1AC

Accountability

Contention 1 is Accountability –

Sales of (PMCs) through (FMS) undermines legislative accountability

Allison Stanger and Mark Eric Williams 6, respectively Professor and Associate Professor
of Political Science at Middlebury College, “Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of
Outsourcing Security,” http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/062101stanger-
williams.pdf

Despite its advantages, outsourcing also engenders a significant set of interrelated costs. The
instrumental relationship
between PMCs and the U.S. government is not equivalent to robust, effective oversight of
traditional military operations and inevitably results in a loss of transparency. These costs are
largely a function of the opaque nature of PMC contracts and the laws that govern them . For
example, PMC contracts typically forbid firms from publicly disclosing their provisions, and the State Department is disinclined to
discuss PMC contracts for “commercial proprietary” reasons. Meanwhile, the president and the State Department have no legal
obligation to inform Congress of contracts smaller than $50 million, nor do lawmakers possess any mechanisms to obtain
information on contracts below that benchmark.23 Moreover, the Pentagon can circumvent the State
Department’s licensing procedures by selling services abroad through its own Foreign Military
Sales program (FMS), through which DoD pays the contractor for services offered to a foreign
government, which in turn reimburses the Pentagon . Under FMS, the only information available
to the public about such con- tracts is the type of services a PMC has exported and in which
country they were performed—and then only through the Freedom of Information Act .24 Finally,
contracts awarded by the Central Intelligence Agency fall outside the normal contract licensing protocols. By clouding the
transparency of policy implementation, outsourcing generates accountability costs. Not only is
the public unable to easily hold political leaders responsible for any misadventures in which a
PMC may engage, but a Congress poorly informed about PMC activities cannot exert the
horizontal accountability over the executive branch needed to maintain effective checks and
balances. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) explained that “the Congress has little choice but to rely on the Pentagon to supervise”
PMC activities; this situation, in turn, leaves lawmakers unable to confirm whether these firms act in “ways that are fully consistent
with US policy, laws and procedures.”25 As Steven Aftergood, a secrecy specialist with the American Federation of Scientists, notes,
“the kind of routine oversight that official military activities would be subjected to are evaded by contractors as a matter of
course.”26

Scenario 1 is Group-think –

Undermining accountability via PMCs causes groupthink

KAIJA SCHILDE 15, Assistant Professor, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University,
“WAR POWERS, PRIVATE ACTORS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY STATE CAPACITY,”
http://www.bu.edu/bula15wreview/files/2015/07/SCHILDE.pdf
Privatization and outsourcing might not simply centralize executive authority, however. As Paul
Verkuil has argued, privatization and outsourcing of security expertise might centralize the
power of the executive branch over the legislative branch, but this might come at a loss of
power, expertise, and capacity of the state in favor of private actors and the market .13 When the
state outsources too much of its core governmental function and core personnel to private
actors—for reasons of efficiency, expertise, or to avoid accountability— it can lose the ability to
regain control of its capacity for agenda setting and oversight.14 Verkuil locates this phenomenon not at the deployment of
private military companies in the service of U.S. policy abroad, but in the outsourcing of project management and regulatory authority in executive institutions and agencies.15

When core governmental functions, such as oversight, contracting, and policymaking

(government “outsourcing its brain”)16 become outsourced by the executive branch of
government, there is an immediate risk of the hollowing-out of governmental capacity and a
long- term risk of agenda capture. Private actors, particularly in national security policy, now act
as a “shadow government” as they outnumber public employees at a ratio of six to one .17 Because the
government has privatized and outsourced core political decisions, there is a shrinking core of public sector employees overseeing contracts, resulting in the executive branch
hiring contractors to oversee contractors.18 While the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has faulted the DOD for insufficient oversight of their contracts because of
declining government personnel, even the GAO has outsourced its review of contractor performance to other contractors.19 Verkuil argues that while outsourcing and
privatization used to occur for reasons of efficiency, it now occurs out of necessity because the executive branch has been downsized to the point where there are not enough
government personnel to perform core governmental tasks.20 Even before any privatization trends, the executive branch has not possessed a great deal of expertise over war
planning in the first place, as Griffin notes regarding the errors made in Vietnam and Iraq war planning, reflecting an “inherent lack of expertise on the civilian side of the

As Zeisberg notes in her introduction, there are

executive branch with respect to making decisions for war.” (Griffin p. 247).

tradeoffs to the executive branch becoming more insular to inter-branch oversight and shared
authority; the “president’s decision space may be restricted by many forces beyond Congress.”
(Zeisberg p. 15). These constraints can come from partisans, cabinets, ideological or emotional

groupthink within advisors, or economic or commercial interests that can “leave the president
beholden . . . against his own will.” (pp. 15-16). While the Munitions Committee case21 provides a fascinating pre-history to the post-WWII increase
in the role of private actors in U.S. security policy, the increase in private power over institutions representing U.S. national security interests has not simply flowed through the

Instead, the executive branch has

mechanism of industry capturing the agenda of the executive branch, as was alleged in the investigation. (p. 188).

increased its flexibility for military action through outsourcing multiple government functions to
private actors—including logistics in combat operations—which have affected its ability to
conduct national security policy. While Senator Gerald Nye’s chief concern in his investigation of the role of the munitions industry prior to WWI was
whether the President would be beholden to commercial interests, he was not prescient enough to foresee the same structural constraints impacting the legislative branch in
the second half of the twentieth century.

Groupthink causes nuclear conflict

Robert Parry 16. Broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the 1980s for the Associated Press and
Newsweek, wrote Neck Deep: The Disastrous Presidency of George W. Bush, Secrecy &
Privilege: The Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq and Lost History: Contras,
Cocaine, the Press & 'Project Truth'. 10-5-2016. "Dangerous New ‘Group Think’ for War with
Syria/Russia." Common Dreams.
https://www.commondreams.org/views/2016/10/05/dangerous-new-group-think-war-
syriarussia

