Possibilities and Prospects: The Debate Over A Guaranteed Income

> November 2009
Possibilities
and Prospects:
The Debate Over
a Guaranteed
Income
By Margot Young and
James P. Mulvale
Possibilities and Prospec ts: The debate over a Guar anteed Income
An Economic Security Project Report
About the authors
Margot Young is Associate Professor of Law at the
University of British Columbia. She is a research
associate with the CCPA–BC Office. James P.
Mulvale is Associate Dean of the Faculty of Social
Work at the University of Regina. He is a research
Please make a donation... Help us continue to offer associate with the CCPA–Saskatchewan Office.
our publications free online.
Acknowledgements
We make most of our publications available free
on our website. Making a donation or taking out The authors extend sincere thanks to Seth Klein and
a membership will help us continue to provide Bruce Wallace for valuable and insightful feedback
people with access to our ideas and research free during the course of the writing of this report. We
of charge. You can make a donation or become a also thank Marc Lee specifically for his input into
member on-line at www.policyalternatives.ca. Or general costing of a guaranteed annual income.
you can contact the National office at 613-563-1341
for more information. Suggested donation for this Community partners, consulted in the initial phase of
publication: $10 or what you can afford. this report, are gratefully thanked for their time and
thoughtful comments on the idea of a guaranteed
annual income. Specifically, we acknowledge the
isbn 978-1-897569-56-6 important contribution made by Robert Arnold, Elsie
Dean, Mike Eso, Susan Henry, Robin Loxton, Bonnie
This report is available free of charge from the CCPA Morton, Jean Swanson, Joseph Tietz, and Bruce Wallace.
website at www.policyalternatives.ca. Printed
Thanks, as well to Robert Arnold, Marjorie Griffin
copies may be ordered through the National Office
Cohen, Michael Goldberg, Marc Lee, and Jane
for a $10 fee.
Pulkingham for reviewing this report and for
410-75 Albert Street, Ottawa, on k1p 5e7 providing very helpful feedback.
tel 613-563-1341 fa x 613-233-1458 Finally, we wish to thank our research assistants on
em ail ccpa@policyalternatives.ca this project: Patricia Cochran and Stephen Buckley.
www.policyalternatives.ca
The opinions and any errors in this paper are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the CCPA or the funders of this report.
This study is part of the Economic Security Project, a
research alliance led by the Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives BC Office and Simon Fraser University. The
ESP is a five-year research initiative studying how public
policy changes in BC are affecting the economic security
of vulnerable populations. The ESP is funded primarily
by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) through its
Community-University Research Alliance Program.
Thanks also to the Social Rights Accountability Project
(funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council, Community-University Research Alliance
Program) and the University of British Columbia’s
Faculty of Law for their financial support of this project.
Layout: Susan Purtell

Summary
The idea of a guaranteed income has a long • Suggests a number of other social
and respectable history in Canadian political welfare measures that should be central
and economic thought. Recently, in the face of elements of any reform program, but that
both wide criticism of the Canadian income se- guaranteed income debates often ignore.
curity system and growing recognition of the The term “guaranteed income” refers to a spe-
unacceptability of current poverty rates, there cific although broad category of social reform.
has been a resurgence in calls for implementa- As a starting place for discussion, the idea of a
tion of a Canadian guaranteed income. But the guaranteed income is used to signal reform pro-
idea is a controversial one; progressive activ- posals that advocate some variant of an income
ists, academics, and politicians disagree about benefit scheme in which the state provides a
the desirability and the practicality of a guar- minimum level of basic income on a continu-
anteed income. ing basis to every adult, irrespective of personal
This report: circumstances or need, with no or very few con-
• Traces the history of guaranteed income ditions attached.
proposals in Canada; Proponents of a guaranteed income cite a
• Catalogues both the most common reasons range of reasons supporting the idea:
supporting advocacy of a guaranteed • A fix to poverty;
income and the most telling concerns • Liberty and individual opportunity;
raised by the notion;
• Social and democratic citizenship;
• Provides an overview of basic dimensions
• Gender equality;
along which proposals for a guaranteed
income differ and sets out models that • Shared social ownership;
capture much of the range of proposals in • A flexible and just labour market; and
the current debate; and • Environmental sustainability.
Possibilities and Prospec ts: The debate over a Guar anteed Income 3
No single overview model is representative of all out, although to different degrees depending
proposals for a guaranteed income. Academic upon the type of guaranteed income proposal
and political writing on the idea is vast. Three under consideration. Traditionally, three con-
working models of guaranteed income proposals cerns predominate:
illustrate the range of proposals across the four • Work disincentive effect — Receipt
criteria of universality, conditionality, adequacy, of a generous and unconditional benefit
and integration. These models are: may mean some individuals will opt out of
1. Minimalist-libertarian model — participation in the paid labour market.
Strong universality and unconditionality of • Reciprocity — An unconditional benefit
guaranteed income set at a low benefit level will give significant public resources to
with minimal provision of other social individuals who may contribute nothing to
goods and income support. society in return.
2. Mixed welfare model — Guaranteed • Cost — A substantial guaranteed income
income models that closely resemble scheme may be too expensive to be
existing social assistance (welfare) schemes politically acceptable or possible.
with partial and conditional benefits, and a
Added to these problems are additional ques-
range of both benefit levels and integration
tions about how guaranteed income proposals
with other social programs.
may reinforce the gendered division of labour and
3. Strong basic income model — Strong women’s economic, civil, and political subordina-
universality and unconditionality paired tion. Equally concerning are observations about
with more generous benefit levels and how guaranteed income proposals lend support
variable integration with other programs. to regressive and unjust neo-liberal forms of so-
Models 1 and 3 incorporate a guaranteed income cial and economic organization.
as a stand-alone program that is relatively dis- Practical implementation of a guaranteed in-
tinct and prominent in the overall social welfare come may result in unacceptable political com-
architecture. The general intent of Model 1 is to promises, such as in inadequate benefit levels,
downsize the social welfare state, but also to keep partial implementation that forestalls more radi-
the poor from starving. Model 3, on the other cal progressive change, and selective application
hand, includes proposals with more ambitious to only the “deserving poor.”
aims of redistributing wealth and establishing The paper concludes by noting that poverty is
social solidarity. Both of these models are rela- more than the simple lack of financial resources.
tively simple in design, but vary in terms of cost: While absence of money is an essential feature
Model 1 stipulates minimal benefit levels while of poverty, social exclusion as well as inadequate
Model 3 requires a relatively generous benefit. access to public goods, networks, and political
Model 2, on the other hand, seeks to guarantee capital are all part of a fuller notion of poverty.
a minimum level of income for all through a Such an understanding of poverty means that a
patchwork quilt of traditional income support range of measures will be key to effective wel-
programs paired with a more limited guaranteed fare reform, including:
income. Of course, no real proposal necessarily • Enhanced collective provision of essential
maps exactly onto any one model, but instead will public goods;
mix and match different elements of each. • Labour market policy reform; and
A number of straightforward concerns about
• Public, affordable, and quality childcare.
the merit of the idea of a guaranteed income stand
4 c anadian centre for polic y alternatives

While the authors of this report conclude in ciety will certainly provide some form of in-
somewhat different positions on the desira- come security, this alone will not satisfy the
bility of a guaranteed income program, both full scope of collective and public responsi-
strongly recognize that no single social pro- bility such a society bears for the welfare of
gram alone will be adequate. While a just so- its population.
Introduction
Canada has rates of poverty that belie the eco- has cycled through Canadian social policy de-
nomic health and wealth of this country. Pock- bates on a regular basis and has never been far
ets of poverty persist for specific groups, and the below the political surface.
duration, depth, and rate of their poverty is often This discussion paper looks seriously at the
shocking. Far too many individuals in Canada suggestion of a guaranteed income and the chal-
lack decent housing, adequate nutrition, and full lenges such a reform poses for traditional ways
participation in our social and economic life. of thinking about income security issues in our
For decades now, commentators of all stripes country. A guaranteed income may indeed offer
have criticized the course of the Canadian in- a valuable opportunity to move out of the “very
come security system. A spate of reports from well worn ruts” of welfare reform.1 Or, the idea
various quarters—the academy, research insti- may promise more than it can deliver. These are
tutes, community coalitions—have called for the questions we take up.
re-visioning of Canada’s income security sys- The analysis and conclusions in this paper are
tem. This has been coupled with the growing the result of ongoing conversation and collabo-
recognition of poverty and income inequality rative work on the idea of a guaranteed income
as immediate concerns. There is consensus that by the co-authors. One of us (Young) is more of
change is needed, but no agreement as to what a sceptic and the other (Mulvale) more of a pro-
that change should be. ponent of guaranteed income. Both, however,
In this report the authors explore the sub- agree that the question of ensuring universal,
stantive merit and strategic appeal of a guar- unconditional, and adequate economic securi-
anteed income as one option for a fundamental ty for all people in Canada is critical. We have
re-thinking of current income support programs learned much from each other, as well as from
in Canada. The last five years have seen a resur- the academic literature, research data, and views
gence in calls for a guaranteed income, partic- of policy experts and community activists with
ularly from anti-poverty and equality-seeking whom we have engaged in the course of prepar-
groups. In fact, the idea of a guaranteed income ing this report.2

