Evaluation ol Reasoning
experience in life. From your previous education and experience, you

have probably already learned a large number of truths, plus methods for
finding out more and for separating false statements from true statements.
As you probably already know, some of the methods by which true
statements can be separated from false statements include (1) experiments
and observations, (2) consulting reliable books or authorities, and (3)
reasoning from other statements whose truth you already know. Also, the
various particular academic disciplines (mathematics, natural sciences,
social sciences, economics, history, archeology, classics, etc.) have their
own specialmethods for discovering facts about their respective subjects.
These are some of the methods by which the truth or falsity of statements
can be judged. Since probably you are already fairly skillful at this other
aspect of evaluating soundness (recognizing true and false reasons), this
logic textbook is devoted primarily to teaching the other equally impor-
tant skill of being able to judge accurately the degree to which given
reasons support further conclusions (that is, validity) the other crucial
component of the ability to reason logically.
When evaluating reasoning, special caution sometimes is needed,
because in some cases reasoning may appear to be deductively valid when
in reality the reasons give little or no support to the conclusion. That is,
when reasoning that appears to be deductively valid fails,
initially
sometimes it flops completely. For example, suppose that someone
reasoned like this:
I put 2 cubic centimeters of alcohol

into this empty test tube and then
added 2 cubic centimeters of water
to it and stirred.
\
Now there are exactly 4 cubic
centimeters of an alcohol-water
mixture in this test tube.
To many people reasoning appears dedu( tively valid ("since,"

at first this
they reason, "2 + =
But two cubic centimeters of alcohol added to
2 4").
two cubic centimeters of water will mix to form slightly less than four
cubic centimeters of liquid. Once this fact of chemistry is known, the
reasoning does not even seem to be strong. So remember, if reasoning falls
"a little" short of deductive validity, do yiot automatically assume that its
reasons probably provide at least strong support for the conclusion.
They
may provide none at all, so look more closely.
In relation to deductively valid reasoning, certain
special terminol-
ogy is commonly used. The reasons in a deductively valid argument are

also called "premises," and the use of the term "premise" is often taken to
indicate that the reasoning in question is supposed to be deductively valid.
Also, the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is said to be
"logically entailed'' or "logically implied" by the premises.
Different logicians vary in their use of the term "invalid" (meaning
"not valid"). Many logicians who specialize in formal deductive logic
(which primarily studies reasoning in artificial formal symbolic lan-
guages) apply the term "in\alid" to any reasoning that is not deductively
valid, and apply the term "valid" only to reasoning that is deductively
valid. In contrast to this, a natural logician (who studies reasoning in
natural languages that are actually used for human communication) may
call reasoning "valid" if it is strong but less than deductively valid.
The range of terms "nil," "weak," "moderate," "strong," and
"deductively valid" will be used in this book to express approximately the
—
degree of support of a step of reasoning that is, the extent to which the
drawn conclusion would be made likely by the given reasons IF those
reasons were true. Of course, for reasoning to be sound and prove or
explain its conclusion, the reasons must actually be true, but you do not
have to know whether or not they are true to judge how well the
—
conclusion follow§ logically from the reason(s) given that is, the degree
to which the reasons would, if true, support the conclusion.
To make a judgment about the approximate degree of support (or
degree of confirmation or of validity or whatever you ike to call i t of a step
, , 1 )
of reasoning, do the following. First, read all the reasons and the
conclusion very carefully, and then try to think of any possible ways in
which, even if the reasons were true, the conclusion could still be false.
That is, try to think of ways in which the reasons could be true and yet the
conclusion nevertheless be false. Try asking yourself The Magic Question:
"Supposing the reason(s) were true, is there any way in which the
conclusion nevertheless could be false?" If there exists no imaginable or
conceivable way in which the conclusion could be false if the reason(s)
were true, then the given step of reasoning is "deductively valid." On the
other hand, if you can think of some way(s) in which the conclusion could
be false even if the reason(s) were true, then the step is not deductively
valid. In that case, to figure out whether it is "strong," "moderate,"
"weak," or "nil," carefully consider how likely these possible ways are. If
there is more than one way in which the reason(s) could be true and the
conclusion false, pick out the most likely of these and estimate how likely
it is. If the most likely of the imaginable ways in which the conclusion
could turn out false even if the reason(s) were true is a highly unlikely
situation (for example, an invasion by extra-terrestrials or a sudden
131 Basil Kvahi.itioii ol Rcisoiiiii^
complete reversal of the Law of Gravity), ifien the degree of support is

"strong." If the imaginable way is a realistic possibility— sometfiing 6i
the kind that can and actually sometimes does occur in our world— but
still rather unlikely, then the inference is rated "moderate." However, if
the possible way is something that is highly likely, something of the sort
that commonlydoes or might occur, or even probable, then the degree of
support is "weak" or worse.
Always keep this in mind: If you give an inference's degree of support
a low rating, then you should be prepared to describe some realistic,
concrete way that the reason(s) could be true and yet the conclusion be
false. On you give the degree of support of a step of
the other hand, if
reasonnig a high rating, then it had better be impossible for anyone else to
think of any realistic way in which the conclusion could be false even if
the reason(s) were true. If someone else can think of a realistic way that the
cone lusion could be false even if the reason(s) were true, that shows that
your judgment of validity is off and that your high rating was incorrect. In
general, then, when you evaluate the goodness of the connection between
a conclusion and the reason(s) given for it, always ask yourself the
following questions: "Is there any way in which this could go wrong?
That is, is there any way in which the conclusion could turn out to be
false even if the reason(s) were true?"
Incidentally, as you might expect, this sort of cautious, careful,
critical thinking is as helpful and valuable throughout real life as it is in
working out the exercises in this text. If you can anticipate in your mind
the ways in which something could go wrong, even before trying it, without
having to learn every lesson the hard way, you can save yourself a lot of time
and trouble and be more successful in accomplishing your goals. To cite a
simple concrete example, if you were considering embarking on a business
venture on the basis of certain reasons for thinking that it will be a successful
venture, it is a good procedure to try to think of all the possible ways in
whi( h the conclusion (that it will be successful) might be false even if the
reasons are true. By doing so, you can take steps to prevent the venture from
going wrong, or even reconsider your actions if the possible ways it could go
wrong are too likely (that is, if the risks are too great). Do not make the silly,
but common, mistake of thinking that if the reasons are true, then the
conclusion will be true too. You must also evaluate the validity of the
reasoning. If the conclusion does not follow, then the conclusion may be
false even if the reasons are true.
The \
Magic V "Supposing the reason(s) were true, is there any way in which the
Question I conclusion nevertheless could be false?"
Summary of Degrees of Support

(or Degrees of Validity)
Nil. Even if all the gi\en reasons were true, they would provide no
justification or explanation whatsoever for the conclusion.
Weak. If the given reasons were true, then they would provide a small
amount of support for the conclusion, but certainly not enough to
justify accepting the conclusion as true. The reasons are logically
make it a "live possibility," but
relevant to the conclusion, they they are
not compelling enough even to make it "a good bet."
Moderate. Less than "strong" but better than "weak." If the reasons are
true, they do not establish the truth of the conclusion, but they make it
"a good bet"; however, more would be required to establish the
conclusion beyond any reasonable doubt.
Strong. If the reasons are true, they make the truth of the conclusion
extremely likely, certain beyond any reasonable doubt, "virtually a sure

thing," but not totally guaranteed. (How likely is "extremely likely"?
Likely enough to make it reasonable to stake something of great value
on the truth of the conclusion, if the reasons are true likely enough —
to serve as a definitely reliable basis for actions.)
Deductively valid. There is no imaginable way in which the reasons
could be true awd yet the conclusion be false. Truth of the reason(s)
would totally guarantee the truth of the conclusion. It is logically
impossible for the reason(s) to be true and the conclusion be false.
Note: There is some room for judgments to vary in applying these ratings.
They are approximate.
Here is a picture that gives a way of relating these various degrees to
each other. The thought of as
different possible degrees of support can be
bands along a gradually varying scale of values ranging from 0% to
different
100% support (or alternatively, if you like, from for "nil" to 1 for — — —
"deductivelv valid").
Degrees of Support
(or "Degrees of Validity")
not deductively valid

I
0%
nil
weak moderate strong
The absence of sharp boundaries between these various degrees actually

enhances the power and utility of these concepts in application to reasoning
\'M> Basic 1- A.iliiaiioii ol Reasoning
Ml naiuial laiitûages. tor no sharp boundary exists in the real-Ufe cases

either.
Reasoning Involving Subjective Personal Views,

Matters of Opinion, Value Judgments, Moral Claims,
and Aesthetic Evaluations Can Be Valid
Do NOT make common

but serious error of thinking that all
tlie
reasoning involving subjective personal views, matters of opinion, value

judgments, moral claims, aesthetic evaluations, etc., necessarily or auto-
matically receives a low rating. Such reasoning may be strong, and even
deductively valid. A simple instance of moral reasoning that is deductively
valid is the following:
All inoral agents should I am

minimize suffering
try to + a moral
and maximize happiness. agent.
(deductively valid)
W.
I should try to maximize happiness and
minimize suffering.
Countless similar examples could be cited. Likewise, much reasoning

involving what many people would regard as "subjective personal views"
or "matters of opinion" is valid. A simple example is the following
passage from an art critic's commentary on the guitars created by the
famous flamenco guitar maker Santos Hernandez:
The instruments of Santos Hernandez represent something very special to

me, because I feel they imbibe the true sound of flamenco music, the sound
of the dry loind.
From Allen Yonge, Flamenco y sus Estious y sus Flamencos

broadcast radio commentary, KRAB-FM
With the addition of an assumption to the effect that for a guitar to have
"the sound of the dry wind," which this critic feels to be the true sound of
Flamenco, is something extremely special to him (an additional assump-
tion that seems clearly justified by the context), there seems to be no
realistic possible way in which the reasons could be true and yet the
description of his feelings in the conclusion be false. If this is correct, then
this reasoning rates as strong:
137 2-1 What Is Good Reasoning
I feel that [the instruments [Imbibing the true

of Santos Hernandez] imbibe , sound of Flamenco
the true sound of Flamenco, is something very
the sound of the dry wind. special to me.]
(strong)
The instruments of Santos Hernandez represent something

very special to me.
Countless other examples could be quoted of valid reasoning involving

aesthetic evaluations, personal opinions, subjective judgments, etc. In
such cases, as in any instance of reasoning, the degree of support depends
on exactly what is said in the reason(s), conclusion(s), and on their
interrelationships. One cannot say in advance that all reasoning involving
certain topics, or certain kinds of statements, will have some specified
degree of validity. Such reasoning can have any degree of validity, from
the lowest to the highest, so it is necessary to evaluate each instance of
reasoning individually on its own inerits.
Exercises
In the exercises that follow, you will be given a series of reasoned

discourses and asked to diagram each (as in Chapter 1; and then judge the
degree of support (validity) of each separate step of reasoning, writing one
of the evaluative terms ("nil," "weak," etc.) beside each arrow. These
terms are not exact, so reasonable differences in individual judgments
should be expected. I think you'll find, though, that after a little practice,
reflection, and discussion, your answers will pretty much agree with
everyone else's.
In order to decide whether an argument is sound, we must ask two
distinct questions: (1) Are the statements given as reasons true? (2) Is the
reasoning valid? The following exercises, however, will concentrate
exclusively on the second question. In these exercises, you will not be
asked your opinion whether you believe the reasons in the discourses, or
the conclusions, are true. You will be asked only about the strength of
each step of reasoning between them. Of course, whether the reasons are
true or false is equally important to determining the soundness of the
reasoning.
In the exercises throughout this chapter, you will be asked to write
out in full the statements shown in your diagrams, rather than using
numbers as in Chapter 1. There are two reasons for writing out the reasons
:i8 Basi( txaluation of Rtasoiiing
and (oiu lusions. Hit' fiisi is to make certain iliai you are aware of every
single word in the reasons and conclusions. The second reason is that
sometimes there are several different possible ways of reading some
statements in a discourse, differences in interpretation that affect the
degree of support, and it is necessary for anyone who is going to check the
accuracy of your ratings to know how you are interpreting these state-
ments, whic h should be made clear when you write them out.
Examples
Example 1: Adapted from an advertisement for processed meat products appearing in

the Nov England Journal of Medicine:
Processed meats contain less sodium than processed cheese. This shows that
processed meals are a food that is relati\ely low in sodium, as compared with
other foods.
Processed meats contain less sodium than

processed cheese.
(weak)
Processed meats are a food that is relati\ely

low in sodium, as compared with other foods.
This reason provides only weak support for this conclusion, because it is
easy for the reason to be true and yet for the conclusion to be false. This
could happen if processed cheese, the item of comparison used, were ac-
tually a food with a very high sodium content. If that were the case, then
processed meats could contain less sodium than processed cheese, and
still be food that was relatively high in sodium content. Still, there is here
a tiny bit of data, or evidence, of the right kind to support this conclusion,
so the support is not quite zero.
Example 2: Adapted from an example given by Rudolf Carnap, Philosophy and Logical
Syntax (1935), quoted from Morton G. White, The Age of Analysis (New York: New
American Library, 1955), p. 210:
This key is made of iron. If an iron thing is placed near a magnet, it will
always be jjulled on by a force of magnetic attraction. This other object is a

bar magnet. The key is placed near the bar magnet now. Therefore, the key
will now be pulled on by an attractive force.
This If an iron thing is This The kev

key placed near a magnet, other is placed
is + it will always be + object + near the
made pulled on by a force is a bar
of of magnetic bar magnet
iron. attraction. mag;net. now.
{deductively valid)
The key will now

I
be pulled on by an attractive force.
This reasoning is deductively \alid because there is no imaginable or

conceivable way in which the statement appearing as the conclusion
could be false if the reasons are all true. Even if the key in this example
were imagined to be fastened down and could not move, this would not
make the conclusion false, because the conclusion does not say that the
key will mo\e. The conclusion only says that the key w ill now "be pulled
on" by an attractive force. (Something that is "pulled on" by a force can
remain stationary, if the attractive force is balanced by opposing forces
pushing in the opposite direction. No exact description of how near the
)
key is to the magnet is provided by the reasons, but this unclaritv does not
affect the validity of this reasoning, because the same term "near appears '
in both the second reason and the fourth reason. Assuming that it means
the same in both (whatever the exact distance between the key and
magnet), the two occurrences of the same term "cancel each other out," so
to speak, and allow the conclusion to follow with deducti\e validity.
Example 3: From a U.S. Postal Office go\ernment publication:
Laetrile contains cyanide, which is a deadly poison. Therefore, laetrile

could not be effective as a cure for cancer.
Laetrile contains Cyanide is a deadly

+
cvanide. poison.
(ml)
I
Laetrile could not be effective as a cure for cancer.
As they stand, these reasons provide no support for the conclusion,

because it is easy for these reasons to be true, and yet the conclusion be
false. This could happen, for example, if the cyanide were contained in
laetrile in a form that permitted only cancerous cells to absorb and be
poisoned by it. (An effective medicine can be a selective poison selective. —
1 U» Basic Evaluation of Reasoning
aLâmsiundcsiicdcellsor micro-organisms that we want todestroy.)

iliai is,
Araiingof "weak. "rather than "nil, "perhaps couldbe defended, but in my

opinion, llie correct rating here is "nil."
Be c eriain that you understand that when a step of reasoning is given
a low rating, this does not mean that we are saying that the conclusion is
false! We are only saying that the conclusion does not follow logically
from the reasons given, so that the reasoning does not prove or explain the
conclusion. When a low rating is given to a step of reasoning, this leaves it
open whether the conclusion is true or false. The conclusion might still be
true, and theremight even be some other reasoning that proves it. When
we give a low rating to an inference, we are only saying that the reasons
given do not, by themselves, prove or explain the truth of the conclusion.
We are not necessarily saying that the conclusion is false. Nor are we thereby
saying anything about the truth or falsity of the reasons.
Example 4: From a radio interview with Henri Matisse, first broadcast in 1942, tr. by
Pierre Sdineider. quoted from Jack D. Flam, Matisse on Art (Oxford: Phaidon Press,
1973. New York: K.P. Dutton, 1973), p. 92:
I am convinced that an artistcan have

no greater enemies than his bad paintings.
{moderate)
I
I do not release a painting or drawing
until I have given it every possible effort.
This reasoning lower than strong because it is realistically possible

rates
for the false even if what is said in the reason is true. This
conclusion to be
could happen, for example, if other temptations or motivations, such as a
need for income, or a mc^mentary impulse to please someone, caused this
artist to release a creation before he was able to give it every possible effort,
despite his conviction that an artist can have no greater enemies than his
bad paintings. (People can fail to act in accordance with their deepest
convictions.) But the support should be rated higher than weak. Although
the reasons do not establish the conclusion beyond any reasonable doubt,
they do make it "a good bet." Therefore, this step of reasoning receives a
rating of "moderate."
EXERCISES 2-1A
(a) Diagram each of the following examples of reasoning. DO NOT USE NUMBERS
these diagrams; instead, write out in full each of the constituent statements in
in
your diagram.
(b) Judge the degree of support of each separate inference in the reasoning.
Express your answer by writing either "nil," "weak," "moderate," "strong," or
"deductively valid" BESIDE EACH ARROW in the diagram according to how you
judge the strength of the inference. (That is, at each step of inference, supposing
that the reasons were true, tell how much support they would give to belief in the
conclusion.)
Optional: If an inference presupposes additional basic reasons that you know to be
true,you may, if you wish, add them to the diagram, in square brackets, and evaluate
the inference on that basis (but you are not required to do this). And if the reasoning
presupposes additional assumptions that you think it is reasonable to believe its
author or speaker would accept, you may, if you wish, add these assumptions to the
diagram, in square brackets, and evaluate the reasoning on this basis (but you are not
required to do this either).
A-1. (Automobile manufacturing compani es say th at it is no longer necessary to

"warm up" car motors before driving<^hereforeJ^letting my new car's motor
run for a few minutes before driving wilTnot increase its effective life']^
\
X î
o /^
V-/ec. l<
ô"- 'ôcJeteê.
^'^^C^st
iCiO
Ov
141
1 i'2 Basic Evaluaiioii ol Rcisoning
A-2. |\\ lull I wore tiusc luu minutes in the store today, they
s Iuk-s tor tifieen
didn't bother my feetJCTjuiehjrb A can wear them for eight straight
tomorrow I
hours ol sta^din^ and walking without difficuUyA .
X
\
J> -^
^ —
eW'.v'^ -i.
^M
A-3. (He feels good all the time/j^herefore Jne feels good in the mornings. ]
1
A
143 Exercises 2-1
Exercise adapted from Kahane:
A-4. \The border between Canada and the United States is the longest unguarded
border in the worldjrrhis snows that Canada is a peaceful natiom
\
\ ^ Û
Iv
A-5. yBetty is in love with JlonaJdjyV persori cannot be in love with more than
onejjf.]::^! at the same timâncARonald, Aroiie, and Betty are different people/!
herefore?'êttv is not in love with Archie'^
11-^*3
'î
01/
EXERCISES 2-1B
inthese diagrams; instead, write out in full each of the constituent statements in
your diagram.
(b) Judge the degree of support of each separate inference in the reasoning. Express
your answer by writing either "nil." "weak," "moderate," "strong," or "deductively
valid" BESIDE EACH ARROW in the diagram according to how you judge the
strength of that inference. (In other words, at each step of inference, suppose that
the reasons were true and then judge how much support they would give to belief
in the truth of the conclusion.)
an inference presupposes additional basic reasons that you know to be true,

If
you may, if you wish, add them to the diagram, in square brackets, and evaluate the
inference on that basis (but you are not required to do this). And if the reasoning pre-
supposes additional assumptions that you think it is reasonable to believe its author
or speaker would accept, you may, if you wish, add these assumptions to the dia-
gram, in square brackets, and evaluate the reasoning on this basis (but you are not
required to do this).
B-l._Jiirs car wont start^TherefoigLit is out of gasL.-^-
Vî-e'^ <- V) C> Nl ^
145
w^
IK) Basic Evaliiaiioii of Reasoning
B-2. riuic were fifty iiiai bit's in tliis jar. The marbles were thoroughly stirred and
mixi'd belore sainj)liiig. The first forty-nine marbles that I removed, all of wfiicli
were (hoscn at random, were all blue. Therefore, the next marble that I choose
horn the jai will also be blue.
B
147 Exercises 2-1
B-3. There were one bundled marbles in tbis jar. Tbe marbles were tborougbly
stirred and mixed before sampling. Tbe first fifty marbles tbat I removed, all of
wbich were cbosen at random, were all white. Therefore, all tbe remaining fifty
marbles in tbe jar are white.
loo +$^
£_Xa>3*^>-^\
1 48 Basic Evaluation of Rta>>oiiing
B-1. II ilu launch a surprise nuclear attack

Iniucl Slates develops ihe ability to
iJKit is so (levastatint^ that the Soviet Union vvou ki be
totally unable to retaliate,
this would increase l^S. national security.Chccauîf the U.S. develops such a nu-
( lear lirst-strike capabilitN. tiien the So\iet l^nion will be more afraid of U.S.
power.
n \
B
149 Exercises 2-1
From a paid political ad\ertisement bv challenging candidate Paul Simon:
B-5. First, my opponent. Senator Percy, was for the B-1 bomber. Then he was
against it. Then he was for it again. As this obviously shows, he is confused.
EXERCISES 2-10
these diagrams; instead, write out
in in full each of the constituent statements in
your diagram.
(b) Judge the degree of support of each separate inference in the reasoning. Express
your answer by writing either "nil," "weak," "moderate," "strong," or "deductively
valid" BESIDE EACH ARROW in the diagram according to how you judge the
strength of that inference. (In other words, at each step of inference, suppose that
the reasons were true and then judge how much support they would give to belief
in the truth of the conclusion.)
an inference presupposes additional basic reasons that you know to be true,

If
you may, if you wish, add them to the diagram, in square brackets, and evaluate the
inference on that basis (but you are not required to do this). And if the reasoning pre-
supposes additional assumptions that you think it is reasonable to believe its author
or speaker would accept, you may, if you wish, add these assumptions to the diagram,
in square brackets, and evaluate the reasoning on this basis (but you are not required
to do this).
C-1. All the apples in that bushel basket are ripe. These three apples are from
that basket. So, these three apples from that basket are ripe.
D^
151
132 Basic Kvaluatioii of Rtasoniiig
C-2. apples are from that bushel basket, and

riu'sc thicf all three of them are ripe,
/5«.all the apples in that basket must be ripe.
\^
C-3. Since every wallaby is an animal, and Gertrude is a wallaby, it follows that
Gertrude is an animal.
\
^^ >
C
153 Exercises 2-1
C-4 It is impossible for vou to beat the house at gambhng,4iMhereforeyou cannot

beat the house at gambUng.
J/
C-5. Jones is an atheistrTherefore. ipnes does not belie\ e in the existence of God.
t).^ ^
^
If)! Basic t\aluati()M ul Rtasoiiiiig
C-6. My opponent advocates national health insurance. All communists advo-

cate national health insurance/so she is a communist.
Ai^^
C-7. The snow is wet and heavy, f herefore/it is not a dry, powder snow.
^^
155 2-2 Semantic Clarification
2-2 SEMANTIC CLARIFICATION
Reasoning often contains language that needs to be clarified before its

soundness can be evaluated. There are various ways in which the meaning
of words and phrases can be unclear.
Words and phrases having several separate, distinct meanings are
called "ambiguous" or "equivocal." For example, the noun "bank" can
refer to (1) a place where money is deposited and loans are made, (2) the
edge of a river or lake, (3) the steep slope of a hill or road, or (4) the lateral
inclination of an airplane when it rounds a turn. Because the word "bank"
has several completely different separate meanings, it is called "equivocal"
or "ambiguous."
Words and phrases having hazy, fuzzy meanings, or imprecise defini-
tions, are called "vague." The noun "hill" is an example. As we normally
use this term, the size of the mounds that qualify as hills is not sharply de-
fined. Is a 10-meter-high pile of earth too small tocount as a "hill"? At the
other extreme, is Pike's Peak too big There are no
to be called a "hill"?
fixed answers to these questions, because the term "hill" is not sharply de-
fined. Of course, for specific purposes, we can arbitrarily set sharp bound-
aries regarding the size of mounds that will be counted as "hills," but prior
to any such stipulation and as the word ordinarily is used, what counts as
a "hill" is not sharply defined. Because of this, the word "hill" is said to
be vague. A term is said to be "vague" if there are some things for which
no definite answer exists to the question whether or not the term applies
to them because its meaning is not clearly or sharply enough defined for
the question to be answered. Many words in natural language are vague
to some extent.
Vague words and phrases have legitimate uses in natural language. ^^
Often, in fact, vague terms are just what are needed (especially when the
reality we are trying to describe has blurred edges or hazy boundaries).
itself
This is true, for instance, of our somewhat \ague ordinary words for colors
("yellow," "orange," "red," "magenta," etc.), and it also is true of the
terms introduced earlier in Section 2-1 to describe the different degrees of
support ("nil," "weak," "moderate," "strong," etc.) possible in reasoning.
Some vagueness in this terminology contributes to its usefulness, given
the continuous nature of the range of values it is used to describe.
Sometimes, however, the presence of ambiguous, vague, or unclear
terms in reasoning may create a problem when we try to evaluate it, because
"'"Bui is a blurred concept a concept at all?' Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all?
Is ite\en always an advantage to replace an indistinct pic ture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one
often exactly what we need?" —
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosopliual Investigations, tr. G.E.M. .-Vn-
scombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), Section 71.
156 BaMc Evaludiion ut Reasoning
what the reason (s) and conclusion (s) actually say will depend on the mean-
ing of these terms, and consequently, the degree to which given reasons
support a given conclusion may depend on the meaning such terms have.
There are different levels of semantic^'* clarification in dealing with reason-
ing in a natural language. To a certain extent, we already engaged in se-
mantic clarification when, in Chapter 1, we analyzed and expressed in a
clear diagram the sometimes rather confused, or obscure reasoning con-
tained in reasoned discourses. And later, in Chapter 3. you will learn how
to carry this art of clarification to even greater depths and heights. At the
present stage, however, it is necessary to learn how to deal with language
that needs to be clarified before we can evaluate the reasoning. This may
be language that needs to be clarified before the validity of the reasoning
can be evaluated, or language that would need to be clarified before the
truth of the reasons could be evaluated, or both. (It should be remembered
that although we have only been practicing the evaluation of validity in
the exercises in this chapter, our larger objective is not just to learn how to
evaluate validity as an academic exercise but rather to learn how to eval-
uate the soundness of reasoning in real cases, of which the evaluation of
validity is a part.)
In order to explain simply some of the ways in which reasoning can
be clarified, I am going to use a very The processes
elementary illustration.
I will show you would take only a fraction of an instant in real time, but
writing out their explanation and justification will take me a number of
pages. This does not mean that it would take a lot of tnne and effort to do
this in practice; once you understand what I am talking about, you
too
can do it in a flash. This is the best way I know to show clearly the methods
and procedures in\ olved. Later on, you will see more complex examples.
So, please allow me to startwith the following argument (for which
we supplied the omitted final conclusion earlier in the exercises for Sec-
tion 1-2). as a very simple illustration:
The bigger the burger, the better the burger. The burgers are
bigger at Burger King®.
—Jingle from a television commercial
(Cited by Pospesel.)
This reasoning is diagrammed as follows:
The bigger the burger ^ The burgers are

the better the burger. bigger at Burger King®.
[The burgers are better at Burger King®.]

^*Semanti<: ha\ m,s< lo do with meaning or meanings.
On initial examination, reasoning appears to be deductively valid,

this
but actually the situation is not so simple, because it contains several cru-
cial ambiguities and unclarities. It cannot really be counted as "deduc-
tively valid," or given any other rating, as it stands, without some prior
clarification. (To condense the following discussion, let us use "B.K." as
an abbreviation for "Burger King®.")
One problem is that the other objects than which B.K. burgers are
alleged to be "bigger" and "better" are left unspecified. As it stands, some-
one might claim that this already opens up an easy way in which the prem-
ises could be true and yet the conclusion be false. For example, it might be
that B.K. burgers were "bigger" than the burgers at other restaurants, but
smaller, and good than, the burgers I make at home. This is a real pos-
less
sibility. Why would that not yield a way in which the reasons could be
true, and yet the conclusion be false? Why would that not be one possible
way in which the statement "The burgers are bigger at B.K." could be true
(namely, they are bigger at B.K. than at any other restaurant), and yet the
statement "The burgers at B.K. are better" be false (namely, if B.K. burgers
are not better thanmy homemade burgers), even assuming the other reason,
"The bigger the burger the better the burger," is true? That is, if "The
burgers are bigger at B.K." were taken to be short for "The burgers are
bigger at B.K. than at any other restaurant" and if "The burgers are better
at B.K." were taken to be short for "The burgers at B.K. are better than any
other burgers, including my homemade burgers," then the reasoning cer-
tainly would not be valid. (There are other possibilities too: If another
restaurant's pizza were "better" than any B.K. burger (and we do compare
how good they are), would this not give us an-
different foods in terms of
other way in which
could be false that B.K. burgers are "better," even
it
though their burgers were bigger than others' burgers? Nothing in the
original discourse explicitly prevents this interpretation. If we are going
to evaluate the reasoning as it is written in the diagram, why don't these

possibilities show- that the original reasoning was invalid, rather than be-
ing deductively valid? If they do not, why not? If it is because the original
wording was supposed to be interpreted in a different way, let us see if we
can make this clear.
Someone may say, "Well, it is supposed to be understood that the
other things (hamburgers in this example, actually) to which B.K. burgers
are alleged to stand in the relations of being bigger than, and better than,
are the same identical things. Admittedly the original discourse and dia-
gram do not specify what other hamburgers are intended to be the objects
to which B.K. burgers compared, but the most charitable inter-
are being
pretation of the reasoning would assume that the objects to which B.K.
burgers are being compared are the same for both comparisons" Prob- —
138 Basic tvalualion ol Rtas(Jiiiiig
ably so. but this was nowhere said explicitly in the discourse or diagram.
Suppose we wanted to clarify this intended meaning explicitly right in the
diagram. How could this be done?
One way would simplybe to add [say, in square brackets] some lan-
guage that would say clearly what the intended objects of comparison are.
If one were only interested in satisfying some academic requirement to
make the reasoning unambiguously deductively valid, then one might try
making the right-hand reason say "The burgers are bigger at B.K. [than
some unspecified other burgers],'" and making the conclusion read, "The
burgers at B.K. are better [than these same other unspecified burgers]." We
could use square brackets in the same way to insert our clarifying language
into the diagram:
The bigger Tfie burgers are
the burger bigger at Burger King®
the better [than some unspecified
the burger. other burgers].
[The burgers at Burger King? are better than

these same other unspecified iDurgers.]
The square brackets have been placed around the language we have added
and the entire conclusion is enclosed in square brackets, because all of it
is language that we added. I'nfortunately, this easy mechanical solution

to the problem of clarification has two important disadvantages. (1) When
"clarified" in this way, the conclusion gives us little or no information
that we can use in guiding our actions. If all we knew were that "The burg-
ers at B.K. are betterthan some other unspecified burgers." we would have
littleor no information to enable us to decide whether or not we should
go to B.K. for a burger, if we want one. (2) In addition to providing no use-
ful information to guide our practical actions, this attempted clarifica-
it stands, would make it practically impossible to determine
tion, as whether
the right-hand reason is true or false. If the burgers used as the basis of
comparison are unspecified, how would we check to find out whether the
burgers at B.K. are bigger than them or not? And if we cannot determine
whether the right-hand reason is true or false, we cannot evaluate the truth
of all the relevant reasons.
Even if the reasoning now has been made valid,
it would remain impossible for us to evaluate its soundness. We might as
well throw this diagram away. So, this way of attempting to clarify the
reasoning has two shortcomings: it would make the reasoning useless to
us. and it would make it difficult or impossible to
establish its soundness.
But at least it did have the virtue of seeing clearly that the same basis for
comparison probably should be used for both "bigger" and "better."
Let us see if we can do a better job of clarifying this reasoning. What

should we take to be the common basis for the comparisons being presup-
posed in this reasoning? Here is a list of some possibilities:
homemade hamburgers
thehamburgers they used to make at B.K.
hamburgers at the closest McDonald's®
hamburgers at any McDonald's®
hamburgers at any eating establishment in the vicinity reached by this par-
ticular TV announcement
hamburgers at any eating establishment reached by this entire advertising
campaign
hamburgers anywhere in the world
Since it is a restaurant advertisement for hamburgers, probably the basis

for comparison not intended to be homemade hamburgers, or the ham-
is
burgers they used to ser\e at B.K. The intended meaning is probably that
B.K. burgers are bigger and better than the burgers at other restaurants. But
beyond this, the intended meaning and best interpretation are not clear,
and little or no further help is available to us from the original discourse.
this, we have some degree of freedom. We must simply
In a situation like
choose what seems to be the best interpretation under the circumstances,
all things considered.
One could do it differently, but I am not going to take the basis of
comparison to be restricted to the burgers at McDonald's for two reasons.
(1) If B.K. burgers were only better than McDonald's, this would give
me very little useful information about where I should buy burgers, since
there are many other restaurants in my vicinity, and if I am only told that
"The burgers at B.K. are better than at McDonald's," this leaves it open
that the best burgers might be found elsewhere. (2) Also, my beliefs about
the B.K. people lead me to expect that they probably mean to claim that
the burgers are bigger and better than burgers at any other restaurant
in the vicinity, and not just at McDonald's.
How big a vicinity? You could take the basis of comparison to be
"burgers at any eating establishment in any of the areas reached by this en-
tire advertising campaign," since probably this particular announcement
was only one of a large number in a large-scale advertising campaign. One
could do it differently, biu I am not going to interpret it in this way for se\ -
eral reasons. If I am
genuinely interested in the information in this par-
ticular discourse at all, I am primarily interested in its possible value and
utility to me in deciding where to buy my burgers. And I am going to buy

burgers only (or mainly) in the vicinity where I live. I certainly am not go-
ing to travel great distances just to buy hamburgers. To interpret the argu-
ment as referring to a wider vicinity would not increase its usefulness to
160 BaMt tvalualion of RtasoiiiiiK
me. and it would make it practically impossible for me to check out the
truth ol the right hand reason, since I have neither the time nor resources
to check the size of burgers at all the restaurants in all the vicinities reached
by that entire advertising (ampaign. (Asa matter of fact, I do not even know
with certainty in what other vicinities the same announcement was aired.)
So. I am going to try taking the intended basis of comparison to be
"burgers at any other eating establishment in the vicinity reached by this
particular announcement." Even though this announcement probably
was part of a large-scale advertising campaign, it is possible that this even
was exactly the way in which the advertisers intended that hearers should
interpret the claims made in eac h announcement, since they are, after all,
probably more interested in selling food at local outlets in the vicinities
reached by their individual announcements than they are in causing hear-
ers to entertain practically unverifiable global or universal beliefs. We are
dealing with an advertisement, after all, not a philosophical thesis. So, al-
though other interpretations are possible, this seems to be a reasonable
guess as to what probably was meant.
Whatever interpretation we choose, there are two equally good ways
to show the clarification in the diagram. One way to show that the Ian-
gauge is understood to have this meaning is by the use of square brackets,
as before:
The bigger the burger. The burgers are bigger

the better the burger. + at B.K. [than at any other
eating establishment within
the vicinity reached by
this announcement].
[The burgers are better at B.K. than at any other

eating establishment within the \icinity reached
by this announcement.]
Another way to show how the language is being interpreted is through use
of a fcjotnoie added to the diagram, as follows:
The bigger the burger. The burgers are bigger'

the belter the burger. at B.K.
[ Ihe burgers are better' at B.K.]

'". . . as compared with the burgers at any oiher eating esiablishmeiit within
the \i(inii\ readied hv (his annoinuement," I assume is meant.
Notice that the single footnote numeral "1" is inserted twice in this dia-
gram, to indicate that the same comparison
being used in both
basis for is
places. This accomplishes the same result as the square-bracket method.

The two means of clarification are equivalent, and one can use whatever
means (footnotes or square brackets) results in a diagram that is clearest
and easiest to read and e\aluate.
Is the reasoning now valid? That depends on what is meant by the left-
hand reason. Another clarification is needed. When the left-hand reason
says, "The bigger the burger, the better the burger," exactly what does this
mean? Does it mean that (A) "If two hamburgers both taste the same, have
the same nutritional value, and are equal in all other relevant respects ex-
cept that one is bigger than the other, then the larger hamburger is better
than the smaller one" — in other words, that "If two hamburgers are equal
in all other relevant properties, then the bigger a hamburger is. the better
it is" (that is, "other things being equal, the bigger the burger, the better
the burger")? Or does this sentence mean (B) "The bigger a burger is, the
better it is — period, regardless of anything else (that is, largeness is the sole
property that determines the quality of hamburgers)"?^^
\Vhen the left-hand reason is interpreted as having the first of these
two possible meanings (namely, "If two hamburgers are equal in all other
relevant qualities, the bigger a hamburger is, the better it is"), it seems more
likely to be true,.*ince, understood in this way, it allows that the goodness
of hamburgers might also depend on other properties besides size (for ex-
ample, taste and nutritional value). This consideration fa^ ors interpreta-
tion (A).
However, if the left-hand reason is interpreted in this way, the degree
of support of the step of reasoning will not be valid, but in fact will only be
weak. In other words, the conclusion (clarified earlier) that "The burgers
are better at B.K. than at any other eating establishment within the \ icinity
reached by this announcement" would not be very strongly supported by
the combination of this interpretation of the left-hand reason together with
the previously clarified right-hand reason (which says that "The burgers
are bigger at B.K. than at any other eating establishment within the vicinity
reached by this announcement"), since, for all we have been told, the ham-
burgers at other establishments might be better in other qualities. So on
interpretation (A): using again the square-brackets method of clarifica-
tion, the result would look like this after evaluation:
^Note to Advanced Readers: Thus the reasoning comes dangerously close to involving a previously
unnoticed fallacy of equivocation, since the sense in which many of us understand the left-hand
premise when we accept it as true is sense (A), but it probably must shift in meaning to sense
(B) for the reasoning to be valid and the conclusion to follow. Our notation will eliminate this
ambiguity.
162 Basic Evaluation ol Rtaioniiig
[If two hamburgers are The burgers are bigger at

equal in all other B.K. [than at any other
relevant qualities, then] + eating establishment in
the bigger the burger, the \icinity reached by
the belter the burger. this announcement].
(weak)
[The burgers are better at B.K. than at any other eating

establishment within the vicinity reached by this an-
nouncement.]
Even if B.K. hamburgers are bigger than those of other eating establish-
ments in the vicinity, it would still remain possible that they were not
better than all the other establishments' hamburgers, because another estab-
lishment's burgers (elsewhere in the vicinity) might be better in other quali-
ties that more than made up for size. So, if the left-hand reason is given
interpretation (A), the reasoning rates as weak (or at best, moderate).
To be sure, the degree of support here might be raised to "deductively
valid" by adding an additional assumption to the effect that "In all other
qualities, B.K. bingers are equal to or better than, the burgers at all other
eating establishments within the vicinity reached by this announcement,"
as follows:
[If two ham- [In all other The burgers

burgers are qualities, B.K. burgers are bigger
equal in all are equal to, or at B.K. [than
other relevant better than, the at any other
qualities, then] burgers at all + eating
the bigger the other eating estab- establishments
burger, the lishments within the within the
better the vicinity reached by vicinity reached
burger. this announcement.] by this
announcement].
[deductwely valid)
[The l)urgers are better at B.K. than at any other eating establishment
within the vicinity reached by this announcement.]
If we have not done the necessary culinary research (namely, testing ham-
burgers at resiaiuants throughout the \icuiiiy) and consequently do not
know whether assumption is true, then naturally we can-
this additional
not justily adding it argument on the grounds that we know that it
to the
is true and that it raises the degree of support. However, it could be argued
that is plausible to think that those who gave the original
it
argument do
beliei'e thai this further assumption is true. •>o it is reasonable to assume

that the resuh of assumption is a diagram that accurately por-
adding this
trays the original intended argument, and therefore the addition is justi-
fied. This, then, would be one possible w ay of handling this argument with
interpretation (A) of the left-hand reason in accordance w ith the principle
that arguments should be analyzed and diagiammed in the way that makes
them into the soundest possible reasoning (Principle of Charity). On this
interpretation, additional research (testing hamburgers at other restau-
rants in the vicinity) will be needed in order to find out whether this valid
argument is also sound.
Alternativelv. the left reason ("The bigger the burger, the better the
burger") could be interpreted in the second way, (B). as meaning "The
bigger the burger, the better the burger, period, regardless of anything
else — that is. largeness is the sole property that determines the goodness
of a burger. This interpretation has the obvious disad\antage that the
truth of this statement is doubtful, since it might be claimed that other fac-
tors besides size determine the goodness of hamburgers. (After all. large
hamburgers could exist that were not \ ery good. On the other hand, inter- )
pretation (B) has the advantage that when the left reason is so interpreted,
the resulting reasoning immediately becomes deducti\ely \alid:
The bigger the burger. The burgers are bigger

the'better the burger at B.K. [than at any
[period — that is. large- other eating estab-
ness is the only -)- lishment in the
pioi>ertv that determines \icinity reached by
the goodness of a this announcement],
hamburger 1.
(deductively valid)
[The burgers are better at B.K. than at anv other eating

establishment within the \icinity reached bv this
announcement.]
So, although this version is p>erhaps not as charitable as interpretation (A)

plus the additional premise I added, it also is a possible way of interpreting
the oiiginal discourse. Incidentally, notice that these two ways of clarify-
ing the left-hand reason [with either interpretation (A) or (B)] also could
have been done equally well with footnotes rather than square brackets.
General Principles
W henreasoning contains unclear language, we often must clarify it

in order to evaluate the reasoning. This can be done by indicating the clear
\6\ Basic Evaluaiioii of Rtasoiiiiig
iiuanin.ms) thai we ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unclear

are taking
language to ha\e. riie dear meaning that unclear language is being un-
derstood to have can be shown with footnote numerals attached to key parts
of the diagram with footnotes added below to explain the exact meaning
that the ihk lear language is being assumed to have in the evaluation, or it
can be shown using square brackets following the unclear language inside
of whidi moic jjrecise language is written that clearly expresses the mean-
ing that we are taking the unclear language to have.
Most reasoning requires less clarification than the example just dis-
cussed. In the following exercises, however, as well as real life, it some-
limes is necessary to clarify unclear language on which the evaluation of
the reasoning depends. Where needed in the following exercises, indicate
your interpretation of such language by clarifications using either square
brackets or numbered footnotes, whichever seems clearer and easier to
comprehend.
There are two situations in which you may (but are not required to)
add additional assumptions [in square brackets] to the author's original
reasoning: (1) if it is reasonable to think that the further assumption you
add is actually assumed or would be accepted by the author and its addi-
tion raises the degree of support (validity) of the reasoning; (2) if you your-
self know (or at least, confidently believe) that the assumption is true and
adding it raises the degree of validity.'^ (Also, adding assumptions some-

times makes reasoning easier to evaluate.)
The question may be asked, "When do you need to add words, foot-
notes, brackets, and so on? Exactly w hen do you need to do all this semantic
( larification. and when not?" The answer is that this must be done when-
ever you start to evaluate the soundness of some reasoning and find that
there is something that needs to be clarified, or pinned down, before the
reasoning can be evaluated. But if everything relevant in the reasoning is
clear enough as it stands, then you need not add any clarifications, and
you can simply evaluate the reasoning as it stands.
Do not make the mistake of giving a step of reasoning a low rating
because it contains unclear statements. That is an error. If it contains lan-
guage that is so unclear that you do not know what the statements say, then
you cannot evaluate the reasoning at all. If you do not know what the state-
ments in the reasoning say or mean, then you cannot tell how high or low
the degree of support is, or whether it is sound or unsound. This fact also
shows us the answer we should have given earlier w^hen asked at the start
whether the B.K. argument was valid or invalid before the clarifications
'"Oi cmiisc. il you add siai'iiunis ihai you know to be Hue hui are lejecied by the original author of the
reasoning, then it is no longei the author's reasoning.
were added. We should have replied that the question had no answer until
the meanings of the statements in it were clarified. If the language is un-
clear, it must be clarified before the reasoning can be evaluated at all.
In the exercises that follow, you are required only to make the clari-
made before the \alidity of the reasoning can be
fications that need to be
evaluated. Do
not go "hog wild" trying to pin down and clarify everything
more than necessary to evaluate the reasoning. Sometimes unclear lan-
guage does not affect the strength of reasoning at all. This can happen,
for example, same unclear language is repeated in both the reason(s)
if the
and conclusion, or in two linked reasons. This frequently happens.
Semantic Reasoning
There is also another, different way in which we may be concerned

about the meaning of words when e\ aluating reasoning: reasoning may be
about the meanings of words as part of its subject matter. Consider the fol-
lowing example:
It is possible to be drunk without being guilty

of dri\ ing while intoxicated (DWI).
{deductively valid)
1
Being drunk is not the same thing as driving
while intoxicated (DWI).
To evaluate this reasoning correctly, it is necessary to understand what the

conclusion says. The statement, "Being drunk is not the same thing as driv-
ing while intoxicated" does not deny that a person can be drunk and driving
while intoxicated at the same time, or even that the drunkenness may be
part of the driving while intoxicated. Even if someone were both, this
would XOT prove or mean that "being drunk" and "driving while intoxi-
cated (DWI)" were the same even in that person's case. "Being drimk"
and "driving while intoxicated" are two separate (legal) concepts or cate-
gories —
even if someone does both. The conclusion in this argument only
says that the two descriptions, "being drunk" and "driving while intoxi-
cated," do not mean the same thing, and are not equivalent. The differ-
ence between thern is proven with deductive validity by the mere possibility
of someone being drunk and yet not driving while intoxicated, because if
"being drtnik" and "driving while intoxicated" were the same thing, it
would be impossible to do the one without automatically doing the other.
If they were the same, it wotild not be possible for the one description ("is
drunk") to apply without the other ("is driving while intoxicated") also
1()») BasK I- \.ilii.ni()ii ()( Reasoning
apph iiii;. Snu f ii is possible to 1)(' "diunk" without being guilty of driving
while intoxicated, according to the premise, it follows with deductive va-
lidity that the two are not the same identical thing.
Notice that this reasoning is deductively valid as it stands, even with-
out a dear, precise definition either of "drunk" or "driving while intoxi-
cated." because these terms appear both in the reason and in the conclu-
sion. It need only be assumed that they are used in the same sense (whatever
it is) both above and below the arrow for this reasoning to be deductively
valid.
Handling Modal Words Used in Place of Inference Indicators
Back in Chapter 1, we saw that modal words (like "must," "can," and
"necessarily") can be used in a discourse to perform the job of inference
indicators. When analyzing a reasoned discourse in which this occurs, it is
generally best to remove the modal word and replace it with nonmodal
language before trying to evaluate the reasoning. This is especially true
whenever the degree of support would be increased by omitting modal lan-
guage from a conclusion in the diagram. In many simple examples, this is
ob\ ions, but in more complicated reasoning about such topics as free will,
God, divine foreknowledge, alternative possibilities, insanity, mathemat-
ics, rights and liberties, and other topics, this point is not obvious and has
deceived many excellent thinkers. However, to avoid complicated philo-

sophical debate over any of these deep issues, let me illustrate this with the
very simple, obvious example of the reasonmg about Janet and her suntan
quoted at the end of Section 1-1.
tan. .She must have gone somewhere sunny for her winter \acation."
Of the two diagrams of this reasoning shown below and on the next page,
the second is better:
/. Modal word retained in conclusion:
In early January, [Janet took a

Janet suddenly winter \acation
appeared with a shortly before
beautiful suntan. early January.]
(nil or x'er\ weak

i
Janet must have gone [meaning, had to
go or was compelled to go] somevvhere
sunny on her winter vacation.
II. Modal word removed from conclusion:
In early January, [Janet took a

Tanet suddenlv ,
winter vacation
appeared with a shortly before
beautiful suntan. early January.]
{moderate)
Janet went somewhere sunny on her

winter vacation.
The second diagram is better than the first diagram, because the way the
conclusion shown in the first diagram is stated might suggest or imply that
some sort of necessity was associated with Janet's going somewhere sunny
on her vacation (for example, that she had to go somewhere sunny and
—
could not have gone anywhere else as if she had been kidnapped or forced,
and nothing else was possible) and the evidence cited in the reasons gives
little or no justification for thinking this. Therefore, by the Principle of
Charity, the second treatment is preferable.

