EN BANC

[G.R. No. 154198.  January 20, 2003]

PETRONILA S. RULLODA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), et. Al., respondents.

Fact/s of the case:

In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the contending
candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.  On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a
heart attack and passed away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.

His widow, petitioner Petronila “Betty” Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections on June 25, 2002
seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband.

On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and Members of the
Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as follows:

Just in case the names “BETTY” or “PETRONILA” or the surname “RULLODA” is written on the ballot, read the
same as it is written but add the words “NOT COUNTED” like “BETTY NOT COUNTED” or “RULLODA NOT
COUNTED.”

Based on the tally of petitioner’s watchers who were allowed to witness the canvass of votes during the July 15,
2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes.  Despite this,
the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.

After the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting on the separate request of Petronila Rulloda to be
substituted as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, issued
Resolution No. 5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT the

recommendation of the Law Department as follows:

1.  To deny due course the Certificate of Candidacy of PETRONILA S. RULLODA; and

2.  To direct the Election Officer of San Jacinto, Pangasinan to delete the name of PETRONILA S. RULLODA,
candidate for Barangay Chairman in Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.

The above-quoted Resolution cited as authority the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23, 2002, setting
forth the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the July 15, 2002 synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections, more particularly Section 9 thereof which reads:

Sec. 9.  Substitution of candidates. – There shall be no substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and
Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute
candidate in lieu of her deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.

Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his Comment, arguing that since the barangay election is non-partisan,
substitution of candidates is not allowed.  Moreover, petitioner did not file any certificate of candidacy; hence, there
was only one candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, respondent Placido.

Public respondent COMELEC also filed its Comment.  It contends that its Resolution No. 4801 was issued not
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
the barangay elections.  Therefore, the same may not be the subject of review in a petition for certiorari. 

Issue/s

Whether or not substitution of candidates for barangay officials is allowed?

Whether or not votes in petitioner’s favor cannot be counted in as much as she did not file any certificate of
candidacy?

Decision

We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent got only 290 votes. 
Respondents did not deny this in their respective Comments. 

Respondents base their argument that the substitution of candidates is not allowed in barangay elections on Section
77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:

Section 77.  Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If after the last day of the
filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or
is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.  The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance
with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the election.  If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should
occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board
of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case of candidates to be voted by
the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution
because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute.  Such an interpretation, aside from being
non sequitur, ignores the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voters.  It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people.  It is well-settled that in case
of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed
through the ballot.

Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay
elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution.  Such a restrictive construction cannot be read
into the law where the same is not written.  Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of candidates
where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must
have been subsumed by law.

As to the second issue, Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioner’s favor cannot be counted
because she did not file any certificate of candidacy.  In other words, he was the only candidate for Barangay
Chairman.  His claim is refuted by the Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the assailed
Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that petitioner’s letter-request to be allowed to run as Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as a certificate of candidacy.

To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election.  Technicalities and
procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate.   Laws
governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials.   The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED.  The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of
the Commission on Elections, insofar as it denied due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, is declared
NULL and VOID.  The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San
Jacinto, Pangasinan is SET ASIDE, and the Board of Canvassers of the said Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Barangay Chairman thereof.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000]

ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI JAMIL
DIMAPORO, respondents.

Fact/s of the case:

1. Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of
Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last May 11, 1998 national and local
election (sic). Petitioner is a re-electionist and a veteran politician;

2. The election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998, and after the voting the ballot
boxes were transmitted to the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol of Lanao del Sur at
Marawi City where the automated counting of votes and canvass of election returns were
centralized;
 3. During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds
were committed at the instance of petitioner or his followers in that votes actually casted
(sic) for the private respondent were not counted and credited in his favor thru (sic) the
concerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the Board of Election Inspectors, military,
Election Officer and the Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew of the petitioner;