What is a Guaranteed Income?
We use the term “guaranteed income” to refer to ever, the following characteristics of a strong var-
a general category of proposals for a minimum iant of a guaranteed income are useful markers.
level of income security for everyone in Cana- At this point in our discussion, this definition is
da. We use this rather general term in order to given to distinguish our subject from more com-
be inclusive of the full range of policy proposals monplace and existing versions of income secu-
that are part of the debate around this approach rity, such as provincial social assistance (welfare
to income security. programs). More nuanced discussion of the range
There are, of course, other commonly used of proposals follows later in the report.
labels—guaranteed annual income, citizen’s The purest or strongest versions of guaran-
wage, guaranteed livable income, basic income, teed income proposals generally specify a floor
social dividend, territorial dividend, state bo- or minimum level of core income provided on a
nus, demogrant—that appear in debate and lit- continuing basis by the state, to which everyone
erature. Within English Canada, the most com- is entitled irrespective of personal circumstances
mon term — despite a wide variance of detail in or need, subject to no or very few conditions of
what is specifically meant — is Guaranteed An- eligibility, such as work requirements.
nual Income. Debates on this topic in Quebec Under this model, an executive earning
have tended to use the French terms “l’allocation $150,000 would receive the same benefit as the
universelle” and “le revenu de citoyenneté.” In- minimum wage secretary sitting outside that ex-
deed, it is a sign of the vigour and extent of the ecutive’s office door, the unemployed but work-
argument that such a range of terminology ex- seeking individual handing that secretary a job
ists. We are faced with, as one commentator puts application, the at-home parent pushing twins in
it, “certain imprecision when it comes to defi- a stroller outside the office building, and the un-
nition and a surplus of choice when it comes to employed person not looking for work who is sit-
terminology.”3 ting at the café on the other side of the street.
Consequently, providing an initial starting But as we note repeatedly, there is great va-
definition of a guaranteed income is tricky. How- riety among guaranteed income proposals with
both large and minor departures from the cen- guaranteed income schemes. For example, the
tral vision defined above. And, the line between Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend, starting in
traditional income security provision and guar- 1999, has paid to each adult resident of Alaska
anteed income proposals can blur, depending an annual “dividend.” These payments are on a
upon the details of each. Consequently, in the small scale ($1,654 in 2007 for each applicant),
discussion that follows, we do provide a series but nonetheless have some features in common
of working models that categorize the range of with more generous and full guaranteed income
different proposals at play in the debate. proposals.4 In Canada, some claim that our na-
There is no full-fledged guaranteed income tional Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income
program in place anywhere in the world. A Supplement program, which ensures an annual
number of jurisdictions have programs that income for all those over 65, is a form of guar-
can be understood to be partial or fledgling anteed income.

The Idea and its General Appeal
One Belgian observer of the debate over a guar- guaranteed income proposal is not only
anteed income has described the idea as “a wash- and simply about ending poverty. The
ing powder that can be used in any washing ma- most powerful political arguments for
chine,” from right to left.5 Multiple and sometimes a guaranteed income are animated by
contending versions make debate about guaran- particular views of social justice, equality,
teed income varied, fascinating, and challeng- and freedom. A guaranteed income, by
ing. When endorsed simply as an appealing idea, providing a core income for all, is seen to
many applaud the notion. But when the details promise equality of opportunity in society.6
of a guaranteed income program are up for de- A guaranteed income, at an adequate level,
bate, the consensus weakens, often but not always allows an individual to realize for herself
along predictable ideological grounds. or himself the promises and opportunities
So what is the general appeal of an idea of a that society offers.
guaranteed income? The following arguments • A Means to Social and Democratic
are made. Citizenship: A guaranteed income is also
• A Fix to Poverty: First, and most touted as a way to ensure citizens can fulfil
powerfully, a guaranteed income holds out the civic duties we all carry as citizens.
the promise of alleviating (and perhaps We cannot aspire to civic virtues when
even eradicating) poverty—at least poverty we are preoccupied with mere survival.
understood simply as lack of income. Thus, an American political theorist,
This helps to explain the attractiveness of Carole Pateman, argues that the economic
guaranteed income in times of growing security a guaranteed income provides
economic inequality and persistent poverty is instrumental to self-government in
amidst affluence. intimate spheres (the family), the labour
• A Measure of Formal Liberty market, and, more broadly, in democratic
and Individual Opportunity: A mechanisms of political government.7
• A Key to Gender Equality: one-time Alberta Prosperity cheque, paid
Poverty often means reinforcement of out in January 2006 to every resident of
discriminatory social and economic Alberta over 18 years of age, was billed as a
relations for women. For example, lack “resource rebate” to Alberta residents from
of income can force women to stay in the budget surpluses accumulated from the
abusive, unhealthy relationships with men. province’s resource-fuelled economy.
As well, the gendered division of labour, • A More Flexible and Just Labour
reflected in women’s disproportionate Market: Proponents argue that a
caregiving responsibilities, results in guaranteed income gives workers flexibility
women’s more vulnerable status in the more suited to the new global market. A
labour market. Income support programs guaranteed income gives an individual
that are conditional on specific patterns of a level of basic economic well-being
(typically male) labour force involvement independent of involvement in the paid
disadvantage women (and mothers, in labour force. This might mean a number
particular). A guaranteed income, it is of positive things. For example, workers
argued, encourages recognition of the full with a guaranteed income in hand could
range of human activities, including unpaid choose to start up a business, work part-
caregiving work, that are key to a cohesive time, job share, take a sabbatical, or
and rich society. An individual could make take an interesting but lower paid job. A
“real choices with reference to economic guaranteed income would “decommodify”
and non-economic activities.”8 Moreover, labour by providing individuals with the
the universality and conditionality that ability to devote their energies to socially
a guaranteed income offers can make necessary and valuable forms of work
traditional scrutiny of welfare recipients that are not paid. It might also enhance
unnecessary. The income security provided the power of labour to bargain effectively
by guaranteed income, it is argued, could with capital. For low wage, unattractive
advance women’s economic and social work, this may mean that workers will be
citizenship and equality. able to leverage better working conditions
• A Recognition of Citizens’ Shared or better pay. Thus a guaranteed income
Social Ownership: Many see a could prevent “desperation bidding” by
guaranteed income as recognition of workers with no other economic options.
individual citizens’ shared ownership • A More Environmentally
in the resources of a society. Fairness, it Sustainable World: Perhaps a system
is argued, requires that a portion of the of income security with guaranteed
goods of a society—its collective wealth income as its centrepiece could challenge
and resources—be shared with all who conventional wisdom on the need for
make up that society. The Alaska Dividend, never-ending economic growth as the
for example, is paid out of the Alaska precondition of general prosperity and
Permanent Fund, a fund created out of income security. Guaranteed income could
a percentage of the proceeds of mineral ensure a modest but sustainable standard
sales or royalties, and thus recognizes the of living for all, in the context of a more
ultimate “ownership” by residents of the “steady state” economy with lower levels
products of the state. Closer to home, the of consumption but greater economic

redistribution. This scenario challenges the historical development of capitalist
the obsession in capitalist economies with economies.
open-ended accumulation and ever-rising As outlined above, the benefits claimed for a
levels of earned income and consumption guaranteed income are many and compelling.
of material goods. It also undermines It is no surprise that the idea of a guaranteed
“wage slavery” that has been central to income is resilient and resurgent.
The Contours (So Far)
of the Guaranteed Income
Debate in Canada
The history of the idea of a guaranteed income noted the presence of poverty in Canada “on a
in western thought is long and already well doc- much larger scale than most Canadians proba-
umented.9 In twentieth century Canada, more bly suspect.”10 The idea of a guaranteed income
specifically, the idea of a guaranteed income of emerged as one mechanism for addressing this
some sort has had resonance for a range of groups, newly acknowledged poverty. Indeed, 1967 had
at different times and in reference to different seen the introduction of the Old Age Security’s
reform agendas. The following chronology sets Guaranteed Income Supplement as an (initially
out some of this historical background to cur- assumed to be temporary) measure to reduce
rent debates. poverty among seniors.
In 1933 a Social Credit government led by The Special Senate Committee on Poverty,
William Aberhart was elected in Alberta. Aber- chaired by Senator David Croll, was created in
hart argued for regular cash payments made by 1968 to study poverty in Canada and recom-
the provincial government to all, as a means of mend effective policy measures to address the
economic stimulus and redistribution. But the problem. The Committee’s 1971 report recom-
promise of a “social credit” paid to all citizens mended a guaranteed annual income financed
proved difficult to implement, in part due to a and administered by the federal government,
lack of funds in the provincial treasury and op- and delivered through a negative income tax.
position from Ottawa. The plan ultimately ran The Committee wrote that this proposal met
afoul of judicial insistence that the federal gov- three basic requirements: “it provides adequate
ernment alone had constitutional control over income, it preserves the incentive to work, and it
currency and banking. Aberhart’s successor as is fiscally possible.”11 The guaranteed annual in-
Alberta Premier, Ernest Manning, officially aban- come was an idea, the Committee wrote, “whose
doned Social Credit doctrine in 1944. time had come.”12
The next significant moment came during the The proposed guaranteed income would
1960s. In 1968 the Economic Council of Canada, cover all Canadian citizens “who need it” (ex-
a former federally funded crown corporation, cluding those who were single, unattached, and