Be \er\ careful. hoAve\er, when remo\ ing modal words from conclu-
sions in diagramming prior to evaluation.Sometimes authors (especially
philosophers) deliberately intend to assert that some necessity, impos-
sibility, or possi*bility is associated with their conclusions and they give or
assume reasons that justify such conclusions. In such a case it would be
wrong to remove the modal word, because doing so would misrepresent the
author's intended reasoning. So ?/ some necessity or possibility clearly is
intended to be asserted in an author's conclusion, and reasons actually
supporting such a conclusion have been given or assumed, then do not
remove the modal words from the conclusions when diagramming the
reasoning.
More on Evaluating the Validity of Reasoning
Logic students frequently have difficulty understanding the relation-

ship between validity and soundness. Soundness means that the reasons are
true and that the steps of inference are valid. V'alidity means that the con-
clusion does follow logically from the reason (s). And this means that the
conclusion is related to the reason(s) in such a way that for the reason(s) to
be true would guarantee, or make highly likely, the truth of the conclusion.
People sometimes get the question of the truth of the reasons con-
fused with the question of the validity of the step of inference. Here is a
plain, simple analogy that may
help to explain the difference between
these two ciuestions, and prevent their confusion. One might compare a
valid (oniK'ction Ixiwtrn the reason(s) and the conclusion to a steel cable
c()nne( ting an automobile to a low truck that is going to try to pull it with
the cable. If the cable is strong, then if the tow truck moves forward, the
car will move too. Likewise, if a step of inference is deductively valid, then
ifthe reasons are true, the conclusion will be true too. If the connection
between reason(s) and conclusion is valid, then if the reasons are true, the
conclusion will follow But notice that a tow cable hooked be-
it in truth.
tween a tow truck and a car could be strong, e\en if the tow truck did not,
or could not, move forward (perhaps because it broke down, and was not
lunning). Likewise, a chain of reasoning, a step of inference between rea-
son (s) and conclusion, can be valid (good), even if the reason(s) be untrue.
Someone who confused the validity of reasoning with truth of the reasons
would, in terms of this analogy, be like someone who confused the ques-
tion of whether the tow cable was strong with the different question of
whether the tow truck was running, or could move forward.
The aspect of valid reasoning that is most important to us is this:
When reasoning is valid, then it is unlikely or impossible for: the conclu-
sion to be false IF the reasons be true. So, you can show reasoning to be
Invalid by showing that it would be a genuine possibility for the conclu-
sion to be false even if the reasons were true. If no such possibility exists,
then the reasoning is valid.
We try to make evaluation by asking ourselves the magic ques-
this
tion: Suppose the reason(s) were true, is there any realistically possible
way in which the conclusion nevertheless could be false? Someone might
describe this prcjcedure somewhat inaccurately by saying that we "assume"
or "suppose" or "pretend" that the reason(s) are true and then ask, "How
likely, in that case, would be the truth of the conclusion?" This way of de-
scribing the magic-question procecure, however, may confuse some stu-
dents, or lead someone to make the mistake of thinking that the result
of asking the question (which gives us our evaluation of validity) some- is
how detached from, or unconnected with, objective reality, or based

somehow on questionable assumptions. To think this is a mistake and
misunderstanding. Our evaluation of the degree of strength (validity) is
not based on assuming or supposing that the reason(s) are true. Supposing
or pretending that the reason(s) are true and then asking how likely, in
that case, would be the truth of the conclusion, is just a picturesque way
of asking ourselves the "hypothetical" question: "If the reason(s) were
true, how likely would this make the truth of the conclusion." If the
answer is, "It would guarantee it 100%," then the step of reasoning is
deductively valid. If the answer is, "Extremely likely, certain beyond any
reasonable doubt, but not totally guaranteed," then the step of inference
—
rates as strong. If the answer is, "Truth of the reasons would make the
truth of the conclusion a good bet, but not establish it beyond any possible
reasonable doubt," then the degree of support rates as moderate. And
so on.
How should you go about trying to answer the magic (or hypotheti-
cal) question? Try to think of, or imagine, possible ways in which the con-
clusion could be false even if all the reasons were true. Pretend that the rea-
sons were true, and then try to make a list, either mentally, in your head,
or on paper, of possible ways in which the conclusion could be false even
if the reason(s) were true. In making this list, draw on everything you know,
or can think of. Then look through the possible ways in your list, and ask
yourself how likely they are. If some of these ways are quite likely that —
is, real possibilities of the sort that can very well happen in our world then —
the degree of support (validity) is certainly less than strong. But if there is
—
no conceivable way, no matter how "far out" it may be not even if some-
thing extremely unlikely happened, like Martians invading in spaceships,
—
or all objects suddenly turning to gold if there is no conceivable, or de-
scribable, or imaginable, way in which the conclusion could be false if
the reason(s) were true, then the step of reasoning is deductively valid. And
if there is some conceivable, describable, or imaginable way in which the
conclusion could be false if the reason (s) were true, but every such "way" is
entirely outside the realm of real possibility and not something of the sort
that does or can happen with much likelihood in our world, then the step
rates as strong. And so on.
So, you evaluate through your list of ways and
validity by searching
asking yourself how most likely item on the list is. If it is highly
likely the
likely— the sort of thing that can and does really happen in our world
then the degree of support is less than strong. The more likely the most
likely ways are, the lower is the degree of support (degree of validity).
"What if, on my list, I overlook some likely possible way in which the
conclusion might be false even supposing the reason (s) were true, and
think that there is no such way?" Then you have made a mistake, a mistake
of the sort that in real life can cause people to lose their health, happiness,
loved ones, life, and so on. Such failures to think of ways in
prosperity,
which a step of reasoning can go wrong are often extremely costly to people
in real life. That is'why you should take full advantage of the opportunity
to practice and improve your skill at evaluating the validity of reasoning
on the exercises in this textbook, in a setting where you can safely make
mistakes, and learn from these to sharpen your reasoning skills without
these mistakes costing anything more than perhaps a few points on an ex-
ercise group, enough of an incentive to motivate you to think carefully and
170 Basit F.valu.itioii ol Reasoning
lo give you iecdback intoiniaiion as to the accuracy ot your evaluations, but

not a serious major danger (like losing your health, home, family, friends,
job, business, life, prosperity, or something else of great value). You can
practice evaluating reasoning here under safe conditions so that, when
you have to reason in real-life situations where the stakes are high and
mistakes potentially disastrous, you will reason in ways that will help you
succeed in finding the truth, lixing well, and being happy.
Ob\ iously, when I suggest that you "Suppose that the reason(s) were
true, and ask in that case, how likely would be the truth of the conclusion,"
this suggestion is being given to you as a prc^cedure for testing validity.
Does this mean that in applicatoin to cases of reasoning in real life you are
supposed to assume that the reasons are true? Of course not!! That would
be stupid, and possibly disastrous! I am only giving you a TESTING
PROCEDl RE for figuring out whether conclusions follow logically. This
procedure is that, so to speak, you experimentally try setting the reason (s)
to the value "true," and then see what happens —
in particular, you try to
determine whether this would make the truth of the conclusion highly
likely, or whether there are some realistic possible ways in which the con-
clusion ne\'eriheless coidd still be false. If the reasoning passes this test for
validity, then you can drop the supposition (or "assumption," ifsomeone
insists on calling it that) that the reasons are true — and if you do not already
know, try to disco\er whether the reasons are objectively true or false. If
the validity has been passed and the reasons are true, then the reason-
test
ing is sound. If the reasoning fails the validity test, then you know that it
is unsound without e\en having to check the reasons for truth.
A simple, cone rete analogy to this testing procedure might be, for ex-
ample, the rough procedure sometimes used to test the holding power of
the parking brake ("emergency brake") of automobiles with automatic
transmissions by setting the parking brake on with the motor running, and
then putting the car in "Drive" and stepping on the accelerator. In this
test, if the parking brake prevents the car from moving, it is considered to
be capable of preventing the car from rolling when parked on a hill. Of

comse, one normally should not drive the car with the parking brake set
like this, but this is done as a way of experimentally testing the brakes. This
is analogous in some respects to our hypothetical-question
test of validity.
When gi\en a piece of reasoning, one normally should not just assume
that the reasons are true. But to evaluate its validity, one may make the
test of supposing (pretending, "assuming") that the reason(s) were true,
and then trying to think of any possible ways m

which the conclusion could
still be lalse. This supposition that the reason(s)
were true roughly corre-
sponds brake by putting the car in gear and stepping on the

to testing the
one can then drop the pre-
gas. If the reasoning passes this test for vaHditx .
tense (or supposition or "assumption") that the reason(s) were true, and
setabout to find out whether or not the reasons are actually true. One should
not automatically assume that the reasons are true when gi\en an argu-
ment (except exp>erimentally. as a momentary way of testing validity). If
the reasoning fails this test, it is in\alid. test, then one drops
If it passes this
this pretense or supposition, and checks out whether the reasons
to find
really are true. But. except when testing \ alidity. one should not normally
go around automatically assuming that gi\en reasons are true, any more
than one normalh should dri\e around with the parking brake on (even
though one does something Hke this for a moment in the testi. Of course.
p)eople do sometimes make the mistake of leaving their parking brake on
while diiving. but this can result in costlv damage. The serious mistake of
really assuming, without checking, that any reasons given in a reasoned
discourse are automatically true can lead to far more costly losses.
In doing the following exercises, you may experience frustration at
the lack of any cookbook or automatic mechanical procedure for evaluat-
ing validity beyond what you ha\e been given. The reason you have been
given no such procedure is that none exists.'^ This is an exercise in reality,
and you are learning to deal with it. Vou will have to use your imaginative
powers, drawing upon e\ ervthing you know and can think of. to e\ aluate
the reasoning in these problems. This is also how things are. and will be.
\\ hen vou are in the real world outside this logic course. Instead of deceiv-
ing the reader by giving an inaccurate, oversimplified picture of the true

complexity of reality by presenting artificial, unrealistic examples that
can be evaluated by a mechanical procedure, this textbook authentically at-
tempts to prepare you to deal with real-life cases and problems.
"When evaluating \aliditv. why are we always asking whether there
is any way in which things could go wrong (a false conclusion despite true
reasons)? Isn t this a lot of negative thinking?" It is cautious, critical think-
ing that can lead to positive results and benefits, and avoid negative con-
sequences. If there is any way in which it can go wrong, we want to discover
that in our thinking before we act. That way. we can take positi\ e measures
to prexeni things from going wrong, and increase our chances of succeed-
ing in our projects and endeavors.
^•\ote to Adianced Readers: If someone tries lo mainiain thai some other set of logical methods (such
as formal logic pro\ ides such a prcxedure. do not allow them to "prove" their claim by demonstrating
i
their meihcxis on their own examples es|x-cially concocted and contrived for that purpose (e.g.. cate-
gorical syllogisms or truth-functional arguments i.Insist that ihe> demonstrate the efficacv of their
methods in application to all the exercises at the end of this section, for example.
172 Basic Evaluation ol Rrasoiiing
Diagramming Collateral Information
Someone may ask, "In evaluating validity, what happens if I happen

to know some additional information that is relevant to the truth or falsity
of the given conclusion, but which is not mentioned among the reasons
in the given discourse? For example, suppose that I were considering the
following reasoning:
90% of all Harry

realtors own + is a
expensive houses. realtor.
(moderate)
Harry owns an expensive house.
This step of reasoning might "moderate," since it makes the truth

rate as
of the conclusion a good bet, but does not establish it as a practical cer-
tainty. But now suppose that I happen to know as additional side, or "col-
lateral," information, that Harry owns no house at all. Can I still say that
the degree of support is moderate? This collateral information would af-
fect my estimate of the probability that the conclusion is true given the
reasons. (In fact, it would show that the conclusion is false.) How should
this be represented? The answer to this question is that if you have infor-
mation like this that you want to include in your evaluation, or take into
account in your deliberations in evaluating the reasoning, add it to the
diagram explicitly, writing it in [using square brackets] and then consider ,
the resulting expanded diagram on that basis. In other words, if you wish,
you can show such collateral information added to the diagram as an ad-
ditional reason (or reasons), and then give the new rating that would re-
sult, as follows, for example:
90% of all Harry [Harry

realtors own + is a + does not
expensive houses. realtor. own a house.
(ml)
Harry owns an expensive house.
If we can have it, if it is available to us, this new piece of reasoning prob-
ably would be more and preferable to the previous one, because it
useful,
tells more of the whole story, as known. In fact, in this diagram, the degree
—
of support would remain the same if the middle and left-most reasons were
omitted:
Harry does not own a house.
Harry owns an expensi\e house.
Furthermore, this is one of those (rare) cases in which one actually could
go from this same reason to a different conclusion that was the negation
of the previous conclusion:
Harry does not own a house.
{deductively valid)
Harry does not own an expensive house.
(Usually, reasons that provide nil support for a conclusion do not support
its negation or denial either.) These are some of the ways in which the im-
plications of outside (or "collateral") information can be represented in
the natural-logic system or model. ^^
Of course, as an exercise for practice, or as an example for some other
purpose, one might want simply to evaluate a diagram as it stands, with
the collateral information left out. Also, it is often impractical to try to
write in every piece of background or collateral information that may enter
'^\ote to Advanced Readers: There generally always is some outside information that we do not get
down on paper, information that remains inside us, as we e%aluate inferences (even if it is only infor-
mation about the meanings of linguistic items in the diagram, and about the number and relative like-
—
lihoods of various possibilities or "possible worlds" merely knowing their relati%e numbers would
not be enough). One can see that even if a von Neumann type computer were programmed to
evaluate degrees of support (validity), information would need to be stored inside the computer
to enable it to do this. It is a persistent delusion, a delusion to which certain logicians seem especially
susceptible, to think that all the relevant information can ever be written down on paper; for, even
of all the rules of language, inference, procedure, etc., were set on paper, at some
if expressions
levelthe dispositions to behave in accordance with them must exist in the subject in some other
form than as a linguistic expression of the rule(s). Likewise, it is neither feasible, nor possible,
actually to write down the totality of evidence or background information that we bring to the
evaluation of reasoning in natural language. This remains true even if one tries to move to a
"possible worlds" explication of the natural-logic concept of degree of support (validity), for the
worlds" needs consideration as well
relative probabilities, or likelihoods, of the different "possible
as their number, and collateral information here again enters through the back door. Not to weigh
the relative probabilities of the various alternative "logically possible worlds," but only to count
their number, is equivalent to assuming that all "logically possible" (or "conceivable") worlds are
equally possible (equipossible), which also is an empirical assumption, a collateral assumption
albeit one that is, of course, certainly false.
The methods and concepts of natural logic are designed to accommodate the fact, noted by
Quine in a slightly different context, that no truly sharp, exclusive line can be drawn fjetween what we
judge a priori and what we judge a posteriori, and that no sharp dichotomy exists between what our
logic, or logical methods and assumptions, tell us. and what our science, or scientific methods and
theories about the world, tell us, the difference being one of continuous degree.
17} Basic Kvaliiaiioii ol Rtasoiiing
into your evaluation — we do not have enough time, paper, or patience for
thumb, just try to write in important addi-
that. So. as a practical rule ol
tional background assumptions, or pieces of information, that others
might not think about, or realize that you are using, because it is not
generally known, but that have affected your evaluation and made it dif-
ferent from what others would say without those assumptions.
Inference Indicator Words
When doing the following exercises, double-check for the presence of

inference indicator words inside the statements shown as reasons and con-
clusions in your diagrams. any inference indicator word appears inside
If
some reason or conclusion in your diagram, then probably you either for-
got to remove it when you replaced it with an arrow in the diagram (a minor
mistake), or else you missed completely some crucial logical relationship
or step cjf reasoning in the argument (a major mistake that can ruin every-
thing) Re-check to make certain that you have replaced all the steps of rea-
soning with arrcjws.'^
There occasionally are special conditions in which reasoning

is diagrammed correctlv with inference
uuluators shown uiside reasons or conclusions in the diagram
(especially the word 'because mside
'
explanations used in further justifications), but the exercises in this chapter

contain no examples
of this.
EXERCISES 2-2A
inthese diagrams; instead, write out each of the constituent statements in your
diagram.
judge the strength of that inference. (In other words, at each step of inference,
suppose that the reasons were true and then judge how much support they
would give to belief in the truth of the conclusion.)
If an inference presupposes additional basic reasons that you know to be true,
you may, if you wish, add them to the diagram and evaluate the inference on that
basis (but you are not required to do this). If your judgment might be disputed
because it depends on the particular way in which you are interpreting the author's
meaning or the special emphasis you are putting on some of the author's words,
attach a footnote explaining why you give the answer you do. If the reasoning
diagram, in square brackets, and evaluate the reasoning on this basis. Clarify lan-
guage when necessary.
From Beardsley. Practical Logic:
A-1. '^'Of course hes guih\MDidn"t he admit that he threatened to kill her?y
Special instruction: If this discourse is treated as an argument, how would it be diagrammed and
how valid is it? How strongly would the reason support the conclusion? (Show w ith a diagram
and e\aluation.) ,-\L.^
-4
•.^. I- N.^
\
1.
I 7tJ Basit lAalii.iiion of Reasoning
Adapi'.d lioni a Law Sdiool Aclinissioii list StiKly (Fiiidc.
A-2. (a ^()<)(1 lioicl (an tî\e you a beautiful room for $80 a (la\\with three meals,
and make a piojit and pay laxes^^^ndXet a tax-exempt hospital operates in the red
lo) 5130 a dayTll say it must f)e bad aaministrationy
w^\
177 Exercises 2-2A
From Dixy LeeRay. Ph.D.. Univ. of Washington: formerly chairjDerson of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission (.\EC». presently called the "Nuclear Regulatory Cxjmmission" (NRC); former Gov-
ernor of the Slate of Washington: quoted in Sewsweek. 96. No. 2. 28:
Iw
A-3.(A nuclear power plant is infinitely safer than ea t ng) >^causp)|300
i peoph
'^
choke to death on food each vear.
^ / S
->fe^-
\
v\. I
^ P^^
s ^
^ C5^_Si» CL.l/'s-^
ITS Basic I- \.iln.ilnm ol Rcasoiiiiin
From On l/ic Cable: The Report uf the Sloan C:otnrnisMon on Cable Communications (New York:
NKC;i;uv-Hill Book Clompanv. 1971). p. 3:
/ I KVV '
A-l.jC.cihlc U'k'\isi()M (od.iN is ai a sia^c wluic the general exercise of choice is still
possibltw^jll loi n()7)c(it'r reason than that there government regula-

is a history of
tion in the litUl ol television, it remains possible by government action to prohibit
it ((able VY], to permit it. or to ptomote it almost by na*t^^Citi/.erT?may still take
a hand in shaping cable tele\ ision's growth and institutions in a fashion that will
bend it to so( iety's will and sot ietv's best intentions.at is not as yet encumbered by
massi\e vested interests, although that day may be no longer remote.^Ît is not as
yet so fixed a part of the national scene, as for example conventional television is,
that it apj)ears almost (juixotic to attempt to re-direct its energiesAThere is, in
short, still time.
179 Exercises 2-2 A
From a campaign speech:
A-5. Nobody wants corrupt government, and the present administration is the
most corrupt in our nation's history. The only way to restore honest government
is to elect Democrats.
EXERCISES 2-2B
diagram.
guage when necessary.
B-1. )A11 insects have exactly six legs(rA.ll spiders have exactly eight legs|s5^here-_
Jbrfi^mo spider is an insect.^
^
i>
J ) ^
ci
b^'
181
182 Basic Evaluaiii)ii ot Rtasonins
B-2.0^>l>t y \\/. would be in iht- best iiuciesls of our cnemies^^êi^ôip^policy

"
XVZ would ' '
not be in our
" '
own best interests^
ur c '
i
I "^
A/ U'.
B-3. ^During Q-Mart^jjii^jsale, all items will be marked down from their normal
price by up to 50 % jfT'herefor^ûring their sale, all items will be selling for half
of their normal price'!^
'
1 r^-
2.
(
183 Exercises 2-2 B
B-4Întake of too much of substance Z i s bad_for uy/ThereforeXintake of any
amount of substance Z is bad for us^/Therefor^Xwe sEbuld try 03^ completely

eliminate all intake of substance Z.^
KJ^\^4^^
\
X
\
•^^<oA^
Adapted from an example given by William Alston in Philosophy of Language (Englewood

Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964),'p- 3.
B-5.ômeone sells insurance in our town/(Someoneêlongs to the First

Methodist ChurchT^'êreforl^^me persoirboth sells insurance in our town and
belongs to the First' Methodist Church."^
1 'X Z'. u
3. \^?<i-'
181 H.iM< h N.ilu.moii ol Rt.isoniiiK
B-6Yl.ast momh. luu housrs made ihe biggest gain for any 30-day period
sales ol
since July. \96'h)(r^vU^^Xu'iinc new houses were sold last month than for any
30-day period since July. 1967. v.
1
\
^
B-7. (a. need for choline in the human diet has been establisheq. ^êreforejpeo-
ple require some choline as part of their nutrition^
\
'X
DV
EXERCISES 2-2C
diagram.
diagram, in square brackets, and evaluate the reasoning on this basis. Clarify language
when necessary.
From ©
Fear of Flying by Erica Jong. Copyright 1973 by Erica Mann Jong. Reprinted by per-
mission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston publishers.
C-1. All natural disasters are comforting because they reaffirm our impotence, in
which, otherwise, we might stop believing. At times it is strangely sedative to
know the extent of your own powerlessness.
185
18ti Basic 1- A.iliiatioii ol Rrasoiiiii^
Adapicd lioin Bcardslcy:
C-2. IVlevision proîaiiis, taken as a wliole, are in a very sorry slate. For never
have we seen siuli depressing offerings as ifie animated commercial and the
audience-participation program. And most of the daylight time is taken up wîth
soap operas. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that television broadcasters
need a new and better code of good braodcasting.
187 Exercises 2-2 C
From Henry N. Pollack and David S. Chapman. "The Flow of Heat from the Earths Interior,"
Scientific American. 237. no. 2. 60:
C-3. One of the fundamental axioms of physics, embodied in w hat is know n as

Fourieis law of heat conduction, is that heat flows from the warmer parts of a
body to the cooler ones. It can therefore be inferred that since the temperature
increases with depth in the earths crust, there is a flow of heat outward from the
earth's interior.
188 HasK 1 A.iliKiiioii ol Rtasoniiis
Ail.ipiccI lioin H. Iiisiiain Knglehardt, Jr., "F.rrois in Medicine," in Knowledge, Value and
Belief, vd. H. Iiisiiani Fni^lehaidt, Jr. and Daniel Callahan (New York: Institute of Society,
Ethics and the I.ile Sciences. 1977), pp. 312-13:
C-4. It is wrong medical failure with error, for a physician.ômetimes.

to ecjuale
fails to cure a patient's cancer, even though the physician made no errors in
treatment.
Hinl: The conclusion here concerns whether or not the property of "being a medical failure" is the
same as the property of "being a medical error."
oJbJ
EXERCISES 2-2D
diagram.
guage when necessary. ,
From Elizabeth Drake and Robert C. Reid, "The Importation of Liquefied Natural Gas,"
Scientific American, 236, no. 4, 24.
D-1. The tanks on a ship carrying liquefied natural gas must have double walls
and insulation more than a meter thick to reduce the vaporization rate. Accord-
ingly a collision that might lead to a loss of cargo would have to be considerably
severer than it would if the ship were built like a petroleum tanker, where the
tank is the hull of the shipD itself. [Therefore, a]ccidents such as ramming and
grounding are highly unlikely to cause the release of cargo from a ship carrying
liquefied natural gas.
189
190 B.isK 1- A.ihiaiion ol Rc.isoiiint;
lioin J.mc \.m I.awic k-C.oothill, In the Shadow of Man. Cojiyrighi © 1971 by Hugo and Jane
van Lauirk-Cioodall. Used by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company, and William Collins
Sons 8c Co., Ltd.
D-2. TheiT is [a] .shadow that is spreading over the chimpanzee today: [for] with
the spread of agridilline and forestry, the habitat as well as the life of the
chimpanzee is threatened. Forests are cleared to make way for cultivation, and
food trees are poisoned to leave more space for better timber trees. Moreover, since
(himps are susceptible to all the infectious diseases of man, wherever their
populations are near new human settlements the apes are endangered by
epidemics.
V
191 2-3 Conditional Relationships
2-3 CONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Before examining some very useful deductively valid steps of reasoning

involving conditional relationships, you need to know some basic facts
about conditional sentences.
A conditional sentence is composed of tuo parts; an antecedent and
a consequent. A conditional sentence asserts that in case the antecedent
condition is true or fulfilled, then so too is the consequent. For example,
If Bob doesn't return the money, then Betty will never speak to us again.
In this example, the words, "if . . . are tised to form or express

then . .
."
the conditional. Of all the ways in which conditionals can be expressed,

this form
If P, then Q
is probably the most common. Here the letter 'P' stands in place of what is
in the 2/-clause (expressing the antecedent), and the letter 'Q' stands in
place of what is in the ^/len-clause (expressing the consequent). The form
is:
If (antecedent I, then (consequent).
Frequently, the word "then" is omitted and the word "if" alone is used to
express the conditional.
Some sentences of the conditional form are true: other sentences of
this form are false. If the antecedent part cannot be true without the
consequent part also being or becoming true, then the whole conditional
statement is true. For example,
A true •
conditional: If Elmer is less than 180 centimeters tall, then Elmer is less than
190 centimeters tall.
With
a true conditional sentence, if the antecedent clause is (or becomes)
then the consequent clause also is (or will be) true. In this example,
trtie,
if Elmer is less than 180 centimeters tall, then he is less than 190
centimeters t^ll (because 180 centimeters is less than 190 centimeters). In
this example, if the antecedent is true, then the conseqtient is true too, so
the entire conditional sentence is true.
On the other hand, if the antecedent of a conditional sentence is (or

becomes) true btit the consequent is false (ordoes not become true), then
the whole conditional is false. The following are examples of false, or
untrue, conditional sentences:
192 B.isit K\aliiati()ii ol Rtasoiiiiig
False
conditionals: II oxygfii is rombined witli hydrogen, then the substance that
resuhs is table salt.

II I touch my nose and say "Poof, poof," then I will turn into a
rabbit.
Wlu'ii ilu' antecedents are true, the consequents of these conditionals can
be false, so these conditionals are false. When oxygen is combined with
hydrogen, the substance that results is not table salt, so the first condi-
tional is false. And I can touch my nose and say "Poof, poof" without
turning into a rabbit, so the statement "If I touch my nose and say Poof,
poof, then I will turn into a rabbit" is jalse. Note that a false conditional
sentence is still a genuine conditional sentence. It is a conditional sentence
that is false.
It is very important to understand that a conditional merely asserts

that in case its antecedent is consequent. A
true, so too is, or will be, its
conditional does NOT assert
consequent follows logically from
that the
the antecedent. It is not required of a true conditional that its consequent
follow logically from its antecedent. In the earlier example, for instance,
the statement "Betty will never speak to us again" does not follow with
deductive validity from the supposition that Bob won't return the money.
The conditional merely asserts that if Bob doesn't return the money, then
—
another event (or nonevent) namely, Betty's never speaking to us
again— also will occur. It does not say that Betty's never speaking to us
again follows logically, or is logically entailed by, Bob's not returning the
money.
Of course, it can happen, and sometimes does, that the antecedent of
a conditional logically entails the consequent, as, for example, in the
following (onditional:
II I have a pencil in my jjocket, then I have an object in my pocket.
When, as here, the antecedent of a conditional happens logically to entail

the consequent, the conditional must be because in this
true, of course,
event, if the antecedent is true, then the consequent must also be true
(since it follows logically from the antecedent). Conditionals of this
"logic ally tme" sort will appear later as a result of the step of conditional-
izing deduc lively valid reasoning.
It is also important to understand that the truth of a conditional does
not in general require any particular ordering in time of the situations

described by its antecedent and consequent. The event described by the
antecedent may
precede the event described by the consequent; the two
may be simultaneous, as in the pencil example; or the event described by
the consequent may precede that described by the antecedent, as m the

following example:
If the fingerprints on tlie gun matcli Smith's, then Smith killed her.
All that a conditional says is that if the state of affairs described by its
antecedent existed, exists, or will exist, then so too did. does, or will the
state of affairs described by its consequent.
Among other uses, conditionals are good for stating "Jiecessary" and
"sufficient" conditions. These two concepts will be explained separately
and then compared.
A sufficient condition for some situation is any circumstance or
condition whose existence or fulfillment, by itself, is enough to bring
about or guarantee the existence of that situation. For example, heating a
combustible material to its kindling point in the presence of oxygen is a
sufficient condition for the occurrence of combustion or burning; having a
pencil in one's pocket is sufficient for having an object in one's pocket.
In general, if P is a sufficient condition for Q_, then a conditional
with a description of P as its antecedent and a description of Q as its
consequent jvvill be true. Consequently, the corresponding conditional
follows with deductive validity from a statement of sufficient conditions:
(P) is a sufficient condition for (Q).
i deductively valid)
If P, then Q.
Here, the letters 'P' and 'Q' are placed in parentheses in the statement
gi\ing sufficient conditions in the reason to represent symbolically the
fact that what fills the blanks in a statement of sufficient conditions
(". .is a sufficient condition for
.
"') are not the complete
sentences P' and Q' themselves, but instead, noun phrases corresponding
to them. Thus, in the combustion example, the following inference is
deductively \alid:
Heating a combustible material to

its kindling point in the presence
of oxygen is a sufficient condition
for the occurrence of burning.
deductively -valid)
\l/
If a combustible material
is heated
to itskindling point in the presence

of oxygen, ifien burning will occur.
191 Basic Evaluation of Reasoning;
Or in ilu* ptiu il example:
My having a peiK il in my pocket is a sufficient condition

for my having an object in my pocket.
{deductively valid)
\1/
If I have a pencil in my pocket, then I have an object
in my pocket.
With the following two ways of talking,
1. (A) is a sufficient condition for (B).

2. If A, then B.
one can always validly replace the first with the second, or pass from the
first second in reasoning.
to the
Of course, when a statement of sufficient conditions is made, it is
very important that its context be clearly stated or understood. For
example, everyone has heard about the proverbial "straw that broke the
camel's back." Suppose someone is about to put the "last straw" on the
back of a heavily loaded camel and you say, "Adding that straw will be
sufficient tf) break the camel's back" or perhaps "If that straw is put on his
back, his back will break." What you mean is that putting that straw on
his back in the present circumstances (that is, with the camel under his
present load) would be sufficient to break his back. You do not, I presume,
mean to assert that in general, at any time, whether loaded or unloaded,
putting that straw on his back would be sufficient to break it.
A necessary condition for some situation is any circumstance or
condition that needs to be fulfilled in order for that situation to exist. For
example, a necessary condition for the occurrence of burning is the
presence of oxygen (which means that without oxygen, combustion will
not take place). But the presence of oxygen is not itself a sufficient
condition for the occurrence of burning oxygen can be present and —
burning not occur (if there's no fuel or the temperature is not high
enough). Notice that a necessary condition does not also have to be a
sufficient condition —
that is, it need not by itself be enough for the
specified situation to exist. It is simply one of the requirements that must
be satisfied for the situation to come about. One may also speak of
necessary conditions in connection with situations that do not involve
cause and cfiec t. POr example, a necessary condition for a number's being
less than 7 is that it be less than 13; a necessary condition for being a
"sister" is that one be female; a necessary condition

being a "father" is for
thar one be a parent; and so on. Notice furthermore
that not only can
something be a necessary condition without being a sufficient condition
(as oxygen is necessary but not sufficient for burning), but also something
can be a sufficient condition without being necessary (as being a Porsche
914 is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for being a car).
Interestingly, necessary conditions are also expressible by means of
the conditional. Suppose the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition
for the burning of a fire. Then, if a fire is burning, what must be the case
with regard to the presence of oxygen? Think about it. The answer is that
oxygen must be present, since without oxygen, fire will not burn
(because, by assumption, the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition
for the burning of a fire). In other words,
The presence of oxygen is a necessary con-

dition for the burning of a fire.
(deductively valid)
If a fire is burning, then oxygen is present.
So too in general. Suppose, abstractly, that Y is a necessary condition for

X. Then, if X comes about or exists, Y must also have come about or been
the case, since without Y, X would not have happened (because Y is a
necessary condition for X). In other words.
(Y) is a necessary condition for (X).
(deductively valid)
i
If X, then Y.
The difference between necessary and sufficient conditions is that a

statement of a sufficient condition for X asserts that the condition is
enough for X to exist, whereas a statement of a necessary condition for X
asserts that the condition is always required or needed for X to exist.
The "only if" Conditional Form

Another way to express the conditional relationship is by using the
words "only if." For example, if the presence of oxygen is a necessary
condition for the occurrence of burning, then burning will occur only if
oxygen is present.
196 Basit Kvalualioii of Reasoning
The presence of oxygen is a necessary condition for the

occurrence of burning.
(deductively valid)
w
Hurinng (xtuib only if 'oxygen is present.
So likewise in general,
(V) is a necessary condition for (X)
(deductively valid)
X only if Y
Actually, "X only if Y" is just another way of saying "If X, then 7." The
two ways of expressing a conditional,
1. Ponly if Q
2. If P then Q
say the same thing, and either may at any time be validly inferred from the
other. For example,
A fire is burning only if oxygen is present.
(deductively valid)
J.
Likewise, one can pass from a conditional of the second form to a

conditional of the
first form:
(deductively valid)
A fire is burning only if oxygen is present.
So too in general, you can always validly pass from a conditional of the
one form to a conditional of the other form:
If r, then Q. P only if Q.
(d.v.) (d.v.)
i
P only if Q. If P, then Q.
1
The two forms of the conditional are equivalent, and either can at any
time be used in place of the other:
7/ P then Q' is equivalent to 'P only if Q'.
This fact sometimes baffles and confuses people, probably because in this
way of expressing the conditional,
ANTECEDENT only if CONSEQUENT

the little word "if" precedes the consequent, whereas in the 'if . . . then'
formulation it precedes the antecedent.
Other Forms of the Conditional
1. Biconditionals. To assert BOTH that (U) is a sufficient condition for

(T) and that (t/) is — on those rare occasions
a necessary condition for (T)
when (U) is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for (T) — one says:
T if and only if U,
which is just a short U then T and T only if U" and is

way of saying, "If
completely equivalent to "U
and only if T." For example, "John is a
if
father if and -only if John is a male parent." This is called a 'bicondi-

tional,' because it is really just two conditionals joined together. Mathe-
maticians sometimes shorten the biconditional phrase "if and only if" to
just "iff" (written with two /'s).
2. Sentences containing the word "when" often perform the same

function as a conditional. 'When P, then Q' entails 'If P, then Q'.
3. Sentences of the form "Not such-and-such unless so-and-so" generally

are used to say that the second condition ("so-and-so") is necessary for the
first. When, for instance, the signs in Hawaiian department stores say
You should not ride the escalator unless you are wearing shoes.
they mean the same as
// you are not wearing shoes, then you should not ride the escalator.
or, in other words,
You should ride the escalator only if you are wearing shoes.
Notice that these signs DO NOT mean "If you are wearing shoes then you
should ride the escalator." (People wearing shoes who lake the elevator
instead have not broken the rule on the sign.) To say "Do not ride the
escalator unless you are wearing shoes" simply means that wearing shoes
198 Basu K\.ilii.iii()ii ol Rc.isoiiing
is a urcessary condition for riding the escalator. Likewise, in general,

sentences of the form
Not A unless B
can be treated, in dealing with reasoning, as entailing
B is a necessary condition foi A
or,
A only if B.
Some people find it easiest in iheir reasoning if they remember always to

transform 'Not A unless B' into 'A only if B\
4. It is important to know that some natural-language sentences that
contain the word "if" nevertheless are not genuine conditionals. Here are
two examples:
1 here are biscuits on the table if you want them.
I don't (are if it rains or freezes.
The fact that conclusions that can be drawn with deductive validity from
genuine conditionals cannot be inferred from these sentences shows that
these sentences are not genuine conditionals. Such inferences are explained ^
in the next section.
SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT CONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Note: E ~ event or situation
A^ = necessary condition for £
S = sufficient cc^ndition for F.
Always Necessary Conditions Sufficient Conditions
If r then Q. If E then N. If S then E.
(d.v.) (d.v.) \ (d.v.)

]/ I
F onlyy if Q. E only if A^. S only if
il E.
(rf-^) (d.v.) {d.v.)

I I I
Not F unless (). Not E unless N. Not S unless E.
EXERCISES 2-3
1. What is the relationship of the occurrences in List A to those in List B:
(1) Item A is only a necessary condition for B.

(2) Item in A is only a sufficient condition for B.
(3) Item in A is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for B.
(4) Item in A is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for B.
Write the appropriate number in the blank before each pair of situations.
ANSWER LIST A LISTB

1 ha\ing some water ha\ mg some purified water
ha\ing an FM radio ha\ing a radio
ha\ ing a motorcycle having a car
having a full set of teeth in having your back teeth in
> .
their natural places
having a pair of
^works
scissors that
their natural places
having something that will
cut paper
^
«^ Rowing plants growing flowers

^^ o) growing flowers
ûnning a gasoline engine
growing plants
consuming an oil product
on'regular gas
:^ operating a nuclear fission generating electricity
reactor that is working to
^ , ' generate electricity

using electricity running an electric sewing
machine
running an electric sewing running a T\' set
machine
detonating a lot o£ dynamite causing an explosion
w-^vW<-» attending public schools learning how to repair cars
.v^ wearing makeup wearing lipstick
-2- finding an ant in the kitchen finding an insect in the kit-
chen
-V- having some footwear having some boots
i:^ having some boots having some footwear
2. Express the conditions below in terms of (a) the 'if then ..." form of the . . .
.'"
conditional, and (b) the ". onlv if form of the conditional.
. . . .
{A} is a
sufficient
entails // .f\. then*r*. .^Zi only if .K^.
condition
for (B)
(C) is a
necessar\
condition
entailb J^ only if
for (D)
199
200 Basic Evaluaiioii of Ri<isoniiii;
3. Give a necessary condition for being a husband (in the legal sense of the word).
Fxpress yom answer in a sentence of the form "A necessary condition for being a
husband is being .
." or "A necessary condition for being a husband is
.
having. . . .
\^ \,.n &...-.»!
4. Give a sufficient condition, that is not also a necessary condition, for eating
cooked eggs.
"^^yj
>-^/t5'
^^ &^Va.
Vv 'cr—^»
5. (a) Give a condition that is necessary but not sufficient for being a "sister" (in
the biological sense of that word). Express your answer in a sentence of the form
"A necessary condition for being a sister is. . . .
(b) Give a condition, or compound of conditions, that is both necessary and

being a "sister" in the biological sense. Express your answer in a
sufficient for
sentence of the form "A necessary and sufficient condition for being a sister
is ... .
\4.
o~~
j^"
(c) Using a bicxMiditional, express the relationship between being a sister and the
condilion(s) you set foiih in (b) above.
r
201 Exercises 2-3
6. (a) '{N) is a necessary condition for (M)' entails:
Check all rjlU M, then N.

correct ( ) N only if M.
answers -(-T) M only if N.
>bn^ Not unless N. M
iÛ N, thenM.
(b) '(O) is a sufficient condition for (P)' implies:
C/i^cA a// ( -^) If O, then P.

correct ( ) If P, then O.
answers (
only
) P if O.
(Y4-0 only if P.
( ) P if and only if O.
(c) '(X) is a necessary and sufficient condition for {¥)' implies:
Check all ( ~Tlf X, then Y.

correct (-y) X only if Y.
answers (X) If Y, then X.
(rf) y only if X.
$
(d) 'Not R unless /' (for example, "The pump will not work unless it has been primed")
implies:
Check all (T) If R, then /.

correct (-^1 (/) is a necessary condition for (/?).
answers (T7 ^ only if /.
t^ If not /, then not R.
203 2-4 Some Valid Steps of Reasoning L'sing Conditional and Other Relationships
2-4 SOME VALID STEPS OF REASONING USING CONDITIONAL AND OTHER

RELATIONSHIPS
In this section you and important deductively

will learn several useful
valid steps of reasoning involving conditional and other relationships.
You vc'ill also learn to avoid some invalid (or fallacious) forms of
reasoning that sometimes lead people into difficulties.
The denial, or negation, of any statement for example, —
I. Bob is welcome.
isformed by incorporating the word "not," or one of its equivalents, with

the words of the original sentence for example, —
II. Bob is not welcome.
Bob isn't welcome.
// is not the case that Bob is welcome.
The sentences in group II are called "negations," or "denials," of the

sentence in group I. If the sentences in group II are true, then the
sentence in group I is false. And the converse is also true: if "Bob is
welcome, "^ then the sentences in group II are false. (It can never happen
that both a sentence and its negation are true.)
To condense the present discussion, let
'Not Q' abbreviate 'It is not the case that Q'
w'here "Q" here is a letter standing in place of any sentence.
I. Double Negation. If the negation of a sentence is itself negated,
the two negations cancel each other. For example, the double negation "It
is not the case that Jill is not welcome" is equivalent to "Jill is welcome."
Thus, in general, one can always replace the double negative with the
simple positive assertion, reasoning as follows:
Not (not P)
(deductively valid)
(Some philosophical logicians refuse to accept such reasoning in certain

mathematical proofs involving infinity, but for our purposes this is of no
concern.)
2. Transposition. One of the most important deductively valid

steps of reasoning with the conditional consists in moving from a
204 Basit Kvaluation of Reasoning
(onditioiial— for examplo, 'If P, then Q'— to another conditional whose

antecedent is a negation of the original's consequent and whose conse-
quent is a negation of the original's antecedent. Here is the form:
(A) If /^ then Q.
(deductively valid)
(B) If not Q., then not P.
Here is an example of such an inference:
(A) If this car belongs to Henry, then its
motor has been souped up.
(deductively valid)
i
(B) If this car's motor has not been souped
up, then it does not belong to Henry.
Traditional logicians call such an inference "transposition" or in some —

cases, "contraposition." In this text, I will call it "transposition. "ô And
for brevity, I will call a pair of conditionals like (A) and (B) above
"transpositives" of each other.
Conditional (B) is the transpositive of conditional (A), but (A) also is
the transpositive of (B), because if we apply transposition to (B), the
double negatives "cancel out," resulting in (A):
(B) If not Q, then not P.
(transposition) (deductively valid)
If not not-P, then not not-Q.
(double negation) (deductively valid)
(A) If P, then Q.
So this is one of those rare cases where a step of reasoning is, or would be,
deduc tively valid going in either direction, from (A) to (B), or from (B) to
(A). This is because if a conditional is true, its transpositive form is also
"
Note to Advanced Headers: Formal logicians who restriri the term "transposition" only to the
rei)la<ement of "If P. then Q" at the level of the prupustlumal calculus with its equivalent "If not-Q,
then not-P. "or vice versa, may use the term "contraposition to denote only inferences between pairs of
'
categorical statements like "All F's are G's" and "All non G's are non-F's" (or "(x)(Fx D Gx)" and
"(x)(~ Cix D ~Fx)" in ciuantificational notation).
205 2-4 Some Valid Steps of Reasoning i'sing Conditional and Other Relationships
true. Hence, replacing a conditional by its transpositwe form or passing

from a conditional to its transpositive form is always deductively valid
reasoning.
TRANSPOSITION
If X. then Z. If not ir, then not }'.
{deductively valid) {deductively valid)
If not Z. then not X. If Y, then ir.
This rule of inference can be stated in words as follows:
TRANSPOSITION: Given the statement of a conditional, it is deduc-

tively valid to infer the truth of a second conditional statement that has as its
antecedent the negation of the first conditional's consequent, and has as its
consequent the negation of the first conditional's antecedent.
When the consequent of a conditional expresses a necessary condi-
tion for its antecedent, the deductive validity of such inferences is
especially obvrous. For, suppose it is true that
(A; If P, then Q.
Then Q is a necessary condition for P. So, if Q is not the case, then neither
is P — in other words,
(Bi If not Q,, then not P.
And going the other way around, 'If not Q, then not P' implies that (Q) is
a necessary condition for (P), which, as we know from before, entails 'If P,
then Q". Here is an example of two steps of transposition;
(deductively valid)
If oxygen is not present, then a fire is not burning.
{deductively valid)
(Notice that these tu<o steps of transposition bring us back to the original
statement from which we started.)
20<) Basu K\aluati()ii ol Rtasoniiig
More about Transposition
I. (an also hv used when the antecedent or consequent

rians|)()siti()n
ot a (ondiiional already contains negative terms. For exannple,
given
II not r, then (>
transposition yields
If not Q,, then not (not P).
Since 'not not P' is e(iuivalent to 'P,' this can be reduced to
If not d, then P.
which is also a transpositive form following logically from the original

conditional. Here's a concrete instance of such reasoning:
If the car is completely out of gas,

then the motor will not start.
(transposition) {deductively valid)
If tlie motor will start, then the car

is not completely out of gas.
Much reasoning involves transposition, so be ready for it. Be sure to

remember both to negate both the antecedent and consequent and to
—
exchange their positions otherwise validity of the inference is not
guaranteed.
II. It is confuse the transpositive form of a condi-
important not to
tional with its converse. The converse of 'If X, then Y' is 'If Y then X.' ,
To replace a conditional with its converse is automatically a NOT

deductively valid inference. The truth of a conditional DOES NOT
automatically entail the truth of its converse. This does not mean, of
course, that if a conditional is true, then its converse is false, but only that
it can happen that a conditional is true when its converse is false. (For
example, "If a fire is burning, then oxygen is present" is always true, but
its converse, "If oxygen
is present, then a fire is burning" is not always
true.) So
from a conditional alone, one cannot automatically infer its
just
converse with deductive validity.
The philosopher John Locke appears to make this mistake in a
passage in his essay "Of Property," which can be abridged as follows:
Ilic inaici ials of nature (air, earth, water) that remain untouched by human
effort btlong to no one and are not property. It follows that a thing can become
207 2-1 Some Valid Steps of Reasoning I'sing Conditional and Other Relationships
someone's private property only if he works and labors on it to change its

natural state. From this I conclude that whatever a man improves by the labor
of his hand and brain belongs to him, and to him only.
The basic underlying structure of this reasoning can be outlined as

follows:
1. If not worked on, then not property.
.{deductively valid)
2. Property only if worked on.
(nil)
3. If worked on, then property.
Locke's step from 1 to 2 is deductively valid. It combines transposition

with changing the conditional from its "if. then ." form to its ". only . . . . . .
if ."
. form. These two steps may be separated as follows:
.
1. If not worked on, then not property.
(transposition) A. (deductively zmlid)
[If property, then worked on.]
(transformation) ^l (deductively valid)
But the author's next step is fallacious. From conditional 2 he mistakenly

infers its converse, and the labor that began as merely a necessary
condition of property ownership is suddenly invalidly concluded to be a
sufficient condition:
(nil)
3. If worked on, then property.
Did you detect this fallacy in the reasoning when you originally read the
discourse?
3. Modus Ponens. Besides transposition, another very important deduc-

tively valid inference involving the conditional is modus ponens (abbre-
208 Basic K\aluati()M ol Rrasonins
viaicd m.p.), also calkd, "affirming the antecedent^ In outline form, it
looks like this:
MODUS PONENS
P + MP, then Q.
[modus ponens) \i (deductively

valid)
Q.
This rule of inference can be slated in words as follows:
MODUS PONENS: Given the statement of a conditional plus a statement

that its antecedent is true, infer the truth of its consequent.
The deductive validity of modus ponens an obvious consequence of the

is
meaning of a conditional statement. For any statement of the form "//

ANTECEDENT then CONSEQUENT" implies that in case the antece-
dent clause is true, so too is the consequent, and in modus ponens the
additional premise states that the antecedent is true so from the two —
premises linked together it follows logically that the consequent is true.
This step of reasoning is also called "affirming the antecedent," because
the additional premise affirms the truth of the antecedent of the condi-
tional that is the other premise. Notice that it does not matter in what
order the two premises come in the discourse or diagram, and that the
antecedent that is affirmed (and the consequent that is inferred) can be
stated in either positive or negative form. So the following diagram also
represents an instance of modus ponens:
If not R, then not /. + Not R.
{modus ponens) {deductively valid)
Not/.
Here the premise 'Not /?' affirms that the antecedent of the conditional is
true, from which the consequent 'Not /' is validly inferred.
Modus ponens is used in a song sung by the famous storybook
character Winnie the Pooh:
/ could spend a happy morning

Seeing Roo,
I could spend a happy morning
Being Pooh.
209 2-4 Some Valid Steps of Reasoning Csing Conditional and Other Relationships
For it doesn't seem to matter,

If I don't get any fatter
(And I don't get any fatter),
What I doP
Pooh's concise reasoning can be diagrammed as follows:
If I don't get any fatter, (And I don't get any

it doesn't seem to matter + fatter.)
what I do.
[It doesn't seem to matter

what I do.]
I could spend a happy Icould spend a happy

morning seeing Roo. morning being Pooh.
As mentioned earlier, modus ponens is also called affirming the antece-

dent. Pooh 'Bear affirms his antecedent (doing it in parentheses) right in
the middle of stating his conditional. 22
Here is another example of modus ponens:
War Cloud was second. If War Cloud was second,

+ then Native Son won the
horse race.
Native Son won the horse race.
Modus ponens, or affirming the antecedent, is always deductively valid

reasoning.
4. Modus Tollens. Another important deductively valid step of infer-

ence is modus tollens (abbreviated m.t.), also called "denying the conse-
quent.'' In outline form, it looks like this:
" From The

House at Pooh Corner hy A. A. Milne. Copyright 1928 by E. P. Dutton&Co. renewal© 1956 ,
by A. A. Milne. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, F.. P. Dutton 8c Co., Inc., and Curtis Brown
Ltd., London, on behalf of the Trustees of the Pooh Properties.
"And to think that Eeyore always maintained that Pooh had only fluff in his head!
L'lO Basic tvaluatioii ol Reasoning
MODUS rOLLENS
If /^ I hen Q. + Not Q.
{modus tollens) (deductively valid)

V
Not P.
Tliis rule of inference can be staled as follows:
MODIKS TOLLENS: Given the statement of a conditional plus a state-

ment that its consequent is false, infer that its antecedent is not true.
Although it may at first seem less obvious to you that modus tollens is
deductively valid, I think that if you will reflect on it carefully, you'll see
that it For suppose that the given conditional is true. It says that if its
is.
antecedent is true, then its consequent also is true. But the additional
premise says that this consequent is not true. This must mean that the
conditional's antecedent is not true either, because if it were true, then so
too would be the consequent, which the other premise has just denied. So
we know that the conditional's antecedent is not true, which is just what
the conclusion asserts. Another way to think about it is that modus tollens
leads to exactly the same conclusion as would a step of transposition
followed by a step of modus ponens:
If P,then Q.
(transposition) (deductively valid)
If not Q, then not P + Not Q.
(modus ponens) (deductively valid)
Not P.
So modus tollens was really already implicit in these other two rules
discussed earlier. Modus always deductively valid.
tollens is
Here is a simple example of reasoning in which modus tollens occurs:
"If this were the right key for the lock, then it would fit the lock. But the
key does not fit the lock. Therefore, it is not the right key for the lock."
Here is a diagram of the reasoning:

If this were the right This key does
key for the lock, then + not fit the
it would fit the lock. lock.
(modus tollens) (deductively valid)
This is not the right key

for the lock.
\
21 1 2-4 Some Valid Steps of Reasoning i'sing Conditional and Other Relationships
Notice that this reasoning has the outHne form of modus tollens:
If P. then O. - Not Q.
(m.t.) {d.v.)
Not P.
Here is another example of reasoning in which modus tollens occurs:
If the liquid m
this bottle were an acid, then litmus paper would turn red
when placed in it. But litmus pafx-r does not turn red when placed in this
liquid. Therefore, the liquid in this bottle is not an acid.
The reasoning in this discourse can be diagrammed as follows;
If the liquid in Litmus paper

this bottle were does not turn
an acid, then litmus + red \N hen placed
paper would turn red in the liquid
when placed in it. in this bottle.
{modus tollens [deduciii el\ valid)
^ ' The liquid in this bottle is not an acid.
Notice that this reasoning is also an instance of modus tollens. or denving

the consequent. The reason at the top-left of the diagram is a conditional
sentence, and the reason at the top right of the diagram denies what is said
in the consequent of this conditional. From this, the denial of the antece-
dent is validly inferred.
Ob\ iously. steps of modus ponens and modub tollens always should
be diagrammed, not as convergent, but as LINKED.
Two invalid, or fallacious, fomis of inference sometimes masquerade
as the valid modus ponens and modus tollens. One is the "fallacv of affirm-
ing the consequent."
F.\LL.\CY OF .\FFIRMIXG THE CONSEQUENT
not deductively valid )-^
-'This degree of support rating is intended to refer only to the \3lidity or in\alidity of this schematic
form. It means that unlike modus ponens. modus tollens. and transposition, an inferences being of
this form does not guarantee its deductive validity. But it is possible for particular substitution in-
stances of this form to be deductively valid for example, if one and the same statement were substituted
1
both for 'P* and 'Q' simultaneously), or to have any other degree of validity. (Formal approaches,
like Copi's, that assume that an argument in naturzd language is proven invalid by showing that
it is an instance of an invalid argument form are strictly fallacious. See .Appendi.x I.)
112 Basic Kvaluaiioii of Reasoning
Heir is an rxamplc in wliidi an aigununt of this fallacious form leads

fioni iiuths to a falsehood:
If a file is burning in Oxygen is present in
this room now, then + this room now.
oxygen is present in this

loom now.
(nil)
A fire is burning in this room now.
The conditional on the oxygen present in my room

left is true, and there is
now, but no fire is burning. So, unlike modus ponens and modus tollens,
the fact that reasoning has the crossed-out form does not guarantee that it
is deductively valid.
Another imposter to guard against is the "fallacy of denying the
antecedent."
FAIXACY OF DENYING THE ANTECEDENT
deductively valid)'^^
Here's an example in which reasoning of this form leads from truths to a

falsehood:
If a fire is burning in A fire is not burning

this room now-, then in this room now.
+
oxygen is present in
this room now.
{nil)
Oxygen is not present in tliis room now.
The conclusion does not follow from the premises.

Both the fallacy of affirming the consequent and the fallacy of deny-
ing the antecedent must be avoided. The x'ttlid forms are, as we've seen,
affirming the antecedent and denying the consequent.
5. Pure Hypothetical Syllogism. Another deductively valid step of

reasoning, (ailed by logicians a "(pure) hypothetical syllogism," occurs
when one conditional is the same as the consequent of

the antecedent of
another conditional, and these two conditionals are put together like this:
If P, then Q. + If Q, then R.
(pure hypothetical syllogism) (deductively valid)
If P, then R.
The deductive validity of this reasoning is obvious. For, suppose that 'P'
(which is the antecedent of the conditional in the conclusion) happens to
be true. What then must be the case regarding the consequent, 'R,' of the
conditional in the conclusion? The supposition that 'P' is true, together
with the top left conditional in the reasons, would entail that 'Q' also is
true. And from 'Q' together with the conditional on the top right in the
reasons, it would follow that 'R is true. So, the two conditionals in the
'
reasons entail that if 'P' is true, then '/?' also is true. In other words, from
these two reasons it follows that if P, then R —
which is precisely what the
conclusion states.
Here isâ simple example of reasoning involving a pure hypothetical
syllogism:
If Ross wins this game, then Liverpool wins the championship. And if Liver-
pool wins the championship, then I will win my bet. So if Ross wins this
game, then I will win my bet.
If Ross wins this game, If Liverpool wins

then Liverpool wins + the championship,
the championship. then I will win my bet.
{deductively valid)
If Ross wins this game, then I
will win my bet.
To use this forrn of reasoning, obviously, the consequent of one of the con-
ditionals in the reason must be the same as the antecedent of another con-
ditional in the reasons.
6. Disjunctive Syllogism. A disjunctive syllogism — sometimes more

loosely called the "either-or" form of reasoning — occurs when a premise
of the form "Either P or Q" is linked with another premise that denies one
of the alternatives and the conclusion is drawn that the other alternative
must be true. In outine form it looks like this:
214 Basic Evaluaiion of Reasoning
Either R or S. + Not R.
(disjunctive syllogism) . # (deductively imlid)
S.
This form of reasoning also is valid without the word 'either'. And the
other premise can deny either of the two alternatives. Thus, the following
is also a valid form of this pattern of reasoning:
Not Q. + F or Q.
(disjunctive syllogism) . {deductively valid)
P.
Here is an example of reasoning involving a disjunctive syllogism:
Either a fuse has blown or else the electricity is off. No fuse has blown. There-
fore, the electricity must be off.
This reasonnig can be diagrammed as follows:
Either a fuse has No fuse

blown or else the + has
electricity is off. blown.
{deductively valid)
The electricity is off.
vSince the word "must" plays only the role of an inference indicator, it is
omitted from the statement of the conclusion in the diagram.)
Other Patterns Involving the Conditional
Many other steps of reasoning involving conditionals also are deduc-

tively valid. Some of these are diagrammed below. Some of these forms
come up in the exercises, so be sure you understand why each is de-
ductively valid.
If P, then not Q. + If not Q, then R.
{pure hypothetical syllogism) i # {deductively valid)
If P, tlun R.
If P. then (QandS).
A. {deductively valid)
If P, then Q.
215 2-4 Some Valid Steps of Reasoning i'smg Conditional and Other Relationships
If .:!. then (X or Vi. + If X. then B. + If V. then C.
{deductively valid)
\i A. then {B or C).
If not P. then Q.
J. (deductively valid)
PotQ
It is helpful to memorize the important forms that you should be able
to apply automatically namely.
The equivalence of If P. then Q" w ith P only if Q"

Transposition (or contraposition)
Modus ponens (affirming the antecedent)
Modus tollens (denying the consequent)
Remember, however, that inferences involving these sentence structures
are XOT THE ONLY \ alid forms of reasoning. Many other forms of rea-
soning are valid also. (We saw examples among the exercises for Section
2-1 and 2-2.)
More Difficult
Conditionalizatiou. Another, more difficult, form of inference in-

volving the conditional deserves special attention. Conditionalization goes
as follows, Suppose that a step of reasoning from some assumption, R,
to conclusion C would be deductively valid:
R
(deductively valid)
Then it must be the case that z/ assumption R be true, then conclusion C is
also true (simply because of the definition of deductive validity and the
deductive validity of the reasoning). So, simply from the deductive va-
lidity of the step of reasoning, one can infer the truth of a conditional
whose antecedent is the same as the assumption or statement R,
statement
and whose consequent is the same as the drawn conclusion C — that is.
If R, then C.
The reasoning in making this connection is diagrammed by putting the

step of reasoning from /? to C in a box^^ and using it as a justification for
"The concept and notation of a box does not appear in Beardsley.

216 Basic Kvaluaiioii of Reasoning
ihe conclusion "If R, then C":
(conditionalization) (d.v.)
If R, then C.
A box like this isused because, in this reasoning, it is neither statement R

nor statement C that justifies the concluded conditional statement; rather,
it is justified by the validity of the step of reasoning from R to C. Here is
an extremely simple illustration:
George has two suitcases
^(d.v.)
George has some luggage.
(conditionalization) (d.v.)
If George has two suitcases, then George has some luggage.
In diagramming steps of conditionalization like this, the top of the

box is closed (that is, a horizontal line is drawn across the top) because the
truth of the conditional statement inferred as a conclusion does not
depend on the truth assumed or pictured as a reason
of the statement
inside the box. If the reasoning in the box is deductively valid, then even if
the statement shown as a reason, R, in the box (for example, "George has
two suitcases") happens to be false, the truth of the conditional statement,
"If R, then C," below the box (for example, "If George has two suitcases,
then George has some luggage") still is guaranteed. The deductive
validity of the reasoning inside the box alone, by itself, guarantees the
truth of the conditional below the box.
Drawing a line across the top of the box expresses the fact that the
assumption, R, below this line in the box is "discharged" that is, the —
basic reason, R, inside the box below the top line is NOT assumed as a
basic reason in the justification for the conditional. (All that is assumed is
the validity of the inference inside the box.) Putting reasoning inside a
box means that any assumption under the top line inside the box is
"hypothetical" as far as the reasoning outside the box is concerned.

