Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Yiannis D. Stefanidis
Nikolaos Plastiras, leader oftlie 1922 Revolutioll, reviwillg a guard ofhOllour while Oil tour ill 1I0thern Greece.
back to the command of the Army and the political Gelleral Theodoros Pallgalos, commander ofhe
forefront. There followed elections for the Fourth reorKanized Greek army l/Ild future dictl/tor.
Constituent Assembly, from which the anti-Veni-
zelist parties abstained. In Macedonia, Venizelos'
Liberal Party headed the polls. Despite strong protests
from within and without Greece, the Jewish voters of
Thessaloniki, like the Muslims in Thrace, had to
exercize their rights as part of a separate electoral
college electing a fixed number of representatives. A
Socialist candidate from Pontos, Ioannis Passalidis,
future leader of the postwar Left in Greece, was
returned in Thessaloniki. The Communist Party - still
named the Socialist Labour Party - contested all the
constituencies but failed to return a candidate. 4
Although Greece was proclaimed a Republic by
the Papanastasiou government on 25 March 1924, the
activity of the Military League and the antagonism
between its factions intensified. The inability of suc-
cessive governments to deal effectively with the
situation in the armed forces encouraged phenomena
ofinsubordination and defiance ofpolitical authority.
Meanwhile, following the massive influx of refugees
and the concomitant decline ofwage levels and living
standards, Macedonia faced unprecedented social un-
rest. In autumn 1924 industrial action spread on the
initiative of the tobacco workers' unions and bloody
?
66 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
,
..
68 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
70 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
Metaxas and Ioannis Rallis. Inevitably, the Venizelist After its failure in Thessaloniki, the Tsaldaris
campaign took the fonn of open confrontation with government attempted to load the dice to its favour in
the Jewish element. The bitter memory of November future electoral contests - a fairly common practice in
1920, when the overwhelmingly anti-Venizelist vote Greek politics - by extensive gerrymandering. The
of the religious-ethnic minorities had proved fatal for electoral refOllli, nicknamed 'baklava-making',
Venizelos and the dream of Megali Hellas, served as provided not only for the abolition of separate elec-
a rallying factor for the Venizelist, Christian Or- toral colleges but in many cases, as in Thessaloniki,
thodox supporters, and for the refugees in particular. subtracted certain, predominantly refugee districts,
On the insistence of the local Liberal leaders, and such as Kilkis, and conveniently merged them into
despite Venizelos' objections, no Jewish candidate newly established constituencies. As a result, the
was included on the Venizelist ticket. Eventually, relative weight of the Jewish vote in Thessaloniki
although the Jews, with the exception of the Com- increased and the likelihood of a repetition of the July
munists, backed the anti-Venizelist ticket to a man, 1933 results receded. At the same time, the persecu-
the Venizelist National Coalition won a resounding tion of civil servants and officers on account of their
victory, polling 47,176 votes to the 42,656 of its political beliefs intensified, while royalist elements
opponents. 17 The Thessaloniki by-election confinned made their presence increasingly felt. On 24 February
the cleavage between Venizelism and the Jewish 1935 supporters of the monarchy staged a rally in
community, while it signalled the return to the Thessaloniki, while an attempt at a republican
Venizelist fold of those refugees who had been lured response was brutally suppressed by the security for-
away by the promises of the opposing side. The ces. Furthermore, the government continued the prac-
Tsaldaris government not only failed to honour its tice of displacement inaugurated by its predecessor
electoral pledge of the 25% compensation payments, amidst a climate of simmering labour discontent.
but its local representatives consistently spoke up for Repression intensified following the remarkable in-
the particular interests ofthe natives at the expense of crease of the communist vote in the 1934 municipal
the refugees. 18 elections. The newly electt!d Communist mayor of
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 71
Leading members oj
Venizelos' Liberal Party in
Thessaloniki (among them
Alexcl1Idros Zannas, who
played a significant role in
the 1935 coup).
crease of the communist vote in the 1934 municipal postponed, while the fleet, already controlled by the
elections. The newly elected Communist mayor of rebels, sailed for Crete instead of moving north.
Kavala, Mitsos Partsalidis, was arrested and im- Meanwhile, the government was able to subdue the
prisoned, while the mayor of Serres Dimitrios rebellion in Athens and declared the country in a state
Menychtas, was forced to resign his post. 19 ofsiege. Significantly, Kondylis did not move against
the rebels in the capital until after he learnt that all
was quiet in northern Greece. On the morning of 2
The March 1935 Revolt and the Consolidation of March the authorities in Thessaloniki set about arrest-
the Anti-Venizelist State ing prominent Venizelist politicians and officers. On-
Anti-Venizelist politics had created, particularly ly later in that day did General Dimitrios Kammenos,
in Macedonia, conditions favourable to a dynamic commander of the 4th Corps in Kavala, decide to
response. The majority of the population apart, move his units against the government. The VI
Venizelist influence was strong among the anny units Division of Serres also sided with the rebels, who
stationed there. The systematic effort of Kondylis as made an appeal to the male population to swell their
Minister of War to control the anned forces by retir- ranks, since the the government had already been
ing or transfering officers to outposts in northern calling up reservists in Old Greece. The enthusiastic
Greece had fostered discontent in the services. On response to the rebels' call revealed not only the
these grounds, the plans for the Venizelist coup, support of the majority of the loca] popoulation for
which was launched on 1 March 1935, focused on the revolt but also a desperate lack of supplies, which
Macedonia as its centre of activity. The fleet, once sufficed for only 5,000 men. Subsequently, instead of
captured, was to sail for Thessaloniki and Kavala, the moving against Thessaloniki as fast as he could,
initiated officers would set about taking control of Kammenos chose to maintain a defensive posture
local garrisons and commands. In case that the along the Strymon. Having deprived themselves of
government in Athens did not give in, a provisional the advantage of surprise and lacking the support of
government was to be set up in Thessaloniki and the fleet, the rebels in Eastern Macedonia remained
would extend its authority over the rest of the country passive observers of the situation.
as circumstances permitted.2° On 4 March, assured of the safety of the
However, the coup ring failed to proceed accord- Macedonian capital, Kondylis went to Thessaloniki
ing to plan. In Macedonia, on the night of 1 March, to co-ordinate the suppression of the revolt. Distrust-
the impression was given that action had been ing local conscripts, he arranged for the transfer of a
force of 10,000 men from the south. On 10 March the
•
72 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
Skirmishes between
govertlment and rebel troops
along the Strymon river.
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 73
'lUI ur t'li.I
KKE, which saw its percentage in Macedonia swell- in favour of restoration - was described as the
ing by two-thirds to 13.65%. The application of the "produce of unprecedented fraud". 23
plurality system, however, precluded the election of
a Communist candidate. Instead, the parties in Major Stamatios Volanis, a descelldallt ofa
government had to face a serious challenge from Cretan family, members ofwich had taken
within: the defection of Sotirios Gotzamanis, whose a prominent part in the Macedoniall Struggle.
He was executedfor his role in the March coup.
Macedonian Union, of a pronounced regionalist out-
look, polled substantially in Western and Central
Macedonia, and the local anti-Venizelist ticket of
Philippos Dragoumis which secured all six seats in
the Flonna district. 22
The avowed purpose of the extremists in the
government camp, led by Kondylis and Metaxas - the
restoration of the monarchy - was received as an
affront to republican opinion in Macedonia. The
resolution of the one-sided Assembly on 10 July to
hold of a plebiscite on the question of the regime
provoked several manifestations of protest in the
cities ofMacedonia. Public meetings in support ofthe
Republic were violently dispersed by the gen-
darmerie, as it was the case with the address of
Themistoklis Sophoulis, Venizelos' lieutenant, in
Thessaloniki on 30 September. Still, for the sup-
porters of the monarchical restoration the Tsaldaris
government was too 'soft' to guarantee the outcome
of the plebiscite. On 10 October 1935, Kondylis,
aided by the chiefs of the armed services, overthrew
the government. Ironically, among those arrested as
a precaution were Generals Petritis, Katheniotis and
Panagiotakos, commander of the Third Corps, who
had assisted Kondylis in the suppression ofthe March
revolt. Kondylis virtually imposed a personal dic-
tatorship, abolishing the Republic and turning the
plebiscite into a farce. The vote of 3 November took
place in conditions ofterror, and its outcome - 97.88%
74 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
proceed with the electoral segregation of such sequently, the disastrous management of the Ana-
minorities. In Macedonia, after the exchange of tolian campaign by Venizelos' opponents and the
populations, the issue was reduced to the presence of national catastrophe that followed confirmed the his-
the large Jewish community ofThessaloniki. By royal torical breach between the refugees and anti-
decree in October 1923, separate electoral colleges Venizelism. This breach broadened after their settle-
were instituted for Jewish as well as Muslim voters in ment in Greece, as anti-Venizelist patrons undertook
Western Thrace to exercize their rights by electing a to protect the interests of the natives against the
predetermined number of representatives to the pressures and, occasionally, the discrimination
Greek parliament. Formally, this arrangement could generated by the pressing needs ofrefugee rehabilita-
be considered as conforming with the obligations of tion. This was particularly the case in Macedonia
Greece for the protection of its ethnic minorities owing to the extensive refugee settlements, a
which stemmed from the Peace Treaties. On the other deliberate act of the Venizelist administration. The
hand, the measure never acquired constitutional sudden arrival ofa multitude ofdestitute rural refugee
grounds; conversely, it could be seen as a breach of families did not fail to cause deep resentment among
the principle of equality fundamental to all Greek the indegenous peasants who had expected to reap the
constitutions. Last but not least, there was no attempt benefits of land reform and the departure of their
at treating the Slavophones of Macedonia in a similar 'exchangable' neighbours. Similar antagonism
way,as in their case the Greek state refused to ac- developed in urban surroundings, too. Finally, one
knowledge the existence of a separate minority.4 cannot overlook the attraction of Venizelos' own
The apparent hostility of the ethnic-religious charismatic personality among the refugee masses:
minorities towards Venizelism could well be inter- the politician who had brought the vision of the
preted as a reaction against their incorporation into Megali Idea nearer to completion, appeared now as
the Greek body politic. The political movement the guarantor of their salvation and rehabilitation
which, under Venizelos' leadership and guidance had after the trauma of the Asia Minor disaster. 7
domi-nated Greek politics since 1910, was justifiably Since, following the departure of all Muslims and
perceived as "the principal, most dynamic, and most many of the Slavophones, nearly half of the popula-
consistent agent of Greek irredentism and nationa- tion ofMacedonia consisted ofrefugees, the political
lism". 5 In addition, serious economic and social domination of the region by the Venizelist side is an
grievances accounted for the minorities' discontent essential constant of inter-war Greek politics. The
vis-a-vis the Venizelist governments. The strains and districts of Florina, which included Kastoria, and
stresses produced by the exchange ofpopulations and Chalicidice constituted the two important exceptions.