This new “group think” has prevented Americans from looking at the Syrian situation with more nuance
and objectivity. Indeed, if you mix in some of the other facts, the on-the-ground reality could be seen as the U.S. and its
“allies” stoking the fire in Syria for five years and, now, as the Syrian military and Russian air power take drastic measures
to finally get the blaze under some control, the U.S. government may bomb the firefighters and destroy their equipment. Beyond the
illegality of that action, how
the U.S. military intervention is supposed to fix things in Syria is never
discussed. By strengthening Al Qaeda and its “moderate” front men, the prospects for a longer and bloodier
conflict are increased, not decreased. The long-held neocon dream of a Syrian “regime change” – even if it could be
accomplished – would only open the gates of Damascus to a victory by Al Qaeda and/or its spinoff, the Islamic State. How
that would make life better for the Syrian people is another never addressed question. There is simply the pretense
that somehow, magically, the “moderate” rebels would prevail, though they are only an auxiliary to Al Qaeda’s
Syrian franchise. The “group think” also doesn’t permit in the inconvenient truth that the recent collapse of the U.S.-
Russia limited cease-fire was driven by the fact that the “moderate” rebels are so intertwined with Al Qaeda’s Nusra Front
– which recently underwent a cosmetic name change to the Levant (or Syria) Conquest Front – that the rebels can’t or won’t separate themselves. The New York Times, The Washington Post and other
mainstream news outlets have sought to bury this reality because it doesn’t fit the preferred narrative of the U.S. fulfilling its commitments under the partial cease-fire agreement and blaming its collapse entirely
on the Russians and their dastardly behavior. One outlier in this propaganda barrage, ironically, has been Rupert Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal, which published a serious article on this key topic on Sept. 29. It
said, “Some of Syria’s largest rebel factions are doubling down on their alliance with an al Qaeda-linked group, despite a U.S. warning to split from the extremists or risk being targeted in airstrikes. “The rebel
gambit is complicating American counterterrorism efforts in the country at a time the U.S. is contemplating cooperation with Russia to fight extremist groups. It comes after a U.S.-Russia-brokered cease-fire
collapsed last week and the Syrian regime and its Russian allies immediately unleashed a devastating offensive against rebel-held parts of Aleppo city that brought harsh international condemnation. … “The two
powers have been considering jointly targeting Islamic State and the Syria Conquest Front — formerly known as the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front — a group that is deeply intermingled with armed opposition
groups of all stripes across Syria’s battlefields. The U.S. has also threatened to attack any rebels providing front-line support to the group. … “Some rebel groups already aligned with Syria Conquest Front
responded by renewing their alliance. But others, such as Nour al-Din al-Zinki, a former Central Intelligence Agency-backed group and one of the largest factions in Aleppo, said in recent days that they were joining
a broader alliance that is dominated by the Front. A second, smaller rebel group also joined that alliance, which is known as Jaish al-Fateh and includes another major Islamist rebel force, Ahrar al-Sham. … “In a call
with Mr. Kerry on Wednesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Syrian rebels ‘refused to follow the U.S.-Russian agreement…but instead merged with [Nusra Front].’” Misleading the American People
So, isn’t that point relevant to understanding what is occurring in eastern Aleppo, an area essentially under the control of Al Qaeda terrorists? As horrible as war is, there is more than a whiff of hypocrisy when
politicians and pundits, who cheered the U.S. Marines’ destruction of Fallujah during the Iraq occupation and who support driving the Islamic State out of the Iraqi city of Mosul, wax indignantly in outrage when
the Syrian military seeks to remove Al Qaeda terrorists from one of its own cities. There is also the issue of why writers who helped mislead the American people and the world into the catastrophe of the Iraq War
were never held accountable and are now in position to whip up more war fever over Syria, Ukraine and Russia. Far from being held accountable, the propagandists who justified the criminal invasion of Iraq have
been rewarded with plum assignments and golden careers. For instance, Washington Post editorial page editor Fred Hiatt, who repeatedly wrote as flat fact that Iraq was hiding WMDs, is still today the editorial
page editor of The Washington Post, urging a new U.S. war on Syria. The Times’ Friedman, who was infamously wrong about the Iraq War and pretty much everything else, is still considered a premier American
columnist who is courted to make high-profile public appearances. Now, Friedman wants to escalate tensions with nuclear-armed Russia, apparently with the sloppily thought-through mission of imposing another
“regime change,” this time in Moscow. As unnerving as a nuclear showdown with Russia should be, Friedman starts his Wednesday column by fabricating a news item about a leak that supposedly revealed that
Putin “owns $30 billion in property, hotels and factories across Russia and Europe, all disguised by front organizations and accounting charades.” After going on for several paragraphs with his fake “news,”
Friedman admits that “I made it up.” Ha-ha, so clever! Then, however, he cites what he claims is real news about Russia, including the dubious prosecutorial “report” blaming the Russians for the Malaysia Airlines
Flight 17 shoot-down on July 17, 2014. That “report” – actually a series of videos – had serious evidentiary gaps, logical problems and obvious bias, since it was driven largely by Ukraine’s notorious SBU intelligence
service which the United Nations has accused of covering up torture. But to Friedman, the allegations blaming Russia for the shoot-down were unassailable. He writes, “a Dutch-led investigation adduced
irrefutable video evidence that Putin’s government not only trucked in the missile system used to shoot down a Malaysia Airlines plane flying over Ukraine in 2014, killing all 298 civilians onboard, but also
returned it to Russia the same night and then engaged in an elaborate cover-up.” It might be noted that some of that “irrefutable video evidence” came in the form of computer-generated images of an alleged
Russian Buk missile battery traveling down darkened Ukrainian roads, very persuasive scenes, much like Secretary of State Colin Powell showing computer-generated images of Iraq’s “mobile chemical weapons
labs” in 2003, labs that didn’t exist. It also might be remembered that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was also accused of mounting “an elaborate cover-up” of his WMD stockpiles, that also didn’t exist. The point being
that slick presentations, which rely mostly on assertions and allude to untested evidence, aren’t always accurate. Skepticism is not only a sign of journalistic professionalism but is necessary to avoid horrible
misjudgments, especially on questions of war and peace. Blaming Russia for Everything "The problem with propagandists like Friedman is that they ignore the illegal actions of the United States, including
mounting military attacks on countries without United Nations’ authority or without the justification of self-defense, in other words, outside the realm of international law." But Friedman just plunges ahead, also
asserting that on Sept. 19, Russia bombed a U.N. relief convoy heading for Aleppo. In this case, Friedman cites U.S. intelligence officials who say that “almost certainly” Russia did it, although I had been told that
some CIA analysts feared the attack was launched by Al Qaeda’s chief Syrian ally, Ahrar al-Sham, using a U.S.-made TOW missile. The United Nations also withdrew its initial assertion that the attack was an
airstrike (although Friedman leaves that fact out, too). This is not to say that the Russians are innocent in these terrible incidents. Further evidence might convincingly prove that they are guilty – and, if they are,
accountability should be assessed as appropriate. Horrible errors happen in war, such as the U.S. airstrike that killed some 62 Syrian soldiers in eastern Syria on Sept. 17 as they were fighting off an attack by Islamic
State militants. The problem with propagandists like Friedman is that they ignore the illegal actions of the United States, including mounting military attacks on countries without United Nations’ authority or
without the justification of self-defense, in other words, outside the realm of international law. It’s also illegal to supply weapons to terrorists, as has been occurring in Syria both directly by Saudi Arabia and other
U.S. “allies” and indirectly by U.S. covert operations giving arms to “moderates” who then turn them over to Al Qaeda. While putting on blinders regarding U.S. violations of international law and their human
consequences, such as the Syrian refugee flow, the sanctimonious Friedman bizarrely blames Putin for this human suffering, too. Friedman cites a scholar named Robert Litwak in claiming that “Putin’s departure
from standard great-power competition — encouraging a flood of refugees and attacking the legitimacy of our political system — ‘is leading to shifts in global politics that could have revolutionary consequences,
even if Putin is not motivated by revolutionary ideology.’” Friedman’s solution to this highly questionable if not imaginary problem is to increase the pain on Putin and Russia, saying “it’s now clear that we have
underestimated the pressure needed to produce effective engagement, and we’re going to have to step it up. This is not just about the politics of Syria and Ukraine anymore. It’s now also about America, Europe,
basic civilized norms and the integrity of our democratic institutions.” While it’s always tempting to dismiss Friedman as a nitwit, the sad reality is that he is an influential
nitwit who helps shape “elite”
American public opinion. He is now contributing to a new “group think”
that is even more dangerous than the one he helped construct in 2002-2003 regarding the Iraq War. Today, this new
“group think,” which — like the Iraq one — is based on a false or selective reading of the facts, could lead
to a nuclear war that could end life on the planet.

