amount of P9,000.

00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any

damage to the leased premises except when caused by
reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private
respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested the
refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing

RULE 65
the rental for the additional ten days of his occupancy after the
expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He
said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the
electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for
repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their
original condition.

The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of

Makati. After the submission of position papers by the parties,

CERTIORARI
a summary judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985,
sustaining the complainant and holding that the repainting was
not chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the
plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance of
the deposit after deducting the water and electricity charges.
The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of P1,250.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the Costs.

This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of

Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on
January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum decision.
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition
for review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was
his motion for reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. He is
now before us to fault the respondent court, principally for
sustaining the memorandum decision of the regional trial court.
His contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court committed grave

abuse of discretion in rendering the memorandum decision.

Ruling: No, in the case at bar because the decision of the

Court of Appeals extensively quoted from the decision of the
metropolitan trial court. Although only incorporated by
reference in the memorandum decision of the regional trial
court, Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless available to the
Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or even
happenstance, if you will, that has validated the memorandum
decision challenged in this case and spared it from
constitutional infirmity.

That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down

the following requirement, as a condition for the proper
application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum
decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact
and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote
reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not
easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to
be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and
the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, attached to the said decision. In other words, the
vs. memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
respondents. conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to
G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989 and made an indispensable part of the decision.

