The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation

STEPHANE LEFEBVRE
Stephane Lefebvre is a former Strategic Analyst at the Canadian Department of National
Defence and a former Marcel Cadieux Policy Planning Fellow at the Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The views expressed here are the
author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of any governmental or
nongovernmental organizations with which he is or has been affiliated. An earlier version
of this article was presented at the Colloque Renseignement et Securite internationale,
Laval University, Quebec City, Canada, on 20 March 2003.

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 once again
forcefully brought to the fore the necessity for cooperation among security
a n d i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s , b o t h n at i o n a l l y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n
all y.
1
The
transnational nature of several terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda (the Base)
being the most notorious, implies that their detection, disruption, and
elimination can succeed fully only if done globally.
2
That said, no one
should surmise that international intelligence cooperation did not exist
pr ior to 11 Sept embe r (her eaf t e r 9=11) . I n f ac t , We s t e rn s e cur i ty and
intelligence agencies have long cooperated (and sometimes simultaneously
competed), either bilaterally—the preferred way—or multilaterally. Their
cooperation is sometimes difficult, uneven, and haphazard, but when lives
are believed to be at stake due to terrorists’ active targeting, efforts to
make it work are certainly redoubled.
With 9=11 and the initiation of military operations against al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, these e stablishedliaison r elationships had t
o be
compl ement ed wi th vigorous new one s i nvolving Middl e Eas t e rn and
Cent r al A s i an count ri e s , of t en making for s t range a l l ianc e s .
3
Whi l e a
variety of intelligence liaison relationships with countries in these regions
may have existed previously they took an enhanced—more operational—
turn. Tactical intelligence must be shared to ensure military success, and
human intelligence gathered to better understand and counterterrorist
organizations, as Arabs can more easily infiltrate Islamist terrorist groups
than can non-Arabs . For t he s e enhanc ed r e lat ion ship s t o work w e l l ,
confidence and trust are essential ingredients, as are the perceived benefits
to both sides in the liaison. Although intelligence liaison activities are
rarely discussed, their importance needs to be recognized.
THE IMPACT OF 9=11
After the 11 September attacks, the United States made full use of its foreign
intelligence liaison relationships, for both defensive and offensive purposes,
in its ‘‘extensive, shadowy struggle against al-Qa’ida.’’

Included were
effo r t s to b e n e fit f rom th e knowl edge and e xpe r i enc e o f the Ru s s ian ,
Chinese, Pakistani, and even Libyan intelligence services. The director of
Spain’ s Nat ional Int e l l igenc e C ent er ( CNI ) , J or ge De z cal lar , publ i c ly
confirmed the enhanced levels of cooperation among intelligence agencies
since 9=11.
5
Even this cooperation between the United States and its allies
against al-Qaeda was not entirely new. When al-Qaeda emerged, several
years ago, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) quickly recognized the
val ue of cooperationwith f oreign intel ligence services in
facing the
challenges of knowing more about the organization and penetrating it. The
cooperation, recognized as fruitful by all parties, led to the dismantling of
several al-Qaeda cells worldwide.
6
Just as the CIA expanded its foreign liaison activities to address the
increasing threat posed by al-Qaeda, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), under the leadership of Louis J. Freeh, director from 1993 to 2001,
increased the number of its overseas legal attache´ offices from 16 in 1992
to 44 by September 2001. The new offices were concentrated in countries
facing a terrorist problem, and where cooperation and coordination with
the FBI would be most mutually beneficial.
7
After 9=11, thirty of these
legal attache´ offices were reinforced by 300 Special Agents and 85 support
staff ‘‘to assist in pursuing leads and coordinating the investigation with
our international colleagues.’’
8
B u t t h e F i n a l Re p o r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S e n a t e ’ s a n d H o u s
e of
Representatives’ Joint Inquiry Staff, which investigated the events leading
t o t h e a t t a c k s o f 1 1 S e p t emb e r , co n c luded t hat the U . S . i nt e l l i
genc e
community had relied too much on the cooperation of foreign intelligence
agen c i e s ins t ead o f r e c rui t ing and d eve lop ing i t s own human sou r c e s
a b r oa d . In th e o p i n i o n o f th e J o i n t I nq u i r y S t a ff , th e r e s u l t s
o f th i s
cooperation in terms of productive intelligence were mixed because various
foreign services were not able or willing to really go after the al-Qaeda
network and its leadership. Compounding this problem was the failure of
U.S. intelligence agencies ‘‘to coordinate their relationships with foreign
services adequately, either within the Intelligence Community or with
broader U.S. Government liaison and foreign policy efforts.’’