217 2-4 Some Valid Steps of Reasoning i'sing Conditional and Other Relationships
For instance, consider the following reasoning concerning the im-

portance that teaching effectiveness should have in college faculty tenure
decisions.
Suppose it were true, as some "publish or perish" proponents often claim,

that "Only good researchers can be effecti\e college teachers." I personally
do not agree w ith this statement, but suppose it were true (as my opponents
claim) that "Only good researchers can be effective college teachers." It
would follow that a faculty member will be an effecti\e teacher only if he
or she is a good researcher. From this it follows that if a faculty member is
an effective college teacher, then he or she must be a good researcher. There-
fore, every effective college teacher must be a good researcher. So, if (as my
opponents claim) "Only good researchers can be effecti\e college teachers,"
then every effective college teacher must be a good researcher. If so, then we
could insure that the uni\ ersity will excel in research by basing tenure deci-
sions solely on teaching effecti\eness.
This line of reasoning, which involves a step of conditionalization, can

be diagrammed as illustrated on p. 218.
As shown, the initial part of this reasoning is put into a box which is
closed across the top to show that the author's reasoning and conclusions
do not depend on the truth of the assumption that "Only good researchers
can be effectivê cbllege teachers." (In fact, in the original discourse, the
author says that he disagrees with this claim.) The author merely supposes
(or, for a moment pretends) that this claim in the box is true in order to
show that if it were true, then it would eventually lead to the conclusion
that "Every effective teacher is a good researcher." After going through the
steps in the box, the author performs a step of conditionalization, con-
cluding that IF the basic reason in the box were true, THEN the final con-
clusion in the box is trtie: // "Only good researchers can be effective college
teachers," then every effective college teacher is a good researcher. Notice
that this is a conditional statement which does not assume or claim that
"Only good researchers can be effective college teachers." The conclusion
following the author's step of conditionalization only assumes ihe validity
of the steps of reasoning inside the box; it does not assume the truth of the
basic reason (or any other statement) inside the box. This fact is expressed
by closing the top of the box with a line drawn across it.
Conditionalization can also be used when more than one basic
assumption appears at the top of the reasoning in the box. For example,
suppose that conclusion C logically follows with deductive validity from
the combination of several assumptions, f?,, R2, R^, , /?n- Using the
letters 'If, 'V 'W
etc., to represent abstractly whatever intermediate
, ,
"Adapted from Edgar Romero, "Tenure, Teaching, and Academic Freedom," The Daily, 1 (June,
1978), p. 10.
218 Basic Evaluation of Reason iug
Only good researchers can be

effective college teachers.
{d.v. )
i
A faculty member will be an
effective teacher only if he
or she is a good researcher.
{d.v.)
I
If a faculty member is an
effective college teacher,
then he or she is a good
researcher.
{d.v.)
I
Every effective college teacher
is a good researcher.
{conditionalization] {d.v.]
If "Only good researchers can be effective college teachers,"

then every effective college teacher is a good researcher.
^ . . .
If so. then ue could insure that the unixersity will excel in

research by basing tenure decisions solely on teaching effectiveness.
conclusions are involved, the complex reasoning might look like this:
/?, + /?, • •
•
+ R^
\U -^ V W+ X
Y + Z
C
If every inference in this reasoning is deductively valid, then it follows
necessarily that if all the reasons or assumptions are (or were) true, then
the conclusion would be true too. That is, the following conditional
219 2-4 Some ]'alid Steps of Reasoning i'smg Conditional and Other Relationships
would be true:
If R^ and /?, and R^ and . . . and /?^, then C.
So, the complex reasoning can be put in a box and used to justify this
conditional:
R, + R, + R,
U+ V w+x
\ i
Y +Z
(conditionalizatton)
If /?, and /?2 and R^ and . . . and Rf^, then C
A variation on this occurs when some of the statements that appear as

basic assumptions in the reasoning inside the box are omitted from the list
of reasons or assumptions in the antecedent of the conditional below the
box. In that case, the top of the box is left OPEN above these statements
(because their truth presupposed by the argument for the conditional

is
statement at the bottom). In other words, in cases where the reasoning

inside the box assumes as premises further assumptions in addition to
those that appear in the antecedent clause of the conditional sentence
below the box, the top of the box is left open above these additional
assumptions. Leaving the top of the box open above some of the basic
assumptions expresses the fact that the step of reasoning to the condi-
tional statement below the box assumes that these additional statements
are true. In conditionalization, the top of the box is closed with a hori-
zontal line only above those basic assumptions that are repeated in the
antecedent clause of the inferred conditional statement that appears below
the box.
Other Patterns of Reasoning Involving Conditionals
Another pattern of reasoning (called "reductio ad absurdum," or "re-

duction to absurdity") employs both conditionalization and modus tollens.
It isused to refute a statement by showing that it loiîcally entails a known

falsehood. If a false conclusion follows with deductive \alidity from a given
statement then, since deductively valid reasoning never leads from truths
'Q' rep-
lo a falsehood, it follows that the given statement is not true. Where
resents the known falsehood, such reasoning may be set out as follows:
REDUCTION TO ABSURDITY
where Q is known
to be false.
If P. then Q. + Not Q.
{modus tollens) {deductively valid)
Not P.
In the original discourse in which it occurs, reduction to absurdity often

appears in something like the following outline form:
Suppose that P were true. Then it would follow that Q is true. So, P
if is true,
then Q is true. But Q is not true. Therefore, it is not the case that P is true.
(When people talk to themselves in silent inner speech, and occasionally in

informal conversations, hypothetical reasoning such as this may be intro-
duced by the phrase "If ... then it would follow that ." instead of "Sup-
, . .
pose that then it would follow that

. . . ;
" On the special occasions when
the word used like this to do the job of the word "Suppose," the
"If" is
next clause may express the conclusion of a step of reasoning ihaii should —
contrary to the usual treatment of ordinary conditional statements be —
diagrammed w'ith an arrow as the conclusion of a step of reasoning in a
diagram in a box.)^^
Here is an example of reasoning that is a reduction to absurdity:
Suppose (as some people have claimed) that the meaning of a word in a lan-
guage were the same as the object or objects which that word names. Then it
Note to Advanced Readers :ln those cases where it is possible, a formal logician might now go
on to rewrite the reasoning in extensionalist notation. (Whether this is always possible is a disputed
question; some philosophers claim that Wittgenstein in his later writings showed that it is not
possible. Furthermore, natural logicians argue that if an argument can be fully analyzed and
evaluated using natural logic, then trying to translate in into extensionalist notation is pointless.)
Also sec Appendix F
would follow that words (like "is."' "the." "yes." and "nothing") that do not
name anything have no meaning. But this is absurd. Words like "is." "the."
"yes." and "nothing" that do not name anything ne\ertheless have a mean-
ing. Therefore, it is not the case that the meaning of a word in a language is the
same thing as the object or objects which that word names.
Here is a diagram of this reasoning:
The meaning of a word

in a language is the
same thing as the object
or objects which that word
names.
Words (like "is." "the,"

"yes," and "nothing")
that do not name any-
thing have no meaning.
If the meaning of a Words (like "is,"

w(5rd in a language is "the," "yes." and
the same thing as the object + "nothing") that do
or objects which that not name anything
word names, then words nevertheless have
(like "is," "the," "yes," a meaning.
and "nothing") that do
not name anything have
no meaiîng.
It is not the case that the meaning

of a word in a language is the same thing
as the object or objects which that
word names.
argument called "proof by contradic-

In a special case of this form of
tion.'' a statementproven by showing that its negation leads to a conclti-
is
sion that is not merely false, but a logical contradiction. In the original
discourse in w hich it occurs, such reasoning often appears in something
like the following outline form:
We wish to show R. Suppose that not R. It would follow that S. But S is a

contradiction. Therefore R is true.
222 Basic tvalualion of Reasoning
SiK li an argument ran be diagrammed as follows:
PROOF BY CONTRADICTION
where S is a
contradiction
If not R, then S. + Not S.
{modus tollens) {deductively valid]
Not not R.
{deductively valid)
1
R.
(Obviously, of course, these same patterns of reasoning also can be used

when some or all of the reasons and conclusions are negations or denials
of other sentences, or stated negatively.) The word "suppose" at the begin-
ning of a discourse very often functions to signal that the statement follow-
ing it is a basic reason in a closed-box subargument, and that this assump-
tion will be "discharged" later.
Proofs by contradiction usually are encountered only in mathematics,
ethics, and philosophy.
Some speakers prefer to reserve the term "reduction to absurdity" for
application only to those arguments where the reasoning in the box leads
to a logical contradiction as in a proof by contradiction. With such speak-
ers, confusion sometimes can be avoided by speaking of "shcjwing that the
assum[Mion logic ally entails a known falsehood" rather than using the term
"reduction to absurdity."
EXERCISES 2-4A
(a) Diagram the following examples of reasoning USING FULL SENTENCES, not
just numbers. Where possible, reorganize the author's original reasoning (for
instance, by adding further intermediate conclusions or omitted basic assump-
tions) so that part of it exactly fits one of the patterns or diagrams shown in Sec-
tion 2-4 (modus ponens, modus tollens, "either-or," etc.). But in doing so, do not
distort the author's meaning or intent.
(b) For every step of reasoning that involves a conditional or other relationship dis-
cussed in Section 2-4, state whether or not it is deductively valid. (In this set of
exercises you are not required to say or judge anything about the degree of sup-
port of any steps of reasoning that do not involve conditional or other relation-
ships discussed in Section 2-4.)
A-1. uThis insecticide w ill kill flying insectsJAnd it it will JqII flying insects,
then might very well be harmful
It for me to breathe it iii^.So,vinrnight very well be
harmful for me to breathe
J> \ +a
,jO
223
22} Basic Evaluation of Rtasoniug
A-2. bJthnTbci s in the hasciii^nu oi\else|h c has gone to the store. He's not in the
basenu'iH. ^())Tie's goiu- to the store.
.. ^ ZJ^
^
<^-
i ^ '^3--:^
J- »^p
-XP
A-3. If want
I to do it and won't harm myself or anyone else, then I should do
I
it.t want to do it and I won't harm myself or anyone else. pTheref ore, I should do it.
-4- ft\ 4-V_(.r fxj.^ f2>

C
J.
?V'
rÂ^^'-jN
^V p
\
225 Exercises 2-4A
A-4. Jones is a terrorist, then she will be unwilling to answer questions be-
If iVIiss
fore the grand jury. Miss Jones is unwilling to answer questions before the grand
jury. ^Therefore, Miss Jones is a terrorist.
A-5. If Dana me. then Dana will have a desire to go dancing with me.(Sd<if
likes
Dana does not ha\e a desire to go dancing with me, then Dana does not like me.>
^ ^
\:> V
'
A-6. II Dana likes nu\ then Dana will have a desire to go dancing with me. Dana
does not have a desire to go danting with me. Therefore,^ Dana does not like me.
o- c --Wa i^s;jpcs.^ cro

u^f-
a B
A-7. I here's either leftover pizza sauce m this jar in the refrigerator, pr else it's
enchilada sauce, and it's not enchilada sauce. So it must be leftover pizza sauce?\
v\ej'
\)V
^- v^f"
y<b
227 Exercises 2-4 ^^
A-8.v4f no spray paint will come. out, then either the nozzle is clo gged o r else the
can has lost its pressurization"^^he4Saint spray won't come out^^Fherefor(p<qther
the nozzle is clogged or else tne can has lost its pressurization>mn7ffT?nozzle is
not cloggedvTnerefom, fhe<;caiThas lost its pressurization.^
(L>®
-^ iT!LXi2->^N-_«~-^ ^1
^ A 4^.fi^ IE
^2.
^3
^K>^^^ cH-
o
1
.^c^
'^ ^
i?^ CT
tr>
EXERCISES 2-4B
tion 2-4 (modus ponens. modus tollens. "either-or," etc.). But in doing so. do not
cussed in Section 2-4. state whether or not it is deductively valid. (In this set of
B-1. If a\Jk)ik stuck into this spinach souffle comes out clean, then this souffle is
ready to eat^ A fork stuck into this spinach souffle comes out clean. Therefore, this
souffle is readv to eat.
Ni.O^ \
229
2'W Basit K\aluaii()n of Reasoning
B-2. you ride a motorcycle often, the odds are virtually certain that you'll be
If
in a serious accident. You're going to ride a motorcycle often, so the odds are
virtually certain that you'll be in a serious accident.
B-3.'* Either the Earth goes around the Sun, or else the Sun goes around the Earth.
The Earth does not go around the Sun. "iFherefore, \he Sun must go around the
"^ -,.-:-
Earth.
231 Exercises 2-4 B
B-4. marijuana is a drug whose use is dangerous to a person's health, then our
If
society should outlaw it. And our society should outlaw marijuana. Therefore,
ynarijuana is a drug whose use is dangerous to a person "s health.
B-5. If this substance is an acid, then it will donate a proton to the other substance,
ft does not donate a proton to the other substance, so it is not an acid.

B-6. If iliis woi id were desi.mu'cl and

( rcaicd by an all-ôod. all-knowing, and all-
powcrtul god. then it would be at least as free from remediable natural evil as a
moderately powerful, good, and intelligent being could make it. But this world is
not as free from remediable natural evil as a moderately powerful, good, and intel-
ligent being could make it. as is shown by the fact that even we weak humans can
think of. and make, ( learly possible improvements (as is proved, for instance, by the
elimination of diseases like smallpox and typhoid fever). Therefore, this world was
not designed and created by an all-good, all- knowing, and all-powerful god.
233 Exercises 2-4B
^^
B-7. you have a capitalist economic system, then the highest priority or empha-
If
sis isput on maximizing a quantity known as "profits." But if highest priority or

emphasis is put on maximizing a quantity known as "profits." then the tendency
of the economic system will be to manufacture objects that are cheaply produced
wîth a preplanned lack of durability, because doing so increases stockholders'
profits by lowering production costs and increasing repeat sales. Therefore, if
you have a capitalist economic system, then the tendency of the economic system
will be to manufacture objects that are cheaply produced with a preplanned lack
of durabilitv.
231 Basic Evaluation of Reasoning ^-)
Adapted from a siaicincnt b\ an offic ial ol Planned Parenthood:
B-8. If the unavaihil)ility ol coniiaccptives were an effective deterrent to teenage

sex. ilien there would be few teenage pregnancies. For, if the unavailability of
contraceptives were an effective deterrent to teenage sex, then teenagers would not
have sex without contraceptives, and if teenagers would not have sex without con-
traceptives, then there would be few teenage pregnancies. So, if the unavailability
of c()ntra(epii\es were an effective deterrent to teenage sex, there would be few
teenage pregnancies. But there are many teenage pregnancies. Therefore, the un-
a\ailability of contrateptives is not an effective deterrent to teenage sex. So, pre-
venting teenagers from having access to contraceptives will not prevent teenage
sex.
235 Exercises 2-4B
B-9. Hf the light wont go on. then either the bulb is burned ou^r_thAattery is no
good/Butîe battery is gopdyand yet th^Hghl won't go oiiÎ^TherefoiXjSît' bulb
is burned out 7^
Special instruction: Just for the practice, diagram this reasoning in two steps, with two arrows,
supplying an intermediate conclusion that you write yourself.
A Vw^8 i- fi
(S -^(S^ %
,3
^ \\
EXERCISES 2-4C
(a) Diagram the following examples or reasoning USING FULL SENTENCES, not
tion 2-4 (modus ponens, modus tollens, "either-or," etc.). But in doing so, do not
C-1. th^ U.S. had a gross national product which exceeded that of all other na-
If
tions combined, then the U.S. would have an obligation to help Third World na-
tions. But the U.S. has no such G.N. P., and therefore it has no such obligation.
"^
237
238 H.iM( Ks.iliiatioii ol Rrasoning
^
^ -)
C-2. 1 his subsiantc is not socluini because ii burns with a green flame, Which it
would not do if it were sodium.
C-3. If\our hypothesis is true then\ certain facts will be found. These facts have
been found. Therefore our hypothesis is true.
L/NV)>î)
/^.^,.
239 Exercises 2-4 C
C-4. If you have diabetes, then youre thirsty all the time. And if you're thirsty all
the time, then you drink liquids all the time. Therefore, if you drink liquids all
the time, then vou ha\e diabetes.
C-5. Republican foreign policy toward Third World countries is likely to bring
about the very result that the United States is trying to avoid. If a policy is likely
to bring about the very result that the United States is trying to avoid, then that
policy is counter-productive from the standpoint of United States aims and ob-
jectives. Therefore, Republican foreign policy toward Third VNbrld countries is
counter-productive from the standpoint of U.S. aims and objectives.
2H) Basit Kvaluatioii ol Rtasoiiiiig
C-6. book will noi have 128 pages unless we are going to use another type-
1 1r'
face. We are going to use another typeface. Therefore the book will have 128 pages.
'^\o-'
(£) A .
b & f\
C-7. Tuition will rise only if the students are going to let it rise. The suidents are
going to let it rise, since tuition will rise.
241 Exercises 2-4 C
e
C-8. Inasmuch as the defendant's footprints were found at the scene of the mur-^
A ^
der, and they would be found there if he is the murderer, we may conclude that the
defendant is the murderer.
H .\\
>A^^pv/
V i-^w^-XC:
C-9. Inasmuch as the defendant's footprints were found at the scene of the mur-
der /^nd 'they would not be fmind/thereuf he were not tn^ murderer, we may
conclude that the defendant is the murderer.
Note: Observe the diffeirence between this exercise and the preceding exercise.
:> r
Xc^)^'r^
^^^
lA
D^^^^
_ \\^^
(^^'^-"^t^^^"'^
^^:
'
2 12 Ba!>it Evaluation of Reasoning
C:-10. Il/>()u aun t t;(tiiiu^sulli( iciit as(()il)i( acid lor good health in your food J
tlun/2()U gft s( urvyT^^Tf you doni get scurvy, then you are getting sufficient
ascorbu acid lor good health in your food.
[hut: RfnifMilni ihai ilu ic arc two separate reqiiiieinenis that reasoning must fulfill to prove its
( oiu lusion.
A
H \
C-lliC£'eorge will»m attend the party unless they let him off early from work.y
4"hey udU let him olf early from work only if the ne w shipment did not arrive to-
^ day.A^Tie new shipment did arrive todaybCCnerefbr^^CCreorge will not attend the
^ party. "7
Special instruction: Supply an intermediate conclusion and diagram this reasoning with two ar-
rows. Evaluate both steps of reasoning. „ d^'^'^
243 Exercises 2-4 C
Q C-12.Germany had not won World War II by 1943. Therefore, if Germany had
"^ won World War II by 1943, then Poland would have ruled the world.
Xote: If. after correctly evaluating this reasoning, you would like to have an interesting experi-
ence, ask a formal logician to explain the result obtained when the same inference is evaluated
using the method of truth tables, or formal truth-functional rules of inference in the proposi-
tional calculus.
EXERCISES 2-4D
just numbers. Where possible, recognize the author's original reasoning (e.g.,
by adding further intermediate conclusions or omitted basic assumptions) so
it exactly fits one of the patterns or diagrams shown in Section 2-4
that part of
(modus ponens. modus tollens, "either-or," etc.). But in doing so, do not distort
the author's meaning or intent.
D-1. If .Smith is the kidnapper, then some of the ransom money will be found in
his house. Some of the ransom money was found in this house. Therefore Smith is
the kidnapjDer.
245
D-2. noi (xcui until 23: 15 Greenwich Mean Time. If it had occurred
I.iiioll (lid
earlier, the flight would be unsuccessful. It follows that the flight

will be successful.
D-3. I am going to show that, some Reagan Administration offi-

contrary to what
cials seem to believe, it is "making contraceptives unavailable to
not true that
teenagers would be an effective deterrent to teenage sex." This can be shown as
follows. Just suppose, for a moment, that it were true that making contraceptives
una\ ailable to teenagers would be an effective deterrent to teenage sex. From this
supposition it would follow logically that teenagers without contraceptives
would not have sex. And from that it would follow that teenagers woidd not have
sex without contraceptives. So, if making contraceptives unavailable to teenagers
would be an effective deterrent to teenage sex, then teenagers would not have sex
without contraceptives. But it is false to say that teenagers would not have sex
without contraceptives; I mean, in other words, teenagers will have sex without
contraceptives. (This is pro\ en by the fact that there are many teenage pregnancies
each year.) Therefore, making contraceptives unavailable to teenagers would not
be an effective deterrent to teenage sex.
Hints: (i) The reasoning of this argument has a slightly different structure from the reasoning in
the earlier exercise on the same topic, (ii) The reasoning in this \ersion uses a step of conditionali-
zation. Consult the last part of Section 2-4 of the text if you are uncertain how to diagram
such reasoning.
Special instruction: In this exercise, you are only required to diagram the whole argument,
and evaluate the step of modus tollens.
247 Exercises 2-4 D
218 Basic Evaluatinn of Rfasoiiiiin
D-i. Sonu' people ( hiim iliat l()i;ic properly is, or should be, a branch of psychol-
ogy. Suppose this were u ue. Then it would follow that the subject matter of logic
would be psychological states or mental objects. And
if that were so. it would fol-
low logically that the properties of the subject matter of logic would differ and
vary from person to person. So. if logic properly is, or should be, a branch of psy-
chology, then the properties of the subject matter of logic would differ and vary
from person to person. But this is not true: the properties of the subject matter of
logic do not and \ary from person to person. Therefore,
differ it is not the case
that logic properly is, or should be, a branch of psycholc3gy.
Hint: This (liscourse contains a rare conditional statement (in the fourth sentence) that. unHke
niosi (onditional statements, actually docs express astepof reasoning, and should be broken apart,
with the ( onsecjuent lause show n as expressing a conclusion drawn from the preceding intermedi-
(
ate conclusion, and the antecedent clause simply discarded. The other conditional statement is a
conclusion reached by a step of conditionalization.
Special instruction: In this exercise, you are only required to diagram the whole argument and
evaluate the step of modus tollens.
249 Exercises 2-4D
250 Basic K\aliiaii(>ii of Rt-asoiiing
D-5. Suppose a Simple Labor Theory of Value were true. Then the true eco-
nomic "value" of any object would be directly proportional to the amount of
human labor required to produce it. From this it would follow that the value of
natural resources (oil, equal only to the value of the labor
timber, minerals, etc.) is
required to extract and transport them. But this is absurd. The value of natural
resources is greater than the value of the labor required to extract and transport
them. Therefore, a Simple Labor Theory of Value is not true.
special instructions: Pill in the missing step(s) of conditionalization and modus toUens [in square
biatktls], and lAaluatc ihc step of modus tollens.
251 Exercises 2-'fD
253 2-5 The How and Why of Supplying Suppressed Premises
2-5 THE HOW AND WHY OF SUPPLYING

SUPPRESSED PREMISES
In logically analyzing (that is, diagramming) and evaluating discourses,

we have always been careful to represent the reasoning exactly as the au-
thor intended it. Occasionally we have found it desirable to add to the dia-
giam further basic reasons or intermediate or final conclusions that it
seemed proper although the author nowhere ex-

to attribute to the author,
plicitly stated them. We always enclosed such additions in square brackets
to show that these particular statements were not actually present in the
author's original discourse, but were added by us. Usually, we considered
such additions justified because it seemed reasonable to assume that they
were intended or believed by the author. Either they fit well with the rest
of the author's general views as expressed in the discourse and adding them
improved the reasoning, or else they were well-known truths, or both. For
convenient abbreviation, I will say that such additional assumptions (or
"suppressed premises") were indirectly contained, or implicit, in the orig-
inal discourse.
When all implicit additional assumptions are inserted into a diagram
as further justification for the steps of reasoning, sometimes they are made
deductively valid (that is, strengthened to the limit). But often they are not.
In even after we have inserted the additional, originally unstated rea-
fact,
sons that the author plausibly can be taken to assume implicitly, often
some of the steps of reasoning still will not be deductively valid. Even when
all the unstated but implicit assumptions have been supplied, some rea-
soning still remains less than deductively valid (that is, it is possible for the
reasons to be true and yet the conclusion be false).
In this section you will learn how, in such cases, to continue from this
point and join to the implicit reasons still further assumptions that are
actually sufficient to make the reasoning deductively valid. That is, you
will learn how to construct and insert new sentences which will make the
—
reasoning deductively valid and how to do this for atiy reasoning. Thus,
unlike earlier sections where we were very careful not to put anything in
the diagram that was not actually believed or intended by the author, in this
section we will 'not concern ourselves with accurate interpretation of the
author; instead we will formulate whatever assumptions are sufficient to
make the reasoning deductively valid. For convenience I will call this
"supplying sufTicient suppressed assumptions (or premises)."
Acquiring this skill and practicing it on some examples is not only
"Sufiicient" can here be thought of a short for "sufficient to make the reasoning deductively
"
valid
valual)l(' as an iniclkc tiial exercise to sharpen your reasoning abilities and

strengtlun your mind; it also has other practical uses. Suppose, for exann-
l)lc. that in n'oluatini^ some reasoning you judge that its
implicit and ex-
p]i( it basic reasons ail are true and lend some support to the conclusion,
but that this support is less than totally conclusive (that is, you judge that
the basic reasons are all true, but that some of the inferences are less than
deductively valid). What should you do next? Where should you go from
here? In many it is best to go search for additional reasons favoring or
cases
opposing the drawn conclusion— ^5/?6'f/fl//y when evidence, statistical
samplings, cjr hypotheses are involved. But with ethical, legal,
scientific
political, theological, philosophical, and theoretical reasoning generally,
sometimes progress can be made by supplying the sufficient suppressed
assumptions and determining whether they are true.
Sometimes, in such cases, you may formulate some true statements that
make the original reasoning deductively valid when added as missing
premises. Then you have developed an argument that is sound, and that
proves the conclusion true. On other occasions, your efforts may result
in discovering a "land mine missing assumption," which is a premise that
is obviously an essential assumption presupposed by the original argument,
a key missing premise of the reasoning, that clearly is false. This could be
a fatal flaw in the reasoning, a discovery that refutes the argument by
showiîg that the reasoning is unsound. (It is figuratively called a "land
mine" missing premise because stumbling across it explosively demolishes
the original reascjning.) More will be said about this later, when other
practical uses of the technique of constructing sufficient suppressed
premises will also emerge.
After reasoning has been diagrammed and evaluated, we jind its
sufficient suppressed assumptions by locating each inference-arrow in the
diagram that is less than deductively valid and linking to the reasons
immediately above this arrow some further sentences that will make the
drawn conclusion follow with deductive validity. Suppose, for example,
that the diagram has the following form (the letters 'A,"B,'etc. here stand in
place of the constituent statements):
A D
A. (moderate) (deductively valid)
V
B +
.strong)
v
We want add further sentences here that will have the effect of replacing
to
the "moderate" and "strong" ratings with "deductively valid." These
additions can be made in any order. So, to the reason represented by 'A' in
the step of reasoning on the top left of the diagram
/I
(moderate)
i
we would add a further statement, say 'M,' sufficient to make the

conclusion, 'B,' follow with deductive validity:
A + [M]
{deduct we ly valid)
The square brackets around 'M' indicate that this statement was not present
in the original discourse.
In the illustration, the other step of reasoning that was not deductively
valid is
B + C
.(strong)
In such cases as this where two or more reasons are involved, the inference's
strength might be raised to deductive validity in any of several different
ways. It may be easiest just to add to the given reasons some further single
sentence, say T,' such that all the sentences taken together logically entail
the original conclusion:
B + C + [T]
(deductively valid)
In other cases it may be easier to insert one or more intermediate conclusions

at thesame time the additional assumptions are added. For example, one
might add an assumption, '/?, to the first reason and deduce an intermediate
'
conclusion, 'X,' which together with the other given reason (and perhaps
^")6 Basic Evaluation of Rtasoning
aiiotlu suppressed assumption 'S') logically entails the originally drawn

1
conclusion in reasoning that looks like this:
B + [R]
{deductively valid)
[X] + C + [.S]
[deductively valid)
^
When expanding reasoning by supplying its sufficient suppressed prem-

ises,always remember that every inference-arrow in the expansion must
be made deductively valid. As in the above example, this may require
supplying further assumptions at several places in the expanded diagram.
Substituting these expanded versions for the inferences that were not
deductively valid in the original reasoning yields the following revised
version:
A + [M]
{deductively valid)
B + [R] D
{deductively valid) {deductively valid)
V
X] + + [S]
[deductively valid)
We now have a deductively valid reformulation of the original reasoning.^

Its basic reasons are statements 'A,' 'D,' M,' 'R,' and 'S/ the last three
of which are the suppressed premises added.
Any uncertainties about the truth of the final conclusion that were due
to inconclusive inferences in the original reasoning have now been driven
back onto the total set of basic reasons in the newly constructed revision.
That is, all uncertainty about the inferences has been eliminated (since all
Note to Advanced Readers.ln those cases where it is possible, a formal logician might now go
on to rewrite the reasoning in extensionalist notation. (Whether this is always possible is a disputed
question; some philosophers claim that Wittgenstein in his later writings showed that it is not
possible. Furthermore, natural logicians argue that if an argument can be fully analyzed and
evaluated using natural logic, then trying to translate in into extensionalist notation is pointless.)
Also, sec Appendix I.
257 2-y The How and Why of Supplying Suppressed Premises
are now ironclad), and it remains only to determine whether every member
of the new set of basic reasons is true. Only if one or more of them is false can
the final conclusion be false. If all the basic reasons in the revised version
(that is, original plus new reasons) are true, then so too is the final
conclusion. So if you know that all the basic reasons are true, then you know
that the conclusion also is true.
What if some of the additional suppressed assumptions are false?
What, if anything, would that show?
A. It would not show drawn as the final conclusion is

that the statement
false. The mere reasoning has false basic reasons, and so is
fact that
unsound, does not mean that the final conclusion is false. Actually it is quite
common for people to try to support truths with unsound reasoning. False
reasons even can lead to a true conclusion with deductive validity! For
example:
All poodles are fish. + All fish have fur.
{deductively valid)
All poodles ha\e fur.

a
So the falseness of some of the reasons you've supplied would not prove that
the final conclusion is false. It still may be true.
B. If some other set of suppressed assumptions, different from those you

supplied, containing no falsehoods, could have been joined with the
original basic reasons to logically entail the same final conclusion, then
falseness of the suppressed assumptions you added does not even show the
original reasoning unsound. For the speaker or writer always can respond,
quite appropriately, that the additional assumptions that he omitted but
intended were the true ones, not the false set you supplied. (More on this in
hint number 1 later.)
C. But if assumptions
a falsehood arises in every possible set of suppressed
whose addition would expansion of the original
create a deductively valid
reasoning, then, the original reasoning is unsound. For practical purposes,
you can take this to mean that if every reasonable attempt to supply
sufficient suppressed assumptions requires the addition of some falsehood,
then for all intents and purposes you may regard the original reasoning as
unsound. (Remember: this does not mean that the conclusion is false for —
false reasons can often entail a true conclusion but only that the reasoning —
does not establish its truth.) In this case-you have shown neither the truth
nor the falsity of the final conclusion, only that the final conclusion need
not be accepted cjn the basis oi this reasoning. The reasoning has been
refuted and can be discarded.
This logical procedure, of course, does not give you something for
nothing. In particular, you are not automatically told whether or not the
argument is sound. ^" But your undecided question about logical validity is
replaced by a question ragarding the truth or falsity of certain reasons,
which in some cases you may be able to determine with the methods you
have for deciding the truth or falsity of statements. You may be able to
consult an encyclopedia, for example, or confer with reliable experts, or
perform experiments and make observations, or draw firm conclusions
from other truths that you already know. By these methods, the truth or
falsity of statements appearing as reasons sometimes may be decided. As a
simj)le illustration, consider the following reasoning about the length of
time that electrical resistors^' can be allowed to sit on the shelf in electronics
parts stores before they are so!d:
Without any current in a circuit to heat the resistor, theresistor has practically
ncj change with age. The shelf life of resistors is usually no problem, therefore.
Bernard Grob, Basic Electronics, 4th ed.

(New York: McGraw-Hill. 1977). p. 232.
Without any current in a

circuit to heat the resistor,
the resistor has practically
no change with age.
(less than d.xi.)
The shelf life of resistors

is usually no problem.
This step of reasoning is less than deductively valid. The reason given says
that when there is no electric current through a resistor, it undergoes almost
no change or deterioration with age. The conclusion says that the life of
resistors when they are just sitting on the shelf in the store is usually no
problem example, with batteries, which have a short shelf
(as contrasted, for
life). What additional assumption will make this reasoning deductively
valid? Obviously the additional assumption is that when resistors are just
sitting on shelves in the parts store, no electrical current is going through
them. By adding this assumption, the reasoning is made deductively valid:
Remember that "sound" means "is valid andhas true reasons."

^'A resistor is an dectrical device used to oppose the flow of an electric current.
Without any current [When resistors are

in a circuit to just sitting on
heat the resistor, + shelves in a store,
the resistor has there is no current
practically no going through
change with age. them.]
{deductively valid)
The shelf life of resistors

is usually no problem.
Adding the assumption "When resistors are just sitting on shelves in a

store, there is no current going through them" raises the inference's strength
to deductive validity. If we knew that the originally given reason plus this
additional reason were true, then we would also know that the conclusion
(that there no need to worry about the shelf life of resistors) is true.
is
Now suppose that I were responsible for items stocked in an electronics

store, and I wanted to find out whether this additional assumption is true.
How could I determine whether it is true? There are many possibilities. I
might find" an authority knowledgeable about electronics, and inquire
whether any electric current flows through resistors when they are on a shelf
and not connected in a circuit. Alternatively, I might obtain a reliable book
on electronics, and try to learn the answer from reading it. Or I could attach
appropriate electrical measuring instruments to resistors sitting on the shelf
to see whether any current is running through them. Or if I knew the basic
natural laws regarding electricity (such as Ohm's law), I might be able to
reason from these basic principles to the conclusion that no current flows
through resistors when they are sitting unconnected on the shelf. These are
some of the ways in which I might determine the truth or falsity of the
additional assumption.
If I learn that the "missing" reasons that I have supplied plus the
reasons given by the author are true, then I know that the reasoning is sound
and the conclusion is discover that the missing assumption is false,
true. If I
then for practical purposes, can discard the reasoning as useless (unless I
I
can think of oftier true assumptions that would make it deductively valid).
Helpful Hints and Practical Tips
1 . When supplying suppressed premises, try to supply only truths. If you

are faced with a choice between different possible additional assumptions,
some of which you know to be true, always select the true ones. For adding a
false assumption when some truth would have done equally well will entitle
260 Ba>.i( Kvaluaiion of Reasoning
ihe original argument's author to reply that the true suppressed premises
were intended rather than the false ones you supplied. Besides, our personal
best self-interests lie less in "refuting reasoning" than in finding the truth
through reasoning. So always supply known truths, if possible, when
adding suppressed assumptions.
2. If you get stuck trying to formulate an additional assumption that is
sufficient to guarantee the inference, here's a maneuver that always works.
Suppose, for example, the troublesome inference looks like this:
R
Ji {less than deductively valid)
Then form a deductively valid inference by linking to the given reason

(statement "R") a conditional having that reason as antecedent and the
drawn conclusion as consequent — that is.
R + [UR, then C]
(deductively valid)
\f
A similar trick works when the drawn conclusion is inferred from several
reasons linked together — as. for example:
R, + R., + . . . + R.,
(less than deductively valid)
K
Here we can make the inference deductively valid by adding a conditional
whose antecedent is a conjunction of all the given reasons and whose
consequent is the drawn conclusion:
/?, + fi^ + ••+ /^„ + [If (/?,+/?, + ... + R„). then K.]
{deductively valid)
K
Qui(kand fail-safe as this device is, your efforts will be more than rewarded
if you'll lirst see if you can just "find" the missingassumptions, and employ
this tri( k only as a last resort.
A
convenient example for illustrating the supplying of suppressed
premises is the following argument from John Stuart Mill:
The pecuHar e\ il of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing

the human race , posterity as well as the existing generation. ... If the opinion
is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error.
"^^
Here is an evaluated diagram of the reasoning in this passage:
If a silenced opinion If opinion

a silenced
is right, mankind is is wrong, mankind loses
deprived of the the clearer perception
opportunity of and livelier impression
exchanging error for [that would be] produced
truth. bv its collision with error.
(strong)
Silencing the expression of an opinion

[depri\es] the human race [of something].
What additiorfal assumption could be linked with the reasons given to make
and figure it out before looking
the inference deductively valid? (Stop
below.) The further assumption "Any opinion is either right or wrong"
seems to suffice:
If a silenced opinion Ifa silenced opinion is [Any opinion

is right, mankind is wrong, mankind loses is either
depri\ed of the the clearer perception right or it
opportunity of + and livelier impression + is wrong.]

exchanging error for [that would be]
truth. produced by its collision
with error.
(deductively valid)
Silencing the expression of an opinion

[deprives] the human race [of something].
33
With the addition of this premise, the argument is now deductively valid.
Cited by Pospesel.
^^Note to Advanced Readers: Objection: "You seem to add a tautology to the author's premises,
tautology cannot make an inducti\e argument deductively valid. .\nd it appears that the argument is
inducti\e before the addition of the lautoltjgy. since it is merely very strong before the addition of that
—
premise." Reply: So mut h the worse for the (widespread) assumption that "inductive" reasoning is
definable as any reasoning supporting its conclusion with less than deductive validity (and that
Ii is well known any inference,can be made into deductively valid

ihai
reasoning by the addition of appropriate further premises. This is true even
of an inference of the type called a "statistical generalization," or "induc-
tion," in which a conclusion is reached about all the members of a certain
group (the population) on the basis of statistical sampling or examination
of a subset (a sample) of that population. For instance, suppose a public-
opinion pollster questions two thousand carefully selected eligible voters in
Canada about their attitudes toward Candidate X in comparison with
Candidate Y. who is running against her for election. Of those questioned,
suppose 45 percent favor Candidate X, 40 percent favor Candidate Y, and 15
percent are undecided. The pollster reasons as follows:
Of the two thousand eligible voters

questioned Canada,
in
45% favored Candidate X.
40% favored Candidate V, and
15% were undecided.
Of
\
the lota) population of eligible voters
in Canada, 45% favor Candidate X, 40% favor
Candidate Y, and 15% are undecided.
Here conclusion about the members of an entire population, P (all the

a
eligible voters in Canada) is drawn from a statement of evidence that
describes only the observed sample, S (the two thotisand eligible voters
questioned). This reasoning is an instance of statistical generalization.
Reasoning of this kind has the following general form:
K members of sample
percent of the
S, drawn from population P, have
property X.
K
\
percent of the members of
population P have property X.
"tauKjlogics" ran bt' distinguished sharply from "noiitautologus m a iiaiuial language). In natural
language, many good arguments are neither "inductions" nor deducti\el\ \alid. Also, in natural
language it seems nnpossible to separate sentences sharpiv into two distinct classes, "tautologies" and
"nontautologies." Some sententes in English seem not to be clearly or sharply categorizable as
"tautologies" or as "nontautologies." This example from Mill appears to be one of the many cases w here
the traditional assumptions conflict with the data from natural language.
Notice that such an inference is not, in general, deductively valid. Assuming

that the sample contains fewer items than the total population, reasoning of
this sort is not deducti\ely valid because it is possible for the conclusion
(about the population as a whole) to be false even if the statement gi\ ing the
reason (the observations of property X in the sample) is true. (For example.
it might be that the sample was in some way unrepresentative of the total
population in respect to having property X. Inferences like this obviously

)
assume that the sample is representative of the population in respect to

having property X. (Being "representative" means that the percentage of
members of the sample having property X is the same as the percentage of
the whole population having this property. ) If this assumption is added, the
reasoning becomes deductively valid:
K percent of the [Sample S is repre-

members of sample S. sentative of population
drawn from population P in the incidence of
P, ha\e property X. property A'.]
{deductively I'alid)
9
K percent of the members of population

P ha\e property X.
If both reasons are true, then so too must be the conclusion.

Someone doubtlessly will point out that there is no way to verify with
absolute certainty that the sample is representative of a certain population
(with respect to property X) except by examining every single item or
member of the total population — in which case, the whole business of
taking a sample would be unnecessary. This But the point of taking a
is true.
sample and examining its members is to obtain a conclusion about the total
population (which is perhaps strongly supported by the evidence) without
going to all the labor and expense of actually examining every member of
that population. (Indeed, sometimes a population is such that examining
every member would be impossible —
there may be too many members, or
some may exist in distant regions of the universe or otherwise be
inaccessible.) In such cases we naturally accept a certain "risk" that we will
reach a false conclusion. However, strong (although nonconclusive)
grounds can often be given for believing that the sample is representative.
For instance:
[ riie size [The sample

of the was not
sample biased in any
was large.] known way.]
A' percent of tlie ineiiibeis of

\ /
[Sample S is representative
sample .S, drawn from popula- of population P in incidence
tion P, have property X. of property A'.]
(deductively valid)
K percent of the members of population

P have properly X.
Even though we have not examined all members of a population, we can

often have good (although admittedly not totally conclusive) grounds for
believing that a certain sample is representative of it.
Now you should do some exercises in which YOU practice supplying
additional assumptions sufficient to make given inferences deductively
valid.
EXERCISES 2-5A
Diagram the reasoning in the following discourses USING COMPLETE SENTENCES,

not numbers. Then add, in square brackets, additional assumptions sufficient to make
each step of inference deductively valid.
A-1. Eating vitamins will help keep me healthy. Therefore, I should eat vitamins.
Special instructions: Complete this particular argument with an added assumption in the form of a
conditional sentence, the easy way out explained in the text.
265
266 Basi( F.valuaiioii of Reasoning
From Kli/abeih Drake and RolH-riC. Rcid. The Importation of Liquefied Natural Gds." Scientific
American, 236. no. 4. 2.'j:
A-2. riu" storage laiiks [lor liquefied natural gas] must be built of materials that
retain their strength at -162 degrees C. Carbon steel ... is not satisfactory because
it gets brittle at low temperatures.
From T. J. Dawson. "Kangaroos." Scientific American, 237. no. 2. 78.
A-3. [Kangaroos] stand apart from other large mammals because they rear their
yoimg in a pouch and because they hop.
special instruction: For j)ractice, do tfiis particular exercise in both of two different ways. (1)
Diagram tfie reasons as linked, and sujjply the furtlier assumpiion(s) tliat will make the reasoning
dedu< tively \alid. Then, (2) diagram the reasoning as convergent, and add to each side separately
the further assumption(s) sufficient to make it deductively valid. (Your complete answer, then,
should show two separate diagrams, corresponding to the two possible ways of analyzing this
reasoning, with all inferences in each diagram made deductively valid.)
267 Exercises 2-5A
Adapitd lion) Rithaid I rubo, " rhe Complete Sleep Book, "
Good Housekeeping, 186, no. 3, 77:
A-4. Surveys in 25 states of over one million people revealed that 26 percent of the
females and 13 percent of the males questioned regularly suffer from insomnia.
This means that, in the I'nited States, better than 30 million people regularly
suffer from insomnia.
Hint: .Ninons the addiiifmal assumptions, add one about the number of people in the I'nited States.
EXERCISES 2-5B
Diagram the reasoning in the following discourses USING COMPLETE SENTENCES,

not numbers. Then add, in square brackets, additional assumptions sufficient to make
each step of inference deductively valid.
From I'lric Xeissei. "The Processes of \'ision." Scientific American. 219. no. 3. 214:
B-1. \'isual memory differs from perception because it is based primarily on stored
rather than on current information . . .
269
270 Basic Kxaluatioii of Reasoning
Iiom FiKtliK h lMt;fls. Soi utlisrn: l't<)f)i(ui and Scientific:
B-2. Soincihiiig can exist only it it is a material thing. So God does not exist.
271 Exercises 2-5 B
B-3. I put 2 cubic centimeters of alcohol into this empty test tube and then added 2
cubic centimeters of water to it and stirred. Therefore, now there are exactly 4 cubic
centimeters of an alcohol-water mixture in this test tube.
Hint: Vou !na> find it iiccfssar\ to add an additional assinn[)iion that is false, in order to make this icasoning
deducti\elv valid.
272 Basic Evaluation of Rt-asoniiig
B-4. Evil makes one think;

Thinking makes one wise;
Being wise good,
is
rherefore: Evil is good.
Hint: .Add omitted iritennediate conclusions in ihe diagram. ,\nd be on the lookout for a "land mine"
buppnssid assumption.
CHAPTER 3
Clofifying
Obscure Reasoning
3-1 ANALYZING MUDDY REASONING

OR CONFUSED EXPOSITION
Not all reasoning is presented in the relatively clear and well-organized

manner of the majority of examples of Chapters 1 and 2. Even the best writ-
ers sometimes use unneeded extra words and sentences, include logically
irrelevant ideas, repeat minor variations of the same statement unneces-
sarily, waver between different formulations of their reasoning, and use
inference indicators improperly. (Sometimes they arc trying to hide holes in
their reasoning with logical razzle-dazzle, but more often, I think, they are
honestly confused or unsure of their reasoning.)
Another difficulty, related to these problems, arises when the various
claims or assertions that constitute the separate reasons or conclusions in
the author's reasoning are vaguely spread o\er many different sentences in
the discourse. When this occurs, it may be impossible to pick out individ-
ual sentences in the discourse that exactly state each of the author's rea-
sons and conclusions. (In extreme cases, an entire book may present a sin-
gle argument that actually could have been expressed in a few carefully
formulated sentences, none of which appears anywhere in the book!)
These problems especially arise with newspaper, radio, and television
editorials, news and opinion magazines, popular books and periodicals,
public speeches, and everyday common conversation. Also, if your experi-
ence is like that of many other writers, you may find yourself facing such
273
^
274 Cilarifving Obscure Reasoning
pioblt'ins w hen xou ny to lewiite your own pre\ ious rou.^h drafts of pa-
pers you arc writing.
In such situations the simple mechanical procedure of first bracket-
ing statements as they appear in the discourse and then arranging these
into a diagram of the reasoning (as in Chapter 1) will not work. In the
present section you will learn howhandle such cases. As will be seen,
to
diagrams of the reasoning can still be constructed, but the process requires
creative interpretation and condensation. In fact, you will have to do a
large part of the author's work for him by formulating sentences that con-
cisely express his points and by restructuring or amending his reasoning
so that it is ordered as logically as possible. Although the labor is far out of
proportion to the thanks you'll ever receive, this is all too frequently a job
that must be done. Often it is the only way to tell what the reasoning really
is, and even whether there is any reasoning.
Suppose, then, you are faced with the problem of figuring out the rea-
soning in inflated, vague, confused, or just poorly constructed discourse.
What should you do? Here is a simple general approach: \'iewing the dis-
course as a whole, try to get an overall idea of the author's line of reason-
ing. In particular, try to find the basic reasons and final conclusions of
the reasoning. Then sketch a diagram that roughly expresses the line of
reasoning that you think the passage contains. Try to incorporate in it as
many of the important points in the discourse as can be made to fit. Now
work back and forth between the sketch and the text, rewriting sentences
and redrawing inference connections in the diagram in such a way as to
make it both consistent with the text and as strong as possible, until you
obtain a diagram that represents as well as possible the author's probable
reasoning. This is called a '^wholistic approach.^
In using this approach, keep two important facts in mind. First, al-
though a discourse contains scattered inference indicators and bits and
pieces of reasoning, its author may actually just be floundering or ram-
bling. If a discourse lacks a connected overall logical structure, then, of
course,no unitary diagram of the reasoning will include and connect all
itsstatements or points. Second, as you attempt to develop your initial
thought, always remember that it may have been incorrect. Since the rest
of the procedure consists in subsequently detailing the original idea, such
an initial mistake could upset the whole analysis. So, when filling in your
original sketch, always keep in mind that it is subject to possible revision.
In particular, if you find that to make the conclusions follow in the dia-
gram, you must include reasons that are not in the text and furthermore
are questionable, double-check to make sure you have not overlooked some
275 3-1 Analyzing Muddy Reasoning or Confused Exposition
Other possible analysis of the reasoning that would not require the ques-
tionable assumption.
A Simple Illustration
To begin with a simple example, consider the reasoning in the fol-

lowing short discourse:
Stir frying consists of cooking foods that ha\e been cut into thin slices (or
into shreds) in a small quantity of oil (usually 2-4 tablespoons) in a frying
pan o\ er high heat. Because of the high heat, the food cooks rapidly and must
be turned, scrambled, and stirred continuously to prevent sticking and
scorching.
Kenneth H. C. Lo. Chinese Vegetarian Cooking

(Xew York: Pantheon Books. 1974). p. 18.
The word "because" indicates that reasoning is present, but what exactly
is it? If the methods of Chapter 1 were tmthinkingly and mechanically ap-
plied to this discourse, the following very bad analysis might be the result:
Nj <^tir frying consists of cooking foods that have been cut into thin slices
(or into shreds) in a small quantity of oil (usually 2-4 tablespoons) in a fry-
ing pan over high heaL^^^BecauseôT^ (^ <Clhe high heaL]> (^ <^he
food cooks^rapidly and must be turned, scrambled, and stirred continuously
to prevent sticking and scorchingS
This is not a good analysis for several reasons. The phrase "the high heat"
has been put into brackets as if it expressed a complete sentence, when ac-
tually these words are just a norm phrase. We would not fully understand
a diagram that looked like this:
The high heat.

