,’ There are few soldiers, and for that matter Americans, ,who’

would not agree with ~the words Of the President when he said-,
in a broadcast, five years ago:
“I hate war!”
Since then we have learned, the hard
enough simply to hate war.
world of ours. when we have fiolst a war.
to a very simple, yet harsh, fait: we have to kill or b&~
And Americans don’t enjoy either alternative.
“~ One of the things that has made life difficult for Us is that
certain nations take the opposite point of view. They, like
war. They revel in fighting. As individuals, many, Of them
enjoy killing. That they should enjoy being ‘ki$d is, l+i-edible
‘,:to us. Perhaps “enjoy” isn’t exactly the, rights word,‘. biit we’
know from innumerable kinds of evidence that @ey~“glOfy i,?:’
+attle, and are traioed~to die for the Emperor or for the Fuehrer.
Twice in a gen&ation the Gernians ‘have throwi% the wbrld, :
~intd 81%,mxholy mess. Twice we’v&~~had tb cio sbmething :$O@t;:
tt. ::It fs~that ‘,“wlee’: which is particalarl~ dlstu,rbing. It ou~lit,
to disturb us.

once may, be underst&dable. But twice...? Maybe tie (ah&

Vf&@We.l~h Of Company) al3 just too dumb to learn from ~;
~~~t%fpsMence; Or are we? -,;“;, ~,
” ” ;Not if we can ,understand exactly hqv the G~ri+&+,ftily:
-kayed as for easy mar@ after World War,I; ,not if’we,s+~&&+ly
,::why, and how, we left them get away with It then; ::,N&t’~if m,$
~:“:fihd out what etic+s were made iti winding tip~$+orid’q$& I &a:
,’ iti trying to induce the German&to keep the p&ace’,‘thereafter, ~’
 ARMY TALKS

Not if we realize @at our tonghest time will Come after the Gei-
mans are militarily smashed on the battlefield.
We will arrive at that moment when the war in Europe is
won. O.K. Wbatdo we do next? Two things:
1. We (that meatis all the United Natitins) t<lm to and beat
the Jam.
2. We take measures to make sure that it doesn’t happen
again.
No. 2 simoh means that we “win the DeaCe.” That is a
phrase which ii loosely bandied about. It has been used and
abused until it has come to sound commonplace and threadbare.
But don’t shy away from it. Don’t fOrget it.

No Problem is More Imporfant

Nd problem more important, or more difficult will face us as
,lon&s the youngest of us is alive. We didn’t win the peace last
time. Why?
There is an answer. And it
is an obvious one, for all who
‘have hearts that Can feel and for
all who have minds that are not
closed. But, first, three prefatory
remarks may be useful:
l., The writer of this ARMY
s TALKS is one of that older
generation: one of a fairish number who “are going around the
Course a second time.” He is not a regular, ,Army~ man but,
counting both wars, has had nearly six years in uniform. He is
getting tired of war.
2. So much for the intrusion of the writer. Now, about
you. Most of you weren’t born when World War I started; or,
probably, when it ended. In reading this ARMY TALKS, or in
discussing this topic, you’ll have to be prepared to find much of
the “history” you thought you knew is being turned topsy-turvy.
-3. And now about this TALK itself: within the space per-
mitt&it is not possible to give proof of every st.atement made.
SOme ma9 seem flat-footed, unsupported assertions. But don’t
let that disturb you. The facts, starkly as they may be stated
can be proved to the hilt. Soft or harsh, the peace terms weren’t
enforced.
why didn’t we win the peace last time?
The answer is simple:.
. We were careless.
28 ‘October, 19*4

we were soft.
We wanted to get back to 1914 normaiCY.
The Germans r+easeled their way out.

The Reasons Be?zimf the Four Poitifs

The ahsv&?r~ is easy, but all the reaso,as behind these ,fOUr
points are not so simple.
We were cafeless, Sure we wire, and so wkre the British.
We-that is most of ‘us--didn’t like to keeps an enemy down., We
didn’t really know the enemy. We were soft becauSe of our tern-
perax+nt, and because of dur ignorance of what the Germa?’
really is.
We wanted to get back to normalcy. Most of US want td
go home now. But we, or our children,‘will have to put &I
uniforins for World War III, if we don’t grasp the essential
fact that, in uniform or out, we have to keep tit this
job of winning the peace. We have to see that the Govern-
ment (and that means a majority ~of all of us)~ acts toward
Germany in such a way that World War III wZll never happen.