9
While the Joint Inquiry Staff assessment might be correct, it seems to
underestimate the time necessary to infiltrate terrorist organizations or
recruit agents knowledgeable enough about them to be useful. Given its
human intelligence weaknesses in regions such as the Middle East and
Central Asia,
10
the United States has no choice but to work with friendly
indigenous intelligence agencies. While intelligence liaison arrangements of
a bilateral na t ure are u s ually the m ost pro ductive, m ulti
lateral
arrangements, especially in the context of a coalition fighting terrorism,
h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r e d . W h i l e n o n ew mu l t i l a t e r a l a r r a n g eme n
ts h ave
surfaced publicly, the assumption must be that multilateral liaison is being
done on at least an ad hoc basis, given the needs of the moment. Although
Australian intelligence specialist Desmond Ball has argued that ‘‘the few
mul t i lat e ral a r rangement s of the Cold War offe r no mode l s ’ ’ for the
current situation,
11
many of those arrangements survived the fall of the
Berlin Wall and have been applied to 9=11.

MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
Close allies routinely exchange intelligence through various bilateral and
multilateral means. But the depth and breadth of these exchanges very
much depend on their sharing a common perception of a threat or sets of
interest s.
12
The c o m m o n t h r e a t p o s e d t o N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y
Organization (NATO) members by the Soviet Union during the Cold War
was thus conducive to allied services sharing large amounts of intelligence
on Soviet intentions and capabilities. The advent and spread of terrorism
in the 1970s forced exchanges and cooperation on this issue among close
allies, although this collaboration materialized rather slowly.
13
Yet, common threat perceptions and shared interests necessary to fruitful
relationships among intelligence agencies are not sufficient, as other factors
may indeed complicate these relationships. For instance, a nation or a
specific agency’s intelligence culture may play a role. To wit, as the Cold
War progressed, the United States came to rely increasingly on national
technical means of gathering intelligence, to the detriment of human source
i n t e l l i g en c e , i n c l u d i n g t h a t p r o v i d e d t h r o u g h l i a i s o n r e l a
tionships.
14
Further more , the not ion o f t rus t in, and r e spe c t for , othe r agenc i e s i s
for emos t when the t ime c ome s to de c ide on the e xt ent o f i nt e l l igenc e
sharing arrangements. That is why, for instance, the United States has built
its most productive relationships around key allies, such as the member
nations of NATO, Japan, and South Korea.
15
During the Cold War, these
a l l i e s e s t a b l i s h e d s e v e r a l mu l t i l a t e r a l f o r ums f o r i n t e l l i g e
nce liaison
purposes, to which a few mechanisms were added in the 1990s.

The UKUSA Agreement

The UKUSA Agreement, signed in June 1948 between the First Party (the
United States) and Second Parties (the United Kingdom (UK), Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand), divided signals collection efforts among its
signatories.
16
Historian Stephen Dorril correctly qualifies it as ‘‘the most
important and resilient part of British intelligence’s ‘special relationship’
with the United States,’’
17
which, incidentally, has gone far beyond the
world of signals intelligence. For instance, the British Joint Intelligence
Commi t t e e ( J IC) , whi ch p roduc e s int e l l igenc e as s e s smen t s for s enior
policymakers, has long involved the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in
i t s work, and v i c e -ve r sa.
18
Coope rat ion among t he five par t i e s to the
agreement is believed to be close, but not necessarily mutually beneficial,
given the disproportionate resources at the disposal of the United States
and the United Kingdom, and those of the relatively small intelligence
communities of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
19
The relationships
fostered by the UKUSA Agreement are a key to the United States’s effort
to secure its homeland, and necessary to its fight against terrorism.

The Club of Berne

The Club of Berne, a forum for the heads of the separate national European
Union security services, has met annually since 1971, and has its own
dedicated communications system. According to the 1999 annual report of
the Dutch National Security Service (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst—BVD,
now the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst—AIVD, or General
Intelligence and Security Service), that year’s meeting agenda for the Berne
Club inc l ude d s u c h i t e ms as t e r ror i s m , c ommuni ca t ions int e r c ept i
on,
encryption, and cyberterrorism. In 2000, the Club focused on the position
or rol e of int e l l igenc e s e rvi c e s wi th r e spe c t to European int egrat ion.
Informal contacts also take place among smaller groups. The Club works
in relative secrecy, amidst doubts about its efficiency and very shaky legal
footing. The situation reports drawn up by the heads of the participating
s e rvi c e s me r e ly provide i nformat i on to membe r s tat e s , s inc e they ar e
addr e s s ed t o no pa r t i cular Europ ean pol i t i cal au thor i ty , such as the
European Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy.
20
The European Union
On 20 September, 2001, the Justice and Home Affairs Council realized that
enhanced cooperation among the member countries’ intelligence services
was required. It decided to establish, within Europol,
21
for an initial sixmonth period, a Counter-Terrorism Task Force for which the member
states were invited ‘‘to appoint liaison officers from police and intelligence
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terrorism.’’
22
The Club of
Be rne , mandat ed t o p rovide guidanc e to Europol ’ s count e r t e r ror i sm
experts, formed a consultation group of directors of counterterrorism
departments, which meets four times a year, to that effect.
23
On 14 March,
2003, the European Union and NATO signed an agreement on the security
of information, a prerequisite for the exchange of intelligence between the
two organizations.