A
bad
i
diagram The food cooks rapidh and must be turned, scrambled, and stirred
continuoush to prevent sticking and scorching.
Although, in a sense, it is true that it is because of "the high heat" that "the
food cooks rapidly and must be turned, scrambled, and stirred continu-
ously to prevent sticking and scorching," ne\ertheless this diagram does
not contain enough information to enable someone who reads it to un-
derstand fully what is being said in the original discourse. "What 'high
heat'?" and "Which food are you talking about?" are among the questions
left unanswered by this diagram. In contrast, a good diagram should be
^
J76 (;hiiil\iiii; Ohscuif Rcdsoiiiiis
sucli that readers can understand correctly exactly what the original rea-
soning was. just from reading the diagram.
A first step in the right direction is recognizing that the phrase "the
high heal" at the beginning of the second sentence of the original discourse
actualh is a noun phrase referring back to the first sentence of the dis-
course.' The basic overall idea of the discourse is that because stir-fry cook-
ing involves a high heat, consequently the food cooks quickly and must be
turned frequently. So a better first analysis would have recognized that the
contents of brackets (2) refer back to statement (1) and express one reason
(R) for statement (3), which is the conclusion (C). In other words, a good
first analysis should have recognized that one reason. (R), is being ex-
pressed twice in the discourse:
A
good
analysis (x) Oitir frying consists of foods that have been cut into thin
slices (or into shreds) in a small quantity of oil (usually 2-4 table-
spoons) in a frying pan over high heaL^ (\Because (^<Cjhe oO

high hea?r> (n^ <^he food cooks rapidly and must be turned,
scrambled, ana stirred continuously to prevent sticking and
scorching^
Putting this improved analysis directly into a program would yield the
following result:
A
good
diagram Stir frying consists of cooking foods that have been cut into thin
slices (or into shreds) in a
small quantity of oil (usually 2-4 table-
spoons) in a frying pan over high heat.
i
The food cooks and must be turned, scrambled, and stirred
rapidly
continuously to prevent sticking and scorching.
This diagram is good because at least it begins to show that the reasoning
is about the conse(]uences of the high heat that is used in stir-fry cooking.
However, it remains imperfect and subject to criticism because the sen-
K\ole to Adiamed Readers: In natural languages, words that appear to be the names of qualities or
pro|xrties. and other abstrac suigular terms, frequently perform the function of simple cross-reference
i
to other senten<es in the same discourse.

tences in it still fail to express the author's reasoning exactly and

completely.
One
question or criticism that can be raised about this diagram con-
cerns the the conclusion is stated in the diagram. "Which food?" some-
way
one might ask after reading the concluding sentence in the diagram. "Does
the author mean that in all types of cooking, the food cooks rapidly and
must be turned, scrambled, and stirred continuously to prevent sticking
and scorching? — If so," someone may object, "surely the author is mis-
taken because in some types of cooking, the food cooks slowly and should
not be turned, scrambled, and stirred continuously." Since the improved
diagram is open obvious misunderstanding or misreading, it is still
to this
not as clear or good as could be. Presumably the author actually means
it
that ni stir-fry cooking, "the food cooks rapidly and must be turned, scram-
bled, and stirred continuously to prevent sticking and scorching." This is
understood in the context of the original discourse, but it is not yet shown
clearly in the diagram. In the original discourse, the context of "in stir fry-
ing" is understood to carry down from the first sentence to the second sen-
tence. To show this clearly in the diagram, the phrase 'in stir frying' (or
equivalent words) must be added somewhere to the sentence expressing the
conclusion, as for example:
A
better
diagram Stir frying consists of cooking foods that ha\e been cut into thin
small quantity of
slices (or into shreds) in a oil (usuallv 2-4 table-
spoons) in a frying pan over high heat.
[In stir frying.] the food cooks rapidly and must be turned, scram-
bled, and stirred continuously to prevent sticking and scorching.
Notice that the conclusion in this new improved diagram contains words
that were not contained in the statement of the conclusion in the original
discourse. It was necessary to rewrite the original concluding sentence
slightly.
Although some readers might consider it nitpicking, there is one
more criticism or possible misunderstanding that might arise regarding
even the new, improved diagram. Someone might protest, "But it is not
because stir frying 'consists of this process that 'the food cooks rapidly and
must be turned, scrambled, etc." — Rather, this must be done because of the
cooking over high heat." This problem can be avoided by rewriting the
278 (;iaiif\iiiK Obst im- Rcasoiiiiit;
basic reason in the diagram as follows:
An even
better
diae,r(im In stir frying, foods that have been cut into thin slices (or into
shreds) are cooked at high heat in a small quantity of oil (usually 2-
4 tablespoons) in a frying pan.
\l
[In stir frying.] the fcôd cooks rapidly and must be turned, scram-
bled, and stirred continuously to prevent sticking and scorching.
This diagiam now

proxides a full and accurate representation of the rea-
soning in the author's original discourse. Notice, however, that neither of
the sentences in the final best same way) in the
diagram appeared (in the
original discourse! The simplest first end of this section

exercises at the
provide an opportunity to practice this sort of analysis and diagramming
on short reasoned discourses like this one containing only one arrow or
step of reasoning.
A Moderately Difficult Example

A more challenging argument to analyze is the following reasoning
from one of Plato's dialogues, where the speaker Socrates is trying to prove
that "right actions" cannot be defined simply as "speaking truthfully and
returning anything we have borrowed or received." In this dialogue, the
author. Plato, has the character Socrates say:
But take thismatter of doing right. Can we say that it really consists in noth-
ing more nor less than telling the truth and paying back anything we may
have received? .\re not these \ery actions sometimes right and sometimes
wrong? Suppose, for example, a friend who has lent us a weapon were to go
mad and then ask for it back. Surely anyone would say that we ought not to
return it. It would not be right to do so; nor yet to tell the truth without re-
serve to a madman. Right conduct, then, cannot be defined as telling the
truth and restoring anything we have been trusted with.
Plato. The Republic
Exactly what is the line of reasoning here? The final conclusion, as seems
dear and is signaled by the inference indicator "then" (without a preced-
ing "if," notice), is "Right conduct cannot be defined as telling the truth
and restoring anything we have been trusted with." So a good start on a
diagram would be setting this statement down, tentatively, as the final
conclusion:
\
Right conduct cannot be defined as telling
the truth and restoring anything we have been
trusted with.
The argument concerns a proposed definition (of "right conduct") and

Socrates is arguing that this proposed definition is no good. But what ex-
actly is his argument for this conclusion? Let us reread the original dis-
course with this question in mind:
But take this matter of doing right. Can we say that it really consists in noth-
ing more or less than telling the truth and paying back anything we may
have received? Are not these \ery actions sometimes right and sometimes
return it. It would not be right to do so; nor yet to tell the truth without re-
serve to a madman. Right conduct, then, cannot be defined as telling the truth
and restoring anything we have been trusted with.
In the second seruen'ce. the genuine question, "Can we say that it [doing
right] consists innothing more nor less than telling the truth and paying
back anything we may have received?" is raised. In the third sentence, the
speaker asks the rhetorical question, "Are not these very actions [that is,
telling the truth and paying back anything we have received] sometimes
right and sometimes wrong? In the next few sentences, he goes on to
'
imagine a case that suggests that he believes the answer to his rhetorical
question to be "Yes." Socrates says:
Suppose, for example, a friend who has lent us a weapon were to go mad and
then ask for it back. Surely anyone would say that we ought not to return it.
It would not be right to do so; nor yet to tell the truth without reserve to a
madman.
The example cited by Socrates seems designed to show that the answer to
the preceding rhetorical question ("Are not these very actions sometimes
right and sometimes wrong?") should be "Yes." He here gives an example
that seems intended to prove that actions satisfying this description [that
is, 'telling the truth and returning anything we may have received'] are
sometimes not "right." Using the shorthand abbreviation "Socrates' ex-

amples" to represent these examples temporarily and for the present mo-
ment only, the reasoning here could be diagrammed roughly as follows:
280 (:laiif\iiig Obsciiir Rtasoniiig
Socrates' examples
I
[These very actions (namely, of "telling the
truth and paying back anything we may have
received") are sometimes right and sometimes
wrong.]
Noiic e that the rhetorical question in the third sentence of the original dis-
course here has been rewritten as a declarative sentence.
The conclusion here would seem to be a good reason for the final con-
clusion found earlier. If the actions of "telling the truth and paying back
anything we may have received" are sometimes right and sometimes wrong,
then it follows that "Right conduct cannot be defined as telling the truth
and restoring anything we have been trusted with." So a reasonable rough
sketch of the overall argument would be as follows:
Socrates' examples.
V
[These very actions (of "telling the truth and
paying back anything we may have received") are
sometimes right and sometimes wrong.]
Right conduct cannot be defined as telling the

truth and restoring anything we have been trusted
with.
Notice that this answers and fills in the question marks from the initial
rough sketch of the argument earlier.
The analysis is getting better. In particular, the final conclusion in
the diagram seems to follow with deductive validity from the intermediate
conclusion, which is usually a reassuring sign that the analysis is on the
right trac k. Ihe main task remaining is to say and fill in what is meant by
the shorthand abbreviation. "Socrates' examples." In the original dis-
course, these examples were presented in the following words:
Are not these very actions [of "telling the truth and paying back anything we
may have received"] sometimes right and sometimes wrong? Suppose, for
example, a friend who has lent us a weapon were to go mad and then ask for
it back. Surelv anvone would say that we ought not to return it. It would not
be right to do so; nor yet to tell the truth without reserve to a madman.
A difficult problem now arises: how is example to be expressed or rep-

this
resented in our diagram? How are the speaker's examples to be transformed
into statements giving reasons that can be put into a diagram?
At this point, the only thing that can be done is to construct some sen-
tences ourselves that will function as a reason making the exact same point
in the diagram. The situation is this. Socrates has asked us to imagine a
case in which "a friend who has lent us a weapon were to go mad and then
ask for it back," and then Socrates has said that in such a case, "we ought
—
not to return it It would not be right to do so." h will be enough for the
diagram if a way can be found to express this point in a single sentence.
One way of doing this is by means of a big conditional sentence, as follows:
[If a friend who has lent us a weapon were
to go mad and then ask for it back, then
surely anyone would say that we ought not
to return it and it would not be right to
return it. (Socrates' example.)]
[These very actions (of "telling the truth

and paying back anything we may have received")
are sometimes right and sometimes wrong.]
Right conduct cannot be defined as telling the

Socrates' example "counter-example" to the definition being criti-

(or
cized) now is expressed by the new sentence giving the basic reason at the
top of this diagram.
To find out whether the task is finished, let us look back through the
original discourse to see if it contains any statements that are part of the
argument but omitted from the diagram.
But take matter of doing right. Can we say that it really consists in noth-
this
ing more nor less than telling the truth and paying back anything we may
have received? Are not these very actions sometimes right and sometimes
return it. It would not be right to do so; nor yet to tell the truth withoiu re-
serve to a madman. Right conduct, then, cannot be defined as telling the
Upon reading this discourse, I notice that the statement, ". nor yet to . .
tell the truth without reserve to a madman" (which seems to be a shortened

(Jaiifyiiit; Obhcuic Rtaioiniii^
version of "It would not be riejht to tell the truth without reserve to a mad-
man") has not been included in the diagram yet. This statement seems to
support the part of the intermediate conclusion that says, "These very ac-
tions (of 'telling the truthand .') are sometimes
. .
wrong." Therefore, . . .
it should be put into the diagram as another basic reason supporting this
intermediate conclusion:
Final
diagram [If a friend who has lent us a weapon were [h would not
to go mad and then ask for it back, then be right to tell
surely anyone would say that we ought the truth with-

not to return it and it would not be right out reserve to a
to return it.] madman.]
[These very actions (of "telling the truth and paying

back anything we may have received") are sometimes
right and sometimes wrong.]
i
Right conduct cannot be defined as telling
the truth and restoring anything we have been
trusted with.
If desired, this additional basic reason could have been expressed instead
in theform of a conditional sentence like the other basic reason, but this
would have been longer, and would have served no useful purpose.
Some critical readers might argue that this tliagram still is not fin-
ished because the phrase "anyone would say" (that we ought not to return
the weapon to the insane friend) itself should be represented as a further
basic reason being given in support of the claim that "If a friend who has
lent us a weapon were to go mad and then ask for it back, then we ought
not to return it and it would not be right to return it." In other words, some
readers might prefer to diagram Socrates' argument as shown on page
283.
Although this diagram certainly is possible, and is more or less consistent
with the statements in the original discourse, it is nevertheless inferior to
the diagram (obtained previously, because it attributes to the speaker a
weak step of reasoning, namely the step from "Anyone would say we ought
not to do .so" t(^ the conclusion "It would not be right to do so" (or equiva-
Questionable
diagram Anyone would say that [Anyone would say that
we ought not to return we ought not to tell
[a loaned weapon to a the truth without
friend who has gone mad]. reserve to a madman.]
1
It would not be right to [It would not be right
[return a loaned weapon to] tell the truth
to a friend who has without reserve to
gone mad]. a madman.
\
These very actions (of "telling the truth
/
and paying back anything we may have received")
are sometimes right and sometimes wrong.
Right conduct cannot be defined as telling the truth

and restoring anything we have been trusted with.
lently, "We ougbt riot do so"). Here is an abbreviated diagram of this step
of reasoning:
Anyone would say that

we ought not do X.
V
We ought not do X.
This step would be weak because the fact that "anyone" would say so does
not prove that "We ought to do X." Everyone might be mistaken about
what we ought to do. Also, scholars of ancient philosophy whcj have the
advantage of having read more than just this paragraph of Plato's works
might argue that since elsewhere in his writings, Plato appears to think
that most people frequently have mistaken beliefs about what we ought to
do, therefore here probably Plato is not using widespread agreement about
some claim as an argument in favor of believing that claim to be true. (In-
deed, some even might use this as a reason to argue that the words "anyone
would say that" should be removed from the top left basic reason in the
final diagram constructed earlier.) As this shows, knowledge of the con-
text of a discourse sometimes helps in diagramming it. But if a person had
absolutely nothing to go by except the original discourse as quoted earlier,
281 ClaiilMiit; ObMuic Reasoning
then an analysis that tried to inckide these further hasic reasons (about
"anyone would say that ") and attributed this questionable step of rea-
. . .
soning vvoidd be a legitimate possible interpretation, although anyone

who tried always to follow the Principle of Charity probably would prefer
the final diagram without the weak steps of reasoning. As usual in real life,
here too. the greater one's knowledge, the easier it is to accomplish what
one wants to do.
The exercises at the end of this section give you an opportunity to
practice and develop these valuable skills on short arguments like these
illustrations. Before reading any further in this section of the text, it might
be best now to do some of the exercises. Then when you feel ready to tackle
a more difficult case, return to the text at this point and attempt to follow
the next analysis.
More Complex Example

Consider the complicated reasoning in the following discourse:
Creation Demands a CRE.4TOR
. . . Matter occupies space and has weight, h is not always necessarily

seen, since certain gases and even the air which you breathe, are also classi-
fied as "matter."
Until recently, scientists talked of the law of the "conservation of mat-
ter." However, with the discoveries in nuclear physics, and following
Madame Curie's experiments with radium, scientists have now found there
is a certain amount of "disintegration" in matter!
This deterioration of radioactive matter is a scientific fact! I'ranium

(I' 238) gradually disintegrates through many intermediate stages into lead
(Pb 206). Uranium, as you may well know, is radioactive and gives off energy
in the form of radiation.
Gradually, over a period of seemingly limitless years, this radioactive
material disintegrates into lead! There is no new uranium coming into exis-
tence today!
This means, simply stated, that science has proved that this earth is
gradually running down I . . .
Science has firmly established, then, there has been no past eternity of
matter!
Matter must have at one time COME INTO EXISTENCE! Since mat-
ter by
its very nature has no past eternity, it had to have been, at one time,
brought into existence!
C^reation, then, the very existence of things, absolutely DEMANDS and
REQUIRES a Creator! That which is made requires a Maker! That which is
produced requires a Producer!

Matter, it has been firmly established, has been made — it did not just
"happen" and has had no past eternity! Therefore here is irrefutable proof
that ALL CREATION REQUIRES A GREAT CREATOR!
—
Quoted from Bible Study instructional materials
published by Ambassador College (Pasadena. California). (Cited by Pospesel.)
This discourse clearly intends to present an argument, but what ex-

actly is it?
Taking approach and \ iewing the discourse as a whole. I

the general
begin by attempting an o\erall idea of the author's reasoning.
to arrive at
In particular. I first attempt to ascertain the author's basic reasons and
final conclusion(s). then I sketch a tentati\e diagram of the reasoning, and
finally I attempt to fill in the details.
The intended conclusion presumably is that "God exists." This
final
is nowhere stated explicitly, but the whole discourse seems to be an at-
tempted proof of the existence of God. Apparently, the basic reasons are
that matter (or at least uranium) deteriorates, and that ". that which is . .
produced requires a Producer." and that such a "Producer" would ha\e to

be God. Sketching this. I have:
Maiter is That which This Producer

deteriorating + is produced + could only be
requires a God.
Producer.
y
God exists.
I insert a plus sign. '+,'

between these basic reasons because it seems clear
that they are supposed conclusion by way of some link-
to lead to the final
age. This is my initial sketch; I may have to change it later.
The next step is to try to de\elop this tentati\e outline in more detail
by working back and forth between it and the original discourse. One
point in the diagram that needs development is the relationship between
the statement thiit matter (or uranium) is deteriorating and the statement
that what is created or produced requires a maker or producer. ^Vhat is
supposed to be the logical relationship between these two components of
the argument? An answer to this question appears near the middle of the
discourse in this paragraph:
Matter must ha\e one time COME INTO EXISTENCE! Since matter by
at
its very nature had no past eternity, it had to have been, at one time, brought
into existence.
286 C;lanl>nig Obbcuic Reasoning
The word "since" indicates th€ following reasoning:
Matter by its very

nature had no past
eternity.
\
Matter was at one time
brought into existence
(made, created, produced).
The conclusion of this step of reasoning links up nicely with the state-
ments "That which is produced requires a Producer" and "This Producer
could only be God" that appeared in the initial sketch to lead to the con-
clusion "God exists." In fact, it does so much better than did the statement
"Matter is deteriorating" in my going to replace
initial sketch, so I am
"Matter is deteriorating" with "Matter was at one time brought into exis-
tence ..." in the diagram under development. The result of this improve-
ment looks like this:
Matter by its very

nature has no past
eternity
That which
Matter was at one time is produced This Producer
brought into existence + requires a + could only be
(made, created, produced). Producer. God.
God exists.
Now I ask myself: Does the author give any reason for his claim that
"matter had no past eternity"? Yes, he does so in the immediately preced-
ing paragraphs, which, referring to uranium, read as follow^s:
Gradually over a period of seemingly limitless years, this radioactive mate-

rial disintegrates into lead! There is no new uranium coming into existence
today!
This means, simply stated, that science has proved that this earth is
gradually running down! . . .
matter!
The last sentence in this part of the discourse, "there has been no past
same thing as the claim in question (that is,
eternity of matter!," says the
that "matter has no whose justification we seek, and the
past eternity")
word "then" which precedes it (without, notice, an earlier "if") indicates
that this statement is a conclusion — drawn,
from the assertion
evidently,
that "science has proved that this earth is gradually running down." Going
back and adding this step to the diagram yields the following:
Science has pro\ed

that the uni\erse is gradually
running down.
i
There has been no
past eternity of
matter (or matter had
no past eternity).
\
Matter was at one That which This Producer
time brought into is produced could only be
+ +
existence (made requires a God.
created, produced). Producer.
God exists.
What happened to the statement "Matter is deteriorating." which

appeared in the initial sketch of the argument? Where is it? Its place has
been taken in the diagram above by the statement "Matter was at one time
brought into existence (made, created, produced)" and the reasons above
this statement in the diagram. What, if any, is the relationship of the claim
"Matter is deteriorating" to the reasoning as I have now filled it in? Let's
go back and reread the portion of the discourse in which it appears:
L'ntil recently, scientists talked of the law of the "conserxation of matter."
Howe\er. with the discoveries in nuclear physics, and following .Madame
Curie's experiments with radium, scientists have now found that there isa.
certain amount of "disintegration" in matter!
This deterioration of radioacti\e matter is a scientific fact! Uranium
(U 238) gradually disintegrates through many intermediate stages into lead
(Pb 206). Uranium, as you ma\ \êll know, is radioacti\e and gi\ es off energy
in the form of radiation.
288 Clarifying Obstmc Rrasoiiiiig
Gradually, cner a period of seemingly limitless years, this radioactive

material disintegrates into lead! There is no new uranium coming into exis-
tence today!
This means, simph stated, that science has proved that this earth is
gradually rinniingdownl . . .
matter!
Nothing explicitly indicates that the fact that matter (or uranium) is
disintegiaiing is the author's reason for claiming that ".Science has proved
that this earth is ruiming down" (or that "there has been no past eternity
of matter"), but I can think of no other possible interpretation of the au-
thor's reasoning. He takes the disintegration of matter (or at least of ura-
nium) show that the imiverse is "running down" and hence
to that "there
has been no past eternity of matter." That is,
Matter is deteriorating.
The
\
iuii\erse is rimning down.
There has been no past eternity of matter.
How is reasoning related to the mention of uranium (U 238)? Well,

this
uranium one specific instance of matter that deteriorates (in fact, the only
is
instance the author mentions). .So, remembering the advice in C^hapter 1
to diagram confirmatory instances of a generalization as reasons support-

ing it. we could write:
Uranium (U 238) deteriorates

into lead (Pb 206).
Matter
\ is deteriorating.
The
\
universe is running down.
\
(etc., as before)
Aganisi this possible interpretation is the weakness of the inference (no

indication is given that other elements in general also deteriorate, and in-
deed, from what the author says, the amount of lead (Pb 206) would seem
to be increasing), and the fact that no such inference is explicitly indicated
in the discourse. In fact, as I now notice on carefully rereading the dis-
course, the statement "Matter is deteriorating," which I originally listed
among the argument's conjectured basic reasons in my initial sketch, ac-
tually nowhere explicitly appears in the discourse; the closest to it is the
more defensible statement, at the end of the second paragraph, "there is a
certain amount of 'disintegration' in matter!" Putting this in place of the
originally used "Matter is deteriorating" and connecting the result with
the part of the argument worked out earlier yields a better argument:
Uranium (U 238)
deteriorates into
lead (Pb 206).
There is a certain
amount of "disinte-
gration" in matter.
The universe is grad-

ually running down.
There has been no

past eternity of
matter (or matter
had no past eternity

time brought into is produced [of matter]
-I- -I-
existence (produced, requires a could only
created,' made). Producer. be God.
V.
God exists.
I feel that this interpretation of the author's intended reasoning is
probably accurate, because it incorporates almost every statement in his

discourse in a more or less logical structure. Not counting various expres-
290 Clarifying Obstuic Reasoning
sions of the same statement, the only statements in the original discourse
that do not appear in this diagiam seem to be the following:
1. Matter occupies space and has weight.

2. Matter is not always necessarily seen.
3. Certain gases, and even the air you breathe, are also classified as "matter."
4. Until recently, scientists talked of the law of the "conservation of matter."
5. It was with the discoveries of nuclear physics and Madame Curie's experi-
ments with radium that scientists found that there is a certain amount of
disintegration in matter.
6. I'ranium is radioactive and gives off energy in the form of radiation.
7. There is no new uranium coming into existence today.
I will now check through these statements to see if any of them belongs in
the diagram I am trying to construct.
Statement in the list basically repeats a standard definition of "mat-
1
ter." This probably serves primarily to make certain that all readers under-
stand what is meant by the term "matter" in this attempted proof, but it
can be viewed as contributing to the step from "Uranium (U 238) deterio-
rates into lead (Pb 206)" to the intermediate conclusion "There is a certain
amount of 'disintegration" in matter" by supplying the obvious additional
premise that uranium is matter. If we wish, we can add this information to
the diagram as follows:
Matter [is anything [Uranium occupies

that] occupies space -I- space and has
and has weight. weight.]
Uranium (U 238) [L^ranium is matter.]

deteriorates into
lead (Pb 206).
There is a certain
amount of "disinte-
giation in matter.
i
(Etc., the same
as before)
1 hese added parts are so ob\ ious that one might feel that they scarcely need
to be mentioned, but still, since they appear in the original reasoning,
it is good put them into the diagram.
to
Statement 2 ("Matter is not always necessarily seen") and statement 3
-
291 3-i Analyzing Muddy Reasoning or Confused Exposition
("Certain gases, and even the air you breathe, are also classified as "mat-
ter") serve to elaborate the definition in statement 1, and to clarify that
definition and remove possible misunderstandings by pointing out that
matter need not always be visible, and that gases are also considered "mat-
ter." If uranium were gaseous at normal temperatures. I probably would
add these statements to the diagram as further backing up the statement
that "[Uranium is matter.]." but since I know that the uranium we observe
usually is not a gas, I am going to omit these statements, 2 and 3, from the
diagram for the sake of simplicity and clarity. I am doing this despite the
explicit occurrence of the inference indicator word "since" and the exis-
tence of a justificatory relationship from statement 3 to statement 2. As
you already know, and as this case illustrates, when a step of reasoning
present in the original discourse does not fit in as a part of the main,
whole overall argument, it is from the diagram.
acceptable to omit it
Statement 4 ("Until recently, scientists talked of the law of the 'con-

servation of matter' ") and statement 5 ("It was with the discoveries of nu-
clear physics and Madame Curie's experiments with radium that scientists
found that there is a certain amount of disintegration in matter'") are side-
remarks about the history of science that do not function as components
of this attempted proof. Therefore, they do not need to be inserted into the
diagram and if is correct to omit them.
.Statement 6. which says. "Uranium is radioactive and gives off energy
in the form of radiation." could be viewed as explainirrg how "Uranium
(U 238) deteriorates into lead." and added to the diagram, if one wanted,
with an arrow pointing to that statement. But by itself, statement 6 does
not fully explain how this occurs; it is only a small component of such an
explanation. Several far more important statements would need to be added
to statement 6 e\ en to begin to explain how uranium changes to lead, so,
since any explanation pro\ ided by statement 6 alone would be so extremely
incomplete. I will omit it from my diagram and treat it as a side-remark.
However, if one wanted, one could include it as a reason for the statement
"Uranium (U 238) deteriorates into lead (Pb 206)." perhaps even adding
[in square brackets, of course] a more complete explanation of how this
transformation occurs (if one happens to know the scientific explanation
in more detail).
\Vhat about statement 7. "There is no new uranium coming into exis-
tence today," the last statement on the list of statements from the original
discourse that had not been incorporated into my diagram? The author
gives no reason for thinking that no uranium is coming into existence to-
day, so this statement apparently is not a conclusion in the argument. But
9
"Ob\ iously. of course, one could also show statement 3 as a reason for statement 2 in a separate diagram
of a second argument, unconnected w ith the main argument that I'm working on. But it seems unim-
portant, so I won't bother. At this advanced level of analysis, one is permitted tci make such judgments.
292 (.larifvini; Obstiiic Reasoning
docs it sc'iAc as a reason for anylhing? Is any conclusion drawn from it?
riu'onh siu h lolc tliat I can see for it is helping to support either the inier-
niediale conclusion that "There is a certain amount of 'disintegration' in
mailer" or else supporting the next intermediate conclusion that "The
universe is gradually running down." It is unclear exactly where it should
be added to the diagram to give the argument its strongest possible recon-
truction. One j)ossibiliiy is to interpret the statement "There is a certain
amount of (lisiniegration" in matter" to refer specifically to laranium. and
link "Xo new uranium is coming into existence today" with it as follows:
Matter is [anything [Uranium occupies

that] occupies space + space and has
Uranium (II 238) + [Uranium is matter,

deteriorates into
lead (Pb 206).
There is a certain amount of No new uranium

"disintegration" in matter is coming into
(for example, in uranium). existence today.
The universe is grad-

ually running down.
There has been no past

eternity of matter (or
"matter had no past
eternity").

lime brought into is produced [of matter]
+ +
existence (made requires a could only be
produced, created). Producer. God.
God exists.
Alternatively, the statement "No new uianiimi is coming into existence

today" could be shown as linked with "Uranium (U 238) deteriorates into
lead (Pb 206)" to support the intermediate conclusion that "There is a cer-
tain amount of 'disintegration" in matter." as follows:
Matter is [anything [I'ranium occupies

and has Aveight. weight.]
Uranium (l^ 2.S8) + [Uraniinn is matter.] + No new uranium

deteriorates into is coming into
lead (Pb 206). existence todav.
There is a certain
amount of "disin-
tegration" in matter.
The universe' is grad-

ually running down.
i
"matter had no past
eternity").
1
+ -I-
existence (made requires a could only be
produced, created). Producer. God.
God exists and created the material universe.
I also have added to. and rewritten, the final conclusion slightly, in an at-
tempt to make it better express the full conclusion that the author is trying
to pro\e. This probably should be done with the earlier diagram too.
I now see that the statement that "No new uraniimi is coming into
existence today" is crucial to the argument, since without something like
291 (llarifviiig ()b><uif Reasoning
it. some uranium still

the fart that uianiuni deteriorates into lead (and yet
exists)would pioxide no evidence that matter was created at some past time.
H()we\er. it is not clear where it fits best. It might even be stronger to re-
move "There is a certain amount of 'disintegration' in mat-
the statement
ter" from the diagram altogether, and draw an arrow directly from the
linked reasons above to the intermediate conclusion "The universe is grad-
ually running down." In fact, it might even be better to cut out this inter-
mediate conclusion also, and draw the arrow directly to the next interme-
diate conclusion below it, "There has been no past eternity of matter."
However, the techniques for improving an author's argument by cutting
out parts of it are not explained imtil Chapter 7 of this text, so I will stop
at this point.
Finding no other way tcj bring my analysis closer to the original in-
tended argument, I conclude that, using the present tools and methods,
this is the best diagram that I can produce of the argument as presented by
its aiuhor.
EXERCISES 3-1
The following discourses are written in a manner that prevents effective use of the
mechanical methods of Chapter 1 For each, use a wholistic approach to make a dia-
.
gram showing the basic argument or steps of reasoning. In the diagram, use sen-
tences you write yourself to express the author's reason (s) and conclusion (s), but
do not stray excessively far from the original wording in the passage.
From ColUngridge Standard Guides: Roses, by Leonard Hollis (London: The Hamlyn Publish-
ingGroup Ltd.. 1970). p. 60. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
1. A question
sometimes raised is whether it is possible to minimise frost damage
by late pruning [of roses]. Unfortunately, nothing can protect the growing shoots
against frosts late in May if these are at all severe, so the short answer is "no."
295
296 Cil.iiifvin^ Obscuif Rc.isoning
From Hiniy \V. Kcuclall, 'Niulcai Rcac lorsand Nuclear Weapons," Nucleus: A Report to Union
of Concerned Scientists Sponsors. 1. no. 3, 2:
2. Arc luu leal eat tors and lUKicar weapons distinct, disconnected issues, as the
i
nuclear industry affirms, or are they two faces of one great problem the nuclear —
dileinnia? There is much e\idence that they are deeply related because from nu-
clear rea( tors come some of the materials for making bombs, and from a nuclear
power fDrogram come the facilities and experienced people for handling these
materials.
297 Exercises 3-1
VV. E. H., the Bronx, N.Y.:
3. I don't know why certain people (psychotherapists, sociologists, second-rate

academicians, and politicians) are always going around saying that "there is no
evidence that the threat of capital punishment or prison sentences deter any more
than lesser punishments." In effect, we have removed the death penalty and de-
creased prison sentences in this country in the past few years (largely on the advice
of these so-called experts) and the incidence of murder and rate of other crimes
has soared. That's some evidence, isn't it? So evidence does exist.
Hint: Here the language about the "existence of evidence" plays a different role than it did in the
preceding exercise, where it functioned only as an inference indicator. Its status here is different.
298 Clarifying Obscure Reasoning
From W. D. Ross. The Righl and the Good (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1930). p. 151:
4. riu- (lufstioii [wht'thcr \ ii tiie is superior in value to pleasure] seems to become

clearer when one turns from considering virtue and pleasure in the abstract to
consider which of them seems the most worthwhile to get for ourselves. It seems
clear that, viewed in this way. pleasure reveals itself as a cheap and ignoble object
in comparison with virtue. This manifests itself clearly in the fact that the acqui-
sition of pleasure for oneself rarely, if ever, presents itself as a duty, and usually
only as something permissible when it does not interfere with duty, while the at-
tainment of moral goodness habitually presents itself as a duty. This surely points
to an infinite superiority of virtue over pleasure, a superiority such that no gain in
pleasure can make up for a loss in virtue.
299 Exercises 3-1
From Anthony Lewis. "Still No Cure for America's 'Crisis'."© 1979by TheNew York Times Com-
pany. Reprinted by permission.
5. There has been reason, in the last 15 years, for loss of faith in American insti-
tutions. One president led us by stealth into a wrong war and an economic morass;
another's contempt for law and the Constitution finally undid him. More gener-
ally, governments have raised and repeatedly disappointed expectations of their
ability to manage affairs and improve life.
\
300 C;laii(%iii!^ ObMiiic Riasouing
Kioni Angus Dtining. " I hf I'LO: A New Image?" Newsiveek XCilW no. 10. 25. Cxipyrighi 1979
by Newsweek Inc. .\ll rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
6. Vhc Palestinian people themselves have varying views as to how the conflict
with Israel should be settled. Roughly 60 percent of the world's 3.5 million Pales-
tinians live in Jordan and the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and be-
cause they face the reality of Israel they are more apt to seek a negotiated compro-
mise. Others, particularly those living in teeming refugee camps in Lebanon and
.Syria, still harbor desjêrate dreams of returning to the homes in what was once
Palestine but is now Isiael.
Hint: To connect everything together, try writing an omitted intermediate conclusion drawn
from the last sentence in the discourse.
301 Exercises 3-1
From "Ouidooi Questions and Answers," The Monexsairr. 10. Xo. .'^9. p. 11:
7. Q. My dad used to forecast rain by watching smoke from tfie neighbor's chim-
ney. What could this tell him?
A. Sluggishly rising smoke will indicate rain as water vapor is lighter than air,
therefore will not buoy up smoke as well as clear, dry air, which is heavier.
More often than not, humid air is followed by cloudy and rainy weather.
Hint: Tie this reasoning together by writing an omitted intermediate conclusion that links with
one of the basic reasons to lead to the final conclusion.
"
.'U)2 (M.iiif\ iiig Obscure Reasoning
From r.S. Ri'prt'sfntativc Mike Loury, Tlic Congressional Record, 130, No. 65:
8. . But alter acknowledging the outrage of the shooting down of the Korean
. .
airliner, there is another very important point and that is that it was primarily an
act of paranoia by the Soviet Union, an act of paranoia that they were afraid that we
were in some way taking pictures of submarine pens or other military installations.
Now the reason I have become so opposed to first strike weapons that will push
the Soviet Union to launch on warning, that greatly endangers the survivability of
this world, is primarily because of the paranoia of the Soviet Union.
And I ask my friend, if the Soviet Union is so paranoid that they will shoot
down an airplane [out of fear that] it may be taking pictures of submarine pens,
what will they do when we have the D-5 15 minutes away and the MX 30 minutes
away, and the Pershing II 8 minutes or 10 minutes away with the capability of
knocking out the majority of their retaliation? And remember that it took them 2
hours and they could not even communicate as to whether to shoot down that
Korean airliner or not.
... we greatly gamble that the extremely paranoid Soviet Union may make
the biggest mistake in the history of the world and [sometime] fire their missiles [in
the erroneous belief] that our rapid, accurate MX, D-5 and Pershing II's are on the
way to knocking their missiles out before they can use them.
Hint: One correct diagram of this reasoning contains nine separate statements, that are con-
nected with six arrows, including two linked steps of reasoning. Add an intermediate conclusion
to the effect that "First-strike weapons do not allow the Soviets time to correct their own errors,
and force the Soviets to have a strategy of launch-on-warning.
Special Instruction: Put your diagram on a separate sheet of paper.

CHAPTER 4
PfQCtiCQl
Decision Making
4-1 MAKING DECISIONS LOGICALLY:

REASONS FOR ACTIONS AND REASONS AGAINST ACTIONS
9
Have you ever fated an important choice between competing options where
the pros and cons were so numerous and complicated that you coidd not
even hold them all in mind at once? At one moment in such a situation,
when you think about the reasons favoring one of the options, that choice
may seem best; later,when you think about the reasons favoring another
option, that alternative may seem better. You may waver between the
alternatives, favoring now the first, then the second or third, until perhaps
some external stimulus evokes a decision determined merely by a momen-
tary impulse. Or perhaps, in a sudden surge of decisi\eness, you slam your
fist on the table and declare. "To heck with it; I'll just do such and such."
simply to end the frustration and confusion. Or, like many of us, you may
simply continue to waver until time decides the issue by eliminating other
alternatives and leaving only one choice (which may later be regretted).
There is a better way. Like complicated problems in mathematics or
physics, complex decisions should be analyzed with pencil and paper. The
methods developed in previous chapters are well suited for this purpose. Let
us now use these methods to set down in one place all the factors involved, in
a form that lets one operate on them objectively and logically so as to make
the best decision. The ability to do this not only helps one to live well and be
happy with personal decisions in one's Dwn private life; it is also very
valuable in any profession that involves making practical decisions for
303
:iOI Pi.Kiii.iI Ht'tision M.ikiug
otlu'i people or lulpiiig tlu'in make their own decisions, as in business, law,
administration, or counseling.
You may method of making important de-
be acquainted with the
cisions by listing all the pros and cons of the various competing options,
and then trying to use these to determine the best option or choice. That
method is good, and often results in optimum decisions, but now a
method exists that is even better. The new- method retains all that was good
in the old method, but improves on it, among other things, by also con-
sidering further reasons that support or oppose the originally-considered
pros and cons themselves, as well as other reasons that attack the sound-
ness of these further reasons, or the validity of preceding reasoning. This
new method is far better than the old one because in many complex, im-
portant decision problems, the crucial considerations that determine the
optimum choice operate at a level where they are not analyzed or evaluated
even seen) by the old method, namely, up several steps above
(or, in a sense,
the bottom pro and con the action described in the

level of reasons directly
conclusion. As a result, many choices that cannot be decided with con-
fidence when only the initially listed pros and cons are considered, now
can be resolved by the new method in favor of one clearly superior option,
whose preferability is when such higher-level reasons and
revealed only
logical relationships are considered.These determinations are possible only
with the new method, which makes it more effective than the old method.^
It also has other advantages, which will emerge later.
The method will first be explained very generally in terms of various

choices represented by the letters 'X,' 'Y/ and 'Z,' and then it will be
illustrated with a concrete example. Suppose you are confronted with a
choice whether to do X, Y, or Z, where these options are mutually exclusive
(that is. choice of any one would prevent you from also doing any of the
others). We proceed as follows. For each alternative, write a corresponding
statement in the form, "I should do X," "I should do K," etc., and diagram
all the considerations favoring that alternative ("pros") as reasons in an
argument whose conclusion is the corresponding statement:
Reason #1 Reascm #2
for doing X fordoing X
I should do X.
*Nole to Advanced Readers: For example, ronirasi the solution to exercise 4-2B with the result obtained
when only the old low-level method is used.
305 4-1 Making Decisions Logically: Reasons for Actions and Reasons Against Actions
Reason ?*1 Reason =f2

fordoing Y fordoing }' ...
I should do }'.
Etc.
At this initial stage it is advisable to write down (without being absurd, of

course) every possible reason you can think of that might favor each choice
without worrying yet whether they are all sound. Good reasons will be
separated from bad ones later, when you The
evaluate the reasoning.
reasons you write down may be of any kind.They may involve foreseeable
consequences of the action, considerations of means and ends, ethical
principles and \alue judgments, goals or objecti\es. yoin o^\n subjective
feelings, emotions, desires, attitudes, and anything else relevant. Later, of
course, when you evaluate them, you may want to assign different weights
to these reasons.
Usually in decision problems there will also be reasons against some of
the alternatives ("cons"). For example, an option may inxolveariskof harm
or loss, it may-limit the choices open to you in the future, it may be too
expensive, it may violate moral principles you hold, and so forth.
Obviously, it is just as important to consider reasons against a possible
choice as it is to consider reasons in fa\or of it. (If X, Y and Z were equally ,
supported by sound positive reasons but strong reasons existed against both
}' and Z, then X would obviously be the best choice.) Reasons against an
alternative could be shown in a decision-making diagram in various ways.

Following the procedure used in earlier chapters to analyze discourses
(where only the reasons alleged to support a conclusion were shown in the
diagram). I suppose one could construct, for each of the possible options. X,
Y, and Z, a second diagram showing the reasons against it (that is, showing
reasons supporting the conclusion "I should ncjt do X," "I should not do
y,"etc.).
Reasons in Favor:
Reasons for Reasons for Etc.

doing X doing Y
\ \
I should do X. I should do Y.
.
.'}06 Practical Decision Making
Reasons Against:
Reasons against Reasons against Etc.

doing X doing Y
I should not do X. I should not do Y.
But because it is desirable to have a way

of gathering together in one place
all the reasons, pro and con, relevantan option (and also for other reasons
to
that will become clear later) it is best to combine the pairs of diagrams by the
following notational convention: Instead of showing the reasons against an
option in a diagram separate from the reasons in favor, include them in the
same diagram with the reasons for the choice, but connect them to the
conclusion with a dashed arrow (slanting, perhaps, in the opposite
direction) to indicate opposition. Your diagram, then will look like this:
Reason #1 for Reason #2 for Reason #1 against Reason #2 against

doing X doing X doing X doing X
/
I should do X.
Reason #1 for Reason #2 for Reason #1 against Reason #2 against

doing Y doing Y doing Y ,doing Y
I should do Y
Etc.
This way of representing the situation makes it easier to survey the pros and
cons in their entirety and assess their combined weight or force later.
Notice that in this procedure, we often start with the (possible) coyi-
clusions, and then look for reasons for, or against, them. This change in
direction need not confuse you. (Already, in earlier chapters, you have seen
reasoned discourses in which the conclusions preceded the stated reasons.)
After completing the diagram for each possible conclusion, you can then go
back and pick out the conclusion that is best supported by "pro" reasons
and least opposed by "con" reasons. The option corresponding to this
conclusion is the best one as far as the factors considered are concerned, and
it is the option that should be chosen if all the relevant factors have
been
correctly inserted into the diagram(s). Notice that various possible con-
elusions are first considered tentatively, as a preliminary step to pickuig out

the optimum choice.
Do not make the mistake of thinking that a reason against one option is
automatically a reason in favor of the competing option(s). This is seldom
true. Usually, a pro or con reason for one option implies nothing
whatsoever about the goodness or badness of the other options. To take an
extremely simple illustration, if I am allergic to anything made from
lemons, this has some weight as a reason against my eating lemon pie; but
the fact that I am allergic to lemons has no weight as a reason for eating
chocolate cake:
I cannot eai an\ thing made from lemons.
(ml)
I should eat chocolate cake.
Everyone should be able to recognize this, for the reason says nothing at all
about chocolate cake. This reason remains invalid in the context of my try-
ing to decide whether to have lemon pie or chocolate cake for dessert. The
allergy is a reason against lemon pie. but it is not a reason in favor of
"
chocolate cake.
Someone may object. "But what lemon pie and chocolate cake are the
if
only two dessert options open to you. and you should have a dessert?" That
would be a very special situation, with a different diagram that contained
two important additional assumptions:
I should The only desserts I cannot eat
eat a + available are lemon + anything made

dessert. pie and chocolate cake. from lemons.
{strong)
I should eat chocolate cake.
In these special circumstances, a reason against lemon pie would support

having chocolate cake. But notice the additional assumptions needed to
make a reason against the one option also support the other option. It
presupposes that these are the only possible options. Usually this is not the
sittiation. People who think that 'a reason against option X is auto-
matically a reason in favor of option V" are presupposing that X and V are
the only options open. They may be imaware that they are actttally
presupposing that the options being considered are the only ones possible.
3()S Piadii.il Decision Making
but ilu'v arc presupposing this nonetheless. If this assumption is made

un(()ns( iously. this makes the situation even worse, because then they do
not e\cn know that they are making it. and it is not out in the open where it
( an be not iced and t hec ked for arc uracy. hi most decision situations, there
will be other possible options that are not being considered, so this
additional assumption, or presupposition, generally is false, and we want to
avoid making any false assumptions in our reasoning, because false
assimiptions make our reasoning imsound and unreliable. (It is especially
dangerous if the false assumptions are hidden so that we are not even aware
of them, for, in tiiat danger is greater that we will never notice them
( ase. the
and consequently be led into bad decisions.)
When we are making decisions, we never want to make blinding as-
sumptions that will prevent us from thinking of some new, better option or
alternative later, even when we have reached the final stages of our decision
making. (If we think of a new. possibly better alternative that we had not
considered, then we will need to go back and make a new diagram for this
possible option too.) One of the greatest assets of someone who is a good
decision maker is the ability to imagine, or think of, new options in the
given situation that no one else was able to propose and that are better
than any of the options previously considered. The mistaken assmnption
that reasons against one option are automatically reasons in favor of the
other option(s) is especially harmful because it has the effect of blinding
us to the possible existence of other alternative courses of action superior
to any in the original list being considered (because this assumption co-
vertly presupposes that the options being considered are the only options
possible). If you are working for an organization faced with a tough choice
between two rather bad options and you can think of a new, third option
that no one else thought of before and that is better than either of the two
options previously being considered, then you are indeed a valuable asset
to that organization.
Even in those rare cases wfiere the options being considered really are
the only possible alternatives, a reason against one is NOT automatically a
reason for the other(s). For. a reason against one option may also be a reason
against the other option(s) too. For instance, suppose I'm in a situation
where I am required to choose a dessert and lemon pie and chocolate cake are
the only desserts possible or available.- If a reason against my choosing
Ôf course, it would bv iicli( iilous to make a decision diagram for a decision as simple as this. This is
merely a very simple example to illustrate clearly the princ iple that a reason against one option is not
automatically a reason in favor of c omjjeting options. I his same principle holds for more complicated
decision situations of the kinds for which decision diagrams are needed.
309 4-1 Making Decisions Logically: RecLsons for Actions and Reasons Against Actions
lemon pie is that I am on a diet and should not be eating desserts made with
sugar, this is not automatically a reason in /fli'or of choosing chocolate cake
(another option). It is also a reason against cake, even if lemon pie and
chocolate cake are the only desserts available and I'm required to choose a
Or suppose I am trying to decide whether to take a trip on my
dessert.
two-week vacation, or not to do so (and stay home). The fact that it will cost
money to stay home (food, utilities, etc.) is not automatically a reason in
favor of taking a trip, for that too probably will cost money. So. do not make
the mistake of assuming that a reason against one option
automatically a is
reason in favor of the other (even in the very rare case where the options
being considered are the only options open). It is possible that it is not. Look
at the relationship between each reason and conclusion carefully, and in
isolation, to make certain that you are connecting the reason correctly only
to the conclusion or conclusions that it really supports or opposes. Deal
with each of the alternatives separately, listing only such specific reasons as
exist for or against each alternative, independently of the other alternative(s).
Our new dashed-arrow notation for reasons against will also perform
another useful job. While putting down in your diagram all the reasons, pro
and con. relevant to each conclusion, you may also think of further reasons
why some of these pro or con reasons are not sound reasons for or against the
course of action in question. For example, suppose one took as a reason for
doing X doing so might please George (whom one wishes
the fact that to
please for some reason). This would be diagrammed as follows:
Some reason
Doing X would I desire to please

please George. + George (or "Pleasing
George is desirable").
I should do X.
Now suppose that on second thought it seemed questionable whether doing

X really would please George (because, say, you remembered that George
had often expressed indifference to whether or not X was done). Here, then,
is a reason against the statement that "Doing X would please George."'
Using the new notation, you could include this important consideration in
your diagram in any of various ways:
310 Piactiial Decision Making
George has oticii
expressed indifference
to whether or not X
is done./ Some reason
Doing
/
.V would
\
Pleasing George
please George. is desirable.
I should do A'.
Or it might be shown with an additional intermediate conclusion:
George has often

to whether or not X
is done.
It is
\
uidikely that
doing X would please
George, y Some reason
/
Doing X would Pleasing George

I should do X.
Notice that this particular intermediate conclusion is diagrammed as being

supported by George's indifference and opposing the idea that doing X
would please George. (Be sure you see why.) The reasoning might even be
diagrammed more expansively as shown on page 311. Generally speaking,
the most expansive constructions are preferable, because later, when you
evaluate the diagrams and make the decision, they draw your attention
does George always mean what
to all relevant considerations (for instance,
he says?) and invite discovery of further reasons for or against the claim
in question (that doing X
will please George).
Reasons that attack the validity of a step of reasoning from a given
31 1 4-1 Making Decisions Logically: Reasons for Actions and Reasons Against Actions
George has often

to whether or not X
is done.
George
\ really is
indifferent to whether
or not X is done.
It is
\
unlikely that
doing X would
please George. Some reason
/
/

I should do X.
reason to the drawn conclusion are a more difficult, advanced topic. These
will be explained in Section 4-2. First. howe\ cr. we need to master the basics.
Notice, that what appear in your decision diagrams as reasons or
conclusions always must be gramatically complete sentences (or abbrevia-
tions thereof). This is very important to thinking straight.
Once decision diagrams ha\e been constructed showing all the
considerations that can be advanced for and against each option, the next
step isjudge the probability that the various statements given as reasons
to
are true, and to evaluate the strengths with which, considered as con-
nected together, they favor or oppose their respective conclusions. No me-
chanical procedure is available for accomplishing this, but as a practical
matter when you st-udy and compare the diagrams for each of the possible
courses of action, you usually will find that one clearly emerges as more
strongly favored by probable positive reasons and/or less opposed by solid
negative reasons than any of the others. The corresponding option, then,
is the best of the alternatives you have considered, and it is the option that,
on the basis of the reasons you've cited, should be chosen. Rarely does
it happen that careful and complete analysis of a decision situation results
,
312 Practical Decision Making
in thejudgment that several different competing alternatives are, within

the probable margin of error, exactly equally good but if this does happen
,
it means that your rational analysis of the problem has

concluded that
there is no good reason to choose one of the alternatives over another.
In such a case you have established that as far as the reasons you've con-
sidered are concerned, the competing courses of action are equally worthy
of choice, so that, as important as the decision may be, you can rationally
make by flipping a coin. But most of the time, careful, thorough, and
it
objective analysis of the reasons for and against each possible choice will
reveal one to be better than any of the others.
Before I illustrate this with an example, here are a few practical tips
and pointers.
Helpful Hints and Practical Tips
1. If the decision situation under analysis involves choosing the best of

which is to some degree desirable, be sure when
several alternatives, each of
setting up the decision diagrams that the final conclusions you show as
competing alternatixes are really mutually exclusi\e. To give an obvious
example, there's no point in trying to decide whether to spend a month in
Italy or a month in Greece if you could do both. In the same way. if the
problem is choosing the least undesirable of several unpleasant alternatives,
be sure you have not overlooked some other possibility better than any of
those you're considering. For example, there's no sense in trying to decide
whether to walk or hitchhike if you could easily take the bus. Correct
analysis of the alternatives is very important! At every step in your decision
making remain alert to the possibility of revising them for the better.
2. In any decision situation the more factors pro and con you include in
your analysis, the better your decisions will be and the happier you'll be
with them. Probably you will find yourself unable to complete all diagrams
satisfactorily in one sitting. In a complicated case, all the relevant
considerations may not even come to mind at once. (This, of course, is one of
the reasons why one wa\ ers and a major advantage of the pencil-and-paper
approach.) So. after recording all the pros and cons you can think of. set
your diagrams aside; when additional reasons occur to you later, add them
to the diagrams. Also, it is often helpful to consult others to see if they can
think of any reasons you've overlooked. (Do not. however, let them do the
actual derision making itself for you unless you know both that they are
considering all the factors and doing this than you.)
that they are better at
J
3. As in the case of X, Y, and Z considered above, a choice may involve

more than two options — or it may simply involve deciding whether or not
to do something, say, \V. In this latter situation all the relevant considera-
diagram (using both kinds of arrows). In such a
tions can be put into a 5?>zg/e
case you need only determine which conclusion —
that you should do W or
that you should not do \V —
is more strongly supported by good reasons.
4. While writing down possible reasons pro and con. if some strike you as
of questionable truth or doubtful validity as a reason for the conclusion, but
you cannot at the moment think of specific reasons why they might not be
true or \alid. circle the uncertain reason and/or place a question mark
beside the questionable inference. Later this will draw your attention to
these points, which, if they turn out to be important to the problem, should
be researched and cleared up before you try to make the final decision.
5. Use large sheets of paper for the decision diagrams. If the decision is
important enough to warrant making a diagram, you should not let
yourself be tempted to omit reasons for lack of space.
Let me now exhibit the application of this procedure to an actual

situation. Here it isi
After finding temporary lodging when they first moved to Portland.

Harold and Dolores devoted themselves to full-time house hunting. A
month and a half of reading classified ads. visiting realtors and rental
agencies, following leads, and systematically scouring the city passed
before they found a house that exactly met their desires: ideal location,
cheap rent, good view, ample space, fireplace, basement, garage, etc.;
it was "a real find." Xe\ertheless. things did not go well that first year
and after numerous painful incidents. Dolores mo\ed out to live with
a new friend. Harold then re\ived a pre\ ious friendship with Betty,
who came up from California to li\e in the house. But she missed the
sunshine and so. after a year, returned to brighter climes. Deciding
then to live a bachelor's life. Harold found a male roommate. For a
couple of years this worked tolerably well, but the house was not quite
large enough to permit two independent adults to live separate lives
without mutual interference. In the end. conflict pre\ ailed and. again
li\ ing alone. Harold found himself paying all the rent and utilities on
a house big enough for a small family. Making matters even worse, he
also found himself becoming bothered by the houses run-down
condition, particularly its interior. Reasonable modifications would
be permitted by the owner, but only if paid for by Harold (who
naturally did not wish to put much money into somebody else's
house).
311 I'lactita! Drtisioii Making
As llaiolcl saw it. his alici natives were (1) remodel the house,
u hi( h entailed buying it (the owner was willing to sell); (2) remain in
the house without remodeling it (either with or without buying it); or
0} mo\e into another place, llie main advantages of moving out
would be cutting expenses by moving into smaller quarters and
getting away from the depressing qualities of the present house. The
latter had been dramatically demonstrated to Harold the previous fall
upon hisieturning to the house after a month's visit to (ialifornia. His
spirits had remained high when the airplane touched down on a
—
he felt, in fact, glad tcj be back.
typically rainy, gray. Portland day
But on reaching his house and opening the door, he was suddenly
o\erc()me by a strange feeling of sadness and depressicjn. "It's this
house that does it. he said tohimself in a flash of insight. "This house
"
gets me down —
it depresses me." Was it simply the cheerless, drab
decor, or was it perhaps the present unconscious recollections of past

painful exj)ei iences that its walls e\T)ked in him? "Whatever it is." he
thought, "this house definitely has a depressing effect on my mcjod.
I've got to move out of it! But on the other hand, he vividly recalled
"
his previous experience years ago of spending a month and a half

looking unsuccessfully for a better place.
What should Harold do regarding his residence?

His step was to analyze his options into distinct, exclusive
first
alternatives. To make sure he was considering all possibilities, he broke

them down like this:
with roommate
buying it
I without roommate
^ with remodeling
[with roommate
Remain .not buying
[without roommate
in
house buying it
[with roommate
I without roommate
^without remodeling
[with roommate
not buying
[without roommate
Move out of house
Notice that this covers all the possibilities open to Harold. Nine possible
conclusions correspond to the options above:
1. I should remain in house with remodeling, buying it. with roommate.

2. I should remain in house with remodeling, buying it. without roommate.
3. I should remain in house with remcxleling. not buying it. with roommate.
4. I should remain in house with remodeling, not buying it. without
roommate.
315 -^-1 Making Decisions Logically: Reasons for Actions and Reasons Against
5. I should remain in house with no remodeling, buxmg it. with roommate

6. I should remain in the house with no remodeling, buying it. without room-
mate.
7. I should remain in house with no remodeling, not buying it. with
roommate.
8. I should remain in house with no reinodeling. not busing it. wiih.out
roommate.
9. I should mo\e out.
Since remodeling the house \\ithout buying it was unthinkable. Harold

could immediately discard alternati\es 3 and 4. \\hich left him faced w ith
the remaining se\en options.
The reasons in favor of moving out (option 9) were ob\ ious: The house
was getting him down; moving somewhere else would spare him from
traumatic psychological associations, and it might be cheaper. This last
reason was circled by Harold because his present living quarters were really
quite inexpensive, even paying the full expenses, and he had not yet
investigated to make sure he could do better in this respect. (Here he was
questioning the truth of the reason, so he circled the reason and put a
question mark alotigside.) And he placed another question mark beside the
arrow leading from that reason to the final conclusion because he was unsure
Striking .Striking
experience. experience.
Present This house has

house painful psychological
depresses associations and
me. moving to another
place would get me
awav from these.
I should move out.
how important even if it was true.

to the conclui.ion that reason really was.
"Even supposing it would be cheaper." he mused, "how strongly would
should move out? Is the monev I'd
that really support the conclusion that I
save really that important to is why Harold placed the second

me?" That
question mark by the arrow leading from "It would be cheaper to '
statement 9. (Here he was questioning the validity of the inference from

'M6 Pi.jdual Dciisioii Making
"It would be cheaper" to "I should In his diagram, Harold

move out.")
separated ihc fact that the present house depressed him from his hypothesis
about traumatic psychological associations with past painful events be-
cause he was not sure of the interrelationship between these two thoughts,
but it was quite clear that both supported the conclusion that he should
move out.
Next Harold turned to considering the reasons against moving out.
The reasons were obvious: Xot only is moving itself bothersome, but his
previous experience house hunting had indicated that he was unlikely to
find another affordable place he liked better than his present house. He
showed these considerations in his diagram as follows:
Previous house-
hunting experience.
1
It is unlikely I could
find another affordable
Moving is place better than the
bothersome. present house.
\
/
9. I should move out.
Notice that Harold diagrammed his "previous house-hunting experience"

as ei'idencesupporting the intermediate conclusion. "It is unlikely I could
find another affordable place better than the present house," which in tmn
functions as a reason against the final conckision tliat he should move out.
Notice, too. how Harold present house as a
tised his situation in the
comparison or reference point both in assessing probable costs and in
judging the })robable goodness of other affordable places.
Let me call your attention to something else. It is important to notice
that although some people might call Harold's present psychological
associations with ihefiouse "irrational" or "illogical." their irrationality, if
they are irrational, does not mean that rational decision making cannot take
them into account. It is only ignorance or confusion that makes people say
things like. "Logic cannot be used in practical life because human nature is
basically illogical." Irrational or illogical feelings and desires can be in-
corporated for what they are (namely, facts) in an analysis of what one
should do that is ratif)nal and logical. Like any other reasons, people's
absurdities can be plugged into decision-making equations; logic is

completely unprejudiced regarding the sorts of facts it can be used on.
To remain in the house with no remodeling and with another
roommate (option 5) was possibly the cheapest way Harold could live, but
past experience with roommates raised doubts whether this was really
workable. Also against this alternative were the known present depressing
effects and hypothesized painful associations with the house. In favor of
buying the house was Harold's feeling that he ought to be getting some
equity^ intomore permanent living quarters. Against buying it, though,
was the possibility of trapping himself permanently in depressing sur-
roundings (although, of course, probably he could always resell it). All these
considerations he placed in his diagram as follows:
Past Striking I could
experience. experience. always resell.