under the age of 40), and was to take the form “employable” and another for the “not employ-
of a negative income tax. It would provide a able.” Benefits for the employable would be 60
guaranteed income of 70 per cent of the poverty per cent of benefits for the not employable. It
lines set by the Committee and would be paired was assumed that employable recipients would
with a 70 per cent reduction rate for each dollar supplement their benefits with employment
of additional income earned. The basic tax ex- earnings.13
emption was to be raised to the poverty level so Around the same time the federal Department
that those receiving only the income guarantee of National Health and Welfare wrote that the
would not pay taxes. idea of a guaranteed income as an anti-poverty
The guaranteed income proposed by the Croll measure had potential, but needed further study
report provided an income of $3,500 for a family and investigation.14
of four or the equivalent of roughly $19,224 in In 1970 the Royal Commission on the Sta-
2008 dollars, adjusting for inflation. The report tus of Women was established. The Commis-
estimated the cost of such a scheme, for 1967, at sion recommended, among other things, that a
$645 million (just over $4.1 billion in 2008). This “guaranteed annual income be paid by the fed-
amount represented around 1 per cent more of eral government to the heads of all one-parent
1967 GNP than existing income security costs. families with dependent children.”15 While ar-
The guaranteed income proposed in the Croll guing that a guaranteed annual income would
report would replace all federal income-mainte- benefit all Canadians, the report nonetheless
nance programs, with the exceptions of federal recommended that the program be at least ini-
programs such as unemployment insurance, the tially targeted where the need was greatest: to
Canada Pension Plan, and Veterans’ Allowances. single parents, specifically sole-support moth-
Provincial governments would remain responsi- ers. The specific form of guaranteed annual in-
ble for the provision of social services, with the come recommended was a negative income tax
Canadian Assistance Plan retained to provide for scheme, joined with reduction of other federal
federal/provincial cooperation in the delivery of and provincial income security schemes.
such services. In this way, individuals not covered In 1973 a minority federal Liberal government
under the guaranteed annual income would be initiated the Social Security Review, marked by
provided for based on a needs test. the publication of the Working Paper on Social
The cost of this proposal was a significant Security in Canada.16 Known as the Orange Pa-
hurdle to its acceptance. As well, critics focused per, the working paper argued for a two-tiered
on the issue of inadequate work incentives and approach to social assistance, including a guar-
the reduction rate. Earnings would have to be anteed annual income plan for those who could
well above the benefit level for significant income not work and an income supplement for the
enhancement to occur through paid work. The working poor. Ultimately, the review came to
plan was never implemented. naught and folded in 1976. At this point, discus-
The Castonguay-Nepveu Commission, ap- sion of guaranteed income receded from the gov-
pointed by the Quebec government, followed in ernment agenda for some time. Two Canadian
1971. The Commission recommended a three-tier economists, Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson,
income security plan for Quebec. The first tier argue that the late 1970s were marked by preoc-
consisted of a basic negative income tax called cupation with rising inflation, wage and price
the General Social Allowances Plan (GSAP). The controls, and growing deficits, and were inhos-
GSAP would replace existing Quebec social as- pitable to engagement with the notion of guar-
sistance with two levels of benefit: one for the anteed income.17
Advocacy of guaranteed income programs, there appeared to be little political support at any
however, continued from a number of organiza- government level for a guaranteed income pro-
tions inside the mainstream social policy com- gram. The project resulted in no official findings,
munity. For example, in 1976 the National Coun- few results of the experiment were published, and
cil of Welfare, an advisory body to the Minister much of the data collected remain archived to
of Health and Welfare, released its Guide to the this day.19 Hum and Simpson attribute this out-
Guaranteed Income.18 come to “mundane factors such as money, tim-
One other interesting artefact from this pe- ing [and] changing policy preferences.”20
riod remains. In 1974, a year after the start of But by the mid-1980s the idea of a guaran-
the federal review of social security, the gov- teed income was back on the policy agenda, due
ernments of Canada and Manitoba signed an primarily to the 1982 Royal Commission on the
agreement to begin a trial run of a basic in- Economic Union and Development Prospects
come experiment, clearly linking the experi- for Canada (Macdonald Commission).21 The
ment to the Social Security Review. Later that 1985 report from the Macdonald Commission
year a version of guaranteed annual income, was marked by general concern about econom-
the Manitoba Basic Guarantee Annual Income ic efficiency and support for free market forces.
Experiment (dubbed “Mincome”) was piloted. Central among the number of reforms to the Ca-
While initially envisioned by at least the Mani- nadian welfare system that were recommended
toba government as a simple and relatively in- was implementation of a Universal Income Se-
expensive trial, Mincome evolved into a com- curity Program (UISP). The UISP was billed as
plicated experiment, with a focus on the issue bringing about reform that would be “radical,
of whether or not a guaranteed income would not cosmetic, and wholesale rather than tink-
provide a disincentive for recipients to engage ering at the margin.” The Commission point-
in paid labour. edly chose not to use the term “guaranteed an-
The Mincome project involved 1,300 Manitoba nual income” to describe this proposal, as the
families, from both urban and rural communi- UISP had benefit levels considerably lower than
ties, and distributed these families randomly be- those traditionally associated with guaranteed
tween a number of different guaranteed income incomes. Nonetheless, the UISP stands as a guar-
plans and a control group for three years. Fami- anteed income proposal. The Macdonald Com-
lies with incomes above a certain amount were mission’s recommendations with respect to the
excluded from the trials and those included in UISP were echoed a year after the report was re-
the study were assigned, in 1974 dollars, one of leased by the Forget Commission on Unemploy-
three support levels ($3,800, $4,800, $5,800) for ment Insurance.22
a family of two adults and two children. Three The Macdonald Commission proposed that
different tax-back rates (the rate at which ben- the UISP would eventually replace much of the
efit payments will be reduced for each dollar of then existing welfare state, including the Guar-
additional income brought into the family) were anteed Income Supplement, family allowances,
used: 35 per cent, 50 per cent, and 75 per cent. the refundable child tax credit, child and mari-
The most generous combination ($5,800 bene- tal tax exemptions, federal social housing pro-
fit and 35 per cent tax back) and least generous grams, federal transfers to the provinces for so-
combination ($3,800 benefit and 75 per cent tax cial assistance, and the income support functions
back) were not tested. of unemployment insurance. Old Age Security
By 1979, the experiment was closed: the So- would be left intact with current levels of sup-
cial Security Review was over and, as mentioned, port. The UISP benefit itself would be financed