the settlement of refugees exacerbated this rift and In Chalcidice, in particular, the anti-Venizelist feel-
turned the minorities towards the anti-Venizelist side ings of the natives went back to the time of the First
for protection. On their part, Venizelos' opponents World War, when they were subjected to forceful
also sought to win over the support of the 'alien' recruitment by the organs ofthe'Provisional Govern-
element under the harsh dilemmas posed by the al- ment, such as "Kondylis and other bullies seconded
most complete attachment of the refugees to Veni- by Senegalese". 8 Anti-Venizelism. also appealed to
zelism. 6 the local landowners, the more conservative urban
The support of the refugee masses for Venizelism strata, the clergy and the professions which felt
was deeply-rooted. Already in the aftennath of the threatened by the prospect of refugee competition. In
Balkan Wars, the Greek-Orthodox element of the expressing these particular interests, a number of
Ottoman Empire, especially its part living along the politicians with strong local connections distin-
western coast of Asia Minor, had been subjected to guished themselves; their influence was due either to
ruthless persecution which resulted in the first refugee family ties, as was the case with the Dragoumis family
wave towards Greece. Venizelos' policy for the par- in Florina and the Dalipis in Kastoria, or dated back
ticipation ofGreece in the First World War on the side to the time of the Macedonian Struggle, with Geor-
of the Entente Powers seemed to offer the only hope gios Tsontos (Vardas) and Konstantinos Mazarakis
for the survival of the Greek communities in their (Akritas) being the most notable examples in Florina
ancestral homes in Asia Minor, Pontus and Thrace. and Pella respectively. A further phenomenon, anti-
The culmination of this policy into the Treaty of the Venizelist - and anti-refugee - regionalism, was par-
Sevres for a moment seemed to realize the most ticularly pronounced in the case of Gotzamanis, a
ambitious dreams of the unredeemed Greeks. Sub- maverick of the anti-Venizelist camp who exercized ~
80 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
considerable influence in the districts of Kozani and Greek Macedonia. This element was largely con-
Pella. These differentiations notwithstanding, the al- centrated in the districts of Florina-Kastoria and Pel-
legiance of the majority of the population of la. 10
Macedonia to Venizelism confirmed the political The policy of combining refugee settlement with
cleavage between the New Lands and Old Greece. the promotion of national homogeneity generated
pressures on the pro-Bulgarian element to emigrate.
Moreover, the band activity and propaganda cam-
The Slavophones
paign of IMRO, particularly intense in the early
In Macedonia, the principal division in Greek 1920s, gave cause for excesses against Slavophones.
inter- war politics, that between Venizelism and anti- In any case, such incidents ceased as the rule of law
Venizelism, reflected the underlying cleavage be- was progressively restored. However, the recogni-
tween refugees and natives, with the ethnic-religious tion of minority rights to those Slavophones who did
minorities constituting an important category of the not identify themselves as Greeks proved imprac-
latter group. In the case of the Slavophones, with the ticable, souring the relations of this element with the
exception of the abortive Politis-Kalfov agreement of state. As will be seen in the third part of the present
1924, the Greek state recognized the existence only chapter, the irredentist claims of Bulgaria and the
of Greeks speaking a Slavonic idiom. Yet the attitude of Yugoslavia effectively discouraged any
authorities themselves were aware ofa more complex thought of conceding special rights to that part ofthe
situation. Contemporary reports from prefects in Slavophone element who might wish them. I 1
Western Macedonia, in particular, acknowledged that Anti-Venizelism constituted the mainstream
some Slavophones in their districts maintained pro- political expression of the Slavophones. Anti-Veni-
Bulgarian sentiments9, a view which the tragic ex- zelist patrons, such as Gotzamatiis, on occasion did
perience of the 1940s tends to confirm. Among that not hesitate to res0l1 to quasi-racial polemics, in their
part of the population, the Internal Macedonian effort to present themselves as the sole effective
Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) still enjoyed a protection against the pressures of the Venizelist ad-
considerable legacy. This organization, which until ministration and the antagonism of the refugees. The
1934 maintained an intimate relationship with the traditionally exclusive patriarchal organization ofthe
Sofia governments, played an impol1ant role in curb- peasant Slavophone communities and their generally
ing the current of Slavophone emigration to Bulgaria low level of social and economic development were
after the Neuilly Treaty. The aim was clear: the further contributing factors to their conservative
preservation of ethnic grounds for future claims orientation. Voting for the anti-Venizelists did not
against Greek sovereignty in the region. However, an exclude a pro-Bulgarian orientation in certain cases,
estimated 53,000 persons eventually departed for according to the allegations of state officials. During
Bulgaria under the terms ofthe Greek-Bulgarian Con- the 1930s, the influence of the KKE was also on the
vention of Mutual Emigration, while another 39,000 increase, and the patty organ, Rizospastis ('The
had left immediately after the Bulgarian capitulation Radical'), became a forum for the expression of ex-
in September 1918. The numbers of the remaining treme autonomist tendencies among the Slavophone
pro-Bulgarian Slavophones in inter-war Macedonia element. Around 1934 the communist-led and strong-
are extremely difficult to determine. Besides, the use ly autonomist 'United' IMRO also made its ap-
ofthe Slavonic language, the mother tongue ofa good perance in Greek Macedonia. Its activity, however,
part of the native rural population in Western and could not have been of much effect as the organiza-
northern Macedonia, had only a very limited value in tion ceased to exist by 1936. 12
determining ethnic or national allegiance - as the
experience of the Macedonian Struggle had
demonstrated. Indeed, part ofthe Slav-speaking - and, The Jews
increasingly, bilingual - natives of Greek Macedonia The case of the Jewish community presented sig-
had remained ardently pro-Greek since the time of nificant distinct characteristics: the bulk of the
Ottoman rule. In any case, the only data available, Ladino-speaking, Sefardic Jews of Macedonia were
those ofthe 1926 League of Nations estimate and the concentrated in Thessaloniki, while small com-
Greek census of 1928, register some 82,000 persons munities further existed in a few urban centres, main-
who had declared 'Bulgarian' as their mother tongue ly in Kavala, Verria and Kastoria. Of course, the
in a total of one-and-a-half million inhabitants of
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 81
The Jewish presence ill Macedollia, particularly ill its capital, had beell promillellt sillce th 15th celltury. This ellgravillg depicts
a ceremollial Jewish occasioll ill the 16th celltury Thessalolliki.