CRUZ, J.:
Facts: The petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the
private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated
rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract,
the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that
no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that
its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination
of the facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity
at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an
examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also
understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin
with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively to
the memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial court
in the case at bar, or to the decision of the respondent court
such decision on the strength of Romero v. Court of Appeals.
As earlier observed, there was substancial compliance with
Section 40 because of the direct availability and actual review
of the decision of Judge Balita incorporated by reference in the
memorandum decision of Judge de la Rama. The
memorandum decision as then understood under the Romero
decision was a valid act at the time it was rendered by Judge
de la Rama and produced binding legal effect. We also affirm
the finding of the respondent court that the summary judgment
without a formal trial was in accord with the Rule on Summary
Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not
improper.
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the
requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed
and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation
will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of
the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a
lawless disobedience.
NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, ILOILO CITY and
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Respondents
G.R. NO. 165001 January 31, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts: New Frontier Sugar Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of raw sugar milling.
Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations with its creditors
as they fell due, petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of
State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation. The Equitable PCI Bank (respondent
bank), filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude
Property, alleging that petitioner is not qualified for corporate
rehabilitation, as it can no longer operate because it has no
assets left. The RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the
proceedings and dismissing the case.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for
certiorari, which was denied by the CA per assailed Decision
dated July 19, 2004. The CA also ruled that even if the RTC
erred in dismissing the petition, the same could not be
corrected anymore because what petitioner filed before the CA
was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal.
Issue: Whether or not CA correctly ruled that petitioners
availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action
for certiorari.
Ruling: The CA correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the
wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
not errors of judgment. It is an original and independent action
that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of
the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since
the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior
to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari
should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of
judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a
petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors.
JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 137914 December 4, 2002
CORONA, J.:
Facts: Petitioners Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno were
charged by Neugene Marketing, Inc. (NMI), with the crime of
estafa with abuse of confidence before the City Prosecutor
issued a resolution absolving the petitioners from criminal
liability due to lack of malice on the part of the petitioners in
retaining the money of NMI. The appeal by NMI to the DOJ
was denied on the ground that the petitioners did not
misappropriate corporate funds. NMI then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution., the DOJ ordered the
reinvestigation of the case. The petitioners filed at the DOJ
petitions for reinvestigation of the cases but the same were
denied on the ground that the trial court's permission should
first be secured before reinvestigation can be conducted
.Petitioners then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
before the trial court on the ground that there was a need for
reinvestigation and there was a prejudicial question in a SEC
case pending before this Court docketed as G. R. No. 112941.
The SEC case questions the validity of the dissolution of NMI.
Initially, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and
ordered the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation. But, on motion
for reconsideration by the prosecutor, the trial court reversed
itself, set aside the previous order and scheduled the
arraignment of the petitioners. On January 19, 1996, the
petitioners filed another motion to suspend the proceedings,
based on the same ground that the prejudicial question in the
SEC case would determine the petitioners' guilt in the criminal
cases, thereby necessitating the suspension of the same.
On June 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the first assailed
order denying petitioners' motion to suspend the proceedings.
Arraignment was scheduled on June 28, 1996. But on the day
of the arraignment, petitioner Lee failed to appear. The trial
court then issued the second assailed order, directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and fixing an additional bond in
the amount of P30,000 by petitioner Lee.
The petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questioning the
said orders of the trial court. However the petition is denied.
Issue: whether or not the appellate court correclty dismissed
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Ruling: Yes, We have consistently ruled that certiorari lies only
where it is clearly shown that there is a patent and gross abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. Certiorari may not be availed of where it is
not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its
questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes
in the court's findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order
may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is
shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court
generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards
interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will
not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly
burden the courts. We find that the allegations of the
petitioners are not sufficient grounds to qualify as abuse of
discretion warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner,vs.ATTY. JOVITO A.
CORESIS, JR., Graft Investigation Officer I and/or OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN - MINDANAO, SIXTO O. DALEON, AIDA
AGULO, DESIDERIO ALABA, NORMA TECSON, and the
BOARD OF REGENTS of the UNIVERSITY OF
SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES; SECRETARY RICARDO
GLORIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY RENO CAPINPIN – of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), DR.
EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, and NEDA REGIONAL
DIRECTOR SANTIAGO ENGINCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 134372. August 22, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of
said university. Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a
Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate School of
USP, with a salary grade of CS 29. The other respondents,
Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are faculty members of said
university. They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject
Ed.D., At the end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three
final passing grades. They were graded without requiring them
to attend regular classes. Instead, Dr. Daleon gave them a
special program of self-study with reading materials, once a
week tutorial meetings, quizzes, and term papers. several
doctoral students complained to petitioner that during the first
semester of school year 1994-1995, there were “ghost
students” in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon. According to
them, these “ghost students”, namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson
were given passing grades despite their failure to attend
classes. The matter was raised in a university council meeting
where it was agreed that the University President, Dr.
Edmundo Prantilla, would create a committee to investigate
the complaint.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr.
Daleon before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The
complaint for gross incompetence, insubordination and
violation of R.A. 6770. The Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao issued an order directing respondent members of
the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear
Administrative Case No. 96-602 to desist from conducting
further proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of
said criminal complaint forwarded to the Office for possible
consolidation with the administrative complaint. A Resolution
was issued dismissing the administrative and criminal
complaints against respondents.
Issue: Whether or not public respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
exonerating Dr. Daleon from administrative as well as criminal
liability
Ruling: No, A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Court’s power
of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that
respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be
subjected to our review under Rule 65.
From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to
hold that the respondent Office had gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3,
1997. We note that the conclusions in said resolution are
based on substantial evidence easily verifiable from the
records. Well established is the principle that factual findings of
administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and
even finality by this Court, provided such findings are
supported by substantial evidence, as in this case. Petitioner
failed to establish that Dr. Daleon and the Board of Regents of
the University of Southeastern Philippines acted in evident bad
faith or with manifest partiality in the performance of their
official duties. Hence, there is no basis to hold that the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed any grave abuse of
discretion in exonerating respondents below from both
administrative and criminal charges.
ROBERT DEL MAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA EBERSOLE DEL MAR,
respondents.
G.R. No. 139008. March 13, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: After peaceful and continuous possession by petitioner
of the subject properties for more than twenty-two (22) years, a
complaint for reconveyance was filed by private respondent
against petitioner on May 15, 1997, alleging, inter-alia, that
petitioner obtained the aforementioned Certificates of Title
through fraud and deceit. Private respondent claimed that said
properties were left by her under the administration of
petitioner, who allegedly transferred the ownership of said
realty in his name by causing the issuance of Certificates of
Title in his name without her knowledge and consent.
However, records show that before she left for the United
States, private respondent executed the corresponding Deeds
of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner. This case, entitled
‘Norma Ebersole del Mar represented by Gerald del Mar vs.
Roberto del Mar and the Register of Deeds, Province of
Isabela’ was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago
City, Branch 35 and docketed as Civil Case No. 2373.
In his Answer, petitioner claimed that private respondent and
her co-owner, Florence Ebersole Finch, sold said properties to
him before the former left for the United States. Moreover, the
properties were transferred for good, sufficient and valuable
consideration, hence the sale was lawful and valid. During the
pre-trial conference, neither petitioner nor his counsel, Atty.
Federico Abuan, appeared, by reason of which the trial court
issued an order declaring petitioner as in default. The non-
appearance was due to the failure of Atty. Abuan, Jr. to inform
petitioner’s attorney-in-fact, Angelita Austria, of the scheduled
hearing. Said petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied, and private respondent was allowed to
adduce her evidence ex-parte. On the same day that said
motion was denied, the trial court rendered its October 21,
1997 decision in favor of private respondent and against
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On January 7,
1998.The counsel for private respondent, moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that petitioner had failed to file the
required brief within the reglementary period, the CA granted
the Motion to Dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling in favor of private
respondent.
Ruling: No, Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Revised Rules of
Court, expressly authorizes the CA to dismiss an appeal for,
inter alia, “failure of appellant to serve and file the required
number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time
provided by these Rules.”
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of when the
following requisites concur: (a) a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
annulling or modifying the proceeding.
LEUNG BEN, plaintiff,
vs.
P. J. O'BRIEN, JAMES A OSTRAND and GEO. R. HARVEY,
judges of First Instance of city of Manila, defendants.
G.R. No. L-13602 April 6, 1918
STREET, J.:
Facts: An action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila by P. J. O'Brien to recover of Leung Ben the
sum of P15,000 alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the
defendant in a series of gambling, banking and percentage
games conducted ruing the two or three months prior to the
institution of the suit. In his verified complaint the plaintiff asked
for an attachment, against the property of the defendant, on
the ground that the latter was about to depart from the
Philippine islands with intent to defraud his creditors. This
attachment was issued; and acting under the authority thereof,
the sheriff attached the sum of P15,000 which had been
deposited by the defendant with the International Banking
Corporation.
The defendant thereupon appeared by his attorney and moved
the court to quash the attachment. Said motion having
dismissed in the Court of First Instance, the petitioner, Leung
Ben, the defendant in that action, presented to this court, upon
January 8, 1918 his petition for the writ of certiorari directed
against P. J. O'Brien and the judges of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. The provision of law under which
this attachment was issued requires that there should be a
cause of action arising upon contract, express or implied. The
contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to
recover money lost at gaming is that the statutory action to
recover money lost at gaming is no such an action as is
contemplated in this provision, and he therefore insists that the
original complaint shows on its face that the remedy of
attachment is not available in aid thereof; that the Court of First
Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the writ of
attachment; that the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and that
consequently the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate
remedy for his relief.
Issue: Whether or not the writ of certiorari is the appropriate
remedy for the relief.
Ruling: No, when a court issues a writ of attachment for which
there is no statutory authority, it is acting irregularly and in
excess of its jurisdiction, in the sense necessary to justify the
Supreme Court in granting relief by the writ of certiorari. In
applying this proposition it is of course necessary to take
account of the difference between a ground of attachment
based on the nature of the action and a ground of attachment
based on the acts or the conditions of the defendant. Every
complaint must show a cause of action some sort; and when
the statue declares that the attachment may issue in an action
arising upon contract, the express or implied, it announces a
criterion which may be determined from an inspection of the
language of the complaint. The determination of this question
is purely a matter of law. On the other hand, when the stature
declares that an attachment may be issued when the
defendant is about to depart from the Islands, a criterion is
announced which is wholly foreign to the cause of action; and
the determination of it may involve a disputed question of fact
which must be decided by the court. In making this
determination, the court obviously acts within its powers; and it
would be idle to suppose that the writ of certiorari would be
available to reverse the action of a Court of First Instance in
determining the sufficiency of the proof on such a disputed
point, and in granting or refusing the attachment accordingly.
In our opinion the cause of action stated in the complaints in
the court below is based on a contract, express or implied and
is therefore of such nature that the court had authority to issue
writ of attachment. The application for the writ of certiorari must
therefore be denied and the proceedings dismissed.
MARIANO TENGCO, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE JOCSON, judge of first instance of Bulacan,
ANASTACIO SANTOS, and CIPIRANO LOMOTAN,
G.R. No. 19427 September 2, 1922
JOHNSON, J.:
Facts: This is an original petition in SC for writ of prohibition, to
refrain respondent judge from taking jurisdiction and deciding
municipal election protest. Upon presentation of petition, an
order was issued to respondents to show cause why the
prayer should not be granted. Respondents Santos and CFI
Judge Jocson filed separate answers.
On June 6, 1922, general election was held in municipality of
Malolos. On June 8, 1922, the board of municipal inspectors
declared that petitioner Tengco had been duly elected as
municipality president. On June 15, 1922, respondent Santos
presented motion of protest in CFI protesting said election.
On June 23, 1922, petitioner Tengco had a general denial to
the facts of the motion of protest and alleged that the facts
were not sufficient to constitute an election protest nor to justify
judicial investigation of said election, and prayed that motion of
protest be dismissed. Petitioner theory is that protestant did
not allege in his motion that he was a registered candidate
voted for such election, that he has no right to present said
motion, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
On July 7, 1922 or more than two (2) weeks after the election,
respondent Santos presented amended motion, changing the
allegation that he was a candidate voted for to a registered
candidate voted for. CFI permitted said amendment and
denied petitioner’s Motion to dismiss, and directed that cause
be set for trial .
Issue: Whether or not the CFI is given special jurisdiction in
election protest cases, acquire jurisdiction to hear and
determine such protest when it is presented by any other
person or persons than those designated by the law
Ruling: No, It may be said that the Election Law makes the
Court of First Instance a court of special jurisdiction, and
provides a special procedure for hearing and determining a
motion of protest in election cases. The Court of First Instance,
being a court of special jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction over an
election protest until the special facts upon which it may take
jurisdiction are expressly shown in the "motion of protest."
There is no presumption in favor of the jurisdiction. It is a well-
established rule that the records of a court of special
jurisdiction must affirmatively show that the court has
jurisdiction. When a court is given special statutory jurisdiction,
under proceedings different from the ordinary proceedings, the
special jurisdictional facts must appear. The special
jurisdictional facts must be shown by the records, both with
respect to the jurisdiction of the subject-matter, as well as with
respect to the jurisdiction of the parties.
From all of the foregoing decisions, we must conclude that if
the "motion of protest" does not show upon its face that it was
presented by "registered candidate voted for," the Court of
First Instance acquires no jurisdiction to hear and determine
the petition or motion.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Petitioner,
vs.
SILANGAN INVESTORS AND MANAGERS, INC. and
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 167055-56 March 25, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Petitioner,
vs.
POLYGON INVESTORS AND MANAGERS,
INCORPORATED and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170673
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
Digested by: John Daryl Josol
Facts: G.R. Nos. 167055 and 167056 involve a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The petition challenges the 21 June 2004 Resolution and 23
December 2004 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan. G.R.
No. 170673 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 7
July and 25 October 2005 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
. franchise agreements with petitioner corporation, as franchiser,
PCGG issued writs of sequestration against Aerocom
Investors and Managers, Inc. (Aerocom) and Polygon. By
virtue of the writs of sequestration, PCGG sequestered
majority of Oceanic’s shares of stock and took over its
management. PCGG voted the shares of stock registered in
the names of Silangan and Polygon, reorganized the board of
directors, elected its own set of officers, and declared cash
dividends.
On 1 August 1991, Jose, Nieto, Jr., Andres L. Africa, Aerocom,
Polygon, Belgor Investment, Inc., and Silangan filed before the
Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against PCGG. The
Sandiganbayan granted Silangan’s motion and released the
uncontested 49% of the cash dividends, with interest, declared
by Oceanic. In its 25 October 2005 Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan denied PCGG’s 20 July 2005 motion for
reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan held that, "Since Polygon
is not sequestered, its shares are not sequestered too, and its
dividends which follow the principal are not also sequestered,