by a reallocation of expenditures for the elimi- alize poverty, setting income security benefits
nated programs. Key to the Commission’s rec- for many at lower levels than even existing pro-
ommendation was their understanding that the grams. The UISP also met with strong opposition
reform would thus impose no extra cost and, from the Canadian labour movement.28
indeed, might even save a considerable amount While the Mulroney government imple-
of money. mented the Commission’s recommendations for
Unlike more traditional guaranteed income free trade, the UISP proposals were ignored by
programs, the UISP was to have a relatively low the government and, for many, the MacDonald
guarantee level and a low reduction rate. The Commission proposal has come to symbolize the
objective, the McDonald report notes, was pres- dangers of guaranteed income proposals.
ervation of work incentives with some income A discussion paper tabled in the House of
support.23 The report recommended a universal Commons in 1994 by then Minister of Human
demogrant-based delivery system,24 rather than Resources Lloyd Axworthy dismissed the idea of
a strictly tax-based system, although argued implementation of a formal guaranteed income
that either would be effective. The report also program. The paper noted that Canada’s current
recognized that a phasing in of the UISP would mix of social assistance and tax credit programs
be required. was a “de facto guaranteed minimum income.”29
The McDonald report acknowledged that the The paper went on to argue against a specific
income guarantees proposed were not adequate guaranteed income program on the grounds of
to meet all family needs without additional sup- cost and effectiveness. A supplementary paper
port, a choice made deliberately to preserve work issued along with the discussion paper continues
incentives. The report also assumed that pro- to be widely read and influential in the guaran-
vincial or municipal social assistance top-ups teed income debate in Canada.30
as a second tier of benefits would continue to Recent years have seen not only a revival of
be available for families with very little income. the idea of a guaranteed income in grassroots
Benefits for young recipients would be contin- and civil society conversations, but a casting
gent upon an “active job search”25 and benefits of the program in more radical form by many
for those between 18 and 35 might be restricted groups. In 2006, The Women’s Livable Income
to half of the level for older recipients.26 Thus, Working Group strongly argued for a guaranteed
the proposal was not a truly universal one. Ben- income in its Women’s Economic Justice Report,
efit levels and tax-back rates varied somewhat assembled from interviews with 44 “grassroots”
depending on age and family status. women.31 In September 2004, feminists, activ-
Criticism of the UISP came quickly and from ists, scholars and writers from across the coun-
a variety of directions. From the left, commenta- try met in Pictou, Nova Scotia, and issued the
tors pointed out that the UISP suffered from the Pictou Statement in which they called for “an
Commission’s failure to acknowledge the con- indexed guaranteed living income for all indi-
text of increasing unemployment and poverty, vidual residents set at a level to enable comfort-
the dismantling of existing social programs, and able living.”32 This endorsement of a guaranteed
growing income inequalities of the 1980s.27 In- income has been echoed, to differing degrees,
deed, the recommendations of the Commission by a number of non-government organizations
adhered to conservative mainstream 1960s and in various publications focusing on social wel-
70s traditions of thinking about guaranteed in- fare reform.33
come schemes. Critics were quick to point out The idea of a guaranteed income also contin-
that such a scheme would effectively institution- ues to pop up in the political arena. In 2000, then
Prime Minister Jean Chretien was rumoured to The 2008 federal election saw Elizabeth May’s
be considering a guaranteed income. In 2006, federal Green Party support the idea of a “Guar-
the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture anteed Livable Income.” The Green Party platform
and Forestry released an interim report in which envisioned an incremental implementation of a
a guaranteed income was touted as a possible guaranteed income initiated by a federal benefit of
means of reducing rural poverty.34 Hugh Segal, $5,000 to every individual on provincial welfare.
a Conservative member of Canada’s Senate, has At the 2008 Congress of the Basic Income
considerable visibility as an advocate for a guar- Earth Network (BIEN) in Dublin, Ireland, BIEN
anteed income. While he would retain special Canada was launched as a national chapter of the
programs for the aged, disabled and for educa- international group. Its objective is to promote
tion and health care, his proposal for a guar- awareness and informed debate about guaran-
anteed income would collapse other programs teed income among activists, researchers, and
into a basic living income offered in the form of politicians across the country.36
negative income tax.35 The debate clearly continues.

Dimensions and Models of
Guaranteed Income Proposals
Academic and political literature on the idea of The question of universality refers to the
a guaranteed income is vast. No single overview range of the general population that is, as an
model is representative of all ideas for a guaranteed initial starting point, covered by the policy. The
income. In this section we elaborate, first, several more universal a benefit is, the more general
basic dimensions along which the proposals vary and widespread its potential distribution across
and, second, three basic models that can be situated the population will be. More selective policies
along these dimensions that reflect the debate. single out smaller subsets of the population for
coverage. As a strongly universal benefit, a spe-
cific guaranteed income policy would provide
Basic Dimensions to Guaranteed Income
for every individual adult member of society,
Proposals
irrespective of income levels. For example, ac-
Four criteria characterize and distinguish guar- ademics Sally Lerner, Charles Clark and Rob-
anteed income proposals: ert Needham have argued for a Basic Income
• Degree of universality of eligibility; system that employs a notion of universality
• Degree of conditionality of entitlement; that dictates payment of benefits to every Ca-
• Adequacy of benefit level; and nadian citizen or permanent resident.38 Few, if
any, proposals for a guaranteed income argue
• Integration with other social programs.37
for complete universality—generally citizenship
(or residency) and age feature in some way to
Universality exclude some individuals or groups. Some pro-
Tight definitions of universality and condition- posals have a kind of differential universality:
ality are impossible—the two terms are used for example, adults might receive larger benefits
elastically and often interchangeably. Ques- than children.
tions about one often shape conclusions about The broad universality of many guaranteed
the other. Yet each captures an important and income schemes makes the issues of cost and
distinct policy dimension. distributional equity significant features of
the political debate. As the breadth of cover- how the benefit payment is spent, or beneficiar-
age widens towards universality, of course, the ies’ social living arrangements. Notably, recipi-
up-front cost of providing a guaranteed income ents of such an unconditional guaranteed income
rises. This may achieve greater coverage (eve- would have no requirements of labour force in-
ryone gets something), but it also raises issues volvement or availability, labour skills training,
of vertical economic distribution because the or job seeking. As we discuss later, the uncon-
wealthy receive the same benefit as individuals ditionality (or limited conditionality) of most
at lower income levels. While a progressive tax- guaranteed income proposals stands as one of
back rate can correct the regressive impact of the most significant political obstacles to general
such coverage, the optics of providing benefits acceptance of guaranteed income reforms. On
to those who do not need them along with the the other hand, monitoring and enforcing par-
initial budgetary impact of such universality ticipation as a condition of receiving guaranteed
may make it politically difficult to have a ben- income adds to administrative complexity and
efit level that is significant in alleviating and expense of delivering the program, and may be
reducing poverty. an intrusive, punitive, and stigmatizing experi-
In considering universality, there is also ence for those receiving benefits.
the question of whether payments should be Unconditionality and universality, it is argued,
made to individuals or to household units, or could be combined to cast guaranteed income
to both at different levels. Most proposals pro- as a basic entitlement of membership in Cana-
vide for direct payments to individuals, citing dian society. Such a benefit could be seen as a
reasons of individual liberty in lifestyle choice right of citizenship, as important as (for exam-
and administrative ease. Concerns about gen- ple) the right to vote.
der equality feature strongly in favour of a more
individualised approach. Proponents of paying Adequacy
benefits to households, on the other hand, cite Proposals vary greatly in terms of the amount
concerns of general equity in relation to the of money that should be paid as a guaranteed
economies of scale that larger households can income benefit. Some proposed levels exceed,
achieve, and of the need for consistency with others fall considerably short of, what might be
existing household-focused programs. This lat- commonly conceived as adequate. A guaran-
ter approach, of course, involves the contentious teed income is understood variably as a small
task of defining what is or is not considered to “top-up” to other sources of income, as a partial
be a “household.” income, or as a fully livable income. Notably, a
number of current Canadian proposals argue
Conditionality for a “guaranteed adequate income,” thereby
Conditionality sets out the kind of conditions that indicating a benefit level that permits a decent
are built into a policy that may limit the eligibility level of income.
of a person otherwise covered by the program. Proposals also vary in terms of form and
Most existing income security programs have duration of benefit provision. Policy proposals
a number of conditions that recipients need to might envision a regular income stream (where
satisfy in order to gain and maintain eligibility. payments are received on a weekly, monthly, even
Guaranteed income proposals are distinctive in yearly basis), or benefits that have a time limit on
that they typically claim to be (at least mostly) eligibility (say three or five years). Some guaran-
unconditional. For example, an unconditional teed income plans consider regional variation in
guaranteed income policy would be neutral as to benefit level. Clearly, costs of living are higher