/
/
/
I should
be getting I can't This house I might be
some equity live happily depresses trapped in
into a in this ine and has unpleasant
permanent house with painful surroundings.
place of a roommate. associations. /
/ /
mv own. /
/ / /
/ /
/
/ /
• i_
'^ 11- >
5. I should remain in the house with no rernodeling. buying it, with a roommate.
Notice how "I could always resell" is diagrammed as a reason against "I
might be trapped in unpleasant surroundings," which itself is shown as a
possible reason against the final conclusion.
Buying the house, staying in it with no remodeling, but not having a
roommate (optiqn 6) would certainly avoid the problem of conflicts with
roommates, but it would also double expenses and consequently make it
doubtful whether this would be a cheap way to live; it might also be lonely.
So Harold diagrammed this option as follows:
'.\n owner's "equity" in a house is its \alue above any amounts owed or charges against it. It represents
the part of the value that is owned by the owner.
318 Piattual Dirisioii Making
Striking I could
I should experience. always resell.

l)c gcKing /
soiiu' c'(jiiity This house
into a depresses Id be
permanent me and has trapped in
plate of painful inipleasant
m\ own. associations. surro/indings.
/ /
/ /
6. I should remani m house with no remodeling, buying it, without roommate.
B('( aiise he was uncertain of its truth. Harold also circled the statement "I
would be lonesome if I lived like that." (There wâs no question about its
validity as a reason, however.)
Options 7 and 8 Harold diagrammed much like 5 and 6, except that if
he sta\ed in the house with no remodeling and without buying it (just
continuing to pay rent), then of course he would not be gaining ownership
of it. Also, although he would still be living in depressing surroundings, he
would in no sense be trapped in them he could leave on a month's notice. —
Possible future rent increases, however, made it uncertain that in the long
run this would always be a cheap way to live. In the diagram, this all came
out as follows:
Possible future Striking Past

rent increases. experience. - experience.
/
/ \
\
This house I should be I can't live
It's a cheap depresses me getting some happily in this
way to and has equity into a hoiise with
live. painful permanent place a roommate.
associations. of my own. /
/ / /
1 .
I
\
should remain in the
/
house with no remodeling, not buying

1^
/
it, with roommate.
Harold listed "I should be getting some equity into a place of my own,"
which appeared in earlier diagrams as a reason in fax'or o/ conclusions 5 and
6, as a reason against 7, since this option specifically fails to accomplish that
goal. Option 8 was much the same, except that it had the further
disadvantage of being more expensive, plus possibly lonely:
Possible
future rent Striking
increases exp>erience.
/
^
Itsa\
\
This house I should be
cheap depresses me getting some
wav to and has equity mio
Ine. J painful a permantrni
'
\ associations. place of mv
/
8. I
\ ^
should remain in the house with no remodeling, not buying
own /
it. without
roommate.
good at all.
Alternative 8 certainly did not look
and 2 were still to be considered. Since he had already
Options 1
analyzed the pros and cons of roommates and was beginning to run out of
paper. Harold decided to consider these two options jointlv. That is. he
decided to make a decision diagram just for "I should remain in the house,
buying it and doing remodeling." considering this option independently of
the roommate question. (This could be thought of as collapsing together
the diagrams for and 2. or as diagramming the option "I should remain in
1
the house, buying it. doing remodeling [either with or without a room-
mate]." In jaioroi buying the house and doing major remodeling were the
)
reflections that it certainly could be made into beautiful living quarters, it
would probably be good investment, it would give him space to house

a
visitors (something that had not occurred to him before), and it was unlikelv
he could find another affordable house with the same ideal combination of
\ iew and location:
It could I should be It would It is unlikelv

me made getting some give me I could find
into equity into a space to another affordable
beautiful place of my house place with the
lixing own and this \isitors. same combination
quarters. would be a ofview and
good in\estmeni. location.
^
1-2. I should remain in the house. bu\ it. and remodel it.
Again 1-2 was the doing so (with remodeling) would in-

possibility that
crease Harold's expenses beyond what it would be good for him to pay, and
of course, the old problem of painful memory associations. So the reasons
against this option looked like this:
I could always
resell.
This house
has painful
psychological I might be trapped
associations in unpleasant
for me. surroundings.
/
/ /
1-2. I should remain in the house, buy it. and remodel it.
(Notice that all the reasons pro and con here apply whether he has a
roommate occurred to Harold that if by remodeling he
or not.) But then it
changed it sufficiently, the interior perhaps could be made like that of

another house (with different layout and decor), causing it. with different
surfaces, to lose power to evoke unpleasant feelings or associations. That
its
is, even though was true that the house had painful associations for him.
it
perhaps this was not a valid reason against (1-2) remaining in it, buying it,
—
and remodeling it because if he changed it sufficiently when remodeling,
it might lose any painful psychological associations for him. Harold used
the special notation to be explained later (in Section 4-2) to show this
consideration attacking and perhaps destroying the validity of the previous
step of reasoning:
This house has painful

psychological associations
for me.
/
/
If I changed it sufficiently
C /
when remodeling,
lose
it
any painful psychological]

would
--^ /
assoc iations for me.
^
1-2. I should remain in the house, buy ii. and remodel it.
This is show a challenge to the validity of another step

the notation used to
oi new thought because he was uncertain that
reasoning. Harold circled his
it was true — tlie only way he really could find out for sure was to make the
experimem and sec— but even if the remodeled house did not lose its painful
associations, he still could always sell it (maybe at a profit). In case youre
interested, the above diagram can be expanded to include these considera-

tions as follows:
This house has painful

psychological associations
for me. /
/
/
If I changed it sufficieiuh
/
when remodeling, it
would lose any painful

psychological associations 7
for me. /
/
Even if it retained /
painful associations.
Icould always resell it.
perhaps at a profit.
1-2. I should remain in the house. bu\ it. and remodel it.
supposed to be added onto the prexious diagram.) Harold actuallv

(This is
continued his analysis to a greater length, but vou have probably seen
enough to get the idea.
From Harold realized that before he could make a final
the diagrams.
decision he would ha\ e to in\ estigate more deeply the relati\ e costs in\ oh ed
in the competing options. When he learned that he could buy the house for
about the same monthly cost as he was presentlv paying for rent on it and
found room in his budget to pay for the additional financing necessary to
remodel it. he decided in fa\or of 1-2. to remain m the house, bining and
remodeling it. and to leave a decision about roommates until later.
(Wouldn't you. o,n the basis of the diagrams. ha\e made the same decision?)
Anyway, years later Harold was still happy with his decision.
The last step, in which the actual final choice and decision are made
on the basis of e\aluating the relative soundness of the reasoning in each
of the diagrams for each of the options under consideration, could (if one
wanted) be represented by a further mammoth diagram in which each
previously constructed diagram for each option appears inside one box
linked together with other boxes, as shown on page 322. This grand overall
diagram represents what Harold really was doing, his actual ultimate
reasoning, when he used the method to determine finally that option 1-
m '^
C
U °-^^l
: ^-o oi
a
^J^ •^ ~-^
3 c
cr.-^ -^
u - .y^ ^ a
a. w ^^ c
.1
"S '-S *: i^
o
+
x li
3
c lO \ • -^
O
U
in
s "y^ 3 C
X o
"^^^y^ s: ^
in
u ..^^ a
Oh
=<-l
C^ '^
l-H o
^
O
322
2 was the best choice. In practice, of course, this final step usually is done
"in the mind" without bothering to go to the trouble of connecting all
the sub-diagrams together into one gigantic diagram. But, in order to

show clearly what is being done, the illustration on page 322 shows how
it would look if one did this. When making the final choice from the com-
peting options, often it is good to place all the various diagrams for the
different possible options side-by-side in a long row on a big table, so that
they can all be viewed simultaneously to make the final choice; in effect,
this is doing the same thing as putting them all together in one mammoth
diagram. In the exercises, you will practice simply constructing the dia-
grams that would go inside the various boxes, but after completing these
exercise assignments, you might, for practice, go back and see whether
one option emerges as clearly best in each exercise problem, or whether
some problems have several equally good options.
A Simplified Exercise Example
I am starting to notice just how expensive college is. My parents can afford
it,but there is still a household back home to run. The cost of living in the dor-
mitory along with board and tuition are going up each semester, and my parents
complain about giving up such a bulk amount of money at one time to meet these
costs. (University deadlines for all payments upset my parents extremely.) I am
debating about whether or not to commute. I could live at our home in the suburbs
and work part time. If I lived at home, I would have to leave an hour and a half
before I had to be on campus. I would, in a sense, miss a lot of college life by not
living on campus, but I would save money. But then again, I wouldn't have a
feeling of independence if I stayed at home. My parents and I have talked about
commuting, and they honestly prefer me to stay on campus, and they want me
to have the best of everything. —Janet Foster, university student
SolutionDiagram for One Option:

I would I'wouldn't If I lived at home, I would miss a
save money have a feeling I would have to lot of dorm life
this way. of independence leave 1 !/2 hours by not living

if I stayed before had
I to be on campus
home. on campus.
I could live at home, work part-time, and commute to college.

Diagram (cont'd.)
Solution for Other Option:
They have honestly University deadlines for all payments

said so. \ upset mv parents extremely.
\
My parents My parents The cost of My parents complain
can afford prefer me living in about giving up such
it. to stay on the dorm go + a bulk amount of money
campus up each at one time to meet
semester. these costs.
I should continue living in a dorm at college.
EXERCISES 4-1A
A-1. Construct diagrams showing the pros and cons of the two options in the fol-
lowing problem. Use BOTH the sentences AND the numbers given TOGETHER in the
diagrams. Put your answers on separate sheets of paper. Fasten several sheets of
paper together, if necessary, to show clearly all the considerations. Use dashed arrows
for "reasons against." Be neat and clear. Do not make illegible diagrams. In this
exercise, you need only construct diagrams showing the reasons; you do not need to
evaluate them. (You can use either the first-person pronoun ("I,") or the third-person
pronoun ("He"), whichever you prefer.)
I need to purchase an inexpensive form of transportation. Should I buy a used
motorcycle, or a used car? (1) A motorcycle would use less gas. (2) But motorcycles
often have a lot of special maintenance problems. Also, (3) cars are generally less
dangerous than motorcycles, because (4) in a car, you have more protection in a
collision with another vehicle. But (5) a motorcycle vôuld be exciting. However,
(6) a motorcycle might be impractical for going out on dates. (7) A car would
be more practical for dates, as well as for going out with several friends at the same
time, and for double dates. (8) A motorcycle would be uncomfortable to ride during
the cold winters where I live But (9) a car with a heater would be fairly comfortable
.
could probably get a slightly-dented-but-still-reliable old sedan at a

in winter. (10)1
cheap price. And (1 1) a car would not depreciate as fast as a motorcycle. Another
problem with buying a motorcycle would be that (12)1 am going to be starting work
soon, and (13)1 can't come to my job dressed in the sort of clothes I'd have to wear to
ride a motorcycle. The fact that ( 14) I can wear the same clothes when driving a car
that I'll wear to my job has to be counted as a factor in favor of a car. On the other
hand, (15) parking is usually easy with a motorcycle, but on the negative side, (16)
motorcycles get stolen a lot. bad, because (18) I'm not going to be
(17) This fact is
able to buy theft insurance. On the other hand, (19) it is unlikely that anyone would
steal a slightly-dented older model sedan, because (20) thieves who are goingto take
the trouble to steal a car tend to steal expensive cars But (21, 1 ) a car would use more
.
gas than a motorcycle. What should I buy?
Hint: Put (3) in both diagrams because it actually says something about each option.
A-2. Construct a diagram showing the reasons for and against the option men-
tioned in the following discourse. (Remember that when a decision is simply whether
or not to do something, only one diagram is used, showing the pros and cons of that
option.) Use dashed arrows for "reasons against." Use BOTH sentences AND numbers
together in your diagram. Put your answers on a separate sheet of paper. In this
exercise, you need only diagram the reasons; you do not need to evaluate them.
From Stuart Winograd. university student:
I am a junior this year, and live in Fontana Hall. I have an opportunity to

become a Resident Assistant in this dorm next semester. The question is whether to
accept the position or not. On the one hand, (1) it would have the advantage of no
room and board charge. (2) It would give me my own room, which is good, but (3) it
would involve being awakened at all hours of the night with resident problems, (4)
which would be a hassle. (5) I would meet a lot of new people easier, (6) which I
would like, and (7) it would involve me more in dorm life, (8) which I would also
like, but (9) I would have to shoulder a lot of responsibility, because (10) I would be
in charge of a whole floor of residents, and 1 1 it would limit my freedom, because
( )
(12)1 would have tobe thereat certain set times. What should I do? The main thing,
though, is that (1) would save me the cost of room and board. (13)
it I need this
financial help to continue school, (14) which I definitely want to do.
Hint: Put statement (1) in the diagram twice, onre by itself alone, and once again linked with some
other statement(s). (This is done because these other statement(s) need something like (1) in order
to support their conclusion, so(l)needs tobe with them, but also(l) would still provide some support
for the same conclusion alone, even if these other reasons turned out to be false, so (1) should be
shown by itself also.)
EXERCISES 4-1B
B-1. Analyze the following decision problem, using the techniques in Section 4-1.
Use BOTH numbers AND sentences together. Use dashed arrows for "reasons
against." Be neat and clear. In this exercise, you need only construct diagrams
showing the reasons; you do not need to evaluate them. Put the diagrams on separate
sheets of paper.
326 Practical Decision Mailing
From Dawn Adams, university student:
I have a difficult decision to make. This semester I started out with 15 credit
hours of classes, plus working 20 hours on campus, plus being a school cheer-
leader. The more involved I became, the worse I did. I dropped down to 12
credit hours, I was worried all the time about weigh-ins for cheerleading, and I'd
rather go to work than to classes. I realize that something must be done before next
semester. I definitely am not going to quit school. I cannot both work and be a
cheerleader.I' ve either got to quit working at the job, or else quit cheerleading. (1)1
enjoy working, because (2) they treat me well. (3) I need the money I get from
working, because (4) school costs a lot (5) I will need the work experience later. (6) I
.
get benefits at work. (7) The work is good for my future. But if I stopped working, I
could socialize more, and (9) I would be able to study more, both for the same
reason, because (10) I would have more time. In favor of stopping cheerleading is
the fact that (11)1 have a hard time with weigh-ins, because (12) I have bad eating
habits, and also because (13) whenever I eat with other people, I gain weight. (14) If I
stopped cheerleading, I would have more time to study. But I can't get ajob in the
future as a cheerleader, while (7) my work will help me in the future. Also, as I
mentioned earlier, (3) I need the money I get from working to continue school. But
(15) I'm good at cheerleading, and (16) I like it. What should I do?
Special Instructions:Remember to state the possible conclusions in such a way that each excludes
the other for this person in the circumstances described in the problem.
Hint: Take one possible conclusion to be "She should continue working."
B-2. Construct two diagrams showing the arguments pro and con regarding the
(two) options that are mentioned in the following discourse. Use only complete
sentences. Use dashed arrows for "reasons against." You need only construct
diagrams showing the reasons in this exercise; you do not need to evaluate them. Put
your answers on separate sheets of paper.
"Here I am, my car has run out of gas on the automobile expressway. Should I
raise the hood and here hoping for a patrol car to come along and help me out of
sit
this situation —
or should I lock the car and start walking to the next exit? If I sit in
the car, I'll get bored, and I hate boredom. If I start walking, this will keep me from
getting bored, because I won't have to sit alone in the car for hours. On the other
hand, if I walk, it might be dangerous. Also, I don't know how long a walk it will be
to an exit. Besides, a patrolman might carry a small can of gas with him that would
be enough to get me to the nearest exit."
Mint. In your two diagrams, try to show reasons supporting and opposing the possible final con-
clusions, "I should raise the hood and sit here hoping for a patrol car to come along and help me
out of this situation" and "I should lock the car and start walking to the next exit."
327 4-2 Reasons Against the I'alidity of Other Reasons
4-2 REASONS AGAINST THE VALIDITY OF OTHER REASONS
In Section 4-1, we saw that a "reason against a reason" rci.3.y cast doubt uôn
the truth of another given reason, or even prove that it is false. Another
possibiUty, equally important, is that a "reason against a reason" may
challenge the validity of the step of reasoning from some given reason to
some conclusion. That is, instead of questioning or attacking the truth of
the other reason, it may attack the goodness, or validity, of the step of
reasoning. Instead of saying, "This other reason is false," it may say,
"Even if reason is true, it is not a valid reason for the conclusion
this other
it is given as supporting." In Section 4-1, we used the example of "Doing
X would please George" as a possible reason for "I should do X."

I should do X.
Now suppose that while analyzing this problem it occurs to you that e\en if
is true that "Doing X would please George," for some reason this does not
it
pro\ide good groimds for doing X. Here the criticism is not that the
statement "Doing X would please George" is false, but rather that it fails to
support the conclusion that you should do X. Perhaps, for example, it
occurs to you that although it would be good if George were pleased and
your doing X wotild certainly please him. it would be inappropriate for

some reason, or liable to cause difficulties under the circumstances, if the
pleasing were done by you.
A consideration of this sort can be represented by adding a t'erf/rfl/ line
to theright-hand end of a horizontal line, and using a dashed arrow dra^\n
horizontally to the vertical arrow being attacked, to show that it is the
validity of the inference, and not the truth of the other reason, that is being
attacked. Schematicalh . it will look like this:
IVIS Pi.Kiu.il DcdMon M.ikini^
Reason 1 for Reason 2
doing A. against doing

A.
Reason why Reason why

/
reason 1 is reason 2 is
not a valid — not a valid /

reason for reason
doing A. against
/
doing A.
/
\i^
I should do A
In the present illustration about pleasing George, the reason against the
validity of the given reason would be shown as follows:
Doing X
would
please
George.
For me to please George

by doing X would be,
under the circumstances,
inappropriate or liable
to cause difficulties.
I should do X
The new consideration to which the horizontal dashed arrow is attached is
the reason given against thinking that "Doing X would please George and
])leasing (»eorge is desirable" constitutes good grounds for my doing X. It is
here diagrammed as attacking the arroi*;, xh^siep of irjference, from "Doing
X would please George and pleasing George is desirable" to the conclusion
"I should do X."
The error that is most often made by beginners using these methods is
that of mistakenly thinking that a reason against the validity of another
reason a reason against its truth. Always remember that the truth of a
is
reason something very different from the validity of a step of reasoning.

is
and that reasons opposing the validity of some other reason must be treated
very differently from reasons opposing its truth. Being clear about this
distinction is verv important to correct decision making.
329 -f-2 Reasons Against the Validity of Other Reasons
Manv people have suffered personal disasters because of their failure to

understand the distinction between the two different ways in which rea-
sons for (or against) an action may be proved to be unsound. Here is one
of the most common ways in which this happens. A person who does not
understand these ideas is given a sound consideration that shows the
invalidity of some other reason which this person mistakenly thinks is a
good reason for a certain action. This person, who does not understand the
concept of validity, then proceeds to deal with, and evaluate, this considera-
tion against his reason as if it supposedly showed that his reason \\-3.s false
(rather than in\ alid He sees clearly that the consideration does not prove
i.
the falseness of his reason, so he rejects it and mistakenly thinks it can be

disregarded. In fact, however, the consideration actually showed, not that
his reason was false, but rather that the reason did not support the action he
mistakenly thought it supported and justified. Consequently, he went ahead
and performed this action on the basis of a reason which he mistakenly
thought supported it. with disastrous consequences. He failed to heed the
warning because he logically mise\aluated it. After\sards he could not
understand wh\ e\ents m
his life had not worked out in the wav he expected.
But if he had-been better at reasoning logicallv. he could have avoided the
disaster.
One simple way to recognize whether a consideration against an
alleged reason for an action attacks (i) its truth, or (ii) its validity, is this. Ask
the question. 'Would this consideration, if true, tend to show that the
statement expressing the reason (i) is false, or would it tend to show that
(ii)
even if the reason is true, it does not support (or oppose, in the case of a
negative reason doing the action or choosing the option that it was
i
supposed to support?" If the truth of the consideration would tend to

show that the statement alleged to be a reason actually was a false statement,
then this consideration attacks ihe truth of the alleged reason, and it should
be diagrammed with a dashed arrow pointing to the statement of that reason
in the decision diagram. On the other hand, if ii the consideration does not
( i
raise a doubt about the truth of the alleged reason, but instead tends to show
why the fact it states, or the claims it makes. e\ en if true, would not be a good
reason for (or against) the action proposed in the conclusion, then this
consideration attacks the lalidity of the alleged reason, and it should be
diagrammed with a horizontal dashed arrow attacking the downward
arrow from the alleged reason to the conclusion (the new notation we just
learned in this section).
Before proceeding further in this section, probably you should at this
time do the first group of exercises at the end of this section (exercises 4-2A)
to make certain that vou understand this important distinction, and to get
some valuable practice that will help you improve your skills in this
imj)ortant area.
Let us apply these techniques to the following real case/ After doing
the first group of exercises, return to this point in the text and study the
following example.
A Complex Example
I h.i\e a problem you to help me analyze. I returned to college

that I'd like
part-time so that can advance into some different and better job with my
I
company when I graduate at the end of this year.

(1) To advance with my company with any success at all. an employee
must move to our corporate headquarters in Atlanta. Georgia. (2a) If I move
to Atlanta. I will have to move my family and find a new home (2b) in some
area I'm not familiar with. Also. (3) buying a new home now could be very
expensive with the current high interest rates. (4) In Atlanta, though, for the
same price of a house here, you do get a much bigger house and lot. Also. (5)
mo\ ing to a new job could be challenging and exciting, but what if I didn't
like it? (6) After physically and monetarily relocating for this job, it would be
catastrophic if it didn't work out. Also. (7) in the state of Georgia, one pays a
stateincome tax, which is expensive and which I don't have to pay here. Also,
(8) just moving by itself is expensive.
(9) If I stay here. I will still have a "good job, " but (10) I will be bored,
and (11) I hate to be bored. (12) I still will have to buy a bigger house anyway,
because (13) my family needs a bigger house, and (14) interest rates are
high here also. (15) If I buy a house here, I will at least know the area. (16)
In Atlanta, I wouldn't.
— R. G. Miller, university student
The captions that emerge here are (A) to move from where he is to Atlanta,
taking the employment position there, or (B) to stay where he is and
continue at the satne job.
The first reason. (1) ("To advance with my company with any success
at all, an employee must mcj\c to our corporate headquarters in Atlanta")
piesumably is a reason in favor of moving to Atlanta assimiing, as seems —

likely from his preliminary remarks, that the speaker wants to advance with
his company with success. Here the situation appears to be one of those rare
special cases where one and the same consideration operates both as a
reason for one caption and also as a reason against another option.
Remember that this happens less frequently than beginners generally
suppose. It is an exceptional, rather than a common, occurrence, something
that ncjrmally happens only when there are two options that exhaust all the
possibilities. But statement (1) ("To advance with my company with any
*As usual, for authenticity, this discourse tias not been edited, but has been left in the form in which it was
originally expressed by the speaker.
331 4-2 Reasons Against the I'altdity of Other Reasons
success at all. an employee must move

our corporate headquarters in to
Atlanta. Georgia") seems to imply logically that, if he stayed where he is
rather than going to Atlanta, he would not ad\ ance with an\ success at all
with his company, which presumably must be considered (given the
speaker's presumed values and priorities) to be a reason against staying
where he is. Let us insert an omitted intermediate conclusion to show this:
( 1 ) To ad\ ance with his company with any success

at all. an employee must move to corporate head-
quarters in Atlanta. Georgia.
[If
\
he does not mo\e to He wants to advance
corporate headquarters in his company
in Atlanta, then he will + with success.
not advance with any
success at all in his
companv.] '
7
/
He shbiild stav where he is and not mo\e to Atlanta.
Remember that a dashed arrow symbolizes a reason against what is shown

below.
This same statement ( 1 ) also, of course, is a reason in favor of trans-
ferring to Atlanta:
(1) To advance with his coinpan\ with He wants

any success at all. an employee must -r to advance
mo\e to corporate headquarters in in his
Atlanta. Georgia. company
with success.
He should ino\ e to a new position at corporate headquarters

in Atlanta.
Because of the dimensions of the pages in this textbook, it is not

convenient for me to show all the reasons, pro and con. cumulatively as I
insert them into the two diagrams. So I will show reasons a few at a time in
separate figines as I insert them into the two basic diagrams, and then show
them all together in two large diagrams at ihe end. Please bear mind as I m
proceed. howe\er. that the additional reasons are being put iiuo the same
diagrams with the reasons alreadv inserted in earlier steps.
332 Piiutical Detisioii Making
The next consideration is statement (2) ("(2a) If I move to Atlanta, I will

have to ni()\e my family and (2b) find a new home in some area I'm not
familiar with "). This is not necessarily a reason for staying where he is. but
it seems to be a possible reason against transferring to Atlanta. One reason
why having to find a new house in Atlanta, if he transfers there, is a possible
reason against transferring there is, as stated in (2b), that he will have to find
a home in an unfamiliar city, which he clearly considers to be something
undesirable. Another reason having to buy a new home
why the necessity of
may be a negative factor is, as expressed by statement (3), that "buying
a new home now could be very expensive with the current high interest
rates. " These considerations could be diagrammed in either of two equally
good ways. One way is to view the problems of finding a home in an un-
familiar city and high interest rates as reasons why it is undesirable to have
to find a new home in Atlanta. This could be shown as follows:
(2b) He is not (3) Buying a new

+
familiar with home now could be
the area. very expensive
with the current
high interest rates.
(2a) If he moves to [It would be bad, or undesirable,

Atlanta, he will to have to find a new home in
have to move his Atlanta.!
family and find
a new home.
He should move to a new position at corporate headquarters in

Atlanta.
But it would work just as well simply to combine the basic reasons herein a
single step of linked reasoning directly opposing the Atlanta option:
(2a) If hf moves (2b) He is not (3) Buying a new

to Ailatua, he familiar with home now could be
will ha\e to move the area. very expensive
his family and with the current
find a new home. high interest rates.
He should move to a new position at corporate headquarters in Atlanta.

333 4-2 Reasons Against the Validity of Other Reasons
Later we will see that we want to separate the reason having to do with
will
interest rates from the reason having to do with unfamiliarity with the area.
But for now, let us pretend that we did not notice this yet.
Although these considerations may have weight or force as reasons
against the Atlanta option, it would be a mistake to think that they were, at
the same time, therefore reasons in favor of staying where he is. They address
problems associated with the Atlanta option, and say something possibly
negative about that option. They do not say anything favorable about the
option of staying where he is. nor do they give any other reason for it, so
these considerations are not a reason for staying where he is.
Do not think. "Oh, yes. they do. If this is a reason against going to
Atlanta, then it is also automatically a reason for staying where he is, since if
he stayed, then he wouldn't be going to Atlanta." To think this way is
mistaken because it fails to grasp certain crucially important facts. In the
first place, "not transferring to Atlanta" is not identical to "staying where
he is." because there are countless ways in which one could "not transfer to
Atlanta" without "staying where he is." For example, one could move
instead to any of many other cities or locations. That would be "not
transferring to Atlanta" without "staying where he is." That is, he could do
some third thing instead of either of these two things.
Someone now may object, "But suppose that those are the only two
options open to him. Then the difficulties with having to buy a new house
in Atlanta would also be reasons for staying where he is." There are two
confusions or mistakes in this thought. First, it is a poor idea to assume
without justification that the options being considered are the only ones
open. Nothing in the information given shows that there are no other
options. On the basis of what we know from common sense alone, it seems
likely that there are other options which he is not considering. For example,
he might be able to take a job with some other company, either where he is
or else possibly in some other city or circumstances where the same house-
finding problem wouldn't arise (for instance, maybe his new employer, on
some third option not hitherto considered, would provide suitable housing).
By making the unjustified assumption that the Atlanta option and stay-
ing where he is are the only two options, you would, without justification,
automatically cut him out of any other options, and lessen the likelihood of
their later being discovered and considered. We never want to allow our
decision-making procedures to put blinders on us that might prevent us
from, at some later point in the decision process, seeing, discovering, or
thinking up some hitherto unconsidered option better than any of the ones
that we considered originally. By making the additional assumption that
the Atlanta option and staying where he is are the only options, you
would automatically cut our friend out of any such third option, and that
331 Praciical Decision Making
bad additional assumption is already contained hidden inside the mis-

taken notion that any reason against one option is automatically a reason
for the other.
would be a confusion to respond by saying: "You say that there
It
are, or might be, some other options that have not been considered, and
that one of these "might" be better than either of the options originally
considered. Well, my reply is that there also might not be any other better
option." It is true that there might not be another better option than the
two considered, but pointing to this truth is irrelevant as a reply to the
point just made, and indicates that this point has not yet been understood.
The point is that the mistaken assumption assumes that IN FACT there are
no other better options when we have no reason or justification for that
assumption. The unjustified assumption 2iSS\xmGS far more than that there
"might not be another, better option"; it assumes that IN FACT there is
no other better options when we have no reason or justification for that
assumption. The unjustified assumption assumes far more than that there
There might not be another, better option.
(ml to weak)
There is, in fact, no other, better option.
is very, very weak — perhaps even nil — reasoning. My point was this: be-
cause, for all we know, there might be another, better option, we would be
unjustified in automatically assuming that there is, in fact, no other, better
(jption:
For all we know, there might be another, better option.
We are not justified in automatically assuming that,

in fact, there is no other, better assumption; for all
we know, such an assumption might be false.
I believe that this reasoning is deductively valid.

Please understand that I ain rjot saying that a reason against one option
is never also a reason for another option (or vice versa). We have already seen
an example of that in the reason about needing to move to Atlanta to
advance with his company with any success at all. We recognized that fact as
a reason against staying and a reason for transferring to Atlanta. It was an
example oi something that was a reason against one option and also a
335 4-2 Reasons Against the J'alidity of Other Reasons
reason in favor of another option. Instead, my point is that it is a serious

mistake, and one tliat can lead to bad decisions, to assume that a reason
against one option is automatically thereby a reason in favor of another. In
fact, more unusual than usual for this to happen.
it is
There is another reason why it is a mistake to assume that a reason

against one option is automatically a reason in fa\ or of the other option: It
may turn out that a reason against one option is also a reason against the
competing option. If I am presented with a choice between a cigarette or a
cigar,and a reason against a cigar is that I have quit smoking, that reason
against a cigar is not therefore a reason for having a cigarette. It is a reason
against a cigarette too. So. it is a mistake to assume that a reason against one
option is automatically a reason in favor of a competing option.
An analogous point holds for reasons in favor of an option. It is a
mistake to assume that a reason in favor of one option is automatically a
reason against the other option(s).One reason this is mistaken is that a rea-
son for one option may also be a reason in favor of a competing reason. If I
am trying to decide whether to play tennis or go swimming, and a reason in
favor of playing tennis is the fact that I need some exercise, it would be a
mistake to think that this is therefore a reason against going swimming. My

need for exercise might also be a reason in favor of going swimming. So. it is
a mistake to assume that a reason in fa\ or of one option is automatically a
reason against the other competing option(s).
The fallaciousness of mistakenly assuming that a reason against one
option must automatically be a reason in favor of another (which other?)
competing option is well illustrated by the present problem about whether
or not our friend should transfer to Atlanta. For. the high cost of house
mortgage interest rates, a reason given against transferring to Atlanta, is not
a reason in fa\ or of the competing option of staying where he is. because, as
it develops, he still will have to buy a new house if he stays where he is
(because his family needs a bigger house), and "interest rates are high here
also." So. here one negative factor associated with the Atlanta option tmns
out also to oppose staying where he is. Someone who made the mistake
of trying to apply the erroneous idea that a reason against one option (such
as Atlanta) is automatically a reason in favor of a competing option (such
as staying where he is) would have been led to the mistaken conclusion
that the current high interest rates were a reason against Atlanta and in
favor of staying where he is (and so, a reason generally favoring staying
where he is), when actually, in this example, it turned out to be a problem
for both options, and not to favor one over the other at all! Thus, an application
of the mistaken assumption would have -led to a big error, an error that
would have created an illusion, or false appearance, of a consideration
—
3.16 Pi ad it al Decision Making
in favor of one option over the other, when actually that was not true at
all.This error could even have led to a mistaken decision. So, do not make
the mistake of assuming that a reason against one option is automatically
a reason in favor of the competing option(s)!
It is always necessary to look with hard, clear logical scrutiny at the
relationship between each reason and the possible conclusions it might, or

might not. support. Do not insert into your diagram(s) any steps of reason-
ing that obviously do not follow. In particular, do not assume that a reason
for (or against) one option is always a reason against (or for) the other
option(s).
Now. how should we fit into the diagram the facts that (12) he still will
have to buy a bigger house anyway, because (13) his family needs a bigger
house, and (14) interest rates are also high where he is now? How do these
facts fit into the total picture?
Are these facts reasons for staying where he is and not moving to
Atlanta? That is, should they be shown as follows?
(13) His family needs a bigger house.
(12) He still will have to (14) Interest rates are

buy a bigger house anyway. high where he is too.
He should stay where he is and not move to Atlanta.
No, this would not be buy a house anyway

logical reasoning. His need to
and where he is now are not a reason for staying where
the high interest rates
he is. Stich a step of reasoning would rate a "nil." (If this is not obvious to
you, study the diagram to make certain that you see clearly the correctness of
this low evaluation.) There is no point in putting obviously illogical steps
of reasoning into a decision diagram —
it only wastes time and paper
especially mistakenly being inserted in a "nil" location rather than

if it is
being put in another, correct place in the diagram where it would have some
strength.
His family's need for a bigger house and the equally high interest rates
where he lives also are not reasons against staying where he is. As we have
just seen, it would be illogical to suggest that he should leave the city he is
living in now because he needs to buy a new house and the interest rates are
just as high where he is now as they are in Atlanta.
Where, then, do these facts fit in? Could his need to buy a larger house
and the high interest rates where he is now li\ ing perhaps be a reason in
favor of transferring to Atlanta? Xo. This would not be
logical reasoning
either, because, as he has already mentioned, the interest rates are equally
high in Atlanta, so Atlanta would present no advantage in this regard. I his.
therefore, does not seem to be a reason for moving to Atlanta either.
How. then, do 12). (13). and( 14) relate to this decision problem? Let us
(
try to think this through more carefully. The fact that his family needs a
bigger house anyway and that the interest rates are just as high where he is
now. indicate that he is going to need to buy a new. home anyway;
different
therefore, the fact that he would have the expense of buying a new house in
Atlanta is weak or nil as a reason against transferring to Atlanta, since he
will have to face a similar expensewhere he is now anyway. In other words,
no special reason against Atlanta that he will have to face the expense of
it is
buying a new house there, since that expense is unavoidable wherever he is.
So. facts 12). 13). and (14) somehow work against the negative reasons (2a)
{ (
and (3) against Atlanta. But how do they do this? Should we show them
something like this:
(13) His family needs a bigger house.
(12) He
\
still will have (14) Interest rates are
+
tobuy a bigger house high here also.
anvwav.
7 7
(2a) If he mo\es to Atlanta, (3) Buying a new home now

he will have to mo\e his could be \ ery expensive
family and find a new
+ with the current high
house. interest rates.
7
Xo. this diagram woiddbe illogical, because it shows 12) and 14) as if they ( (
were reasons for thinking that statements (2a) and (3) were false. But the fact
that (12) he still will have to buv a bigger house anyway, and (14) interest
rates where he is now are equally high is no reason for thinking that (2a) is
false (that is. it is no reason for thinking that he will not need to move his
family and find a new home if he moves to Atlanta). (Indeed, if anything,
they further support statement (2a).) Nor do they gi\e any reason for
thinking that (3) is false. Statements (12)ai.id 14)do not prove, or e\en tend
(
to prove, that interest rates are not high where he is currently living or that
.138 I'ladu.jl Decision Making
buying new lioine would not be expensive now. So (12) and (14) cannot be
a
diagrammed as attacking the truth of statements (2a) and (3).
How. then, do statements (12) and (14) move against statements (2a)
and (3) as possible reasons against Atlanta? Here, I think, is the answer. The
facts that (12) he will have to buy a bigger house anyway, and that (14) the
interest rates where he is now are equally high, show that statements (2a)
and (3), even if true, are not good reasons against transferring to Atlanta.
1 hat is. facts 4) attack the validity, or weaken the support, of (2a)
( 1 2) and ( 1
plus (3) as a reason against transferring to Atlanta. They attack the validity
of the reasoning, rather than the truth of the reasons. This analysis is
diagrammed as follows:
(13) His (2a) If he moves to (3) Buying a new-

family needs Atlanta, he will have home now could be
a bigger to move his family + \ery expensive
house. and find a new home. with the current
high interest rates.
/
(12) He still will (11) Interest
/
have to buv another. rates are just /
+
bigger house even as high where
if he stays where he is now. /
he is now. /
/
In other words, he would have the same problem of the expense of buying
if
a new house whichever option he chose, then the fact that he would have it
on the Atlanta option has no strength at all as a reason against Atlanta in
comparison with the other option(s).5
The fact he already knows the area where he is now. and facts
(15). that
(2b) and he transferred to Atlanta, he would be forced to look for
( 1 6)^ that if
a new house in an unfamiliar area have a different status. His unfamiliarity

with Atlanta is a disadvantage of the Atlanta option, and some reason
against transferring there, given that he must get a new house if he does so.
Ône could also think of this point as showing that these expense-of-necessary-house-buying con-
siderations "balance out" (or "cancel out ') as reasons against Atlanta in this problem, since they are
equally strong reasons against the other option(s) being considered. We could leave them standing as
reasons against Atlanta, provided we showed exactly the same facts as reasons equally against the option
of staying where he is. They then would balance out in the evaluation process.
^Statement (16) is really the same as statement (2b), and could have been given the same number.
.
This can be diagrammed as follows:
(2a) If fie moves to (2b i- 16) In

Atlanta, he will Atlanta, he
have to mo\e his — would not know
family and find a the area,
new home.
7
/
He shoidd mo\e to a new position at corporate headquarters in Atlanta.
And the fact that 15i if he buys a house where he is now. he will at least
i
know the area (together with the fact that (12) he will need to buv a bigger
house anvway) is a factor in favor of staving where he is:
(13) His familv needs

a bigger house.
(12) He
\
will have to buy (15) Here, ^^here he is.
a bigger house an\\\'a\ he knows the area.
He shoidd sta% where he is and not mo\e to .Atlanta.
As we studv the problem we notice. howe\ er. that another factor related
to house-buying fa\ors Atlanta. According to the information he has, (4)
In Atlanta, for the same price of a house here, you do get a much bigger
house and lot."" This, together with the fact that 12) he will have to buy a (
bigger house anywav. is a reason favoring the Atlanta option:
(13) His famih needs a bigger house.
(12) He
\
needs to buv (4) In .\tlanta. for the
a bigger house anyway. + same price as where he
is now. you do get a
bigger house and lot.
He should mo\e to a ne\\- position at corporate headquarters

in Atlanta.
Tliis seems to (onipleic the diagramming of the factors, pro and con, that
have to do with the need to buy a new house.
Let us now diagram the other pros and cons. Statement (5) says.
•Moving to a new job could be challengingand exciting, but what if I didn't
Hke it?" From the tone and structure of this sentence. I gather that our friend
attaches a positive value to the prospect of a job that is challenging and
exciting, sopresumably the possibility that the new position will be
challenging and exciting is supposed to be a consideration in favor of
moving to Atlanta:
(5) Moving to a new job could be challenging

and exciting.
He
\
should move to a new position at corporate
headquarters in Atlanta.
But tfie same sentence also raises a thoughtful, important, and serious
question: What he does not like the new situation in Atlanta? And he says
if
in (6). "After physically and monetarily relocating for this job. it would be
catastrophic if it didn't work out." The real possibility of a disastrous
outcome he chooses Atlanta must be counted as a reason against the
if
Atlanta option. To show this in the diagram, we must write a declarative

sentence that expresses the significance and import of his question ("What
if it didn't workout? "). This question recognizes the possibility that the new
situation in Atlanta might not work out. This risk, together with (6) (which
says that it would be catastrophic if it didn't work out) is a negative aspect of
the Atlanta option. This can be shown as follows:
h is possible that the (6) After physically

new situaticjn in .Atlanta + and monetarily relocating
might not work out. for the new job. it would
be catastrophic if it
didn't work out.

7
/
He should mo\e to a new position at corporate headquarters

in .\tlanta.
This risk is an important consideration that should be taken seriously.

Two more reasons against the Atlanta option are that (7) in the state of
Georgia, one pays a state income tax, whicti is expensive, and which he does
not lia\e to pa\ where he is. and that (Si ju^t nio\ nig b\ iii^tjli is expensi\e.
These are two separate reasons, both having to do with expenses associated
with a transfer to Atlanta. They could be put into the diagram in either of
two equally good ways. One way to diagram them is as two independent
reasons convergenth supporting an omitted intermediate conclusion like.
"Transferring to Atlanta would ui\c)l\e extra expense. which is a reason ""
against Atlanta, as follows:
(7) In the state of Georgia. (8) Just nio\ ing b\

one pays a state income tax. itself is expensi\e.
which is expensi\e.
[Transferruig to .\tlanta would in\ol\e extra expense.]
He should move to a new position at corporate headquarters

in Atlanta.
Alternatively. (7) and (8) could be diagrammed directlv as reasons against

transferring:
(7) In the state of Georgia. (8) Just nio\ing by

one pays a state income tax, itself is expensive.
\\hich is expensixe. '
/ /
,/ /
He should mo\e to a new position at corporate headquarters

in Atlanta.
(Perhaps one also could diagram (8) as a reason in favor of staying where
he is.)
The fact that (9) if hestavs where he is. he \\ ill still have a "good job" is
presumably some sort of reason for staying where he is:
(9) If he stays where he is now. he still
will ha\e a "good job."
He should stay where he is and not mo\e to

Atlanta.
:M2 Piadital Decision Î<lki^,^
But tilt' tad (hat ( 10) if ht" stays, he will be bored and ( 1 1 )
he hates to be bored,
are reasons against slaying:
(10) [IIhe stays.] ^ ( 1 1 ) He hates to

he will be bored. be bored.
7
He sliould stay where he is and not move to Atlanta.
By themselves, these facts together are not also a reason to transfer to

Atlanta, because they do not say anything positive, or anything at all, about
Atlanta. As far as what (lO)and(l 1) themselves say is concerned, the Atlanta

position might be equally boring. Statement (5), which earlier raised the
possibility that moving to a new job
could be challenging and
in Atlanta
exciting, did say something positive about the Atlanta option, and it was
inserted earlier as a consideration favoring Atlanta, so we have already taken
care of that factor.
All of these components are shown together in the diagrams on pages
343 and 344.
The pro and con considerations as they were recounted by our friend
have now been diagrammed. One obvious criticism of what he has said is
that it is easy to think of many other factors that might also be relevant to
this decision and which he has not even

that should be considered, but
mentioned. Here some additional factors that I think should also
is a list of
be considered: differences in salaries and job security between the two
positions; the personal preferences of other members of his family; schools;
weather, climate, environmental concerns; the relative attractiveness of the
two cities; and relationships with friends and relatives. It would be a
shame, and perhaps even a disastrous error, for our friend to make his
decision on the basis of such a partial and incomplete review of relevant
considerations. Factors omitted from the diagram(s) are not considered
when the diagrams of the option(s) are evaluated, and some of these might
turn out later to be major problems that he wished he had taken into account
and solved, problems that would have tipped the scales in favor of the other
option if they had been considered at the time. Or, they may have involved
benefits and advantages that would have been his, if he had made another
choice, things so important that he would have decided otherwise if he
had thought to consider them, good things which he will later regret miss-
ing. Naturally, of course, decisions usually rrmst be made in a condition
of imperfect knowledge, and we probably never can even think of all the
possible pros and cons, much less evaluate them. When the appointed time
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for the decision to be made arrives, we must try to select the objectively
best choice on the basis of the incomplete, imperfect, and sometimes un-
certain information available to us at the time. But in the present case,
some of the considerations that our friend has overlooked seem so obvious,
and so potentially important, that they almost cry out for inclusion in the
diagram before making the decision. The omitted considerations here are
not so hidden or obscure that one could not be expected to think of them;
rather, they are so obvious, and have such a high potential for great im-
portance that it would be almost gross negligence to fail to consider them.
Perhaps our friend here has become so preoccupied with the prob-
lems of house buying that worries about this consumed his thought,
thereby causing him to overlook other important considerations. If we
were acting as his adviser, we probably would do him a favor by getting
him to analyze the implications of these other important considerations
(family wishes, salary, schools, etc. —
assuming that he has not already
—
done so and not told us) and to include them in the diagrams along with
everything else. Until these other factors are considered too, it is im-
possible to make a reliable evaluation of the competing options.
This does not mean that the diagramming work that we have done
so far is of no use or value. Our work has solved part of the problem. We
have produced diagrams that he parts of the larger total diagrams that
will
show all The pros and cons of other consid-
the other considerations.
erations can be added later to the parts of the diagrammatic analysis that
we already have constructed.
Nevertheless, the treatment of the house-buying aspect of this problem
does appear already to have revealed something important. It seems to show
that the whole problem of his having to buy a new house drops out of the
question (or "cancels out") more or less, as neutral, as far as the decision
whether to transfer to Atlanta or not is concerned. For, the fact that he needs
to obtain a new house anyway, even if he stays where he is, and to do so at
equally high interest rates, attacks and destroys the validity of his need to
find a new home if he transfers to Atlanta as a reason against the Atlanta
option. As a result, this whole aspect of the problem drops out of
consideration as, in a sense, irrelevant, and without weight or force as a
reason for or against either option. So we can, in effect, remove it from the
diagram, and need not even look at it, or consider it further, in deliberating
over this decision. Our friend can stop thinking and worrying about the
expense of buying a new house as far as this decision is concerned, and he
can now turn his attention to the other aspects of the problem.
His knowing the area where he presently is and not knowing the area
in Atlanta, which is an advantage of staying where he is over transferring.
M6 Puulital Decision Makii"^
may even be more or less coiiiuerbalanced by the likelihood that he can get
the bigger house he needs at a lower price in Atlanta than where he is now. If
the weights of these two factors are approximately equal within the level
and degree of accina( y possible in such matters, then they also "balance
out." and the whole set of house-buying considerations can now be ignored
in the rest of the deliberations (since they balance out in their support for the
two options), rhis is an important discovery, because it simplifies the
problem (by eliminating a whole set of complex considerations that were
using up time and mental effort) and because it means that the decision
logically can be made on the basis of the totality of all the other con-
siderations.
It earlier that out friend failed to consider all the factors
was noted
relevant to a determination of the net financial value of the competing
options. He listed the increased costs of moving to Atlanta, but he failed to
include also any possible differences in salary or income that might
counterbalance, or even outweigh, these increased costs. Consequently,
without more information, we cannot accurately weigh the financial pros
and cons of the two options.
The other major reasons he cited are the possible challenge and
excitement of a new position in Atlanta, as opposed to the security of a
"good job" under known conditions where he is. These two positive
features of the two competing choices are counterbalanced, to a certain
extent, by related negative factors: the Atlanta option involves the risk and
danger associated with an uncertain future which might involve a "catastro-
phic" loss if it did not work out, but staying where he is will be "boring,"
which he The evaluation of the relative weights of these pros and cons
hates.
will depend, in part, on one's "philosophy of life" and the relative positive
and negative values that one attaches to excitement, challenge, security,
risk, danger, boredom, etc. These values may even change at different
periods in one's life, and in different circumstances (for instance, depending
on whether or not one has a family). What such values should be is a
deep and important fundamental question that it is useful to think about
occasionally in one's life. One reason for taking appropriate courses in
philosophy and the humanities while in college is the opportunity they

provide for reflecting upon, and examining, one's basic values, and coming
to a thoughtful, informed judgment about them. As the present real
example illustrates, even if one tries to avoid independent philosophic
reflection on life's basic values, it is difficult to avoid having to deal with the
same questions and issues in practice, with less time to think.
In this example, then, to make the best decision, we also would need
more information than we have been given about the relative positive or
negative values for our friend of such things as excitement, challenge,

security, risk, danger, boredom, etc. Also, as discussed earlier, we need
more factual information about other aspects of the competing options
(such as family preference, salary differences, etc.). With only the in-
formation given, neither option emerges as clearly preferable (although
we have been able to determine that the house-purchasing pros and cons
balance out and can be dropped from the deliberations). With more in-
formation, however, one option could emerge as clearly the best one.
I
EXERCISES 4-2A
The following fragments could be parts of larger decision problems. In them, different
kinds of "reasons against reasons" are given. Diagram the reasoning in each, showing
the logical relationships among the numbered statements. When numerals are given in
the problem, use BOTH statements /A A/D numerals in each diagram. These exercises
provide experience and practice at distinguishing the two different ways in which
reasons can oppose other possible reasons in short passages.
A-1. One possible reason against the idea that (1)1 should get a dog might be the
fact that (2) I would have to spend a lot of time each day taking care of it. But this
wouldn't really be a problem forme, because (3) I would enjoy taking care of a dog.
Besides, (4) a dog doesn't really take much lime to take care of.
Hint: Statement (3) should appear twice in the diagram, doing two separate jobs.
349
3'A) l'i.i(ii(al Decision Making
A-2. A j)()ssibl(' reason wliy (1)1 should go into the business partnership with
Harry is maybe that (2) more profits than I am making now. On
if I do, I will earn
the other hand, (3) my overhead expenses would be greatly increased if I went into
the partnership, and (4) this would prevent my earning additional profits.
A-3. A possible reason why (1)1 should go into the business partnership with
Harry is that (2) if I do, I more profits than I am making now. But on the
will earn
other hand, (3) I have no need for any more profits than I am making now.
351 Exercises 4-2 A
Use complete sentences you construct yourself (and not numerals) to show the
reasons pro and con the reasons for and against actions discussed in the following
discourses. Put all the reasons given by both speakers together in the same diagram.
A-4. He: Let's not go to the beach. Its too long a drive to get there.
She: But the drive is very interesting and beautiful. Besides, it's only 15
kilometers, and that's not a long drive.
Special instruction: Show the relationship of these reasons to each other, and to the conclusion
"We should go to the beach."
A-5. She: Vou shouldn't eat that dessert, because it is loaded with sugar.
He: Sugar won't hurt me. Besides, that dessert is made entirely with a
nonsugar sweetener substitute.
Special instruction: For a change, this time show the relationship of these reasons to each other,
and to the conclusion "He should not eat that dessert."
332 Piattical DiciMoii Making
Diagram the following decision problem in full, using BOTH numerals /A A/D sentences.
A-6. Wc are trying to decide whether or not to buy a color TV set at the present
liiiu'. A color T\' would be more enjoyable than our present black-and-white TV
( 1 )
when watching shows such as nature shows and sports, but this is actually not too
strong a reason loi buying a color set now because (2) we can alw-ays watch special
programs at my parents on their color set. Also, (3) I'm afraid that if we had a color
rV. I would spend a lot more time watching TV, and consequently (4) I would
waste even more time than I do now, if we had one, and (5) wasting more time would
be bad. Also, (6) we would like to have more money in our savings, and (7) keeping
our present black-and-white set would help us save money.
On the other hand, (8) color TVs may be more expensive in the future, so
that (9) if we ever are going to buy one, perhaps we should get it now, and (10)
we certainly do want to have one some day. On the other hand, (11) it is also
possible that better quality TVs will become available for less money in the future,
and, consequently, statement (9) might not be true. Besides, (12) we expect to
have more income in the future, so that (13) we probably could still afford one
in the future even if it became more expensive, so the truth of (8) would not nec-
essarily entail the truth of (9).
(14) My parents have a color TV
and would enjoy watching color when they
visit us, but (15) it won't hurt them to watch our black-and-white when they TV
visit.
NOTE: When the decision in question is simply whether or not to do some one thing, only one
diagram (with one conclusion and the reasons that relate to it) should be used.
Tape several pieces of paper together, as needed, to .show the entire diagram on one piece
of paper.
EXERCISE 4-2B
Construct one diagram showing the arguments pro and con regarding the course of
action mentioned in the following discourse. For this exercise, you need only
construct a diagram showing the reasons given in the discourse; you are not required
to evaluate it. You may use numbers in this diagram. More hints are provided below.
Only one diagram of pros and cons is needed; write it on a separate sheet of paper.
Ladies and gentlemen; the question before us today is whether or not (1) our
country should continue to build more nuclear fission^ electricity generating
plants. Let us consider the reasons for and against this proposal. On the pro side is
the point that (2) we will need much moreenergy of all sorts, including electrical, in
the future, as we believe because (3) experts tell us that we will need more energy.
Also, supposedly (4) nuclear fission reactors are a cheap source of electrical power,
as we again have reason to believe since (5) experts tell us that it will be cheap.
Another pro reason is that (6) fission reactors are a safe source of power, as is
supported by the fact that (7) experts tell us so. Furthermore, (8) building these
reactors will create jobs and employment. (Each of these points, of course, assumes
that (2) we need this energy.)
Opposing this, it is said that although, of course, it is true that (8) building
these plants will create jobs, it does not follow from this that (1) we should build
them, because (9) the same amount of money spent on alternative energy sources.
insulation, and conservation to save or recover from what is presently wasted and
lost an equal amoimt of energy, would create no less than f we times as many jobs as
the same amount of money would create if spent to build fission reactors. So (8) is
not a good reason for (1). [Hint: Diagram this move by showing statement (9)
as a reason against the validity of statement (8) as a reason for (1).] This fact just
is a reason given why we should not (1) build them.
stated, (9), also
Also,has been argued that it is false that (4) nuclear fission reactors are a
it
cheap source of electrical power, as supposedly is seen from the fact that (10)
presently electricity from new nuclear plants costs about five times as much as oil as
a source of electricity, plus (11) the cost of nuclear fuel already is rising much faster
than thecost of oil. Another reason against (4) is that (12) building and maintaining
these reactors highly expensive. (13) At minimum, to
is build and maintain a
typical reactor, for example, it works out that it costs many tens of thousands of
dollars per person in the area it will serve, a cost that supposedly will be recovered
through increases in electric bills to these persons over the short period of 30 to 40
Another reason against thinking that (4) fission is a cheap
years that a reactor lasts.
source of power is no more than 40 years, a reactor must be
the fact that (14) after
taken apart and disposed of, and (15) this will be highly expensi\e. It must be
'Nuclear "fission" is not to be confused with nuclear "fusion." This argument is about fission, not fusion.
353
remembered that just because (5) experts tell us that nuclear fission reactors will be
cheap does not pro\e that (1) they really will be cheap, since (16) no one yet knows
the actual lolal cost ol a nuc lear fission reactor, for ( 1 7) no one yetknows what it is
going to cost todismantle or "decommission" one, because (18) it has not been
figured out or decided how to decommission a fission reactor yet.
Also, against both (l)and (6) is the claim that (19) nuclear reactors are unsafe.
Some of the reasons given for this are. in the first place, (20) there is always the
danger of a "melt-down" that not only would force the permanent closure of the
reactcjr, but also could necessitate permanently abandoning large areas of land
around the reactor. Secondly, (21 a safe way has not yet been found to dispose of
)
radioactive reactor by-products, wastes, and contaminated worn-out reactor parts.