ancient Jewish community of Thessaloniki, which in and foremost, the privileged status which had virtual-
1912 constituted halfthe city's population, was by far ly relieved the Jewish business class of the interven-
the most important. Following the incorporation of tions ofthe Ottoman administration could not possib-
the city into the Greek state, the community declined ly continue. Unlike the Turks, the Greeks constituted
in size, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage serious competitors who would soon displace the
of the city's population: from some 70,000 in 1920 to Jews from their dominant position in the city's finan-
50,000 within the next two decades. 13 Regarding their cial life. The arrival of the refugees intensified the
position as a political factor, the Jews, unlike the antagonism between the two elements, causing it to
Muslims or the pro-Bulgarian Slavophones, were spread into the field of labour. Indeed, the great
clearly conscious of their distinct ethnic-religious majority of the Jews were salaried employees and
identity yet lacked a national point of reference out- wage-earners. The influx of a cheap refugee labour
side the limits of the Greek state. The rise of the force seemed certain to imperil the prospects of the -
influence of the Zionist movement among the Thes- predominantly Jewish - native working class but even
saloniki Jews after the First World War did not con- to maintain its meagre living standards, far less im-
stitute a serious threat to Greek sovereignty. Sig- prove them. 14
nificantly, many among them, the more well off in The policy of the inter-war Venizelist govern-
particular, chose a nationality other than Greek or ments vis-a-vis the Jews appeared to have two con-
opted especially after 1930, to emigrate to Palestine, flicting aspects: on the one hand, a deliberate effort
the 'Promised Land' ofthe Zionists. Certainly, Greek was made towards the gradual integration of this
rule signalled the irreversible decline of the Jewish element into Greek society. In this context, a political
community both in numbers and economically. First rapprochement was attempted between Venizelism
82 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
and moderate representatives of the Jewish com- Socialist movement in Macedonia were deeply
munity. At the same time, various privileges which rooted, dating from the last stage of the Ottoman
seemed to seclude the Jews from the rest ofthe Greek period and the creation of the Jewish Federacion
society were abolished: these included the exemption Socialista Laboradera in 1909. In general, with the
from military service, the observation of the Jewish exception of a short period between 1926 and 1931,
Sabbath as a holiday in Thessaloniki, and the right of the rift between Venizelism and the Jews was clear
foreign schools to provide elementary education in and, during the 1930s, although remaining pre-
languages other than Greek (the vast majority of dominantly. social and political, it assumed sinister
Jewish children attended French or Italian schools). overtones as a confrontation between the Jewish and
On the other hand, the revolutionary government of the Greek (the refugee in particular) elements. ls
1922-1923 had introduced the much-resented politi-
cal segregation of the community into a separate
The Settlement of the Refugees in Macedonia
electoral college, a measure re-enacted by the
Venizelos government in 1928. The Jewish com- . The arrival of the refugee masses, as has already
munity, for its part, under the influence of the Zionist been noted, transformed the social, ethnic and politi-
faction, seemed to reject equally any signs of a policy cal outlook of Macedonia. The early inter-war period
of assimilation and its confinement into a political was marked by a momentous. effort at refugee
ghetto; for this reason, it chose to abstain from the rehabilitation through their full and productive in-
1923 elections. In subsequent electoral contests, the tegration into the country's society and economy.
majority of the Jewish electorate maintained its anti- Initially, securing the very subsistence ofthese large-
Venizelist attitude, already manifested in the 1915 ly destitute persons was a matter of vital priority.
and 1920 elections. The influence of the KKE was Immediate reliefwas provided by both the Greek state
considerable too, and the Jewish working class - and private charitable organizations, particularly
along with the tobacco workers - constituted the hard from the USA: by June 1923, the Relief Commission
core of the Communist following in Macedonia. The of the American Red Cross had taken upon itself to
connections ofthe Jewish element with the labour and maintain and provide health care for hundreds of
Greek refugees.
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 83
thousands of refugees in Macedonia and the rest of Constantinople, was appointed first chairman of the
the country. 16 Commission. Further, the Greek government under-
The task of final refugee settlement, of course, far took to ensure the material conditions for the success
exceeded the capabilities of the Greek state, let alone ofthe Commission's task. Indeed, by 1927 more than
any private initiative. For this reason, the Greek 800,000 hectares had been allotted for refugee settle-
government resorted to the League of Nations, re- ment, three-quarters of them in Macedonia. More-
questing the assistance of the international com- over, the Greek governments obtained two 'refugee'
munity in securing the necessary funds. The Council loans in the international money markets, in 1924 and
of the-newly established international organization 1927, procuring some in Macedonia £16.5 million,
accepted the Greek request and decided to assume the while another £2.5 million was contributed by the US
supervision of the project as a whole. To this end, a government as part of the settlement for the Greek
special subcommission of the League was set up, War Debt. 17 ' .
which, in collaboration with the Greek government, Macedonia and Western Thrace, became the
produced a plan for dealing with tlie refugee problem. Commission's main field of activity. The settlement
This plan was jointly approved in the form of a programme did not necessarily take into account the
protocol by the Council of the League and the Greek origin of the refugees, whether rural or urban (the
government in Geneva on 29 September 1923. Ac- latter element was preponderant by a small margin).
cording to its provisions, an autonomous organiza- Rather, the availability ofextensive areas ofland, the
tion, the Refugee Settlement Commission, was set up. product of the exchange of populations as well as of
It was administered by a four-member Committee, the vigorous application ofland reform, led the Com-
consisting of two foreigners (one of whom had to be mission to focus its attention on agricultural settle-
from the US) and two Greeks nominated by the ment. By the end of 1930, when its mission was
League ofNations and the Greek government respec- terminated, it had successfully promoted the produc-
tively. Henry Morgenthau, former US ambassador in tive settlement of some 87,000 refugee families in
rural areas of Macedonia, where two-thirds of the
84 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
Commission's funds had been allocated. To this end, challenged and eventually replaced the Jews as the
nearly 31,000 houses were constructed - in addition dominant element in these fields. On the other hand,
to the 10,000 completed by the state, reclamation as mentioned before, the destitute urban refugees
projects were carried out, tools, grain, draught masses in effect offered an abundant and cheap
animals and livestock were distributed. The benefits workforce which, at least temporarily, undermined
of this activity became apparent from an early stage, the position of the native working classes. Generally
as the dramatic decline in mortality and the parallel speaking, however, the relatively rapid and fruitful
rise in birth rates within three years of the Com- absorption of the bulk ofthe refugees into the various
mission's inception testified. 18 sectors of production stimulated the economy by
The progress of refugee settlement in urban introducing new activities and enlarging the domestic
centres was considerably retarded by the limited op- market, even though local levels and structures of
portunities for immediate employment and the lack production did not permit the full utilization of the
of housing. Thessaloniki, in particular, saw its refugee potential. The Greek governments, par-
population doubling after the influx of 162,000 ticularly those in power between 1923 and 1932, took
refugees during the early months after the Asia Minor a number of measures to facilitate the reinstatement
disaster. Although a large part was subsequently of refugees in landed property, to encourage the es-
directed towards the countryside and other urban tablishment of small and medium sized enterprises,
centres, the remaining refugees added to the enor- and to advance considerable amounts ofcredit to rural
mous housing problem created by the Great Fire of settlers. This policy expressed a conscientious effort
1917. The appropriations of the Commission for ur- to avert the risk of the refugee masses being reduced
ban settlement amounted to just one-fifth ofthe sums to an impoverished and socially explosive element,
spent on its agricultural programme and were by shoring up their sense of ownership and self-sup-
predominantly allotted in Old Greece. In the urban port after the trauma of dislocation. 2o
centres of Macedonia its scope of activity was However, these existed serious causes of resent-
seriously limited by the involvement of the local ment. In spite of the impressive progress achieved,
authorities and private interests, resulting in consid- refugee settlement, particularly in the urban centres,
erable friction between the Commission's repre- remained far from complete. In many cases, in which
sentatives and state organs. On the contrary, in rural real property was distributed to refugees, the final
areas, the autonomous role of the Commission, along acquisition oftitle deeds delayed as it was conditional
with the decisive material support ofthe state, seemed upon the at least partial payment of its value. The
to guarrantee the successful accomplishment of its inability or reluctance of many refugees to settle this
mission. A further factor of success was the work of obligation prolonged the ambiguity until the
its 2,000-strong Greek personnel, who on the whole wholesale cancellation of all refugee debts to the
carried out their tasks with admirable dedication and Greek state in 1944. The most serious problem, one
efficiency.19 which even threatened to undermine refugee al-
Yet, the refugees themselves were undoubtedly legiance to Venizelism, concerned the compensation
the single most important factor in the success of the claims for their abandoned properties. The matter
settlement programme and the general revitalization appeared much more urgent in' the case of urban
of Macedonia after 1922. Despite the - complete, in refugees who had not benefited from the largely rural-
most cases - loss of their fortunes, within a relatively orientated settlement policy. Under the Lausanne
short time the refugees "entirely changed" the face of Convention, the compensation of the exchanged per-
the country, thanks to their "courage, energy, capacity sons should primarily fall upon their host country
for work, and receptivity (sic) to new ideas". Their while any outstanding difference would be borne by
settlement accelerated the implementation of land their country of origin. Yet for five years the matter
reform and stimulated the agricultural cooperative was endlessly debated without a mutually acceptable
movement: a federation of agricultural cooperatives estimate of the respective obligations being reached.
of Macedonia was set up as early as in 1924. Given the numerical and financial superiority of the
Moreover, the knowledge and skills of many of them exchanged Greeks, Turkey had every reason to ac-
contributed in all sectors of economic activity. Par- quiesce in the prolongation of the dispute. The im-
ticular energy was displayed in commerce and busi- passe was broken by Prime Minister Venizelos, in the
ness: in Thessaloniki, the newcomers dynamically framework of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement: by
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 85
State a1ld private reliefage1lcies u1ldertook to alleviate the plight ofrefugee children with public meals.