in some areas of Canada – in large cities, for ex- A brief discussion of each of the three models
ample – than in other regions. A single benefit follows.
level ignores this variability.
1. Minimalist-libertarian Model
Integration This model stipulates a base income guaranteed
A key question is how much a guaranteed income to all adult residents, with no conditions at-
proposal is integrated with other income support tached. However, the benefit is set at an income
programs and the provision of “in kind” public level unlikely to raise individuals out of poverty.
goods such as health care and social housing. The concern is to protect a paid work incentive.
Some proponents of a guaranteed income In this model, guaranteed income tends to be
endorse a guaranteed income as replacement paired with elimination of most other income
for most other income security programs (such support programs and public services now of-
as unemployment insurance, social assistance, fered by federal and provincial government.
and public pensions). Other proposals envision Thus, this model is premised on strong univer-
a guaranteed income program that is comple- sality and unconditionality. But it has weak ad-
mented by a number of other publicly provided equacy and is not integrated with other means
income supports, services and goods. Obviously, of income security and the provision of public
if and how guaranteed income is integrated with goods. It extends the income guarantee widely
other social and income support programs will and easily, but is informed by a political philos-
affect its ultimate cost. ophy of individual responsibility and limited
government. It is often premised on arguments
for radical downsizing of the welfare state and
Three Working Models for Guaranteed
of labour market regulations such as minimum
Income
wage laws. The Macdonald Commission pro-
As we have already noted, there is no one sin- posal is an illustration of this type. So too is the
gle representative model that captures the full proposal from right-wing American economist
scope of what has been proposed as a guaran- Milton Friedman for an income security scheme
teed income. targeted at low-income people delivered through
For purposes of further discussion and de- a “negative income tax” mechanism.39
bate we have generated three general models that
identify some important themes and variations 2. Mixed Welfare Model
in application of the four criteria set out above— This category represents those proposals that
universality, conditionality, adequacy, and inte- blend the existing system of income security and
gration. The three models that we set out here the notion of a guaranteed income.
are “ideal types.” Actual proposals may blend Guaranteed income proposals in this model
and mix aspects from more than one of these are partial and typically extended to a smaller
working models. But these three models help subset of the population, based on variables such
to map the terrain of policy debate and choices as age, income level, and labour market partici-
in regard to guaranteed income. pation. So, they are not fully universal. These
The three models we identify are: proposals also vary in terms of how adequate or
• Minimalist-libertarian model; unconditional the benefit is. A key characteristic
• Mixed welfare model; and, is the mix of income security measures. Joined
• Strong basic income model. with a qualified guaranteed income program are
partial income security for some groups, through
existing discretionary, means-tested income sup- (e.g. caring for children at home), uncondition-
port programs (especially provincial social as- ality is weaker. An example of a proposal at this
sistance programs), and less stigmatizing, con- more generous end of the scale is contained in
tributory social insurance programs (such as the 2006 Caledon Institute report Towards a New
Employment Insurance and the Canada/Quebec Architecture for Canada’s Adult Benefits. The re-
Pension Plans). Thus, this model is strong on in- port argues for an income-tested, long-term, ad-
tegration of a limited guaranteed income with equate basic income for individuals who cannot
other income security programs. reasonably be expected to work.40
Within this general model some proposals are
more minimalist and severe in terms of income 3. Strong Basic Income or Guaranteed
security guarantees, with a stronger emphasis on Adequate Income Model
paying out benefits only to those who “deserve” This model stipulates that a guaranteed income
them, and as a supplement (rather than a partial should provide the material basis for “real free-
or full replacement) of the income that everyone dom for all” through a significant redistribution
is expected to earn in the labour market. These of wealth. Proposals of this type seek to elimi-
proposals concern themselves with “activation” nate poverty and ensure a universal and uncon-
policies to encourage participation in the paid ditional liveable income.
labour market. Guaranteed income elements of This model has a number of key elements.
these proposals are thus often characterized by First, the benefit is paid by the state out of pub-
low benefits, a limited number of recipients and licly controlled resources to every individual
frequent linkage to paid work—they have weak (or household unit), regardless of the income or
adequacy, reduced universality, and varied con- wealth of that individual (or household unit).
ditionality elements. However, integration with The payment would be in cash and would have
other income security measures of a more tradi- no restrictions as to how it is spent. It would be
tional and individualistic sort is high. paid on a regular basis, say every month. Sec-
Other proposals in this category take a wid- ond, all members of a given society would re-
er and more generous approach. For example, a ceive the income, although what is meant by
mixed-welfare proposal may stipulate long-term, members can vary. Some think of membership
adequate, and non-stigmatizing income benefits to as restricted to legal citizens; most proponents,
persons not expected to participate in the labour however, conceive of membership in a broader
market (e.g. the elderly and persons with serious sense that includes all legal permanent residents.
disabilities), paired with short-term, emergency Third, the payment is unconditional: no means
assistance for other individuals, along with ex- test or work requirement would accompany it.
tended coverage and higher benefit levels for pro- Fourth, the level of income guaranteed is formu-
grams such as unemployment insurance. Thus, lated to lift each individual recipient’s income
some categories of people are given guaranteed above the poverty line or some other indicator
support through allowances that are independ- of adequacy or liveability.
ent of labour-market participation, while others One of the best-known advocates in the cur-
are not. Thus, elements of universality and ad- rent debate, Belgian scholar Philippe Van Parijs,
equacy are stronger, and income support is seen argues for such a version of guaranteed income.41
as linked with the collective provision of social Van Parijs argues that this variant of guaranteed
goods. But because guaranteed income is often income “is a profound reform that belongs in the
linked to “legitimate” disqualification from work same league as the abolition of slavery or the in-
or participation in some non-market form of work troduction of universal suffrage.”42

The result is a model that has the features is available to everyone but a reciprocity norm
of strong universality and unconditionality, but dictates that recipients must be engaged in either
that is also paired with a high level of adequa- paid work or some form of socially necessary or
cy. Integration with other elements of income useful work (for example, household or care work
security and welfare is variable—the model is in the home, artistic production, or volunteer la-
sometimes postulated as replacing most other bour in the community). Thus universality and
income security programs and other times pro- conditionality are paired in this variant.
posed as an addition to continuing provision of
some other programs for both income security The Stakeholder’s Grant Variant
and public goods. Some advocates further ar- The stakeholder’s grant idea has historic roots in
gue for deregulation of the labour market as the writings of Thomas Paine44. More recently
companion policy to a strong guaranteed in- two American scholars, Bruce Ackerman and
come program, thus pairing this robust ver- Anne Alstott, have proposed a Universal Basic
sion of guaranteed income with a strengthened Capital whereby a considerable payment is made
free market.43 to each individual on a one-off basis, for exam-
ple, at the beginning of adulthood.45 Some pro-
The Participation Income Variant posals call for the development of an account or
A variant of this model of guaranteed income grant where use of funds is restricted to a range
is the idea of a “participation income.” In these of specific purposes, such as advanced education
sorts of proposals, the guaranteed income benefit or launching a new business.
An Aside on Delivery Mechanisms:

Universal Demogrant or Negative Income Tax?
All of these models assume that a guaranteed income program could be delivered either through
a universal demogrant or through a negative income tax.
A universal demogrant involves an up-front payment, typically tax-free, to all (adult) citizens. Thus,
it is paid regardless of income level, in the same amount to all individuals with no reduction rate.
Most universal demogrant proposals stipulate that all other income is taxable, and typically at a
rate higher than current income tax rates. Indeed, many proponents argue for a flat tax rate on
all other income, although this is not an inevitable feature of universal demogrant programs.
A negative income tax provides, through the device of a tax credit, a cash benefit to families
or individuals with no or low income. A family or individual is guaranteed to reach at least the
minimum cash benefit income level. Payment is reduced by a “tax back” rate for every dollar
of additional income received. Once the recipient reaches a certain level of income, the benefit
reduces to zero. Thus, under a negative income tax scheme there are three groups of benefit
recipients: those receiving full benefits, those receiving partial benefits, and those receiving no
benefits. Unlike a demogrant, a negative income tax is paid out selectively and involves consider-
ably less “up front” budgetary spending.
Of course, the initial spending of a demogrant can be recouped through the tax system, should
tax structures be so calibrated. A demogrant also advances money to those who need it in the
present moment, while a negative income tax (unless structured to allow advance application)
makes recipients wait for payment contingent upon the “income test” represented by a tax filing.
The negative income tax is thus less responsive to the immediate contingences of low-income
economic life.
Critique of the Idea
There is much that is compelling about a guar- The issue of work incentive is represented
anteed income, as we have already signalled. But in the debate by the image of the Malibu surfer,
a number of concerns stand out, both straight- quick to use the guaranteed income benefit to
forward concerns about the merits of the idea quit work and spend the days on the beach. If
itself, and cautions about the pragmatic dangers large numbers of individuals opt out of paid work
of implementation. Both types of concerns are to live on their guaranteed incomes, economic
discussed below. productivity and growth may be imperilled.
Proponents of guaranteed income have a range
of responses. They argue, as we have already noted,
The Merits of the Idea Itself
that a guaranteed income is actually facilitative
The characteristics of universality and uncondi- of more creative, flexible, and productive involve-
tionality, key to what is attractive and distinctive ment in a greater variety of work and paid labour.
about a guaranteed income, also provide a focus Moreover, guaranteed income experiments, such
for a series of critiques—particularly the three as the Manitoba Mincome program discussed
traditional and perennial concerns of work in- earlier,46 showed only modest work disincentive
centives, reciprocity, and cost. effects.47 Such a small effect on work incentives
is not particularly economically significant—al-
Work Incentives though it may certainly be politically significant
Someone in receipt of a generous uncondition- for those who oppose a guaranteed income.
al benefit may no longer wish to work. This may Connected to concerns about labour force in-
be particularly true if work is tiresome and low volvement are criticisms that a guaranteed income
paying and the recipient decides that the com- will amount to no more than simple employer
bination of leisure time and guaranteed income subsidization and an incentive for employers to
is preferable to whatever the additional benefits reduce workers’ wages. The historic example in
of paid work might be. England over 200 years ago, the Speenhamland
system, is frequently used (although not without

