MODULE 6

PLEADINGS (RULE 6; RULE 7; RULE 8)

(Four Hours)

Lesson Outline:
1) What are pleadings?
2) What are the kinds of pleadings?
3) What are the kinds of counterclaim? Distinguish one from the other.
4) What are the kinds of defenses? What is the effect of failure to plead a defense?
5) When may a reply be filed?
6) What are the parts of a pleading?
7) When is a certification on non-forum shopping required? What is the effect of failure to comply
with the requirement of certification on non-forum shopping?
8) How is a pleading verified?
9) What are the distinctions between a certification on non-forum shopping and a verification?
10) How may a party plead an actionable document?
11) What are the kinds of defenses?
12) What are the kinds of specific denial?

Readings:
a) Gegare v. CA, G.R. No. 132264, Oct. 8, 1998

Facts: There was a lot with an area of approximately 270 sq. m. in General Santos City. Its title
was named after Paulino Elma. A reversion case was filed by the State against Elma in the CFI of
South Cotabato, wherein a decision was rendered declaring Elma’s title null and void and thus,
was ordered cancelled. The lot was reverted to the mass of public domain subject to disposition
and giving preferential right to its actual occupant, Napoleon Gegare. (The writ of execution went
to series of processes including applying before the Board of Liquidators. They are, however, not
essential to our topic. The chief of LASEDECO, through the Board of Liquidators’ directive,
investigated the lot and recommended the division of the same equally to both parties. The
Board issued the resolution ordering the said division. The Office of the President affirmed the
board’s resolution. Private respondent, Armie Elma, paid for the value of the ½ of the lot. An
original certificate was then issued to him. Petitioner was also advised by the Board to do the
same. Petitioner then filed an action for “Annulment and Cancellation of Partition of Lot 5989, Ts-
217, situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City and Annulment of Resolutions No. 272 and and
185 and/or to Declare them Null and Void” against private respondent and the Board. The suit
was docketed Civil Case No. 3270 in the RTC of General Santos City.

Issue: Whether or not Katarungang Pambarangay Law is applicable in this case.

Held: Yes, Katarungang Pambarangay Law is applicable in the case at bar.

Ratio: True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and private
respondent who are also contending parties in the case are residents of the same barangay so
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as it provides---

Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or

proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there
has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated.
The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably. If
the other only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case
falls within the exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation
should still be undertaken among the other parties.

b) The Visayan Packing Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. L-29673, Nov. 12, 1987

Facts :Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract of sale. Under the contract, petitioner
bound itself to pay the purchase price in ten (10) equal yearly installments with interest. Prior to
the due date of the first installment, respondent sent petitioner a written
reminder thereof. Petitioner, however, responded by filing in the CFI of Manila two
(2) special civil actions for declaratory relief, alleging ambiguity in the contract between
it and respondent consisting in the agreement’s failure to clearly state the precise time when
the obligation to pay the first installment of the price would arise. Respondent filed a civil action
for collection based on what it deemed to be the due date. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the collection suit alleging that because of the pendency of the declaratory relief actions, no
cause of action could be deemed to exist in favor of respondent for collection. The
Motion was however denied and petitioner was later ordered to pay respondent the sum
claimed. Petitioner appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in the
collection suit. Petitioner assailed the decision contending that the money claim should have
been set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief action, and since
respondent had not done this, but had instead set it up in a separate suit, the claim had thereby
become barred.

Issue: Whether the failure to set up the money claim in the declaratory relief actions barred its
collection in a separate civil case?

Held: No. There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that
proscribes the filing of counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract
subject of the complaint. Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection
should have been dismissed and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief
suits, by way of an amended answer. This was not done. The actions proceeded separately and
were decided on the merits. The final verdict was that the declaratory relief suits
instituted by petitioner were unmeritorious, quite without foundation and, in the light of all
the relevant facts, appear to have been initiated by petitioner merely to obstruct and
delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of which was
decreed in the collection suit. Under the circumstances, and taking into account the not
inconsiderable length of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence
to substantial justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of
the rule on compulsory counterclaims. Rules of procedure are after all laid down in order to
attain justice.

c) Philippine Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Abiertas House of Friendship, Inc.,
G.R. No. 125571, July 22, 1998

The Facts

Petitioner Philippine Womans Christian Temperance Union, Inc. (PWCTU) filed, with the court a
quo on April 1, 1996, a Complaint against Private Respondents Abiertas House of Friendship, Inc.
(AHFI) and Radiance School, Inc. (RSI) for recovery of possession with damages and a prayer for
preliminary injunction and restraining order.5 Petitioner alleged in its Complaint that it was the
registered owner of a parcel of land in Santolan Road, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 209770
T-2270 issued on May 19, 1934. The said certificate of title contained a restriction that
reads:6cräläwvirtualibräry

xxx the property shall be used as a site for an institution to be known as the Abiertas House of
Friendship, the purpose of which shall be to provide a home for needy and unfortunate women
and girls, including children of both sexes and promote and foster all efforts, work activities
looking toward their protection from the ravages at all forms of immoralities.