24
The Kilowatt Group
Created in 1977, upon an Israeli suggestion following the attack by Black
September at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, was the Kilowatt Group.
Believed to have changed its name since then, it is comprised of twentyfour membe r s e
rvi c e s : EU m embe r sta t e s , Canada , Nor way, Swede n ,
Switzerland, the United States (CIA and FBI), Israel (MOSSAD and Shin
Beth), and SouthAfrica. They exchange, on a non-reciproc
al basis,
information on terrorists and terrorist organizations. According to an
Assembly of the Western European Union report, however, ‘‘the ‘group’ is
little more than a telex network.’’
25
The NATO Special Committee
The NATO Special Committee, known in NATO parlance as AC=46, is one
of the oldest intelligence exchange mechanisms among allies. Established by
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 3 December 1952, it is comprised of
the heads of security intelligence services of NATO member countries, each
of whom speaks for his country’s intelligence community. AC=46 advises
the NAC on espionage, terrorist, and other nonmilitary related threats that
might affect the alliance and i ts member states. The work o
f the
Committee, whose chairmanship rotates annually among heads of service,
is supported by the NATO Office of Security. In the wake of 9=11, the
B e l g i a n c h a i r o f t h e S p e c i a l C o m mi t t e e e s t a b l i s h e d , w i t
hin NATO
Headquarters, an analytical unit to compile and analyze intelligence on
terrorism obtained from security services, disseminate this intelligence to
the Council and the Secretary General, and closely cooperate with NATO
military intelligence bodies. The Committee also explored the possibility of
increasing its cooperation in the field of counterterrorism with Russian
intelligence agencies.’’
26
As part of the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’s (EAPC) Action
Plan 2000–2002, meetings of the EAPC forty-six countries’ intelligence
agencies were held within the framework of the NATO Special Committee.
These meetings focused on the identification of threats from, and responses
to, international terrorism.
27
An EAPC meeting touching upon intelligence,
but outside the framework of the NATO Special Committee, was also held
post-9=11. Hosted by Poland, it was attended by a representative of the
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Committee, who chaired Working
Table 1 on the exchange of information, education, and training.
28
In April 2002, Romanian authorities organized a symposium for NATO
members and candidate countries to discuss ‘‘The Intelligence and Security
Services and the Security Agenda of the XXIst Century.’’ According to a
NATO official who attended the meeting, ‘‘the event was also meant to
dispel lingering suspicions among intelligence services, which in the past
worked against each other.’’
29
The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units
The Egmont Group was established in 1995 to provide an international
forum for cooperation and the exchange of intelligence among national
financial intelligence units. Initially focused on the fight against moneyl a u n d e r i n g ,
i t s wo r k n ow i n c l u d e s e ff o r t s t o t hwa r t t h e fi n a n c i n g o f
terrorism. Many of i ts members are actively supporting th
eir U.S.
colleagues in the war on terrorism.
30
In June 2002, 11 financial intelligence
units, including the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of
Canada (FINTRAC) , we r e adde d t o t he organi zat i on’ s 58 m embe r s ,
raising its membership to 69.
31
‘‘Uni¢cation’’ of Services
In Mar ch 2001, Rus s ian int e l l igenc e agenc i e s hos t ed a m e e t ing in St .
Petersburg, bringing together the heads of intelligence agencies, or their
representatives, from no fewer than 39 states. This ‘‘International Forum
of Secret Services’’ had, as its ultimate objective the bringing about of a
new l e vel of in telli gen c e c o ope rat i on th rou gh t h e ‘ ‘
un ific atio n’’ of
espionage agencies.
32
The Forum was certainly among the largest gathering
of intelligence agencies ever, outside of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council in AC=46 format.
While useful for bringing together the intelligence services of several
countries for some lofty purposes, and building confidence and trust over a
long period of time, these multilateral arrangements are, overall, far from
being privileged platforms for intelligence cooperation. The key reason has
to do with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, according to
the principle that ‘‘the wider the dissemination of information, the greater
the chance of its unauthorized disclosure.’’
33
Bilateral liaison arrangements
are thus the preferred means of international intelligence cooperation.
Most, if not all, bilateral exchanges are subject to the third-party rule,
which means that intelligence supplied by a party to another cannot be
shared with a third one without the originator’s consent. Without such a
rule, intelligence shared with an ally could end up in the hands of a third
party friendly to the original recipient but an adversary of the originator.
34
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Bilateral liaison arrangements are a defining characteristic of the intelligence
wo r l d . S e t u p f o rma l l y ( i . e . , wi t h t h e s i g n i n g o f a M emo r a n d
um o f
Understanding) or informally (on the basis of an unwritten, gentlemanly
agreement), they pay particular attention to the participants’ protection of
their intelligence. They usually cover a wide range of issues, including the
sharing of assessments, raw data, or training facilities and the conduct of
joint operations, some of which could lay dormant at any given time.
While traces and discussions of particular bilateral relationships can be
found in the historical literature, key questions such as ‘‘How does such
coope ra t ion ar i s e ? How f r equ ent ly and wha t form do e s i t take ? Who
authorizes it and arranges it?’’ are not always easily answered.