significant debate48) to argue that a guaranteed ing taxes is politically unpopular. So committing
income may result in worsened exploitative con- substantial public revenue to ensure basic eco-
ditions in the labour market, especially a lower- nomic security for all is seen by many as beyond
ing of wages to below subsistence levels. Some the realm of the “reasonably discussable.”
advocates argue this is good, allowing “contin- Nonetheless, it is interesting to examine
ued participation of low earners in paid work.”49 some preliminary work done to estimate the
Nonetheless, a guaranteed income, from this an- actual budgetary cost of a program of guaran-
gle, looks too much like a subsidy to employers teed income. Lerner, Clark and Needham51 have
and an incentive to low wages. presented a hypothetical model of a guaranteed
income for Canada that would be paid as a uni-
Reciprocity versal grant to all citizens and permanent resi-
The freeloading surfer that haunts the debate dents. They calculated the cost of a scheme that,
also symbolizes a second concern. Why pay the in 1999, would pay the very modest income of
lazy, critics ask. Providing a guaranteed income $7,000 per year to persons age 65 and over, $5,000
to individuals who choose not to “work”—either to persons aged 21 to 64, $3,000 to persons un-
in the paid labour market or in community en- der 21 (paid to the primary caregiver), and an
hancing activities—offends the moral principle additional $5,000 paid to each household, to be
of reciprocity. At a minimum, it is argued, indi- divided equally among adult members of the
viduals have a duty to work according to their household. The total cost of this scheme was es-
abilities. To receive something for nothing is timated to be $198.6 billion in 1999 dollars. This
unjust. From this perspective, the decoupling guaranteed income program would replace fed-
of income from contribution simply encourages eral benefits for elderly persons and children, as
parasitism. Rather than being a significant step well as Employment Insurance benefits for the
towards de-commodification and engaged com- unemployed. Subtracting these savings, the net
munity involvement, guaranteed income is seen cost of their scheme was calculated as $161.7 bil-
by some as the ultimate “passive benefit.”50 lion in 1999 dollars (or $200.3 billion in 2009 dol-
Advocates, like Van Parijs, point out the par- lars). As a point of comparison, the total federal
tiality of the complaint. A guaranteed income government revenue for fiscal year 2008/09 was
recipient may get something she or he has not projected to be $241.9 billion.
earned, but so too does the idle heiress or talented In 1994 Human Resources Development
hockey player who, from undeserved good luck, Canada (hrdc) considered the cost of guaran-
benefits from the current unequal distribution teed income options delivered both as a univer-
of wealth, income, ability, and leisure. Why deny sal demogrant and through a negative income
others a modest share of “undeserved gifts”? tax. The universal demogrant option would re-
But, this is not necessarily a convincing answer quire the expenditure of an additional $93 bil-
and the moral concern of reciprocity and desert lion ($124 billion in 2009 dollars) and would pay
remains a significant challenge to the theory and a benefit level that would be far from “livable.”
public acceptability of a guaranteed income. On the other hand, the HRDC paper projected
that the negative income tax option (costing a
Cost total of $37.3 billion) would be “cost-neutral.” It
Any version of guaranteed income — whether could be financed by savings in other programs
universal or targeted, delivered as a demogrant such as unemployment insurance, the child tax
or through negative income tax — obviously in- benefit, and federal contributions towards so-
volves substantial government spending. Rais- cial assistance.
Hum and Simpson, the Canadian economists Hum and Simpson estimate that their Basic
whose work we have already discussed, model Income would be very expensive, in one scenario
the cost of several variations of what they desig- costing $217.1 billion, compared to $75.8 in ex-
nate as “Basic Income” (a universal, non-taxable isting transfer payments to individuals from the
benefit set at the poverty line so as to eliminate federal government (in the year 2000). On the
poverty, at least in principle) and “Guaranteed other hand, Hum and Simpson estimate the cost
Income” (that would be paid out as a universal of their (more modest) Guaranteed Income to be
benefit set below the poverty line, coupled with much less and argue that it could reduce poverty
a tax-back rate on earned income).52 more efficiently than their Basic Income model.
table 1 What would a Guaranteed Income program cost in Canada?

Cost of possible GI programs (population data 2006):
Grants paid to individuals
Program Cost (billions)
Grant of $15,000 per year paid to all individuals age 18 and over $392
Grant of $7,000 per year paid to all individuals age 18 and over $153
Grant of $15,000 per year for only ages 18 to 64 $327
Grant of $15,000 per year to individuals age 18 and over, plus a demogrant of $418
$4,000 per year for each child under 18
Grants paid to households

Grant paid to households based on household size, where the value of the grant is equal $250
to the LICO for a mid-sized city (2001 data)
Payments only to individuals and families below the poverty line to bring them up to the $21.5
LICO (i.e. reduction of poverty to zero) (2003 data)
Cost of existing income security programs (2005)

Old Age Supplement $29
Child Tax Benefit $9
Employment Insurance $14
GST and other tax credits $15
Canada Pension Plan/Quebec Pension Plan $32
Provincial payments to individuals (e.g. income assistance) $32
Local payments to individuals $3
Total transfers to persons $135
Basic personal tax exemption (foregone revenue) $26
Age and spousal tax deductions (foregone revenue) $3
Total cost of tax deductions $29
Total transfers to persons ($135b) plus tax expenditures on basic personal & age/ $132
spousal deductions ($29b), minus CPP/QPP as a contributory pension scheme ($32b)
Note: The numbers in these charts are intended to give a general idea of what costs are involved in economic security programs, including possible GI
programs. Most numbers are taken from analysis conducted by Marc Lee, economist at the CCPA. The numbers are approximate.

In one Guaranteed Income scenario, they peg year was $16.3 billion in both cash and tax points,
the cost at $37.8 billion.53 although this figure included support for both
For purposes of this CCPA report, some cost post-secondary education and social assistance.
estimation was carried out on guaranteed in- Statistics Canada calculates that, in 2006/07,
come dispersed as a demogrant, paid to either the total amount of spending on all social serv-
individuals or households (see Table 1). The most ices (including both income support and direct
adequate version of guaranteed income in this service to persons) by all levels of government
model (a grant of $15,000 per year to all persons in Canada was $172.4 billion.56
age 18 and over, and $4,000 per year for those It thus appears that a full-fledged version of
under 18) is estimated to cost $418 billion. Cur- guaranteed income is out of our immediate finan-
rent costs in 2005 of existing income security cial reach. It is also interesting to note, however,
programs were $132 billion,54 meaning that the that a large majority of Canadians believe that the
net cost of this relatively generous guaranteed growing gap between the rich and the poor must
income option would be $286 billion,55 using be narrowed, and that higher taxes and closing
the 2005 figure (or $311 billion in 2009 dollars). tax loopholes for the wealthy are acceptable ways
One can also calculate the cost of less expensive of doing so.57 There is also a large amount of re-
options, including a grant to households rather search evidence concerning the indirect costs of
than individuals that would cost $250 billion poverty and economic inequality in our country
(minus unspecified savings in other areas), and in sectors such as health care, criminal justice,
a targeted benefit to all poor individuals and and education. Finally, there is a green argument
households (that would in principle eliminate that we can no longer support the environmen-
poverty) that would cost $21.5 billion. tal costs of premising income support and eco-
To put the above figures in context, federal nomic redistribution on economic expansion
government spending in 2006/07 on direct trans- and growth.58 It will be interesting to see if such
fers to persons was $55.6 billion ($30.3 billion for broader calculations of the costs of not having a
the elderly, $14.1 billion to the unemployed, and guaranteed income scheme will be factored into
$11.2 billion for children). Additionally, the total debates about the affordability and feasibility of
Canada Social Transfer to provinces in the same guaranteed income as time goes on.
Other Issues
Two other sets of issues about the merits of a re-distribution of social and economic resources.
guaranteed income are important to mention. Indeed, if a guaranteed income is also used as an
First, it is of course true that strong guaranteed excuse or reason to cancel other forms of social
income proposals sit in opposition to the more spending and social programming—as some right
punitive and minimal income security system the wing advocates of the plan envision—the overall
neo-liberal state tolerates. Yet, ironically a guar- distributive effect of guaranteed income imple-
anteed income program that neglects or rejects mentation may be regressive and less just.
inclusion with other forms of income assistance Guaranteed income proposals may also risk
and the provision of public goods can reinforce over-emphasizing the importance of private ac-
the individualism and market focus of neo-lib- tion and ignoring the roles that public respon-
eralism. Second, while feminist support for a sibility, public provision, and public ordering of
guaranteed income holds centre stage, particu- community institutions can play in securing in-
larly at the community level in Canada, there are dividual and community welfare. For example,
also prominent feminist critiques of the notion. many advocates of a guaranteed income point
These issues are briefly discussed below. to the possibilities for involvement in volunteer
community work that a guaranteed income al-
lows.59 Yet, community infrastructure surely is
Ideological Resonance
critical enough to warrant adequate financial sup-
A guaranteed income program requires the state to port from the state. It is great to have community
redistribute income more broadly and more fairly. centres with an active volunteer corps, but surely
However, emphasis on a guaranteed income alone it is even better to have community centres with
as the centrepiece of social welfare provision may adequate, trained, and (well) paid staff.
divert attention from the unjust workings of the Some models of a guaranteed income, par-
market – both the market’s provision of services ticularly those that have minimal integration of
and its treatment of workers. A reform program the guaranteed income into a wider scheme of
that does little else than put some money into eve- income and social benefits, imply that the remedy
ryone’s pockets is unlikely to achieve an adequate to poverty is simply individual and fiscal; struc-