ly, the Venizelist governments normally entrusted the tremely slow process". The forerunner of the KKE
portfolios of Public Welfare and Relief to politicians had vehemently opposed Venizelos' irredentist
of refugee origin from Macedonia, such as Leonidas policy and had waged an intense anti-war campaign
Iasonidis and Emmanouil Emmanouilidis. Native during the operations of the Greek army in Asia
Venizelist politicians also acquired a considerable Minor. Moreover, the party often seemed to consort
refugee following and rose to high positions, notably with anti-Venizelism in supporting the position ofthe
Ioannis Valalas from Kastoria, Dimitrios Dingas and natives vis-a-vis the refugees. The single most impor-
Alexandros Zannas from Thessaloniki, who served as tant obstacle, however, was posed by the party's
ministers of Agriculture, Education and Aviation adoption of the secessionist line of the Communist
respectively.23 International on Macedonia and Thrace. This line,
The strong Venizelist influence and the swift which ex~essedly opposed the mass settlement of
progress made in the field of refugee settlement - refugees in northern Greece, was not abandoned until
especially in rural areas, considerably curtailed the 1935. In any event, during the early 1930s, the effects
prospects of a swing towards the Left, to the newly of the Great Depression and the intensification of
established KKE in particular. In urban centres, how- social struggles helped increase the appeal of the
ever, the extremely poor living conditions, low wages KKE: from 1931 onwards, about half the party's
and widespread unemployment afflicting the refugee Central Committee and the majority of its Politburo
population favoured political radicalization. From an consisted of refugees. 24
early stage, the KKE attempted to exploit this
'inflammable' social material, even appearing in the
The Labour Movement and the Role of the
1926 and 1928 elections under the banner ofa 'United
Communist Party
Front of Workers, Peasants and Refugees'. Despite
its relative success in 1926, when two of its refugee Inter-war Macedonia, particularly Thessaloniki
candidates were returned, the growth of Communist and the urban centres of Eastern Macedonia - Kavala,
influence among the refugee element proved an "ex- Serres, and Drama - experienced the development of
s
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 87
s
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 89
united and independent state together with other parts Balkans".3! The attitude of the KKE on this sensitive
of their country" .29 To be sure, its declarations not- issue, along with real grievances, foreign propaganda,
withstanding, the KKE did very little to promote the and Metaxas' short-sighted policy of repression fo-
realization of this policy. Significantly, despite the mented the elements of a crisis which would break
presence of ten Communist deputies in the Chamber out dramatically under the conditions of war and
after the 1926 elections, no reference whatsoever was enemy occupation.
made on their part to the 'national question' of
Macedonia. This attitude played no small part in the
repeated 'restructuring' of the KKE leadership im- III. Macedonia in the Foreign
posed by the Comintern. The party leadership which
was eventually installed under Secretary-General
Relations of Greece, 1923-1939
Nikos Zachariadis in 1931 appeared to adopt the The Greek foreign policy ofthe inter-war period -
slogan of Macedonian autonomy or independence in with the sole exception of Pangalos' short-lived dic-
its most extreme form. Before long, however, the tatorship - had shed all irredentist aspirations and
issue was quietly dropped from the party's pronoun- primarily aimed at the preservation of the country's
cements following its successive electoral set-backs. independence and territorial integrity. To this end, it
The line on the Macedonian Question had already consistently supported the Peace settlement which
cost the party many prominent members and had had followed the First World War, including the
helped alienate the refugee element, its rural part in Treaty of Lausanne. The safeguarding of Greek
particular, whose position in their new homeland it sovereignty in Macedonia and Western Thrace, con-
directly threatened. At the same time, it had offered stituted the main preoccupation ofthis policy, as these
an effective ideological weapon to the party's adver- two newly acquired territories were in fact the most
saries as well as a case for the persecution of its vulnerable - and most coveted - parts of national
members since the days of the Pangalos dictatorship. territory. As a result of its geographical position - an
On the other hand, the appeal of the KKE among the extensive borderline cut across by the extremely vul-
Slavophones, whom the slogan of autonomy should nerable Axios (Vardar) valley - the security of Greek
have attracted, did not appear great enough to offset Macedonia directly depended upon Greece's rela-
its obvious ill effects.30 tions with its northern neighbours as well as with
In 1935, in view ofthe rise ofFascism and Nation- those European Powers which perceived a special
al Socialism in Europe, the Comintern was compelled interest in the region. The main problem in this
to reconsider its line on the Macedonian Question. In respect arose from the fact that the Sofia governments
order to meet the Fascist challenge, Moscow and the did not accept the territorial settlement of the Peace
international communist movement had to abandon Treaties as final. This attitude constituted a real - if
the tactics of destabilization in the Balkans. Instead, not immediate - threat to the security of neighbouring
the 7th Congress of the International put forward the countries and a permanent destabilizing factor in the
cooperation of ali 'democratic forces' against Fas- Balkans. Consequently, the Greek governments at-
cism as the principal duty of its members. The IMRO tached primary importance to relations with Belgrade.
was condemned as Fascist and the slogan of a united Yet in spite of a common interest in containing Bul-
and independent Macedonia was dropped. Respond- garian revisionism, relations between Greece and
ing to the new imperative, the 6th Congress of the Yugoslavia were not entirely in harmony. Inevitably,
KKE, which was convened in December 1935, sub- Macedonia often became the focus of inter-war
stituted a new declaration asking for "complete diplomacY,occupying a central place in the maze of
equality for minorities" in place of the old line. The affairs between Athens, Belgrade and Sofia.
official resolution of the 6th Congress at long last
recognized the drastic transformation which had been
effected in the ethnic composition of Macedonia fol- Macedonia and the Crisis in Greek-Bulgarian
lowing the exchange of populations and the settle- Relations, 1923-1927
ment of the refugees. Soon, however, it appeared that Until the mid-1930s the Bulgarian challenge was
the breach with the past had been far from complete: manifested in the support which, after the overthrow
the same party resolution pointed out that the of the radical Stamboliski government in June 1923,
Macedonian Question remained open and would only Sofia afforded to continuing activity ofIMRO, which
be solved "after the victory of Soviet power in the
p
-------------------------------------------......,...-
90 YlANNIS STEFANIDIS
primarily aimed at detaching Macedonian territories extremely slow pace. Its task, already a complex one,
from Yugoslavia and Greece. The success of the proved impossible as both parties, for varied reasons,
IMRO's task, ostensibly the autonomy or inde- appeared reluctant to promote a speedy settlement.
pendence of an extensive area (but for many of its Athens, given the eventual preponderance of the
contesting factions its ultimate annexation to mother emigration movement towards Bulgaria, was not par-
Bulgaria), postulated the support ofat least part ofthe ticularly anxious to face the burden arising thereof.
native Slavophone element. In Greek Macedonia, Sofia, for its part, preferred to reserve the compensa-
however, following the exchange of populations and tion claims of its own immigrants as a means for
the consolidation of its overwhelmingly Greek ethnic exerting pressure on its neighbour. In this attitude the
character, the conditions for the development of a Greek governments did not fail to perceive revisionist
secessionist movement had become practically ex- considerations and the influence ofIMRO. 3
tinct. I In the southern Vardarska province, however, Distrust of Bulgarian intentions did not permit the
the Belgrade governments faced a serious situation. implementation of a bilateral agreement reached in
The majority of the local Slav and Albanian popula- Geneva on 29 September 1924. The representatives
tion had real causes to resent Serbian domination. The of Greece and Bulgaria to the Council of the League
dismal living conditions, the settlement of thousands of Nations, Nikolaos Politis and Hristo Kalfov,
of Serbian families, the exclusion of natives from signed two protocols which defined the terms for the
most places of authority, and, above all, the often application of the special Convention on the protec-
violent policy of 'Serbianization' fanned local dis- tion of minorities signed by Greece and the Allied
content and provided the ground for the subversive Powers at Sevres in 1920. A bloody incident at Terlis,
activity of IMRO. This organization was not only near the Greek-Bulgarian border, in July 1924, in
supported by Bulgaria or part of the local population which several Slavophone peasants were shot dead by
but also by non-Balkan powers: Fascist Italy, in par- a Greek detachment, had acted as a catalyst for the
ticular, whose relations with Belgrade remained tense reaching of the agreement. Yet despite the con-
for most ofthe inter-war period, was prepared to assist ciliatory intentions ofthe then Foreign Minister Geor-
every effort that might create serious trouble for its gios Roussos, the Greek political and military leader-
neighbour. 2 ship was quick to perceive grave dangers to the
Sofia, for its part, did not desist from raising the country's security and its external relations. The
matter of the rights of 'Bulgarian' minorities, par- protocols clearly implied the existence of a Bulgarian
ticularly with Athens, mostly in connection with the minority in Greece as well as a legitimate interest of
settlement ofother outstanding issues. For some time, Sofia in its fate, thus opening the way to interventions
Greek-Bulgarian relations were beset by the question into the internal affairs ofits neighbour. Furthermore,
of a commercial outlet for Bulgaria to the Aegean, in the sharp reaction of Yugoslavia proved a compelling
accordance with a provision of the Neuilly Treaty. In factor. Belgrade considered the agreement as estab-
spite of the repeated offers on the part of Greek lishing a dangerous precedent which threatened to
governments of facilities in the ports of Ale- undermine its own policy of 'Serbianization' in the
xandroupolis (Dedeagatch) or of Thessaloniki - on Vardarska banovina. Strongly-worded demarches
the model ofthe existing Serbian free zone - the Sofia were immediately delivered to Athens as part of a
governments did not appear interested in anything pressure campaign which culminated in the 1913
short of cession ofterritory. A serious problem, how- Greek-Serbian treaty of alliance being denounced. In
ever, which further bedevilled relations between the the event, Andreas Michalakopoulos' government
two countries, proved to be the implementation ofthe sought anxiously to be released from the Geneva
Greek-Bulgarian Convention of Mutual Emigration. protocols, which the Greek Assembly refused to
As has been noted, IMRO influence accounted for the ratify. To this end, the international prestige of
reluctance of many pro-Bulgarian inhabitants of Eleutherios Venizelos was resorted to, and the Greek
Greek Macedonia to apply for emigration, at a time leader was entrusted with the task of presenting the
when the hard pressed Greeks of Bulgaria were vir- Greek case before the Council ofthe League in March
tually left with no option but to depart. What was 1925. The protocols, Venizelos maintained, despite
more, the Mixed Greek-Bulgarian Commission of the "praiseworthy intentions" of its initiators, "com-
Emigration, which had been set up to assist in the pletely ignored the political reality", which had
liquidation of the properties of emigrants and to fix resulted from the mass exodus of the Greek popula-
the indemnities owed by either side, proceeded at an tions ofBulgaria in contrast to the apparent reluctance