4. In many Precincts, about 115 official ballots were refused or rejected by the counting
machine which the private respondent’s watchers or representatives have requested and
insisted to be re-fed to the automated machine for the second and third times but their
requests were not heeded by the Election Officer and the Machine Operator, who is a
close kin of the Petitioner, and instead considered the said ballots as finally rejected,
while in other precincts, around 56 ballots were found therein which were not drawn from
the official ballots and were included in the counting of votes over the objection of the
private respondent’s watchers or representatives;

5. Before the termination of the counting of votes and the consolidation of the results, the
machine operator and the Election Officer carried away from the Kalimodan Hall the
diskette and brought the same to the down town without the knowledge of the private
respondent’s watchers or representatives;

6. As a result of the foregoing irregularities, the petitioner was proclaimed as winner

having obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a
slight margin of only 20 votes;

xxx xxx xxx

1. On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the true
winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a petition to annul the
proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong,
Lanao del Sur docketed as SPC No. 98-226.

2. As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality, private respondent filed on May

25, 1998, an ordinary "Protest ad Cautelam" against the petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Sur entitled "Hadji Jamil D. Dimaporo vs.
Abdulmadid Maruhom" for election protest (Manual Judicial Recount, revision and
reappreciation of ballots) docketed as Election Case No. 11-127.

3. On June 1, 1998, petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom filed an answer with counter-protest

in Election Case No. 11-127 special and affirmative defenses and counter-protest. In his
answer petitioner prayed to hold in abeyance further proceedings since the protest is ad
cautelam or subject to the petition filed before this Honorable Commission.

4. On July 2, 1998, before SPC No. 98-228 could be set for hearing by this Honorable
Commission, the private respondent as petitioner therein, filed a motion to withdraw his
petition in said SPC No. 98-228 albeit said case was among those cases the proceedings
of which were ordered to be continued beyond June 30, 1998, under Comelec Resolution
No. 3049 promulgated on June 29, 1998. xxx

5. On July 17, 1998, an order was issued by this Honorable Commission, (First Division)
granting the private respondent’s motion to withdraw petition in SPC No. 98-228 and
considered the same withdrawn. xxx.

6. Upon receipt of a copy of said order, dated July 17, 1998, private respondent filed an
urgent motion before the respondent court on July 27, 1998, praying for the issuance of
an order directing the proper officials/officers concerned to bring and produce before said
court the ballot boxes subjects of the protest and counter-protest and to set the case for
hearing as mandated by law. xxx

7. After the delivery of the ballot boxes involved in the protest and counter-protest, the
public respondent issued an order, dated August 17, 1998, setting Election Case No. 11-
127 for hearing (a) for the creation of the Committee on Revision and appointment of the
Chairman and Members thereof; (b) making of the cash deposit and payment of the
revisor’s compensation; (c) partial determination of the case, etc. on September 1, 1998,
at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.

8. When the case was called for hearing on September 2, 1998, a Revision Committee
was created and its membership were duly appointed in open court which committee was
directed by the respondent court to finish the revision of ballots, if possible, within 20
days from the commencement of the revision xxx

9. After the Revision Committee was directed by the respondent to commence the
revision of ballots, the petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom thru counsel orally moved for the
 dismissal of the protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot boxes containing the ballots in
the protested and counter-protested precincts have been violated; (2) Automated
counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of the ballots; and (3)
Protestant is guilty of forum shopping warranting summary dismissal of the petitioner of
the protest.

10. The private respondent thru (sic) undersigned counsel, vigorously opposed the said
oral motion to dismiss and orally argued that the motion is clearly dilatory having been
made only after the Revision Committee has been ordered to commence the revision of
ballots on September 1, 1998 and maintained that (1) The motion to dismiss is not
allowed in an election protest; (2) The sanctity and integrity of the ballot boxes subject
matter of the protest and counter-protest have been preserved and never violated; (3)
The automated counting of ballots does not preclude the filing of the election protest for
the judicial recount and revision of ballots; and (4) The private respondent is not guilty of
forum shopping because his petition of protest is clearly and explicitly a Protest Ad
Cautelam in view of the pendency of his petition before this Honorable Commission
which was withdrawn by the private respondent before it could be set for hearing or acted
upon by this Honorable Commission.