It turns every threat

Smith and Dixit 19 [Khalil Smith Practice Lead, Diversity & Inclusion NeuroLeadership Institute.
Jay Dixit is an award-winning science writer, journalist, and storytelling teacher whose work has
appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, Rolling Stone, Psychology Today, and
The Best of Technology Writing. Jay is the founder of Storytelling.NYC, where he leads
storytelling classes, writing workshops, and corporate training to companies in New York and
across the country. "How JFK Inspired the Term ‘Groupthink’."
https://neuroleadership.com/your-brain-at-work/jfk-inspired-term-groupthink/]

brilliant people
Kennedy wasn’t the only one asking that question. The fiasco attracted the attention of Irving Janis, a Yale psychologist who studied group cohesion. Janis became interested in understanding how a team of self-evidently

can pool their intellectual powers and still somehow arrive at such a unquestioningly catastrophic
n

decision. Janis set out to identify a psychological mechanism that could explain the disastrous decision. After years of research, he published a book proposing the existence of a previously undiagnosed, unnamed, and unknown problem afflicting

a phenomenon he termed “groupthink

groups tasked with making decisions: .” When groups work together to make a decision, Janis posited, they suffer from a
process problem that distorts their perception of reality and leads to
, although unnoticed by the members of the group, nevertheless

reckless outrageous decisions In the Bay of Pigs

, the problem was that although
. Invasion, Janis discovered,

Kennedy’s advisors had good reason to think the mission would fail, they never voiced these
concerns. Although they harbored private doubts, they “never pressed, partly out of a fear of being labeled ‘soft’ or undaring in the eyes of their colleagues.” In the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., one of the advisors present at the meetings,

Kennedy’s “senior officials… were unanimous for going ahead … Had one senior advisor opposed the adventure, I believe that Kennedy would have canceled

Groupthink was
it. No one spoke against it.” responsible Janis believed, for other foreign policy fiascoes as
at least partially ,

well: the decision by American military commanders in 1941 to ignore warnings of a surprise
attack at Pearl Harbor the decision by Harry Truman and his advisers to cross the 38th
by Japan ; in 1950

parallel into North Korea; and the decision by Johnson to escalate American Lyndon B. and his advisers in the late 1960s

involvement in the Vietnam War. Groupthink goes mainstream After Janis’ study, the word groupthink entered the lexicon, and the concept became an everyday concept in political science, psychology, and

psychologists have blamed groupthink as a factor in Watergate

management. In the decades since Janis first published his article, the scandal, the

Iran-Contra and both the Challenger affair, and the Columbia space shuttle explosions.

Scenario 2 is Professionalism –

Lack of effective checks on PMCs breaks-down Civil-Military Relations (CMR) –

traditional understandings of CMR fall within the “institutional model” which
fails to account for the unique threat posed by PMCs, specifically due to a lack
of professionalism
SCOTT M. WIEDERHOLT 12, Major, USAF, ““THE CHANGING FACE OF CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS” An examination in the post 9/11 environment,” https://www.hsdl.org/?
view&did=813401

The above issues lead to a lack of transparency and accountability of executive decisions, limits
to the electorate’s (and Congress’) ability to reflect critically on the ramifications of the use of
PMCs, and possibly to a re-shaping of the military ethos in the public’s perspective They also .

limit the ability of institutional checks from the media, non-governmental organizations, think
tanks, and academia to bring attention to these actions to the public sphere Without robust .53

checks and balances on the use of PMCs, critical judgments on foreign policy, potential
corruptive practices, or government performance in general, is difficul t for the public to know
and debate Thus the expanding use of PMCs into core military areas, or even the sole reliance
.

on PMCs for vital military support functions, can introduce friction into effective civil-military
relations . 1.4 Implications PMCs are not part of the military. When states hire PMCs to perform the work of war, they designate PMCs as their agents of violence.54 Those traditionally viewed as the trusted security agents of the state, customarily

As such, PMCs can

their military forces, are now ensconced in a structure where the application and management of violence no longer resides under their exclusive purview. The rise of the PMCs changes this distinctiveness.

affect both aspects of Feaver’s Problematique. This introduces a nuanced view into the civil-
military dialogue, and as argued here, requires an expansion in the military’s institutional idea
of professionalism. Huntington described military professionalism through the characteristics of expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. Janowitz similarly used professionalism, but approached it through a sociological lens.
Feaver contended that both Janowitz and Huntington defined away the problem of civilian control through their broad application of the ideal of professionalism.55 This implied that just stating the need for a professional military does nothing more than eschew the

As the country moves forward in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan

problems of control without critically thinking through the ramifications.

and Iraq, senior military leaders should take to heart the implications derived from issues PMCs
bring to civil-military relations The problem is that all of the civil-military relations theory
.

described here simply subsumes the use of PMCs Simply mirroring the institutional model .

presented by Huntington, with his prescription for strict rules, norms, and procedures is ill-
suited for the private sector PMCs do not fall under policies built under this institutional
.56

culture because of their private nature . They can say yes or no on any given situation. For example, unlike the US military, they do not have to refrain from participating in political events or from

Rather, PMCs internationalize military

expressing their views in public.57 Additionally, they do not operate in the society-military- political construct familiar to Huntington devotees.

operations, involving other governments, non- state actors, and individuals Thus, to apply . 58

Huntington’s model in order to control PMCs introduces many contradictions. One of these
contradictions is professionalism An ethic of professionalism does not exist in the PMC field
.

where long-term relations between the client and the contractor can create a consistent
relationship Some of this inconsistency is due to the lack of institutional commitment by the
.59

PMCs on oversight, training, and discipline .60 In one stark example, US reputation suffered badly after the Abu Ghraib scandal, yet while the soldiers involved fell under the UCMJ, the civilians
implicated escaped any prosecution or punishment.61 Additionally, the fact that PMCs hire employees from multiple countries and cultures introduces management challenges for the PMC and can prove consequential to completing the contracted mission.62
Finally, the market driven nature of the industry can encumber PMCs from institutionalizing a professional culture over time. Executive Outcomes, for example, one of the first PMCs in the post-Cold War era, formed in 1989 and dissolved in 1999.63 Of note, a
synthesis of civil-military literature regarding the use of PMCs often recommends a construct to professionalize the PMCs in the way Huntington envisioned.64 While it has its merits, the research conducted by Feaver indicates Huntington’s model did not accurately

Finally, oversight remains a

explain how civil-military relations worked during the Cold War.65 Applying the same function to PMCs may hide the true effects of their functions in the same manner.

daunting civil-military implication with increased PMC use The capacity of the state and the .

military to implement policies depends on effective oversight This requires a depth of .

institutional mechanisms at the macro and lower-level bureaucratic structures .66 For example, theoretical governmental

Feaver’s agency theory can provide a theoretical mechanism to

control, such as Huntington’s theory, represents a mechanism at the macro-level.

measure how the day-to-day civil-military machinations work. These mechanisms support senior
military leaders on creating meaningful measures of effectiveness to gauge oversight . However, the GAO

This threatens to skew how commanders plan for force

consistently reports on the inability of the government to manage the enormity of the contracting footprint.67

protection and develop rules of engagement regarding contractors . These implications present challenges to the senior military officer. The presence

It puts the military in the difficult position of obeying

of PMCs requires the commander to acknowledge the possibility of not having the right functions at the right time.

the executive, who possibly bypassed Congress, and providing advice on the military’s true
capability to Congress during periodic testimony . To whom do loyalties lie? If the executive bypasses Congress to avoid public debate of its foreign policy goals, yet orders the
military to work with those same contractors to accomplish the mission, how should the military respond?

Lack of professionalism and a failure of CMR collapses military effectiveness

and decimates global stability
Mackubin Thomas Owens 12. Professor of national security affairs in the National Security
Affairs Department of the Naval War College. 07-29-13. “What Military Officers Need to Know
about Civil-Military Relations.” Naval War College Review. Vol. 65, No. 2.