35
Most intelligence agencies recognize that the gaps in their coverage, access,
or expertise to do certain things, periodically compel them to rely on allied
intelligence services to fill the void. As an example of lack of expertise, in
t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s t h e D i r e c t i o n d e l a su r v e i l l a n c e d u t e r r i t o i r e ( F
rance’s
internal security service—DST) asked the CIA and Germany’s Federal
Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst—BND) for assistance in
exploiting documents provided by Colonel Vetrov (codenamed Farewell) of
the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), who in 1980 had offered his
services to the DST. Yves Bonnet, the head of the DST at the time, had
simply concluded that his service did not have the necessary expertise to
do the job.
36
The liaison relationships of the United States have perhaps been discussed
more than those of any other country, largely because of the greater openness
of U.S. society with regard to intelligence matters. For example, the United
States and Germany have built a solid cooperative partnership dating back to
the end of World War II.
37
They shared responsibilities against common
t a r g e t s , s p e c i fi c a l l y t h e S o v i e t Un i o n a n d t h e G e r m a n D e m
ocratic
Republic, throughout the Cold War and at least until the end of the Soviet
Union in 1991. With the advent of terrorism in Germany in the 1960s and
1970s, intelligence cooperation between the two countries extended to this
area as well.
38
Israel, which faces constant threats from terrorism, has also developed a
series of intelligence relationships with its closest allies. Additionally, the
foreign intelligence service, the Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks
(ha-Mossad le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim—MOSSAD), has built
unlikely ties with certain Muslim and Arab intelligence agencies, including
that of Jordan.
39
Others, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO)
and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), have hundreds of
l i a i s o n a r r a n g eme n t s i n p l a c e wi t h f o r e i g n s e c u r i t y a n d i n t
elligenc e
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partners, distributed across 104
count ri e s ,
40
and, as of 2002, CSIS had 230 liaison arrangements with
agencies from 130 countries. Like other Canadian organizations with an
intelligence mandate—the Department of National Defence, the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, the Communications Security Establishment,
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Privy
Council Office—CSIS also has full-time Security Liaison Officers (SLOs)
pos t ed abroad.
41
Given the i r la rg e numbe r , th e l ia i son ar rang emen t s
managed by intelligence agencies are quite likely to differ tremendously in
scope, breadth, and depth.
REASONS FOR COOPERATION
Intelligence agencies cooperate for many reasons. No one agency can do and
know everything. But, they act primarily in support of their nation’s foreign
policy objectives and in their self-interest. They may even get better in the
process,
42
that being one of the objectives behind many of the overtures
offered by multilateral arrangements for the sharing of intelligence, such as
NATO’s EAPC meetings in the framework of the Special Committee.
The United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are
particularly attractive partners for less fortunate services that can trade
human intelligence for the more sophisticated and expensive technical
products to which they would not otherwise have access. As Paul Taillon
notes, ‘‘[O]n occasion, some smaller nations can have access to important
human intelligence sources, and therefore these states can be attractive
partners in intelligence-gathering activities abroad.’’
43
Ultimately,
intelligence cooperation occurs when the potential benefits are evident, and
the costs or risks of that cooperation well understood.
44
Filling identified
gaps, reducing operational costs, and replacing nonexistent diplomatic
relations are among the major benefits of intelligence cooperation. Others
may include some ability to influence, where applicable, the policies of
other countries, or ‘‘affect the course of a military conflict,’’ as happened
in 1984 after Iraq received U.S. intelligence useful in its war against Iran.
45
RESTRAINTS ON COOPERATION
The nature and extent of intelligence liaison relationships can be affected by
several factors:
(1) Differences in perceptions of a threat and the foreign policy objectives of the
services’ respective nations, which may prevent a coordinated, effective, and
forceful approach in, perhaps, the fight against terrorism;
46
(2) Differences in the distribution of power, which may be conducive to unequal
relationships with the consequent impact, for example, on domestic affairs for
the dominant partner, such as complaints about unfair burden-sharing;
47
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partner, which may lead to a setback
in the relationship.
48
This is a tricky issue for Western governments, which have
to carefully balance the requirement to protect their citizens with that of not
assisting human rights violations through cooperation with a liaison partner.
49
(4) Legal issues. For example, the CSIS can enter into a liaison arrangement with a
foreign agency only with the approval of the Solicitor General of Canada, after
consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The
Solicitor General may impose conditions on any arrangements, and must ensure
that the human rights record of a prospective partner be assessed and weighed in
any decision, that all applicable laws of Canada be respected, and that the
arrangement be compatible with Canada’s foreign policy.
50
The impact that judicial practice may have on a liaison arrangement must
be taken into account by both parties. A recent Canadian case is instructive.
