Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=phd.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York and Ph.D. Program in Political Science
of the City University of New York are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Comparative Politics.
http://www.jstor.org
The Causes of Terrorism
Martha Crenshaw*
0010-4159/8110715-00011$05.00/1
? 1981 The City University of New York 379
Comparative Politics July 1981
380
Martha Crenshaw
381
Comparative Politics July 1981
bombings when they were able to acquire plastic explosives. In 1907, the
CombatOrganizationof the Socialist-Revolutionarypartypaid 20,000 rubles
to an inventorwho was working on an aircraftin the futile hope of bombing
the Russian imperialpalaces from the air.9 Today we fear that terroristswill
exploit the potentialof nuclearpower, but it was in 1867 that Nobel's inven-
tion of dynamite made bombings a convenient terroristtactic.
Urbanizationis partof the moderntrendtowardaggregationand complex-
ity, which increasesthe numberand accessibility of targetsand methods. The
popular concept of terrorismas "urban guerrillawarfare" grew out of the
LatinAmericanexperienceof the late 1960s.'0 Yet, as Hobsbawnhas pointed
out, cities became the arenafor terrorismafter the urbanrenewal projectsof
the late nineteenth century, such as the boulevards constructed by Baron
Haussmanin Paris, made them unsuitablefor a strategybased on riots and the
defense of barricades.'1In preventing popular insurrections, governments
have exposed themselves to terrorism.P.N. Graboskyhas recentlyarguedthat
cities are a significantcause of terrorismin thatthey providean opportunity(a
multitudeof targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences)
and a recruitingground among the politicized and volatile inhabitants.12
Social "facilitation," which Gurr found to be extremely powerful in
bringing about civil strife in general, is also an importantpermissive factor.
This concept refers to social habits and historicaltraditionsthat sanction the
use of violence againstthe government,makingit morallyand politicallyjus-
tifiable, and even dictating an appropriateform, such as demonstrations,
coups, or terrorism.Social myths, traditions,and habits permitthe develop-
ment of terrorismas an establishedpolitical custom. An excellent example of
such a traditionis the case of Ireland, where the traditionof physical force
dates from the eighteenth century, and the legend of Michael Collins in
1919-21 still inspiresand partiallyexcuses the much less discriminateand less
effective terrorismof the contemporaryProvisionalIRA in NorthernIreland.
Moreover, broadattitudesand beliefs thatcondone terrorismare communi-
cated transnationally.Revolutionaryideologies have always crossed borders
with ease. In the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries, such ideas were
primarily a Europeanpreserve, stemming from the French and Bolshevik
Revolutions. Since the Second World War, ThirdWorld revolutions-China,
Cuba, Algeria-and intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon and Carlos Mari-
ghela13have significantly influenced terroristmovements in the developed
West by promotingthe developmentof terrorismas routine behavior.
The most salient political factor in the category of permissive causes is a
government'sinability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism.The absence of
adequatepreventionby police and intelligence services permitsthe spreadof
conspiracy. However, since terroristorganizatonsare small and clandestine,
the majorityof statescan be placed in the permissive category. Inefficiency or
382
Martha Crenshaw
leniency can be found in a broad range of all but the most brutallyefficient
dictatorships,includingincompetentauthoritarianstates such as tsaristRussia
on the eve of the emergence of NarodnayaVolya as well as modern liberal
democratic states whose desire to protect civil liberties constrains security
measures. The absence of effective security measures is a necessary cause,
since our limited informationon the subject indicates that terrorismdoes not
occur in the communist dictatorships;and certainly repressive military re-
gimes in Uruguay,Brazil, and Argentinahave crushedterroristorganizations.
For many governments, however, the cost of disallowing terrorismis too
high.
Turningnow to a considerationof the direct causes of terrorism,we focus
on backgroundconditions that positively encourage resistance to the state.
These instigatingcircumstancesgo beyond merely creatingan environmentin
which terrorismis possible; they provide motivationand directionfor the ter-
roristmovement. We are dealing here with reasonsratherthan opportunities.
The first condition that can be considereda direct cause of terrorismis the
existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroupof a larger
population, such as an ethnic minoritydiscriminatedagainstby the majority.
A social movement develops in orderto redress these grievances and to gain
either equal rights or a separatestate; terrorismis then the resort of an ex-
tremistfaction of this broadermovement. In practice,terrorismhas frequently
arisen in such situations: in modern states, separatist nationalism among
Basques, Bretons, and Quebegoishas motivatedterrorism.In the colonial era,
nationalistmovements commonly turnedto terrorism.
This is not to say, however, that the existence of a dissatisfied minorityor
majorityis a necessaryor a sufficientcause of terrorism.Not all those who are
discriminatedagainst turnto terrorism,nor does terrorismalways reflect ob-
jective social or economic deprivation.In West Germany, Japan, and Italy,
for example, terrorismhas been the chosen method of the privileged, not the
downtrodden.Some theoretical studies have suggested that the essential in-
gredientthat must be addedto real deprivationis the perceptionon the partof
the deprived that this condition is not what they deserve or expect, in short,
that discriminationis unjust. An attitudestudy, for example, found that "the
idea of justice or fairness may be more centrally related to attitudestoward
violence than are feelings of deprivation.It is the perceived injustice under-
lying the deprivationthatgives rise to angeror frustration."14 The intervening
variables, as we have argued, lie in the terrorists'perceptions. Moreover, it
seems likely that for terrorismto occur the governmentmust be singled out to
blame for popularsuffering.