The combination of civil-military relations patterns and service doctrines affect military
DOCTRINES

effectiveness In essence, the ultimate test of a civil-military relations pat-tern is how well it
.

contributes to the effectiveness of a state’s military, especially at the level of strategic

assessment and strategy making . 50 However, Richard Kohn has explicitly called into question the effectiveness of the American military inthis realm, especially with regard to the planning and conduct of
operations otherthan those associated with large-scale conventional war. “Nearly twenty yearsa fter the end of the Cold War, the American military, financed by more money than the entire rest of the world spends on its armed forces, failed to defeat insurgencies

He attributes this lack of

or fully suppress sectarian civil wars in two crucial countries, each with less than a tenth of the U.S. population, after overthrowing those nations’ governments in a matter of weeks.” 51

effectiveness to a decline in the military’s professional competence with regard to strategic

planning In effect, in the most important area of professional expertise—the connecting of war
.“

to policy, of operations to achieving the objectives of the nation—the American military has
been found wanting This
. The excellence of the American military in operations, logistics, tactics, weaponry, and battle has been manifest for a generation or more. Not so with strategy.” 52

phenomenon manifests itself, he argues, in recent failure to adapt to a changing security

environment in which the challenges to global stability are “less from massed armies than from
terrorism; economic and particularly financial instability; failed states; resource scarcity
(particularly oil and potable water); pandemic disease; climate change; and international crime
in the form of piracy, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of organized
lawlessness.” He echoes
He observes that this decline in strategic competence has occurred during a time in which the U.S. military exercises enormous influence in the making of foreign and national security policies.

the claim of Colin Gray: “All too often, there is a black hole where American strategy ought to
reside.” 53 Is there some-thing inherent in current U.S. civil-military affairs that accounts for this failure of strategy? The failure of American civil-military relations to generate strategy can be attributed to the confluence of three factors. The first of
these is the continued REVIEW dominance within the American system of what Eliot Cohen has called the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, the belief that there is a clear line of demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the
uniformed military who then conduct the actual fighting. Until President George W.Bush abandoned it when he overruled his commanders and embraced the “surge” in Iraq, the normal theory has been the default position of most presidents since the Vietnam War.
Its longevity is based on the idea that the failure of Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara to defer to an autonomous military realm was the cause of American defeat in Vietnam.
 Plan
The United States federal government should implement a substantial
reduction of the sale of Private Military and Security Companies’ services
through the Foreign Military Sales Program.
 ITAR

Contention 2 is International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) –

PMC sales through the FMS undermine ITAR

Clive Walker AND Whyte 5, Walker, School of Law, University of Leeds and Department of
Applied Social Sciences, David Whyte, University of Stirling. “CONTRACTING OUT WAR?:
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, LAW AND REGULATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,”
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?
ID=53011207006607400209000506710106902200905603302009300907502108309100507612
50071200230040100060161220300400680261010151131231060560140250550171230830690
64028075097095005013070099066012023092122090010083126110104025107094119109093
007127096092092123026&EXT=pdf

The US regulatory system has been much longer established. The Arms Export Control Act
196899 and the [ITAR] International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)100 require State
Department approval for the sale of military equip- ment and related services (including
training) between US companies and foreign States. Manufacturers and providers of defence
goods or services for export must register with the Office of Defense Trade Controls in the [ DoS]
Department of State, from whom must be sought a license. Any letter of offer to sell defence
articles or services for $50m or more, any design and construc- tion services for $200m or more,
or any major defence equipment for $14m or more must be notified by the State Department
to Congress,101 a degree of legislative accountability not likely to be mirrored in the United
Kingdom.102 But the level of public information can be, and often is, limited for reasons of national security, so that only lists of countries and the defence articles are disclosed. The level
of scrutiny and control created by the US licensing regime, where every detail of the contract is
approved by the State Department’s Office of Defence Trade Controls,103 potentially enables
close control and knowledge of PMC activity. However, PMCs can also contract directly through
the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme, which does not require any
licensing. Instead the Department of Defense serves as an intermediary, arranging procurement, logistics and delivery and often providing product support and training to the relevant foreign
government, which in turn reimburses the Pentagon for its payments to the private contractor. Vinnellís contract to train the Saudi Arabian National Guard (the employees of which were a recent target of
attack)104 and several of MPRIís contracts to train the Balkan militaries came under the FMS program.105

The International Code of Conduct (ICOC) is the gold standard for norms
regarding PMCs, BUT it has limited effectiveness now due to lack of a strong
enforcement mechanism. The plan functionally moves the US in line with the
ICOC via implementing regulations in line with ITAR, which bolsters ICOC
credibility – that causes international follow-on and industry self-regulation
Reema Shah 14, Yale law, Bristow Fellow, supreme court clerk, “Beating Blackwater: Using
Domestic Legislation to Enforce the International Code of Conduct for Private Military
Companies,” https://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/beating-blackwater-using-domestic-
legislation-to-enforce-the-international-code-of-conduct-for-private-military-companies
*ICOCA = ICOC Association, led by a Board of Directors. The Board is chosen by the vote of all
members and consists of twelve individuals, with four members coming from PMCs, four from
civil society organizations, and four from states. They enforce the ICOC.

After years of being maligned as mercenaries, private military

I. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO REGULATION

contractors [PMCs] reemerged following the end of the Cold War. Weak states with few military
capabilities turned to PMCs for help,3 and even the United States hired private firms to
supplement its military operations in the 1990s in order to lower costs .4 This trend accelerated
dramatically following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Over the course of the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the involvement of PMCs ballooned. Their role expanded from
support activity to essential military functions, including combat,5 and by the later years of the
wars, half of total U.S. personnel deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan were private contractors .6
However, this extensive involvement by private forces gave rise to some of the most heinous human rights abuses of the wars, including the 2007 Nisour Square shooting7 and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.8
Upon coming to light, these incidents provoked domestic and international outrage and highlighted the legally ambiguous space in which contractors operated. In response, the United States enacted several
reforms to ensure that contractors were held accountable for their actions.9 The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), originally passed in 2000, was expanded in 2004 to allow contractors supporting
Defense Department missions abroad to be prosecuted for crimes that would result in more than one year of imprisonment if they were committed within the United States.10 And in 2007, Congress amended the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to subject private contractors to the system of courts-martial should they engage in misconduct.11 Few individuals have been prosecuted under the new provisions, but the

The U.S.
reforms went some way toward bringing U.S. military contractors under U.S. law.12 The issue, however, has grown well beyond the activities of contractors employed by the United States.

wars have changed the landscape elsewhere by giving rise to massive multinational PMCs and
also legitimating their use. This global industry is now estimated to have gross revenue of over
$100 billion per year,13 and these companies are not closing shop just because the U.S. wars
are ending. Instead, these sophisticated enterprises have shifted their focus to other lucrative
regions.14 For this reason, the absence of a clear legal framework to govern the conduct of multinational PMCs is highly problematic.15 Domestic legal reforms, such as those enacted by the United
States, have helped to hold private contractors participating in U.S. military operations accountable, but they do little to regulate the global PMC industry for two reasons. First, MEJA and the UCMJ can only be
used to prosecute individuals. When companies providing military services act illegally, no clear statutory basis exists to hold the whole company liable.16 Additionally, these laws fail to address the industry’s
increasingly global presence. The United States is no longer the only, or even the primary, consumer for private security providers. Consequently, laws that impose liability only for misdeeds occurring alongside
Department of Defense missions do not adequately constrain the conduct of PMCs abroad. Accordingly, since the mid-2000s, the international community has sought to fill the void by constructing a global regime
that can better monitor these companies, ensure compliance with human rights norms and international humanitarian law, and hold violators accountable. The first such effort was led by the Swiss government
and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which resulted in the completion of the Montreux Document in 2008.17 The document provides a list of best practices that states should implement to manage
PMCs.18 Forty-nine countries have become signatories to date.19 Yet Montreux’s efficacy has been limited both because it does not create any binding commitments and because it is directed at PMC behavior in
armed conflicts, which constitutes only a fraction of PMC activities.20 Montreux was followed by a more ambitious multi-stakeholder initiative, which led to the creation of the International Code of Conduct for

The ICoC outlines the obligations of [PMCs] private security companies under
Private Security Service Providers.

international law and specifies rules that ought to govern the use of force and vetting
procedures for subcontractors.21 Unlike earlier initiatives, the ICoC has been signed by over 708
companies worldwide and has garnered significant support from states and [NGOs]
nongovernmental organizations.22 The creation of the Code is a promising step in the effort to
ensure that private military companies respect human rights and comply with international law.
Nonetheless, its current effectiveness is limited because it lacks a viable enforcement
mechanism. II. THE INADEQUACY OF ICOCA If the ICoC is to fulfill its goal of constructing a global governance system to regulate private military companies, it must be meaningfully enforced. The
ICoC Association was launched in September 2013 in order to provide an oversight mechanism for the Code. States and human rights organizations lauded the formation of ICoCA as a groundbreaking step in
regulating the industry. The State Department even announced that it “anticipates incorporating membership in the ICoC Association as a requirement in the bidding process” for all future diplomatic security
contracts.23 Membership is open to all companies, civil society groups, and states that agree to adhere to the Code. The Association is led by a Board of Directors empowered to monitor and certify the
compliance of signatory companies.24 The Board is chosen by the vote of all members and consists of twelve individuals, with four members coming from PMCs, four from civil society organizations, and four from
states.25 ICoCA’s charter calls for in-field assessments of company practices and consultation between the Board and companies whose practices are found to violate the Code.26 It also establishes a complaint
procedure through which allegations of misconduct can be reported.27 While these are surely positive developments, it is difficult to see how they will be able to engender compliance with the Code’s strict
requirements without any punitive mechanisms. The absence of a judicial body or forum where PMCs can be held accountable if they persist in violating norms makes adherence to the Code largely voluntary.