Polygon is entitled to receive its share on the dividends
declared by Oceanic to its Class "A" shareholders in the
amount of P25,786,357.59."
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the release of the cash
dividends, with interest.
Ruling: No, In petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner must show that respondent tribunal
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari under Rule 65
is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not
a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a
limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an
inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for
an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of
was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
PCGG failed to show that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
JULIE'S FRANCHISE CORPORATION, ROBERTO R.
GANDIONCO, JOSE ENRICO R. GANDIONCO, CORNELIO
R. GANDIONCO, JOSEPH R. GANDIONCO, PATRICIA
CARLA G. UY, VIRGILIO G. ESPELETA, EMMANUEL E.
VIADO, ATTY. GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, and ATTY.
INOCENTES C. PEPITO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CHANDLER O. RUIZ in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, HON.
YOLINDA C. BAUTISTA in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Dipolog City, and
RICHARD EMMANUEL G. DANCEL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 180988 August 28, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
Facts: Respondent Dancel, as franchisee, entered into three
over the bakeshop. In 2003, respondent Dancel decided to
renew the franchise agreements for the three Julie’s
bakeshops. Three months before the expiration of the
franchise agreements, petitioner corporation evaluated the
performance of the three Julie’s bakeshops and the results
were favorable. Respondent Dancel paid the renewal fees for
the next five years of the franchise agreements covering the
three Julie’s bakeshops. However, when respondent Dancel
and his business partner Jose Rodion Uy dissolved their
business partnership, petitioner corporation informed
respondent Dancel that it was terminating the three franchise
agreements and that the extended term of the franchises
would expire on 30 June 2005.
Respondent Dancel filed against petitioner corporation a
complaint for Specific Performance with prayer for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order before the trial court. The trial court denied
respondent Dancel’s application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order for lack
of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals resolved to grant the
Temporary Restraining Order, effective for 60 days from
notice, restraining or enjoining petitioner corporation from
terminating the franchise agreements. Respondent Dancel
filed with the trial court a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. In a Joint Resolution6 dated 19 July
2007, the trial court resolved to issue a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction in accordance with the Court of Appeals’ Decision,
the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC acted without jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling: No, the petitioner questions the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. We find no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court, which merely issued the questioned Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in accordance with the decision of the
Court of Appeals which has already attained finality. Such
decision has become final and executory after petitioner
corporation’s appeal to this Court was denied for being filed
beyond the reglementary period. Except to correct clerical
errors, a judgment which has acquired finality can no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct a perceived erroneous conclusion of fact or law. There
would be no end to litigation if parties are allowed to relitigate
issues which were already resolved with finality.
The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended
to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction The writ of certiorari
is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions that acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of
discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be
equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
SEVERINO B. VERGARA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, SEVERINO J. LAJARA, and
VIRGINIA G. BARORO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 174567 March 12, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
Facts: The City Council of Calamba issued Resolution No.
115, Series of 2001. The resolution authorized Mayor Lajara to
negotiate with landowners within the vicinity of Barangays
Real, Halang, and Uno, for a new city hall site. During the
public hearing on 3 October 2001, the choice for the new city
hall site was limited to properties owned by Pamana and a lot
in Barangay Saimsin, Calamba. The City Council passed
Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001, authorizing Mayor Lajara
to purchase several lots owned by Pamana. Through Mayor
Lajara, entered into the following agreements: (1) MOA, (2)
Deed of Sale, (3) Deed of Real Estate Mortgage And (4) Deed
of Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment.
On 19 November 2001, the above documents were endorsed
to the City Council. Petitioner alleged that all these documents
were not ratified by the City Council, a fact duly noted in an
Audit Observation Memorandum dated 9 August 2002 and
issued by State Auditor Ruben C. Pagaspas of the
Commission on Audit. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari and
mandamus against the City Mayor, the City Treasurer, the
President of Pamana, Inc., and the Vice President and Trust
Officer of the Prudential Bank for violation of Section 3(e) of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding no
probable cause to hold any of the respondents liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
the Ombudsman dismissed for lack of probable cause the case
against respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Ruling: No, In this case, the Ombudsman dismissed
petitioner’s complaint for lack of probable cause based on the
Ombudsman’s appreciation and review of the evidence
presented. In dismissing the complaint, the Ombudsman did
not commit grave abuse of discretion. We reiterate the rule that
courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of
discretion in determining probable cause unless there are
compelling reasons. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a
showing of grave abuse of discretion. Besides, to justify the
issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of abuse of
discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of
law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
CONCEPCION V. VDA, DE DAFFON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES
OSMEÑA VDA, DE DAFFON, AILEEN DAFFON, JOSELITO
DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA DAFFON, LEILA DAFFON and
SUZETTE DAFFON, respondents.
G.R. No. 129017 August 20, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Digested by: John Daryl Josol
Facts: Petitioner was married to the late Amado Daffon, with
whom she begot one son, Joselito Daffon. Joselito married
Lourdes Osmeña, and they bore six children. Joselito died
after his father's demise. Respondent Lourdes, together with
her six children, instituted an action for partition against
petitioner over the properties left by Amado which formed part
of his conjugal partnership with petitioner. Respondents prayed
that the conjugal properties of Amado and petitioner be
partitioned and that the one-half share of Amado be further
partitioned between petitioner, on one hand, and the
respondents as heirs of Joselito, on the other hand. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss, but the trial court denied the same.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied by the
trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, but the latter dismissed the same.
Issue: Whether or not CA was correct in dismissing the petition
for certiorari.
Ruling: For certiorari to lie, it must be convincingly proved that
the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act
too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law; or that the trial court exercised its power
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
personal hostility. In the case at bar, the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion
to Dismiss. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in
dismissing the petition for certiorari.
GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL,
respondents.
G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: In a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership filed by petitioner Gabriel L. Duero against private
respondent Bernardo A Eradel and two others, private
respondent was declared in default for failure to file his
answer. As a consequence, judgment was rendered in favor of
the petitioner. Private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial,
but was denied by the trial court. Subsequently, he filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment based on the same ground
as in his motion for new trial. But the said petition was denied
by the trial court. In a motion for reconsideration, he alleged
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case since the value
of the land was only P5,240. Again, it was denied by the trial
court. Private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the CA. The appellate court gave due course to the petition by
maintaining that private respondent was not estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not CA acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Ruling: No, The Court could not fault the Court of Appeals in
overruling the RTC. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the
parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even
by their express consent. Even if private respondent actively
participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine
of estoppel cannot be properly invoked against him because
the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime
and at any stage of the action. By "grave abuse of discretion"
is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. But here we find that
in its decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction
over the case and that private respondent was not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent Court
of Appeals discussed the facts on which its decision is
grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter.
Its action was neither whimsical nor capricious.
Dillena v. Court of Appeals G.R. no. 77660
Facts: Spouses Dolores Sebastian and Rufino Carreon died on
March 7, 1974 and August 21, 1974, in Quezon City and
Manila, respectively, leaving an adopted daughter Aurora
Carreon, private respondent herein. On October 21, 1974,
Fausta Carreon Herrera, sister of the deceased Rufino
Carreon instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378 entitled "In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Spouses Rufino
B. Carreon and Dolores Sebastian — Petition for Letters of
Administration" before the then CFI, Branch XXXI, Quezon
City. On November 7, 1974, the said court appointed Fausta
Carreon Herrera as Special Administratrix only for the purpose
of receiving and collecting all sums of money due and payable
to the estate, in addition to the powers and duties provided for
under Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. After hearing
the petition and the opposition therein, the lower court, on
October 28, 1985, denied the petition and ordered petitioner to
return physical possession of the fishponds to private
respondent. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the aforesaid
order which was denied. On February 20, 1986, a petition for
certiorari was instituted by petitioner before the respondent
Court of Appeals and as earlier mentioned, the said court, on
November 14, 1986, dismissed the petition. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied. The matter was
elevated up to the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals in upholding the
order of the trial court, deprived him of his property without due
process of law because he was not a proper party in the
court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion
Held: the probate court still gave him fifteen (15) days to
submit the required explanation and the case was re-set to
November 11, 1981. But then again, petitioner, despite receipt
of the second notice requiring his appearance, chose not to
appear and totally ignored the order of the probate court to
submit the explanation. One who was given full opportunity to
present his evidence and who failed to do so cannot complain
that he was denied due process when the court rendered its
decision. Moreover, petitioner, on July 25, 1985, filed a petition
before the probate court, by way of special appearance,
precisely questioning the power of the said court to declare null
and void the sale of the fishponds involved herein. As has
been stated, the lower court after hearing the petition and the
opposition thereto denied the same. Clearly, petitioner was
given full opportunity to present his case. Thus, We give no
credence to petitioner's assertion that he was denied due
process of law. der dated September 13, 1984, nullifying the
deed of sale had long become final and executory for failure of
petitioner to appeal therefrom within the reglementary period.
On this score alone, the petition for certiorari which was
belatedly filed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals on
February 20, 1986 should have been dismissed outright
because the remedy of certiorari does not lie where appeal has
been lost. certiorari cannot take the place of an appeal.
VDA. De Caldito v. Segundo
G.R. no. L-58187
Facts: Petitioner seeks to annul an order of the respondent
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V,
in Civil Case No. U-3484 dismissing the complaint filed by the
petitioner for the recovery of damages for the death of her
husband who was killed while riding a motorized tricycle
owned and operated by the private respondent when the same
was bumped by a truck while travelling on the public highway
in Villasis, Pangasinan in the evening of December 19,1972
Issue: Whether or not the institution is barred by statute of
limitation of 4 years on Quasi-delicts or 10 years based on a
contract of carriage
Held: The petitioner is seeking to avail of the remedy of
certiorari as a substitute for appeal. The questioned order of
dismissal is appealable and the proper remedy should have
been to appeal the same. No circumstance had been shown to
explain why such procedure was not observed, nor to justify a
deviation from the same as to make available a petition for
certiorari in lieu of taking an appropriate appeal. As may be
noted, the petition was filed almost one (1) year after the
issuance of the order of dismissal complained of. Even in
situations wherein certiorari is allowed as a remedy in lieu of
appeal, said period may not be considered as a reasonable
time within which to avail of such a remedy. Moreover, the
imputed error to the challenged order is not jurisdictional but
merely one of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.
MMDA v. Jancom Environmental Corp.
G.R. no. 14765
Facts: A build-Operate-Transfer Contract for the waste-to
energy project was signed between JANCOM and the
Philippine Government. The BOT Contract was submitted to
President Ramos for approval but was then too close to the
end of his term that his term expired without him signing the
contract. He, however, endorsed the same to incoming
President Estrada. With the change in administration came
changes in policy and economic environment, thus the BOT
contract was not pursued and implemented. JANCOM
appealed to the President for reconsideration and despite the
pendency of the appeal, MMDA caused the publication of an
invitation to pre-qualify and submit proposals for solid waste
management.
Issue: Whether or not there is a valid and binding contract
between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM.
Held: There is a valid and binding contract between JANCOM
and the Republic of the Philippines. Under Articles 1305 of the
Civil Code, “A contract is a meeting of the minds between two
persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other,
to give something or to render some service.” Art. 1315 of the
Civil Code provides that a contract is perfected by mere
consent. Consent, on the other hand, is manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract (Art. 1319, Civil
Code). In the case at bar, the signing and execution of the
contract by the parties clearly show that, as between the
parties, there was a concurrence of offer and acceptance with
respect to the material details of the contract, thereby giving
rise to the perfection of the absence of President’s signature is
untenable. Significantly, the contract itself provides that the
signature of the President is necessary only for its effectivity,
not its perfection.
There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot revoke or
renounce the same without the consent of the other. From the
moment of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. (Art. 1315) It is a
general principle of law that no one may be permitted to
change hid mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts, or
to proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.
Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. no. 134278
Facts: On May 24, 1990, the Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police (PC-INP), now Philippine National
Police or PNP, launched OPLAN AJAX to minimize, if not
entirely eliminate, the extortion activities of traffic policemen at
the vicinity of Guadalupe Bridge, Makati, Metro Manila. On July
5, 1990, at about three o’clock in the afternoon, two operatives
of OPLAN AJAX, namely, 2LT Federico Bulanday, PC and
Intelligence Agent Angelito C. Leoncio, both members of the
Counter-Intelligence Group (CIG) stationed at Camp Crame,
Quezon City, were on board a car with Plate No. NDK-238.
They were traveling along J.P. Rizal Street, Makati, when they
were flagged down by three policemen in uniform.  These were
petitioner PFC Rodolfo Rodriguez, PFC Arsenio Silungan, and
PFC Rolando Pilandi.  All were members of the Metropolitan
Traffic Command assigned with the Makati Police Station. An
administrative case for grave misconduct was subsequently
filed against Rodriguez, Silungan, and Pilandi, who was at
large, with the National Police Commission or NAPOLCOM.
Docketed as Adm. Case No. 90-80, the case was assigned to
Atty. Narzal B. Mallares as hearing officer. A second
administrative case was filed with NAPOLCOM against the
three erring police officers for their summary dismissal. A
charge for robbery/extortion was filed with Headquarters, PC-
INP. It was docketed as Adm. Case No. 01-91 and assigned to
P/Major Efren Santos as Summary Hearing Officer. On July
13, 1998, petitioner filed the instant petition for review under
Rule 45.
Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
petitioner PFC Rodolfo Rodriguez
Held: Clearly, where a police officer is dismissed by the PNP
Director General and the dismissal is affirmed by the
NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, the proper remedy is to
appeal the dismissal with the DILG Secretary. That the
NAPOLCOM Chairman is also the DILG Secretary is of no
moment, for under the aforecited laws and regulations, only
the DILG Secretary can act on the appeal. Besides, what is
involved here is not the sole act of the NAPOLCOM Chairman,
but the decision of the Commission. Should the DILG
Secretary’s decision prove adverse to appellant, then he as the
aggrieved party may bring an appeal to the Civil Service
Commission. In instances where the CSC denies the appeal,
the remedy under R.A. No. 7902 would be to appeal the
adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. In the instant case,
petitioner had three opportunities to appeal the decision of the
NAPOLCOM.  He chose not to avail of them, but instead opted
to file an action for certiorari and mandamus with the appellate
court. As we have stated in the Decision, which is now under
review, this Commission affirmed the summary dismissal from
the service of herein respondent-appellant, because he was
caught in the act of committing robbery extortion in an
entrapment operation and, when subjected to laboratory
examination, was found positive with ultraviolet fluorescent
powder on both palmary portions of his hands, face and arms,
including his left pant’s pocket, where pieces of P20.00 bills
were found when searched. Wherefore instant petition is
denied.
Conejos v. Court of Appeals
G.R. no. 149473
Facts: Respondent EUTIQUIO PLANIA alleged in
his Complaint for specific performance/rescission with
damages  filed with the municipal trial court that on 19
September 1989 he entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with Teresita Pacaña Conejos whereby they
agreed that each of them would pay half of the purchase price
of the 134-square-meter residential lot situated in Tisa,
Labangon, Cebu City, subject matter hereof, and that upon full
payment they would equally divide the lot and register it in their
individual names. The Regional Trial Court, Br. 9, of Cebu
City reversed the MTCC.  It ruled that except for the unilateral
claim by Conejos that the Memorandum of Agreement  had
been cancelled no other evidence was proffered to prove the
same. It ratiocinated that a written agreement like the
subject Memorandum of Agreement  could not be considered
abandoned by the mere say-so of one of the parties thereto.
The Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc., need not even be informed of
the Agreement for its validity because the latter was not a party
to it and as such the Agreementremained binding as between
Plania and Conejos.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in not ruling for the
mutual cancellation by both parties of the Memorandum of
Agreement.
Held: The court held that there were occasions when this
Court treated a petition for certiorari as one filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. However, the circumstances prevailing in
the instant case do not justify a deviation from a general rule.
Notably, the instant petition was filed way beyond the
reglementary period allowed under Rule 45 without any
justifiable reason therefor nor any reasonable explanation
being proffered by petitioner. In addition, the arguments she
cited are without merit and are in fact mere rehash of the
issues raised before and judiciously resolved by the courts a