FIere’s what a former American Under-Secretary of State,
Sumner Welles, has to say about this in his recknt ,bo&, The
Tim for +dsion:
“The point of view that a great number ~of men
in the armed forces adopted upon their return hotie
swelled the changing, current of popular %?xitiment.
The government had done little, if anything,,
during the war months~ to keep the men in the Army
and Navy informed of the ,great issui?s invol+ed in
the League Covenant and Peace Treaty, s&d of ‘the
reasons for their governmen@ ..policy; ~Althougli
our men- by the hundreds of Jhcnxands had gone to
the war on fire with enthusiasm for the ideals~which~
Woodrow Wilson had held up’before their eye?, ‘mi?y
returned home in a .far different frame of mind.
The, idea that their sacrifices were only haZf paid
for by their victory had near been hanmer~d
home to them. They had not .been given ‘3he
chance to real??& that the contributionslo blood and
treasure made toward winning the wsr coidd only
be justified if then people of the United St@.&
insis@d teat their government adopt a policy~~‘de-
1signed to prevent these sacrifices from being’ again
,dematided ~o~~themse1ve.s or of, their sons.“~
 (TPlls Skme, ARMY TALKS. orientntlotl and disixssion
groups pencralig, are clesifgled 1.0 tickle the problem, Where
stmner weikes allegeti that the government fell down 1ast.
time.),
The Germdras We&%&d llU% 0X@/ 02lt.
tioiw we come t.0 the s6ory of bow they defeated t.he peace
arca@, by meaua which we are just. now seaing in the full light
Of c&&Y.

/‘or Some kfrrors We Were to Blame

1. Two weeks before the Armistice, General Pershing t&M
j+e:ddent Wilson that be didn’t Want an Armistice. The fine
that Generals Pershing :%nd Bliss wanted to take was “to con-
tinue the war tmtil the destruction OP the Qermnn Army would
appear plainly as a purely military event.” Top American
~~llicary authorities wanted to Uush Allied armies forward inte
the R&h. rlyht IrltO Berlin.
Wilson objected. Why’? Here are the words of his reason.
In 11.telegram of instruction to his representative. Col. House:
“Bcc~wt! It is certain that too much success or
security oh the part of fhe Allies will make a
genuine pesce settlement exceedingly difficult. if
not impossible.”
Error citte: On’s milttarp suhfcct, statesmen failed to take
the ndatce of the nrllltar~ adthoritks.
a. The terms on which Germany was granted pence, signecl
a$ Vcxsaiillles 20 June tcj18, were the result of much harries
yonderlng rrrad were arrived at only after prolon&xi and difficult
co~~ferences between tbc negotiators of the four leading Victor-
1o11snatlons. The terms were determlned after more than six
mont,hs’ discussion and cOnsideration. They were not %dequnte
Qnd they WrW!“‘t lived Up tO!
The Rig l%ur con-
ductcd the ne~otiablon”:
wocdraw Wilson for Eli:.
United St&es. Llo;‘d
George for Oreat Exi-.
tain; Clememx?au rnr
mxrncc, am OtlkUldO
ror Italy.’ There *<!x
ac,ute difeerences Of
ctginio~ on almas~ evi+Y
Subiect: freoclom 0Y til:>
to consider-later. This attitude was too probletiatic fop m&Y
of tbe other nations, especially France. Clemenceau recognbzd
that, for the time being, Germany was too weak to fight, btit he
was looking forward to a period ten, ,fifteen or twnen~y y+rS~
later when Germany might be strong enough to start another
World War. He, quite ,naturaily, wanted above all to make
France Secure from another agression.
Error Two: We, the VictorS, quartelled amOngSt OUrSek?s,
then and later. which was just what the Germans hoped lot.
During the Paris peace terms discussions, ,there was do
full undeixtanding-even by the French--of the real,~nZ+n? of
Ian State and the German~pbople. We probably~~Sho*ed

- granted. They ha& to be

won the hard way. That’s how we got our freedom, bur Consti-
tution and the Bill of Rights.
The majority of Germans Zilce to be regimented. They~r~veJ
in the goose-step. They prefer to be told .what to do.
They believe war is natural ,and glorious. We don’t.
“’ They believe they are &~ HerrenLvoZlc-a master trace that,
must ixle and exploit ‘lesser breeds. W.z,‘~think ~otiz% is “G&3
ctiuntry,” and think pretty well of’~our%?lves, b&w& don’t ,vz+nt
30 enslaVe otha nations.