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 91
of the pro-Bulgarian element in Greece to emigrate. soldiers were killed when a Bulgarian patrol fired on
At the same time, Venizelos assured the Council of and subsequently occupied a Greek observation post
the Greek government's intention to honour its at Demir Kapu, on Mt Beles. Pangalos considered that
obligations arising from the Sevres Convention. His the provocation called for a dynamic response, and,
line of argument eventually convinced the League to against the counsel of foreign diplomats, ordered
absolve Greece from ratifying the protocols. 4 army units to enter the Bulgarian soil and to occupy
The repudiation of the Politis-Kalfov protocols Petrich, the centre of komitaji activity. Simultaneous-
further strained the already tense Greek-Bulgarian ly with military action, the Greek government
relations. The regime ofAlexander Tsankov tolerated delivered an ultimatum to Sofia demanding moral and
the activities ofIMRO, which had been instrumental material compensation as well as the arrest and
in the overthrow of the preceding Stamboliski punishment of those responsible for the killing. Bul-
government. A firm supporter of this organization, garia immediately appealed to the Council of the
Colonel Volkov, was to serve as minister of War for League of Nations, which in tum demanded the im-
a consider-able period. Under the cover of the mediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of
authorities, IMRO bands took effective control of the the Greek troops. Subsequently, a special commis-
Petrich region, from where they launched frequent sion of investigation was set up, which submitted its
raids on to Yugoslav and Greek soil. Frontier inci- report on 28 November 1925. The invasion of Bul-
dents were often reported. At the same time, pressure garian soil was condemned and Greece was charged
on the Greek element in Bulgaria intensified: the to pay £45,000 in indemnities to Bulgaria, which for
murder of the Greek mayor of Stenimachos in July its part was obliged to compensate the family of the
1925 was followed by the killing of two more Greeks Greek officer killed. Finally, in order to assist the two
in September of that year. The reaction of General sides in settling future incidents, the Council of the
Pangalos' government included both diplomatic League appointed a team of two Swedish officers to
protests and military measures along the border with inspect the Greek-Bulgarian frontier. 6
Bulgaria. Furthermore, a bloody bomb attack in The crisis in Greek-Bulgarian relations was soon
Florina in September 1925 was attributed to IMRO defused. By May 1926, the Bulgarian indemnities had
terrorists. 5 been paid, while the team of observers had only one
The atmosphere of tension nearly erupted into minor incident to report until its mission terminated
full-scale armed conflict following a serious frontier a year later. In December 1927, the Finance Ministers
incident on 18 October 1925: a Greek officer and two of Greece and Bulgaria, Georgios Kaphantaris and
92 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
ofNikola Pasic brought forward the expansion of the treat this element merely as Slav-speaking Greeks.
free zone, a special tariffregime and joint administra- In general, by 1925-1926, the diplomatic position
tion of the Thessaloniki-Gevgelija railway, as well as of Greece vis-a-vis its Balkan neighbours had consid-
the recognition of the Slavophones of Greek erably weakened. Pangalos' ill-conceived military
Macedonia as a Serbian minority. The Michalako- action against Bulgaria was a further blow to the
poulos government for its part, in addition to country's international prestige. Moreover, his ambi-
repudiating the Politis-Kalfov agreement, promptly tion of reversing the settlement of the Treaty of
reduced the tariffs on Yugoslav imports and took Lausanne combined with his apprehension of a pos-
steps to improve the facilities at the port of Thes- sible Sofia-Belgrade understanding to compel him to
saloniki. However, the talks on a new treaty collapsed restore the old Greek-Serbian alliance at every cost.
shortly before General Pangalos came to power. At Belgrade was quick to exploit the occasion in order
about that time, the attempt of the Greek government to advance its claims. In this respect, it enjoyed the
to secure for the Slavophones of Macedonia the right full support of France, which considered a strong
of education in their own vernacular foundered upon Yugoslavia as the best guarantee of its interests in
the objections of Sofia, which demanded the intro- South-Eastern Europe. At the same time, the Yugos-
duction ofthe Bulgarian language, and the protests of lav government took advantage of the non-recogni-
Belgrade, which counterproposed the use of Serbo- tion of minority rights to the Slavophones of
Croat.! 0 Henceforth, the Greek government would Macedonia in order to step up its pressure on Athens:
while its minister lodged an official protest in Decem-
ber 1925, anti-Greek agitation was stirred up in
Alldreas Michalakopolilos, Foreigll Millister Yugoslav cities and continued well into the following
;11 1928-1932. year.!!
Under these circumstances, the signing of a treaty
of friendship and arbitration in August 1926 all but
completely satisfied Yugoslav demands. A conven-
tion on minorities was also concluded, recognizing a
'Serbian' minority in Macedonia, while by another
convention Yugoslav citizenship was granted to some
400 Slavophone families. It became apparent that a
dangerous precedent was about to be established,
which could prove detrimental to Greek sovereignty
in Macedonia; however, such a prospect was fore-
stalled thanks to the overthrow of the dictator only a
few days after the signing of the agreements. Among
the first acts ofthe all-party Zaimis cabinet formed in
November 1926 was to make it clear to Belgrade that
it did not consider Pangalos' initiatives as binding and
to ask for fresh talks on an entirely new basis. Finally,
in August 1927, the Greek parliament rejected
without debate the 1926 agreements as null and
void. 12
Initially, Belgrade appeared to .insist on the full
observation of its accords with Pangalos. Yet events
such as the conclusion of a pact reducing Albania to
a satellite of Italy and the concurrent tension in rela-
tions between Rome and Belgrade compelled the
latter to loweri its tones and merely temporize. In the
course of 1927 the Greek government submitted a
series of proposals for the settlement of all outstand-
ing bilateral issues on the basis of the May 1923
Convention, with the League of Nations acting as
94 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
.AtjJ.fjv 6SGOlXlO"tWtls--'
Pfll:t de Sal<:>nique '
A view ofthe port ofThessaloniki, symbol ofthe desire ofboth Serbs and Bulgarians
for an 'outlet' on the Aegean.
firmed the adherence of both parties to the regime matter could be given fresh study, provided that Bul-
established by the Peace Treaties. At the same time, garia unequivocally and publicly recogn~zed the ter-
Belgrade agreed to cede all its rights over the Thes- ritorial settlement of the Peace Treaties. l ?
saloniki-Gevgelija line to the Greek government for This allusion was in line with Venizelos' view that
twenty million francs. 16 Bulgaria's reconciliation with its neighbours would
With regard to Greek-Bulgarian relations, Venize- improve dramatically the prospects for security and
los' policy of promoting the country's security stability in the Balkans. The Greek Prime Minister
through bilateral agreements ran into severe ventured to communicate his ideas to the Yugoslav
obstacles. Apart from Sofia's underlying rejection of Foreign Minister Marinkovic during the latter's visit
existing frontiers, progress in this field stumbled over to Athens in December 1930: invoking his own
its insistence - under the influence of IMRO - on record of Greek-Turkish reconciliation, Venizelos
keeping the Macedonian Question alive, as well as on suggested that a Bulgarian minority should be recog-
the distrustful attitude ofYugoslavia. The recognition nized in southern Yugoslavia - the implication being
of minority rights for the Slavophones in Macedonia that Greece would act likewise - in return for
constituted a serious aspect of the problem. A Bul- Bulgaria's formal declaration that it accepted the ex-
garian demarche to this effect was rejected by the isting frontiers as final and the suppression of IMRO;
Greek government in early 1929, but the matter was to this end, the mediation of the Western Powers and
brought up again at the meeting of the foreign mini- Turkey might be sought. Far from being attracted to
sters of the two countries in Geneva in September the scheme, Marinkovic curtly rejected Venizelos'
1930. Replying to his Bulgarian colleague Burov, proposal as constituting interference in the internal
Michalakopoulos pointed out that a Greek concession affairs of his country. Michalakopoulos was not in
on this account would not fail to upset relations with agreement with Venizelos' reasoning either but he
Belgrade, as had been the case with the Politis-Kalfov personally favoured a hard line: it seemed rather
protocols. He seemed to suggest, however, that the doubtful whether concessions ofthat kind could com-
7
96 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
pel Sofia to reverse its policy, at least for as long as relations was initiated in 1930 with the convening of
IMRO maintained its strongholds within the Bul- the first Balkan Conference, on the initiative of
garian government and the army.18 Papanastasiou, former associate of Venizelos and
Greek-Bulgarian relations were further perplexed leader of the Democratic Union. Four such conferen-
by the set of economic problems already mentioned, ces were held in Athens, Istanbul, Bucharest and
with serious political implications: with regard to the Thessaloniki between 1930 and 1933, with a last,
question of a Bulgarian commercial outlet on. the unofficial, meeting in Athens in 1934. Yet, existing
Aegean, Sofia ignored Venizelos' renewed offer of a differences tended to undermine the project from the
free zone in Thessaloniki or Alexandroupolis. The outset: the Bulgarian delegates insisted upon raising
Greek General Staff, for its part, opposed the idea of minority questions with their neighbours only to meet
extending the railway connection to either side of the with the steadfast refusal of the other delegations to
border, thus facilitating Bulgaria's access to the discuss the issue; as a result, the Bulgarians withdrew
Mediterranean. Some progress was achieved towards during the Bucharest Conference. In April 1934 it was
the definition of mutual financial obligations arising decided that the fifth Conference should be post-
from the Convention on mutual emigration. Although poned indefinitely. Later developments would not
serious reservations were expressed, in December permit the continuation of this effort. 21
1928 the Greek parliament ratified the Kaphandaris-
Mollov agreement for the settlement of mutual com-
pensation claims, which entailed a considerable bur- The Transformation of the Diplomatic Setting
den for Greece. Yet the Greek government made its on the Eve of the Second World War
fulfilment conditional upon the payment of the Bul- The rise of Adolf Hitler to power and the re-emer-
garian war reparations. In fact, an agreement was gence of German expansionism called into question
reached in January 1930 whereby the Bulgarian the precarious balance established by the Versailles
government tmdertook to pay an average annuity of Settlement. In view of the inactivity of the Western
11 million gold francs for a period of 36 years. Powers in the face of Fascist aggression, a climate of
Regarding further bilateral issues, the Bulgarian uncertainty and instability prevailed in Europe,
government significantly refused their submission to posing serious security dilemmas to those govern-
international arbitration. 19 ments still adhering to the status quo. In the case of
The Great Depression afforded Sofia an oppor- Greece, the cause for anxiety was twofold: Bulgarian
tunity to default on its financial obligations. As soon revisionism and, from 1936 onwards, Italian expan-
as the Hoover Plan for an one-year moratorium of sionism. Under these circumstances, the idea of a
international debts was announced, the payment of Balkan defensive arrangement - on the model of the
Bulgarian reparations was suspended. In return, the Central European 'Little Entente' - was put forward
Greek government withheld all disbursements under and energetically promoted by French diplomacy.