The first of these is the adoption of a binding multilateral

Various options have been proposed as alternative mechanisms to enforce the ICoC.

treaty that would require signatories to provide for domestic enforcement of the ICoC
provisions.28 While such a treaty would likely be the most rigorous method of bolstering the
ICoC, it is not a viable option for the near future. The international consensus that is required to
achieve such a comprehensive treaty simply does not exist at this point, as demonstrated by the
limitations of the Montreux effort. Another option that has been floated is to leverage profits
from government contracting to induce compliance with the Code’s provisions. Because the United States, United
Kingdom, and United Nations have all made government contract awards contingent on company membership in ICoCA, some argue that the potential loss of business opportunities will deter companies from

disregarding the Code’s obligations.29 While this is a significant incentive, it is insufficient for two reasons. Firstly, because of the shrinking defense
budgets in the United States and Western Europe,30 the ability of the United States and its allies
to sway the behavior of PMCs is limited. Many of the most lucrative business opportunities are
likely to be found elsewhere,31 making the costs of losing U.S. and U.K. agency contracts
minimal compared to opportunities available in other regions . Given that many of the countries increasing military spending have
checkered histories with respect to human rights,32 this is particularly worrisome. It is unlikely that these states will follow the [US] United

States’s lead in requiring ICoCA membership for government contracts, especially if it results in
higher prices. Consequently, many companies will simply opt to forgo the constraints of the
ICoC. While the United States should continue to use its market power to leverage as much
compliance as possible, this approach is therefore at best only a limited means of enforcement .
Secondly, relying solely on the market could allow PMCs to essentially self-regulate while using ICoCA to legitimize their activities, akin to what has previously occurred. Over the past decade, private military
companies formed several industry associations to deflect criticism and improve standards.33 These associations put forth codes of conduct and were supposed to accredit member firms based on adherence to
the codes. But in practice, their ability to regulate PMC behavior generally fell short of expectations. They maintained close ties to the executives running the companies,34 whose desire to increase profits for their
companies conflicted with their ability to serve as effective market monitors.35 In the absence of any independent punitive power, many associations were essentially used to legitimize the industry and allow
governments to bypass more rigorous checks, while leaving companies free to police themselves.36 ICoCA is better placed than these industry groups were to serve as an effective overseer, but without a stronger
method of holding companies accountable for non-compliance, it risks a similar fate. Companies embraced the ICoC largely because their representatives were intimately involved in the drafting and discussion
process.37 While the inclusion of these parties has been key to ICoCA’s success thus far, the dominance of PMCs in the Association risks sacrificing its independence. The overwhelming majority of the
Association’s members are companies. Because all members vote to elect the Board of Directors responsible for overseeing the companies,38 the industry can exert significant influence over decisions regarding
certification. With no potential for legal accountability, ICoCA could turn into another iteration of earlier industry associations. The prospect of regulatory capture makes relying on the market insufficient to truly

For governments that have little interest in seriously regulating PMCs, which includes
enforce the Code.

many of the countries increasing military spending discussed earlier, mandating ICoCA
certification could allow them to claim compliance with international standards while forgoing
meaningful checks on company behavior. And even for governments that have shown a genuine desire to prevent PMC misconduct, such as the United States and
the United Kingdom, regulatory capture makes using market mechanisms illusory. If ICoCA membership is no longer a clear proxy for full adherence to the Code’s rigorous provisions, governments will still be
forced to conduct individualized assessments before making contracting decisions. These kinds of case-by-case comparisons can suffer from inconsistency and inattention, and obviate the advantages of an
institution such as ICoCA. Thus, relying on the market, while appealing, is inadequate to enforce the ICoC. III. DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT TO SPUR COMPLIANCE WITH THE ICOC This Comment therefore proposes a

By strengthening the
third approach, which aims to be more rigorous than market mechanisms of limited efficacy but more feasible than concluding a multilateral treaty.

domestic legal framework governing the conduct of [PMCs] private military companies, the
United States can assist international enforcement efforts and bolster the credibility of ICoCA.
More specifically, legislation modeled after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and
International Traffic in Arms Regulations ( ITAR) can be used, respectively, to directly regulate
U.S.-based PMCs hired by foreign governments and to indirectly regulate many foreign PMCs.
While some foreign companies would still be able to avoid U.S. laws, establishing such a
framework would both force many of the industry’s biggest companies to comply with the
international norms and human rights standards outlined by the ICoC and lay the groundwork
for the development of a more effective global regime.39 In the coming years, many PMCs based in the United States are likely to be hired by
foreign governments.40 In order to hold them accountable for their actions on behalf of these governments,

U.S. laws mandating adherence to ICoC standards41 must clearly apply to their conduct abroad.
The FCPA demonstrates how this can be accomplished through an effective extraterritoriality provision—one that reaches all U.S. citizens, nationals, and residents, all U.S. companies, and all foreign companies
that trade securities in the United States, regardless of the location of the illegal act.42 The FCPA criminalizes bribery of foreign officials and requires companies to keep detailed records of their transactions.43 It is
rigorously enforced by the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission; violations of the law can trigger penalties of up to $5 million and twenty years’ imprisonment for individuals and $25
million for corporations.44 In recent years, the DOJ and SEC have also forced companies to disgorge profits earned through illegal transactions. This has resulted in record-setting penalties, including fines directed
at Siemens for $800 million and Halliburton for $579 million.45 The DOJ and SEC have been able to impose these penalties because both U.S. companies and foreign companies that trade securities in the United
States have assets in the United States that can be readily fined. A similar approach could be used to hold U.S.-based PMCs liable for misconduct abroad. Authority could be given to the DOJ to pursue civil and
criminal actions against companies that depart from ICoC standards and commit an offense. Litigation would be conducted under the purview of Article III judges, who would be responsible for determining
whether a transgression had occurred. By making any legislation clearly applicable to both foreign and domestic activities of U.S. companies, lawmakers could counter the presumption against extraterritoriality.46
Because many of these companies have assets in the United States, coupling this extraterritorial scope with significant penalties for violations, as the FCPA did, would enable robust enforcement. This would
ensure that companies that violate the Code are not only rebuked by ICoCA, but also held legally accountable. U.S. companies contracting with foreign governments would thereby be compelled to adhere to ICoC
standards. Regulating foreign PMCs with no financial presence in the United States poses greater difficulty.47 The FCPA model is not useful where entirely foreign PMCs contract with foreign governments.