quo. The issues require a review of the factual findings which,
verily, could not be done because this Court is not a trier of
facts. More importantly, a reading of the records of the case
strengthens our disposition that both the trial and the appellate
courts did not abuse their discretion in assessing their factual
findings. We find their conclusions amply supported by the
records of the case and grounded in law. The instant petition
for certiorari is dismissed.
Felizardo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. no. 112050
Facts: Private respondent Nemesio B. Jose, as owner-lessor
of a house and lot located at No. 63-20th St., East Bajac-
Bajac, Olongapo City, filed on February 24, 1992, an action for
ejectment with an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner Quintin
Felizardo. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 3163 in the
Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City. On September 1, 1992,
judgment was rendered against the petitioner. On September
17, 1992, upon motion of the private respondent, the court
issued an order for the execution of its decision. The matter
was elevated up to the Supreme Court.
Issue: the propriety of the special civil action
for certiorari instituted by the petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City to challenge the judgment
rendered by the court a quo
Held: It is settled that the writ of certiorari is available only
where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  It
is also the rule that this special civil action should not be
allowed as a substitute for an ordinary appeal or where there
are other remedies available.
There is no doubt that the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo
City had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case lodged
by the private respondent and over the person of the petitioner,
who had filed his answer to the complaint. The only question is
whether that court, in continuing to act on the case despite the
lack of prior barangay conciliation as required by the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, committed a mere error or
judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary appeal or an
error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.
At any rate, even assuming that the petition for certiorari filed
by the petitioner was the proper remedy, the same cannot be
granted as it cannot be said that the court a quo  committed
grave abuse of discretion in finding the allegations for the
issuance of preliminary injunction to be sufficient compliance
with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. We agree with the
Regional Trial Court that: Thus, when the lower court allegedly
disregarded the counterclaims of petitioner, when it refused to
rule on "compensation off-setting" and ruled that the
application for a provisional remedy in the complaint for
ejectment was not sham or that it was not proved as such, and
also when said court failed to dismiss the case for lack of
compliance with the requirement of PD 1508 — there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court . . . It
cannot be said that respondent judge acted in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner to be said to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Besides, as already pointed
out, the petitioner had other plain, speedy and adequate
remedies available to him under Rule 70, Section 8, of the
Rules of Court. Therefore the petition is denied
Escudero v. Dulay
G.R. no 60578
Facts: On 18 July 1979, petitioner Araceli D. Escudero, wife of
petitioner Paterno D. Escudero, executed a "Deed of Absolute
Sale under Pacto de Retro" in favor of private respondents, the
Amistad spouses, over a parcel of residential land in Lapu-
Lapu City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9223 of
the Register of Deeds of that city. The consideration stated in
the document was P42,350.00. Redemption was to be made
by the vendors within three (3) months after the execution of
the Deed of Sale, at the same price of P42,350.00.  The period
of redemption expired without an offer of repurchase being
made by petitioner wife or her husband, petitioner Paterno D.
Escudero, who had earlier given his wife a special power of
attorney "to sell, transfer, mortgage and convey" the land
subject of the pacto de retro sale, which was the spouses'
conjugal property. The respondent trial court rendered
judgment against petitioners. The court held that the
interpretation by petitioners' counsel of par. 3 of Art. 1606 of
the Civil Code was misplaced, as decisions have uniformly
held that the provision applies only to situations where there is
a dispute as to the nature of a transaction either as a true sale
with right of repurchase or an equitable mortgage, and not
where the parties admit or agree that the transaction is a true
sale, as petitioners' counsel did admit or stipulate in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals and that the trial
court erred in its decision
Held: Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure for failure to file a
timely petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules. Where, however, the application of this rule will result in
a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be
relaxed. While this Court is cognizant of the rule that,
generally, a client will suffer the consequences of the
negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in
the interest of justice and equity, exceptions may be made to
such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of
each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant
case, result in the outright deprivation of their property through
a technicality. The Court cannot close its eyes to the petitioner
wife's affirmative and special defense, under oath in her
Answer before the respondent trial court that her transaction
with private respondents was not a pacto de retro sale but an
equitable mortgage. The Court cannot also but take note of
petitioners' evidence to support such verified defense, notably
the incriminating note signed by the agent of both parties in
which the real nature of the questioned transaction is revealed.
Therefore the appealed decisions are reversed and set aside.
Acain v. IAC
G.R. no. 72706
Facts: While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally,
a client will suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake
or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice
and equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in
accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case.
Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result
in the outright deprivation of their property through a
technicality. The Court cannot close its eyes to the petitioner
wife's affirmative and special defense, under oath in her
Answer before the respondent trial court that her transaction
with private respondents was not a pacto de retro sale but an
equitable mortgage. The Court cannot also but take note of
petitioners' evidence to support such verified defense, notably
the incriminating note signed by the agent of both parties in
which the real nature of the questioned transaction is revealed.
espondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private
respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
Issue: whether or not private respondents have been pretirite
Held: Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance
including. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy
are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should
stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned. In the instant case private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591
ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the
widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited . It was
denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for
the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are
matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in
the course of the trial on the merits of the case. A subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
February 15, 1985. Thus, this Court ruled that where the
grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the
right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in
not dismissing the case, and even assuming the existence of
the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the
broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be
entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy
and adequate relief. Petition is denied for lack of merit.
Saludes v. Pajarillo
G.R. no. L-1121
Facts: Conchita Vda. de Saludes, herein petitioner and
appellant, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on November 12, 1945, to annul a deed of sale a house
and lot executed by her in favor of the herein respondent and
appellee, Gregorio Pajarillo. During the pendency of the suit,
respondent Pajarillo filed an action for ejectment in the
municipal court of Manila against petitioner Saludes to compel
her to vacate said house and lot. Petitioner Saludes filed in
that case a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there was
another action pending between the same parties and for the
same cause and that the court had no jurisdiction over the
case. The motion was heard and submitted for resolution. The
municipal court, however, presided over by Judge Vicente
Bautista, without acting upon said motion for dismissal, and
without a trial upon the merits, rendered judgment ordering the
defendant Saludes “to vacate said premises, pay the rental at
the rate of eighty pesos per month beginning July 1st, 1946,
until she leaves the premises and surrenders possession
thereof to plaintiff, plus costs of suit.” Whereupon, Saludes
filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial mainly upon the
ground that the judgment was a patent nullity there having
been no trial on the merits wherein both parties could introduce
their evidence. While this motion was pending, Judge Bautista,
upon motion of Pajarillo, and without notice upon Saludes, filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Manila
to annul said judgment. The petition was denied upon the
ground that the remedy was appeal. And Saludes appealed to
this Court.
Issue: Whether or not Saludes is entitled to the petition sought
for
Held: It is only after the defendant has answered the complaint
that the court may proceed to the trial of the case on the
merits. In the trial, first the plaintiff is entitled to testify and to
introduce the testimony of his witnesses, and next the
defendant may also testify and offer the testimony of his
witnesses, and finally plaintiff may offer rebutting testimony.
After testimony has been closed, the parties or their
representatives may be heard in argument . And at the
conclusion of such trial and not before, may the court render
judgment according to the law and the facts proved by the
evidence duly presented by the parties . Thus, the trial to
which a defendant is entitled is one in which he has a full
opportunity to present all the evidence he may have in support
of all the defenses or counterclaims duly pleaded by him. The
court has no authority to hold the trial before defendant had an
opportunity to plead, and has no power to limit such trial to a
mere questioning of the parties as to what their stand on the
case is, particularly when the questioning is made at a time
when a motion to dismiss is being heard, the parties having no
idea at the moment that the trial of the case is already being
held and confined to such interrogatory. Under such
circumstances, in answering the questions of the court,
statements may be made by the parties which are not intended
as a pleading or testimony and may thus be devoid of
accuracy and completeness; facts may have been stated
without care, with omission of important circumstances that
may be of decisive influence; and since the parties, or at least
the defendant did not know that she was testifying in a formal
trial, she may have failed to mention other issues and other
transactions that may affect or change the meaning of all the
statements she has actually made. We believe and so hold
that such procedure is irregular and arbitrary, conducive to
confusion and injustice, and is null and void. Respondent
contends that certiorari was improper because an appeal from
the decision of the municipal court was available. This
contention is untenable. An appeal under the circumstances
was not an adequate remedy there being an order of execution
issued by the municipal court. Judgment appealed from is
reversed and judgment of the mtc is set aside.
PNB v. Florendo
G.R. no 62082
Facts: Plaintiffs are tenants of four (4) parcels of land located
in the municipality of Mabinay, Negros Oriental, whose
previous owner Ricardo Valeroso, mortgaged the same to the
Philippine National Bank . In 1971, said parcels of land were
bought by spouses Agripino and Soledad Viloria who assumed
the mortgage with PNB. In 1974, defendant PNB requested
defendant Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental to foreclose the
mortgage on the aforesaid parcels of land after the failure of
the owners thereof to pay certain amortization and the same
was sold at public auction to the defendant bank as the highest
bidder . Notwithstanding the fact that said lands were already
brought under the Land Reform Program of the government,
the PNB caused the titles to said parcels of land transferred in
its name to the prejudice of plaintiffs. The trial court ruled in
favor plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in admitting the First Amended Complaint which
adds another parcel of land not within the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27.
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. Jurisdiction, in
general, is either one over the nature of the action, over the
subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the
issue framed in the. Jurisdiction over the subject matter, on the
other hand, is conferred by law and does not depend on the
consent or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or
any one of them. The order of the respondent Judge admitting
the First Amended Complaint including therein said questioned
Lot 787-B-2-A which is a residential lot not falling within the
ambit of PD 27, hence, beyond CAR's jurisdiction, was issued
in excess of jurisdiction. The term excess of jurisdiction
signifies that the court, board or officer has jurisdiction over a
case but oversteps such jurisdiction while acting. Verily, the
writ of certiorari is granted "to keep an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction. It is the proper remedy "where it
clearly appears that the trial court is proceeding in excess or
outside of its jurisdiction, Since the "office of the writ
of certiorari  has been reduced to the correction of defects of
jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other
purpose", said remedy is available in the instant case to keep
the trial court from proceeding in the case in excess of its
jurisdiction. Wherefore, the petition for certiorari  is granted.
Jose v. Zulueta
G.R. no. 6598
Facts: Pursuant to a decision duly rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 11927 and affirmed
by the Supreme Court, therein defendant Jose C. Zulueta was
ordered to pay therein plaintiff George Edward Koster, Inc. "the
sum of P46,093.77 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from September 27, 1949, with respect to the sum of
P30,000.00; and from December 8, 1949, as to the sum of
P16,093.77, until the entire amount is fully paid." Said decision
having become final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued on December 28, 1956. After due hearing on the
matter, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dated July 30,
1959, holding that there was condonation of the interest
payable by Zulueta effected prior to transfer of G. E. Koster
Inc.'s interest to the Exchange Investments, Ltd., and that the
trial court, therefore, gravely erred in issuing the alias writ of
execution for the collection of said interest. The alias writ of
execution was set aside and the preliminary injunction made
permanent. The petitioner now comes to us seeking to nullify
the said decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion
Held: In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the trial court's
order of January 16, 1959, directing the issuance of the
alias writ of execution in question, as well as that of March 12,
1959, denying respondent Zulueta's motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid order, not being interlocutory, are appealable.
No appeal from said orders, however, was interposed within
the reglementary period, nor any reason given for such
failure. Under the circumstances, and the right to appeal
having been lost for reasons not herein proved to be
excusable, a petition for certiorari is not proper. Evidently, the
above pronouncement contemplates of instances where there
is right to appeal, said right still existing and available, but
would be inadequate to prevent the injury or wrong sought to
be corrected. Hence, this Court declared that certiorari may be
allowed. This pronouncement cannot be invoked in the instant
case, because not only is there no showing that appeal from
the disputed orders would be inadequate and insufficient he
right to such appeal, at the remedy, but also that, the right to
such appeal, at the time the petition for certiorari was filed, has
already be lost — through respondent's own fault negligence
— and no longer available. Furthermore, the execution of the
order (to enforce collection of the interest) was made after the
expiration of the period to appeal without such appeal having
been perfected. Clearly, respondent lost his right to question
the correctness of said order. The decision of the C.A. is
reversed and set aside and the decision of the RTC affirmed.
Marcelo v. De Guzman
G.R. no. 29077
Facts: The antecedent facts are not disputed. At about 3:00
o'clock in the morning of June 21, 1966, Sgt. Alejandro
Quirante, a PC officer detailed with the Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations, PARGO for short,
applied with Judge Jose C. de Guzman, presiding judge of the
City Court of Quezon City, Branch III, for a search warrant to
search the premises of the KANEBO Laboratory at No. 55
Times St., Quezon City. The application was filed in
connection with Criminal Case No. 558, wherein, curiously
enough, the "KANEBO Laboratory" was named as accused.
Her motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied,
Marcelo filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for
certiorari and mandamus against Judge Jose C. de Guzman,
Bartolome Cabangbang, in his capacity as chairman of the
PARGO, Capt. Reynaldo San Gabriel, Sgt. Alejandro Quirante
and their agents, deputies and/or representatives, praying that
the warrant in question be declared nun and void and that the
personal properties seized thereunder he restored to her. The
petition was given due course and, after the answer of
respondents was filed, the case was submitted for resolution
on the bases of the parties' pleadings and memoranda. The
matter was elevated up to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in entertaining the
petition for certiorari.
Held: A final order is defined as one which disposes of the
whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined; on the other hand an order is
interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Tested
against this criterion, the search warrant issued in Criminal
Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character
because it leaves something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused
therein. In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein
above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge de Guzman gravely
abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant.
Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously when he ignored
the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized"; and that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman
would neither be an adequate nor speedy remedy to relieve
appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of
her personal property had resulted in total paralization of her
business, and recourse in appeal would have unduly delayed
recovery of the articles and documents which had been
improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford
an adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed
as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury
to a party. Petition is denied.
St. Peter Memorial Park v. Campos
G.R. no. L-38280
Facts: In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the spouses
Regino Cleofas and Lucia de la Cruz filed suit against St. Peter
Memorial Park, Inc. (or Memorial Park for short), Araceli
Wijangco del Rosario, National Investment and Development
Corporation (or NIDC), Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank (or Banco Filipino for short), the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the Sheriff of
Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-15001). In their amended
complaint, the spouses prayed that they be declared the
rightful owners of Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate, that the
Torrens Title to said lot be reconstituted, the title thereto of
their deceased predecessor, Antonio Cleofas, having been
burned in a fire in 1933; that the certificates of title over said lot
in the name of the Memorial Park, and that in the name of
Wijangco del Rosario, and all the certificates of title from which
these certificates were derived be declared null and void; that
the mortgages over said, lot constituted in favor of Banco
Filipino and the NIDC be declared null and void; and that the
Memorial Park be ordered to pay plaintiffs damages. The
amended complaint likewise sought issuance of preliminary
injunction and the appointment of a receiver. The lower court
ordered appointment of a receiver, but upon filing of a bond by
the Memorial Park, the receivership was lifted. After trial, the
lower court, on May 2, 1973, rendered a decision in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
Issue: whether or not the respondent Judge acted in grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the joint appeal of the
Memorial Park and Banco Filipino in its order of July 8, 1974.
Held: As contended by herein respondents, the general rule is
that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when
ordinary appeal is available. However, we have granted the
writ in cases where it is shown that appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve
petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained of
to avoid future litigations, we passed upon a petition
for certiorari though the proper remedy was appeal. This rule