tural remedies are not necessarily envisioned or Moreover, the issues of work and income that a
encompassed. But a guaranteed income, alone, guaranteed income invokes have strong relevance
cannot redress or alter structural problems re- for women, given gender stereotypes and norms
sponsible for poverty and disempowerment in that structure the division of labour in Canadian
Canadian society. society in ways that disadvantage women.
Moreover, the most simple guaranteed income A guaranteed income may be an attractive policy
proposals implicitly cast citizenship primarily in for women whose caregiving work is undervalued
terms of the citizen as consumer, empowered by and not economically supported. However, it may
that citizenship to purchase social welfare needs also threaten to reinforce the gendered division of
in the market. This is consistent with what one labour, making it more difficult for women to choose
commentator calls “elite neo-liberalism,” focusing the mix of unpaid caregiving and labour market
on the “individual liberties of a mass consum- employment that is individually optimal. Simply
erist society.”60 Public expectations about what assuming that it is ideal for women to be free to
ought to be collectively provided are decreased choose to do unpaid caregiving work ignores the
accordingly, and community is corroded.61 positive aspects of choosing not to do such work.
Social welfare goods cannot be provided ad- It too often understates the critical role paid work
equately by the private market alone. Many such plays in social inclusion and community building
goods require collective, public provision — like for individual women. Women risk not being able
medical care, social insurance, education, child to assert the desire to work outside of the home
care, social housing, and so on. No matter how once an income is available that economically al-
adequate a guaranteed income is, there will still lows them to stay out of the paid labour force.
be services and goods that individuals will need Simply put, a guaranteed income might result
— and that any just society would not see them in further institutionalization of women’s location
go without — that income spent in the private within the family—the “domestic labour trap,”64
market cannot guarantee.62 reinforcing the gendered division of labour in the
The idea that economic and social needs can family and eroding women’s access to the job mar-
be best met by a universally established guar- ket and careers. The result is a failure to liberate
anteed income that delivers (roughly) the same women from the very social assumptions and hi-
amount to everyone also ignores that some in- erarchy that construct the domestic characteriza-
dividuals and groups have significantly different tion and devaluation of women’s work in the first
and more extensive needs, and ought therefore place.65 A guaranteed income may mean an increase
to have greater and different entitlements than in leisure and self-development opportunities for
would be provided by a standard universal ben- some, but it is unlikely that those individuals will
efit.63 For example, a universal and fixed grant for be mothers with young children.
health care would over-insure some and under- In sum, the worry is that some versions of
insure others. Reform to the welfare state must guaranteed income lend support, perhaps un-
recognize that key areas of human welfare re- knowingly or unintentionally, to the gendered
quire more that equal allotments of cash. division of labour, an under-emphasis on pub-
lic citizenship and substantive equality, and a
shrinking of public service provision. There is
Women
much that is libratory in aspirations of liberal
There is a gendered face to poverty. Women rely economic individualism and the formal equality
significantly more than men upon a variety of state that underpins it, but one also must be cautious
provided income and social assistance programs. to avoid promoting such an ideal uncritically.
Political Strategies and Feasibility
We turn now to the issues of political saleability Benefit Level

and feasibility — the pragmatic considerations of Because it will be difficult to sell the idea of a
bringing about an actual and adequate guaran- guaranteed income that grants a truly adequate
teed income program in Canada. Largely, these income, for the reasons of cost and reciprocity
are issues of political power, and in particular discussed above, the amount of the benefit is likely
what vision of the Canadian welfare state will be to be subject to political compromise. This risks
supported by those elected to govern. what Ackerman and Alstott have characterized
We are at an interesting moment: what is po- as the “chump change” problem — that benefits
litically possible may be shifting. The discredit- under any guaranteed income that is political-
ing of free market economics and growing sen- ly feasible will be inadequate and ineffective in
sitivity to the environmental disaster that lurks bringing about real change.67 The problem of
around the corner have recast public perceptions poverty will be touted as having been fixed, but
of what we must expect from government. And the reality will be that the poor will be less vis-
Canadians, according to a number of studies, ible or credible as objects of political concern and
want poverty addressed with clear and effective attention. We must be careful not to lose sight
government policies for poverty reduction.66 That of the motivating goal—the alleviation and, ul-
said, political hurdles remain. timately, elimination of poverty.
As discussed above, the political resonances
of certain versions of guaranteed income with
neoliberalism and traditional gendered notions Gradual Implementation
of labour should make us cautious. Compro- Many thoughtful proponents of a guaranteed
mise in implementation of any program is inevi- income see a strategy of gradual implementa-
table, and we must be wary of what this might tion — an initially modest but universal guar-
mean for a guaranteed income in practice. This anteed income whose benefit level grows as the
results in a number of specific issues of prag- public gets used to the idea — as answer to the
matic concern. tricky issue of cost.68 But a limited version of

guaranteed income could very well justify on- an example of such a more selective but uncon-
going or even accelerated dismantling of other ditional income security program. The Child
social welfare programs. Already existing pub- Tax Benefit, introduced in 1984, was at one time
licly provided income security benefits might touted as the seed for an eventual form of guar-
be folded into the guaranteed income, and pub- anteed income for families with children. And
licly provided goods and services (such as child- some form of guaranteed income for persons
care) might lose political viability. The outcome with disabilities circulates in and out of various
could be the worst of both worlds: an inadequate current policy discussions.
guaranteed income, and reduction or continued Not surprisingly, those welfare recipients
non-provision of many other aspects of the so- deemed most “undeserving” — single, employ-
cial welfare state. able adults without children — do not feature
Another variant of staged, partial implemen- largely in proposals for more limited versions of a
tation involves compromising the notion of uni- guaranteed income. And this fact highlights the
versality. Guaranteed incomes could be granted danger that the rhetoric and justifications for a
to different select groups of individuals in need. guaranteed income could be used to reinforce,
Such a program of guaranteed income would rather than dismantle, the punitive and damag-
not be universal to all adults, say, but would be ing stereotypes already in play in existing wel-
unconditionally guaranteed to those members fare programs about who deserves public sup-
of some designated sub-group of the popula- port and who does not. The needs of only some
tion. Canada’s current Old Age Security plan is of the poor will appear to merit attention.
Conclusion
This paper has illustrated some of the promise, arrangements in Canada in incremental, fea-
complexity, and challenges of the guaranteed sible, and carefully considered steps. He notes
income model, drawing on specific proposals that the collapse of neo-liberalism in the current
and longstanding debates as they have unfolded global economic crisis has also led to the trans-
in Canada and elsewhere. Looking ahead, what fer of billions of dollars of public money from
conclusions should be drawn about guaranteed governments to large corporations. So, Mulvale
income in Canada for those concerned about argues, citizens and social justice advocates can
economic security and social justice? legitimately ask the question: “If governments
We began this research with disagreement are willing to go to such dramatic lengths to bail
between the two of us. Yet, interestingly, as the out General Motors and other huge companies,
project has progressed our opinions have come what should our elected representatives be do-
closer together. We both share similar concerns ing to ensure the economic survival of average
about the dangers and challenges of practical im- working families and economically vulnerable
plementation of a guaranteed income program. citizens?” He argues for nurturing the current
We both recognize strongly the inadequacy of shift in public consciousness brought about by
reform to income and social security that in- the weakening of neo-liberalism, the willing-
cludes only a guaranteed income and neglects ness of governments to transfer wealth (at least
other forms of collective provision of public to large corporations), and the ecological im-
goods. And we both agree that discussion of a perative to lower consumption and to achieve
guaranteed income is a fruitful exercise and an environmental sustainability.
important element of the public debate over the Young remains more convinced that welfare
future of income security. reform is better served by a mix of programs
Differences do remain. Mulvale is an advo- for income support, labour policy, and public
cate of eventual implementation of a guaranteed goods. No doubt, in an ideal world calling for a
income. He remains engaged with the task of pure and strong guaranteed income, paired with
strategizing on how to modify income security state provision of key public goods and other tar-