Petitioner further averred that on May 24, 1995, Private Respondents AHFI and RSI entered into
a contract of lease whereby the former would rent out to the latter certain portions of the
aforementioned property owned by the petitioner, to enable RSI to establish and operate a grade
school in said premises.7 Petitioner contended that such contract was entered into without its
consent as the owner of the property,8 that AHFI had no right to lease any portion of said
property, and that therefore the contract of lease was null and void.9 It argued further that the
continued operation of the school by RSI violated the restriction on the title to the property, and
that despite a demand to vacate, RSI continued to occupy the premises.10 It prayed that the
contract of lease be declared null and void; and that private respondents be ordered to vacate
the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for the use of the same, as well as for
damages and attorneys fees.11cräläwvirtualibräry

On April 3, 1996, private respondents jointly moved to dismiss the RTC Complaint on the grounds
that (1) there was another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, and (2)
the Complaint violated the rule against forum shopping. They asserted that petitioner had
previously filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, on December 5, 1995, a Petition
for injunction with damages against AHFI and RSI (Philippine Womans Christian Temperance
Union, Inc. vs. Abiertas House of Friendship, Inc. and Radiance School Inc.).12 In addition, they
asserted that a judgment in one would amount to res judicata in the other, because there was,
between the cases, an identity of parties and rights asserted; and the reliefs prayed for in the
RTC Complaint were founded on the same facts alleged in the SEC Petition. Private respondents
also moved to cite petitioner in contempt of court for violating the rule against forum
shopping.13cräläwvirtualibräry

On April 12, 1996, petitioner filed its Opposition, arguing that the SEC Petition did not bar or
abate the RTC Complaint; and that although the parties were identical, the causes of action were
different -- in the former, petitioner sought (1) to prohibit AHFI from engaging in the school
business anywhere, because it was not authorized by its charter; and (2) to declare the lease
contract between AHFI and RSI fraudulent and ultra vires, because it was made to enable AHFI
to engage in the operation of a school illegally. The RTC Complaint, on the other hand, sought
the nullity of the contract of lease between AHFI and RSI because, as petitioner argued, AHFI
could not lease out a property it did not own.14cräläwvirtualibräry

As earlier stated, on May 20, 1996, Judge Marcelino F. Bautista, Jr. issued the assailed Resolution
and, on July 15, 1996, the Order denying reconsideration. Raising only a question of law,
petitioner came directly to this Court through this petition for review.15

The Issue

Petitioner posits this sole issue:

The lower court erred in applying the rule on litis pendentia and in dismissing the complaint
notwithstanding that the nature of the action and the relief prayed for in the RTC complaint are
not identical with the nature of the action and relief prayed for in petitioners petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

Our discussion will revolve around two matters: (1) litis pendentia and (2) forum shopping.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

No Litis Pendentia

The RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. We disagree. Litis pendentia
requires the concurrence of the following requisites:

1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both
actions

2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts

3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res adjudicata in the other case16cräläwvirtualibräry

It is true that both the SEC Petition and the RTC Complaint involved the same parties --
Petitioner Philippine Womans Christian Temperance Union, Inc. and Private Respondents Abiertas
House of Friendship, Inc. and Radiance School, Inc. A study of the said initiatory pleadings,
however, reveals no identity of rights asserted or of reliefs prayed for.

In the SEC Petition, PWCTU questioned AHFIs corporate act of operating a school under the
guise of RSI, purportedly another corporation.17 Petitioner contended that AHFI could not
operate or manage a school because it was contrary to its declared corporate purpose, which
was primarily to provide a Home where unwed and expectant mothers can go to find friendship,
help, security and privacy in time of need.18 Contending that AHFIs charter does not legally
allow it to enter into a contract with any firm for any purpose other than to use the premises as
Home for unwed or expectant mothers and their babies,19 petitioner likewise assailed the
contract of lease executed between private respondents for being ultra vires. The SEC Petition
also sought that Private Respondents AHFI and RSI be declared mere alter egos and extensions
of petitioner, and that they be prohibited from operating a school anywhere.20cräläwvirtualibräry