Issue

Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is a prohibited pleading in an
election protest pending before the Regional Trial Court.

Decision

Petitioner’s argument that the filing of a motion to dismiss in an election contest filed with a regular court
is not a prohibited pleading is well taken. As we pointed out in Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC:

Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his argument that the motion to dismiss filed by
private respondent is a prohibited pleading under Section 1, Rule 13 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure because the said provision refers to proceedings filed before the
COMELEC. The applicable provisions on the matter are found in Part VI of the Rules of
Procedure titled "PROVISIONS GOVERNING ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE TRIAL
COURT" and as this Court pointedly stated in Aruelo v. Court of Appeals

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is

it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in
election protests or quo warranto cases pending before regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing
of a certain pleading in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested in the
Supreme Court.

The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not extricate petitioner from his predicament because the
denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss was based on the fact that the other grounds relied therein was
considered unmeritorious and not because the said motion is a prohibited pleading in electoral protest
cases. While the challenged COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely correct in dismissing the
petition in this regard, the soundness of its discretion to accord unto the trial court the competence to
resolve the factual issues raised in the controversy cannot be doubted. Indeed, as reasoned by the
COMELEC, the –

… Commission assumes the competence of the trial court to handle electoral protest and
cannot encroach on its original and exclusive jurisdiction on electoral protest cases
involving the contested mayoralty seat. To our mind, the trial court should be allowed to
resolve the case on the merits to be able to rule on the factual and legal grounds raised
by the petitioner as his defenses in his Answer. Should the petitioner be dissatisfied with
the outcome of the case in the lower court, he can still appeal, as his relief, to this
Commission within the reglementary period provided by law.

Moreover –

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of
how to interpret and apply the laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the
spirit; the naked provision or the ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in
isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the
voter’s obvious choice. In applying elections laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood
legalisms.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 EN BANC

G. R. No. L-36142, March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA,
                    Petitioner,

       -versus-

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,ET. AL.,

Respondents.

_______________________________________________________

G. R. No. L-36164, March 31, 1973

VIDAL TAN, J. ANTONIO ARANETA, ET. AL.,

                                                             Petitioners,

-versus-
 

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL.,

                                                                      Respondents.

G. R. No. L-36165, March 31, 1973

GERARDO ROXAS, ET. AL.,

                                Petitioners,

                            -versus-

ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, IN HIS CAPACITY

AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; ET. AL.,
                                                              Respondents.

____________________________________________________________

G. R. No. L-36236, March 31, 1973

EDDIE B. MONTECLARO,
                             Petitioner

-versus-

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL.,

                                                      Respondents.

G. R. No. L-36283, March 31, 1973

NAPOLEON V. DILAG, ET. AL.,

                                       Petitioners,   

-versus-

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL.,

                                                                                 Respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Fact/s of the case

The afore stated cases are a continuation of cases, decided on January 22, 1973, hereafter
collectively referred to as the plebiscite cases.
Background of the Plebiscite Cases.

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, as amended, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines. The said Constitutional
Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on
September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under
Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on
January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the supreme Court, Case against the Commission
on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or
their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the
Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because
the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the
ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for
the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress" and "there is no proper submission
to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech,
press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."
Thereafter, substantially identical actions were then filed by other afore stated petitioners.

Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending
the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed
Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution.

It is worthy to note, that the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential
Decree No. 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions.
One of those interesting questions was that, the vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be
considered the plebiscite on the New Constitution.

If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the new Constitution should be
deemed ratified.

Hence, on January 17, 1973, the late former president Ferdinand E. Marcos had issued
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102,"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF
THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. And partly read as
follows:

"WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention
is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;

xxx

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution
proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been
ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.

The Present Cases

Prior thereto, or on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G. R. No. L-36142 against the Executive
Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and
their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not
found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana,
as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of
all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in
substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had
announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said
proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are
without power to approve the proposed Constitution"; "that the President is without power to proclaim
the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify
the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
 Issue/s

1. Whether or not Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable,
question?

2. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified
validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional
and statutory provisions?