Thirdly. (22) even if no major accident occurred and a safe way could be found to
dispose of the wastes and parts, inevitably the level of background radiation is
and (23) this is very unsafe because (24) it
raised by the operation of fission reactors,
increases the probability of cancer and causes everyone to age prematurely.
Also, it is questionable whether it is true really that (2) we will need all this
extra energy. (25) Since the rise in oil prices, the consumption of electricity has
fallen far belcjw predictions.
EXERCISE 4-2C
Analyze the following decision problem. Fasten two large sheets of paper together, or
use one very large piece of paper, on which to put the diagrams. Write out BOTH the
statements AND the numerals together in the diagrams. For this exercise, you need
only diagram the pros and cons of the various alternatives, not evaluate them.
I am thirty-four years old. and have been working in the same

a registered nurse. I
hospital emergency room for twelve years. (1) My work is what most people
consider exciting, stimulating and rewarding. (2) I have good job security in
nursing, because have twelve years seniority, and also (4) I receive a good salary.
(3) I
(5) I am well respected by my peers, supervisors, and physicians, which is something

positi\e about my present position. Another plus is that (6) I am proud of my
abilities in nursing, because (7) I am gofjd at nursing. (8) I am. by most standards, a
success in my profession. The problem, it seems, is that the success is not felt within
me.
I ha\e reached a distressing point in my job in that (9) I feel that it is routine
and boring; I dread every hour of every day spent at the hospital, and I feel bored and
burned out. because (10) I am tired of the same people and situations. After some
face-to-face honesty with myself. I have to admit that (11)1 never had a desire to be a
nurse. When counseled in high school. I was advised to go into nursing, teaching,
or secretarial work. My parents were elated with my decision to enter nursing
school. I crjnsidered it to be the lesser of the three evils. Nursing was ne\er my
primary career choice. (12) My true desire always has been to practice veterinary
medicine.
At this jjoint, I see myself with some basic alternatixes. I can either return to
school and pursue the new career goals in veterinary medicine, or I could remain in
nursing. If I did remain in nursing. I could always change my specialty or hospital.
All my options seem to be the following:
1. I should remain in nursing and in the emergency room at the present hospital
where I am now.
2. I should remain in nursing and work in another area of the same hospital.
3. I should remain in nursing and work in the emergency room of another hospital.
4. I should remain in nursing and work in another area of another hospital.
5. I should pursue veterinary medicine, including returning to school.
After reviewing these options. I felt that opticjns 1. 2. 3. and 4 could be combined
into one: I should remain in nursing. If I decided to remain in nursing. I could

approach the other alternatives in a separate decision.
The pros and cons of pursuing veterinary medicine are complicated. I've
already mentioned that (12) it always was my true desire and my primary career
3.55
^'y6 Piactual Decision Making
(li()i(c. And (\:i) ilu* (halk'ngc of new people, and new situations, is appealing.
Another reason for |3in suing \eierinar\ medicine is that (14) I feel that I will be a
successful \ei. because (15)1 have a strong compassion for animals. Also, (16) it is
important that I feel happy with myself, and (17) I will feel good about myself as a
vet. for the same leasons: because (14)1 will be successful, because (15)1 care about
animals.
But there are problems. (18) Admittance to a graduate school where I can study
veterinary medicine will be difficult, because (19)1 will be thirty-six years old when
I apply to graduate s( hool, and (20) graduate schools prefer younger students. And
(21 ) while I am in school it will be difficult academically, because (22) I have been
out of school 12 years, and (28) returning to the educational situation is more
long period of time. Another problem is that (24) schooling will
difficult after a
pose a financial burden, because (25) I will only be able to work a few days a week
while in school, and (26) there will be the additional expenses of tuition and
conunuting. Also. (27) my family and friends do not think I should do this but (28) —
it's not really all that important to me what they think of me. And (29) once I am out
of veterinary school, I will be more independent financially, (30) which will be
good, because (31)1 prefer to be financially dependent only on myself. And (32) once
I'm otit and practicing veterinary medicine. I will be able to build job security.
EXERCISE 4-2D
Select a complicated decision problem with which you are personally acquainted,
preferably a decision with which you yourself are faced, and construct a diagrammatic
analysis in the manner explained in Chapter 4. For this exercise, you need only
diagram the pros and cons of the various alternatives, not evaluate them. If you can
think of no suitable, or sufficiently complicated decision problem of which you have
personal knowledge, you may instead analyze the options open to the woman in the
following case history, constructing a diagram showing all the pros and cons, for her,
of these options. Use separate sheets of paper and write very clearly, using complete
sentences (or obvious abbreviations thereof) for the reasons and conclusions. You
probably will find it necessary to write sentences of your own construction (or ab-
breviations thereof) to express the various reasons and conclusions, because the
sentences of the woman in this case history are not well enough organized to be used
in the decision diagrams. (If necessary, refer back to Chapter 3 to review how to
construct diagrams using your own sentences.)
D-1. A/7-5. B. IS 42, married 22 years, and has jive children born within ten years.
Her husband has retired from the military and has begun his own business. When
interviewed she made the jollowijig statements.
"I've resented for years that my husband didn't help with caring for the
children. I felt, as the ch-ildren grew older, that they missed completely the influence
of a father. He never went to the boys' games or look them camping or played with
any of the children. He was always too busy with his hobby, chess.
"After ten years I realized I wasn't in love with him. yet I'm Baptist and believe
that a person married only once in her lifetime. I believe remarriage is adultery
is
according to the Bible, so I stayed in the marriage. After his retirement four years
ago, we separated, but for reasons I'm not certain of. we came back together again.
Several years ago he invested $5000 in a business, and I countersigned about half the
loans, putting up for collateral the house we bought after his retirement and all its
contents. Now the business and I could lose the house, which is in my
is failing
name. I work full time and help him with the business, because if I didn't help
try to
him he'd have to hire a secretary. Until I realized I was working two jobs and
handling the children and all their problems, which he ignored. I was doing it all.
"Sex to me is only a duty and I find my stomach hurting when he comes near
me. I also find that in this community-property state our whole family will suffer
along with his business and perhaps lose the only stable, concrete thing in our life,
which is our house. Financially. I would be better off divorced, as he is a good
person and would give us at least half of his retirement checks, as he does now. Yet I
don't believe in divorce. What should I do?
"Even if we were legally divorced, I'd still be married to him according to my
principles, and yet I can't continue living this way, as my nerves are shot. I have to
357
ibS Prattical Dctision Making
lake (laiuiuili/cis to sleep and drink twelve to sixteen cups of coffee a day to stay
awake."
iMi R\ii \vi R "What are your options?"
MRS B "First there's di\ ore e. which would legally free the house. A lawyer told
nie that with divorce, if the house is in my name it would be salvaged when his
business goes under. The kids would be disappointed in me. however, if I divorced,
even though each has said their father has never been a father, and he's been around
so rarely they wouldn't miss him.
"Second, there's legal separation— which is essentially how we've been living
now But with
. legal separation my relatives needn't know and the people at church
wouldn't pass judgment.
"Or I could just continue as I've been doing, but I have to struggle so hard just
to get by financially and emotionally that I'm often thinking of suicide."
wi R "Are there any reasons against legal separation?"
iMKRMi
MRS "Legal separation wouldn't free me financially. Also I think I'm
B
interested in having male companionship, and this would be unfair to the men
seeing me. It would be playing with fire [the possibility of sex], as I'm still human
and want some kind of affection. And my kids would have a hard time explaining
why their mother might be dating other men. It would, in short, look suspicious to
"
our community of friends and rclati\es.

iNTLRMhWKR: " How old are your children?"
MRS. B: "Bill is 20, Mary is 18; the younger kids are 16, 15, and 12."
iNTKRMiwKR: "Are thcrc any reasons in favor of legal separation?"
MRS B "Only as a trial, a first step in that he would formally obtain another
:
residence. This would be desirable for my nerves because I can't stand to have him
touch me.
"It could result in two things. Living without making any decision. Or it
might result in his understanding how I feel and it might result in his changing, but
I don't hold hope after twenty years he would change that much.
"The separation might help the kids get used to the idea of a divorce."
iNTER\iLui R: "Have you discussed this with your children, and if so, how do
they feel about it?"
MRS B "The two older ones have said they would never forgive me. Bill is
going to be a minister, and Mary is married and has her own life. The younger kids
seem to be more sympathetic and know I'm under a lot of strain."
iNTKRv iKwi R "Have you discussed this with your husband, and if so, what does
he say?"
MRS B "The few times each year we've argued I've mentioned divorce and then
:
it seems to be forgotten. He has said, 'If that's what you want to do .' in a hurt
. .
tone of voice. I'm afraid it might destroy him. although his business seems more
important to him than his family.
359 Exercise 4-2D
him to go to a marriage counselor but he absolutely refuses."

"I've tried to get
"What are the reasons in favor of divorce?"
IN TERvitwLR:
MRS. "It would formally end a marriage that doesn't exist. It would free me
B.:
financially. It would stem any gossip. It would in a sense be easier for the children to
p understand. It would be more truthful."
INTERVIEWER: "And the reasons against divorce?"
MRS B "In the eyes of God, once married I'm always married. It would just be
:
another failure in my life. And it wouldn't be setting a good example for my

children. I'm raising them to respect marriage."
Hinl: Diagram "She's trying to raise them to respect marriage" as a reason supporting the additional as-
sumption thatmust be Hnked with "Getting a divorce would not be a good example of how married people
should behave for children" to oppose the option of divorce. And add the omitted additional assumption
"A trial would be good" to Mrs. B's statement "It would be a trial." This addition should help you to
connect "Her husband might change" and "She doesn't love him" to the rest of the diagram.
CHAPTER 5
TfoditionQl Topics
5-1 SOME INFORMAL FALLACIES
Sometimes reasoning at first glance appears to be good when actually it

is bad. Bad reasoning is said to "commit a fallacy" or to be "fallacious. Usu- "
ally fallacious reasoning is unsound, but occasionally it is bad for other

reasons. Fallacious arguments should not persuade anyone to accept their
conclusions, but, unfortunately, they sometimes do. Probably no limit
exists to the numbers of different kinds of fallacies that could be distin-
guished, but certain ones recur so frequently that they have received stan-
dard names. Knowing the names of these mistakes in reasoning helps you
to recognize them when they occur. It is also important to understand
why they are mistakes, so that you can avoid them in your thinking as well
as notice them if they occur in the thoughts of others. Many common
fallacies are so outrageous that they seldom appear in the writings of first-
rate authors, but they do often occur in political editorials, speeches,
propaganda, popular writings, articles, and ordinary conversation, so
it is important to know about them.
A. The genetic fallacy. If a person has a certain belief, presumably

there usually is some causal explanation For example, people
for this fact.
may hold beliefs as a result of early childhood experiences, upbringing,
education in school, or countless other possible causal factors. Also, if a
person believes something, he may or may npt be capable of offering a justifi-
cation for the statement belie\ed. Such justification would involve citing
361
362 riaditioiial I opics
whal art' iK'licvt'd to be facts that constitute good reasons for the statement
oi ass?iî()iS'm (juestion. So the phrase or form of words "the reason for per-
son A's h( liel thai //' is equivocal.' It can refer either to (a) the factor(s)
that cause or have caused person X to (ome to and hold that belief; or to
(b) the statements that could or would be given in justification for that be-
lief, by X or by someone else. Thus, for example, if you inquired regarding
the cause or causes of my present belief that "The sum of the interior angles
in a Euclidean triangle equal to two right angles, or 180°," the true an-
is
swer would refer to my being compelled to memorize this statement when

a child in elementary school. But if a justification for this belief were re-
quested, rather than citing this autobiographical fact I would attempt to
prove the statement (in this case, by deductively valid inferences from more
basic axioms and theorems of geometry). To justify the claim, I would try
to present an argument that established it.
In attacking another person's claim or assertion, it is a logical fallacy
to try to refute it by somehow assailing or discrediting the cause of that
person's belief rather than its justification. Reasoning that makes this mis-
take is said to commit "the genetic fallacy/' The genetic fallacy, then, oc-
curs when the causes of someone's belief are attacked as if they were the
justification for it. This is fallacious because the causes of someone's belief
are not in general relevant to its truth or falsity in the special way that the
reasons for it (that is, its justification) are.
Consider, for example, the famous story of the discovery of the ben-
zene ring by the nineteenth-century German chemist, Friedrich Kekule.
After years of experimentation and thought spent in fruitless quest of the
elusive structure of thebenzene molecule, Kekule one night went to sleep
and dreamed he saw a snake swallow its tail to form a hoop. He awoke
with the idea that the benzene molecule might have the shape of a hoop
or ring, a hypothesis subsequently found to fit the data. Now, Kekule 's
dream may have been among the causes that originally led him to think
of the hypothesis of the benzene ring, but it certainly was not part of the
justification he or anyone else would give for believing it. If you asked Kek-
ule (or any other chemist) the reasons for thinking the hypothesis true,
the answer certainly would not cite the fact that it had come to Kekule
in a dream Rather, it would be pointed out that this hypothesis is justified
.
by its relationship to the experimental facts and other accepted theories.

Anyone who tried to argue against Kekule 's hypothesis by saying that it
had come to Kekule in a dream and therefore could not be trusted would
commit the genetic fallacy. He would be making the mistake of inap-
Êqun'ocal: ambiguous; having two or more distinci meanings or significations (for instanc c. the word
"bank." which can refer to a place where one deposits money for safekeeping, or to the hind adjoining
a body of water).
363 5-7 Somr Informal Fallacies
propriatelv treating the cause or source of the claim as if it were part of

its justification.
The genetic fallacy takes countless forms. For example, some p)eople
have talked as if it were relevant to the question of the existence of God lo
claim that belief in God is basicalh motivated bv a desire to have a heav enly
father to replace the earthlv parents that we all lose. But even if this psy-
chological claim about motivation were true, it would be logically
irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the clsiim that God exists.
B. The argumentum ad hominem. The ad hominem fallacy oc-

curs when someone aigues against a claim or position by attacking its
holder! SI in logicalh inelevani ways. Some Nazis, for example, argued that
the Theon of Relati\ iiv must be false because its creator. Albert Einstein,
was Jewish. In addition to its other unsavor\ features, this reasoning is
logically fallacious because the personal qualities of a beliefs holder are

logically irrelevant to the tnuh or falsity of that belief. ^Vhelher or not the
Theon of Relativity is true depends entirely and completely on certain
facts of physics; facts about Einstein are inelevant.
Even daniaging. true accusations against the holder of a belief do not
refute the belief. It is said that the philosopher Francis Bacon was removed
from his pKJsitidh as chancellor for dishonesty. But even if this is true and
he was dishonest, this constitutes no argument against his philosophical
theories.
Francis Bacon was removed from

his position as chancellor for
dishonestv.
{ad hominem fallacy)

^ (nil)
The philosophical theories of

Francis Bacon are false.
Some logicians regard the ad hominem fallacv as a subcase of the genetic

fallacy, because in many cases of the ad hominem fallacy, someone tries
to refute a view or belief by pKDinting to some allegedly negative property,
feature, or characteristic of the original cause or source of that belief.- In
the Francis Bacon example, for instance, the fallacious reasoning tries to
refute a philosophical theon bv pointing to an alleged characteristic
(namely, dishonesty) of the original cause or source of the view (namely,
Francis Bacon Other logicians, however, hold that the ad hominem fal-
i.
lacy should not be considered to be a subcase of the genetic fallacv because ,
M3fien the ditfereni kinds of informal fallacies oxerlap. A single step of reasoning nv^\ . .^n^niii more
than one of the manv "infonnal fallacies" simultaneously.
361 Iiaclitioiuil Topics
ihcif arc many cases where the jierson whom an ad hominem attack tar-
gets is only someone who happens to hold the view being attacked, but is
not the cjriginal source or creator of the view.
In oiclinarx life, the fallacy of arguing ad hominem frequently oc-
(in s when i)eople think they can discredit a view by pointing out that it is
held by "hij^pies," "Communists," "dissidents," "impudent snobs," "cap-
italists." or "the bomgeois." This sort of reasoning is strictly fallacious,
because who holds a belief is irrelevant to whether or not it is true.
Exception: If the fact that a certain person holds a belief has itself been
offered as evidence or support for a claim, then an inquiry into his char-
acteristicsand qualifications may be relevant. For example, if Smith is
cited as a witness wlio testified to having seen, from a distance at dusk,
Jones commit a criminal act, then evidence showing that Smith had liight
blindness that adversely affected his ability to discriminate forms in twi-
ligiit would be logically relevant. Or if the testimony or statements of an
alleged expert or authority have been cited in support ofsome claim, then
evidence showing that this person actually lacks expertise or is motivated
by prospects of personal gain would be relevant to discrediting this justi-
fication. In cases where personal characteristics of some person (for exam-
ple, acduate impartiality) have themselves been offered
visi(jn. expertise,
some conclusion, pointing to facts

as part of the reason or justification for
about the person relevant question whether he or she really has
to the
these characteristics would be appropriate and would not commit the fal-
lacy of arguing ad hominem. For instance, suppose that the argument of
one side has the following form:
Smith Smith Smith Smith

swears is has no has
that always special good
he saw honest moti\e vision
Jones + and + to lie + at
conmiit reliable or give night.
a in what false
criminal he says. testimony
act that against
night. Jones.
\ /
Smith did see ones commit

a criminal act that night.
i
Jones committed a criminal
act that night.
365 5-7- Some Informal Fallacies
A replv or counter-argument that showed that one of the basic reasons in

this argument would be logically appropriate and would not com-
is false
mit the fallacy of arguing ad homniem.
\ote: The logical error does not come in criticizing someone on per-
sonal grounds. Rather, the fallacy of reasoning rt^ homineyn comes if /)om
this criticism you go on to infer that some particular statement that this
person believes to be true must therefore be false. If you say that someone
is an ass and back your claim up with good reasons, you have not com-
mitted the fallacy of arguing ad homineui: but if you say that someone is
an ass and therefore his views are false (or insignificant), then you've com-
mitted the logical fallacy of reasoning ad hominem (even if you prove that
he's an ass).
C. The fallacy of equivocation. Fallacies that tinn on the meanings

of thewords used in reasoning are sometimes called semantic fallacies.
Suppose, for instance, someone were to argue as follows:
Onlv man is rational. -^ No woman is a man.
No woman is rational.
Something is obviously wrong with this reasoning. In the course of the

argument, the word "man" evidently has shifted meaning. In the sense in
which we presumably understand this word if we accept the first premise
as true, the term "man means the same as "mankind" and refers to hu-
"
man beings in general (as contrasted, for example, with other animals In i.
this sense, the top left premise really savs something like. "Of all the ani-
mals, only human beings are rational." But in its occurrence in the second
reason, where it contrasts with "woman." the word "man evidently refers "
to gender and means "male." So the second reason reallv says "Xo woman
is male." Between the reasons and the conclusion, the ambiguous word
"man changes from one of its meanings to another in such a way as to

"
make the reasoning appear \alid when really it is invalid. This reasoning
commits the fallacy of equiiocation. a mistake in reasoning that occurs
when, in the course of an argument, some of the words or phrases in\ olved
change their meanings in such a way as to make the conclusion appear to
follow logicallv when reallv it does not (or, at least, does not follow when
the words are all fixed in senses that make all the reasons true).
The best way to disco\er and prevent fallacies of equi\ocation is by
always attending carefully to the meanings of the words and phrases in a
discourse. Once discoxcred, such fallacies can be clearly exposed by re-
^
366 Tradilioiial Topics
placing the anibi.ûou.s phrases with woids thai unambiguously express

the exact meaning of the equivocated term in each of its separate particular
locations in the argument. One could show the equivocation in the falla-
cious reasoning above, for example, by rewriting it in the following way:
Onlv humans are rational. + No woman is male.
(nil)
\|/
Xo woman is rational.
The worthlessness of the inference now becomes obvious. Restated in un-

equivocal terms, it loses whatever appearance of validity it improperly
gained through the ambiguity in the word "man."
In general, the more abstract the words in a discourse, the more diffi-
cult it is to detect fallacies of equivocation. (Also, probably, the more sym-
pathetic one is with a certain claim, the less likely one is to notice a fallacy
in an argument for it.) Try to find the equivocation in this example.
1. The management of an industry has sole

responsibility for preserving its plant and
means of production.
+
2. hi industry, the health of the workers
is an indispensable means of production.
The management of an industry has sole

responsibility for preserving the health
of the workers.
Here the phrase "means of production" seems to have been equivocated

upon. In reason 1, in the sense in which it presumably is taken by a reader
who readily agrees with it, "means of production" refers to tools and ma-
chinery, whereas in the second reason the term apparently includes every-
thing required for operation of the plant or industry.
This example also an especially frustrating feature of equiv-
illustrates
ocations: A dishonest debater can
sometimes slip free of the charge of equiv-
ocation by claiming, for example, that by "means of production" he or she
meant all along "whatever is required to operate the plant or industry."
Though we doubt his or her truthfulness, we may be able to do little more,
if we want to escape having to agree to the conclusion, then deny the truth
'From Beardsley. Practical Logic.

367 5-1 ^ Some Informal Fallacies
of one of the reasons when 'means of production' is understood in this spe-

cial sense. Unscrupulous trial lawyers sometimes employ the trick of get-
ting an unsuspecting witness to agree with an ambiguous sentence in one
meaning, and then using the sentence in another meaning in an equivocal
argument leading to some conclusion damaging (in the view of the judge
and jury) to the witness's testimony. So watch out!
(In general, remember, though, that fallacious arguments can be given
in support of a conclusion which, although not justified by those argu-
ments, nevertheless happens to be true.)
D. The fallacy of false alternatives. When the number of alterna-

tives or possible positions regarding something is falsely assumed to be
less than actually committed. (This
exist, the fallacy of false alternatives is
fallacy is also sometimes called "the fallacy of thinking in extremes.")
Most commonly, it is mistakenly assumed that an "either-or" or "all-or-
nothing" situation exists, when actually there are other possibilities. In
other words, it is mistakenly assumed that there are only two possibilities
("Either A or B") when actually there are more possibilities. For instance,
early supporters of American participation in the Vietnam War created a
false alternative when they assumed that "Either the United States must
fight the Communists in Vietnam, or else they will have to be fought from
the shores of California." This commits the fallacy of false alternatives be-
cause other possibilities in addition to these two are overlooked.
In this fallacy, the mistaken assumption may be mentioned explicitly,
or it may just be an unstated sufficient suppressed assumption (in the sense
of these terms explained near the beginning of Section 2-5). Sometimes,
the mistaken assumption is written down or mentioned explicitly. For ex-
ample, suppose someone says:
"If you aren't for our organization, then you are against our organization. I
know that you aren't for it. Therefore, you must be against it."
This reasoning assumes that either I am "for" the speaker's organization,

or else I am "agai'nst" it. But perhaps I am neither "for" it nor "against"
it. Perhaps I do not care one way or the other. Maybe my position is one of
neutrality. The speaker's assumption that either I am "for" his organiza-

tion or else "against" it overlooks ihe possibility that lam neither "against"
it nor "for" it either. If my situation actually fits this third possibility, then
the speaker's assumption (that if I am not "for" his organization, then I
must be "against" it) is false. Since this false assumption serves as a basic
reason in his reasoning, although deductively valid, is unsound. It is

368 riaditioiKil Topics
II you aif not for our I know that you

organization, then you + are not for our
are ngaiu.sl it. organization.
{deduct ix'ely valid)

\|/
You are against (ûr organization.
unsound because one of the basic reasons is false.

The same faUacy also can be committed by having a false "Either-or"
or "If not A. then B" assumption as an unspoken or silent suppressed
premise of one's reasoning. In other words, a false alternative can be as-
sumed without its being mentioned explicitly, simply by having it as a
sufficient suppressed assumption of one's reasoning. For instance, suppose

that in the previous example the speaker had said only,
"You are not for our organization. Therefore, you must be against it."
In this event, the speaker's reasoning commits the fallacy of

still false al-
ternatives, because it makes the false unspoken assimiption that either I
am "for" his organization or else I am "against" it, when in fact, it is pos-

sible that neither is the case. If the argument were diagrammed without
showing or including this assumption, then the strength of the reasoning
woidd be rated as very weak:
You are not for our organization.
(very weak)
You are against our organization.
This step of reasoning is very weak because it is quite easy for the reason
to be true, and yet the conclusion be false — for example, if I am neither
"for" that organization nor "against" it.
If the false alternative assumed by this reasoning were made explicit
and added to the diagram as an additional suppressed assumption [in
square brackets], then as seen earlier, the argument becomes unsound
due to a false premise:
[F.ither you are for our You are not for

organization, or else + our organization,
you are against it.]
(deductively -valid)
V
You are against our organization.
369 5-7 Some Informal Fallacies
When the false alternative is an additional assump-

explicitly included as
tion, the reasoning is deductively valid, but unsound, due to the falseness
(in this example) of the additional assumption. So, as you see, with or
without the suppressed assumption added to the diagram, the reasoning is
unsound.
E. Hasty generalization. In a statistical generalization, or "induc-

tion," the fallacy of hasty generalization is committed when a conclusion
is drawn about an entire population on the basis of too small a sample. For
instance, suppose someone questioned only ten eligible voters in the United
States and on the basis of this small sample drew a conclusion about the
probable outcome of a presidential election in which millions of people
were voting, hi such a case, obviously, not enough people were questioned
to justify the conclusion. Hasty generalization is sometimes also called
"the fallacy of insufficient statistics" or just "jumping to a conclusion too
soon."
F. The straw man. The fallacy called "setting up a straw man" oc-
curs when someone, in attacking an opponent's position, attacks a less de-
fensible position superficially similar to, but actually different from, the
position really li^ld by his opponent. A variation on the same fallacy occurs
when someone deceptively defends a position superficially similar to,
but actually different from, the position attacked by his opponent. This
trick is popular in political argumentation. Here's an example from a
speech:
To these people who constantly say you ha\e got to listen to these younger
people, they ha\ e got something to say, [I reply that] I just don't buy that at
all. They smoke more pot than we do and if the younger generation are the
hundred thousand kids that lay around a field up in Woodstock. X.Y.. I am
not going to trust the destiny of the country to that group.
George Meany, American Federation of Labor President,

reported in the Xew York Times. August 31, 1970.
(Cited by Kahane.)
You can ad hominem fallacy in the speaker's attack on

easily see the
younger people (that is, the reference to pot smoking and Woodstock). But
did you notice the way he tries to divert his audience with an attack on a
straw man? The statement that the speaker supposedly is arguing against
is that young people have something to say and should at least be listened
to. But instead of refuting this, he slyly switches to attacking the idea that
we should "trust the destiny of the country to that group," a suggestion

very different from saying that young people should be listened to.
,170 Iraditioiial Topics
G. Begging the question. When reasoning, for one of its reasons or

assumptions (whether exphcit or suppressed), depends on a statement that is
identical or equivalent to the drawn conclusion, then it is said to "beg the
question. Such an argument, which assumes the very claim it is trying to
"
prove, is also called "circular" or is said to "argue in a circle." Here is a

simple example:
h is best to have government by the people because democracy is the best
form of government.
In this argument, the reason given ("democracy is the bestform of govern-
ment") merely conclusion ("It
restates the is best to have government by
the people") in different words.
Reasoning is also said to beg the question if one of its sufficient
suppressed or presupposed assumptions is the conclusion itself.
In much more complicated cases of begging the question, the overall
reasoning may look like this:
m
B + C G+ F
D+E
X
Here statement X, the conclusion, is also assumed or presupposed as one
of the basic reasons. It is easy to see in visual terms why such reasoning is
called "circular";one could draw an arrow of support from statement X
in the conclusion to what it supports at the top of the diagram.
Such reasoning just goes around in a circle.

371 5-1 Some Informal Fallacies
Reasoning that begs the question can be technically sound, but it fails
to advance our knowledge.
H. Argumentum ad ignorantiam. The fallacy of arguing from ig-

norance occurs when someone argues that because we do not know that a
certain statement is true, therefore it is false, or because we have no proof
that a certain statement is false, therefore it is true, or "What I am saying
is true because you cannot disprove it." This fallacy occurs in both of the
following examples:
There is insufficient evidence to establish that God exists. Therefore, God

does not exist.
There is no proof that God does not exist. Therefore, God exists.
The reasoning arguments is fallacious, because ignorance or

in both these
lack of proof or evidence about a claim establishes neither that it is true nor
that it is false.
Of course, in cases where (1) facts or evidence of a specifiable sort
should exist if a certain claim or hypothesis looking
is true and (2) after
carefully in an appropriate manner, we find that no such evidence exists,
then, in that case, the nonexistence of such evidence supports the conclu-
sion that this clatm or hypothesis is false. For example, suppose that when
the electric lights suddenly go off in a room in your apartment, someone
offers the hypothesis that one of the fuses in your fuse box has blown out.
This hypothesis would lead one to expect to find a blown fuse somewhere
in the fuse box, and the finding of a blown fuse would confirm this hy-
pothesis. But if you actually look and find no blown fuse, this is legitimate
evidence that the hypothesis of a blown fuse is false. The fallacy of arguing
from ignorance is not committed by someone who reasons, "We looked in
the fuse box and found no e\idence of a blown fuse; therefore, the hypothe-
sis that a fuse has blown is false." But the fallacy of arguing from ignor-
ance would be committed, in this example, by an illogical person who rea-

soned, "We do not know whether or not a fuse has blown; therefore, a fuse
has not blown," or "It has not been proven that a fuse has blown; there-
fore, a fuse has not blown." Such reasoning would commit the fallacy of
arguing from ignorance.
EXERCISES 5-1A
For each of the following discourses, decide whether it commits one of the fallacies
characterized in Section 5-1. If it does, state which fallacy it commits. If it commits
the fallacy of equivocation, pick out the word or phrase equivocated on, and state or
define its separate meanings. If the discourse does not commit one of the fallacies
characterized in Section 5-1 write the sentence "This discourse does not commit one
.
of the fallacies characterized in Section 5-1."
A-1. A few days after I aie one chocolate bar. my face broke out. Therefore, after
eaiin^ a chocolaie bar. mv face \\ ill ahvavs break out.
A-2. She was onlv a low -le\el munchkin in our Department. That is our replv
to the made by Barbara Honegger. a Gender Discrimination Analyst in the
charges
Justice Department, to the effect that she found many laws and governmental reg-
ulations that disaiminate against women, but that our administration refused to
do anything about it. This i^ also our refutation of her letter to the Washington Post
saying that her position in the Justice Department was a sham, and that women
who think President Reagan believes in equality are "buying a lie."
.\dapted from the public siatemems of a s|x>ke>man

for the Depanmeni of Justice in the Reagan .Administration.
A-3. President Lvndon Johnson did severe hami to the United States. For it was
he who. acting almost alone and against the counsel of many of his advisers, made
the decision to escalate United States miliiar\ involvemeni in \'ietnam.
."^74 Iiaclilional lopicN
A-4. Professor Smith is uiiiiian icd. i ides a and seldom wears

molorry{ le. a neck-
lie, riierelore liis iheorN ol (lie mind-body relationship is no good.
A-5. Poverty is ineradicable, as the proverb says. The poor are always with us,
and they will always be. As long as anyone free to accumulate a little more of the
is
world's goods than others, there will always be some people at the bottom of the
scale of wealth: these are the poor. Even if you move them up the scale of wealth
by charity, they will only leave someone else at the bottom.
What conclusion may be drawn from this? That all this talk of raising the
—
standard of living is Utopian folly and utter nonsense. For it follows that some
—
people must always be poor that is, on the brink of starvation and despair. And,
however we may bewail this fact as humanitarians, not all the wisdom of Solo-
mon can change it.
Beardsley, Practical Logic.
A-6. It is obvious that the present administration is weary and incompetent, for
everyone can see the extent of its fatigue and inability to act effectively or coordi-
nate its actions.
A-7. I know that what it says in the Koran is true because in the Koran it states
that what it savs there is true.
375 Exercises 5-lA
A-8. It certainly is not impartial to take sides in a dispute. Vet the Commission
decided in favor of the company and fined the union. Ho^s can it claim to be im-
partial? How can we respect a biased judge?
Adapted from Beardsley. Practical Logic.
A-9. We are not gomg to heed the counsel of the Harrniians and \'ances and Clif-
fords. \\ horn history has branded as failures. . . .
Spiro Agnew. Cleveland. Ohio. June 20. 1970.

Cited bv Kahane.
A-10. It has not been pro\ed conclusi\ely that nuclear-fission electric power
plants are dangerous, so they aren't a hazard.
EXERCISES 5-1B
For each of ine following discourses, decide whether it commits one of the informal
fallacies characterized in Section 5-1. If it does, state which fallacy it commits. If it
commits the faJlacy of equivocation, pick out the word or phrase equivocated on. and
state or define its separate meanings. If the discourse does not commit one of the fal-
lacies characterized in Section 5-1, write the sentence "This discourse does not com-
mit one of the fallacies characterized in Section 5-1."
B-1. My former husband was mean and cruel. Therefore, all men are no good.
B-2. No one has proved thai smoking marijuana is harmless. Therefore, ii must
be harmful.
B-3. The wTiier and philosopher Rousseau (1712-1778)1 abandoned all five of
his children to orphanages. Therefore, his theories on child development and early
education cannot be correct, and should not be taken seriouslv.
B-4. Either a person is a Bircher or a Communist. Jones is not a Bircher. so he

must be a Communist.
378 rraditional Topics
B-5. It is ii liilsc idea that tducation should encourage independent thinking and
make students "think h)r thenisches." If students had to think things out inde-
jK-ndcntly of all \vc know from great thinkers of the past, how far would they get?
riu y would never know as much geometry as Ku( lid, as much physics as Newton,
or as much biology as Darwin. We don't want them to think for themselves, but to
think lightlv: their thinking must be dependent upon the great thinkers.
Beardsley, Practical Logic.
B-6. comity assessor's office confirmed today that the assessed val-
Officials of the
uation of the Seattle First National Bank Building has increased only about 2 per-
cent since 1971.
The building's assessment was questioned last night by a former employee of
forum on Mercer Island.
the assessor's office at a candidate's
The former employee, Bob Clymer, accused Assessor Harley Hoppe of giving
the Sea-First Building and other major businesses special consideration while resi-
dential-property values have risen as much as 50 percent in King County.
However, Loran Clark, Hoppe's chief deputy who represented him at the
meeting, said Clymer was a "disgruntled former employee" and that the valua-
tion was {proper.
"Tax Valuation of Sea-First Building Disputed, Defended,"

The Seattle Times, October 17. 1975. p. 1.
Special Instruction: Apply directions to Clark's reply.
B-7. Medicine X has no proven medical effectiveness. Therefore it is medically

ineffective.
B
379 Exercises 5-1
B-8. The so-called nuclear freeze proposal says that the Western allies should just com-
disarm themselves unilaterally and turn the control of their countries over to the
pletely
Communists. Such a proposal is ridiculous, and therefore it should be opposed and
defeated.
Hint: The nuclear freeze proposal calls for a bilateral, mutually verifiable cessation in the produc-
tion and deployment of new nuclear weapons.
B-9. It may seem ob\ iotis that in order to obtain a greater tinderstanding of some-
thing and in order to question the truth of an idea, it would be a good idea to deter-
mine its origins. It seems clear that if we know the possible reasons why we believe
a certain thing, it will increase the likelihood that we will be able to work with it
in a rational manner. Yet how often is the origin of e\en the simplest belief ex-
amined? Mathematics is probablv the branch of thought where the origins of ideas
are questioned most, and even there new ideas are discovered by the analysis of the
reasons for the acceptance of certain axioms. For example, when the Euclidean
axiom about parallel lines was questioned, a whole new geometry was disco\ ered.
Any attempt to discover the reasons for belief in an idea implies a question of the
truth of that idea: even if the idea is true it is likely that a greater understanding of
the idea and its relationship with other ideas will be gained.
One example of this approach in action is the hypothesis that fear is the foun-
dation of religion, fear of death, fear of insecurity, fear of being treated unjustly.
If we look at when people believe in religion, we find that it is particularly in times
of stress and fear that faith in religion is exhibited. If we analyze the origin of re-
ligion, we find that it has been associated with fear throughout its history. One
can hardly avoid the hypothesis that fear lies at the foundation of faith. Religion,
then, really has no rational foundation.
From a student paper.

880 TiadiiioiKil Topics
B-10. ()1)\ loiisly, \\t' should all Ik' belter off if we had more money. So one easy
way (o make everyone belter off is to raise all incomes and prices by 10 percent;
for then we would all ha\e more money.
Adapted from Beardsley. Practical Logic.
B-11. No one can prove conclusively that physical objects exist outside our
minds. Therefore, physical objects do not exist outside our minds.
EXERCISES 5-1C
For each of the following discourses, decide whether it commits one of the fallacies
characterized in Section 5-1. If it does, state which fallacy it commits. If it commits the
fallacy of equivocation, pick out the word or phrase equivocated on, and state or define
its separate meanings. If the discourse does not commit one of the fallacies
characterized in Section 5-1, write the sentence This discourse does not commit one
of the fallacies characterized in Section 5-1."
C-1. Don't believe Mr. Brown's statements about the fact that we should not let
any more of our forests fall into the hands of the loggers. He is a conservationist
and only wants to keep the forests for himself and a relatively few fellow
conservationists.
C2. Enlisted men often are the superior of their military officers both in in-
telligence and physical ability. Therefore, the idea that a military officer
is the
superior of his men is ebviously false. So, officers do not, in fact, have any au-
thoritv over their men in the militarv.
C3. The fact that the paradoxes of religion and mysticism cannot be resolved
proves that these paradoxes are irresolvable.
C-4. Well. I know a woman who had ten thousand dollars under her mattress and
wore a mink coat to collect her welfare check. As this shows, the people on welfare
are all a bunch of chiselers.
381
:<82 I radiiioiial Topics
C-5. As for Senator Jones's eloquent defense of the James bill, I need only say this.
Take a look at the voting record for the last two sessions and you will see that Jones himself
voted against essentially the same bill on those occasions.
C-6. I understand that you don't like the Rolling Stones. I conclude from this that
you do not like rock-and-roll bands.
C-7. Our tires are always low-priced and dependable. No other tire has the ability to
grip the road like our TX-10 supertread road tire. The reason is that the TX-10 su-
pertread has unsurpassed traction. It's the tire for your highway driving.
C-8. "Isn't it better to help the gays out of the closet and face problems openly?"
"No, it would be absurd to turn the control of the university over to them.
So, I say that we should vote against giving any funds to the Gay Awareness
Committee."
C-9. A documentary
feature on 60 Minutes showed how a Chicago medical lab was
defrauding the Medicare program and engaging in kickback abuse. As this shows, no
government medical program will work in this country.
C
383 Exercises 5-1
C-10. There is no room for sidestepping this issue, Senator.Are you going to support
legislation to eliminate all private ownership of guns, or are you going to let this country
be ruled bv assassination?
C-11. Astrology, which tries to predict the future from the positions of the stars
and times of birth, had its origin in an ancient, magical view of the world. This
already shows that its claims are unreliable and untrue.
C-12. You can tell that the call for a nuclear freeze is a mistaken suggestion,
because the Soviet Union supports the idea.
CHAPTER 6
Analyzing
Medio Editorials
6-1 ANALYZING REASONING EXPRESSED

IN CONTEMPORARY EDITORIAL STYLE
Editorials in tFie media ( ne\\spap)ers. magazines, television, radio, etc.)

unfortunately often contain no reasoning at all. Sometimes they only re-
affirm, perhaps in new same old nonconiroversial views

restatements, the
that almost everyone already holds (for instance, the desirability of good
government, peace, prosperity, etc.). And when editorialists do "argue
for" (that is. endorse) a view that is controversial or "political." they often
merely make assertions expressing their opinions, without ever trying to

support their statements with real reasoning or argumentation. Ob\ iously.
of course, if an editorial contains no reasoning or argumentation, then
there is little or no reasoning to analyze and e\ aluate with our methods. We
ourselves might be able to construct some reasoning of our own that tended
to confirm or disprove the editorialist's opinion, and use our methods to
clarify and check the soundness of our own arguments or counterargu-
ments, but. if so, this reasoning is our own contribution to the problem or
issue, rather than the work of the editorialist who merely asserted the
opinion we in\ estigated and tested.
Some better editorials do. however, contain reasoning in which the
author tries to cite reasons supporting or explaining important conclu-
sions. Usually such reasoning is not presented in the methodical, step-by-
step style that characterizes the writings of good mathematicians or phi-
losophers, but instead is presented in an 'editorial style with a form and
'
385
386 Analyzing Media Editorials
pattern of its own, based on the assumed tastes, abilities, interests, and
nK)ti\ations, among other things, of its intended audience. For example,
editorialists may assume that if their audience's attention is not caught and
held by the first paragraph, or perhaps even the first sentence, of their edi-
torial, then the rest of their editorial may be ignored, and never heard or
read at all. So, the writers of such discourses may feel they need to begin
either with a catchy first sentence or with a reference to some recent major
news story or significant current event, and then somehow to connect this
to the rest of their editorial, working from the opening "kicker" to the main
reasoning they wish to present. Thoughtful reflection and logical analysis
may even reveal that their initial catch-phrases or leading ideas are not even
important components of their main arguments at all.
Editorialists have their task further complicated by the flightiness and
fickleness of their audience, which may have a short attention span as well
as limited time and taste for the reading of thoughtful or profoimd edi-
torials. Liveliness, wit, and readability may be more necessary and impor-
tant, from this standpoint, than accuracy, clarity, and rigorous reasoning.
Not only may precision and attention to detail suffer, but editorialists may
find that they need to arrange the sentences in their discourses so that read-
ers feel an easy flow from word to word, idea to idea, in a smooth stream
of consciousness, even if this obscures the reasoning and violates the basic
rules of grouping and ordering of reasons explained in Chapter 1. Edi-
torialists may need to follow such a progression, even when it has the con-
sequence that their audience misses much of the main point, force, and
structure of the editorialist's reasoning. To hold the attention of mass audi-
ences for only a few minutes, for example, an editorialist may need to ar-
range the sentences in his or her discourse so that each begins with the last
word, phrase, or idea of the preceding sentence, even when this is not the
best, clearest, or most logical order of presentation when considered from
the larger standpoint of the overall structure of the reasoning being pre-
sented. And since the audience may have a taste only for what is flashy and
"interesting," and may be "turned off" by careful, thoughtful, clear, step-
bv-step reasoning with a close attention to validity, even the best editorial-
ists may find they can present only the "high lights" of their cases, and
must omit important details, crucial additional assumptions, vital inter-

mediate conclusions, helpful inference indicator words, and sometimes
leave the final conclusion(s) imstated.
Forewarned now of all these special problems, you should be able to
use the analytical tools and methods from previous sections of this text-
book to make a diagram that accurately represents, in a clear form, the rea-
soning in any discourse written in contemporary editorial style. Of course,
you generally cannot use numbers and brackets, as in the simple exercises
387 6-1 Analyzing Reasoning Expressed in Contemporary Editorial Style
in Chapter 1, but must instead use sentences you write yourself to picture
the reasoning, as in Chapter 3.
You should be forewarned that the illustration and some of the exer-
cises for this section involve arguments that are longer and more compli-
cated than most average editorials. My justification for giving you such
complicated examples is that if you can handle the most difficult cases,
you certainly will be able to deal adequately with any simpler cases as well.
Some students, and even some logicians, unfortunately, do not want to
work on long, complicated examples of reasoning in natural language.
They only want to work on short, simple examples of reasoning. This is
unfortunate because the solutions to many complex human problems as —
well as many of the deepest and most profoundly beautiful theoretical in-
sights known to the human mind —
are reached and understood only
through long and complex reasoning. To restrict our logical inquiries and
investigations to short, simple reasoned discourses would result in a great
impoverishment.
A Very Complicated Example

Consider the following discourse from a T\' editorial (paragraph
numbers added for ease of reference):
1 Our thinking about inflation is paralyzed by a cliche. It is. as repeated by

Mr. Roy .\sh today: Inflation is too complex to understand and there are no
easy answers.
2 I beg to argue that it is not complex and there are answers.
3 The trouble is: too much money in the system chasing too few goods and
services. So prices keep going up.
'^
There is too much money mainly because too many are getting more
income than their production justifies.
5 They get too much because they get from Congress subsidies, as in
. . .
shipping and a hundred other industries tax breaks as in oil and a

. . .
thousand other industries . rulings by regulatory agencies allowing arti-

. .
ficially high prices, as in trucking and other industries.

6 Probably most industriesof any size are featherbedded by favors, allowed to
be inefficient and to take more from the national pie than they contribute.
^ A solution is combing out of inefficient industries, stopping their breaks,
subsidies, and fixed prices. .Make them earn their way in free competition.
8 Of course many of them would fail without artificial help. They won't let
that happen while they have clout with Congress.
9 The cause of inflation is not complexity. It is want of political courage. It
will remain as long as our politicians depend on special interests to get and
hold office.
"Commentary" by Howard K. Smith. ABC

Evening Sews, September 3. 1974.
388 Analy/ing Media Editorials
This discourse clearly intends to present an argument, but what exactly

is it?
ing the discourse as a whole and approaching it generally, I be-

\'ie\\
gin by trying to arrive at an overall idea of the author's reasoning. In par-

ticular, first I try to determine the author's basic reasons and final conclu-
sions, then I sketch a tentative diagram of the reasoning, and finally I try
to fill in the details.

In looking for intended final conclusions in this editorial, the first
statement that catches my eye is the sentence (paragraph 2) "I beg to argue
that it not that complex, and there are answers." If I were
[inflation] is
analyzing this discourse in a mechanical and unthinking manner, I might

gather from this sentence that one main conclusion of the reasoning is sup-
posed to be "inflation is not that complex" and "there are answers." But
this interpretation would be mistaken, because the rest of the reasoning
does not focus on the issue of whether inflation is simple or complex; in
fact, the author hardly talks about the question of simplicity versus com-
plexity. Instead, he talks mostly about what he thinks the causes of infla-
tion are, and what can (and should) be done to stop inflation. The bit of talk
about whether inflation is too complex to understand turns out to be a
misleading clue. It functions mainly to make a transition from the open-
ing catch-line (referring to Roy Ash's statement that day) to the editorial-
ist's own thoughts about inflation.
However, the end of this same sentence in paragraph 2 ("and there are
answers") points us in the right direction. We can expect one of the author's
main points to be "there are answers [tothe problem of inflation]" and to
suggest what these answers are. This he does in paragraph 7:
A solution is combing out of inefficient industries, stopping their breaks,

subsidies, and fixed prices. Make them earn their way in free competition.
Here the word "solution" performs the same function as the word "an-
swer." This proposed "combing out of inefficient industries ."is part of . .
the answer the author offers to the problem of inflation.

For convenience, I will rewrite paragraph 7 as a single complete sen-
tence giving the author' s proposed solution, using square brackets to show
the words I have added to make the author's meaning clearer. Here is the
paragraph as rewritten:
A solution [to the problem of inflation] is combing out of inefficient indus-

tries,stopping their [tax] breaks, subsidies, and fixed prices, and making
them earn their way in free competition.
Does the author give any reasons for thinking that doing these things
would solve the problem of inflation? Yes, in paragraphs 3-6 he offers a
detailed explanation of what he believes are the causes of inflation, before

suggesting (in paragraph 7) that his proposed solution would work by re-
moving those causes. Speaking of inflation, he says:
3 is: too much money in the system chasing too few goods and
The trouble
services. So prices keep going up.
4 There is too much money mainly because too many are getting more
5 They get too much because they get from Congress subsidies, as in . . .
shipping and a hundred other industries tax breaks as in oil and a

. . .
thousand other industries rulings by regulatory agencies allowing arti-

. . .
ficially high prices, as in trucking and other industries.

6 Probably most industries of any size are featherbedded by favors, allowed to
take more from the national pie than they contribute.
These sentences can be viewed as causal reasoning giving an explanation

of how, according to this author, "inefficient industries, tax breaks, sub-
sidies, and fixed prices" lead to, or cause, inflation. The chain of events
that the author says leads to inflation is as follows. His basic idea is that
"too many [industries] get more income than their production justifies"
and this happens, he says, because "most industries of any size are feather-
bedded by favors, allowed to be inefficient and to take more from the na-
tional pie than^th^y contribute." This can be diagrammed as follows:
Probably most industries of any size are

featherbedded by favors, allowed to be
inefficient and to take more from the
national pie than they contribute.
i
Too many [industries] are getting more income
than their production justifies; they get too
much [income].
As examples of industries allegedly "featherbedded by favors," the author

cites several instances:
. . . and a hundred other industries

subsidies, as in shipping tax breaks as . . .
and a lliousand other industries

in oil rulings by regulatory agencies al-
. . .
lowing artificially high prices, as in trucking and other industries.
These cases could simply be added as examples to the general statement

they illustrate and support, as follows:

390 Analysing Media Editorials
natif)nal pic than they contribute (for

example, subsidies, as in shipping; tax
breaks, as in oil; rulings by regulatory
agencies allowing artificially high prices,
as in trucking and other industries).
1/
Too many [industries] are getting more
income than their production justifies;
they get too much [income].
Or can be viewed as specific examples that support the

belter, these cases
author's general claim that "probably most industries of any size are feath-
erbcddcd by favors, allowed to be inefficient and to take more from the na-
tional pie than they contribute." This can be diagrammed as follows:
DIAGRAM A
[There are] subsidies, as in shipping and
a hundred other industries, tax breaks as
in oil and a thousand other industries,
and rulings by regulatory agencies allowing
artificially high prices, as in trucking
and othei industries.

inefficient to take more from the

What has this consequence (of "too many getting more income than their
l^roduction justifies") got to do with inflation? In paragraphs 3 and 4 the
authoi says that this causes inflation:
The trouble is: too much money in the system chasing too few goods
and services. So prices keep going up.
There is too much money mainly because too many are getting more
391 6-1 Analyzing Reasoning Expressed m Contemporary Editorial Style
The explanation offered by the author apparently has the following

structure:
Too many [industries] are getting more income

than their production justifies; they get too
much [income].
There is too much money in the system chasing

too few goods and services.
Prices keep going up.
Combining this diagram with the author's explanation, in Diagram A. of

why too many industries allegedly are "getting more income than their
production justifies" yields the following larger diagram which I shall
call Diagram B.
DIAGR.\M B
[There are] subsidies, as in shipping and
-a hundred other industries, tax breaks as in
oil and a thousand other industries, and
rulings by regulatory agencies allowing
artificially high prices, as in trucking
and other industries.

featherbedded by fa\ors, allowed to be

i
There is too much money in the system
chasing too few goods and services.
Prices keej) going up.