In 2002, Nicholas Ribic, charged under Canada’s international hostagetaking law , was g
ran t ed ac c e s s t o CS I S and Depar tment of Nat ional
De f ence document s , s ome o f whi ch contained i nt e l l igenc e r e c e ived i n
confidence from foreign intelligence agencies. While recognizing this fact,
the trial judge took the position that a fair trial took precedence over the
prot e c t ion o f thi rd par t i e s ’ int e l l igenc e data. The f ede ral gove rnment
lawyers lost the argument that a release of the documents would damage
Canada’s ability to obtain intelligence from foreign governments and
other third parties. ‘We promised, before we received the information,
that we would keep the information confidential,’ Alain Pre´fontaine, a
Justice Department lawyer, said in an interview. ‘The source would be
more reluctant to divulge information in future . . . knowing that the
third-party might disclose it to the Canadian government, who might
then make it public.’
51
(5) Related to the above is the fear that the intelligence exchanged, or knowledge
acquired, through the relationship will be compromised or passed on to a
third party without the originator’s consent is a major constraining factor on
any liaison arrangement.
52
Numerous historical cases are available to illustrate
this point.
Certainly, one of the most damaging cases was Harold Adrian Russell
(Kim) Philby’s. A British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer working
for the KGB, he served as a liaison officer to the CIA from 1949 until
recalled to London in 1951. His time in Washington, D.C., was marked by
unprecedented access from the highest to the CIA’s lowest-ranked officials,
its planning, and what the Agency knew about Soviet operations. Without
compunction, he used this knowledge to derail a joint SIS-CIA infiltration
op eration i n Albania, t hereby leading to the death o f a t l
east 300
individuals.
53
Also, during his time in Washington, he hosted at his home
a fellow KGB spy, Guy Burgess, working for the British Foreign Ministry,
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which, along with the SIS, was
still unaware that Philby was working for the Soviets. According to Miles
Copeland, who was with the Agency at the time, CIA Director Walter
Bedell Smith ‘‘sent an ultimatum of the greatest bluntness to the British.
‘Fire Philby,’ he said, ‘or we break off the intelligence relationship’’’
54
( P h i l by d e f e c t e d to t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a f ew y e a r s l a t e r ) . Du r i
ng t h i s
delicate period, the United States severed its cooperation with Britain on
atomic weapons amidst fears that its nuclear secrets would
be
compromised.
55
A more recent case is the leak of a National Security Agency (NSA)
memorandum on signals intelligence collection against members of the
Uni t ed Nat ions S e cur i ty Counc i l (UNSC) . A f emal e employe e of th e
NSA’s cousin in the United Kingdom, the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ), was arrested in March 2003 and charged under the
Official Secrets Act. According to a news report, the memo was leaked
because of the arrested employee’s disagreement with the policy on Iraq
being pursued by her government and that of the United States.
56
The leak
was excessively embarrassing to the United States, which became subject to
a UN investigation into the matter at the time when it was fighting hard at
the UNSC to see its views on Iraq prevail. Ian Davis and David Isenberg
of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) argued that
the leak was ‘‘driving a further wedge between Western nations at a crucial
time,’’ and speculated that the damage caused to transatlantic relations
would take a while to repair.
57
(6) The intelligence exchanged through a liaison relationship could potentially
be used for unintended purposes, as it was by Israel in June 1981 when it
struck Iraq’s Osirak reactor, thanks to satellite imagery obtained from the
CIA. In response, t he U nited Statesamended i ts intelligen
ce-sharing
agreement with Israel to ensure that it would use U.S. intelligence for only
defensive purposes.
58
This list, while not exhaustive,
59
illustrates the variables to be weighed by
in t e l l i ge nc e age nc i e s whe n c on s i de r i ng en t r y i n t o a pa r t i c ul ar l
i a i son
arrangement with a foreign intelligence agency. These variables lead to the
as sumpt ion that int el l igen c e agenci e s l ike ly p re f er formal r at he r t han
informal agreements, since they offer more protection and lay the base for
a more equitable quid pro quo.
FINDING THE RIGHT QUID PRO QUO
Although the literature on international intelligence cooperation is sparse
and l ar g e ly hi s t or i c a l
60
the r e i s hardly any doubt that al l int e l l igenc e
services perform s om e kind o f liaison func tion. N one h a
s all t he
resources—financial, human, and technical—to be entirely self-sufficient in
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of security threats makes
isolation an impossible option. While international cooperation has to be
entertained, its benefits must be weighed against the costs and risks. Post
9=11, once implausible relationships are now apparently working out, at
least for the narrow purpose of combating al-Qaeda.
Multilateral arrangements, though they exist, are mostly neglected by
i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s , w h i c h p la c e m o r e i m p o r t a n c e o
n bil at er al
relationships, primarily for security reasons. Fulfilling other objectives,
such as influencing policies and outcomes, is usually easier bilaterally,
rather than through a forum comprised of dozen of intelligence agencies,
each having a different mandate and objective. What is shared and done
multilaterall y i s usually not of a s ensi tive nature. M ultil
ateral
arrangements, such as NATO and the Club of Berne, could be useful,
however, to establish relations based upon trust and confidence with new
organizational members or outside partners. Their purpose is, therefore,
more political, and their activities conducted in support of national or
agreed-upon policy objectives. While some multilateral arrangements have
contributed to the ongoing global war on terrorism, their impact, as far as
can be openly discerned, has been minimal.