geted income benefits, along with labour market in the civil, social and political life of a commu-
policy reform, might be clearly best. But that is nity, having meaningful employment opportuni-
not the world we inhabit. Thus, Young argues ties, and having affordable housing.69 Quebec’s
that enhanced social assistance—incorporating anti-poverty legislation, An act to combat pov-
significant improvements to benefit levels and erty and social exclusion, defines poverty as “the
eligibility, in combination with important pub- condition of a human being who is deprived of
lic goods and labour market reforms, is a more the resources, means, choices and power nec-
strategic and potentially effective set of poverty essary to acquire and maintain economic self-
reduction goals. sufficiency or to facilitate integration and par-
Nonetheless, the notion of a guaranteed in- ticipation in society.”70
come functions for Young as a timely and im- With this understanding of poverty in mind,
portant reminder of what must necessarily be a we both agree there are key elements of reform
basic aspiration of any income security reform. that must be in any program of income securi-
Mulvale concurs. Guaranteed income security, ty, regardless of whether a guaranteed income is
justified by many of the reasons set out above, also part of the package. First, we need to strive
can be understood as a goal to be realized by a for the continued and enhanced collective pro-
combination of different policies, legal reforms, vision of essential goods — goods and services
and government programs. It need not necessar- that everyone should be able to access. These are
ily stake an urgent claim to a specific, concrete things such as education, health care, childcare,
program. It can inspire and catalyze a variety of and so on. These goods are best provided univer-
other reforms that together offer a complex ma- sally by government. Without the base of such a
trix of income security. well-developed welfare state, people will remain
So in the short to middle term, in any case, in need, despite guaranteed income grants.
we agree. It is best to work to achieve a strong- Second, labour market policy reform is critical,
er and more generous version of our current especially for those most vulnerable in the paid
“mixed welfare” model of income security that labour market, such as women. The issues of pre-
would more strongly align with principles such carious work and workplace justice must be part
as universality, unconditionality, and adequacy. of any program of income security advocacy. This
And, it is important to work for other social jus- will require such things as a higher and adequate
tice reforms as well. minimum wage, better paid care-giving leave for
Such reform efforts should be based upon a days when children and other family members
broad understanding of poverty. Poverty is more are sick, flexible hours of work, and adequate ma-
than a simple lack of financial resources. To be ternity and parental leave support.
sure, absence of money is an essential character- Third, any reform must include ready access
istic of poverty and distinguishes it from other to universal, affordable, and high quality early
circumstances of low levels of well-being. But childhood education and care that is available as
poverty is also marked by social exclusion, and a public service. Along with good employment
by inadequate access to public goods, commu- policies, universal childcare will significantly
nity networks and resources, and political capi- enable many of the poor to leave their pover-
tal. This fuller notion of poverty is well-accepted; ty behind. This reform is essential to women’s
for example, various United Nations documents equality in particular.
speak of poverty as limited opportunities for Finally, as the above three points illustrate,
well-being, covering such things as being ad- it is unlikely that any one single social program
equately fed, clothed and sheltered, taking part can provide the full range of services and income
support that our society ought to guarantee. A income security reform. It is evocative of what a
guaranteed income alone cannot satisfy the full just and fair society must guarantee to everyone:
scope of collective and public responsibility a an adequate degree of unconditional economic
just society bears for the welfare of its popula- independence and empowerment. We may disa-
tion. Proponents of a guaranteed income should gree as to the priority and form such recognition
be cautious about too singular a focus in their should take. However, the debate over a guaranteed
welfare reform urgings. income is critically taken up, if only to remind us
Nonetheless, discussion of a guaranteed in- of some of the key necessary ingredients of eco-
come is certainly valuable to any full debate over nomic security for all people in Canada.

Notes
1 Pateman, 2004, p. 6. 14 Canada, 1970, p. 3.
2 An initial discussion paper on the idea of a guar- 15 Royal Commission on the Status of Women, 1970,
anteed income was prepared by the authors. This p. 325.
paper served as the focus for a Community Con-
16 Canada, 1973.
sultation held in Vancouver in March 2007 with
a broad cross-section of individuals from com- 17 Hum and Simpson, 2001.
munity organizations, policy centres, and advo-
cacy groups concerned about alleviating poverty 18 National Council of Welfare, 1976.
and broader economic security questions. Con- 19 For a summary of the Mincome project, see Hum
sultation participants were drawn mostly from and Simpson, n.d.
the greater Vancouver area, but also included
participants from Victoria and Regina. This day 20 Hum and Simpson, 2001, p. 82.
long consultation provided us with a rich and nu-
21 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
anced discussion of the potential advantages and
Development Prospects for Canada, 1985.
disadvantages of a guaranteed income model of
income security in Canada. 22 Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment Insur-
ance, 1986.
3 Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 36.
23 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
4 Brazil has legislation establishing a gradual path
Development Prospects for Canada, 1985, p. 795.
towards a “Citizen’s Basic Income.”
24 A demogrant is a universal benefit payment made
5 Vendrik Kees, interview cited in Vanderborght,
to individuals solely on the basis of some demo-
2004, p. 27.
graphic characteristic, say age.
6 Standing, 1998, p. 102.
25 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and De-
7 Pateman, 2004. velopment Prospects for Canada, 1985, p. 798.
8 McKay, 2005. 26 Ibid, p. 799.
9 For example, the website of the Basic Income Earth 27 See, for example, Kitchen, 1986.
Network sets out a history of the idea of basic or
28 Mulvale, 2001, p. 100.
guaranteed income from the early 1500s to the
present. See http://www.basicincome.org/bien/ 29 Human Resources Development Canada, 1994a.
aboutbasicincome.html#history. Accessed Au-
30 Human Resources Development Canada, 1994.
gust 12, 2009.
31 Women’s Livable Income Working Group, 2006. A
10 Economic Council of Canada, 1968, Chapter 6.
connected group, LIFE, maintains a website advo-
11 Special Senate Committee on Poverty, 1971, p. x. cating a guaranteed livable income at http://www.
livableincome.org. Accessed April 13, 2009.
12 Ibid, p. 175.
32 Christiansen-Ruffman et al., 2004.
13 Québec, 1972.
33 See, for example, Pasma, 2009. 55 This figure does not take account of the additional
income tax that would be paid with a guaranteed
34 Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and
income system in place. This additional revenue
Forestry, 2006.
could lower the net cost of the benefit by 20 to
35 Segal, 2008. 30 per cent.
36 See the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) website 56 Statistics Canada, 2007.
at http://www.basicincome.org/bien/aboutbien.
57 CCPA, 2007.
html#na. Accessed August 14, 2009.
58 Mulvale, 2007.
37 For a longer list, see De Wispelaere and Stirton,
2004. 59 See, for example: Women’s Livable Income Work-
ing Group, 2006.
38 Lerner, et al., 1999, p. 43.
60 Long, 2006, p. 201.
39 Friedman, 1962.
61 Brodie, 1995.
40 Battle et al., 2006.
62 This dilemma, of course, is not unique to guaran-
41 Van Parijs, 2000, p. 3.
tee income advocacy. It is present any time anti-
42 Van Parijs, 1992, p. 7. poverty strategies emphasize the importance of
monetary benefits.
43 See, for example, the opening article in La Revue
Nouvelle, April 1985, cited in Yannick Vander- 63 Some guaranteed income proponents do argue for
borght, 2004. As well, Brittan, 1983; Van Parijs, benefit rates that take account of such features as
1992; Blais, 2002. family size, disability and age. However, all impor-
tant differences may not be adequately factored
44 Paine, 1819. into a universal program.
45 Ackerman and Alstoot, 1999. 64 Orloff, 1990 (unpublished), cited in McKay, 2005,
46 Hum and Simpson, n.d.

p. 109.
65 McKay, 2005.
47 For a useful, more detailed, discussion of this is-
sue, see Pasma, 2009. 66 Klein, et al., 2008, p. 6; Hennessy and Yalnizyan,
48 Block and Somers, 2005.
2008.
67 Ackerman and Alstott, 2004, p. 52.

49 Ibid.
68 See, for example, Blais, 2002.

50 Vanderborght, 2004, p. 31.
69 UN OHCHR, 2003.
51 Lerner, et al., 1999, pp. 42 – 50.
70 Quebec, 2002.
52 Hum and Simpson, 2005, pp. 286 – 87.
53 Ibid., p. 289.
54 This figure is arrived at by taking the total cost of

transfers to persons ($135 billion), then adding the
tax expenditure (foregone revenue) on personal
and age/spousal tax deductions ($29 million), and
then subtracting CPP/QPP costs ($32 billion).

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and Simon Fraser University, and includes 24 community organizations and four BC
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An Aside on Delivery Mechanisms:

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table 1 What would a Guaranteed Income program cost in Canada?

Grants paid to households

Cost of existing income security programs (2005)

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We turn now to the issues of political saleability Benefit Level

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1 Pateman, 2004, p. 6. 14 Canada, 1970, p. 3.

8 McKay, 2005. 26 Ibid, p. 799.

46 Hum and Simpson, n.d.

67 Ackerman and Alstott, 2004, p. 52.

68 See, for example, Blais, 2002.

54 This figure is arrived at by taking the total cost of

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table 1 What would a Guaranteed Income program cost in Canada?