 They’lay down a one%ided education, in which from kinder-
garten to university the youth are crammed with a false and per-
verted version of history. We at least seek the truth. We don’t
ban and burn books.
A German professor, Karl A. Kuhn; bbils It all down to
twenty-two words, in, his book, The True CaUseS Of the War:
“ivfust Kultur rear its domes over mount.ains of
corpses; oceans of tears and the death rattle of the
conquered? Yes, it must!”
A few courageotis democrats, writers and ministers revolted
against this doctrine. All honoIc to them; but they are in a
minority (just as today we find only a few sturdy exceptions
such as Thomas Mann, Einstein and Cardinal Falhauber). The
majority, through the past eighty years, has either been silent,
or chimed in with Pastor Naumann, an economist, who said:
“Everything must be made subservient to the
next war.”
Whether or not Naumailn endorsed this principle, he
certainly recognized what was going on, and saw that each of
Germany’s aggressive wars must inevitably lead to new wars.

The Blood-Red Thread ot Oermarij

,In the previous World War, in this war, and between wars
this theme has run like a blood-red thread through al1
classes of Germans. There is no purpose to be served in taking
up Space here to relate what Hitler, and the Germans under
Hitler, have said. Their views are too recent and too well-known
to need repetition.
Anotller point we were
slow to grasp last time, and
may not yet fully realize,
is the influence which the
PrUSSIanS (mostly Lhhe
Junker class) and through
them the General Staff of
the German Army, have
had in,eausing war after
war. On this point there
is a good American witness.
Sumner Welles. who soeaks
from a life-time on the lnside,of the welter of intern.&ional-cela-
tions. In his recent book, Welles writes:
“It is their (the Prussians’) teacning a@ their
COnCept which made Germany during the last ,100
 9

41 Staff has been the driving force in,

German policy ~1s k dangerous oversimplificationi
I am not disposed to minimize the importance oi
other factors in German history. They all have
their place. But I am convinced that each of them
has played its part only in so far as it was permitted
to do so by the real master of the German race,
namely, German militarism, personified )n, and
channelled t;hrough, the German General Staff.”
This Is confirmea by many other writers, British, French
and even German. It has been confirmed by the record of
Hit.ler’s career.

The Danger of War/d War 111

Sat, ironically, in the solution of this problem Hitler map
oe on 0%~ side in World War II: If he keeps on firing, Imprison-
ing and murdering generals as he did after the,generals’ ,Plltsch
(plot) that broke into print July 20th of, this pear.
There isstill a further lesson that
we were very vague about in 1919: we
thought there existed in Germany
sufficiently sturdy seeds’of~demodratij?
tom enabte the ,Gsrmans to develop
self-governing principles and s re-
publiean form ‘of government. But
they weren’t there, those seeds: or at’
least they were few or sterile. ,~
On this subject the Germans
fooled us for a while, In fact for SsV:
era1 years. The Weimar Constitution
looked nice on paper, but It had
fooled us for a while, in fact for sew
neither’reality nor soul.,The Germans
threw out’ the Kaiser, about thirty
hours before the Armistice tooa’
effect. A mvolution~ of the workers
was announced.; ,An ex-saddle-maker
 named ~Ebert became president of the synthetic republic. Pri-
vately, Ebert said that he “hated revolution like sin.”
~’ And what Was the German General Staff doing about this
supp0q.d People’s Revolution? General Greener, Chief of the
‘General,Staff, gave the game away and showed the, revolution
;‘p,“,,a naked fake, When he ,testified in a German court

“From the very beginning, Ebert and I fought

(against) the revolution together.”
But of courso in 1919 We couldn’t ‘be expected to realize this
skullduggery, ,although a careful :study of German history
should:.have put our leaders wise.
Error 3; We~mdnV Studied German history and: psychology;
Or. tf SO; ure’d’studied under the wton$’ teachers.
Here you have three
,oi the serious errors
we made. The Ger-
mans cried, worked
and bluffed their way
out of the Versailles
Treaty, during the next
twenty years, and
added to our~and the’world’s troubles. Here, in skeleton outline
only. are some of the things they put over on the rather corn-
placent outside world:

German Defiqzce of Versailles Treaty

1. The first defiance of ‘the Versailles Treaty came June
2i. 1919-one week before the treaty was signed. The German
fleet, as soon as it entered Scapa Flow, Scotland, to surrender
was scuttled by the officers of the German High Command
This lost to the Allies eleven battleships, five cruisers and Porty-
eight destroyers.