The second condition that creates motivations for terrorismis the lack of
opportunityfor political participation.Regimes thatdeny access to power and
persecutedissenterscreatedissatisfaction.In this case, grievancesare primar-
383
Comparative Politics July 1981
390
Martha Crenshaw
391
Comparative Politics July 1981
such stupid blundering fools that they make our cause appear imbecile and
farcical. When the fact becomes known that those half-idiotic attempts have
been made by men professingto be patrioticIrishmenwhat will the world think
but that Irish revolutionistsare a lot of fools and ignoramuses,men who do not
understandthe first principles of the art of war, the elements of chemistry or
even the amountof explosive materialnecessary to remove or destroy an ordi-
narybrickor stone wall. Thinkof the uttermadnessof men who have no idea of
accumulativeand destructiveforces undertakingwith common blasting powder
to scare and shatterthe Empire.35
Not only do serious terrorists scorn the ineptitude of the more excitable, but
they find them a serious security risk. Rossa, for example, could not be
trusted not to give away the Clan na Gael's plans for terrorism in his New
York newspaper articles. In a similar vein, Boris Savinkov, head of the
Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary party in Russia, tried to
discourage an aspirant whom he suspected of being drawn to the adventure of
terrorism:
392
Martha Crenshaw
393
Comparative Politics July 1981
394
Martha Crenshaw
395
Comparative Politics July 1981
Conclusions
396
Martha Crenshaw
NOTES
*I would like to thank my colleagues at Wesleyan University for their comments on this
manuscript.I am also gratefulto the NationalEndowmentfor the Humanitiesfor a fellowship that
funded my research.
1. For discussions of the meaning of the concept of terrorism, see Thomas P. Thornton,
"Terroras a Weapon of Political Agitation," in HarryEckstein, ed. InternalWar (New York,
1964), pp. 71-99; MarthaCrenshawHutchinson, "The Concept of RevolutionaryTerrorism,"
RevolutionaryTerrorism:The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962 (Stanford:The Hoover Institution
Press, 1978) chap. 2; and E. Victor Walter, Terror and Resistance (New York, 1969).
2. Walter Laqueur, "Interpretationsof Terrorism-Fact, Fiction and Political Science,"
Journal of ContemporaryHistory, 12 (January1977), 1-42. See also his majorwork Terrorism
(London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977).
3. See, for example, Paul Wilkinson, Terrorismand the Liberal State (London:Macmillan,
1977), or J. Bowyer Bell, A Timeof Terror:How DemocraticSocieties Respondto Revolutionary
Violence (New York, 1978).
4. This is not to deny that some modem terroristgroups, such as those in West Germany,
resemble premodem millenarianmovements. See specifically Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Liberty
and Terrorism," InternationalSecurity, 2 (1977), 56-67. In general, see Norman Cohn, The
Pursuit of the Millenium (London:Secker and Warburg, 1957), and E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive
Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movementin the 19th and 20th Centuries (Manches-
ter: ManchesterUniversity Press, 1971).
5. A samplingwould include Douglas Hibbs, Jr., Mass Political Violence:A Cross-National
Causal Analysis (New York, 1973); William J. Crotty, ed. Assassinations and the Political
Order (New York, 1971); Ted RobertGurr, WhyMen Rebel (Princeton, 1971), and Gurr,Peter
N. Grabosky, and RichardC. Hula, The Politics of Crime and Conflict (Beverly Hills, 1977).
6. For a summaryof these findings, see Gurr, "The Calculus of Civil Conflict," Journal of
Social Issues, 28 (1972), 27-47.
7. Gurr, "Some Characteristicsof Political Terrorismin the 1960s," in Michael Stohl, ed.
The Politics of Terrorism(New York, 1979), pp. 23-50 and 46-47.
8. A distinctionbetweenpreconditionsand precipitantsis found in Eckstein, "On the Etiology
of InternalWars," History and Theory, 4 (1965), 133-62. Kenneth Waltz also differentiates
between the frameworkfor action as a permissive or underlying cause and special reasons as
immediateor efficient causes. In some cases we can say of terrorism,as he says of war, that it
occurs because thereis nothingto preventit. See Man, the State and War (New York, 1959), p.
232.
9. Boris Savinkov, Memoirsof a Terrorist,trans. Joseph Shaplen(New York: A. & C. Boni,
1931), pp. 286-87.
10. The majortheoreticiansof the transitionfrom the ruralto the urbanguerrillaare Carlos
Marighela, For the Liberationof Brazil (Harmondsworth:Penguin Books, 1971), and Abraham
Guillen, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The RevolutionaryWritingsof AbrahamGuillen,
trans. and edited by Donald C. Hodges (New York, 1973).
11. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries:ContemporaryEssays (New York, 1973), pp. 226-27.
397
Comparative Politics July 1981
398
Martha Crenshaw
399