the Kaphandaris-Mollov agreement. Moreover, in Between October 1933 and February 1934 the ground
late 1931, the work of the Mixed Commission of was laid for the conclusion in Athens of the so-called
Emigration was terminated without a settlement Balkan Pact with the expressed aim of safeguarding
being reached on a number of outstanding issues, the existing territorial order in the region. The Tsal-
which were then referred to the Finance Committee daris government, seeing no real prospects for a nor-
of the League of Nations. The existing differences malization of relations with Bulgaria, considered that
precluded the renewal of the commercial agreement Greece ought to align itself with the other 'con-
between the two countries, which expired at the end servative' Balkan countries: Romania, Turkey and
of 1931. As a result, Bulgarian products suffered from Yugoslavia. In the course of 1933, the Greek govern-
the tenfold increase in Greek tariffs designed to ment had been particularly worried by the prospect of
protect domestic production. The impact was par- an accommodation between Sofia and Belgrade - a
ticularly adverse on Bulgarian exports, as Greece permanent incubus for Greek foreign policy. In such
absorbed nearly one-fifth of their volume. Under a case, it was feared, the two countries might feel
these circumstances, the prospects seemed for a tempted to pursue their claims jointly on Greek
Greek-Bulgarian understanding increasingly re- Macedonia and Thrace. On the other hand, the ex-
mote. 20 clusion of Bulgaria from the pact further estranged
A noble attempt towards improving inter-Balkan that country from the four signatory powers. Sofia,
isolated, invested all its national aspirations in the
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 97
Metaxas addressing the foreign mi1listers ofthe Balka1l Pact cou1Itries, meeting i1l Athens.
forces of revisionism in Europe, Italy and Nazi Ger- had been stepped up since the suppression of IMRO
many.22 by the government of Kimon Georgiev in 1934. In
The participation of Greece in the so-called January 1937 the Yugoslav government of Milan
Balkan Entente was strongly criticized by Venizelos, Stojadinovic proceeded to sign of a treaty of
who saw his legacy in foreign affairs being dis- friendship and non-agression with Bulgaria in blatant
mantled: his policy of bilateral pacts rested on the disregard ofthe Balkan Pact, provision which required
principle of non-participation in alliances which the prior consent of its partners. At the same time,
might bring Greece up against a major European relations between Athens and Sofia de-teriorated.
power, Italy in particular. That was exactly what Metaxas, deeply distrustful of Bulgarian intentions,
participation in the Balkan Pact entailed. Venizelos' firmly opposed any idea of concessions to bring Bul-
criticism compelled Foreign Minister Dimitrios Max- garia into the Pact. In the economic field, while past
imos to state in Parliament that the guarantees of the problems remained unresolved, a further, threefold,
Pact applied only in the event that the threat emanated increase in Greek tariffs virtually excluded Bulgarian
from a Balkan power. 23 This statement helped products from the Greek market. At the same time, the
demonstrate the limited value of the Pact, which, construction ofan extensive - and costly - fortified line
however, constituted a pivotal element of Greek along the Greek-Bulgarian frontier got under way,
foreign policy until 1940. Before long, however, it while the army manoeuvres of October 1937, the first
became apparent that its existence could not prevent on a large scale after several years, confirmed the
even the much feared understanding between Yugos- primary orientation of the Greek defence planning
lavia and Bulgaria. Contacts between the two states towards repelling a Bulgarian attack. 24
l
I
_
~- ----- -----------------------
98 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
proaching stonn. 25
In early 1938 Britain made a last-minute attempt
to facilitate a settlement between Bulgaria and the
countries of the Balkan Entente. Its immediate aim
was to inspire in Sofia a sense of equality vis-a-vis its
neighbours through the abolition of the disannament
clauses of the Neuilly Treaty. Turkey acted as a
mediator in securing the consent of Greece and
Romania. In contrast to Bucharest, which demanded
a previous non-aggression pact with Sofia, the
Metaxas government, despite its record of distrust of
Bulgarian intentions, promptly fell into line with the
British initiative. On 31 July 1938, Metaxas, acting
as chainnan of the Balkan Pact Council, and the
Bulgarian Premier Giorgi Kioseivanov signed in
Thessaloniki a joint declaration whereby Greece and
its partners recognized the right of Bulgaria to reann
and accepted the abolition of the demilitarized zones
in Thrace, in exchange for a general condemnation of
war as a means of settling international disputes.
Meanwhile, the Greek government anxiously sought
British guarantees, which, however, were not
forthcoming. Following the infamous Munich Agree-
ment and the dismembennent of Czechoslovakia, it
became clear that the territorial settlement of the
Treaties was open to revision. In Sofia, the event was
greeted with irredentist agitation clearly directed
against Macedonia and other objectives of Bulgarian
revisionism. The short-lived thaw in Greek-Bul-
garian relations once more gave its place to coldness
King George II. His return to the throne, and the Metaxas and suspicion. According to a British observer, the
dictatorship, seemed to serve, immediate British interests only tangible result of the much vaunted Thessaloniki
in Greece.
Agreement proved the... renaming of a street bearing
the name of the Byzantine Emperor Basil the Voul-
Meanwhile, following the Italian attack on Abys- garoktonos (Bulgar slayer) in Thessaloniki!26
sinia and the international tension that ensued, Therefore, on the eve of the Second World War,
Britain's interest in the Balkans and Greece, in par- Greece was insufficiently prepared and without effec-
ticular' revived. A friendly government in Athens tive international guarantees in the face of an already
would constitute a major asset for British policy in visible threat: the occupation of Albania by Italian
view of the developing Anglo-Italian antagonism in troops in April 1939 posed a new and grave dilemma
the Mediterranean. The restoration of the monarchy for Greek security, which was nb longer threatened
and the imposition of Metaxas' dictatorship seemed exclusively from the north. At the same time, the
to favour British strategic interests in the region. On rapid shift in the balance ofpower in Europe rendered
the other hand, the obvious expansionist tendencies the Balkan states unable to observe their commit-
of Rome left the Greek government with little room ments to mutual security. Both the Balkan Pact,
for manoeuver. In a time of a major international having already lost momentum, and the guarantees
crisis, its alignment with the powers supporting the which Britain and France extended to Greece and
status quo, Britain and France, seemed inevitable. Romania in the wake of the Italian invasion of Al-
Soon, however, it became clear that these powers bania, would prove of no account at the critical mo-
were not in a position to guarantee the security of ment. 27
Greece effectively, much less to ward off the ap-
•
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 99
The Mllsellm ofthe Macedo1lia1l Strllggle at the crossroads ofAgias Sophias a1ld Koromila Sts. The latter road was called 'Basil
the BlIlgar-Slayer St.' IIl1til1938, whe,;' it was re1lamedfollowi1lg the Metaxas-Kiosseiva1lov agreeme1lt.
100 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
consular report, Salonica, 20.4.1933; FO 371, 20389, R 3310, Lomas cit., pp. 115-119; PRO, FO 286, 1138/165, report on Communism,
to Walker, Salonica, 27.5.1936. second semester 1935.
13. N. Alivizatos, The Political Institutions in Crisis, 1922-1974: 26. Histmy, pp. 375-378; PRO, FO 371, 20389, R 3310, Lomas to
Aspects of the Greek Experience (in Greek), Athens 1983, pp. 347, Walker, Salonica, 27.5.1936, and Walker to Eden, Athens, 2.6.1936;
350-361; Elephantis. op. cit., pp. 95-97; PRO, FO 371,15237, C 882, FO 286, 11381165, report on Communism, first semester 1936.