2. ‘, In the Versailles Treaty, Germany promised to hand over
the war-guilty for trial by the Allied and Associated powers.
The outrages Were headed up by the Kaiser, and those listed ran
lnto the thousands. Did we try them? Don’t be credulous, now
that you have gone this far.
Fh’st, the Kaiser. Lloyd George won anelection in Decem-
ber, 1918,~ with the slogan “Hang the Kaiser.” But the Kaiser
Wasn’t hanged. I& wasn!t even tried. He beat the gun by
getting to Holland a few hours ahead of the Armistice. The
Dutch called him a “political” refugee, and wouldn’t give whim
up. (A, Couple of adventurous American ~officers tried~ to kidnap
hfm, but falled. So that was that, and the ,ex-Kaiser chopped
Wood at Boom for twenty years and more uiitp h&&d ln his bed.
 ra oetobcr, ,944 11

3. Then the Germans weaseled, their promise to hand ,over

the other war criminals for Allied trial. they persuaded us to
permit trial by a Gernmn court, on the ground that it would
dishonor these fine fellows to, be tried by foreigners. The trial
was duly held in Leipzig. At first there were 1,500 on the war
criminal list. Then t~he list shrunk to 892. Of this lot,‘Britain
demanded the trial of 97; Belgium of 334; ‘Prance also ~of 334;’
Italy of 29; Poland of 57, and Rumania of 41. The United States
.agreed to forget all about it.
But when the trial started, the list to be put in the dock by
Germany mysteriously shrunk again-m fourteen. Wearily, the
Allies prepared evidence against seven. abut Germany couldn’t
“find” three of these, so four ultimately faced the judges. They
got minor sentences, but whether or not these sentences were
served history does not record clearly.
There is the Lesson for This 7Yme
4. The members of the Big Four in Paris, you will recall
from a previous page, agreed that Germany ought to lose some
territory. Germany did, but never left off whining to get it
back. Shortly before the end of World War I, ,when it was clear
that the German General Staff and the’Kaiser, had lost that
gamble, a prominent German was asked by a Swiss:
“What will you do if you lose the war?”
The German knew the answer, and knew above all. sonie-
thing about Anglo-Saxon psychology, and replied:
“We will organize sympathy!”
Some territories, like the Saar and the Rhineland (which
had been demilitarized) they got back later, because other na-
tions became, apathetic and “went soft.” The balance in~K$?epe,
and much more to boot, Hitler got back later. Allied a&d
forces were to have remained in, the Rhineland for fifteen years;
They pulled out their final token occupation forces in eleven
years.
5. You have heard a lot about reparations. Germany
started off owing a huge amount, more than economists could
figure out how to transfer from the Reich to those who hoped
ii k&t. it. This figure was oroaretiivelv scaled down in the
Dawes,’ %&ung and-other &in s, until v&h the Hoover mora-
toriurn rep!?+ions finally disa ,ppeared.
This fantastic financial hocus-
pocus did not occur under Hitler;
It was all ended before Hitler
came to’ powder. The sleight-of-
hand fitianciers were the leaders
‘of republtcan Germany. Thiy
managed to borrotu (largely
from the United States) from
six to ten times as much, tn
cash, as they paid out id tepar&-
cash. Tot&l fieures will not be eiven here. because thev
cause headaches even to financiers and eeonomi& who u&ally
dote on such things. Btit three items of curious and important,
interest may be mentioned, before leaving this involved subject.

G,eivnan ,Inflation Organized by Reich

Germany pleaded poverty and inability to pay, giving her
inplation as one reason. But this inflation, which wiped out aZl
Geiman internal debt, was deliberately organized by Reich
bankers,,industrialists and Junkers. The figures of the German
inark became a grim joke-for those who didn’t have marks.
Hqe’s’what happened. The pre-World War I mar& was worth
four ta the dollar. ‘In October, 1923, it was 4,200,000,000 to the
dollar! Champagne, in the Hotel Adlon bar, was five cents a
bottle, if you had ‘dollars! Then the: mark was stabilized at.
~qe~ri~lto~th of, its former value.
C ,The,second item has to do with the-amount of the repsrs-
@iS $harged sgainst Germany in 1919, as compared wlth .~the~
simi ,;that Germany exacted from France in 1871., After the
aneo-Prussian war the reparations figure was set. roughlr. at

w gelr:
te third’ item compares
?8 “cwler, 1944 13

a period Germany collected-mostly in gobds--ouery forty-one

da?& a sum equal to the original amount she was asked to pay
after the first war’ as total reparations each ?/ear for World War
I damages!
