Argument for Elusive Nature of Virtue (Meno 77b3-78b8)

What is the essence of virtue, rather than the relational qualities of individuals

embodying it? In the examination regarding virtue and following Socrates’ rejection of

Meno’s qualitative description of virtue distinctly pertaining to separate identities—

including but not limited to: man, woman, child, and servant (71e)1—Meno provides a

definition that only aids Socrates in his attempt to demonstrate the elusive fundamental

nature of virtue. Socrates has previously claimed he has never met an individual who

knows the essence of virtue (71c), a claim Meno vehemently rejects. As a result,

Socrates spends the rest of the discussion refuting Meno’s initial definition to

demonstrate Socrates’ conviction virtue previously has never been known. The ambiguity

of virtue relates directly to the absolute influence individual perspective holds over

awareness. The influence of individual perspective has been previously demonstrated

with Meno’s first definition assigning separate virtues to separate individuals. Socrates

challenges Meno to look beyond individual, relative qualities of virtue in an attempt to

uncover the essence of virtue.

How can Socrates prove that Meno’s definitions are simply a matter of

perspective, completely separate from actual truth? Socrates approaches this dilemma

with a process of specification: he reduces Meno’s definitions to a series of “facts” that

are easily disproven through rhetoric. Once Socrates can demonstrate error in the

individual factors, he can establish the inconsistency of the entirety of Meno’s definition.

1
Plato. “Meno” Five Dialogues. Trans. G. M. A. Grube. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 2002:pp. 58-92
Meno’s subsequent definition states “. . . virtue is to desire beautiful things and have the

power to acquire them” (77b4). Socrates immediately equates Meno’s chosen adjective

with good, essentially facilitating a prolonged discussion of Socrates’ initial question and

furthering his argument regarding the unattainable knowledge of virtue; more

specifically, his ascription of “good” enables a more in-depth examination of the

ambiguity of terms such as “good” or “bad” when taking into account individual

perspective and perception.

In an attempt to break down Meno’s vague and subjective definition of virtue,

Socrates presents a refutation underlining the fact that if virtue depends on the desire of

good things, then an absence of virtue must entail a desire for bad things. Socrates’

establishment of this dichotomy enables a sequential examination of Meno’s conjecture

and, more importantly, further evidence regarding the influence of perception in the

debate examining the essence of virtue. Socrates says, “It is clear then that those who do

not know things to be bad do not desire what is bad, but they desire those things that they

believe to be good but that are in fact bad” (77e). Socrates asks a fundamental question

regarding perception: if an individual desires a perceived good (of a thing that is in truth

bad), does this perception of good make the thing good? More specifically, if a person

believes something to be good, how can one logically separate this individual from others

who desire actual good? Socrates questions Meno regarding the degree to which

perception affects Meno’s definition. If the nature of “good” desire proves to be variable

on an individual scale—transforming its definition based on differentiation in human

experience and perception—then the nature of virtue cannot be attributed as conceivable

by an individual.

Socrates guides Meno to a conclusion that refutes Meno’s previous argument

stating lack of virtue entails a desire for bad things, since to want bad or harmful things

involves a desire for personal harm. Both Socrates and Meno agree that a wish for

personal harm involves a desire for misery, which is a state of being that no individual

wants (78a3). Through this process of explication and specification, Socrates leads Meno

to the conclusion that no one desires things he/she believes to be bad. Through this series

of refutations, Socrates has led Meno to the conclusion that the first element of his

definition—the desire of good things—proves to be inconsequential in determining

virtue. Since all individuals desire things they believe to be good, there is no difference in

quality of desire, and therefore no difference in superiority regarding desire.

This establishment of inconsequentiality regarding the quality of individual desire

allows Socrates to examine and eventually refute the second element of Meno’s

definition, the power to acquire good things. In short, Socrates continues the process of

disputation of one aspect of Meno’s definition, leading directly to contention of another

portion. Socrates concludes the discussion of Meno’s definition with a hypothesis.

Socrates says, “if one man is better than another, he must be better at securing them

[good things]” (77b8). Having demonstrated that the designation of “good” things truly

lies in the eye of the beholder, he leads the conversation away from the recently
disproven factor that it is “good desire” determining virtue, and now introduces a

discussion regarding power.