Given this, a more effective

Because these companies are unlikely to hold assets in the United States, enforcing penalties for misconduct becomes challenging.48

approach is to indirectly regulate foreign PMCs, by using their reliance on the expertise of
former U.S. military officers to induce them to abide by U.S. laws. ITAR offers a helpful
framework for how to do so. The regulations implement the Arms Export Control Act49 and
govern the import and export of defense-related products and services, including sensitive
technology and munitions; violating the regulations can trigger hefty fines and
imprisonment.50 One of ITAR’s key provisions prohibits Americans from training foreign
militaries without State Department approval. Most PMC services, including non-combat and
advisory functions, qualify as training foreign military forces and require State Department
authorization.51 Yet this restriction on the activities of U.S. citizens is rarely enforced, because the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, which is responsible for monitoring, is understaffed and
overwhelmed with managing arms exports.52 The United States could shape the overseas conduct of some foreign PMCs by making State Department approval of U.S. citizens’ participation in PMC activity
contingent on company compliance with ICoC standards. This could essentially be accomplished through agency action if greater resources were devoted to enforcement. U.S. persons seeking to provide defense
services abroad already must obtain a State Department license to do so.53 The Department could establish a policy of only granting licenses to U.S. citizens who are working for PMCs that adhere to the ICoC and
are accredited by ICoCA. To ease the administrative burden of this approval system, the State Department could maintain a list of compliant companies, which citizens could then rely upon in making employment
decisions. Coupling this licensing system with the possibility of civil and criminal prosecution if individuals are caught evading restrictions could effectively prevent Americans from offering their military know-how
to foreign companies that fail to meet international standards.54 Of course, this approach would not force foreign PMCs contracting with foreign governments to obey U.S. laws or hold them liable for failure to do

so.Nonetheless, many foreign companies are heavily reliant on the unparalleled expertise of
American former military officers.55 In fact, for most companies, their employment of highly
trained former U.S. officers is their most compelling sales pitch for obtaining business.56 Consequently,
while it is possible that some PMCs would choose to circumvent any restrictions by limiting their reliance on American personnel, this is unlikely to be the case across the industry. Many of the

companies would likely opt to comply with ICoC standards in order to be able to continue hiring
critical U.S. personnel. Passing legislation modeled after the FCPA and ITAR would likely lead to
changed practices in other countries as well. The FCPA helped bring about a dramatic change in attitudes toward corruption. Bribery has gone from being
accepted as the cost of doing business in certain countries to being treated almost universally as unethical, illegitimate, and counterproductive for economic growth.57 This evolution in norms resulted in the
passage of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1999, which has since been ratified by forty countries.58 The Convention requires signatories to enact domestic legislation criminalizing bribery of foreign officials
and monitors each country’s subsequent execution. Furthermore, the FCPA has prompted U.S. companies to pressure other countries to pass analogous legislation so as to level the playing field for their own

While there are important differences between

businesses.59 Together, these two developments have prompted widespread reforms abroad.60

building a global anti-corruption regime and a PMC regulatory regime, the progress the FCPA
has made illustrates how rigorous U.S. enforcement of ICoC standards could eventually
galvanize greater enforcement abroad. By engendering greater compliance with the Code’s provisions, domestic legislation could solidify norms of behavior among
PMCs. And by penalizing U.S.-based PMCs for violations, it could create a profit incentive for these companies to urge other countries to pass similar reforms. In conjunction, these changes could help bring about

Although ITAR has had a more limited impact on the development of

more effective global regulation of PMCs.

international norms because the regulations only apply to U.S. exporters, they have changed the
behavior of many defense-related companies in a way that has had ripple effects throughout
the industry. Because the regulations impose a duty on companies to come forward and disclose
breaches of ITAR to the government,61 and impose significant penalties for failing to do so,
many munitions manufacturers have implemented internal checks to more rigorously monitor
compliance.62 Greater scrutiny of the activities of companies that train foreign militaries would
likely spur similar norms of internal corporate policing among PMCs as well . By using the FCPA and ITAR as models, the
United States could provide for the first truly meaningful enforcement of the ICoC, and thereby hold PMCs accountable for a much wider range of activities than those covered by MEJA and the UCMJ. While
current congressional gridlock makes passing this kind of legislation difficult, there are reasons to be optimistic that this proposal can nonetheless be implemented in large part. The FCPA was similarly ambitious
and encountered significant opposition, but still managed to pass.63 And the alterations to ITAR could be enacted through executive orders instead of legislation, thereby circumventing the need for congressional

The establishment of ICoCA is an

involvement. In conjunction, these changes could in the long term trigger substantial changes in behavior globally. CONCLUSION

important development in building a legal framework to govern the global conduct of PMCs. Yet
it suffers from the same weakness that has hampered earlier efforts to regulate PMCs on a
multinational scale: the absence of a viable enforcement mechanism. Through stronger
domestic legislation that borrows from the approaches of the FCPA and ITAR, the United States
could ensure greater compliance with the Code and bolster the credibility of ICoCA as it seeks to
establish a global governance regime for PMCs .

Scenario 1 is Russia –

US promotion of ICOC, specifically the Montreux Document, causes Russia to

cease gray-zone operations using PMCs, AND challenges Russia’s “deniability”
strategy
Christopher R. Spearin 18, a professor in the Department of Defence Studies, Royal Military
College of Canada/Canadian Forces College, wrote Private Military and Security Companies and
States: Force Divided, “Russia’s Military and Security Privatization,”
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Summer_2018/7_Spearin.pdf

In light of this signi cance, this article answers the following questions: What role do PMSCs play
in Russian military endeavors? What informs this role? And what policy might inform a US
response in the longer term? In answering these questions, the article identi es the presence of
PMSCs in Russian military thinking. In turn, it highlights the recent Russian utilization of PMSCs
as a gray-zone challenge, de ned as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-
state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality [that] are characterized by
ambiguity about the nature of the con ict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about
the relevant policy and legal frameworks.”11

America should place

Given this challenge, the article contends the United States might robustly highlight its stance towards the PMSC industry: namely,