6. Germany, under the Weimar Republic and under the
Nails, signed,trqaty after tie&y, but broke them~all. tiermany
pi.etended to want peace, but the German General ,+Jtaff,, ~the
industrialists, the so-tailed democratic-Socialis& and ‘the N&s
all x&ted,. and intended the same thing: a war of ,&vex&.
They rearmed, from the very fir& days after the Armistice. was
signed. They were restricted to 100,000 standing army, but
before Hitler came to pcwer they had actually at least 250,000,
plus the illegal “Black Reichs-
wehr,” and labor batt~alions.
They were fdrbiddeh airplanes
and tanks, so they built t.hem
secretly. They were forbidden
submarines so they had them
built and tested In another
CountJy.
They fooled the Armaments
Control Comtiission at every
turn. In 1925 General Malcolm,
the British member of the com-
mission, reported (in a 504-page
document) that Germany was not by any means disarmed,, in
fact was rearming, but the British and Belgian goVernmt?ntS
buried the report, and, weary of t.he whole thing, turned as&y.

German Propaganda Split the Allies

German propaganda spread like a pestilence’ ‘over the
world, and soothed, irritated-.but always split-the erstwhile
Allies. We didn’t want to recognize that Hitler’s shrill shriek:
ings were the truth. He was believed whenever he shouted that
“this was his last demand,” because that it what we wanted to
believe. The world turned a deaf ear because it so badly wanted
peace. The British, in 1935, cast 11,000,000 votes in a peace ballot,
which urged the Government to back up t,he League of Nations,
and in the same breath demanded ,that all nations of the League
reduce their armaments. We weren,‘t any more consist&t,
less if possible, and starved our forces, ‘army, navy~. and, ,+r.
Unfortunately, col+ctive security was; already collapsing., It
w&s the pitiable period ‘df appeasement.. .,i i, ‘,
The culmipating tragi-farce came, with the Munich settle-
 ARMY TALKS

w’s ~+final” demand: A British premier was cheered,

?d with Hitler’s Signature On a scrap of paper

introduced Selective’Service. ~~

how GermanY’s diabolical

Germany overran eVery nation in E&pe except’ six. This i.s

World War II, but it represents the fifth aggressive war in 75
years for which Germany under the German General Staff is
r$sponsible. Don’t forget what they did before 1914: Denmark
(a war of aggression) in 1864; Austria (a war of aggression) in
1866;‘France (a war of aggression) in 1870.

How~.Are We Going to Treat Germany?

~’i4fi.k all ahese &&riences we have had’ &&lent &ppor-’
tu&y to learn hoti to treat the Germans this time. In one
‘dray it iS fort*& that World War ‘II’ has ‘come 60~. so~ti aftei
~)Vorld War I because there are, hundreds df millions stlil active
who have ,b&mable p ‘observe the results of German~qualities
in 410th ,Wars.’ We have our records and. our memories. We
&a+6 tiillions of dead and mZ&ned. We, in the United States,
hai-e a, war debt teti times what it was a few years’ago: &Fe
haye Our, ~m$ipli6d taxes. We have oui ration books’&$d our
cbupoQs. We’bave had our peaceful,,liv+s interrupted. ”
‘WiKWe. put up With this thing, ~agtiih land again and again?
Just :bkti+se’t&&&ans ~want, to take over civilization; land
‘run it: tiii?ir’w~y? ~3f ‘JV~? don’t ,intend to put up withy it, then
we haves to decide how to handle this German problem; and
when we’ decide;#ick to it, without getting soft or “sporting”
about it. “Ways ,atid~ means’* brains have beeti working out
the VariOUS factors ‘of the~,solutioxi. ~’ WithotitVdisci.@ng the
rights :or wrongs, the ease oi the :,difficulties,~ whethei we wtrl
,dO &diethe+WS shdu~d,:let’s.~see what has been sugg&tsci:”
1,: ,,W& intend to:‘occu$~ Germariy.( This is more, than ~‘a
mg@?stiorC ,‘It is a statement of f+ct.~ ~‘%he Unite&&&s;~
Great, Britain, ‘abd~ ,,the S6vM Uhioti: h;Eve -atinoti;ji+~~ @?is,
bfficially; ~,. The, :&petit&%3 a&$ of ~&jcup+ti6n ~%a~#.,: $t:,:&e&i;
 ~6. Territorial ad&stments. It is taken for granted that all
looted iand will, be returned to’ odmers. Exactly which owners;
as of what-date, has not been determined.~ Some favor dividing
Germany into small parts. Sumner Welles urges partition into
three parts: Southern Germany, comprising Bavaria, Wuittem-
berg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Rhlneland, Saar; ,Central Ger
many, including Upper Hesse, Thurlngia, Westphalia, Hanover,
Oldenburg and Hamburg;~ North-East Germany, with Prussia
‘(exclusive of East Prussia which may go to Poland), Mecklen-
h,nYl anri Raw”*”