On the other hand, the core of the RTC Complaint was petitioners ownership of the property
subject of the lease contract; and AHFI, not being the owner of said property, had no right
whatsoever to lease it out. Hence, petitioner contended that RSI, the purported lessee, had no
right to occupy such property,21 and that the occupancy and continued operation of the school
by RSI violated the restriction on the title to said property.22 The Complaint likewise sought
damages and back rentals for the illegal use of the subject property.23cräläwvirtualibräry

The foregoing considered, we agree with petitioner that the thrust of the RTC Complaint was to
enjoin the operation of the school in its premises. Because of its proprietary interest as owner of
the premises, petitioner maintains that it never consented to or approved of the lease
arrangement between private respondents.24 Along quite a different line, petitioner argued,
through its SEC Petition, that AHFI had no power to engage in the school business, which it was
doing through RSI; and that AHFIs act of operating a school was ultra vires and contrary to
AHFIs charter.25cräläwvirtualibräry
In their Joint Comment, private respondents maintained that the rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for in the SEC Petition and the RTC Complaint were identical, insisting that in both cases,
the petitioners cause was centered on the contract of lease and the supposed violation by
respondents of the restriction on the title to the property.26cräläwvirtualibräry

True, both the SEC Petition and the RTC Complaint delved on the contract of lease. However, in
the former, the contract of lease was alleged to have been executed ultra vires; that is, it was
beyond the power of AHFI to enter into because it was not empowered to engage in the school
business. The focus, therefore, was on the alleged ultra vires act, not on the contract itself. On
the other hand, the validity of the contract of lease was the principal issue in the RTC Complaint.
Thus, it cannot be said that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for were the same.

Verily, the Securities and Exchange Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the Petition filed
before it, presenting as it did purported intra-corporate issues. On the other hand, the trial courts
jurisdiction over the accion publiciana case cannot be denied.

The third requisite is also absent, because a judgment in the SEC case will not amount to res
judicata in the RTC litigation and vice versa. Any judgment that will be rendered by the SEC will
not fully resolve the issues presented before the trial court. For instance, a SEC ruling against the
private respondents, prohibiting them, on the ground of ultra vires, from engaging in the school
business anywhere will not settle the issues pending before the trial court: those of possession,
validity of the lease contract, damages and back rentals. Conversely, a trial courts decision
abrogating the lease contract and granting damages and back rentals will not settle the issue of
ultra vires or corporate power of the private respondents to operate a school in a place other
than petitioners property.

Second Issue:

No Forum Shopping

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Private Respondents AHFI and RSI contend that the RTC
Complaint may still be dismissed for violating the rule against forum shopping.27 They emphasize
that the definition of forum shopping makes reference to identical issues, and not to identical
causes of action. They argue that both the SEC Petition and the RTC Complaint involved mainly
the issue of their right to continue operating the school on the premises subject of said cases, as
well as that of the validity of the contract of lease executed between them.28 We are not
persuaded.

As earlier discussed, the main issue in the SEC Petition was AHFIs purported act, through RSI, of
operating a school anywhere, which was allegedly against its corporate charter. The RTC case,
however, was an accion publiciana; and the issues presented there were the validity of the
contract of lease, payment of damages and back rentals. Clearly, the issues in the two cases are
not identical.

In First Philippine International Bank vs. Court of Appeals,29 the Court said: The test for
determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid down in the
1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez,30 also by Chief Justice Narvasa; and that is, forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other.
The requisites of litis pendentia not having concurred, and the issues presented in the SEC
Petition and RTC Complaint not being identical, petitioner is therefore not guilty of forum
shopping.

d) The United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. v. Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems, G.R. No. 135945, March 7, 2001

FACTS: Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City, was mortgaged to
the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually foreclosed and acquired later on by
the said bank as the highest bidder. On 11 April 1983, through its President Eduardo Cojuangco
Jr., the subject property was donated to the Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation
stipulated that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in
human settlements and economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of
Human Settlements.

On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing the Ministry of
Human Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well as all its assets, programs and
projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS).

On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its application before the PMS to acquire
a portion of the Dominican Hills property. In a MOA, PMS and United agreed that the latter may
purchase a portion of the said property from HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATIO,
acting as originator, on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter.

Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The deed of
conditional sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be paid upon
signing, with the balance to be amortized within one year from its date of execution. After
UNITED made its final payment on January 31, 1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 1, 1992.

Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the Dominican Hills
property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a
demolition order from the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private
respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION
(ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an action for injunction before RTC Baguio City. Private
respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction was later denied.