In all likelihood, bilateral liaison arrangements and certain specialf u n c t i o n m u l t i l
ateral intelligence arrangements will char acteri ze
international intelligence cooperation in the war against al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups. The Joint Inquiry Staff’s conclusion that United
States intelligence must develop its own human intelligence sources is wellintended. But
foreign intelligence agencies, because of their geographical
location and the composition and ability of their personnel, will continue,
in many cases, to have a clear comparative advantage which will not be
overcome by the U.S. putting more money into intelligence while isolating
itself in so doing. The key for U.S. intelligence agencies, as well as for
other agencies involved in the worldwide fight against terrorism, will be to
find the right quid pro quo with their liaison partners, while protecting
t h e i r o wn s o u r c e s , me t h o d s , an d i n f o rma t i o n i n r e a c h i n g b o t
h t heir
common and separate objectives.
REFERENCES
1
This article focuses upon the international intelligence cooperation between
civilian security and intelligence agencies responsible for fighting terrorism and
therefore makes no attempt to characterize the nature and extent of military
intelligence relationships.
2
See, inter alia, Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages: Government Responses to
Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 163.
INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 537
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For instance, Libyan intelligence agencies assisted the West in the fight against
terrorism post-9=11. Richard J. Aldrich, ‘‘Dangerous Liaison: Post-September
11 Intelligence Alliances,’’ Harvard International Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3,
Fall 2002, p. 51.
4
Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, Statement before the Joint
Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives
I n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e E v e n t s L e a d i n g t o t h e At t a c k s o f S e p t
emb e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 1
(Washington, DC: 18 September 2002), p. 14; see also pp. 7–8.
5
El Pais, Spain, 28 April 2002.
6
Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, Statement before the Joint
Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives
I n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e E v e n t s L e a d i n g t o t h e At t a c k s o f S e p t
emb e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 1
(Washington, DC: 8 October 2002). This was confirmed by the Director of
Ce nt ral I n t e l l i ge nc e ( DC I ) on 17 O c tobe r 2002. George J . Tene t , Wr i t t
en
Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence before the
Join t Intelligence Committee o f t he U.S. Senate and U.S.
H ouse of
Representatives Investigating the Events Leading to the Attacks of September
11, 2001 (Washington, DC: 17 October 2002), pp. 11–12.
7
Eleanor Hill, Statement of 8 October 2002.
8
Robert S. Mueller III, Testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committee of the
U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives Investigating the Events Leading
to the Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: 17 October 2002), p. 3.
9
Joint Inquiry Staff, Report: The Context. Part I: Findings and Conclusions
(Washington, DC: 10 December 2002), p. 9.
10
See, inter alia, Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the
CIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002).
11
Desmond Ball, ‘‘Desperately Seeking Bin Laden: The Intelligence Dimension of
the War Against Terrorism,’’ in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of
Global Order, Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds. (Houndmills, United Kingdom:
Palgrave, 2002), p. 71.
12
Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, pp. 174–175.
13
J e a n - F r a n c o i s G a y r a u d a n d D a v i d S e´ n a t , L e t e r r o r i s m e ( P a
ris: P resses
Universitaires de France, Que sais-je? No. 1768, 2002), pp. 61–62.
14
Ri cha rd R e and Kr i s t e n E i chens eh r , ‘ ‘A Conve r sat ion wi th Bob Graham.
S e a r c h i n g f o r An swe r s : U. S . I nt e l l i g e n c e Af t e r Se p t emb e r 1 1 , ’ ’
Ha r v a r d
International Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2002, p. 40.
15
Ibid., p. 41.
16
Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: The
Pe nguin P ress, 2002), p. 26. The key work on this subject i
s Jeffre y T.
Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation
Between the UKUSA Countries (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).
17
Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence
Service (New York: The Free Press, 2000), p. 56.
538 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVRE
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
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See Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw
the World (London: John Murray, 2002), pp. 271–280.
19
Christopher O. Spencer, ‘‘Intelligence Analysis Under Pressure of Rapid Change:
The Canadian Challenge,’’ The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. XVI, No. 1,
Spring 1996, p. 63.
20
See, inter alia, Sylvain Besson, ‘‘Un ve´ ´ teran des renseignements franc ais oppose le
secret-de´fense `a l’enqueˆte sur ses comptes suisses’’ (6 December 2002), at
h t t p : ==w w w . m a r c o s b i l l i o n s . c o m=m a r c o s =Y 2 0 0 2 =D e c e m b e r
=0 6 % 2 0
French%20intelligence%20veteran%20opposes% 20secrecy%20defence.htm;
M r . L e m o i n e , R a p p o r t e u r , ‘ ‘T h e N e w C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g E u r
opean
Intelligence—Reply to the Annual Report of the Council,’’ Report submitted on
behalf of the Defence Committee, Document A=1775 (Brussels: Assembly of
t h e W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n U n i o n , 4 J u n e 2 0 0 2 ) , a t h t t p :==w w
w.assembly-
weu.org=en=documents=sessions_ordinaires=rpt=2002=1775.html#P179_22707;
and Intelligence Forum e-mail at http:==lists.his.com=intelforum=msg04402.html
21
Europol was set up to deal with criminal intelligence. See its booklet entitled
Europol Intelligence Management (The Hague, n.d.).