PMSCs in a normatively defensive context in which utilization is transparent.12 The [ US] United
States might promote greater international acceptance of the Montreux Document, which US of
cials have endorsed, that sets the defensive nature of PMSCs. Since the document establishes
that PMSCs focus on “armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys,
buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention;
and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel,” successfully promoting it might
help the United States influence the removal of such nonstate actors from Russia’s gray-zone
arsenal.13 Russian Thinking and Usage Using contractors, and PMSCs as a subset of those actors, is a key element of the American way of war.14 This application was
made plain during the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq—for instance, US Central Command reported 176,000 contractors were deployed alongside the 209,000
uniformed personnel under its responsibility in 2010.15 The PMSC employees accounted for about 15 percent of the private presence, an amount considerably larger than many
military contingents offered by America’s allies.16 For the United States, this development is, in part, a function of decades of decisions underscored by both the strategic
requirement for resources and neoliberal thinking.17 The integration concerns how, why, and by whom tasks are done, with an eye towards reaping the bene ts of fostering a
division between service managers and service providers with the latter facing potential competitors. The desired result is to reduce costs, gain ef ciencies, and create
economies of scale. Looking back to the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration initiated public-private competitions. A decade later, the Johnson administration reinforced this
approach through the Performance of Commercial Activities circular. The Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush administrations bolstered the process and its dual fundamentals of
preventing government competition with civilian enterprise and maintaining competitive responses and economic ef ciency.18 Analysis of the resulting changes reveals a
movement from government towards governance.19 Given the fact that the United States is both the world’s dominant military power and largest consumer of PMSC services,
other states have taken note for the sake of assessment and adaptation if not emulation. For-pro t actors, for instance, are now nestled into contemporary Russian
considerations of the nature of war. Russian military doctrine released in 2014 speci cally categorizes such nonstate actors as private military companies.20 Likewise, General
Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, has re ected on the changes in the conduct of warfare. While widely recognized as the Gerasimov
doctrine, “doctrine” likely goes too far in terms of offering a sense of programmatic unity.21 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article, private military companies are
presented therein as a new actor in the modern milieu.22 While Gerasimov and his colleagues may have merely acknowledged the American way ofwar or, relatedly, identi ed
the means and challenges Russia will likely confront in the future, one can rightly argue that they do, in fact, describe Russian approaches and practices, especially regarding for-
pro t violent actors.23 In the collective Russian approach towards these actors, the word “military” is quite exible. From one angle, private military companies are deemed
nonmilitary armed forces. This re ects the variance of manpower levels, weaponry types, and professionalism—or capability and repower—compared to a state’s army, navy,
and air force.24 From another angle, these actors are not solely for maintaining the status quo or for offering protective services. Instead, “private military companies . . .
prepare an operational setup” for the eventual activities of state armed forces.25 These actors can also conduct independent offensive operations. Moreover, the relationship
between state authorities and private military companies is quite intimate, to the point that companies form “ ‘hybrid businesses,’ technically private, but essentially acting as an
arm of the Russian state.”26 The characteristics and nature of this approach are informed by two factors. First, private military companies t into “new generation war- fare,”
which despite some differences is known in Western assessments as hybrid warfare.27 In this approach, armed forces remain valuable; however, the state utilization and
orchestration of nonmilitary measures of strategic in uence are increasingly important.28 On one hand, “new” may be somewhat of a misnomer. The Soviet experience reveals a
long history of relying upon nonstate actors, whether partisans or guerrillas, in various countries, to achieve directed military and policy objectives.29 In this sense,
contemporary Russia has not turned to military and security privatization to reduce costs, gain ef ciency, and create economies of scale as is evident in the US case. Instead, with
nonstate actors working in conjunction with the Russian state, Moscow is revisiting the use of nonstate uniformed means. On the other hand, Gerasimov asserts the “role of
non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”30 In this
“new” environment, actors like PMSCs are perceived to have a leg up, at least in some domains, vis-à-vis much larger state-based organizations. The second factor is that the
uncertain legal status of these nonstate actors in the Russian context heightens the obfuscation.31 To explain, there are currently no rules in the Russian Criminal Code that de
ne the use of Russian rms abroad. Companies so operating have had to present themselves as advisors or “training centers” or have sought incorporation outside of Russian
territory.32 This solution applied, for instance, to Russian rms conducting tasks such as defending maritime shipping from pirates, escorting logistics convoys in con ict zones, and
protecting energy sector infrastructure. This approach is required to take a wide berth around Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code that prohibits Russian mercenaries. In this
context, a mercenary is “a person who acts for the purpose of getting a material reward, and who is not a citizen of the state in whose armed con ict or hostilities he participates,
who does not reside on a permanent basis on its territory and who is not a person ful lling of cial duties.”33 The RSB-Group, for example, is registered domestically to work
within Russia and registered in the British Virgin Islands for international operations.34 In 2016–17, the RSB-Group employees worked in eastern Libya ostensibly to remove
landmines. Owner Oleg Krinitsyn indicated, however, the rm had other tasks and operated under liberal conditions regarding the application of violence: “If we’re under assault
we enter the battle, of course, to protect our lives and the lives of our clients. . . . According to military science, a counterattack must follow an attack. That means we would
have to destroy the enemy.”35 Moreover, the group operated in a region controlled by General Khalifa Haftar, a warlord enjoying both Egyptian and Russian support. Though
the rm’s actual employer is unknown, Krinitsyn did indicate the RSB-Group was “‘consulting’ with the Russian foreign ministry.”36 In short, the RSB-Group provided Russia the
ability to maintain its in uence without a uniformed state presence. The malleability of the Russian approach is also evident in the case of the Moran Security Group and the
Slavonic Corps. In 2013, supposedly Syrian paymasters hired the Moran Security Group to protect energy infrastructure. Moran gave this task to the Slavonic Corps (registered in
Hong Kong), which provided 267 personnel for the proposed ve-month mission.37 The mission subsequently changed to offensive operations with activities directed against
Syrian rebels. Poorly resourced, the service ended after only one month. Detaining the security personnel who returned to Russia in the fall of 2013, the Federal Security Services
(FSB) also conducted the rst arrests under Article 359—Vadim Gusev and Evgeny Sidorov, two Slavonic Corps commanders. This response occurred despite the fact that the head
 Finally, Russian firms can be absorbed into
of Moran Security Group was a FSB reservist and the mission likely had FSB clearance.38

broader state initiatives designed to create hesitation and confusion consistent with gray-zone
challenges. For instance, Russian orchestration of the con ict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine featured a variety of armed actors known as “green men” that brought
about Russia’s creeping success. Russian rms such as Wagner were part of this collage, and media reports suggest Wagner had access to a Russian military base near eastern
Ukraine.39 Reports also suggest the company’s efforts were highly valued by other actors on the ground.40 Indeed, the US government recognized Wagner’s impact in the
region after the fact: the company “recruited and sent soldiers to ght alongside separatists in eastern Ukraine. PMC Wagner is being designated for being responsible for or
complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.”41 Toward a

Diplomatic Strategy The [US] United States has had many reasons to set limits on the PMSC industry.
Certainly, America wished to avoid accusations of hiring mercenaries, who are inherently shadowy actors in the modern context. The pejorative term, mercenary, would have
tainted US initiatives in already complex undertakings such as the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States Federal Acquisition Regulation plainly establishes
PMSC personnel are “not mercenaries and are not authorized to engage in offensive operations.”42 Though the international legal de nition of a mercenary does not make an
offensive or defensive differentiation, nor does Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code, the United States, through its purchasing power and regulatory activities, has instilled
this distinction.43 Moreover, making this distinction permitted the US military to focus actively upon offensive undertakings that upset the status quo, showed initiative in
theatre, seized territory (rather than only holding it), and demanded specialized skillsets and sophisticated equipment denied to other actors.44 In the of cial US determination
then, PMSCs are defensively boxed: “The use of force by [PMSCs] is limited to self- defense, the defense of others and the protection of U.S. Government property. . . . [PMSCs]
may not engage in combat, which is de ned as deliberate destructive action against hostile armed forces or other armed actors.” 45 Making this distinction was also valuable
because other states, as indicated above, followed the US lead vis-à-vis military and security privatization. Since the PMSC activities of others could negatively impact US
operations in theatre, framing the PMSC industry through common practices, expectations, and regulation became important.46 Thus the United States was a key negotiating
party and one of the original state signatories to the Montreux Document, which at the time of writing, had been endorsed by 54 states, 24 of which are NATO members and
many of whom are close US allies; Russia is not a signatory. Linked to this evolution, the American National Standards Institute and ASIS International developed the PSC.1

This standard operationalizes the [ICOC] International

Standard in 2012, at the request of the US Department of Defense.47

Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, the industry’s supporting initiative for
the Montreux Document. 48 As stressed by Ian Ralby, PSC.1 “provides auditable procedures for the development, certi cation, and monitoring of ongoing
compliance” of PMSCs at home and abroad.49 The US Departments of Defense and State now require PSC.1 compliance for the rms they hire, and other state and private clients
of PMSCs have embraced the standard.50 Given the particular nature of Russia’s reliance upon military and security privatization, the United States faces a challenge with two
characteristics. First, Russia’s offensive use of these nonstate actors con icts with the longstanding US practice and political efforts toward limiting PMSCs to defensive
endeavors. Second, Russia utilizes, rather than employs, these actors. This challenge is exacerbated further by the relationship between the two nations: Russia is not an ally
with whom the United States might engage closely or diplomatically nor are the countries likely to develop a common practice in theatre. Nevertheless, the United States might

As Deborah Avant notes, one cannot

make progress by drawing attention to how Russia relies upon military and security privatization.

ignore the impact of the [US] United States, which “has chosen to play a large consumer role in
this market and its choices have therefore had a large impact on the market’s ecology.”51 This role has
helped to limit what the international industry should sell and to indicate, in a normative sense, what other interested parties should buy. This “defensive” norm does not
collapse simply because Russia does not fully follow it in the rst or early instances. However, given that norms are in uenced strongly through practice, especially the practice of

This weakening standard would have negative implications for maintaining

powerful actors, they could loosen.