3. Whether or not the aforementioned proposed Constitution has acquiesced in (with or without
valid ratification) by the people?

4. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

(After deliberating on these cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would write his
own opinion and serve a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, the Court
discussed said opinions and votes were cast thereon.)

Writer's Personal Opinion

As to the first issue:

The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable,
not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political
questions is the principle of separation of powers  characteristic of the Presidential system of government 
the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories,
namely: 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those
concerned mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or
interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement
of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable
and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere  but only within such
sphere  each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority, not
only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to
inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions
made by the other departments  provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area
allocated thereto by the Constitution.[25]

This principle of separation of powers under the presidential system goes hand in hand with the system of
checks and balances, under which each department is vested by the Fundamental Law with some powers
to forestall, restrain or arrest a possible or actual misuse or abuse of powers by the other departments.
Hence, the appointing power of the Executive, his pardoning power, his veto power, his authority to call
the Legislature or Congress to special sessions and even to prescribe or limit the object or objects of
legislation that may be taken up in such sessions, etc. Conversely, Congress or an agency or arm thereof  
such as the commission on Appointments  may approve or disapprove some appointments made by the
President. It, also, has the power of appropriation, to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts," as well as that of impeachment. Upon the other hand, under the judicial power vested
by the Constitution, the "Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law," may
settle or decide with finality, not only justiciable controversies between private individuals or entities, but,
also, disputes or conflicts between a private individual or entity, on the one hand, and an officer or branch
of the government, on the other, or between two (2) officers or branches of service, when the latter officer
or branch is charged with acting without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or in violation of law. And so,
when a power vested in said officer or branch of the government is absolute or unqualified, the acts in the
exercise of such power are said to be political in nature, and, consequently, non-justiciable or beyond
judicial review. Otherwise, courts of justice would be arrogating upon themselves a power conferred by
the Constitution upon another branch of the service to the exclusion of the others.

and, in an attempt to describe the nature of a political question in terms, it was hoped, understandable to
the laymen, We added that "the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy" in matters concerning the government of a State, as a
body politic. "In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure."

Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act,
not its wisdom..[30]
After an, exhaustive analysis of the cases on this subject, the Court concluded:

The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment
has been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing Constitution is a judicial
question. There can be little doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is
the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the
manner required by the Constitution, unless a special tribunal has been created to determine the
question; and even then many of the courts hold that the tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally
amend the organic law.[36]

In the light of the foregoing, and considering that Art. XV of our 1935 Constitution prescribes the method
or procedure for its amendment, it is clear to my mind that the question whether or not the revised
Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with said Art.
XV is a justiciable one and non-political in nature, and that it is not only subject to judicial inquiry, but,
also, that it is the Court's bounden duty to decide such question.

The Supreme Court of the United States has meaningfully postulated that "the courts cannot reject as 'no
law suit' "  because it allegedly involves a political question  "a bona fide controversy as to whether some
action denominated "political" exceeds constitutional authority."[37]
 

As to the second issue:

Under Section 1 of Art. XV of said Constitution, three (3) steps are essential, namely:

1. That the amendments to the Constitution be proposed either by Congress or by a convention

called for that purpose, "by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives voting separately," but "in joint session assembled";

2. That such amendments be "submitted to the people for their ratification" at an "election"; and

3. That such amendments be "approved by a majority of the votes cast" in said election.

Compliance with the first requirement is virtually conceded, although the petitioners in L-36164 question
the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to incorporate certain provisions into the draft of the
new or revised Constitution. The main issue in these five (5) cases hinges, therefore, on whether or not the
last two (2) requirements have been complied with.

The fact showed, according to the latest official data, the total number of registered voters 21 years of age
or over in the entire Philippines, available in January 1973, was less than 12 million. Yet, Proclamation
No. 1102 states that 14,976,56 "members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption
of the proposed Constitution, as against 743,869 who voted for its rejection," whereas, on the question
whether or not the people still wanted a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, "14,298,814
answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite." In other words, it is conceded that the number of people
who allegedly voted at the Citizens' Assemblies far exceeded the number of registered voters under the
Election Code in force in January 1973.