7. Re-educatibn of Germans.
~Lord Vansittart, for forty years in
,tlie:British Foreign Office, ,says in
Lessons of My Lzfe:
‘This German generation is
admittedIy ~ineurable.. . A new and
retaught generation will have to
replace the incursbles. We must
,,pcrforce, leave open the date of
safety. Our successors alone can
~decide.”
The great argument’on this subject revolves around, the
question of “Who shall undertake the re-education?“-shall it
be done from outside, or left to Germans under our direction?
8. The problem of the German people. They will be fed.
But their responsibility as Q people, the shallowness of their
democratic experience, and their proneness toward obeying
aggressive and ruthless leaders is ~increasmgly recognized.
9. Our continuing responsibility. It is being-~stresseci,
although by no means yet accept& in ihe, United States, that
ttie~ “same intense planning and torrents of energy” which thin
Wats must be devoted to “v&r&g the peace.“,‘: As a~~distiii~~,
28 octaber, 1944 17

guished American international lawyer, :Louis ~Nizer, puts it, in

his book What to Do With Gernway?:

“Those who write the peace must be gifted

with the righteousness which comes from a justified
anger against the? immediate past, and a calm
determination about t,he lollg future.”
And an anti-Nazi journalist, Leopold Schwarzschild, in htS
brilliant book World Sn Trance, concludes with this warning:
“N&r again must we believe that the un-
pleasantness, sacrifices and responsibilities that all
this implies are too heavy and too great to be borne.
They are heavy and they are serious. It is s. burden
to police, the world-at least in its’most dsngerow
quarters.’ It is neither easy nor inexpenslv+”
 18 A&MY iPALES

Twenty-six years ago, the nations of the world asked th&n-

&yes: “What to do with Germany?“~ Today We ate having tc
ask it again.‘~ ,Btit $%&a&&g is the easier part. The question
‘i&St be answefedby’,you and me and every Other O&who has
&&I tiweatiiig it Outs over here for m&e than twb years. :
We can beat the Germans. We are giving them done of the
worst beatings In history. It &mot be too thorough. But don’t
let us think for a ,minute that a thorough thrashing will solve
then problem of Germaziy. It is the first step, and it must be
‘done as ruthlessly and as completely as possible. But after
that, what?
This issue of ARMY TALKS, written by a soldier who served
in the last w&r as Well as in this. brlngs.back the attitudes and
the errors of a quaI%er of a century ago. History is often made
by men who have le&ned Very little from history.
,Nobody is hn, a ‘stronger,posit@x, xiobbcly has more &t staKe
fh ,this v+ar$ti&tiiose tied who have f&&t iti ,ft. ~Xf we fail to
,,’ stopand reflect 2nd try ‘to ~nswez the repeated “*h&do you
,th+&?‘,: of this ARMY TALK@, We may be guilty of ‘flghting
~tithotit:lmowing why.
~’ Every man in’the American Army owes it to himself and xc
@& f&mily to have some answers: They Won’t all Bgree;:but they
,,shOuld 811~ make Se&. Let’s, examine tiie c+rors, Of ‘Ver&ilies.
Let’s reconsider the history kitten between 1918,and 1989 &j
I&S .atthipt t0 pdzzle Out the toughest probieti with wfiicb
men saddle the world-war.
You may not believe in a League of Nati&. You iaay sniile
at the idea of an international police force, but they are great
thoughts, they are ideas which cannot be dismissed without
cc=uideratj&. ThBy are at least efforts to solve the problem.
V+ethe< CkmIany is to be &copied for ten years; whether
Gel+ilany cab be re-edutiated tb a less war-like attitude; whether
there is a Nazi land :a Gertiati-these &e sotie of then questlo&
We UULit aIls!Ye~, What do you think?
Pmlied bY.NC.I1CS& Penr*o* Printlns co., mtd.. Eimwr street. N. Ke”tlnntm:~Landon;~W.tO.
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OOPS y-- SORRY