The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and annulment of the said
MOA. It was later on dismissed upon motion of United. The said Order of dismissal is currently
on appeal with the Court of Appeals.

The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City
Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and
reconstructed the demolished structures.

To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed a petition for
annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's
Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day,
public respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status
quo. Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner
filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
ISSUE: W/O COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts with
prayer for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing thereof?

RULING: COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It discharges
quasi-judicial functions:

"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they
are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of
separation of powers observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers
into its three (3) branches — the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary — each department
being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive
department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the
judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

e) Escorpizo v. University of Baguio, G.R. No. 121962, April 30, 1999

f) Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, Aug. 15, 2000

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution dated June 29,
1998 charging herein petitioners for violation of Section 3, paragraph e of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which was issued by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao
and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, and the Memorandum dated June 11, 1999
wherein Ombudsman Desierto disapproved the recommendation of the Special Prosecutor
dismissing Criminal Case No. 24852.

The antecedent facts are as follows: In a sworn complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, private respondents Dr. Jose Pepito H. Dalogdog, Dr. Aurora Beatriz A.
Romano, Maria Teresita C. Abastar, Jessica S. Allan and Maria Teresa Aniversario charged herein
petitioners Efren O. Loquias, Antonio V. Din, Jr., Angelito I. Martinez II, Lovelyn J. Biador and
Gregorio Faciol, Jr. with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged failure to give the
salary increases and benefits provided in Section 20 of the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers
(R.A. 7305) and Local Budget Circulars Nos. 54, 54-A, 56, 60 and 64 for the health personnel of
the local government of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur. Herein private respondents were
officers of the Association of Municipal Health Office Personnel of Zamboanga del Sur who
instituted the said complaint in behalf of the 490 members of the said Association. Petitioners
Efren Loquias and Antonio Din, Jr. are the Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively, of San Miguel,
Zamboanga del Sur while petitioners Angelito Martinez II, Lovelyn Biador and Gregorio Faciol, Jr.
are members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the said municipality.

Docketed as Case No. OMB-MIN-98-0022, herein public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A.

Desierto approved on September 4, 1999 the Resolution dated June 29, 1998 of Graft
Investigation Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr. of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao finding
"probable cause to conclude that the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 has been
committed by respondents Mayor, Vice-Mayor, members of the Sangguniang Bayan and Budget
Officer of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur" and that accordingly, the appropriate Information be
filed with the Sandiganbayan.1 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 24852.

On March 15, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with prayer to defer
arraignment and pre-trial alleging that they recognize the salary increases of the health personnel
as a mandatory statutory obligation but the salary increases could not be implemented because
of lack of funds and the municipality had incurred overdrafts. They further argue that the failure
to give salary increases and other Magna Carta benefits were due to circumstances beyond their
control and not due to any manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
on their part.2

In the Memorandum dated June 11, 1999, Special Prosecution Officer I Jacqueline J. Ongpauco-
Cortel recommended the dismissal of the case which recommendation was approved by Deputy
Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.
This recommendation was, however, disapproved by Ombudsman Desierto on June 18, 1999
stating in his handwriting that "(T)he crime had obviously been committed, per OMB Mindanao
findings, long before the payment granting that the accused latters claim/allegation is true."3

Meanwhile, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 14, 1999 of the Resolution
of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao dated June 29, 1998 alleging that there is no
probable cause in holding that they violated Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. They allege that theint affidavits of waiver executed by private complainants have made the
case of the prosecution against the accused "too weak which could not even create a probable
cause."4 Petitioners further allege that the order disapproving the dismissal of the case
constitutes a denial of their motion for reconsideration.5

Alleging that the order disapproving the dismissal of the case constituted denial of the motion for
reconsideration,6 petitioners filed the present petition assailing the Resolution dated June 29,
1998 and the Memorandum dated June 11, 1999 raising the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPROVING THE
RESOLUTION CHARGING THE PETITIONERS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 PAR. (E) OF R.A.
3019 ISSUED AND APPROVED BY OMBUDSMAN FOR MINDANAO.

II. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISAPPROVING THE
MEMORANDUM RECOMMENDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER(S) ISSUED BY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, CONCURRED BY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR BUT
DISAPPROVED BY THE OMBUDSMAN."

Petitioners contend that they recognize the salary increases of the health personnel as a
mandatory statutory obligation but the same could not be implemented due to lack of funds and
the Municipality incurred an overdraft. They further argue that petitioners Loquias, Din, Martinez,
Faciol and Biador were not yet elected as local officials during the year 1994; hence, they cannot
be held liable for non-payment of salary increases as mandated by the local budget circular which
took effect in the year 1994 before their election.