for the granting of a motion for new trial, as all other rules of
procedure, should be liberally construed to assist the parties in
obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court
litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal
interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the
fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to find out
such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of
legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities. In
making the foregoing conclusions, we do not by any means
intend to prejudge the effect of such evidence on the outcome
of the case. We are confining ourselves to the conclusion that
the evidence intended to be submitted, "would probably alter
the result. We hold that respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial, having
disregarded in a capricious and arbitrary manner, the newly
discovered evidence. The case is remanded to the trial court
for new trial and the orders declared null and void.
Marahay v. Melicor
G.R. no. L-44980
Digested by: Dahn S. Uy
Facts:  petitioner filed with respondent court an action for
recovery of real property against Aliwanag B. Valleramos.
Later, the complaint was amended to implead and include
other defendants, the other private respondents herein, as
indispensable parties. After the issues were joined, the case
was set for pre-trial on August 9,1974, but this was deferred to
a later date due to the absence of petitioner and her
counsel.  On April 4, 1975, the same case was again
scheduled for pre-trial but the same did not proceed due to the
fact that petitioner appeared without her counsel while only
one of the defendants appeared with counsel.  Later, informed
of her lawyer's inability to attend the pre-trial, petitioner
secured the services of another lawyer, Atty. Dominador
Monjardin, who was present at the next pre-trial conference
held on October 9, 1975.Trial on the merits commenced on
November 13, 1975 with the petitioner taking the witness stand
on direct examination. The defense failed to cross-examine her
since the proceedings were cut short for lack of time and the
continuation thereof was set for January 19, 1976. The motion
to dismiss, which was made orally in open court, was
submitted for resolution by the trial court. As earlier stated, the
court below in its order dated February 27, 1976, dismissed
the complaint. Two motions for reconsideration were filed by
petitioner but the same were denied by respondent judge,
hence, the present special civil action.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in ordering the dismissal of the case and, consequently,
denying petitioner the right to fully prosecute her case.
Held: While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non
prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is
whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with
want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude.  In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay
the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff,
as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with
rather than wield their authority to dismiss. Further, when a
party, without malice, fault, or inexcusable negligence, is not
really prepared for trial, the court would be abusing its
discretion if a reasonable opportunity is denied him for
preparing therefor and for obtaining due process of law. Time
and again, we have emphasized that the rules should be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist
the parties in obtaining not only speedy but, more importantly,
just and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. Therefore the petition for certiorari is granted.
Asian Trading Corp. v. Court of appeals
G.R. no. 76276
Facts: On November 25, 1983, Philippine Banking Corporation
(Bank) filed a Complaint against the petitioners, which was
later amended, for the collection of the sum of P2,700,000.00
plus interest and attorney's fees. Docketed as Civil Case No.
5775 before Branch 136 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
On July 25, 1985, the trial court denied the Demurrer to
Evidence and rendered judgment in favor of the Bank. The
matter was elevated up to the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in ruling that
appeal was the proper remedy and not certiorari
Held: The petition is devoid of merit. In dismissing petitioners's
petition for certiorari, the respondent court relied on Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court prescribing the
requirements for a petition for certiorari, to wit (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Well entrenched to the
point of being elementary is the doctrine that certiorari  will only
lie if there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. a special civil action for certiorari  under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when 'there is no appeal
nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.' Certiorari  cannot be allowed when a party fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, Apt
and proper is the observation by the respondent court that
instead of filing a motion for reconsideration of or appealing
from, subject judgment, the petitioners resorted to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is unavailable under
the antecedent facts and circumstances. Anent petitioners's
protestation of deprivation of due process, the respondent
court erred not when it considered the yearning of petitioners
to present evidence before the trial court, as an empty
formality and exercise in futility. ". . . The sole office of the writ
of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Therefore the petition is denied.
Mangaliag v. Pastoral
G.R. no. 143951
Facts: On May 10, 1999, private respondent Apolinario
Serquina, Jr. filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano. The
complaint alleges that: on January 21, 1999, from 9:00 to
10:00 a.m., private respondent, together with Marco de Leon,
Abner Mandapat and Manuel de Guzman, was on board a
tricycle driven by Jayson Laforte; while in Pagal, San Carlos
City, a dump truck owned by petitioner Mangaliag and driven
by her employee, petitioner Solano, coming from the opposite
direction, tried to overtake and bypass a tricycle in front of it
and thereby encroached the left lane and sideswiped the
tricycle ridden by private respondent; due to the gross
negligence, carelessness and imprudence of petitioner Solano
in driving the truck, private respondent and his co-passengers
sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities;
petitioner Mangaliag failed to exercise due diligence required
by law in the selection and supervision of her employee;
private respondent was hospitalized and spent P71,392.00 as
medical expenses; private respondent sustained a permanent
facial deformity due to a fractured nose and suffers from
severe depression as a result thereof, for which he should be
compensated in the amount of P500,000.00 by way of moral
damages; as a further result of his hospitalization, private
respondent lost income of P25,000.00; private respondent
engaged the services of counsel on a contingent basis equal to
25% of the total award. On April 17, 2000, the respondent RTC
Judge, Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral, issued the first assailed
Order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion
Held: the court , as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction. In the present case, no judgment has yet
been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of fact, as soon as the
petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did
not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss.
Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent,
the Sibonghanoy  doctrine does not control the present
controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings must apply. Therefore, petitioners are not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. In any
event, the petition for certiorari is bereft of merit. The
petitioners’ reliance in the case of Movers-Baseco Integrated
Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corporation is
misplaced. The claim for damages therein was based on a
breach of a contract of lease, not a quasi-delict causing
physical injuries, as in this case. Besides, there was no claim
therein for moral damages. Furthermore, moral damages are
generally not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a
breach of contract in view of the provisions of Article 2220 of
the Civil Code. Wherefore the petition for certiorari is
dismissed.
Romero v. C.A.
G.R. no. 142406
Facts: On April 23, 1996, petitioner Ma. Corona Romero and
her siblings executed a letter-contract to sell with private
respondent Saturnino Orden. In said contract, private
respondent proposed to purchase from Romero and her
siblings a property located at Denver cor. New York Sts.,
Cubao, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 145269, for the total amount of P17M. The contract
stipulated that private respondent shall pay petitioner the
amount of P7M upon the execution of the deed of absolute
sale, the balance of P10M not later than December 19, 1996
and that private respondent shall shoulder the expenses to
evict the squatters on the property. The motion for
reconsideration was denied and the petition for certiorari was
filed in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering of
the reannotation of the notice
Held: Petitioners contend that: the notice of lis pendens is not
necessary in this case since the complaint does not pray for an
express award of ownership or possession; what is involved in
this case is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale, thus,
no title has passed to private respondent yet which needs to
be protected by a notice of lis pendens; by ordering the re-
annotation of the notice of lis pendens, when private
respondent did not even assert a claim of possession or title
over the subject property, the CA went against the doctrine
in Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, where this Court held that
the applicant must, in the complaint or answer filed in the
subject litigation, assert a claim of possession or title over the
subject property in order to give due course to his application;
the CA, in concluding that there was no hearing before the
annotation was cancelled, overlooked the fact that the motion
for cancellation was set for hearing on November 12, 1997,
that private respondent was duly notified but failed to appear,
and that he was able to file his opposition to the motion to
cancel lis pendens which the RTC considered before
promulgating its Resolution dated November 26, 1997. Lis
pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over
property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the
action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy
and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in
litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or
decree by subsequent alienation.Its notice is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular property is
in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
Whether or not the claim of private respondent has merit is of
no moment and should not affect the annotation of lis
pendens on the title of the subject property. There is nothing in
the rules which requires a party seeking annotation of lis
pendens to show that the land belongs to him. There is no
requirement that the party applying for the annotation must
prove his right or interest over the property sought to be
annotated. Thus, we have held that even on the basis of an
unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be
annotated on the title. Said annotation cannot be considered
as a collateral attack against the certificate of title based on the
principle that the registration of a notice of lis pendens does
not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. The rules merely
require that an affirmative relief be claimed since a notation
of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a
right or a lien. It only protects the applicant’s rights which will
be determined during trial. In fine, petitioners failed to show
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the re-annotation of the notice of lis pendens therefore the
petition for certiorari is dismissed.
Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor
G.R. no. 140954
Digested by: Dahn S. Uy
Facts: On May 21, 1991, private respondents Custodio, Rufo,
Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of
Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog (Bertuldo
for brevity). They alleged that: they own a 1,399- square meter
parcel of land situated in Malayo Norte, Cortes, Bohol,
designated as Lot No. 1714; sometime in March 1980, they
allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the said property for a
period of ten years and construct thereon a small house of light
materials at a nominal annual rental of P100.00 only,
considering the close relations of the parties; after the
expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded the return of
the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed
thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of
the entire property. On January 21, 1999, the trial court, while
ordering the complaint to be expunged from the records and
the nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to pay
the correct docket fees. Subsequently they filed for petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated after
private respondents paid the docket fee deficiency since the
trial court had earlier expunged the complaint from the record
and nullified all proceedings of the case and such ruling was
not contested by the private respondents. 
Held: In this case, no special and important reason or
exceptional and compelling circumstance analogous to any of
the above cases has been adduced by the petitioners so as to
justify direct recourse to this Court. The present petition should
have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure
to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition at
bar. Moreover, no formal substitution of the parties was
effected within thirty days from date of death of Bertuldo, as
required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Needless
to stress, the purpose behind the rule on substitution is the
protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to
ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule on
substitution would render the proceedings and judgment of the
trial court infirm because the court acquires no jurisdiction over
the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on
whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.Thus,
proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the trial court
to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any
future claim by any heir that he was not apprised of the
litigation against Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty.
Petalcorin to represent him. To be sure, certiorari under Rule
65  is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is
not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.57 It offers only a
limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an
inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for
an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of
was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,not to be
used for any other purpose, such as to cure errors in
proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or
fact. A contrary rule would lead to confusion, and seriously
hamper the administration of justice. Wherefore the petition for
certiorari is dismissed.
Law firm of tibayan v. C.A.
G.R. no. 143706
Facts: Petitioners Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan
and respondent Erlando A. Abrenica are the registered
partners in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan, a
professional law partnership duly organized under Philippine
laws. On May 6, 1998, petitioners Tungol and Tibayan filed
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a
complaint for accounting, return and transfer of partnership
funds with damages and application for issuance of preliminary
attachment against their partner, respondent
Abrenica. Petitioners, plaintiffs therein, claim that a real estate
transaction entered into by the herein respondent Abrenica,
defendant therein, was a law partnership transaction. The
lower court ruled against the petitioner and hence the petition
was filed with the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not appellate erred in holding that SEC has
jurisdiction over the subject matter which was raised the first
time.
Held: It is elementary that a special civil action for certiorari is a
remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. When a court exercised its jurisdiction
and an error was committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error was
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment
would be a void judgment. An error of judgment that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible
through the original special civil action of certiorari. Therefore,
the SEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it addressed a
non-jurisdictional issue in a special civil action for certiorari. It
sought to correct an error in the enforcement of the writ of
attachment, an error of judgment which is clearly a factual
issue involving appraisal and evaluation of evidence. No grave
abuse of discretion may be attributed to the SEC Hearing
Officer/Panel simply because of the alleged misappreciation of
facts and evidence. Erroneous factual findings amount to no
more than errors in the exercise of jurisdiction which are
beyond the ambit of the sole office of a writ of certiorari,
namely, the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the
commission of grave abuses of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. All taken, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in
sustained the Order dated September 17, 1999 of the SEC en
banc in EB Case No. 666 which ordered the discharge of
attachment made on personal properties of respondent
Abrenica. Because of the conclusion we have thus reached,
there is no need to delve on the validity of the SEC en
banc Order dated September 28, 1999. Therefore the petition
is hereby granted.
Fortune Insurance Corp. v. C.A.
G.R. no. 110701
Facts: On November 11, 1988, Isabela 1 Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (ISELCO-I) secured Fire Insurance Policy No. 9216 from
petitioner for Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos. This was
later on changed to Policy No. 9218 with expanded coverage
to include typhoons and floods. The period covered by the said
amended insurance policy is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of
November 11, 1988 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of November 11,
1989. The properties covered are all of ISELCO-I's distribution
lines, electric posts/poles, transformers and its accessories,
towers and fixtures installed and/or specifically situated in the
towns of Alicia, Angadanan, Cabatuan, Cauayan, Cordon,
Echague, Jones, Luna, Ramon, San Isidro, San Mateo,
Santiago, Reina Mercedes, San Guillermo and San Agustin all
in the Province of Isabela. On June 17, 1992, after trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of ISELCO.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Judge in issuing the Special Order
granting execution pending appeal.
Held: the court disagrees. Respondent judge exercised sound
discretion in granting execution pending appeal on the grounds
that: (1) ISELCO-I is a cooperative of the people within the
area of coverage that is engaged in the business of retailing
electricity to its members - a commodity basic to their welfare
and vital to the industries of the people; and (2) to deliver
electricity to the people, its electric lines, posts, transmissions,
transformers and other accessories must always be
maintained in good order and condition. Finally, it must be
stressed here that respondent Judge granted execution
pending appeal based upon the evidence of those factual
circumstances mentioned above. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals affirmed those factual findings and respondent
Judge's conclusion that the same constitute good reasons
contemplated by law for granting execution pending appeal. It
bears reiterating, therefore, that it is not the function of this
Court to analyze and weigh evidence all over again unless
there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are
totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. In the same vein, the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties
and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls
under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule, and this,
petitioner has failed to prove. Therefore the petition is hereby
denied.
Metro Transit Organization v. C.A.
G.R. no. 142133
Facts: Petitioner Metro Transit Organization, Inc. ("MTO" for
brevity) is a government-owned and controlled corporation
operating a light rail transit ("LRT" for brevity), while petitioner
Jovencio Bantang, Jr. ("Bantang" for brevity) is an officer of
MTO. Respondent Ruperto Evangelista ("Evangelista" for
brevity) worked as a cash assistant in the Treasury Division of
MTO.On December 29, 1989, after completion of an inventory
count of tokens, petitioners discovered that 2,000 pieces of
tokens were missing. Petitioners conducted an investigation
which resulted in implicating Evangelista as one of the alleged
perpetrators responsible for the loss of the tokens. The
evidence presented against Evangelista included three
handwritten letters by three persons, namely: George
Kasunuran, a vault keeper of MTO; Renato Mendoza, a
treasury personnel of MTO; and Edgardo de Leon, owner of a
token outlet. The labor arbiter ruled against petitioner and the
matter was elevated to the Supreme Court by petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in denying the
petition for certiorari
Held: The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is
indispensable before resort to the special civil action for
certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to
correct its error, if any. The rule is well-settled that the filing of
a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to
the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to certain
exceptions. Certiorari is not a shield from the adverse
consequences of an omission to file the required motion for
reconsideration. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals in its decision, petitioners may not arrogate to
themselves the determination of whether a motion for
reconsideration is necessary or not. The instant case,
however, is a petition for review where only questions of law