It is thus clear that the proceedings held in such Citizens' Assemblies  and We have more to say on this
point in subsequent pages  were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications
prescribed in Section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since
there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or
segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies must be
considered null and void.[53]

The term "votes cast" ... was held in Smith v. Renville County Commissioners, 65 N.W. 956, 64 Minn. 16,
to have been used as an equivalent of "ballots cast."[56]

The word "cast" is defined as "to deposit formally or officially."[57]

It seems to us that a vote is cast when a ballot is deposited indicating a "choice." The word "cast" means
"deposit (a ballot) formally or officially.  In simple words, We would define a "vote cast" as the exercise on
a ballot of the choice of the voter on the measure proposed.[58]

In short, said Art. XV envisages with the term "votes cast"  choices made on ballots  not orally or by
raising  by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years
of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics,
namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting,
with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of
the election returns. And the 1935 Constitution has been consistently interpreted in all plebiscites for the
ratification rejection of proposed amendments thereto, from 1935 to 1967. Hence, the viva voce voting in
the Citizens' Assemblies was and is null and void ab initio.

As to the third issue:

It is urged that the present Government of the Philippines is now and has been run, since January
17, 1971, under the Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention; that the political
department of the Government has recognized said revised Constitution; that our foreign relations are
being conducted under such new or revised Constitution; that the Legislative Department has recognized
the same; and that the people, in general, have, by their acts or omissions, indicated their conformity
thereto.

As regards the so-called political organs of the Government, gather that respondents refer mainly to the
offices under the Executive Department. In a sense, the latter performs some functions which, from a
constitutional viewpoint, are politics in nature, such as in recognizing a new state or government, in
accepting diplomatic representatives accredited to our Government, and even in devising administrative
means and ways to better carry into effect. Acts of Congress which define the goals or objectives thereof,
but are either imprecise or silent on the particular measures to be resorted to in order to achieve the said
goals or delegate the power to do so, expressly or impliedly, to the Executive. This, notwithstanding, the
political organ of a government that purports to be republican is essentially the Congress or Legislative
Department. Whatever may be the functions allocated to the Executive Department  specially under a
written, rigid Constitution with a republican system of Government like ours  the role of that Department
is inherently, basically and fundamentally executive in nature  to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed," in the language of our 1935 Constitution

A given department of the Government cannot generally be said to have "recognized" its own acts.
Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Accordingly, when a
subordinate officer or office of the Government complies with the commands of a superior officer or
office, under whose supervision and control he or it is, the former merely obeys the latter. Strictly
speaking, and from a legal and constitutional viewpoint, there is no act of recognition involved therein.
Indeed, the lower officer or office, if he or it acted otherwise, would just be guilty of insubordination.

For the same reasons, especially because of Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire Philippines under
Martial Law, neither am I prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102,
and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions  some or many of
which have admittedly had salutary effects  issued subsequently thereto amounts, constitutes or attests to
a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. In the words of the Chief Executive,
"martial law connotes power of the gun, meant coercion by the military, and compulsion and
intimidation."[83] The failure to use the gun against those who comply with the orders of the party
wielding the weapon does not detract from the intimidation that Martial Law necessarily connotes. It may
reflect the good, reasonable and wholesome attitude of the person who has the gun, either pointed at
others, without pulling the trigger, or merely kept in its holster, but not without warning that he may or
would use it if he deemed it necessary. Still, the intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the
people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

This is specially so when we consider that the masses are, by and large, unfamiliar with the parliamentary
system, the new form of government introduced in the proposed Constitution, with the particularity that
it is not even identical to that existing in England and other parts of the world, and that even experienced
lawyers and social scientists find it difficult to grasp the full implications of some provisions incorporated
therein.