22
European Union, ‘‘Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Justice and Home
Aff a i r s ) , B r u s s e l s , 2 0 S e p t emb e r 2 0 0 1 , ’ ’ d o c ume n t SN 3 9 2
6=6=0 1 R E V 6
(Brussels, 20 September 2001).
23
Frank Gregory, ‘‘The EU’s Role in the War on Terror,’’ Jane’s Terrorism &
Insurgency (January 2003); Annual Report 2001 of the National Security Service
(AIVD) (The Hague: AIVD, 2002), p. 55. Accessed at http:==www.aivd.nl= on
12 March 2003.
24
The text of the draft agreement is available as an attachment to the Forwarding
No t e f rom the Counc i l of th e European Union, ‘ ‘Agr e ement b e twe en th e
European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the Security
o f I n f o rma t i o n , ’ ’ P E SC 5 9 9 , CO SDP 4 6 3 ( B r u s s e l s : 1 8 D e c emb
er 2 002).
Ac c e s s e d a t h t t p :==f a c u l t y .ma xwe l l . s y r . e d u=a s r o b e r t s=f o i=l i
b r a r y=g s o i a=
n a t o_ eu _2 00 2_d r f t . pd f o n 1 2 M a r c h 2 00 3 . S e e a l s o NATO P r e s s
Release
PR=CP(2003)022 (14 March 2003). Accessed at http:==www.nato.int on 14
March 2003.
25
‘‘Swiss Citizen Abducted by Western Secret Service?’’, ‘‘Fortress Europe?’’ -
Circular Letter (FECL) No. 46, August 1996; Lemoine, The New Challenges
Facing European Intelligence.
26
Annual Report 2001 of the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) (Prague: BIS,
2002). Accessed at http:==www.bis.cz=eng=vz2001=vz2001.html on 10 March
2003; Annual Report 2001 of the National Security Service (AIVD) (The Hague:
AIVD, 2002) , p . 55 . Ac c e s s ed a t h t tp:==www.aivd.nl= on 12 Ma r ch 2003;
NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001),
p. 298; Lemoine, The New Challenges Facing European Intelligence.
27
EAPC Action Plans c an be found on the N AT O Web site at
http:==www.nato.int=pfp=eapc-blue.htm#work.
28
The agenda and spe eches delivered at this meeting are post
ed at
http:==www.nato.int=docu=conf=2002=c020222b.htm.
INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 539
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Agence France Presse, as quoted in Southeast European Times, 11 April 2002.
‘‘President Ion Iliescu Meets Participants in Symposium on Role of Intelligence
Services in XXIst Century,’’ Romanian News Agency, 12 April 2002. Accessed
at http:==www.romania.fi=news_archive= on 12 March 2003.
30
Alan Larson, ‘‘The International Dimension of Combating the Financing of
Terror ism,’’ Statement b efore theU.S. Senate Committee
on F inance
(Washington, DC: 9 October 2002). In his Executive Order of 24 September
2001, U.S. President George W. Bush requested that the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and other appropriate agencies make all efforts to
cooperate and coordinate with other countries, including with respect to the
sharing of intelligence about funding activities in support of terrorism. ‘‘Bush
E x e c u t i v e O r d e r o n F r e e z i n g T e r r o ri s t A s s e t s ’ ’ (W a s h i n
gton, DC: U.S.
Department of State, International Information Programs, 24 September 2001).
Accessed at http:==usinfo.state.gov= on 25 September 2001.
31
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, Performance
Repo r t fo r the Pe r iod Ending Ma r ch 31, 2002 (O t tawa: M ini s t e r of Publ i c
Works and Gove rnment Se rv i c e s Canada, 2002) , pp. 1–2, 58; and J immy
Gurule´, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Washington,
DC: 9 Oc tobe r 2002) , p. 14. Se e a l so Stat e me n t o f Pu r pos e o f t h e Egmont
Group of Financial Intelligence Units (The Hague, 13 June 2001).
32
Oleg A. Kalugin, ‘‘Window of Opportunity: Russia’s Role in the Coalition
Against Terror,’’ Harvard International Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2002,
p. 60.
33
Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’ International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 4, No. 3, Fall 1990, p. 315.
34
Ibid., pp. 315–316.
35
Lemoine, The New Challenges Facing European Intelligence.
36
See Yves Bonnet, Contre-espionnage: Me´moires d’un patron de la DST (Paris:
Calmann-Le´vy, 2000).