may be raised.9 What petitioners are attempting to do here is
to urge the Court to re-examine the probative value or
evidentiary weight of the evidence presented below. The Court
cannot do this unless the appreciation of the pieces of
evidence on hand is glaringly erroneous. This is where
petitioners fail. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of
both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter that petitioners failed to
present substantial evidence to establish that Evangelista stole
the 2,000 pieces of tokens. The findings of the Labor Arbiter,
when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court unless patently erroneous. In the instant
case, we find no patent errors.It is not the function of this Court
to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below. The jurisdiction of this
Court is limited only to reviewing errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower courts. Likewise, it is not for this
Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of an
administrative tribunal which has expertise in its special field.
Therefore the petition for certiorari is denied.
Government of the U.S. v. Puruganan
G.R. 148571
Facts:   Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,  the
United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent
to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated
June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and
0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as
Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and
documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted
them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action,
pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069,
also known as the Extradition Law.Upon learning of the
request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice
(DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The
validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a
Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially,
the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ
was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices
changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier
Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right
to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. This Resolution has become final and
executor, and hence the petition was filed in the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not The public respondent acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing
an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Held: courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise
review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny.
They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due
process" every little step of the way, lest these summary
extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also
sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to
comply in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple request to
return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted
into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can
unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and
defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international
cooperation. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be
conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding
basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions,
delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
Therefore the petition is granted.
Butuan bay wood export corporation v. C.A.
G.R. no. L-45473
Facts: On April 1, 1976, private respondent Diamond
Machinery Co., Inc. filed a verified complaint for replevin
against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 23226 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIV, presided over by
respondent Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero. On the same
day, private respondent filed its "Bond for Manual Delivery of
Personal Property" in the amount of P898,440.28, and on April
2, 1976, respondent Judge issued a writ of seizure.On April 8,
1976, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside the
Order of Seizure.On April 19, 1976, private respondent filed its
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and to Set Aside Order of
Seizure, to which petitioner filed its Reply on April 26, 1976.
The petition for certiorari was denied by the court appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the disputed order of June 1, 1976 was
issued by the trial Judge without, or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion
Held: Petitioner's allegation that respondent Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion or had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction is without merit. As pointed out by petitioner
himself, there is a grave abuse of discretion justifying the
issuance of a writ of certiorari where there is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an
evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. The case at
bar evinces no proof demonstrating that respondent Judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment or that he
exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal animosity. A sedulous
perusal of the questioned order brings to the fore the lack of
factual and legal basis of petitioner's assertion. Indeed, before
a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a
lower court, all available remedies must be
exhausted. Likewise, in a host of case We ruled that before
filing a petition for certiorari in a higher court, the attention of
the lower court should first be called to its supposed error and
its correction should be sought. If this is not done, the petition
for certiorari should be denied. The reason for this rule is that
issues which Courts of First Instance are bound to decide
should not summarily be taken from them and submitted to an
appellate court without first giving such lower courts the
opportunity to dispose of the same with due deliberation.
Therefore the petition is denied and the judgment of the
appellate court is affirmed.
Philippine Consumers Foundation v. NTC
G.R. no. L-63318
Facts: On April 14, 1982, the NTC issued an ex-parte order
provisionally approving the revised schedule which, however,
was set aside by this Court on August 31, 1982 in the case
of "Samuel Bautista vs. NTC, et al.,"  116 SCRA 411. The
Court therein ruled that "there was necessity of a hearing by
the Commission before it should have acted on the application
of the PLDT so that the public could air its opposition,
particularly the herein petitioner and the Solicitor General,
representing the government. They should be given the
opportunity to substantiate their objection that the rates under
the subscriber investment plan are excessive and
unreasonable and, as a consequence, the low income and
middle class group cannot afford to have telephone
connections; and, that there is no need to increase the rate
because the applicant is financially sound. Petition for certiorari
was filed.
Issue: whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it approved the Revised Subscriber
Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of
specific rules and regulations implementing Presidential
Decree No. 217. Petitioner claims that these implementing
rules and regulations are mandatory pre-requisite for the
approval of said SIP rates
Held: The court is not impressed. At any rate, there is no
justification for the rate increase of the revised schedule of
PLDT's Subscriber Investment Plan. It is to say the least,
untimely, considering the present economic condition obtaining
in the country. The approved rate defeats the purpose of the
decree which is to spread ownership among the wide base of
investors. The State, in Presidential Decree No. 217
promulgated on June 16, 1973, adopted the basic policies of
the telephone industry, which, among others, are: (1) the
attainment of efficient telephone service for as wide an area as
possible at the lowest reasonable costs to the subscriber; (2)
the capital requirements of telephone utilities obtained from
ownership funds shall be raised from a broad base of
investors, involving as large a number of individual investors
as may be possible; and (3) in any subscriber self-financing
plan, the amount of subscriber self-financing will, in no case,
exceed fifty per centum (50%) of the cost of the installed
telephone line, as may be determined from time to time by the
regulatory bodies of the State. Anent the question that
petitioner should have appealed the decision of respondent
NTC, instead of filing the instant petition, suffice it to say that
certiorari is available despite existence of the remedy of appeal
where public welfare and the advancement of public policy so
dictate, or the orders complained of were issued in excess of
or without jurisdiction. Therefore the decision of the NTC is
annulled and set aside.
Yau v. Manila Banking Corporation
G.R. no. 126731
Facts: Esteban Yau is the judgment creditor of Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. by virtue of a Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 6 dated March 27, 1991 in Civil Case No.
CEB-2058, entitled “Esteban Yau v. Philippine Underwriters
Finance Corporation, et al.,” which included Silverio as one of
the defendants. The decision became final and executory and,
accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on September 17,
1992.Despite service of the writ and demand by the sheriff for
the satisfaction of the judgment, the defendants therein,
including Silverio, failed to pay said judgment. The only asset
of Silverio that could be found for the satisfaction of the
judgment was his proprietary membership share in the Manila
Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Manila Golf). Accordingly, the
sheriff levied upon the Silverio share on December 7, 1992. At
the public auction sale on December 29, 1992, Yau emerged
as the highest and only bidder of said Silverio share at P2
Million and the corresponding Certificate of Sale issued in his
name.However, at the time of the execution sale on December
29, 1992, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy
pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attachment dated
March 27, 1999 and October 17, 1990 obtained by the Manila
Banking Corporation (Manilabank) from Branches 62 and 64 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City before which complaints
for sums of money, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 90-511 and
90-271,respectively, were pending, in which Silverio is also
one of the defendants. Petition for review is filed.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its
decision.
Held: Clearly, Yau, being the judgment creditor of Silverio in
Civil Case No. CEB-2058 and the purchaser at the public
auction sale of the Silverio share, would be adversely affected
by the disposition of the Silverio share, subject of the writ of
attachment issued by Branch 64 of RTC Makati City, should a
decision be rendered in favor of Manilabank and, as such, has
standing to intervene to protect his interest. Besides, no
purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to protect his
interests before Branch 64 where the Silverio share is under
custodia legis.  If we follow the contention of Manilabank, this
would result in a violation of the aforementioned principle of
judicial stability or non-interference.Lastly, on the matter of
allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the
rules now allow intervention “before rendition of judgment by
the trial court.” After trial and decision in a case, intervention
can no longer be permitted. The permissive tenor of the
provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to
give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the same.The rule on intervention was evidently
intended to expedite and economize in litigation by permitting
parties interested in the subject matter, or anything related
therein, to adjust the matter in one instead of several suits.
Therefore the petition is denied and the Judgment of the C.A.
is affirmed.
Aquino v. NLRC
G.R. no. 98108
Facts: It appears that petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent
(NCR-2-396-87). He alleged that he was removed from the
payroll in January 1987 and was not paid his salary. Private
respondent answered that petitioner had abandoned his work
after he was held accountable for advances amounting to
P48,921.9. On May 30, 1990, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision, finding petitioner's dismissal as illegal. The matter
was elevated up to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not a memorandum on appeal due on a
Saturday can be filed timely on the following Monday.
Held: To remove any doubts that may possibly arise as a result
of the obiter dictum in the cases decided after Pacaña, we
hereby reiterate the Pacaña  ruling and uphold the amendment
to Section 1 of Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
enforced on January 14, 1992 on the principle that the law
does not require the performance of an impossible act
(impossibilum nulla obligatio est). The decision of the Labor
Arbiter in this case included a monetary award, i.e., award for
3-year back wages amounting to P80,820.00. Therefore, to
perfect its appeal before the NLRC, private respondent should
have posted a cash or surety bond equivalent to the money
judgment in accordance with Article 223 of the Labor Code. In
justification of the non-posting of the bond, both respondents
argued that the NLRC issued the rules implementing R.A. No.
6715 only on August 31, 1990, which took effect on October 9,
1990. They claimed that the requirement of R.A. No. 6715 on
the filing of a bond was not yet in force when private
respondent filed its appeal on June 25, 1990. The NLRC
further alleged that it was not bound to follow the Interim Rules
promulgated by its predecessor because it was the one
created under R.A. No. 6715 and authorized to promulgate the
implementing rules. We agree with the Solicitor General that
the provisions of Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 6715, requiring the posting of cash or surety bond
in appeals from decisions of Labor Arbiter granting monetary
awards, are self-executing and do not need any administrative
rules to implement them.The appeal made by private
respondent, not having been perfected on time for failure to file
the appeal bond, the decision of the Labor Arbiter became final
and executor. Therefore the petition is granted.
Bache & Co. v. Ruiz
G.R. no. 32409
Facts: On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of
a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Section
46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all
other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72,
73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo
de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file
the application for search warrant which was attached to the
letter.In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970,
respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They
brought with them the following papers: respondent Vera’s
aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant
already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an
affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent
De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio
already accomplished and signed by him but not yet
subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but
still unsigned by respondent Judge. Petition for certiorari was
filed in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge failed to personally
examine the complainant and his witness.
Held: In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was
conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant and his
witness. While it is true that the complainant’s application for
search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter
did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which
could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not
there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed,
the participants seem to have attached so little significance to
the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent
Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to
recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic notes
taken at the hearing of this case in the court below shows that
per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V.
Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions
of the complainant and his witness, and that stenographic
notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time
respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After
respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk
Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and
witness Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber and
informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions.
Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to
him her stenographic notes. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void.
National Electrification Administration v. C.A.
G.R. no. L-32490
Facts: The undisputed facts follow: On June 14, 1965,
respondents Rural Power Corporation, Eusebio E. Ferrer,
Lourdes Sison, and Eduardo Ferrer (hereinafter referred to as
Rural Power) executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA) in the
sum of P985,000.00 for the purpose of improving the former's
services to the public. On the same date, Rural Power was
required to execute two other real estate mortgages to secure
two other loans for the amounts of P98,000.00 and
P81,000.00, but said amounts were never released. Of the
three deeds of mortgages, only the first in the amount of
P985,000.00 has been the object of implementation. On May
27, 1970, petitioner instituted a Petition for certiorari and
mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before respondent
Court of Appeals. However, the Appellate Court ruled that the
failure of petitioner to ask respondent Judge to reconsider his
Order of March 4, 1970 before resorting to the remedies of
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction was "fatal"
to petitioner's position.
Issue: whether or not respondent Appellate Court gravely
abused its discretion in holding that petitioner's omission to
move for reconsideration before the Trial Court prior to filing a
petition for certiorari and mandamus was fatal to the petition.
Held: The court granted the petition. The error in toes case is
purely technical, To take advantage of it rather than to cure it,
does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its present. ration as
fatal to the plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. A
litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more
deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest
in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue, and then brushing aside as wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities
of procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits.
Lawsuits, unlike duels are not to be won by the rapier's thrust.
Technicality when it deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice becomes its great hindrance and enemy, and deserves
scant consideration from the courts. There are no vested rights
in technicalities. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Decision of respondent Appellate Court , dated August 17,
1970, is hereby annulled and the Regional Trial Court
corresponding to the former Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan is hereby directed to transmit the entire original
record of the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Vda. De Sayman v. C.A.
G.R. no. L-25596
Facts: The subject-matter of the instant proceeding is the writ
of execution issued by the trial court to enforce its judgment
after the same became final and executory, but during the
pendency of a petition for relief from the same. The said order
of execution was brought to the respondent Court of Appeals
on a petition for certiorari. In a decision of said court
promulgated on December 14, 1965, the writ of execution
issued by the trial court was annulled and set aside. The said
decision of the Court of Appeals is the subject of the petition
for certiorari in the instant proceeding. The petitioners assail
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals on three (3)
principal grounds, namely, (1) the petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals should not have been entertained inasmuch
as the private respondent did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the order of execution in the trial court; (2)
the trial judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
authorizing the execution of its judgment; and (3) the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the mere filing of the petition for
relief will justify the stay of execution of the judgment
complained of.
Issue:  Whether a writ of execution may be issued despite the
pendency of a petition for relief against the judgment sought to
be enforced. It is the rule that when a petition for relief is filed
Held: It is to be further noted that in G.R. Nos. L-29479 and L-
29716, the right of the private respondent to seek a review of
the decision of the trial court in connection with its appeal from
the denial of the petition for relief was sustained. The
possibility which the respondent Court of Appeals seeks to
guard against still exists in greater likelihood. The judgment of
the trial court the enforcement of which is sought to be
restrained has not yet attained the status of being beyond
modification or reversal. Hence, the enforcement of the same
at this stage of the proceeding is premature. In the least, to
stop its execution as was ordered by the respondent Court of
Appeals may not be categorized as a grave abuse of
discretion. Therefore the petition for certiorari is denied.
Peroxide Philippines Corporation v. C.A.
G.R. no. 92813
Facts: On December 6, 1982, herein private respondent Bank
of the Philippine Islands (BPI) sued herein petitioners Peroxide
Philippines Corporation (Peroxide), Eastman Chemical
Industries, Inc. (Eastman), and the spouses Edmund O.
Mapua and Rose U. Mapua (Mapuas) in Civil Case No. 48849
of the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila for
the collection of an indebtedness of Peroxide wherein Eastman
and the Mapuas bound themselves to be solidarily liable. Upon
the filing of said action, the trial court, then presided over by
Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment which was actually done on January 7,
1983 after BPI filed an attachment bond in the amount of
P32,700,000.00. Petitioners' properties were accordingly
attached by the sheriff. BPI sought for certiorari.