Greece, annual report for 1930. 27. History, pp. 378-379; PRO, FO 371, 20389, R 3310, Lomas to
14. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 255, 258-259; Moutaphis, op. cit., Walker, Salonica, 27.5.1936; 22370, R 3614, Hole to Waterlow,
399-401; PRO, FO 371, 15970, C 1621, Greece, annual report for Salonica, 24.3.1938.
1931; 15966, C 3416, consular report, Salonica, 16-30 April 1932; 28. PRO, FO 286, 1138/165, report on Communism, first semester
FO 286, 11181131, consular report, Salonica, 20.4.1933. 1936; FO 371, 20389, R 3310, consular reports, Salonica, June-July
15. Elephantis, op. cit., p. 387; Histmy, pp. 319,321; Mavrogordatos, 1936; 22370, R 3614, Hole to Waterlow, Salonica, 24.3.1938.
op. cit., pp. 211-215. 29. Alivizatos, op. cit., pp. 412t1'.; Histmy, pp. 380, 384-385.
16. PRO, FO 286, 1118/131, consular report, Salonica, 20.4.1933. 30. History, pp. 389-396; PRO, FO 286, 1144/165, Lomas to Water-
17. Histmy, p. 325; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 202-204, 240-241, low, Salonica, 29.1.1937; Waterlow to Eden, Athens, 22 May; Laurie
258-261; same author, Studies and Documents on the Period 1909- to Roberts, 9.9.1937; FO 371, 22370, R 7087, Hole to Waterlow,
1940 (in Greek), Athens-Komotini, 1982, p. 97; PRO, 1118/131, Salonica, 6 Aug. 1938; with regard to the regime's unpopularity and
consular report, Salonica, 20.4.1933; FO 371,16772, C 6413, Meade its repressive practices in Macedonia, see: FO 371, 22370, R 2028,
to British Embassy in Athens, Salonica, 12.7.1933; 18399, R 1788, consular report, Salonica, Jan. 1938; R 3614, Hole to Waterlow,
Greece, annual report for 1933; 19518, R 1081, Greece, annual report Salonica, 24 March 1938; R 5661, Hole to Waterlow, Salonica,
for 1934. 6.6.1938; 23769, R 729, consular report, Salonica, December 1938;
18. In this respect, Sotirios Gotzamanis, a prominent anti-Venizelist 23770, R 2072, Hole to Waterlow, Salonica, 18.3.1939.
politician from Western Macedonia, when demanding a statement 31. Kotos, op. cit., p. 50; PRO, FO 371, 22371, R 2072, Greece,
from Prime Minister Tsaldaris in Parliament in 1934, reportedly annual report for 1937; 22372, R 3533, consular report, Salonica, for
exclaimed: "When, at last, Mr. Prime Minister, will the fields be taken Feb. 1938; 23770, R 2072, consular report, Salonica, Jan. 1939;
away from the refugees, and restored to the natives?"; in Mavrogor- 23470, R 732, Waterlow to Lord Halifax, Athens, 23.1.1939.
datos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 202-203; see also, ibid., p. 213.
19. Histmy, pp. 325-326; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., p. 241; PRO, FO II. Social and Ethnic Aspects of Political
286, 1118/131Iii, consular reports, Salonica, July-Sept. 1933; Developments in Inter-War Macedonia
11281131, consular reports, Salonica, February-March 1935; FO 371,
I. lAM, GGM, file 69, Governor-General to the Prefectures and
19518, R 1081, Greece, annual report for 1934.
Subdivisions of the Govemment-General, 2 Jan. 1925; S. Ladas, The
20. G. Daphnis, Greece BeiWeen Two Wars, 1923-1940 (in Greek),
vol. 2, Athens 1974, pp. 333-334; A. Veremis, The Interventions of Exchanges ofMinorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York
1932, pp. 427-439; Pentzopoulos, op. cit., pp. 17, 128-129, 134; K.
the Greek Army in Greek Politics, 1916-1936 (in Greelc), Athens
Svolopoulos, The Decision/or the Compulsory Exchange ofpopula-
1977, pp. 238-248; Histmy, pp. 359-360. .
tion Between Greece and Turkey, Thessaloniki 1980, pp. 12-19.
21. Daphnis, op. cit., pp. 334-349; Histmy, pp. 266-271
2. Ladas, op. cit., pp. 41, 75-90,104-106,123; Pentzopoulos, op. cit.,
22. Histmy, pp. 272-273, 364; S. Linardatos, How We reached the
pp. 17, 129-130,134.
4th ofAugust, 5th ed., Athens 1988, pp. 62-63; Mavrogordatos, op.
3. Ladas, op. cit., pp. 121-123,291 ff.; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., p. 229;
cit., pp. 236-237, 290-291; I. Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Par-
Pentzopoulos,op. cit., pp. 99,134, 136-139, 188.
liamentary Elections in Greece, 1946-1967: The Political Geography
4. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 237-240.
ofthe Political Forces (in Greek), Athens 1985, pp. 109-110; PRO,
5. Ibid., p. 230.
FO 286,11281131, consular reports, Salonica, April-June 1935.
23. History, pp. 369-372; PRO, FO 286, 11281131, consular reports, 6. Ibid., pp. 230-231.
7. lAM, GGM, file 89A, Third Anny Corps to General Staff,
Salonica, June-October 1935; FO 371, 19509, R 6816, Lomas to
3.6.1924; Major Tsigantes to Third Army Corps, 14.6.1924; file 89B,
Waterlow, Salonica, 6.11.1935.
Prime Minister's Office to various Ministries and the Government
24. Histmy, pp. 372-374; Nikolakopoulos, op. cit., pp. 107-115.
General of Macedonia, 17.9. 1925; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp.
25. Elephantis, op. cit., pp. 235-243, 388-389; Nikolakopoulos, op.
102 YIANNIS STEFANIDIS
199-207; same author, Studies and Documents, pp. 94-95. 21. Dritsa, op. cit., 142-143; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 145, 188-
8. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 185, 197, 288-291; 191, 196-197; Pentzopoulos, op. cir., pp. 68, 117-119, 157; PRO, FO
Moutaphis, op. cit., 394; Nikolakopoulos, op. cit., pp. 109-110; 371,20389, R 3310, Lomas to Walker, Salonica, 27.5.1936.
Pentzopoulos, op. cit., p. 188; PRO, FO 286, 855, Hole to Bentinck, 22. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 207-209. .
Salonica, 10.9.1923; Bentinck to Lord Curzon, Athens, 20 Oct. 1923. 23. Ibid., p. 210; Nikolakopoulos, op. cil., pp. 113-114; Pentzopoulos,
9. lAM, GGM, file 88, Prefecture of Pella to Government-General, op. cit., pp. 183-189.
Edessa, 26.11.1922; Prefecture of Florina to Government-General, 24. Elephantis, op. cit., pp. 315-318, 386; Kofos, op. cit., p. 80;
16 Dec. 1922; Benakis Museum, file 373, Venizelos Archive, P. Mavrogordatos,op. cit., pp. 315-318, 386; D. Pentzopoulos, op. cit.,
Dimitriadis to the Association for the Dissemination ofGreek Letters, pp. 190-192; PRO, FO 371, 10771, C 7036, Greece, annual report for
13 Aug. and 23.9.1927, in Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 246-248. 1924; 11357, C 5755, Greece, annual report for 1925; 13659, C 1763,
10. E. Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics, Lon- Greece annual report for 1928. .
don 1950, p. 30; Ladas, op. cit., pp. 104-105, 123; D. Pentzopoulos, 25. A. Liakos, The Socialist Labour Federation of Thessaloniki
op. cit., pp. 60-61, 128, 131, 134; PRO, FO 371, 9896, C 15199, (Federacion) and the Socialist Youth: Their Charter (in Greek),
Greece, annual report for 1923. Thessaloniki 1985, pp. 105-107; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 146-
11. Ladas, op. cit., pp. 106-107; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 248,252; 147,196-197,209; Moutaphis, op. cit., 381-382, 422; PRO, FO 286,
Pentzopoulos,op. cit., pp. 60-61, note 36; PRO, FO 371, 9896, C general report on Communism for September 1923; FO 371,9896, C
15199, Greece, annual report for 1923; ; 10771, C 7036, Greece, 15199, Greece, annual report for 1923.
annual report for 1924. 26. Elephantis, op. cit., pp. 387-391; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp.
12. Kofos, op. cit., p. 48; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 202-203, 256-257; K. Moskot~ Introduction to the HistOlY ofthe Working Class
249-251. Movement (in Greek), Athens 1985,470-474; PRO, FO 371, 9896, C
13. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., p. 254; R. Molho, 'The Jewish Com- 15199, Greece, annual report for 1923; 13659, C 1763, Greece,
munity of Thessaloniki and Its Incorporation Into the Greek State', annual report for 1928; 14391, C 5972, Greece annual report for 1929;
in Thessaloniki afterI9I2 (in Greek), Thessaloniki 1986, p. 285. 15237, C 882, Greece, annual report for 1930.
14. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 253-255; Molho, op. cit., p. 299, note 27. Elephantis, op. cit., pp. 30-32,290,294-297; PRO, FO 371, 9896,
47; PRO, FO 286, 1132/278, Salonica, monthly report for April 1935. C 15199, Greece, annual report for 1923; 10771, C 7036, Greece,
15. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 239-240, 255-262; PRO, FO 286, annual report for 1924; 11357, C 5755, Greece, annual report for
855, Hole to Bentinck, Salonica 21.11.1923; FO 371, 14381, C 7183, 1925; 12178, C 3697, Greece, annual report for 1926; 12924, C 780,
Salonica, monthly report for April 1930; 18393, R 5438, Waterlow Greece, annual report for 1927; 13659, C 1763, Greece, annual report
to Simon, Athens 18 sept. 1934; 33211, R 6527, D.F. Howard to C.A. for 1928; 14391, C 5972, annual report for 1929.
Macartney, Foreign Research and Press Service, 21.2.1942. 28. Barker, op. cit., pp. 40-41, 45-50, 54-62, 67-69; Elephantis, op.
16. HistOly, p. 301; Pentzopoulos, op. cit., pp. 75-77; PRO, FO 286, cit., pp. 36-38; Kotos, op. cit., pp. 57-58, 66-76; S. Palmer - R. King,
854, Bentinck to Curzon, Athens, 24.1.1923; FO 371, 9896, C 15199, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, Connecticut
Greece, annual report for 1923. 1971, pp. 26-28, 35-39; D. Slijepcevic, The Macedonian Question:
17. HistOlY, p. 302; Ladas, op. cit., pp. 618-621, 629-639; The Srrugglefor Southern Serbia, Chicago 1958, pp. 190-195; PRO,
Pentzopoulos, op. cit., pp. 77-92, 95-105. FO 371, 10771, C 1036, Greece, annual report for 1924; see also: V.
18. Dritsa, op. cit., 138; Ladas, op. cit., pp. 645-647, 648ff.; Mav- Vasilev, 'The Bulgarian Communist Party and the Macedonian Ques-
rogordatos, op. cit., pp. 187-188; Pentzopoulos, op. cit., pp. 97, tion Between the Two World Wars', Bulgarian Hisrorical Review, 17
105-111; PRO, FO 371, Greece, annual report for 1926. (1989), Sofia, 3-19.
19. Dritsa, op. cit., 136, 138-140; Ladas, op. cit., pp. 672-678; 29. Kofos, op. cit., pp. 78-80; Mavrogordaios, op. cit., pp. 232-234,
Pentzopou10s,op. cit., pp. 110-117; PRO, FO 371, 15237, C 882, 251; Moskof, op. cit., pp. 432-435.
Greece, annual report for 1930. 30. Kotos, op. cit., pp. 80-81; Liakos, op. cit., p. 11, note 24;
20. HistOly, pp. 302-303, 327-332; Ladas, op. cit., pp. 678-685, Mavrogordatos, op. cir., pp. 98-99; Moskot~ op. cit., pp. 435-441;
688-689; Mavrogordatos, op. cit., pp. 188,215; Pentzopoulos, op. PRO, FO 371,11357, C 5755, Greece, annual report for 1925; 12178,
cit., pp. Ill, 115, 143-167. C 3697, Greece, annual report for 1926; 12924, C 780, Greece, annual
INTER-WAR MACEDONIA 103
report for 1927; 13659, C 1763, Greece, annual report for 1928. II. HistOlY, pp. 287-293; PRO, FO 371, 11357, C 5755, Greece,
31. Barker, op. cit., pp. 74-77; Kofos, op. cit., pp. 90-92; Mavrogor- annual report for 1925; 12924, C 780, Greece, annual report for 1927.
datos,op. cit., pp. 234-235; same author, Studies and Documents, pp. 12. History, pp. 287, 343.
99-100; Palmer-King, op. cit., p. 48. 13. Barker, op. cit., pp. 35-36; HistolY, pp. 343-344,346; Karamanlis,
op. cit., pp. 41-43; PRO, FO 371,12178, C 3697, Greece, annual
III. Macedonia in the Foreign Relations of Greece, report for 1926; 12924, C 780, Greece, annual report for 1927; 14381,
1923-1939 C 7183, consular report, Salonica, August 1930.
1. Barker, op. cit., p. 24; Kofos, op. cit., pp. 103-104; Pentzopoulos,
14. HistOlY, pp. 348-349; Karamanlis, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
op. cit., pp. 60-61. IS. HistolY, pp. 350-354; Karamanlis, op. cit., pp. 60-61; PRO, FO
371,13659, C 1763, Greece, annual report for 1928.
2. Barker, op. cit., pp. 22-23,43-44; Kofos, op. cit., pp. 103-104;
16. HistOlY, p. 354; Karamanlis, op. cit., pp. 67-70; PRO, FO 371,
Palmer-King,op. cit., pp. 39, 56-57; PRO, FO 371, 9896, C 15199,
14391, C 5972, Greece, annual report for 1929.
Greece, annual report for 1923; 14391, C 5972, Greece, annual report
tor 1929; Slijepcevic, op. cit., pp. 178tT. . 17. Karamanlis, op. cit., pp. 103, 106, 112-113.
18. Karamanlis, op. cit., pp. 109, 131-133; PRO, FO 371,15237, C
3. JAM, GGM, file 69; Kofos, op. cit., pp. 48, 50-51; Ladas, op. cit.,
882, Greece, annual report for 1930; FO 286, 1105/189, N. Henderson
pp. 44-45, 50-51; Palmer-King, op. cit., pp. 31,219 note I;
to A. Henderson, Belgrade, 21.4.1931; Waterlow to A. Henderson,
Pentzopoulos, op. cit., pp. 60-61. PRO, FO 371, 9896, C 15199,
Sofia, 7 May 1931; Ramsay to A. Henderson, Athens, 20.6.1931.
Greece, annual report for 1923; 10771, C 7036, Greece, annual report
for 1924; 12178, C 3697, Greece, annual report for 1926; 12924, C
19. HistolY, pp. 352-353; Karamanlis, op. cit., pp. 108, 114; PRO, FO
286, 1052, consular reports, Salonica, August and October 1929; FO
780, Greece, annual report for 1927; 14391, C 5972, Greece, annual
371, 15237, C 882, Greece, annual report for 1930.
report tor 1929.
4. History, p. 287; Kofos, op. cit., p. 49; Ladas, op. cit., pp. 110-114; 20. Karamanlis, op. cit., pp. 108-109, 136-142,277-279; PRO, FO
PRO, FO 371,10771, C 7036, Greece, annual report for 1924; 11357, 371, 15970, C 1621, Greece, annual report for 1931; 16774, C 1121,
C 5755, Greece, annual report for 1925; A. Tounta-Fergadi, Greek- Greece, annual report for 1932.
Bulgarian Minorities: The Politis-Kalfov Protocol, 1924-1925 (in 21. PRO, FO 371, 15237, C 882, Greece, annual report for 1930;
Greek), Thessaloniki 1986. 15970, C 1621, Greece, annual report for 1931; 16774, C 1121,
5. Barker, op. cit., pp. 25-26; HistOlY, p. 287; JAM, GGM, file 90; Greece, annual report for 1932; 19518, R 1081, Greece annual report
Kotas, op. cit., pp. 51-52; PRO, FO 371, 10771, C 7036, Greece, for 1934; according to Minister for Foreign Affairs Michalakopoulos,
annual report for 1924; 11357, C 5755, Greece, annual report for Professor Joannis Spyropoulos at the University ofThessaloniki had
1925. originally conceived the formula ofBalkan Conferences. See also: K.
6. 1. Barros, The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Svolopoulos, 'Alexandros Papanastasiou and Inter-Balkan Under-
Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925, Oxtord 1970. standing', in Alexandros Papanastasiou: Institutions, Ideology, and
7. History, p. 344; Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 278; Ladas, op. cit., pp. Politics in the Inter-War Period (in Greek), Athens 1987, pp. 393,
309-315; PRO, FO 371,12178, C 3697, Greece, annual report for 395,398.
1926; 12924, C 780, Greece, annual report for 1927. 22. HistO/y, pp. 355-357; Svolopoulos, op. cit., pp. 396-398.
8. Barker, op. cit., pp. 36-45; Kotas, op. cit., pp. 52-54; Palmer-King, 23. HistOlY, pp. 356, 358; PRO, FO 371,19518, R 1081, Greece,
op. cit., pp. 38-39,48-49. annual report for 1934; 20392, R 1432, Greece, annual report for
9. Barker, op. cit., p. 34; HistolY, p. 287; PRO, F0371, 9896, C 15199, 1935.
Greece, annual report for 1923; 11357, C 5755, Greece, annual report 24. PRO, FO 371, 21147, R 347, Greece, annual report for 1936;
tor 1925. 22371, R 2032, Greece, annual report for 1937; 23733, R 2140,
10. HistOlY, pp. 287, 294; JAM, GGM, file 89B, memo. on foreign Bulgaria, Greece, annual report for 1938.
propagandas in the area of the Third Army Corps, part I, Serbian 25. HistolY, pp. 380-382; PRO, FO 371, 22371, R 2032, Greece,
propaganda, n.d.; Kofos, op. cit., p. 49; Tounta-Fergadi, op. cit., pp. annual report for 1937.
145-149; PRO, FO 371,10771, C 7036, Greece, annual report for 26. PRO, FO 371, 23777, R 886, Greece, annual report for 1938.
1924; 11357, C 5755, Greece, annual report for 1925. 27. HistOlY, pp. 405-409.