As to the fourth issue:

Accordingly, the issue boils downs to whether or not the Executive acted within the limits of his
authority when he certified in Proclamation No. 1102 "that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen
hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming
majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the
Philippines and has thereby come into effect."

In this connection, it is not claimed that the Chief Executive had personal knowledge of the data he
certified in said proclamation. Moreover, Art. X of the 1935 Constitution was precisely inserted to place
beyond the Executive the power to supervise or even exercise any authority whatsoever over "all laws
relative to the conduct of elections," and, hence, whether the elections are for the choice or selection of
public officers or for the ratification or rejection of any proposed amendment, or revision of the
Fundamental Law, since the proceedings for the latter are, also, referred to in said Art. XV as "elections".

The theory that said proclamation is "conclusive upon Court is clearly untenable. If it were, acts of the
Executive and those of Congress could not possibly be annulled or invalidated by courts of justice. Yet,
such is not the case. In fact, even a resolution of Congress declaring that a given person has been elected
President or Vice-President of the Philippines as provided in the Constitution,[69] is not conclusive upon
the courts. It is no more than  prima facie evidence of what is attested to by said resolution.[70] If
assailed directly in appropriate proceedings, such as an election protest, if and when authorized by law, as
it is in the Philippines, the Court may receive evidence and declare, in accordance therewith, who was duly
elected to the office involved.[71] If prior to the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, no such
protest could be filed, it was not because the resolution of Congress declaring who had been elected
President or Vice-President was conclusive upon courts of justice, but because there was no law
permitting the filing of such protest and declaring what court or body would hear and decide the same. So,
too, a declaration to the effect that a given amendment to the Constitution or revised or new Constitution
has been ratified by a majority of the votes cast therefor, may be duly assailed in court and be the object of
judicial inquiry, in direct proceedings therefor  such as the cases at bar  and the issue raised therein may
and should be decided in accordance with the evidence presented.

Inasmuch as Art. X of the 1935 Constitution places under the "exclusive" charge of the Commission on
Elections, "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,"
independently of the Executive, and there is not even a certification by the Commission in support of the
alleged results of the citizens' assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102  apart from the fact that on
January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the
Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens'
assemblies all over the Philippines  it follows necessarily that, from a constitutional and legal viewpoint,
Proclamation No. 1102 is not even  prima facie evidence of the alleged ratification of the proposed
Constitution.

Resume of the Votes Cast and the Court's Resolution

The results of the voting, premised on the individual views expressed by the members of the Court in their
respect opinions and/or concurrences, are as follows:

1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the
validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their
discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it
is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should
keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from
both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied
with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue
is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the
1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.[87]

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been
validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding
the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner
the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view,
however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting
and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the
necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the
political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable
votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said
that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially
complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."

Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view
there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.

3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people
have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines,
of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando
states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that
independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the
people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such
doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of
ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant
feature of martial law."[88]

Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a
regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted,
(they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the
Constitution."[89]

4. On the fourth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold
that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee
cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not
state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution;
and

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force;

with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the
vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect.

It is so ordered.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8921 January 9, 1914

ERNESTO GARDINER, protestant-appellant, vs. GREGORIO ROMULO, protestee-appellee.

Fact/s of the case

An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance in an election protest for the office of provincial governor
of the Province of Tarlac. In the short opinion heretofore rendered by this court 1 the entire election held in the
municipality of Camiling was annulled. It is our purpose, in this opinion to set out our reason for taking such
action.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An examination of the record convinced us that the frauds and irregularities occuring in the conduct of the election
in this municipality were very numerous. They may be grouped under the following general headings: (1)
Irregularities in the selection of polling stations and the construction of the voting booths; (2) the disappearance of
blanks ballots after delivery thereof to the municipal treasurer, and the subsequent markings of the remainder by the
various election boards; (3) frauds practiced by the inspectors in the preparation of the ballots of illiterate voters; (4)
other irregularities and frauds in connection with the preparation and counting of the ballots; (5) intimidation and
threats employed by Romulo and his partisans on the day of the election.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law

Issue/s

The questions we are called upon to decide are: Were there mere irregularities in the conduct of the election in the
five several precincts of Camiling? If so, were these irregularities of so serious a character as to be ascribed to
inexcusable ignorance or a reckless disregard of the law? Were there fraudulent practices in the conduct of the
election? Were threats and intimidation employed of a character serious enough to intimidate and coerce the
electors?