Issue:Whether or not The trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying BPI's urgent ex parte motion to suspend
the order of August 23, 1988.
Held: the Supreme Court affirmed the findings and conclusion
of respondent court that the order of Judge Acosta, dated May
29, 1986, suspending the writ of attachment was in essence a
lifting of said writ which order, having likewise been issued ex
parte  and without notice and hearing in disregard of Section 13
of Rule 57, could not have resulted in the discharge of the
attachment. Said attachment continued unaffected by the so-
called order or suspension and could not have been deemed
inefficacious until and only by reason of its supposed
restoration in the order of December 16, 1987 of Judge
Gerona. Under the facts of this case, the ex parte  discharge or
suspension of the attachment is a disservice to the orderly
administration of justice and nullifies the underlying role and
purpose of preliminary attachment in preserving the rights of
the parties pendente lite as an ancillary remedy. The
proceeding in the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment,
as a mere provisional remedy, is ancillary to an action
commenced at or before the time when the attachment is sued
out. Accordingly the attachment does not affect the decision of
the case on the merits, the right to recover judgment on the
alleged indebtedness and the right to attach the property of the
debtor being entirely separate and distinct. As a rule, the
judgment in the main action neither changes the nature nor
determines the validity of the attachment.  At any rate, whether
said petitioners are guarantors or sureties, there exists a valid
cause of action against them and their properties were
properly attached on the basis of that indubitable
circumstance. Neither do we subscribe to petitioners' charge
that respondent court injudiciously gave due course to the
aforesaid petition for certiorari without requiring the prior filing
and resolution of a motion for the reconsideration of the
questioned orders of the trial court. There are, admittedly,
settled exceptions to that requisite and which obtain in the
present case. A motion for reconsideration was correctly
dispensed with by respondent court since the questions raised
in the certiorari  proceeding had been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court. Also, under the circumstances
therein, a motion for reconsideration would serve no practical
purpose since the trial judge had already had the opportunity
to consider and pass upon the questions elevated
on certiorari to respondent court. Therefore the petition is
denied.
THE CENTRAL BANK VS HON. JUDGE GAUDENCIO
CLORIBEL
G.R. No. L-26971, APRIL 11, 1972
Concepcion, C.J.
Facts:
Banco Filipino is a savings and mortgage bank duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines. CB issued,
pursuant to Resolution No. 1769 of the Monetary Board, CB
Cir No. 185. Subsequently, however, within the same year,
Banco Filipino changed its policy by compounding and paying
the interest on its savings deposits, at the maximum rate fixed
by the Monetary Board, from the quarterly to the monthly
basis, and by paying, in advance, the maximum rates of
interest on time deposits.
THE Monetary Board approved a resolution, directing the
Banco Filipino to comply strictly with Central Bank Circular No.
222. Banco Filipino filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction
against Petitioner herein and the Monetary Board, "insofar as
they restrict the payment of monthly interests on savings
deposits and advance interests on time deposits," and praying
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte to
restrain the Petitioner, its officials and/or agents from enforcing
the aforementioned circulars and resolutions to the extent that
the same imposed said restrictions, or, should the court
"require that a hearing be conducted on the petition for a
preliminary injunction, that a preliminary restraining order to
the same effect be issued pending such hearing."
Thereupon, Cloribel, as Judge of said court, issued ex parte
the restraining order prayed for. After the hearing and the
submission by the parties of their respective memoranda,
Judge Cloribel granted said application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Accordingly, the latter instituted the order of
November 23 and to meanwhile restrain its
enforcement, upon the ground that, in issuing said order,
Judge Cloribel had committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Banco Filipino sets up, the following defenses, to wit: 1) that
said petition should be dismissed, because "petitioner has not
exhausted all remedies in the Court of First Instance of Manila
before coming to this Honorable Court"; 2) that having heard
the parties before issuing the contested order, respondent
Judge had neither committed a grave abuse of discretion, nor
exceeded his jurisdiction, in acting as he did; and 3) that the
contested resolutions and circulars are null and void for (a)
they were issued without previous notice and hearing, (b) they
impair vested rights, and (c) the statutory power of the
Monetary Board to "fix the maximum rates of interest which
banks may pay on deposits and any other obligations" does
"not include the regulation of the manner of computing and
paying interest, since this function is not expressly granted
petitioner."
Issues:
1. Whether or not petition is improper because CB has not
exhausted all remedies in the Court of First Instance of
Manila?
2. Whether or not respondent Judge had neither committed a
grave abuse of discretion, nor exceeded his jurisdiction, in
acting as he did?
Held:
1. No. It is true that Petitioner herein did not seek a
reconsideration of the order complained of, and that, as a
general rule, a petition for certiorari will not be entertained
unless the respondent has had, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the error imputed to him.
This rule is subject, however, to exceptions, among which are
the following, namely: 1) where the issue raised is one purely
of law; 2) where public interest is involved; and 3) in case of
urgency. These circumstances are present in the case at bar.
Moreover, Petitioner herein had raised — in its answer in the
main case and in the rejoinder to the memorandum of the
Banco Filipino in support of the latter's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction — the very same questions' raised in the
Petition herein. In other words, Judge Cloribel has already had
an opportunity to considered and pass upon those questions,
so that a motion for reconsideration of his contested order
would have served no practical purpose. The rule requiring
exhaustion of remedies does not call for an exercise in futility.
2. Yes. It was, therefore, apparent from the pleadings and
memoranda that Banco Filipino had no cause of action against
Petitioner herein to restrain the same from demanding strict
compliance with said circulars. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, "(a) preliminary injunction may be
granted ... when it is established" (1) that "the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief demanded," which consists in restraining
"the commission or continuance of the acts complained of,"
and (2) that the commission or continuance thereof "would
probably work injustice to the plaintiff" or be "in violation of the
plaintiff's rights" and tend "to render the judgment ineffectual."
Since Banco Filipino was clearly not entitled to the relief
sought in said Civil Case No. 67181 and no "injustice" to said
institution would, accordingly, result from its compliance with
the contested resolutions and circulars, it follows that
Respondent Judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its
aforementioned order of November 23, 1966, in said case.
LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009
Corona, J.
Facts:
Aries Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra (PRs) filed a illegal
dismissal case against Laguna Metts Corp (LMC). LA decided
in their favor but the NLRC reversed the LA decision. PRs
filed an MR but it was denied. PRs’ counsel received the denial
on MAY 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008 (the last day of the 60-D
filing period of a petition for certiorari), PRs’ counsel filed a
motion for extension to file the petition praying for an extension
of 15 days. The Court of Appeals (CA) granted a non-
extendible 15D period. LMC moved for the reconsideration of
the resolution claiming that under the current Sec 4 of Rule 65
as amended by AM 07-7-12 dated Dec. 4 2007, extension of
time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed. CA
denied LMC’s motion and said that the new rule only
discouraged the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of
time but did not strip the CA of its discretionary power to grant
extensions in exceptional cases, in the interest of justice.
Aggrieved, LMC now files this petition for certiorari in the SC
claiming GADALEJ of the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not a motion for extension to file a petition for
certiorari is still allowed?
Held:
No. The amended rules explicitly deleted the last paragraph of
Section 4 of Rule 65 allowing for an extension of the period for
not longer than 15 days due to compelling reasons. As a rule
an amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases
indicates an intention to change its meaning. If the Court
intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant
extensions under Sec 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing
such authority would have been preserved. The removal only
meant that an extension is no longer allowed. The rationale for
the amendment is to essentially prevent the use (or abuse) of
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even
defeat the ends of justice. When the CA granted the extension,
it arrogated unto itself the power it did not posses, a power
only the SC may exercise. Even assuming, the CA retained the
discretion to grant extension, the reasons (see footnote 3 of
the case: lack of material time due to voluminous pleadings
that have to be written and numerous court appearances to be
undertaken; lack of funds) of PRs’ counsel and PR did not
qualify as compelling. While technicalities should not unduly
hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to
the success of that quest which all courts are devoted. Petition
granted. CA decision was reversed and set aside. The petition
of PR in the CA case is ordered dismissed for having been
filed out of time.
OUANO VS PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134230, July 17, 2002
Sandoval-Guiterrez, J.
Facts:
On December 11, 1997, PGTT filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a complaint against Jovenal Ouano, petitioner, for
Recovery of ownership and Possession of Real Property and
Damages. In its complaint, PGTT alleged that it is the owner of
Lots Nos. 1-10, Block 2 of the Sunnymeade Crescent
Subdivision located at Pit-os, Talamban, Cebu City. Sometime
in October of 1996, PGTT found that Ouano uprooted the
concrete monuments of the said lots, plowed them and planted
corn thereon. Despite PGTT’s demand that he can vacate the
lots and restore them to their original condition, Ouano refused
claiming that he is the owner and lawful possessor of the 380
square meters he occupied. Due to Ouano’s wrongful act,
PGTT was deprived of the use of its property and suffered
damages in the amount of P100,000.00. Likewise, PGTT was
constrained to file the subject action and hired the services of
his counsel for P100,000.00.
On February 5, 1998, Ouano filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it is the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over it considering
the assessed value of the lots involved is only P2,910.00, as
indicated in the latest tax declaration, citing Section 19
(paragraph 2) and Section 23 (paragraph 3) of BP 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by RA No.
7691.
In its opposition to Ouano’s motion, PGTT contends that the
RTC has jurisdiction since the market value of the lots is P49,
760.00. Besides, the complaint is not only an action for the
recovery of ownership and possession of real property, but
also for damages exceeding P100, 000.00 over which claim
the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction under Section 19
(paragraph 8) of the same law.
The trial courts ruled it has jurisdiction over the case because
“it is of judicial knowledge that the real properties situated in
Cebu City command a higher valuation than those indicated in
the tax declaration. The observation of plaintiff’s (PGTT)
counsel as to the issue on damages is likewise sustained
considering that, being a corporation, it may have incurred
damages in the form of unrealized profits.”
Hence the present petition for certiorari filed by Ouano under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1998
and May 27, 1998 as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
Held:
No. The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC has
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. CEB-21319. The complaint
seeks to recover from private respondent the ownership and
possession of the lots in question and the payment of
damages. Since the action involves ownership and possession
of real property, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim is determined by the assessed value, not the market
value, thereof, pursuant to BP 129, as amended by RA 7691.
Section 33 (paragraph 3) of the said law, the MTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction on all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed P20, 000.00 or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed P50,
000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation, expenses and costs; Provided, that in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of
the adjacent lots.
It is undisputed that the assessed value of the property
involved, as shown by the corresponding tax declaration, is
only P2, 910.00. As such, the complaint is well within the
MTC’s P20, 000.00 jurisdictional limit.
The finding of respondent judge that the value of the lots is
higher than that indicated in the tax declaration and that,
therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case is highly
speculative. It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating
the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of
regularity as it has been issued by the proper government
agency.
EMMANUEL RELAMPAGOS VS ROSITA CUMBA AND THE
COMELEC
G.R. No. 118861, April 27, 1995
Davide, J..
Facts:
In the elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner Relampagos
and private respondent Cumba were candidates for Mayor of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the
winning candidate, with a margin of twenty-two votes over the
former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an
election protest with the RTC which found the petitioner to
have won with a margin of six votes over the private
respondent and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision
to the COMELEC. The petitioner, on 12 July 1994, filed with
the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the
trial court granted On 3 August 1994. The private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of execution
which was denied on 5 August 1994.
The private respondent then filed with the respondent
COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order
of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and the writ of execution. On 9 February 1995, the
COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition.
Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as
Municipal Mayor, pending resolution of the appeal before the
Commission. Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed
this special civil action. 
Issue: 
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases
where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction? 
Held: 
The Court in concluding that the aforesaid last paragraph of
Section 50 of B.P. 697 has not been repealed by the Omnibus
Election Code held that the COMELEC has the authority to
issue the extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the
trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of
discretion in granting the petitioner’s motion for execution
pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution. Any
motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the
period for the perfection of the appeal. Since the motion for
execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or
after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer
validly act thereon. COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it
correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the
trial court.
TRIFILO MONTEBON VS ATTY. TANGLAO-DACANAY AND
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 136062, April 7, 2005
Sandoval-Guiterrez, J.
Facts:
Edwin Salimbangon concluded a Rattan Cutting Contract with
the government through then Undersecretary Victor O. Ramos
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).  Thereafter, Salimbangon entered into a Rattan
Supply Contract with Tradewinds Rattan and Handicraft, Inc.
(TRHI) through its Vice-President Robert Lim.  TRHI would
supply Salimbangon rattan poles for a period of one year.
As Vice President of TRHI, Lim appointed Trifilo Montebon,
herein petitioner, as its agent to process and follow-up
pertinent papers for the supply and release of rattan poles
shipment from the source to the port of Cebu.
Sometime in May, 1990, the officers of the DENR, headed by
Alfredo Madrid, filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Tagum, Davao a complaint for possession of rattan poles
without government permit, against petitioner, in violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines).  During the preliminary investigation, the MTC
issued an Order directing petitioner to take possession of the
seized rattan poles for lack of space in the court for stock
piling, but prohibiting him not to dispose the same until the
case is resolved. Meanwhile, on July 31, 1991, Lim cancelled
petitioner’s authority to represent TRHI and subsequently
appointed Wilfredo Fortuna as its new agent.  Fortuna was
authorized to process and follow-up pertinent papers for the
supply of its rattan poles to the Port of Cebu.
The MTC found a prima facie case against petitioner.  Hence,
an information for the offense charged was filed against him
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tagum, Davao.
Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information
on the ground that he had paid all the forest charges and fees
due the government.
Fortuna applied for a Certificate of Minor Forest Products
Origin (CMFPO) with the DENR over the unsplit rattan poles.  PIEDRAS did not have sufficient funds, it negotiated for RCBC
Petitioner also applied for a CMFPO, claiming ownership of the
unsplit rattan poles. Petitioner’s application was denied
because he had no more authority to represent TRHI. When
petitioner found that the poles were released to TRHI, he filed
an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao (OMB-MIN) against Placido Huesca, DENR
cartographer, and Roger Cantuba, DENR Forest Conservation
Unit Division Chief, for violation of Section 3(e) and (h) of
Republic Act 3019 (RA 3019) and robbery. Subsequently,
petitioner filed a supplemental complaint for the same charge
against Robert Lim, Edwin Salimbangon and Alfredo Madrid.  subscription shall be paid by TRB upon call of the OPMC
Petitioner claimed that all of them conspired in releasing the
rattan poles to TRHI. Thereafter, the complaint filed by the
petitioner was dismissed, thus, he filed for a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint?
Held:
No. Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise
known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989”, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the sole power to investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." Relative to this, the court held that it is the
consistent policy of this Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory powers.
In the present case, we cannot sustain petitioner’s contention
that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he approved the Memorandum of Atty. Corazon T.
Dacanay, Legal Counsel of the Office of the Ombudsman,
recommending the dismissal of the complaint leveled against
respondents Lim and Salimbangon.  A perusal of the said
Memorandum does not show any taint of grave abuse of
discretion on his part.  Neither is there an indication that he
acted in an arbitrary or despotic manner arising from passion
or hostility when he approved Atty. Dacanay’s Memorandum
recommending the dismissal of the complaint against the two
respondents.
VICENTE UY VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 11544, July 6, 2004
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
Respondent PIEDRAS is a sequestered corporation voluntarily
surrendered by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto to the PCGG under a
Compromise Agreement entered into on November 3, 1990.
PIEDRAS was the registered owner of 7,499,812,500 class “A”
shares and 4,999,875,000 class “B” shares of OPMC.  On
September 18, 1991, OPMC put out a notice of the issuance of
additional OPMC shares for which its existing stockholders
may exercise their non-assignable pre-emptive rights. As a
condition for the additional subscription, fifty percent of the
purchase price for the entire subscription must be paid not
later than 5:00 p.m. of October 31, 1991, and the other fifty
percent to be remitted upon call by the OPMC Board of
Directors.  In order to avail of the total shares it is entitled to
subscribe to, PIEDRAS needed P124, 906,875.00.  As
and TRB to advance the needed amount.  The agreements
with the respective banks were confirmed and authorized by
the PCGG in an En Banc Resolution.
PIEDRAS likewise agreed to pay the capital gains tax due on
the transfer of the OPMC shares from it to RCBC. On the other
hand, the SSA between PIEDRAS and TRB provided that TRB
would advance the amount of P5,000,000.00 in order to pay
for the additional subscription by PIEDRAS of 477,717,745
class “B” OPMC shares.  The remaining unpaid amount for the
Board of Directors. 
On October 31, 1991, the deadline set by OPMC for the
exercise of its stockholders’ pre-emptive rights, RCBC and
TRB advanced the total amount of P55, 957,562.50 to
PIEDRAS as initial payment for PIEDRAS’s additional
subscription.  Petitioner filed with public respondent
Sandiganbayan a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with a
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order assailing the actions
of the PCGG in negotiating with respondent banks for the
advance of the funds needed by PIEDRAS to pay for its
additional subscription.  

Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter which involved the alleged
disturbance of petitioner’s rights as a stockholder and the
violation by PIEDRAS of the exclusivity of the pre-emptive
offering by OPMC.  Sandiganbayan said, was a purely intra-
corporate matter which is outside of its jurisdiction.  The
Sandiganbayan added that assuming it did have jurisdiction
over the case, the petition failed to show abuse of discretion on
the part of PIEDRAS or the PCGG.  Moreover, petitioner, while
a landowner and a taxpayer, does not have the capacity to sue
as his case does not meet the requisites for a taxpayer’s suit.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case?

Held:
No. The Sandiganbayan stated that its jurisdiction pertains
only to the determination of the propriety of the sequestration
made by the PCGG.  It cannot assume jurisdiction over
petitioner’s case which essentially raises the issue of whether
it was proper for PIEDRAS to exercise its pre-emptive
rights.  The PCGG, in its Comment, argued that PIEDRAS’s
OPMC shares of stock had been previously subject of a
compromise agreement between itself and Mr. Roberto
Benedicto.  By virtue of the compromise agreement, the
shares were given back to the Philippine
Government.  Necessarily, the issue of ownership of the
subject shares had already been determined.  The
Sandiganbayan no longer has jurisdiction over any action
arising out of any controversy regarding the exercise of
ownership rights over said shares of stock.  Furthermore, the
agreements were beyond the ambit of the COA Circular which
requires public bidding since dacion en pago transactions are
expressly excempted therefrom.  Finally, there was no violation
of the CARL since there was no disposition yet of ill-gotten
wealth from which receipts may be applied and used for the
agrarian reform program.