Diagram B shows how ihe author tries to trace the causes of inflation back
to special treatments, tax breaks, subsidies, etc. How do these causes relate
to his proposed solution to the problem of inflation? Well, if (as the author
claims) the cause of inflation is subsidies, tax breaks, favorable rulings,
and other circumstances that allow certain industries "to be inefficient
and to take more from the national pie than they contribute," then a solu-
tion to the problem of inflation would be removing these causes that is, —
"combing out of inefficient industries, stopping their tax breaks, subsidies,
and fixed prices, and making them earn their way in free competition."
This follows logically simply by the principle that to eliminate a problem,
one should remove its causes. One of the many ways in which this reason-
ing could be diagrammed is shown in Diagram C. Here the two sentences
in the author's seventh paragraph have been joined together into one con-
cluding sentence. Notice the square brackets enclosing words and sentences
that were not explicitly contained in the original discourse.
DIAGRAM C
[Inflation is being caused by subsidies, [To prevent or stop
tax breaks, and special treatment one must
a situation,
of industries by regulatory agencies, terminate the causes
+
allowing them to be inefficient and of that situation.]
to take more from the national pie
than they contribute.]
A solution [to the problem of inflation] is combing

out of inefficient industries, stopping their [tax]
breaks, subsidies, and fixed prices [and making]
Diagram D shows another equally good way to create a diagram of

this {)art of the reasoning.
DIAGRAM D (Alternative of C)
[When industries are given subsidies, [To eliminate

tax breaks, and special treatment one must
a situation,
-I-
by regulatory agencies, remove the causes
allowing them to be of that situatic:)n.]
inefficient and to take more from
the national pic than they
contribute, then inflation occurs,
and this is happening right now
in the picst ni case.]
393 6-1 Analyzing Reasoning Expressed m Contemporary Editorial Style
Diagram D (cont'd.)
I
A solution [to the problem of inflation] is combing
out of inefficient industries, stopping their [tax]
breaks, subsidies, and fixed prices [and making]
Diagrams C and D are equallygood alternatixes, but to condense the fol-

lowing discussion. I will use Diagram C.
How is the reasoning in Diagram C related to the reasoning in Dia-

gram B, the long serial causal explanation that leads from "subsidies, tax
breaks, and rulings by regulatory agencies allowing artificially high prices"
to the consequence of inflation? Well, the long serial causal chain of rea-
soning in Diagram B showed (allegedly) that inflation is caused by the
favored treatment of industries, which allows them to be inefficient and
to take more from the national pie than they contribute. That is. the causal
explanation attempted to justify the claim about the causes of inflation
that appears as oneôf the basic reasons shown on the top left of Diagram
C (and also on the top left of Diagram D). In other words, this causal ex-
planation supports the top left reason in Diagram C (and also D). We can
show this bv combining Diagrams B and C. using a box. as shown in Dia-
gram E. The causal explanation is put in a box with an arrow drawn from
the whole box to the conclusion that "Inflation is being caused by sub-
sidies, etc.," because this conclusion is supported by the explanatory rea-
soning in the box The author s whole explanation of the causes of inflation
. '
is put inside the box because he gives that entire line of reasoning to sup-
port this conclusion. And the top of the box is left open (rather than closed)
because the rest of the author's argument depends not merely on the va-
lidity of the causal reasoning in the box, but also on the truth of its basic
assumptions.
An equally acceptable alternative way to represent this part of the au-
thor's argument would be to let the instances of the word "because' in the
original discourse' appear inside or as part of some of the whole sentences
in the diagram purely as causal statements (instead of replacing these in-
stances of because' with arrows, as was done in Diagrams B and E). So.
for example, reasoning also could be represented
this part of the author's
as shown in Diagram F. Although there has been considerable free rewrit-
ing in the top portion of Diagram F, I ha\e omitted square brackets for
clarity and because my sentences merely say in different words what was
contained explicitly in the original discourse.
DIAGRAM K (B and C Combined)

fThcic are] subsidies, as in shipping
and hundred other industries, tax breaks
a
as in oiland a thousand other industries,
and rulings by regulatory agencies allowing
artilic ially high prices, as in trucking
and other industries.

by favors, allowed to be
feat her bedded
Tofi many [industries] are getting more

There is too much money in the system

chasing too few goods and ser\ ices.
Prices keep going up.
[Inflation is being caused by subsidies, [To pre\ent or stop a

tax breaks, and special treatment situation, one must
+
of industries by regulatory terminate the causes
agencies, allowing them to be of that situation.]
inefficient and to take more from
the national pie then they contribute.]
A solution [to the problem of inflation] is
combing out of inefficient industries,

stopping their [tax] breaks, subsidies, and
fixed prices [and making] them earn their
way in free competition.
DIAGRAM F (Alternative of E)
Shipping Oil Trucking
Inflation is There is too much Too many industries get

being caused money chasing too more money than their
by too few goods and services production justifies
much money because too many because of subsidies,
chasing + industries are getting + tax breaks, and rulings
too few more income than their by regulatory agencies
goods and production justifies that allow artificially
services. (they are taking "more high prices.
from the national pie
than thev contribute").
[Inflation is being caused by subsidies, [To pre\ent or stop a

tax breaks, and special treatment situation, one must
of industries by regulatory terminate the causes
+
agenciesTallowing them to be of that situation.]
inefficient .ancf to take more from
the national pie than they contribute.]
A solution [to the problem of inflation] is
combing out of inefficient industries,

stopping their [tax] breaks, subsidies, and
fixed prices [and making] them earn their
way in free competition.
The reasoning in this discourse can be diagrammed equally well in several

possible ways, and the ways shown in Diagiam E and in Diagram F are
both acceptable. Howexer, m\ own preference is Diagram E.
The diagrams constructed so far represent the reasoning in the part
of the discourse enclosed in dotted lines:
1 Our thinking about inflation is paralyzed by a cliche. It is, as repeated by

Mr Roy Ash today: Inflation is too complex to understand and there are no
easy answers.
2 I beg to argue that it is not complex and there are answers.
3 The trouble is: too much money in the system chasing too few goods and
So prices keep going up.
services.
4 There is too much money mainly because t(jo many are getting more
5 They get too much because they get from Congress . . . subsidies, as in
shipping and a hundred other industries ... tax breaks as in oil and a
thousand other industries rulings by regulatory agencies allowing arti-
. . .
fic ially high prices, as in trucking and other industries.
<> Probably most industries of any size are featherbedded by favors, allowed to
be inefficient and to take more from the national pie than they contribute.
'
.\ solution is combing out of inefficient industries, stopping their
breaks, subsidies, and fixed prices. Make them earn their way in free
(ompetition.
8 Of course many of them would fail without artificial help. They won't let
that happen while they have clout with Congress.
9 Ihe cause of inflation is not complexity. It is want of political courage. It
will remain as long as our politicians depend on special interests to get and
hold office.
What about paragraphs 8 and 9? What role do they play in the author's
argument?
Examining these last two paragraphs, we find statements that go on
to assert, among other things, that many of these allegedly inefficient,
featherbedded industries "would without artificial help," that "They
fail
won't let that happen while they have clout with Congress," and that in-
flation "will remain as long as our politicians depend on special interests
to get and hold office." How are these statements logically related to each
other and to the rest of the discourse? The answer to this question, I think,
is that the author is giving the first two as a partial explanation or justifi-
cation for the third, in reasoning that can be sketched as shown in Dia-
gram G.
DIAGRAM G
Many of [these [Inefficient, featherbedded
inefficient industries dependent on
featherbedded special favors] won't let
industries dependent [themselves fail due to the
on special favors] elimination of artificial
woidd fail without help] while they have
artificial help clout with Congress.
(i.e., subsidies,
tax breaks, etc.).
[Inflation] will remain as long as our

pcjlitic ians depend on special interests
to get and hold office.
How does this reasoning relate to the rest of the argument? Well, the author
previously concluded that "A
solution [to the problem of inflation] is
combing out of inefficient industries, stopping their [tax] breaks, sub-
sidies, and fixed prices [and making] them earn their way in free compe-
tition," and now he goes on to say that many of these allegedly inefficient.
featherbedded industries would fail if this proposed solution Avere put into
effect, and that "they won't let that happen while they have clout with
Congress." From this it seems to follow that as long as they have clout with
Congress, these industries will not let the author's proposed solutions be
put into effect, and. hence, inflation will continue. This reasoning is
sketched in Diagram H.
DIAGRAM H
A solution [to the Many of [these [hiefficient
problem of inefficient, featherbedded
inflation] is featherbedded industries
combing out of industries dependent on
inefficient dependent on special favors]
industries, + special fa\ors] + won't let
stopping, their would fail [themsehes fail
[tax] breaks, without due to the

subsidies, and artificial help elimination of
fixed prices [and (subsidies, tax artificial help]
making] them earn breaks, etc.). while they have
their way in free clout with
competition. Congress.
[Inflation will remain as long as inefficient

industries have clout with Congress.]
Logically, this reasoning seems to hang together moderately well, but its
final conclusion ("Inflation will remain as long as inefficient industries
have clout with Congress") is not the same as the conclusion stated in the
last paragraph of, the author's original discourse, or in the previous Dia-
gram G, namely, that "It [inflation] will remain as long as our politicians
depend on special interests to get and hold office." How could the conclu-
sion about inflation remaining as long as these industries ha\ e "clout with
Congress' be related logically to the other conclusion about inflation re-
maining as long as politicians depend "on special interests to get and hold
office"? What additional assumption is needed to raise the degree of sup-
port of the following step of reasoning?
[Inflation \v ill itniain as long as + ? ?
intnicicnt indusirtcs have (lout

with Clonal ess.]
[Inllaiion] will remain as long as

out politicians depend on special
interests to get and hold office.
()l)\ iously, some additional assumption is required to the effect that "Inef-
ficient industries will have clout with Congress as long as our politicians
depend on spec ial interests to get and hold office." Putting this in square
brackets and linking it as an additional reason to the preceding diagram
yields the following:
[hiflaii(Mi will [hiefficient industries will

remain as long as have clout with Congress as
inefficient + long as our politicians
industries ha\e depend on special interests
clout with Congress] to get and hold office.]
[hiflaticjn] will remain as long as oin politicians

depend on special interests to get and hold office.
Since the top left basic reason in this diagram is the same as the final con-
clusion in Diagram H, these two diagrams now can be joined. The result is
shown in Diagram I.
DIAGRAM I (G and H Combined)

A solution [to the Many of [these [Inefficient
problem of inflation] inefficient, featherbedded
is combing out of featherbedded industries
inefficient industries, industries dependent on
stopping their [tax] dependent on special favors]
breaks, subsidies, and special favors ] + won't let [themselves
fixed prices [and would fail fail due to the
making] them earn without elimination of
their way in free artificial help artificial help]
competition. (subsidies, tax while they have
breaks, etc.). clout with Congress.
^
Diagram I (cont'd.)
i
[Inflation remain
\\ill [Inefficient industries will
as long as inefficient have clout with Congress
industries have clout as long as our politicians
+
:\uh Congress.] depend on special interests
to get and hold office.]
[Inflation] ^\ ill remain as long as our politicians

Diagram E showed how the long causal explanation (lead-

Earlier,
ing, you'll remember, from subsidies, tax breaks, and special favors for
inefficient industries to the result of inflation) allegedly supported the
conclusion that "A solution [to the problem of inflation] is combing out
of inefficient industries, stopping their [tax] breaks, subsidies, and fixed
prices [and makirig] them earn their way in free competition." Since this
same statement appeared as a basic reason in Diagram I (on the top left),
the two diagrams can be joined to produce a single diagram that ties all
the author's reasoning together, as shown in Diagram J.
DIAGRAM J (E and I Combined)

[There are] subsidies, as in shipping and a hundred other
industries, tax breaks as in oil and a thousand other industries,
and ruHngs by regulatory agencies allownig artificially high
prices, as in trucking and other industries.
i
Probably most industries of any size are featherbedded by
favors, allowed to be inefficient and to take more from the
i
Too many [industries] are getting more income than their
production justifies; they get too much [income].
i
There is too much money in the system chasing too few goods
and services.
i
Prices keep .going up.
400 Aiialy/ing Media Editorials
Diagram J (cont'd.)
[Inflation
I
being caused b\ subsidies, tax
is [To prevent or
breaks, and special treatment of industries stop a situation,
by regulatory agencies, allowing them to be + one must terminate
inefficient and to take more from the the causes of
national pie than they contribute.] that situation.]

breaks, subsidies, and + special favors] + won't let [themselves
fixed prices [and would fail fail due to the
[Inflation will remain [Inefficient industries wîll have

as long as inefficient clout with Congress as long as our
+
industries have clout politicians depend on special
with Congress.] interests to get and hold office.]
[Inflation] will remain as long as our politicians

The square brackets show parts that were added to the author's original
discourse to fill in the reasoning.
Alternative Possible Diagrams
In examples like this editorial, where one must write (or rewrite) the
author's sentences and add omitted parts to the diagram, different analysts
may end up with diagrams that differ from one another in the sentences
they contain but arc equally defensible and acceptable as representations
of the author's leasoning. For example, if Diagram I were combined with
DIAGRAM K (F and I Combined)
Shipping Oil Trucking
Inflation There is too much

\
Too many
y /
industries get
iscaused money chasing too more money than their
by too few goods and services production justifies
much money because too many because of subsidies,
chasing industries are getting tax breaks, and rulings
+ +
too few more income than their by regulatory agencies
goods and production justifies that allow artificially
services. (they are taking "more high prices.
from the national pie
than thev contribute").
[Inflation is being caused by subsidies, tax [To prevent or

breaks, and special treatment of industries stop a situation,
by regulatory agencies, allowing them to be + one must terminate
and to take more from the
inefficient the causes of
national pie than they contribute.] that situation.]

breaks, subsidies, and + special favors] + won't let [them-
fixed prices [and would fail selves fail due to the
[Inflation will remain [Inefficient industries will ha\e

as long as inefficient clout with Congress as long as our
+
industries have clout politicians depend on special
with Congress.] interests to get and hold office.]
[Inflation] will remain as long as our politicians depend on

special interests to get and hold office.
102 AnaK/iiin Media Editorials
the slightly ditiercnt Diagram F (which was shown another pos-

earlier as
sibleway of representing the first part of the author's argument), rather

than with E, then the final result would be the slightly different Diagram
K. Diagram K is also acceptable as a representation of the author's reason-
ing, rhe two different diagrams are more or less equivalent.
Leftover Sentences
Looking back at the original text of this editorial, we see five state-
ments that have not appeared so far in any of the diagrams:
1. "Our thinking about inflation is paralyzed by a cliche. (In first paragraph)

2. "h [this cliche] is. asrepeated by Mr. Roy Ash today: Inflation is too com-
plex to understand, and there are no easy answers." (In first paragraph)
3. "I beg to argue that it is not that complex, and there are answers." (In sec-
ond paragraph)
4. "The cause of inflation is not complexity." (In ninth paragraph)
5. "It [the cause of inflation] isa want [lack] of political courage." (In ninth
paragraph)
It isalways good to review any leftover sentences to make certain that noth-
ing important to the author's reasoning has been omitted from the dia-
gram by mistake. Statement 1 ("Our thinking about inflation is paralyzed
by a cliche") seems to be a psychological claim for which the author never
really argues. He merely uses it as an opener, an "attention-getter," or
catchy introduction to the rest of the discourse, so this sentence safely can
be left out of the diagram. Statement 2 simply says that a certain historical
event (an act of speaking by Mr. Ash) took place, and seems not to be a
component in his reasoning. This particular quotation serves as a "foil" for
the author's argument. He sets it up like a bowling pin in order to refute it
or knock it down. But statement 2 itself does not serve as a basic reason or
conclusion in the author's positive argument. So it can be omitted from
the diagram also.
The author's reasoning as so far reconstructed could perhaps be view ed
as supporting what is claimed in statement 3, that inflation "is not that
complex, and there are answers." This interpretation could be diagrammed
by putting either Diagram J or K in a box with an arrow leading to the con-
clusion that "Inflation is not that complex, and there are answers." This
would not be wrong, but since it would tend to obscure what seem to be
the author's main points (namely, the particular sohuion he recommends
to the problem of inflation and its relationship to the dependency of poli-
ticians on special interests to get and hold office), it seems acceptable and
perhaps preferable not to bother to do this. Probably sentence 3 is better
viewed instead simply as a kind of "logical topic sentence," introducing
the reader to the reasoning that follows.
Sentence 4. which says "The cause of inflation is not complexity,"
does not seem to be a reason or conclusion either. Of course, if someone in-
sisted, I suppose that this could be taken as a divergent final conclusion
incidentally supported by our supplied intermediate conclusion that "Infla-
tion is being caused by subsidies, tax breaks, and special treatment of
industries by regulatory agencies, allowing them to be inefficient and to
take more money from the national pie than they contribute," arguing that
if the cause of inflation is subsidies, tax breaks, etc., then the cause is not
complexity. One could do this by diagramming the reasoning as diverging

at this intermediate conclusion, with one arrow leading to this side con-
clusion and the other arrow leading, as shown in Diagrams J and K, to the
author's proposed solution and the rest of the line of reasoning already
diagrammed.
Similarly, one could try to fit sentence 5, "The cause of inflation is a
want diagram as another final conclusion
of political courage," into the
in a divergent argument. This could be done by adding to the diagram the
further additional a'ssumption that a lack of political courage is itself, in
turn, the cause of the subsidies, tax breaks, and other alleged favorable treat-
ment of inefficient industries. This reasoning could be diagrammed as
follows:
[Subsidies, tax breaks, [Inflation is being caused

and special treatment by subsidies, tax breaks,
of industries by and special treatment of
regulatory agencies are + industries by regulatory
caused by a lack of agencies, allowing them to
political courage.] be efficient and to take
more from the national pie
than they contribute.]
[The cause of inflation] is a want [lack]

of political courage.
If one wished to add this to Diagram J or Diagram K, it, wotrld appear as
another final conclusion in a divergent argument, as shown in Diagram L.

101 Aiialv/ins Mt-dia Kditorials
DIAGRAM L
(Tof) part of this diagram is the same
as shown in Diagram J or Diagram K.)
[Siibsiclifs, [Inflation is [Inflation is [To prevent

tax breaks, being caused being caused or stop a
and special by subsidies, by subsidies, situation
iicaimt'iH tax breaks, tax breaks, one must
ol indiisiiics + and special and special + terminate
by regulatory treatment of treatment of the causes
agencies are industries industries of that
caused by a by regulatory by regidatory situation.]
lack of agencies, agencies,
political allowing them allowing them
courage.] to be to be
inefficient inefficient
and to take and to take
more from more from
the national the national
pie than they pie than they
cc^n tribute.] contribute.]
\|/
[The cause of inflation] is the A solution [to

want of political courage. the problem of
inflation] is
combing out of
inefficient (Same
industries. as
stopping their + shown
[tax] breaks. in
subsidies, and Diagram J
fixed prices or
[and making] Diagram K.)
them earn
their way in
free competition.
(Same as shown in Diagram J

orDiagram K.)
Another possible analysis, corresponding to a different possible interpre-

tation, might represent sentence 5 as somehow following from the main
conclusion that "Inflation will remain as long as our politicians depend
on special interests to get and hold office."' The author mav have in mind
the assumption that the problt-m ot politicians depending on "special in-
terests to get and hold office" is caused by a lack of the political courage
necessary to change this situation, and he may be concluding from this that
a lack of political courage is the original root cause of the inflation prob-
lem. This interpretation is diagrammed a^ >ho^\ n m Diagram M.
DIAGRAM M
(Same as shown in
Diagram J or Diagram K.
I
[hiflation] will [A lack of political courage
remain as long as is the cause of the
our politicians continued existence of the situation

depend on special of our {X)liticians depending on
interests to get special interests to get and
and hold office. hold office.]
ii
[The cause of inflation] is a
want of political courage.
This interpretation represents Statement 5 from the "leftovers" list as the

final conclusion of the main line of reasoning. Since the author nowhere
explicitlv clarifies the exactway in ^^ hich Statement 5 relates logically to
the rest of the reasoning, different analyses at this point are possible.
The problems encountered with Statement 3 illustrate some impor-
tant points. Statement 5, which quite possibly was intended by the author
as a final conclusion, ended up on my list of "leftover sentences" due to

mv failure to incorporate it in m\ initial ^ketches for the diagram. This
does not show a defect in the method: on the contrary, it shoAvs how the
method can compensate for human failure. This oversight was discovered
and corrected by the step of listing and reviewing every sentence in the dis-
course that had not been incorporated in the diagram constructed up to
that point. This also shows the wisdom, when doing wholistic analysis, of
making a list of "lefto\er sentences"' and checking through it as a final
step to make sure that no part of the reasoning has been omitted from the
diagrams. This final step of self-correction helps to comjênsaie for human
errors by exposing parts ot the reasoning that may ha\ e been overlooked in
previous, more intuitive steps. Of course, a different analyst, encountering
the same discomse, might ha\e begim by incorporating Statement 5 in an
initial sket( h of the reasoning— but then too, of course, a different analyst
might initially have overlooked some other component of the argument. So,
always is wise to check through the list of "leftover sentences" as a final
it
precaution in wholistic analysis, for in doing so, you may detect some rea-
son or conclusion that was overlooked in your previous diagrams.
Remember too. of course, that the final conclusions frequently are
not the most important statements in the reasoning. The aim of diagram-
ming is not to discover the major points of rhetorical emphasis in a dis-
course, but to expose the actual inner structure of the reasoning for the pur-
pose of subsequently evaluating its soundness. Also, the aim of analysis is
not to make the reasoning appear more convincing or look better than it
really is. On the contrary, our aim is to lay open and expose any faults or
weaknesses that may exist in it, to facilitate criticism, and to discover the
truth. Also perhaps it should be mentioned that this illustration was espe-
cially selected in part because it contains much more reasoning than most
editorials contain. (In fact, many editorials contain no reasoning whatso-
ever.)
ExercisesB and C contain more reasoning than the average editorial
so be prepared to spend some time working on them. Remember that
a reasoned discourse has not been fully understood until you have rec-
ognized all the logical Ci^nnections.
EXERCISES 6-1A
Diagram the reasoning in the following letters to editors. Use sentences you write
yourself to express the author's reason(s) and conclusion(s), but do not stray excessively
far from the original wording in the discourse. Put your diagrams on separate sheets of
paper.
From Darwin P. Moradiellos, "\o\v Soviets Want to Freeze Nuclear Arms," Letters to the Editor,
The Tampa Tribune (October 16. 1982), p. 15-A. Cols. & 2. 1
A-1. TAMPA — According to a recent news article in the Tribune, Soviet authori-
ties have all but destroyed the dissident movement [in the U.S.S.R.]. The organi-
zation that was formed to monitor Soviet compliance with the 1975 Helsinki
Human Rights Accord has been forced to suspend its activities by the Kremlin.
This development shows once again the Soviet Union is a totalitarian state
that does not allow any independent political activity on the part of its citizens.
Such being the case, it follows that Soviet citizens who are involved in the interna-
tional nuclear freeze movement are necessarily carrying out the wishes of their
government.
The coupling of the nuclear freeze campaign to the Kremlin is its big flaw.
In order for such a movement to have credibility, it must be independent of govern-
ments on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
From Edward & Bonnie Flowers, "More Urban Nude Beaches," Letters to the Editor, The Tampa
Tribune Times (December 26, 1982), p. 2-C, Cols. 1 & 2.
A-2. VV'e would with you a reason why clothing-optional beaches

like to share
should be allowed and supported by elected officials and citizens.
The more wealthy who choose to do so have practiced nudity in courtyards,
enclaves, private spas, and Even ex-President Lyndon John-
costly nudist clubs.
son and Billy Graham have admitted to swimming nude in the White House
swimmmg pool. If the wealthy and well-known can go nude then why not the av-
erage citizen?
But what about those at the bottom of the economic ladder? Where can they
enjoy the freedom and naturalness of nudity? They have no opportunity to prac-
tice nudity, which incidentally is a God-given option. And yet, of all of us, they
are the most deserving of that opportunity. For in nudism, the differences of birth
and fortune are most effectively erased.
So, it is not enough to work for clothing-optional beaches in isolated places
farremoved from the central cities. Equal opportunity requires that we work for
them at all public beaches and as close to the central city as possible for easy access.
407
—
EXERCISE 6-1B
Diagram the reasoning in the following editorial. Use sentences you write yourself to
express the author's reason (s) and conclusion (s), but do not stray excessively far
fronn the original wording in the discourse. Put your diagram on a separate sheet of
paper.
From Carl T. Rowan, "U.S. South Africa Stand Denounced," editorial, ? 1981, Field Enterprises,
Inc. Courtesy of Field Newspaper Syndicate.
A liberal outlook
U.S. South Africa stand denounced

By CARL ROWAN
WASHINCiTOX — Vou pass an fectively took the side of the white
aile\ where a huge man is using a minority which has the weapons, the
pound the life out of a frail
stick to dogs, the police, the other instru-
woman, and you say that it is just a ments of oppression.
domestic quarrel, so you are not go- Crocker revealed the truth about
ing to take sides. this administration's "human rights"
But in refusing to "take sides" you policy: Its concern about racial op-
have taken the side of the huge man pression, police-state brutality, denial
with the lethal stick. of the rignts of workers and the peo-
You see the Nazis throwing Jews ple in general, is always going to give
into concentration camps and gas way to its "pragmatic" concerns
chambers, but you decide that be- about getting and keeping the miner-
cause you have btisiness interests in als and raw resources of other lands,
Germany you "wont choose between or its blanket claim that it is "stop-
the Aryans and the Jews." ping world communism."
This kind of "morality" is re- Crocker told an American Legion
surgent in America. Members of the convention (a choice of audience
Reagan administration watch South surely inspired by the gods) that in
Africa's armed police with guard South Africa, "We cannot and will
dogs raid a wretcned squatter's camp not permit our hand to be forced to
of some 400 black women and chil- align ourselves with one side or
dren, leaving them naked to the cold another ... In this rich land of tal-
winter night rains of Cape Town ented and diverse peoples, important
the apartheid regime's w ay of assert- Western economic, strategic, moral
ing that the blacKS are "illegally in a and political interests are at stake."
white area"; they watch South Africa True, all these interests are at stake
spirit away without charge, or official in South Africa. The land has been
announcement, blacks who vocally strategically located, the diamonds,
oppose brutal racial discrimination, gold and other minerals have been
those blacks to be beaten and some- there since before there was a United
times murdered; they watch South States. The Reagan administration
Africa impose the grimmest of has come up with nothing new ex-
police-state punishments on whites cept the extremely dangerous notion
brave enough to oppose apartheid that the way to guarantee permanent
openly. But the Reagan administra- access to those minerals and other
tion still says: "In South Africa, the resources is to crawl with moral
region's largest country, it is not our nakedness into bed with the most
task to choose between black and brutal racists in the world. . . .
white." In the pretense of "waging the

With those words so lacking in global struggle," this country is be-
morality as to make a jackal puke, coming an international moral leper.
Chester A. Crocker, the assistant sec- That will not serve the needs of man-
retary of state for African affairs, ef- kind anywhere. (Copyright)
Hint: A good diagram can be made using about eight arrows, including three linked steps, and
about twelve reasons and conclusions.
409
EXERCISE 6-1C
Diagram the reasoning the following editorial. Use sentences you write yourself
in
to express the author's reason (s) and conclusion (s), but do not stray excessively far
from the original wording of the discourse. Put your diagram (s) on a separate sheet
of paper.
From Ladd Hamilton, editorial, Lewiston Morning Tribune (November 26, 1981). p. D-1:
The symbol of
a bankrupt policy
The Reagan administration evidently is based on false assumptions and partly because
convinced that there a military answer to
is it ties American fortunes to the losing side. The
the social and political ferment in Central and military tyrannies probably are doomed in Latin
South America. The Defense Department has America, and the longer the United States con-
created a Caribbean militarv command, upgrad- tinues to support them with money, weapons
ing a small task force President Carter organized and military advisers, the less political influence
in response to reports of that Russian brigade in it going to have in that part of the world after
is
Cuba. the old regimes are gone.

The new Caribbean military command is The U.S. is operating in Nicaragua today just
more symbol than substance, and what it sym- as it did in Cuba at the close of tne revolution
bolizes is a bankrupt American policy in Latin there. Instead of congratulating the Cubans on
America. In the absence of enlightened political having overthrown the tyrant Batista, and form-
action, the United States now seems to have ing useful alliances with the new Cuban govern-
nothing left but the military response. ment, we made Cuba our enemy and forced it
The question the American strategists now into league with the Soviet Union. The Russians
face is now to stop Russian arms and other are now in the western hemisphere almost by
assistance from flowing into Central America invitation. And they probably will increase their
through Cuba in support of dissident factions. influence here by supplying to the new govern-
But whv are these factions accepting Russian ment of Nicaragua the help denied it by the
and Cuban assistance? Because they have been United States.
unable to get it from the United States. The pol- Moreover, the military presence that we pro-
icy of the United States, in fact, has been to pose to substitute for rational political action is a
support the right-wing dictatorships of the area sham. The Joint Chiefs admit there are no bul-
—
against popular uprisings to defend the land- lets in this gun. The new Caribbean military
lords against the tenant farmers, the rich against command is a hollow threat that can only dem-
the poor, military against civilian, all in the onstrate to friend and foe alike how fruitless our
name of anti-communism. policy has been. L.H.—
This policy has failed partly because it was
Hint: Look for four separate lines of argument that all converge on the same final conclusion.
411
CHAPTER 7
Analyzing
Philosophical Reasoning
Fair Warning: This chapter is for philosophers and the bravest students
of logic only.
7-1 ANALYZING LONG 4.INKED ARGUMENTS
Most of the discourses considered in Chapter 1 were analyzable in a simple

one-sentence-after-another fashion. But not all reasoning is like that. Dis-
courses containing extensi\ e linked reasoning, in particular, are especially
difficult to diagram. For in such cases one must not only distinguish rea-
sons from conclusions and connect them properly with arrows, but one
must also correctly represent all logical connections among linked rea-
sons — thatone must worry about getting the plus sign (+) in the proper
is,
places. The difficulty is increased by the fact that writers of long linked ar-
guments frequently give their readers no explicit indication that a conclu-
sion has been reached by a logical combination of two or more reasons.
Often one is able to tell that linking has occurred in such cases only by
noticing that some statement in the discourse would follow logically only
from putting together two statements appearing elsewhere in it. This
means, of course, that some evaluation of the validity of a possible infer-
ence must accompany, or e\en precede, determination of the structure of the
reasoning.
Further complicating the situation, the author may also have failed
down all the assumptions of his or her reasoning. This fact
explicitly to set
may pass unnoticed until every relevant statement in the discourse is put
into a diagram and a hole is noticed where an essential part of the structure
is missing — at which point you may go back and insert obviously sup-
413
Ill Aii.ii\/mt^ Piiii()s()i)lii(;i! Rcasonint;
pressed assumptions (enclosing them in square brackets to show that they

did not api)ear in the oi iginal discourse). Because one should, of course, at-
tribute to an author no more than is required for the reasoning to follow,
evaluation also plays an important role here. So in determining the struc-
ture of linked reasoning in natural language, one must frequently supple-
ment with personal logical insight the mechanical procedures set forth
earlier.
I will illustrate such analysis on a medium-length passage of reason-
ing from the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher, David Hume. As
background, you should know that Hume used the term "impressions" to
refer to "those perceptions [of the human mind] which enter with most
force and violence . . . sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make
their first appearance in the soul," that he used the term "ideas" to refer to
"faint" memory images copied from earlier impressions, and that he pos-
tidaied that "all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from
simple impressicjus, which are correspondent to them, and which they ex-
actly represent." In the following paragraph, which stands at the begin-
ning of a long section oir personal identity in his Treatise of Human Nature,
Hume argues that in fact we have no idea or conception of a "self" (or
"ego") of the sort commonly postulated by other philosophers:
There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately
conscious of what we call our self; that we feel its existence and its continu-
ance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration,
both of its perfect identity and simplicity. . . .
Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experi-
ence which is pleaded for them; ncjr have we any idea of ,vr// after the manner
it is here explained. Fcjr, frcjni what impression could this idea be derived?
This question it is impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction

and absurdity; and yet it is a question which must necessarily be answered if
we would have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible, h must be some
one imi)rcssion tliat gi\'es rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any
one impression but that io which our several impressions and ideas are sup-
posed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that
impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of
our lives: since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no im-
pression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions
and sensations succeed each other and never all exist at the same time. It
cannot therefore be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that
the idea of self is derived; consequently there is no such idea.
Since it was already explained in Chapter how to locate and circle infer-
1
encc- indicatcjrs and enc lose distinct constituent statements within angle
415 /-/ Analyzing Long Linked Arguments
brackets, I begin with these initial steps already completed:
(1) (There are some philosophers who imagine we are at every moment
consciousof what we call out self, and feel its existence and its continuance in
existence, and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of
its perfect identity and simplicity) .... (2) (Unluckily, all these positive
assertions are contrary to that very experiencewhich is pleaded for them);
(3) (we have no idea of self after the manner here explained). (Tor^
(4)(there is no impression from which this idea could be deri\ed). (5)(It is
impossible to explain how such an impression could be obtained without a
manifest contradiction and absurdity); and yet (6)(it must be possible to
explain how such an idea could be derived if we would have the idea of self
pass for clear and intelligible) (7)(It must be . some one impression that gives
rise to every real idea).But (8) (self or person is not any one impression, but
that to which our sexeral impressions and ideas are supposed to ha\e a
reference) (9)(If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression
.
must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives);
([since^ (10)(self is supposed to exist in that manner (that is, in\ariably the
same through the whole course of our lives)). But (1 1)( there is no impression
constant and invariable). (12)(Pain and pleasure, grief and joy. passions and
sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time).
Q Therefore^ ( 1 3)(it cannot be from any of these im pressions, or from any other,
that the idea of self is deri\ed) ; and ônsequenth^ ( 14) ( there is no such idea of
self).
You probably noticed that I added words or changed their order at various
points to form sentences that more I judge
clearly express the statements
intended by the author. This both permissible and desirable.
is
Exactly four inference indicators, "For," "since," "Therefore," and

"consequently," explicitly appear in this discourse. Since the same final
analysis results regardless of the order in which they are considered, I will
treat them in the order in which they appear in the discourse, referring to
them as the "first," "second," "third," and "fourth" inference indicators,
respectively.
In the original unaltered discourse the first indicator, "For," preceded
a question, but since reasons are expressed by statements, I have replaced
Hume's interrogative sentence with a declarative sentence gi\ing what I
take to be intended rhetorical point: "there is no impression from which

its
this idea could be derived." When this is done, the first indicator shows
statement 3 to be supported by this statement (4):
116 Analyzing Philosophical Reasoning
(4) There is no impression from which this
idea [ihat is. an idea of self of the sort

supposed by these philosophers] could be
derived.
(3) We have no idea of self after the

manner here explained [that is. no idea
of self of the sort supposed by certain
philosophers].
It will emerge later that this inference constitutes merely a preliminary

outline of the reasoning to be developed in the rest of the paragraph— sort
of a "logician's topic sentence."
The next inference indicator, "since," shows statement 10 as a reason
for statement 9:
(10) .Self is supposed to exist invariably
the same through the whole course of our

lives.
(9) Ifany impression gives rise to the

idea of self, that impression must continue
invariably the same through the whole

course of our Jives.
Some readers may balk at attributing so questionable an inference to such

a renowned author, but the explicit appearance of the indicator "since"
can scarcely be gainsaid (or in plain talk, this author is so famous one
would expect his reasoning to be better, but the diagram represents ex-
actly what he actually said).
The third indicator in this passage, "Therefore," indicates that state-
ment 13, "It cannot be from any of these impressions [pain, pleasure, grief,
joy, passions or sensations], or from any other, that the idea of self is de-
rived," is a conclusion from something. But from what? Now I must sift
through the preceding sentences to find reasons from which this conclu-
sion might follow. A natural mistake would be to think that this conclu-
sion is drawn from the immediately preceding statement (that is, 12: "Pain
and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other,
and never all exist at the same time"). To eliminate this possibility, I need
417 7-1 Analyzing Long Linked Arguments
only ask myself: Would statement 12 be a good reason for what is asserted
in statement 13 about the source of the idea of self? Not by itself, obviously.
As it stands, statement 12 lists some mental phenomena and says they con-
stantly change; statement 13 says that the idea of self cannot be derived
from "any from any other." In itself, anyway,
of these impressions, or
statement 12 would not seem to justify statement 13. So one must look back
through all the statements preceding 13 to try to find some statement or

combination of statements that would warrant conclusion 13. (Stop reading
for a minute and really do this I)
Upon doing this, one notices that statement 1 1, a uni\ersal generaliza-
tion of which statement 12 cites some specific instances, asserts that no
impression is constant, and that statement 9 asserts that for an impression
to give rise to an idea of self, it must "continue invariably the same through
the whole course of our lives" (that is, be constant). Taking these two state-
ments together, it would follow logicallv that the idea of self is not derived
from any impression:
(9) If any impression gives (11) There is
rise to the idea of self, that no impression

impression must continue -I- constant and
in\ariaMy the same through in\ariable.
the whole course of our li\es.
13) Itcannot be from any . .
impression that the idea

of self is derived.
Notice that 1 ha\e deleted the reference in statement 13 to the impressions

listed instatement 12. (Compare 13 above with the original.) I justify this
rewriting by the principle that whenever restatement clarifies an author's
reasoning, this should be done. In Hume's original presentation, the refer-
ence in 13 to the specific impressions mentioned in 12 misleadingly sug-
gests that the important logical connection is between 12 and 13. (Look at
these statements in the original.) But we have realized that this is not so. So
I have reformulated 13 in a way that expresses what I take to be its meaning
in the original, yet makes it clearer that this conclusion follows from 9
linked with not from 12. In general. I think, whenever you can clean
11,
up an author's formulation of an argument to make it clearer, more ele-
gant, or more directly to the point without changing its sense or altering
the basic line of reasoning, you should feel free to do so.
J
418 An.ii\/iiig IMiilosopliical Reasoning
In tci Ills by citing a number of cases for which

of jusiificalory structure,
it is impressions in statement 12 actually substantiates the
true, the hst of
general claim made in statement 11 that no impression is constant and in-
varial)le. So 12 should be diagrammed as supporting 11:
(12) Pain and pleasure, grief and

joy, passions and sensations succeed
each other and never all exist at the
same time.
(11) There is no impression constant

and invariable.
In general, a series of confirm'.ng examples is diagrammed as a reason for

the generalization it supports. (Always remember, though, that a different
argument which assumptions might proceed in the very
started with other
opposite direction, using an assumed universal statement to support some
claim about certain particular instances.)
The fourth and final inference indicator "consequently" heralds as a
conclusion statement 14, "There is no such idea of self." But here is a prob-
lem: What is the meaning of the adjective "such" in this sentence? Presum-
ably, by the words "such idea of self" the author means an idea of the sort
he earlier characterized as held by certain philosophers, an idea of the self
as something possessing "perfect identity and simplicity" (and, perhaps,
of which "we are at every moment intimately conscious"). I will make this
explicit by placing at the top of the diagram the following definition:
"such" an idea an idea of self as something

of self =ii,i possessing perfect identity
and simplicity
In general, when the repetition of a long phrase would make a diagram cum-
bersome, feel free to with a suitably defined abbreviation.
replace it
Returning to the matter at hand, we have ascertained that statement

14 is a conclusion. But from what? The preceding conclusion, expressed
by statement 13, appears to be the most likely candidate. (Look and see if
you agree.) It asserts that this idea, the idea of self, cannot be derived from
any impression. What further premise, if linked with this, would yield
statement 14 as a conclusion? That is, what could logically replace the
c]uestion marks in the following diagram:
(13) Itcannot be from any . . .
impression that the idea +

of self is derived.
(14) There is no "such" idea of self.
Well, an additional assumption like "Every idea some im- is derived from
pression," or something similar, would do the trick. Bearing this in mind
while re\iewing the discourse, I notice that statement 7 asserts "It must be
some one impression that gives rise to every real idea." This is slightly dif-
ferent than expected, but it is close. Substituting statement 7 for the ques-
tion marks in the abo\e diagram yields the following:
(13) It cannot be from any (7) It must be from some
impression that the one impression that

["such"] idea of self is e\ery real idea is
derived. derixed.
(14) There is no "such idea of self.
Notice that statement 14 fits fairly well in the argument as a conclusion

from statements 13 and 7. For statement 13 claims that there is no impres-
sion from which "such" an idea of self could be derived, and statement 7
says that every real idea we have
our minds must be derived from some
in
one impression.' It follows with deductive validity that we can have no
"such" real idea of self — which is \ery close to what statement 14 says (if we
subtract the qualification "real"). The logical way these statements fit to-
gether strongly supports the hypothesis that this is the correct interpreta-
tion of the author's intended reasoning. Here again, then, an evaluative
judgment supports a particular analytical interpretation. (If a careful
search through the discourse had revealed no statement that combined with
13 warranted 14, hpwever. could ha\e supplied the missing assimip-
I still
tion myself, enclosing it in square brackets and marking it perhaps with an
alphabetical letter to show that it was not explicitly present in the original
discourse.)
'By a "real" idea, apparemly. the author means an idea for which a corresponding realit\ exists thus, —
for example, the idea of a lior.sr is "ical" (since iheie exist animals (oriespoiuling to it), but the idea of
a unicorn is not "real."
J
V20 AnalN/int? Pliilosophical Reasoning
Joining together in one place all the bits and pieces of reasoning
worked out so far, we obtain the following two distinct pieces of reasoning:
"such" an idea an idea of self as something

of self =.1,1 possessing perfect identity
and simplicity
DIAGRAM 1
(4) There is no impression from
whi( h the idea of self could

be derived.
(3) We
\
have no idea of self after the
manner here explained [that is, no
"such" idea].
DIAGRAM 2
(10) Self is supposed to exist invari- (12) Pain, pleasure,

ably the same through the whole etc.
course of our lives.
i
(9) If any impression gi\es rise to the (11) There is no impres-
idea of self, that impression must sion constant and
+
continue the same through the invariable.
whole course of our lives.
(13) Itcannot be from any + (7) It must be from some
impression that such an idea one impression that every

of self is derived. real idea is derived.
(14) There is no such idea of self.
Inspection of these two diagrams reveals, as anticipated earlier, that the

first merely sketches the line of reasoning that the second develops in de-
tail. (Statement 4 is approximately the same as statement 13, and statement

3 says the same as the conclusion, statement 14.) So in subsequent evalua-

tion one can pass over consideration of the first analysis in favor of the
second.
Review of the original discourse reveals yet another inference in the
passage. Look at statements 5 and
Statement 5 asserts the impossibility
6.
of explaining how an impression could be obtained from which "such" an

idea of self could be derived. Statement 6 says it must be possible to explain
how this idea could be obtained if the idea is to be clear and intelligible.
Linked together, these two statements would entail that "such" an idea of
self is not clear and intelligible:
(5) h is impossible to explain (6) If such an idea of self is
how an impression could be clear and intelligible, it
obtained from which such an must be possible to explain

idea of self could be deri\ed. how it could be deri\cd.
(X) [Such an idea of self is not

clear and intelligible.]
(Statements 5 and 6 ha\e been reworded slightly to make the inference

more obvious.) The square brackets around statement X show that it was
not included in the original discourse.
Now how is this reasoning related to the rest of the discourse? Well.
the whole chain of reasoning in Diagram 2 appears designed to show the
impossibility of explaining how "such" an idea of self could be obtained.
For it attempts to show that the explanatory principles accepted by Hume
(together Avith his reasoning) lead to the conclusion that there could be no
such idea — that is. his explanatory assumptions are incompatible with the
existence of any such idea of self. Hencethe existence of such an idea could
not be explained (by principles accepted by Hume) which is exactly what —
statement 5 asserts.
When an entire chain of reasoning (as opposed to just its last line or
final conclusion) is used to justify some claim, this fact is represented in
natural logic by enclosing that entire chain of reasoning in a box and con-
necting it by an arrow to the conclusion it supports. (Similar notation was
used in Chapter 2, Section 4 to diagram "proof by contradiction," "re-
duction to absurdity," and steps of "conditionalization" in reasoning.)
Applying this notation to the present example yields the following final
diagram:
iJ
dia(;ram 3
(5) It is impossible to explain (6) If such an idea of self is
how an impression could be clear and intelligible, it

+
obtained from which such an must be possible to explain
idea of self could be derived. how it could be derived.
(X) [Such an idea of self is not

clear and intelligible.]
So on this analysis, statement X is the omitted final conclusion of .the argn-

ment. (It might he remarked, though, that statement 14, the conclusion
shown in Diagram 2, may actually be all the author requires for his ulti-
mate purposes. If so, of course, a subsequent evaluation that rejected the
reasoning in Diagram 3 but accepted the reasoning in Diagram 2 would
leave his required conclusion standing.) This box is left open at the top
because the basic reasons on which the reasoning in Diagram 2, the rea-
soning in the box, depends are also here assumed by the conclusion (state-
ment 5) drawn from that reasoning.
EXERCISES 7-1A
Diagram the reasoning in the following discourses, showing clearly any linkage. You
may use circled numbers
your diagram (instead of writing out the sentences), pro-
in
vided you show clearly with brackets and numbers the statements you intend in the
discourse. Supply any suppressed premises or omitted conclusions you wish to supply
(but you are not required to supply any).
From "killei Question.' Braheian Debater. Winter (1976). p. 1:
A-1. It exery satellittr must move to remain in orbit, and if earth does not move.
then there cannot be what is called a "geosynchronous" satellite. A geosynchro-
nous satellite apjDears to be motionless in the sky and appears to remain directly
above a certain fixed point on earth.
But geosynchronous satellites exist. Many communications and some weather
satellites are geosynchronous.
But svnchronous satellites are impossible in a theory of a motionless earth.
Therefore, the earth must move I
Hint: Be alert for definitions and rep>etitions of statements.
423
From Louis A. Ptitv. Jr., "Pogo Pinpointed the Enemy in Central America," TampaTribune-
Times (April 8. 1984), p. 5-C. col. 4-5.
A-2. . . . the United States has acted consistently as a status quo anti-revolutionary
power and in so doing has shaped the very societies against which Central Ameri-
cans are in rebellion.
This simple formulation, however, has far-reaching implications, for in pro-
testing against local systems of oppression, Central Americans are in fact rebelling
against the most far-flung and most exposed component of the North American
national system. Revolution in the region, periodic upheaval and protracted
struggle [against United States' forces of intervention] hence become inevitable, for
those systems cannot over the long run both serve as extension of North American
needs and at the same time meet Central American needs. And when client elites
failed to underwrite U.S. hegemony, the result became inevitable intervention.
With whom is the United States at war in Central America? It is, in fact, with
itself, with its past policies, to be more specific.
Htnts: Beware of the first "for.' And use a box to tie in the final (ondusion.
A
425 Exercises 7-1

i2() Aii.iK /int; IMiilosophu .il Reasoning
Iioni SodaU's' aiguincni. piiscnicd In Plato in The Republic, in an original, free adaptation:
A-3. It is possible to prove logically that justice is preferable to injustice — that is,
that il is bt'tUM to be a right-doing person than to be a wrong-doer— and this can
be proven without bringing in anything about claimed rewards or punishments in
an afterlife. The proof is somewhat long, so be patient and pay attention. We be-
gin by defining what we shall mean by "having one's soul in proper order." By
this is meant ha\ ing all three parts of the soul alive and performing their proper
fimciions — that is, the intellective mind, concerned with reasoning; the spirited
element, concerned with pride and winning at competition; and the appetitive
element, concerned with the pursuit of sensory pleasures — all should be alive,
with each part performing its proper function, inc hiding especially the intellec-
tive part, which should be in (barge of making decisions and guiding the other
two parts and learning whic h things are good. (This might be called "ha\ ing your
character and jxisonality properly ordered," or "ha\ing yoinself properly or-
ganized," or even, "ha\ ing your head together properly," but I will call it "having
your soul in propei order.") Now letting "X" represent any person, let us sup-
A
427 Exercises 7-1
pose that X's soul is in proper order. From this supposition it follo^vs that each
part of X"s soul is performing its proper function. And so. in particular, it follows
that X"s intellect is performing its proper function. Biu the intellect's proper func-
tion includes acquiring knowledge (or at least, true belief) about which things are
good. Therefore, the conclusion follows that person X has knowledge (or at least,
true belief) about the good. So therefore, by conditionalization. if person X's soid
is in proper order, then X has knowledge (or true belief) about the good. But also,
if person X's soul is in pfofier order, then X is ruled by reason. Therefore, if person
X's soul is in proper order, then that person is ruled by reason and has knowledge
(or true belief) about the good.
But if a person is ruled by reason and has knowledge (or true belief) about
the good, then that person will be right-doing (that is. \\ill not act wickedly or
wrongly), because a person always seeks what his or her dominant element regards
as good (a psychological fact). Therefore, putting the previous two principles to-
gether in a pure hypothetical syllogism: if a person's soul is in proper order, then
J
128 Anals/in^ Pliilosophical Reasoning
that person will be right-doing (that is, this person will not act wickedly or
wronglv). Therefore, if a person is not light-doing (that is, will act wickedly or
wronglv). then that person's soul is not in proper order.
But if a person's soul is not in proper order, then that person will not be
hajjpy. because a person can be happy only if his or her soul is in proper order.
There are at least three separate and independent reasons for this contingent psy-
chological fact. (1) Appetites unchecked by reason grow, and lead to a frustrated
or jaded state of mind, or personal ruin, and consequent unhappiness. (2) Without
proper internal harmony and order, subjective turmoil, strain, and inner con-
flicts produce a troubled mind and prevent inner peace and happiness. (3) Persons
unguided by their rational mind do not make choices and decisions well, and will
not live well and be happy. These are three separate reasons why a person can be
happy only if his or her soul is in proper order, from which, as I said before, it
follows that if a person's soul is not in proper order, then that person will not be
happy.
A
429 Exercises 7-1
Putting this conclusion together with the intermediate conclusion reached
earlier (to the effect that if a person is not right-doing, then that person's soul is
not in proper order), entails that if a person is not right-doing (that is, will act
wickedly or wrongly), then that person will not be happy. However, if a person is
right-doing, then it is at least possible that this person may be happy, and whate\ er
leaves open the possibility of happiness is certainly preferable to anything that
guarantees unhappiness (since happiness is preferable to unhappiness). Therefore,
it is better to be a right-doing person than to be a wrong-doer (since the right-doer
has at least a possibility of happiness, whereas a wrong-doer will be unhappy, as
just proven). Therefore, the life of justice is preferable to the life of injustice — that
is, justice is preferable to injustice. (Notice that this proof depends for its basic
reasons only on certain facts of human psychology, together with definitions or
analyses of certain moral, attributes in relation to the human personality.)

4:U) An.ih/iiit; Philosophical Rtasoniiig
EXERCISES 7-1B
Diagram the following reasoning, showing clearly any linkage. You may use circled
numbers in your diagrams (instead of writing out the sentences), provided you show
clearly with brackets and numbers the statements you intend in the passage. Supply
any suppressed premises or omitted conclusions you wish to supply (but you are
not required to supply any).
B-1. The following is an attempted scientific and philosophic disproof of the
theory of Two-Way Dualistic Interactionism, which is the theory that mind and
body are two separate things that can exert a causal influence on each other. This
disproof is based solely on a consideration of physical forces found in the material
universe where the body and nervous system exist, forces detected by observations of
the changes-in-motion (what physics calls "accelerations") of the material particles
that make up the body and nervous system. The reasoning goes as follows. If any
force is being applied to something in the material universe, we can tell this by
observing the pattern of its changes-in-motion. But we never observe the existence
of any changes-in-motion of particles in the human body and nervous system that
we cannot explain in terms of physical forces coming entirely from other parts of the
body or its environment. Therefore, all changes-in-motion of particles in the body
431
132 Analv/ing Philosophical Reasoning
come about as a result of physical forces, and therefore, there are no changes-in-
motion of particles in the body that come about as a result of nonphysical forces. But
all ph\ si( al < hanges-in-motion of material particles come about as the result of, and
require the existence of, forces. And an immaterial mind could affect the body only if
it changed the motion of some particle(s) in the body. But as we have seen, no
changes-in-motion of particles in the body come about as a result of nonphysical
forces. Therefore, no immaterial mind is affecting the body.

B
433 Exercises 7-1
From Stephen N. Thomas. The Formal Mechatiics of M ind (Uhdca, N.Y: Cornell University Press,
1978) pp. 166-67:
B-2. The incompatibility of supplemented dualism with our functionalist hy-
pothesis is seen as follows. If supplemented dualism were true, then an entity
could, logically, have or be the subject of mental states only if it had a nonphysical
or immaterial subcomponent. Thus, if supplemented dualism were true, then a
system without a nonphysical subcomponent could not have mental states. But
if our functionalist hypothesis is correct, then a system could have mental states
without having a nonphysical subcomponent. Thus it is not the case that both our
functionalist hypothesis and supplemented dualism are correct. Therefore, if our
hypothesis is correct, supplemented dualism is false.

4:i I AiKih/iug Philosophic ill Rrasoiiiiit<
From David Hunu'. Treatise of Human \alure. Pan III, Section XI\'. Here the philosopher is dis-
cussing the supposed necessity with which a cause produces its effect. Hume assumes the hypothe-
sis that all ideas come cither from (i) sense impressions or (ii) introspective impressions (which
he calls "internal impressions or impressions of reflection"), such as inward perception of one's

own thought processes.
B-3. The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression
conveyed by our senses, whic h can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be de-
ri\ ed from some internal impression, or impression of reflection. There is no in-
ternal impression, which has any relation to the present business, but that pro-
pensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual
attendant [that is, the tendency to pass from the idea of a frequently seen cause to
an expectation of its usual effect]. This therefore is the essence of necessity. Upon
the whole, necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it
possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in
bodies.
435 Exercises 7-1
From Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 18-14 (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1959). p. 27:
B-4. In an increasingly prosperous society it is only the very richest people who
can go on living on money-interest. Everyone else has to carry on a business with
his capital, or venture it in trade. As a result, the competition between capitals be-
comes more intense. . . . [T]he big capitalists ruin the small [in this competition],
and [consequently,] a section of the erstwhile capitalists sinks into the working
class, which [therefore] as a residt of this supply again suffers to some extent a
depression of wages and passes into a still greater dependence on the few big cap-
9
italists. The number of capitalists having been diminished [as a consequence of
the sinking mentioned earlier, therefore] their competition with respect to workers
scarcely exists any longer; and the number of workers ha\ ing been augmented,
their competition among themselves has become all the more intense, unnatural,
and violent. Consequently, a section of the working class falls into the ranks of
beggary or starvation just as necessarily as a section of the middle capitalists falls
into the working class.

436 AiKih/iiit; Phil()s()phi(al Reasoning
Hence. e\en in ihc tondition ot society most fa\oiable to the worker, the
inevitable resuh tor the worker is overwork and premature death, decUne to a mere
mathnie, a bond servant of capital, which piles up dangerously over against him,
more (omjxtiiion, and for a section ol the workers star\ation or beggary.
Hints: Be watchful for a divergent structure that reunites. I used a box to tie the final conclusion to
the preceding reasoning.
437 7-2 Analyzing Disorganized or Confused Complex Reasoning
7-2 ANALYZING DISORGANIZED

OR CONFUSED COMPLEX REASONING
The wholistic general strategy explained in Chapter 3 suits cases in which

simple reasoning involving only a few steps is diffused over a whole dis-
course. When, on problem is that the many steps in a par-

the contrary, the
ticularly long and tortuous argument are presented in a way that is some-
how confused or improperly organized, it is best to supplement the
wholistic approach with the special analytical procedure described in this
section. The basic idea is to work in successive steps "down from the top" and
"up from the bottom" of the diagram of the reasoning in the discourse,
connecting the chains of reasoning, if possible, at the middle. The rationale
behind this strategy is that authors are most likely to state the basic reasons
and final conclusion(s) clearly. So by pinning the diagram's basic assinnp-
tions and final conclusion(s) firmly to the text, you put yourself in the best
possible position to fill in the intervening reasoning (or to find a gap. if the
reasoning contains one).
Here in sequence is the step-bv-step "up from the bottom and down
from the top procedure for dealing with confused or disorganized long
"
chains of reasoning.
I. Find or formulate a sentence expressing as clearly as possible what you

take to be the jinal conclusio}i(s). If the final conclusion is only suggested
but not explicitly stated, write a sentence that expresses it.
II. If this conclusion is clearly inferred from, or supported by. some other
statement(s) in the discourse, note this fact.
III. If this conclusion is a compound sentence, write a sentence for each
conjunct of the compound and treat these sentences as conclusions of sep-

arate and distinct lines of reasonitig. (The reason is that logical obscurity
in discourses often derives from the authors drawing several distinct con-
clusions from a common reason simultaneously. Treating the situation a^
several separate and distinct lines of reasoning, rather than. say. drawing
diverging arrows from a common reason, simplifies the analytical prob-
lem.) Later you c-an rejoin the lines you separated, if you determine that
this will yield the best representation of the reasoning.
I\'. Look carefully through the discourse to see if you can find anything
given in support of any of these conclusions. If so.express each reason
clearly and succinctly and insert it in thediagram(s) with an arrow pointing
to each conclusion it supports.
i:58 AiKil\/in^ ^Mlil<)^()|)lli{al Reasoning
\'. II the reason is however, separate the conjuncts and

a (oiijuiu tioii.
show ea(h separately in the dia.^ram, representing the inference as con-
vergent or linked, whichever is appropriate.
VI. Treating each of these reasons as the possible conclusion of earlier

reasoning in the passage, repeat steps I through V for each of them. Con-
tinue this process upward as far as you can for each successive reason.
Turning now to the top of the diagram:
VII. examples or illustrations are given in the discourse, they will

If
probably have the ultimate status of basic reasons. Find or formulate gen- i\
eral statement of the claim or principle they illustrate. In your subsequent

analysis, ignore the examples or illustrations and attend only to the general
statement. Doing this will help you disregard the details and concentrate
on the general i)rin( iples involved in the reasoning.
\'II1. Write down as possible basic reasons every point that seems impor-
tant which the author affirms without support or justification. Luher
these are the basic reasons, or else they are complete irrelevancies (you'll
find out which later).
IX. If any conclusions are drawn in the discourse from these possible basic
reasons, show them in a diagram. If any of these conclusions are conjunc-
tions, show the conjuncts as separate statements.
X. Treating any such drawn conclusions as possible reasons for further

conclusions, repeat steps VII through IX for every conclusion you find.
you may find your-

After completing these two parts of the procedure,
self with several arrow diagrams, some with reasons that rise up above the
final conclusion(s), others with conclusions extending down from the
basic reasons. If luck is with you, the topmost reasons in the diagram(s)
you constructed up from the bottom will be among the basic reasons
distinguished in the second part of the procedure —
in which case the dia-
grams merge and the following step is unnecessary. Otherwise, you will need
to perform the following final step:
XI. Try to connect the basic reasons and conclusions drawn from them
with the final conclusions and reasons given for them. Do this by filling in
the reasoning between the top and bottom parts of the reasoning as best
you can, remembering to put square brackets around any statements you
add to those exj^lic illy appearing in the text. In other words, by construct-
ing additional sentences try to build a bridge of logically connected sen-
tences between the bottom statements ui the 'down from the top" parts of
the diagiam and the top statements in the "up from the bottom" parts as
youve developed them. A variation on this procedure is possible when an
author has supplied material to connect the top and bottom parts of the
diagram in a way that you can see is less valid than another possible way.
If you see a logicallv superior way to get from the top parts to the bottom
parts, you can do some surgery on the diagram, cutting out unneeded lines
that weaken the reasoning and attaching the parts abo\e and below back
together again in a way that connects them more strongly.
In this edition of this text, limitations of space (plus the complaints
of critics who dislike lengthy examples) have prohibited me from gi\ing
an illustration of all of these methods here, but I will illustrate Step XI
on the diagram for the attempted proof of the existence of God constructed
at the end of Chapter 3. You can probably practice the other methods well
enough yourself on the exercises at the end of this section.

By the end of Chapter 3, the argument from the present existence
of radioactively decaying substances like Uranium (U 238) to the inter-
mediate conclusion that matter was created at one time, and from this
to the final conclusion that "God exists and created the material uni-
verse," had been analyzed, using less advanced methods, as diagrammed
on the opposite page.
As diagrammed, this reasoning seems to be unnecessarily weak in
the middle. There are two problems, at least, with the intermediate con-
clusion, "There is a certain amount of "disintegration" in matter." {{) It
might be questioned whether this intermediate conclusion really follows

from the reasons above it, arguing that the way uranium changes to lead
is not "disintegration," but only "transformation," a fact that does not
lead to the same final conclusion, {ii) In itself, the statement "There is
a certain amount of 'disintegration' in matter" does not seem to support
strongly the conclusion below it that "The universe is gradually running
down." For (a) in itself, the existence of this "disintegration" does not
exclude the possibility that there might also be a compensating amount
of "reintegration" in matter somewhere else in the universe. Also, (b)
it might be wondered how it was established that this disintegration is not
part of some larger complex process by which the universe is, so to speak,
"rewinding itself at the same time?
If we cut this problematic intermediate conclusion out of the dia-
gram, and join together the parts above and below without it. the middle
segment of the diagram would look as shown in the shorter diagram on
page 441.
Two more unnecessary problems appear to be associated with the
MO Analv/ing Philosophical Rtasoiiieig

and has weight. weigh tj
Uranium (U 238) [Uranium is No new uranium

deteriorates matter.] + is coming into
into lead (Pb 206). existence todav.
There is a certain
amount of "disintegration"
in matter.
1
The universe is gradually
running down.
I
"matter had no past
eternity").
Matter was
i at one That wliich This Producer
lime brought into is produced [of matter]
+ +
existence (made, requires a coidd only
produced, created). Producer. be God.
God exists and created the material imiverse.
intermediate conclusion "The

universe is gradually running down." (/)
Someone might sweeping statement about the entire universe
feel that this
is scarcely justified just by premises about uranium, which is, after all,
only one of a hundred or so elements, and a fairly rare one at that. Also,
the amount of lead apparently is increasing. Could this somehow coun-
terbalance the loss of uranium? (ii) It is unclear how strongly this in-
termediate conclusion about the universe running down supports the fur-
(same as before)
Uranium (U 238) i No new uranium

deteriorates into + [Ihanium is + is coming into
lead (Pb 206). matter.] existence today.
The universe
I is gradually
running down.
i
"matter had no past
eternity").
i
Matter was at one That which is This Producer
+ +
existence (made, requires a could only
ther conclusion that "There has been no past eternity of matter (or 'matter
had no past eternity')." Could a gradual process have been occurring
for an eternity?
Let us sec if we can improve this diagram with an additional adjust-
ment so as to get away from these problems. Presumably the main under-
lying idea of the argument is that in any region of the universe where the
amount of matter is finite, if the deterioration of uranium is a one-way pro-
cess that occurs at a finite rate, then if this process had taken place for an
eternity, all the uranium would have changed into lead already. But we
see that it has not, since there still is uranium around us that is actively
deteriorating into lead. Therefore, the universe is not infinitely old ("There
has been no past eternity of matter," etc). Uranium simply functions in
the argument an atomic clock indicating (by the amount remaining)
like
that the universe finitely old. Except for the assumption that no new
is
uranium comes into existence in the universe, there is no need for the
ML' An;ilv/ini4 PIiiloNoijhual Reasoning
artûnunt to get into global claims about what the rest of the universe is
doing nieanuhile. So actually, once understood, it seems that the argu-
ment also would be stronger without the intermediate conclusion, "The
luiiverse is gradually nmning down." If we cut this statement out also, the
result looks like this:

I'ranium (U 238) Xo new uranium

deteriorates into [I'ranium is + is coming into
lead (Pb 206). matter.] existence todav.