Decision

Were we confronted with the bare proposition that the polling stations were located on the second floor and that the
30-meter space around them was not kept clear, it might be that we should not have taken drastic step of avoiding
the returns from this municipality. The law directs that these things be done, but it does not say that the fact that they
were not done shall have the effect of vitiating the returns, and unless the nonobservance of the law in this respect
was made a means of fraud or coercion they should be considered as harmless irregularities.

The voting booths in the five precincts of Camiling in no sense of the word insured a secret ballot. The most
superficial study of the Election Law should demonstrate that the central idea is to prevent any other person than the
voter from knowing how he marks his ballot. And the most ordinary intellect could not fail to observe that open
booths, unprovided with a guard rail, and with the writing shelves facing the sides of the booths would leave but a
mere shadow of the absolute and impenetrable secrecy which a strict compliance with the law affords the voter. No
explanation of this gross disregard of the law has been made. It has not been alleged that it was due to ignorance or a
misunderstanding of the law. Indeed, it would be difficult to believe that the importance of affording the elector a
secret ballot should be so far misunderstood as not only to fail to provide with doors and guard rails, but also to
place the writing desks so that they faced the sides of the booths. The combination of the three circumstances
suggests strongly that it was due to design rather than to mistake or ignorance.chanroblesvirtuallawli

Where an election takes place which is held or conducted in violation of some express constitutional or statutory
provision, or where through some act of commission or omission prohibited by law on the part of the voters or some
of them, the result of an election is affected, or if it be shown that fraud intimidation or other illegal methods were
practiced, then an election cannot stand." chanrobles virtual law library

These are the grounds upon which we rejected the returns from the five precincts of the municipality of Camiling: a
fatal flaw in the conduct of the election, accompanied by frauds on the part of the election officials, and intimidation
of voters.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In concluding this extremely disagreeable task, we desire to state that we are aware of the seriousness of
disfranchising the innocent electors of a whole precinct for acts done by others. We are not unmindful of the force of
the argument that if courts set aside the returns from a precinct for light and trifling causes, it will encourage the
unscrupulous to seek profit by the honest mistakes of election officers committed in the conscientious performance
of their duties. On the other hand we appreciate the importance to the people of enforcing those statutory provisions
which the legislature have provided to insure a free and undefiled expression of the popular will at the polls, to the
extent that fraud may not flourish under the guise of honesty. The right of suffrage so of comparatively recent origin
in this country. If at this early stage of its existence, the courts are to countenance such bold disregard of the law as
was exhibited in the municipality of Camiling at the last general election, representative government will soon
become a farce; a mere catchword or an empty illusion. Regardless of the political unrest engendered by such
deplorable litigation as the present and its enormous expense to the contestants, we are of the opinion that a firm
stand against fraudulent elections must now be taken, once for all. If no encouragement is offered to vicious
practices, they will, at least, never grow larger.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual la

Endnotes:

1
October 31, 1913.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court found the protestee, Romulo, received a plurality of 138 votes. We have reached the conclusion that
the entire election held in the municipality of Camiling must be annulled on account of frauds and gross
irregularities. This gives the protestant a plurality of 143 votes. Whatever might be our rulings on the validity of the
other questioned votes, the result would not be changed. We therefore accept the decision of the trial court upon
these points without announcing any doctrine in reference thereto. The result is that an order must be issued
directing the provincial board of canvassers to correct their returns by giving the protestant a plurality of 143
votes.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In view of the importance of the questions presented and argued, this court will, at the earliest practicable date, set
forth in full its reasons for annulling the election in Camiling.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

No costs will be allowed in either instance.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library