In its Comment,7 the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Solicitor General, alleges that the
petition does not comply with Section 5, Rule 7 as the Verification and the Certification on Non-
Forum Shopping were signed only by petitioner Antonio Din and not by all the petitioners and
there is no showing that petitioner Din was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent them in
this case; that the petition raise factual issues; and that the municipality had sufficient funds to
grant the statutory salary increases and benefits.

In their Reply,8 petitioners contend that there was substantial compliance with Section 5, Rule 7
notwithstanding the fact that only one of the petitioners signed the verification and certification
on forum shopping; and that the petition does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented.

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one
of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is
defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall
certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court,
etc.9 Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the
certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the
latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to
the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims
filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.10

Moreover, petitioners question the act of the Ombudsman in disapproving the resolution
recommending the dismissal of the criminal case. We have ruled that this Court will not interfere
with the Ombudsmans exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory
powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion
of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and
independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of
the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.11 In Venus v. Desierto,12 this
Court stated that it ordinarily does not determine whether there exists reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. As held in the
Ocampo case:

"x x x The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant."13

With respect to theint affidavits of waiver allegedly executed by private complainants for the
purpose of requesting the Special Prosecutor to move for the dismissal of the criminal case,14
this Court ruled in Alba v. Nitorreda15 that aint affidavit of desistance is not binding on the Office
of the Ombudsman and cannot prevail over the provision of law which categorically allows the
Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute on its own any act or omission of a public
officer or employee, office or agency which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.

WHEREFORE , the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSEDfor lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

g) Villacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 20, 2011

On January 27, 1994, respondents husband (Catubig), was on his way home from riding in
tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Emperado. Catubig was the one driving the
motorcycle.While approaching a curve, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler
cargo truck by crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was then being traversed by theCeres
Bulilitbus driven by Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction.The two vehicles collided causing
the death of Catubig and Emperado.

Cabanilla was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC).After preliminary investigation, the MCTC dismissed the
charges after it found that Cabanilla was not criminally liable because there was no negligence on
his part.

Respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for Damages against petitioner. Respondent alleged
that petitioner is civilly liable because the latters employee driver, Cabanilla, was reckless and
negligent in driving the bus.

Petitioner contended that the proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of Catubig
when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and traversed the opposite lane of the
road.As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner asked for the dismissal of respondents
complaint for not being verified and/or for failure to state a cause of action. Trial then ensued.

OnJanuary 26, 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision favoring petitioner.Based on the sketch
prepared by PO2 Elnas, which showed that "the point of impact x x x occurred beyond the center
lane near a curve within the lane of the Ceres bus[;]" plus, the testimonies of PO2 Elnas and
Cadimas that the motorcycle recklessly tried to overtake a truck near a curve and encroached the
opposite lane of the road, the RTC ruled that the proximate cause of the collision of the bus and
motorcycle was the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal which found both Catubig and Cabanilla negligent in
driving their respective vehicles. Thus, the Court of Appeals decreed that petitioner is equally
liable for the accident which led to the deaths of Catubig, Jr. andEmperado and hereby award to
the heirs of Catubig, Jr. the amount [of]P250,000.00 as full compensation for his death.

The Court of Appeals denied the MR of petitioner. Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
ISSUE: (1) Whether respondents complaint for damages should be dismissed for the latters
failure to verify the same,(2) Whether petitioner is vicariously liable for the death of Catubig.

HELD:The petition is meritorious.

NO PROCEDURAL DEFECT WARRANTING OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL

The 1997 Rules of Court, clearly provides that a pleading lacking proper verification is to be
treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect.However, it also just as clearly
states that "[e]xcept when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit."No such law or rule specifically requires that
respondents complaint for damages should have been verified.

NO FAULT/NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE, NO LIABLITY ON THE PART OF EMPLOYER

Imputing fault or negligence on the part of the employer for the fault or negligence of its
employee does not apply to petitioner since the fault or negligence of Cabanilla has never been
established by respondent.To the contrary, the totality of the evidence shows that the proximate
cause of the collision is attributable to the negligence of Catubig.The RTC concluded that
Catubigs overtaking of a slow-moving truck, while approaching a curve, was the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision which led to his own death.

Thepresumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the
negligence of their employees. Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision resulting in Catubigs death was his own negligence, and there was no fault or negligence
on Cabanillas part, then such presumption of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner,
asCabanillas employer, does not even arise.

h) Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 86568, March 22, 1990
i) Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 187487, June 29,
2015