37
CIA historian Kevin Conley Ruffner compiled a rich collection of documents on
this relationship, Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the
BND, 1945–49, that was recently declassified. Thi s was not ed in Ruffne r ’ s
biographic details in the Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter
2002=2003 (accessed at http:==www.intelligence-history. org=jih=contributors-2-
2.html on 6 March 2003); and discussed in Vincent Jauvert, ‘‘Gehlen, l’homme
du Reichet de la Maison-Blanche,’’ Le Nouvel Observateur, 11 July 2002.
38
Loch K. Johnson and Annette Freyberg, ‘‘Ambivalent Bedfellows: GermanA m e r i c a n
Intelligen ce Relations, 1969–1991,’’International Journa
l of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 165–179.
39
Yigal Sheffy, ‘‘Israeli Intelligence and Counterterrorism,’’ paper presented at the
annual conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence
Studies (CASIS) (Ottawa: 26–28 September 2002), p. 9.
40
ASIO Director General Dennis Richardson, Address to Australian Industry
Group (Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane, 17, 19, and 21 February 2003).
Accessed at http:==www.asio.gov.au=Media= comp.htm on 10 March 2003.
41
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Public Report 2001 (Ottawa: CSIS,
2002). Accessed at http:==www.csis-scrs-gc.ca on 10 March 2003); Government of
Canada, The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community (Ottawa: Privy
Council Office, 2001), pp. 17–18. Accessed at http:==www.pco-bcp.gc.ca on 10
March 2003.
42
As Paul Taillon argues, ‘‘more experience in working with foreign security,
intelligence agencies and military forces may assist in an overall improvement
of national intelligence services.’’ Hijacking and Hostages, p. 166.
43
Ibid. , p. 166; Se e a l so J effr ey T. R i chel son, ‘ ‘The Cal culus of Int e l l igenc e
Cooperation,’’ p. 312.
44
Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’ pp. 307–323.
45
Ibid., p. 314.
46
Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, p. 172.
47
Ibid., p. 172; Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’
p. 309.
48
Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, p. 174.
49
This is a particularly sensitive issue in Canada. The Security Intelligence Review
Commi t t e e ( SIRC) r egular ly audi t s CSIS on thi s mat t e r , whi l e be ing f ul ly
conscious of the balance to be maintained between protecting Canadians and
preventing further abuses as a result of intelligence exchanges. See Security
Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC Report 2000–2001: An Operational Audit
o f t h e C a n a d i a n S e c u r i t y I n t e l l i g e n c e S e r v i c e (Ot tawa : P u b l
i c Wo r k s an d
Government Services Canada, 2001), p. 7.
50
Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC Report 2001–2002: An Operational
Audit of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2002), p. 19.
51
Tom Blackwell, ‘‘Kidnapping Ruling May Pose Security Threat,’’ The National
Post, Canada, 14 September 2002.
52
Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, p. 175.
53
Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightley, with an introduction by John le
Carre´, The Philby Conspiracy (Toronto: Fontana Books, 1968), pp. 2, 187–188;
John Prados, President’s Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations
f rom Wo r ld Wa r I I th rough the Pe r s ian Gu l f, r ev i s ed and updat ed edi t ion
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996 [1986]), pp. 48, 50.
54
Bruce Page, et al., The Philby Conspiracy, pp. 234–235.
55
This led Britain to build the Blue Danube atomic bomb. Michael Smith, ‘‘MoD
Shows Terrorists How to Make an A-Bomb,’’ The Daily Telegraph, 15 April
2002, p. 1. Coope rat ion was r e s tor ed i n 1958. Pe t e r H enne s sy , Th e S e c r e t
State: Whitehall and the Cold War, p. 59.
56
Martin Bright, ‘‘GCHQ Arrest over Observer Spying Report,’’ The Observer, 9
Mar ch 2003. Thi s was compounded by s tor i e s that the Uni t ed Stat e s was
clearly reluctant to share intelligence with UN inspectors in Iraq for fears ‘‘that
s ens i t ive i nformat ion might be l eaked to th e I raqi s and that int e l l igenc e -
gathering sources could be compromised.’’ Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Colum
Lynch. ‘‘U.N. Officials Say Intelligence to Prove US Claims Is Lacking,’’ The
Washington Post, 27 January 2003, p. 12.
57
Ian Davis and David Isenberg, ‘‘The Long History of UN Espionage,’’ The
Observer, 9 March 2003.
58
Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’ p. 316; Bob
Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1987), pp. 160–161.
59
Other factors include: a) ‘‘nations that provide key intelligence may seek to extort
political or other benefits from a partner, or to avoid sanctions;’’ b) ‘‘participation
in international intelligence arrangements may also cause a nation to conduct
intelligence operations of little or no direct use to its own security;’’ and c)
‘‘Finally, nations may risk, or so believe, serious embarrassment when details
of intelligence sharing become public.’’ Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of
Intelligence Cooperation,’’ pp. 317–318. For a general discussion, see also
Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 200–220.
60
For a short overview, see Arthur S. Hulnick, ‘‘Intelligence Cooperation in the
Post-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?’’ International Journal of Intelligence
and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1991–1992, pp. 455–465.