"matter had no past
eternity").

+ +
existence (made, requires a could only
Additional modification could also be made (including adding some of

the missing assumptions), but I think this is an improvement on previous
versions. It may be possible to challenge or criticize this argument on other
grounds, but some of the unnecessary defects in formulation that invite
objections that are irrelevant (once the argimient is correctly formulated)
have been corrected, resulting in a better and more interesting argument.
Of course, if we later discovered that some of the removed parts were useful
or essential for some reason that ^ve did not appreciate at the time, then we
would go back and replace them.
EXERCISES 7-2
The reasoning in the following long linked arguments is convoluted and confusing.
Use the methods explained in Section 7-2 (or any other methods that work) to con-
struct a diagram corresponding to each that clearly and coherently represents, in its
best possible aspect, the author's reasoning.
From Norman Malcolm, "Anselms Ontological Arguments." Philosophical Reiiew, 69(1960),

49-50. (Cited by Pospesel.)
1. Let me summarize the proof. If being greater than which cannot be con-
God, a
ceived, does not exist then he cannot into existence. For if He did He would
come
either ha\e been caused to come into existence or ha\e happened to come into
existence, and in either case He would be a limited being, which by our concep-
tion of Him He is not. Since He cannot come into existence, if He does not Exist
His existence is impossible. If He does exist He cannot come into existence (for the
reasons given), nor can He cease to exist, for nothing could cause Him to cease to
exist nor could it just happen that He ceased to exist. So if God exists His existence
is necessary. Thus God's existence is either impossible or necessary. It can be the
former only if the concept of such a thing is self-contradictory or in some way logi-
cally absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists.
443
\\\ Aiiah/in^ Philosophical Reasoning
Kioni Allictl Jules Ayei. Lanfruafê, Truth and Logic (^cw York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952),
pp. l-l.'i. (Cited by Pospesel.) Xole: A "proposition" is a statement. A "tautology" is a state-
1 1
ment supposedh Hue simply by virtue of the meanings of the words it contains (for example, "All
bachelors are unmarried"). .\n "a priori" proposition is a judgment that can be justified and
known to be true without observations using our sense organs.
2. It is now
generally admitted, at any rate by philosophers, that the existence of a
being ha\ ing the attributes which define the god of any nonanimistic religion
cannot be demonstratively proved. To see that this is so, wt have only to ask our-
selves what are the premises from which the existence of such a god could be de-
duced. If the conclusion that a god exists is to be demonstratively certain, then these
premises must be certain; for, as the conclusion of a deductive argument is already
contained in the premises, any uncertainty there may be about the truth of the
premises is necessarily shared by it. But we know that no empirical proposition can
ever be anything more than probable. It is only a priori propositions that are logi-
cally certain. But we cannot deduce the existence of a god from an a priori prop-
osition. For we know that the reason why a priori propositions are certain is that
they are tautologies. And from a set of tautologies nothing but a further tautology
can be validly deduced. It follows that there is no possibility of demonstrating
the existence of a god.
445 Exercises 7-2
From Xorman Malcolm, "The Privacy of Experience," in Epistemolog}: Xew Essays in the The-
ory of Knowledge, ed. Avrum Stroll (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1967), p. 151.
(Cited by Pospesel.) Hint: Feel free to write your own statement(s) expressing Malcolm's claims
—
about the assumptions made by the theory of the privacy of pain e.g., "The explanation pro-
vided by the theory of the privacy of pain of why . .depends on the assumptions that.
. .
."
.
3. The theme [theory] of the privacy of pain may be thought to explain why it is
that you can be in doubt, can be mistaken, and can find out, that I have a pain,
whereas / cannot. This would be because you cannot have, or feel, my sensation.
You cannot have "direct" knowledge of my sensation, but only "indirect" knowl-
edge by way of my behavior and words. This attempt at explanation is as unsatis-
factory as the previous one. As we saw, you can have, and feel, the very sensation I
have. (Do not protest, "But I can't feel your feeling for it"; for what could that
mean?) Also we saw that in the sentence, "I know I have pain," the "I know" does
not serve any purpose; consequently I cannot say that I know "directly" that I have
pain; and so you cannot say, in contrast, that you know "only indirectly" that I
have pain.
}J6 An.ih/iiit; IMiilosophic al Reasoning
\'ol. X, LCC, ed. and tr.

From Si. Anstlin. Proslotiion (1077) reprinted in A Scholastic Miscellany,
K. R. Fairweather (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1956). Quoted in Edwards and Pap, A Mod-
ern Introduction to Philosophy CSexy.- York: The Free Press. 1973), pp. 404-405. Since the language
in this discourse is so confusing. I have numbered the statements as
an aid to the student.
4. ( 1 ) Ami so. () Lord, since thou givest understanding to faith, give me to under-
stand—as far as thou knowest it to be good for me—
that thou dost exist, as we be-
lieve, and what we believe thee to be. (2) Now we believe that thou art
thai thou art
a being than which none greater can be thought. (3) Or can it be that there is no
su(h being, since "The fool hath said in his heart, 'There is no God'"? (4) But
when this same fool hears what I am saying— "A being than which none greater
—
can be thought" he understands what he hears, and (5) what he understands is
in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it exists. For (6) it is one
thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another thing to understand
that it exists. (7) When a painter considers beforehand what he is going to paint,
he has it in his understanding, but he does not suppose that what he has not yet
painted already exists. (8; But when he has painted it, he both has it in his under-
standing and understands that what fie has now produced exists. (9) Even the fool,
then, must be convinced that a being than which none greater can be thought ex-
ists at least in his understanding, since (4) when he hears this he understands it,
and (5) whatever is understood is in the understanding. (10) But clearly that than
which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the understanding alone. For
(11) if it is actually in the understanding alone, it can be thought of as existing
also in reality, and (12) this is greater. Therefore, (13) if tnat which a greater can-
not be thought understanding alone, this same thing than which a greater
is in the
(annot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. (14) But ob\iously
this is impossible. Without doubt, therefore, (15) there exists, both in the under-
standing and in reality, something than which a greater cannot be thought.
APPENDIX I
Limitations in FornriQi Approaches

to the Analysis and Evaluation
of Reasoning in Natural Languages
The use of the common jargonphrase "svmbolic logic" to refer to formal

approaches to the analysis and evaluation of reasoning in natural languages
fosters the misconception that the central or defining characteristic of the
formal ("symbolic" approach is its translation of reasoned discourse from
•
natural language into some other. p)erhaps more succinct, symbolism. This
misconception has some unfortunate consequences.
The conceptual confusion caused by the term "symbolic logic" tends
to obscure the nature of the reservations about formal approaches that have
motivated the dexêlo^ment of natural logic. To unfold these in detail would
require a lengthy treatise, and is certainly impossible in a brief appendix at
the end of an elementary logic textbook, but some indication perhaps can be
provided in a few paragraphs. The basic problem is that the "exten-
sionalisrti" of formal approaches in effect assumes that, in general, the
validity of reasoning depends entirely on the presence of. and relations
among, only certain key "logical terms" (words like "all." "some." "and.
"or." "not." "if-then. "etc.. represented bv sp>ecial symbols in formal logics
whereas, in fact, the validity of reasoning in natural languages usuallv
dep>ends more on the properties of. and relations among, so-called "non-
logical" terms (for example, "red." "colored." "bachelor." "unmarried,
"sister." "female." etc.). and other sentential substructures with more
complex semantic properties and relationships appearing in the reasons
and conclusions. Consequently, "formal" (syntactic) validity, while a suf-
,
ficient condition is not a necessary condition for the validity of reasoning
' .
in natural languages. As a result of this, reasoning in natural language that

tests as "invalid" when translated into an extensional language "for- t
malized") nevertheless may actually be "valid" (deductively valid) due to the

meanings of its nonlogical terms. Of the countless illustrations that could
Êxcept in cenain cases, such as when the (extensionalist) material conditional is used inappropriately
to represent the natural-language counter-factual conditional.
447
448 Appendix I
be given of such "semantic" inferences, here is one:
The need for chohne in the human

diet has been estabHshed.
[deductively valid)
People require some chohne as part

of their nutrition.
(Other examples appear throughout PRNL.) The validity of such in-

ferences is neither manifested nor detected in an extensionalist formaliza-
tion (e.g.. in quantificational notation), because most of the key operative
terms ("need," "require," "human," "people," "diet," "nutrition." etc.) do
not reappear in both the premise and conclusion. So even before attempting
to formalize this in quantificational notation, one can see that the different
predicates and relational terms in the premise and conclusion would be
represented by different schematic letters, and, consequently, in such a
formalization the premise and conclusion would contain different sche-
matic letters (representing the various general terms), so that the inference
would appear (and be) formally invalid. But the inference is deductively
valid in natural language, because in natural language, the semantic
relationships among these terms — for example, entailment relationships
deriving from the semantic connections between "need" and "require,"
between "diet" and "nutrition," between "human" and "people," and
other more complicated connections and relationships also not reflected in
a quantificational formalization — make it valid.
In formal approaches as usually presented, students are taught, in
reasoning from natural language into the notation of
effect, to translate the
formal logic, and then to test the supposedly "equivalent" symbolic
translation for formal (deductive) validity. If it is not formally valid,
students are given to understand that the original argument in natural
language also is not deductively valid. This procedure is strictly fallacious,
and would lead to erroneous evaluations of most deductively valid
reasoning in natural language, if its proponents ever actually tried to apply
it to the real cases, because the extensionalistic "formalizations" of most
deductively valid reasoning in natural language are not formally valid. In

particular, this happens when the deductive validity of the original
reasoning in natural language depends on the .semfl^?//c5. rather than on the
logical form or syntax, of the premise(s) and conclusion, which samplings
indicate is the case in more than 90% of deductively valid inferences in
natural language. Consequently, as usually taught in traditional logic
textbooks (e.g., in Copi), the formal approach to the analysis and evaluation
449 Appendix I
of reasoning in natural language will actually yield erroneous evaluations

in 90 Sc oi its applications to deductively valid reasoning in natural lan-
guage. (The lack of any alternative systematic general method for e\al-
uating these same arguments may have permitted this fundamental de-
fect in formal approaches to go unnoticed prior to the development of
natural logic.)
Teaching students logical methods and approaches that are fallacious
is unlikelv to improve their reasoning skills. At most, one can hope that
such texts will not seriouslv damage the students" processes of thought and
reasoning, or have any other permanent pernicious effect. Why instruc-
tors would knowingly teach students false logical principles and fallacious
methods is diiTicult to understand, but if an instructor is going to do so
for some reason, then it would seem that the students should at least be
informed ihdii the approach they are learning is fallacious. It is no surprise
that students will have ditTiculty reasoning validly and thinking straight
if. when in good faith they enroll in a college logic course, they are never
informed that they are being taught logical methods and theories that are
strictly and grossly fallacious.
The fundamental defect in formal approaches to the analysis and
e\ aluation of reasoning ni natural languages can be shown in more concrete
detail by challenging its advocates to exhibit detailed, complete formaliza-
tions of such arguments as the choline example. Since, naturally, thev
ignore such challenges, let us ptusue the investigation otnselves by
attempting to formalize this one instance from among the infinity of
problem cases. Simplifying by ignoring the rather large and intractable
problems surrounding the use of the definite description 7~)^^ need ") ( . . .
and temporal reference (''... has been established") in the premise of this
illustration, and with the noun '"People" in the conclusion (the syntax
of which seems to be that of a mass noun), one might attempt to formalize
this trivially simple example of reasoning from natural language as:
(3x)(30{A'.v &£.vn
i
(.v)(P.\0/?.\ I
using "Aa" for 'x is need for choline

a in the human diet'
'Ext for x has been established at time t'
'Px' for ".v is a person'

'Rx' for x requires some choline as part of .v's nutrition'
Now these quantificational schemata ob\ iously do not represent a dedtic-

tively \ alid argument or argument form: it is easy to find interpretations of
450 Appendix I
their schematic letters in anonempty universe of discourse under which the

premise is true and the conclusion is false. Beyond this point, I must submit
the problem of completing the formalization of this example to the
proponents of the use of extensionalist formal logic to model reasoning in
natural languages, for I see no way to complete it. (Incidentally, it should be
observed that any additional premise(s) added to complete the formalization
of this illustration must all at least be true, since the original argument in
natural language is also sound as it stands— and arguably, we should
require that any such additional premise(s) be logically true, or analytic,
since the argument in natural language is deductively valid as it stands.)
This problem cannot be solved by borrowing the trick used in Section
2-5 to transform deductively invalid reasoning into deductively valid rea-
soning by adding as a further premise a conditional whose antecedent is
the given reason and whose consequent is the given conclusion,
(3x){3t)(Nx & Ext) + {3x)(^t){Nx & Ext) D({x){Px DRx))
(d.v.)
{x){PxDRx)
and using modus ponens to draw the conclusion. This would not solve
the extensionalist 's problem for the following reasons.
(1 This device was used in 2-5 to solve a problem that is quite different
from the present one. In Section 2-5, the aim was to transform reasoning that
is not deductively valid in natural language into reasoning thatis deduc-
tively validby adding some additional assumption(s). In the present con-

text, the problem under discussion is an argument that is, as it stands in
natural language, already deductively valid, and the question is whether it
can be translated into an extensionalist canonical form that is formally, or
syntactically, valid.
(2) Were the method of simply constructing,an additional premise,

as
such a conditional statement (whose antecedent is the premise and whose
consequent is the given conclusion) to be the procedure by which
proponents of extensionalistic approaches would "formalize" the more
than 90 percent of deductively valid arguments in natural language that
cannot otherwise be translated into a valid quantificational form, then, of
course, general quantification theory is not needed since all arguments
would then already be "formalizable" in the propositional calculus, using
only schematic sentence letters ('/", 'Q', etc.) for the whole sentences in the
premise(s) and conclusion, plus a truth-functional (material) condi-
45 1 Appendix I
tional, like this:
P+ (PDQ)
{d.v.)
using 'P' for 'The need for choHne in the human diet
has been estabhshed.'

and 'Q.' for 'People need some choline as part of their nutrition.'
Of course, in the usual extensionalist theoretical formulations, formaliza-

tion entirely in the propositional calculus is reserved for "truth-functional"
arguments, that is, reasoning whose validity depends merely on the truth-
functional structure of the given premise(s) and conclusion reasoning that —
is intuitively truth-functionally valid, i.e., valid in the propositional
calculus, a condition obviously not met by the present example; the more
detailed notation of general quantification theory is supposed to be used in
the more general, caSe where the validity of the reasoning involves general
terms, predicates and relational terms, that appear inside atomic constitu-
ents connected truth-functionally.
(3) To anyone who
actually thought that the simple procedure of
adding premise a conditional sentence constructed along the
as another
lines described solves the problem, I would pose the following dilemma:
Are (i) all arguments from natural language that are otherwise unformaliz-
able to be "formalized" in this manner, or (ii) only the deductively valid
ones? If (i) all are to be formalized in this manner, then this "formal"
approach will end up erroneously finding every argument in natural
language to be "deductively valid," since every argument, including every
invalid argument, gets replaced by a "deductively valid" argument when a
specially concocted conditional like this is added. In that case, the formal
approach will be fallacious in the opposite way, since an infinity of invalid
arguments will then erroneously be evaluated as "deductively valid."
Every argument will be found to be valid if line (i) is taken, clearly an
erroneous result.
If the procedure of formalizing the otherwise unformalizable natural-
language arguments by adding as another premise a specially constructed
conditional, as explained in Section 2-5, were followed, then every natural-
language argument would emerge as "deductively valid" and the approach
would be fallacious through erroneously evaluating every natural-language
452 Appendix I
argument, including invalid ones, as "deductively valid," since, as

all
pointed out in 2-5, every argument is replaced with a deductively valid

argument when transformed in this fashion.
The other possibility is that only the arguments from natural
(ii).
language that are deduc lively valid arc to be completed in this way with an
added conditional. But in that case, how arc these valid arguments initially
distinguished and separated from the invalid arguments? Apparently not by
the methods of formal logic, since we would first need to know whether the
arginnent is deductively valid in order to determine whether or not to use
this mechanical trick to replace it with a deductively valid syntactic form.
We might first evaluate such arguments by the methods of natural logic, and
then (a)
,
if an argument is determined by the methods of natural logic to be
deductively valid, "formalize"with such a specially constructed added
it
conditional premise and pronounce it "formally valid," and (b) if the

methods of natural logic find it not to be deductively valid, refuse to add
such a conditional, and accordingly report that it is not formally valid. But
then, obviously, the process of "formalizing" the argument in extensional
canonical notation is not functioning to determine the argument's validity
or invalidity. Such a procedure would not even serve to corroborate the
evaluations previously obtained by natural logic, since any invalid ar-
gument mistakenly evaluated as "deductively valid" by a careless employer
of the methods of natural logic would, by the formal procedure under
discussion, have a special conditional premise added to it that converted it
into a formally valid argument. The formal procedure of adding a
conditional premise to create a syntactically valid argument would follow
the earlier erroneous evaluation, likewise mistakenly finding the invalid
argument to be "deductively valid."
The problem would not be solved by suggesting that we should add
such a conditional premise if and only if it is a tautology, or a logically or
analytically true statement, because with nonsyntactic semantic entail-
ments, the corresponding conditional premises are not "tautologies" in
virtue of their logical form, but instead in virtue of the content or meaning
of their nonlogical constituent terms. They are not formal tautologies. A
truth-table test would not show, for example, "If the need for choline in
human nutrition has been established, then people require some choline
as part of their nutrition" to be a formal tautology. Likewise,
'[(3 x)(3 t)(Nx & Ext)] D{x)(Px DRxy

IS not a quantificational schema that comes out true under all inter-
pretations of its schematic letters over a nonempty universe of discourse.
So formal methods are incapable of determining whether such a con-
ditionalis "analytic" (or true in virtue of the meanings in natural Ian-
453 Appendix I
guage of the constituent terms) in precisely the problem cases under dis-
cussion.
Semantic inferences in natural language could be formalized and eval-
uated adequately using the artificial extensional language of quantifica-
tion theory only if the totality oi semantic rules and semantic relationships
\\ithin the natiual language somehow could be formalized also so that,
when added to the given premise(s) as additional assumptions, all con-
clusions semantically entailed in natural language by the premise(s) would
become formally entailed, or formally derivable, using only the rules of
inference of quantification theory. It is unlikely that this could ever be
done, because it is unlikely that the ftill totality of semantic rtiles of anv
natural language cotdd be reduced to a set of qtiantificational formtilae.
And formalization of a proper subset of the semantic rules of the natural
language would be insufficient, because we would need to be assured that a//
the semantic rtiles had been formalized and added to the premise! s). since
otherwise, finding a formalized argument to be formally (syntactically)
"invalid would not entail that the original reasoning in natural language
was deductively invalid, becatise the same reasoning might turn out to be
valid when some additional re\e\ am. but previously omitted, formalization
from which it came were added
of the semantic tu]^s of the natural language
to the premise. Formalizing the totality of semantic rules of a natural
language in extensional notation (such as the symbolism of quantifica-
tion theory) is something that certainly has never been accomplished bv
formal logicians, and probably never could be accomplished. And finallv.
even if this herculean feat were somehow accomplished, the highest
tribunal, the court of last appeal, the tiltimate authority, by which its
adequacy would be judged would be the agreement, or disagreement, of its
implications with the verdicts of the methods of natural logic. What. then,
would be its utility?
The mistake of categorizing reasoning in natural language as de-

ductively invalid because formally deductively invalid I call '^ the formal
it is
fallacy.'' This fallacy recurs throughout many introductory textbooks in

formal logic.
To think that "proofs of the completeness of quantification theor\""
show that the conclusion
solve this problem, or answer this challenge, or
"People require choline as part of their nutrition" is. after all. actuallv
derivable by the methods of quantification theory from the premise in
the example, would be a grand confusion e\ idencing a superficial com-
prehension of the nature of formal logic. The proofs of the "complete-
ness" of quantification theory relate only to its formal (or syntactic)
completeness, not to completeness in the sense of being able to derive all
quantificational formulae that are translations of sentences that are
434 Appendix I
seiiiaiuically cniailcd by the original premise(s) in natural language.

Various proofs but a completeness proof may relate, for example, to
differ,
the syntactically tautologous character of a conditional ("if ..then

.
.")
. . .
having the prernise{s) of an inference as its antecedent, and the conclusion

as consequent, a conditional true under all interpretations of its
its
schematic letters in a nonempty universe of discourse (Quine's "valid"). In

these terms, extensionalism's problem is that a corresponding conditional
for a quantificational formalization of the reasoning in the choline
example, or any other pure semantic entailment, would appear to be non-
tautologous (Quine's "invalid") because nothing in the formalization
would compel the assignment of possible interpretations to its schematic
letters to honor, so to speak, the limitations entailed by the semantic
content, or semantic properties and relations, or "meaning," of the natural-
language terms represented by the schematic letters in the formalization. To
illustrate quickly with a simpler case, suppose we have the semantic
inference, "x is a sister; therefore, x is female." Although this is valid in
natural language, the conditional "For all v. if Sx, then Fx" appears
nontautologous because there exist possible interpretations of the sche-
—
matic letters under which it comes out false for example, an interpretation
in w^hich we suppose "S" is true of the number 1, and "F" is false of the same
number. This interpretation would be excluded if the limitations imposed
by the semantics or meanings of the represented terms "sister" and "female"
were taken into consideration. But because the formal extensionalistic logic
ignores the "meaning '
of the general terms in the statements in favor
exclusively of "logical form,'' it does not take this into account, and con-
sequently, the proofs of "completeness" do not imply, for example, that "x
is female" (or "(3x)(Fx)") can be deduced from "x is a sister" (or
"(3x)(.Sx)") by the rules of inference of quantification theory alone.

Completeness proofs only prove that any schema that would form the
consequent of such a conditional that is true under all interpretations of its
schematic letters (where its antecendent is the premise(s)) can be reached as
deduction using only the rules of inference of quantification
last lines of a
theory. The completeness proofs do not even purport to prove that quan-
tificational translations of every conclusion semantically entailed in
natural language by a premise can be reached as the last line of a formal
deduction using only the rules of quantification theory (although the use of
the imprecise description "proofs of the completeness of quantification
theory" may have misled some students and caused them to think that
the formal deductibility of schemata corresponding to every conclusion
actually entailed by the premise(s) in natural language had been proven).
The set of formal schemata derivable by the rules of quantification theory
from a given schema will not generally include all schemata correspond-
455 Appendix I
ing to natural-language sentences that are semantically entailed by the

sentence whose formal translation is the given schema, but will, in gen-
eral, be only a very small proper subset of the totality of these schemata.
Thus, a major defect in extensionalist formal logic as a method for
analyzing and evaluating reasoning in natural languages is that by focusing
exclusively on the relations only among the so-called "logical terms." and
constructions from these (logical syntax), it abstracts from, and omits
from consideration, the implications of the meaning or semantics of the
other terms and constructions in the premises and conclusion, which are a
primary source of the validity of most reasoning in natural language, as any
objective examination of a representative sample of reasoning from natural
language clearly shows. Semantic considerations generally are far more
determinative of the validity of reasoning in natural language than is the
logical syntax (logical form) of the statements involved.
The same flaw undermines the commonly repeated (extensionalistic)
doctrine that "the validity of reasoning is purely a matter of the /orr??, and
not the content, of the statements involved" (where these logical "forms,"
and their relationships to each other, are structures of the sort represented
and analyzed by \'enn diagrams, truth tables, quantificational notation,
formal rules of inference, set theory, etc.). Although the validity of some
arguments (suclr^s the examples that fill the textbooks of formal logic) does
derive entirely from the "logicalform" of the statements involved, in the
overwhelming majority of real cases of deductively valid reasoning in
natural language, the validity stems from the "content" of the terms and
statements involved rather than from their logical form, and consequently,
the actual use of a formal approach will erroneously and fallaciously mis-
categorize these deductively valid arguments in natural language as
"invalid." Frankly, these and other problems make formal logic com-
-At a deeper level, a full critique of extensionalism. beginning with the ideas of the latter Wittgenstein,
would re\iew the difficulties in applying the .\xiom of Abstraction to concepts in natural language,
especially the great majority of vague and open-textured concepts (sets must be well-defined and
"definite" for quantification thcor\ to apply, and the extensions of \ague and open-textured concepts
are not well-defined or sharply delineated); difficulties in the extensionalistic theory of the quantifier
and its set-theoretic explanation in terms of a "universe of discourse"; difficulties in Warsaw Semantics'
attempted extensionalistic explanation or definition of truth as applied, for example, to sentences

containing open-textured concepts in natural language; problems in extensionalism's rather nai\e
theory of the reference of singular terms; the bizarre and probably spurious ontological commitments
entailed by the quantificational "formalizations" of many sentences in natural language; difficulties in
the naive assumption of the truth-functional nature of many complex sentences in natural language;
problems in attempts to deal with natural language's counterfactual conditionals in terms of exten-
sionalism's material conditional; the paradoxes in extensionalistic Confirmation Theory, and other
apparently unsohable theoretical problems generated by extensionalist models in the philosophy of
science; failures in the extensionalist account (in terms of reference and set theory) of the relationship of
language to the world; etc. Even a succinct documentation of this list would fill a book and so is
impossible here, but this preliminary partial list may at least ser\e to indicate some of the further
difficulties associated with the use of extensionalistic formal logic and symbolic notation as a model of
natural language and inference. (For a discussion of how philosophical problems are generated by
defective, inaccurate, or impoverished models, see The Formal Mechanics of Mind. pp. 13-26.)
456 Appendix I
pletely unsuitable tor the analysis and evaluation of actual reasoning in

natural language.
"Perhaps formal logic, or a nonextensional symbolic logic, could be
expanded and improved, through additions and modifications, so that
the artificial language that it uses provided a better model of natural
language remedying these problems." —
If the expanded artificial lan-
guage were truly isomorphic to natural language in all relevant respects,
how then would it be different from natural language? If it were truly
equivalent to natural language, I suspect that basically we would have
arrived back at natural language again. In any case, natural logic already
provides a methodology for evaluating inferences in natural language.
In addition to concealing all these problems, the use of the jargon
phrase "symbolic logic" to denote extensionalistic formal logic also ob-
scures the fact that natural language itself already is a full-blown symbol
system or symbolism. In fact, at bottom, since natural language is already a
symbol system, the direct analysis and evaluation of reasoning in natural
language by natural logic actually is equally entitled to be called "symbolic
logic" (that is, the study of inferential relationships in a symbol system
capable of expressing statements). This point is so obvious and unim-
portant as hardly to merit mention, except as a way of neutralizing, and
perhaps counteracting, the widespread "formal logic = symbolic logic"
conceptual confusion, a confusion that has caused its victims to make the
mistake of thinking that natural logic's reservations dhout formal logic
(which they call "symbolic logic") are criticisms of the use oi symbolism
in logic, or perhaps o{ symbolism in general, an absurd straw man they
easily knock down, erroneously thinking that thereby they have "re-
futed" these criticisms of formal approaches to the analysis and evalu-
ation of reasoning in natural languages.
'Some victims of this confusion even seem to think that "symbolic" (formal) logic is simph a kind of
logicalshorthand, somewhat like a stenographic shorthand notation, except used for logical pur-
poses. 1 hey have no comprehension of the significance of its extensionalistic logical interpretation.
APPENDIX II
On the History and Theory

of the Linked-Convergent Distinction
The distinction between linked and convergent inferences was not drawn by
Beardsley. not even in his fourth edition of Thinking Straight.^ It was
introduced in the 1973 edition of PRXL. Beardsley represented linked and
con\ ergent inferential relationships alike, using multiple arrows for (what I
call) linked relationships, as if all reasoning with multiple reasons were
convergent (except that this distinction did not exist in his system). The
concept of linked reasoning, and the distinction between it and convergent
reasoning, needed to be added to Beardsley"s system of analysis before it
could be generally-applied at all. Diagrams of some of the same argu-
ments analyzed in Beardsley 's Practical Logic are included in PRNL to show
concretely how the two systems give different analytical representations
of the same reasoned discourses.
Objection: ""But your concept of linked inference is simply a metaphor
for the conjunction of premises, and this has been understood since
Aristotle. The "+" symbol used in your linked diagrams is simply
equivalent to the familiar conjunction "and" (in formal symbols, " " or •
"Sc")/' Reply: There is some truth here, mixed with much confusion. In the con-
text of a notation where the distinction between convergent and linked
structures is understood to stand in the background, certainly ""and"" (or "&:'"
or any other symbol for conjunction) can be used to perform the same
function as "+". That is. in the context of the notational conventions and
concepts of natural logic, all the following diagrams can equally charac-
terize a linked inference:
Reason A + Reason B Reason A &: Reason B Reason A

and
Reason B
I
Conclusion C Conclusion C Conclusion C
Ênglewood Cliffs. N.J.: Preniicc-Hall. 1975.
457
158 Appendix II
In suchacontext, the use of'and" or "&,"forexample,tojoin the reasons

would be understood to mean the same as "+" and an underline.
from this, however, it does not follow that "and" itself means the same
as what is meant by the concept of linkage in natural logic. This is shown by
the fact that outside special notational contexts such as the one above, the
word "and" can join convergent reasons equally well as linked reasons. For
instance, in discourse form, the example of convergent reasoning in Sec-
tion 1-3 might be expressed as follows: "I promised Harry that I would
go into the partnership with him and\ might make a lot of money if I do,
so I should go into the partnership with him. " The two reasons are joined
by the word "and," yet they remain convergent, not linked. The same
can be done with any other discourse expressing convergent reasoning,
as many examples throughout PRNL illustrate. So, linkage is not equiv-
alent to conjunction. It means much more.
The natural-logic concept of linkage is actually similar to a proof-
theoretic concept in formal logic, except that it is applied directly to
reasoning in natural languages. In particular, in formal proof theory, the
notation that most closely parallels the linkage notation of natural logic is
not the notation for conjunction ("'"), but rather the special notation used
to write "justifications" alongside derived lines in formal proofs showing
the previous line(s) from which each new line is inferred (together, perhaps,
with a note indicating the rule of inference used). For instance, in formal
logic, if "Fx"on line 6 of a formal proof is derived from line2 together with
line 5 by modus ponens, one might write "2,5, modus ponens" alongside
line 6:
(6) Fx (2,5, M.P.)
Such proof-theoretic notation, rather than the notation for conjunction,

corresponds to natural logic's notation for linkage. In fact, historically,
the linkage notation used in natural logic originally was adapted from the
notation used in the formal systems of Gentzen and Schiitte, where indica-
tions at the ends of lines of proof are replaced by diagonal lines connected in
an upwardly branching tree. Those formal modes of representation sug-
gested the idea of similarly displaying reasoning in natural languages, ex-
cept with sentences of natural language appearing at the nodes instead of
formulas in the artificial language of extensionalist notation, and with the
fixed, limited quantificational rules of inference replaced by the more uni-
versal natural-logic criterion of validity (because in reasoning in natural
languages, there is no fixed set of rules of inference which must be cited to
Jltt^
459 Appendix II
justify inferences, explained in Appendix I, the

and also because, as
justification for inferences in reasoning in natural languages usually
depends on the content, meaning, or semantics, of all the words in the
symbol strings, rather than on their logical form or syntax alone).
No corresponding extensionalist formal notation seems available,
however, to distinguish or represent what natural logic portrays as con-
vergent reasoning (in which separate, independent lines of reasoning
support the same identical conclusion). In formal systems, any conclusion
that has different, separate lines of justification would, in general, have the
status of a type of which separate tokens are repeated on separate lines
in the proof —
that is. tokens appearing on separate lines of the proof
without being fused together. The closest formal approximation to the
natural-logic portrayal of convergent inference would perhaps be two
separate deductions leading to two different tokens of the same conclusion
(e.g.. "yl") appearing on separate lines in the proof, followed by a step of
conjoining these two similar lines (as, for example, "A Si A"), followed by a
step oi simplification (to "A"). However, such a pattern would not truly
represent convergent inference, because the final conclusion ("A ") actually
would be coming from only one of the conjuncts (for example, the first
conjunct if the expression of the rule of simplification reads, "From p ^q,
infer p"), the justification for the other conjunct really contributing
nothing. (Notice, incidentally, how prominently conjunction would figure
in this formal approximation to convergent reasoning; if the natural-logic
proof-theoretic concept of linkage were equivalent to the sentential
connective of conjunction, as the objection mistakenly supposes, what then
would be the formal equivalent ofconf^rgg-nce? Conjunction also?) I see no
better way to model the distinction, or difference, between linked and
convergent inferential patterns in the existing notation of formal logic; in
the last analysis, perhaps this is not really possible.^
A horizontal underline also is used in natural logic to indicate that
several reasons lead to a conclusion combinatorially. Again, it should be
clear that the possibility of omitting the horizontal underline and sim-
plifying the graphics to write simply
Reason A
and
Reason B
V.
Conclusion C
m so, and if these two patterns really exist in reasoning in natural

languages, then this is yet another
respect in which existing formal notation is inadequate to represent reasoning in natural languages.
460 Appendix II
again does not imply that "linkage" is equivalent to conjunction, or that

"and" means the same as "+" or the underline. If one were operating outside
the context of a model and system of concepts where a distinction is under-
stood to exist between linked and convergent reasoning and a. notational
convention is understood to the effect that ij the same reasoning were to be
represented as convergent, it would be diagrammed in another way for —
example, as
Reason A Reason B
Conclusion C
then the preceding graphically simplified diagram would not even be a

all. Without the background context
representation of linked reasoning at
of this natural-logic proof-theoretic distinction, a diagram that resembled
the preceding graphically simplified diagram might be a representation of
convergent or linked reasoning, or simply any reasoning from several
premises to a conclusion with no differentiation or distinction made between
linked and convergent inferential patterns. If the natural-logic distinctions
and notational conventions were not operating in the background, one
could not say whether that diagram represented linked, convergent, or both
kinds of reasoning. Thus, the possibility of replacing "+" with "and" (or
^'k") in the diagrams, andof omitting the underlines, does nothing to show
that conjunction is equivalent to linkage, or that the two concepts are
identical.
Linkage actually represents a particular mode of passing from the
conjoined reasons to the conclusion. Conjunction, on the other hand, is a
way of combining several simpler statements to form a compound whose
truth value is a Boolean function of the truth value of the combined
statements. Linkage is a way of drawing a conclusion from the combination
(if one likes, "from the conjunction") of several statements. The easy con-
fusion of conjunction with linkage thus resembles the familiar widespread

confusion of conditional statements (and the "if-then" connective) with
logical implication, which is an entailment relationship.
Aristotleand other traditional logicians certainly understood, and
represented, the uniting or merging of premises to support conclusions
combinatorially, at least in some types of inferences. But the claim that
Aristotle, and/or other traditional logicians, understood and anticipated
For more on the difference between conditional statements and logical implication, see "The-
oreticalNotes" in the Instructor's Manual.
46 1 Appendix II
the natural-logic concept of linked inference and the correlative distinction

between linked and convergent reasoning, is surprising because the natural-
logic concept of linked inference is a unitary, or uniting, concept that
bridges the supposed sharp line of the traditional induction-deduction
dichotomy, severely straining (and possibly even contradicting) the tradi-
tional theory that "induction" and "deduction" comprise two completely
different kinds of inference, or distinct modes of logical reasoning. (The
natural-logic concept of linked inference cuts across this traditional alleged
fundamental dichotomy because both of these two supposedly different
"types of reasoning" receive identical diagrammatic representations, and
because natural logic permits representing reasoning that traditional
dichotomic theory would seem to need somehow to factor into two separate
steps (one "inductive," the other "deductive") as 3. single linked inference.
For example: "Tfie first apple from this basket was ripe and the second
apple from it was ripe too; therefore, the third apple drawn from the basket
also will be ripe.") Indeed, a few recent induction-deduction dichotomists
desirous of adopting something like arrow notation including linkage have
felt the need to introduce the use of different types of underlines (such as
single vs. double underlines) to distinguish "inductions" from "deduc-

tions." They, of course, then naturally find that they require a third kind of
underline (such as dashed) to represent the very large class of inferences that
resist being fitted into one of these two traditional categories, a class ap-
parently larger than either of the first two.)
So I am surprised to be told that Aristotle understood the concept of
linked reasoning (and so, apparently, the correlated concept of convergent
reasoning), because I thought that the traditional theory of the induction-
deduction dichotomy began in Aristotle's distinction between epagoge and
syllogismos'. But lam most delighted to hear this because, as you may know,
natural logic still has not fully solved the difficult problem of giving a
general, exhaustive formula for distinguishing linked from convergent
inference in natural languages. If Aristotle (or other traditional logicians,
for that matter) drew and understood this identical distinction, their exact
definition or formulation of it may help solve this problem, so please tell me
where in woYks these concepts are presented, the terminology he
Aristotle'-s
used for the two categories "linked" and "convergent." and exactly how he
defines or explains the difference between them.
"Well, traditional logicians perhaps do not draw the distinction
explicitly in their theories of logic, but they certainly use the two patterns of
—
reasoning in their expository writings." But the question concerned the
'An. Post. 71a 5-8. 71b 15-19. For a discussion, see Perry Weddle. "Inductive. Deducti\e." Informal
Logic. 2. no. 1. 1.
462 Appendix II
origins ot these concepts and distinctions in logical theory, and not the mere
following of patterns in reasoning that accord with them. It is certainly not
surprising to hear that great traditional philosophers actually reasoned in
these two patterns, for natural logic strives to represent accurately the
patterns that actually occur in reasoning in natural languages. If the model
is accurate, probably even previous ordinary speakers have used both
convergent and linked patterns in their reasoning. Originally, the objection

seemed to concern the recognition and characterization of these different pat-
terns in a logical theory. A logician's use of certain patterns of inference as
he actually reasons does not necessarily imply that these patterns are also
recognized or analyzed in his theory of logic. (Even the logical model of
Frege did not fit the reality of Frege's own reasoning in his philosophical
writings.)
"Perhaps the linked-convergent distinction was not explicitly noted by
traditional logicians because it is soobvious." —
Perhaps so, but then why is
it not at least reflected in their logical systems or methods of analysis,
especially since the distinction seems crucial to the analysis and evaluation
of reasoning in natural languages, and, whether it is obvious or not, seems
to involve an important unsolved theoretical problem in applied logic? (In

truth, of course, overlooking the obvious has long been a source of error in
traditional logical theories.)
APPENDIX III
On the Definition of Validity

in Natural Logic
"Suppose an argument has premises that cannot be true, or a conclusion

that cannot be false (e.g., is it would not be
a necessary truth). In that case,
possible for the premises to be true and
conclusion be false. So,
yet the
wouldn't such an argument be 'deductively valid' by the definition of
validity in natural logic? And isn't there something wrong with this,
and conclusion might have
because, looked at intuitively, these premises
nothing do with each other?"
at all to
To begin,- we might observe the precedent of formal logicians who
classify such argûments (for example, with contradictory premises or
tautologous conclusions) as formally "valid," so formal logic is in no
stronger position than natural logic in this regard. Also, it could be argued
that the issue is moot from a practical standpoint, since arguments with
necessarily false reasons can never be sound (and therefore the conclusion is
not established, and need not be accepted, even though the argument is
so,
"valid"), and since a conclusion that cannot be false (for example, a nec-
essary truth) is always true, one could never be led into error by accepting
it. Also, the questioner might be reminded of Quine's observation that no
statement in the totality of our beliefs (even a so-called "necessary truth") is

beyond revision in the face of sufficiently recalcitrant experience.^
Actually, this problem seems more embarrassing for formal logic than
for natural logic, because in natural logic, "valid" defined asreasoning is
reasoning in which the truth of the reason(s) would make the truth of the
conclusion at least highly likely — or some formulation equivalent to this
definition. It is quite possible to maintain that reasoning with a necessarily
true, or tautologous, conclusion and an irrelevant premise (for example,
"The Sun is hot; therefore, = 0") does not count as "valid reasoning"
under this definition, because the truth of the conclusion is not, or would
^W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point of View (Camhridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 42.
463
464 Appendix III
not be, made highly hkely by the truth of the premise. Reasoning with
a self-contradictory premise and an intuitively irrelevant conclusion (for
example, "P and not -P; therefore, the Sun is cold") does not auto-
matically qualify as "valid" in natural logic for a similar reason. It is dif-
ficult to see how to amend extensionalist definitions to accomplish an
equivalent result.
Actually, "the unlikelihood of: the conclusion's being false if the
reason(s) were true" is. strictly speaking, only a necessary condition of
validity entailed by the natural-logic definition, as I hope the text
everywhere says, when carefully read. To obtain a sufficient condition of

validity in natural logic, one must conjoin this with the additional re-
quirement that the truth of the reason(s) would make the truth of
the conclusion at least extremely likely — or perhaps, that the truth of the
reason(s) would increase our reasonable expectation of the truth of the con-
clusion above what it would be if we did not possess the information in
the reason(s), but I have more reservations about this latter formulation.
Further discussion of the problem of defining "validity," as the term
applies to reasoning in natural languages, involves theoretical issues
beyond the scope of an elementary textbook. The students' text mainly
attempts to present methods of logical analysis and evaluation that are
univerally applicable and effective, without troubling or confusing be-
ginners with extended discussions of problems in traditional logical the-
ory, or how natural logic attempts to avoid them (In fact, these appendices
.
were only added with reluctance, because important theoretical aspects

of the methods of natural logic were being misunderstood by some phi-
losophers.)
Index
Abbreviation, in argument diagram. .Artificial language, xi, 5-7. 447-56

311, 418 Axiom of Abstraction. 455 footnote
Additional assumptions {See
Suppressed premises)
Afllrming the antecedent. 208
Ambiguous language. 155, 365-67 Basic reason, defined, 38
Analysis: Beardsley, Monroe, xi. 10 footnote. 20
advanced. 385-446 footnote. 39 footnote. 57
basic concepts of, 1-93 footnote. 66 footnote. 83
of disorganized reasoning: footnote. 122 footnote
complex. 437-42 'Because." as inference indicator.
simple. 273-94 13-17. 393-95
Analytic-synthetic distinction, xi. 128. Begging the question, 370-71
173 footnote^6i-62 footnote, Biconditional. 197
448-56, 463 'Borderline arguments. 21-22
'
Angle brackets. 66-70. 83-92 Bosanquet. Bernard, xi

Antecedent, in conditional. 191. 197. Box notation. 215-22. 321-22. 393-94.
208 399, 422
Argument: Bracketing. 66-70. 83-89, 131, 158.
ascertaining existence of, 17-24 160-165, 253-64, 368
basic forms of. 57-65
defmed, 10-12
determining structure of, 57-63,
83-93 Carnap, Rudolph, xi, 15 footnote
basic mechanics of 66-73 Causal explanation. 13-17, 389-95.
and inference indicators, 12-20 399-400
Argument diagram. 37-38 Cause, and genetic fallacy, 361-63
abbreviation in. 311, 418 Charity (See Principle of Charity)
in a box, 215-22. 321-22, 393-94. Circular reasoning, 370-71
399, 422 Clarification:
for convergent arguments, 60-65 of muddv reasoning, 273-94,
in decision making,'304-l2 385-406. 437-42
for disorganized reasoning, 273-94 of unclear language, 155-67
for divergent arguments, 58 Collateral information, 172-74, 253-64
for linked arguments, 58-60 Completeness proofs, 453
for serizil arguments. 57-58 Conclusion:
Argumentation ad hominan, 363-65 defined, 11-12
Argumentum ad ignorantiam, 371 of disorganized arguments, 437-39
Aristotle, 457, 460-61 omission of, 21
Arrow notation, 37-65 validity of, 111-40
465
466 Index
Conditional: Deductively valid reasoning:(Co«^)

confused with implication, 460 as suppressed premises, 259-61
connectives for, 191-98 and transpositives, 203-7
and contraposition, 203-7 Degree of support:
counterfactual, 447 footnote deductively valid, 127-35
defined, 191-93 moderate, 125-26, 135
fallacious inferences involving, nil, 123, 135
211-12 strong, 126-27, 135

material, 447 footnote weak, 123-25, 135
and miscellaneous inference forms, Degree of validity, 122 {See also Degree
212-215 of support)
and modus ponens, 208-9 Denials, 203
and modus tollens, 209-11 Dependent clause, in analysis, 90-92
and necessary condition, 194-95 Discourse, defined, 10
and sufficient condition, 193-94 Disjunctive syllogism, 213-14
as suppressed premise, 260 Divergent argument, defined, 58
Conditionalization, 215-19 Double negation, 203
Confirmatory instance, 59, 418, 438 Dreben, Burton, xi
Conjunct, 10, 437-38, 457-63
Conjunction, role of, 10, 437-38,
459-62
Consequent, in conditional, 191, 197,
208 Either-or reasoning, 213-14, 367-69
Contraposition, 203-7 Equivocal language, 155, 365-67
Convergent argument, defined, 60-65 Essential clause, 90-92
convergent-linked distinction, in analysis, 85, 90-92
60-65, 89, 457-62 Evaluation, 111-40
Converse, 206-7 Explanation, contrasted with
justification, 13-17
Extensionalism, 6 footnote, 447-56,
464
Dashed arrows, 306-12, 327-30

Decision making:
diagramming procedure for,
304-22, 327-47 Fallacy:
example of, 313-22, 330-45 of affirming the consequent, 211-12
recommendations on, 312-13 of denying the antecedent, 212
Decision procedure for validity, 171 of equivocation, 365-67
Declarative sentence, 9-10, 47 false alternatives, 367-69
Deductively valid reasoning, 127-30 false dilemma, 367-69
and contrapositives, 203-7 formal, 453-54
defined, 191-93 genetic, 361-63
fallacious inferences involving, of hasty generalization, 369
211-12 informal types of, 361-71
and miscellaneous inference forms, of insufficient statistics, 369
212-15 of thinking in extremes, 367-69
and modus ponens, 208-9 Final conclusions, defined, 38
and modus tollens, 209-11 Footnotes, 160
and necessary conditions, 193-94, Formal 453
fallacy,
198 Formal 256 footnote,
logic, 5-7,
and sufficient conditions, 194-95, 447-56, 459
198 Frege, 455 footnote, 462
jl:^^
46: Index
Genetic fallacy, 361-63 Magic question, 133-35, 168

Gentzen, Gerhard, vii, xi, 458 Mill, John Stuart, 42-44. 261
Giving evidence, 21, 59-60 Modal words, 22-23, 72-73, 166-67
Moderate support, 125-26, 135
Modus ponens, 207-9. 260
Hastv generalizations, 124, 127. 369 Modus 209-11
tollens,
Hume. David, 262-64, 414f
Hypothetical syllogism, 212-13
Hypothetico-deductive, model of Natural language, 4-6, 155. 447-64
scientific explanation, xi, 13-17, Natural logic, 6-7, 447-64
59-60 Necessary condition, 194-95. 198
and transposition, 203-7
Negations, 203
Imperatives, 9, 47-48, 67 Nil support, 123, 135
Inconsistency, defined, 130 Nonlogical terms, 447-56
Inductive reasoning. 38 footnote. 59, Nonrestrictive clause, 90-91
122-27, 262-64 in analysis, 91-92
diagramming of, 59, 262-64 Noun phrases, 39-40. 87
dichotomy with deduction, 461 diagramming of, 87
and fallacy, 369
problem of, 122-27, 262-64
and suppressed premises, 262-64 Omitted conclusion, 21, 39-40
Inessential clause, 87, 90-92
in analysis, 90-92
Pascal, 2
Inference {See also Argument)
Peirce. Charles S. xi
,
basic forms of, 57-6iO
Philosophv of life. 346
replaced by arr<5\v, 37
Plato. 2, 278
Inference indicator:
Population, and statistical
absence of, 18-20, 39-42
generalization, 262-64
for conclusions, 12-13
Possible worlds, 173 footnote
omission of, 18-20, 39-42, 174
Premise, defined, 133
for reasons, 12
Prepositional phrase, diagramming of,
Intermediate conclusion, 38, 57
86
as suppressed premise, 255-56
Principle of Charitv. 18-20, 43, 47, 73,
Irrationality, in decision making,
89, 163. 167'
316-17
Problem of induction, 263
Proof, requirements for, 111-16
Proof by contradiction, 221-22
Justification:
Proof theory, 458
contrasted with explanation, 13-17
Pure hypothetical syllogism, 212-13
and genetic fallacy, 361-63
Qualifying word (or phrase), and

Kekule,Friedrich, 362-63 degree of validity, 130-31
Quine, xi, 261-62, 173 footnote, 454,
463
Linked argument:
defined, 58-60
long, 413-22 Reasoning:
Locke, John, 206-7 basic analysis of, 9-93
Logical form, 455 basic evaluation of, 111-264, 361-71
Logically entailed, defined, 133 in decision making, 303-12,
Logically implied, defined, 133 321-22, 328-30. 342-47
468 Inclrx
Reasoning. (Co/i/.) Straw man fallacy, 369

defined, 12 Strong support, 126-27, 135
disorganized and confused, 273-94, Structure:
437-42 and basic argument forms, 57-65
either-or, 213-14 determination of, 68-73, 83-92
Reasons {See also Suppressed premises) Sufficient condition, 193-94, 198

against conclusions, 305-9 Suppressed premises:
against other reasons, 309-11, basic mechanics of, 164, 253-59
327-30 and begging the question, 370-71
basic, 38 false, 257-58
in evaluation, 111-19 and false alternatives, 367-69
inference indicators for, 12 implicit, 253
and noun phrases, 38-39 and long linked arguments, 413-14
Reduction to absurdity, 219-21 recommendations on, 259-60
Representative sample, 262-64 sufficient, 253
Restrictive clause, 90-92 Symbolic Logic, 5-6, 447-56
in analysis, 90-92
Rhetorical question, diagramming of,
9, 83-84 Tautology, xi, 261-62 footnote, 450,

452
Transposition, 203-7
Sample, and statistical generalization, Truth, of reasons, 111-19
262-64
Schiitte, Kurt, vii, ix,458
Unsound, defined, 113-19
Semantic clarification, 155-74
Semantic fallacy, 365-67
Semantic reasoning, 165 Vague language, 155
Semantic rules, 453-56 Validity:
Sentences, and declarative function, and decision making, 311, 327-30
9-10 defined, 111-36, 167-72, 447-56,
Serial argument, 57-58 458-59
Sound argument, requirements for, degrees of, 122-36, 168-71 (See also
111-19, 167-72
Degree of support)
Square brackets, use of, 89, 158, 160,
172
Statement, defined, 10 Weak support, 123-25. 135
Statistical generalization: Wholistic approach, 274
diagramming of, 59 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, vii, xi, 5, 155
and fallacy, 124, 369 footnote, 256 footnote, 455
and suppressed premises, 262-64 footnote
A
PRACTICAL REASONING
IN NATURAL LANGUAGE
Stephen Naylor Thomas
READERS' COMMENTS:
"... the finest text that have ever read in what might be
I
called practical reasoning'. Its pedagogical elegance far

surpasses its competitors."
"This text is a student's book— a student's dream. It is

mainly concerned with teaching students how to think and
reason logically, rather than with teaching questionable
doctrines of traditional logical theory. To put it differently,
the student's need to understand and learn how to read dis-
course accurately and reason logically is treated as being
more important than the difficulties in formal logic."
was amazed by Thomas' success at putting together

"I
methods of logic that are genuinely applicable, just as the

title indicates, to natural language. Other texts and their log-
ical methods are really off in their own little world, not doing
much of real applicability or value."
". .The basic diagramming approach is a valuable peda-

.
gogical device because it draws a picture of an argument

(helping the reader to 'see' the structure of an argument),
and because the type of diagram used has affinities with
'natural deduction' techniques in symbolic logic, allowing
the reader to move to more advanced work in logic with a
base to build upon."
Stephen Naylor Thomas, a graduate of Harvard University,

received his Ph.D. degree in philosophy of science from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of
The Formal Mechanics of Mind, published by Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
PRENTICE-HALL, INC. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632
ISBN D-13-bT21S3-l

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hird Edition is5>5 mi^.

Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07632

Thomas, Stephen N. (dale)

BC177.T5 1986 160 84-26403

Editorial/production supervision and

© 1986, 1981, 1977, 1975, 1974, and 1973 by Stephen N. Thomas

No part of this book may be

Printed in the United States of America

Prentice-Hall International (UK) Limited, London

PREFACE TO THE INSTRUCTOR vii

i BASIC ANALYSIS OF REASONING 9

1-1 What is Reasoning 9

BASIC EVALUATION OF REASONING 111

2-1 What Is Good Reasoning? Ill

Exercises 2-1 A 141

2-4 Some Valid Steps of Reasoning Using Conditional and Other

CLARIFYING OBSCURE REASONING 273

3-1 Analyzing Muddy Reasoning or Confused Exposition 273

PRACTICAL DECISION MAKING 303

4-1 Making Decisions Logically: Reasons For Actions and Reasons

TRADITIONAL TOPICS 361

5-1 Some Informal Fallacies 361

ANALYZING MEDIA EDITORIALS 385

6-1 Analyzing Reasoning Expressed in Contemporary Editorial Style 385

7-1 Analyzing Long Linked Arguments 413

APPENDIX I Limitations in Formal Approaches to the Analysis and

APPENDIX II On the History and Theory of the Linked-Convergent

APPENDIX III On the Definition of Validity in Natural Logic 463

language.) Thus, by a traditional definition of "induction," this is, in

large part, a textbook on inductive reasoning (although philosophers who

clarificatory techniques has been converted into a new Chapter 3 and

which transparencies can be made for display in class on an overhead

On the surface, this is an elementary, democratic textbook endeavoring

to teach the rudiments of reasoning to beginning logic students. The ob-

that at a deeper level it is a theoretical work, presenting a new, nontra-

In addition, I would like to thank Howard Kahane, who permitted

Stephen Naylor Thomas

Rational vs. hrational

example, the danger of nuclear warfare, contamination or destruction of

Logic and Language

Natural and Artificial Languages

This book is about reasoning in natural languages. A natural lan-

English, French, German, Dutch, Spanish, Chinese, Swahili, and Hopi

The Two Traditional Approaches to Logic

Logic can be approached in different ways. Formal logic, one tradi-

The Advent of Natural Logic

retical, technical, legal, political, economic, or scientific reasoning. For the

1-1 WHAT IS REASONING?

shall deal in this book will be declarative sentences or sentences of other

entire sequence of words from a beginning capital letter to a period at its

(a) She is much older than he.

only the second discourse contains reasoning.

Partial list of words or phrases that often function as

as . . . (many exceptions) seeing that . . .

since . . (many exceptions)

for . . . (many exceptions) in view of the fact that . . .

because ... on the correct supposition that . . .

as shown by . . . assuming, as we may. that . . .

as indicated by . . . may be inferred from . . .

follows from . . . may be deduced from . . .

being that . . . may be derived from . . .

being as . . . whereas . (in legal docutnents)

inasmuch as . . . in the second place . . .