international peace and security and managing violence worldwide. In short, a strong US
influence can preserve the country’s normative power to maintain global stability. In this vein, the US
government recently upheld its defensive credentials by turning down the possibility of employing PMSCs more robustly and offensively. On several occasions in 2017, Erik
Prince, the founder of the PMSC Blackwater, advocated for the United States to take a new approach towards its operations in Afghanistan. His plan, directed more towards
counterterrorism than counterinsurgency, called for reducing the US military presence. Prince proposed 5,000 contractors and 90 privately supplied aircraft to replace departing
US military elements.52 Rather than rotating in and out as state military forces do, this private presence would be a long-term engagement at a substantially lower annual cost
of $10 billion rather than the $45 billion spent currently. Under this plan, these private personnel would both mentor and become enmeshed within the Afghan security sector.
Personnel would become more and more engaged in the full spectrum of operations, moving beyond the limitations set for the international PMSC industry. Nevertheless,
despite President Trump’s avowed tendency toward unorthodox solutions, the proposal was not acted upon. The second reason to preserve this normative power relates to the

As Russia has made clear, companies can be used in gray-zone conflict

strategic implications for the United States.

activities that feature “rising revisionist intent, a form of strategic gradualism, and
unconventional tools.”53 Gray-zone practitioners look to upend the international system favoring
the United States slowly through efforts that fall short of major armed con ict or that occur in
bewildering ways. For Russia, its use of firms deviates from US expectations, promotes
deniability, and increases confusion in regions of US interest . Given the dif culty in deterring
Russia from utilizing a particular tool in its gray-zone arsenal, either through the threat of force
or sanction, US promotion of the Montreux Document might help steer privatization efforts
away from the aforementioned ambiguity, opacity, and uncertainty inherent in wider gray-
zone endeavors. Formal, state- sanctioned efforts will bring the utility of unconventional gray-zone strategies into doubt.54 To avoid the castigation caused by
having its efforts labeled mercenary and obscure, Russia might eventually sign the document or at least adopt a similar approach. Several factors underscore this contention.

To start with, the Montreux Document has a catholic approach to “private business entities that
provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves.”55 The
document can, therefore, apply to a variety of activities. In turn, by identifying and relying upon
existing international law, the document spells out the pertinent legal obligations for states. Ful
lling these requirements makes it less likely that states can deny a PMSC presence and argues
against the notion that the organizations exist in legal limbo. To ensure further transparency,
the document outlines good practices for states to follow . Thus, promoting the internationally recognized Montreux Document
rather than advancing the US standard PSC.1, which might be problematic for universal acceptance, would make diplomatic sense. Furthermore, the management and control of
violence concerns all states. One can view this from two angles. First, as Jack Straw asserted when he was the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, “The control of violence is one of the fundamental issues—perhaps the fundamental issue—in politics.”56 Managing and framing the limitations on
nonstate actors capable of applying violence has been a long-term effort, arguably ongoing since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It is a task engaged by states for the sake of
preserving the state as an institution and for creating joint expectations within the international society of states.57 Second, in a more immediate way, while the Russian use of
these nonstate actors is cast in the context of upending the international system favoring the United States, gray-zone con ict dynamics and revisionist intents might appeal to
other states who wish to shift at least a local dyadic or regional status quo. Consequently, these objectives arguably behoove many states to prevent erstwhile adversaries from
asymmetrically levelling the playing eld through military and security privatization. Taken together, the United States need not focus solely on Russia given the wider

Although it did not sign the Montreux Document, a

international utility. Additionally, there are speci c Russian matters to consider.

Russian delegation was involved early in the negotiations. Most likely, Western criticism of
Russia’s August 2008 con ict with Georgia subdued Moscow’s interest in the initiative .58 In this vein,
though they have not come to fruition, there have been several domestic legislative attempts to authorize and legalize the foreign work of Russian rms.59 Finally, there have
been concerns within the Russian security sector that substantial military and security privatization efforts will affect morale and give rise to unhealthy competition.60 Taken

Russia’s use of
together, these factors speak to a larger constituency for having Russia become part of the international normative fold. Concluding Remarks

firms as offensive tools in gray-zone con ict is not in keeping with the defensive use of PMSCs
established by global practices underscored by the United States. Indeed, the United States sets
such standards in large part by its own usage of PMSCs, by serving as an example for others, and
by its diplomatic engagement, often with close allies. Russia’s application of these nonstate
actors is also contrary to the associated effort to make the industry more transparent and less
deniable. As such, a renewed emphasis on spreading the merits of the Montreux Document would be an appropriate US policy response. Such an effort is important
because, as is plain with the Russian experience, the PMSC phenomenon should no longer be interpreted as a creature of policymaking within the United States and between it
and its allies. Many PMSCs are now a part of the confrontational, if not adversarial, relationships between great powers. Given these stakes, this article recommends two
avenues for further examination. The first is for the United States to engage the PMSC industry to sustain and to elevate the Montreux Document. Earlier actions and statements
of individual companies and industry associations suggest they too wish to avoid the normatively pejorative label of mercenary.61 To capture this statistically, over 700
companies have signed the aforementioned International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. Consideration might be given, therefore, to catalyzing and
supporting industry activism that might ensure PMSCs do not become tarnished by the “offensiveness” of Russian activities.

Russian use of PMCs in gray-zones causes military escalation

Kathleen H. Hicks 19, Senior Vice President; Henry A. Kissinger Chair; Director, International
Security Program “Russia in the Gray Zone,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-gray-zone

Russia’s gray zone efforts are also visible in the military sphere, below the level of direct warfare
with the United States. Over strenuous U.S. objections, Russia recently sold Turkey a sophisticated surface-to-air missile system, the S-400. Aside from further
testing Turkey’s place in the NATO alliance, there is fear that the Russian engineers will gain access to U.S.-made equipment in Turkey’s existing or future arsenal. In space,
Russia conducts operations against U.S. commercial and allied military satellites, and in cyberspace, Russia’s Main Intelligence Administration, or GRU, has been active not only
in election interference but in probing the U.S. power grid. Russian and Chinese cyber infiltration of U.S. naval assets and systems is also well documented. In the Western
Hemisphere, in-spite of dire economic and humanitarian conditions, Russia persuaded Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro from stepping down and provided support to the

Presenting perhaps the greatest risk for military escalation beyond

Maduro regime in the form of military advisers.

the gray zone is Russian use of disguised forces . In Ukraine, Syria, and the Central African
Republic, for instance, Russia has deployed a paramilitary mercenary organization , the Wagner
Group. Last year, U.S. military forces successfully struck Wagner Group positions in Syria.

Specifically, Russia’s use of deniability increases the risk of escalation and

miscalc
Petersohn ’18 (Ulrich, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of Liverpool, “By
fighting wars with private armed forces, Russia risks conflict between major powers,” pg online
@ http://theconversation.com/by-fighting-wars-with-private-armed-forces-russia-risks-conflict-
between-major-powers-94373 //ghs-40 AND CHRIS)
 This gave both sides the
What prevented the situation from escalating was the fact that the attackers were not in fact members of the Russian armed forces, but private military and security contractors (PMSCs).

benefit of plausible deniability. Russia pretended not to know about Russians in the area, while
the US denied any knowledge of Russian involvement . But while the encounter didn’t escalate, one thing is clear: private combat providers are back in business, and are not

The former practice might be controversial, yet it is

only deployed in domestic conflicts against rebels. They are also starting to take part in interstate rivalries.

unlikely to escalate into interstate war. The latter, however, risks further inflaming interstate
rivalries This meant major powers
. Before the 19th century, rulers used mercenaries and privateers on a regular basis to exploit as much leeway as they could with a minimum of responsibility.

could deploy force against their rivals while plausibly denying any involvement; the specific
association between an adversary and the attacking force would be unclear . This is still a useful advantage today. Unlike regular

But while the resulting uncertainty provides

armed forces, private actors can be hired and fired quickly, and their authorisation to use violence issued and withdrawn swiftly.

cover for adventurous policies, it also increases the risk that conflicts will escalate and that
major powers will be dragged into wars . This was a crucial reason why the international community resisted a resurgence of combat providers for hire in the first decade of the 2000s. The
services on the market for force were intentionally limited to armed security services, and specific rules for contracting were drafted, as were guidelines for PMSCs’ conduct. Since then, the overwhelming majority of the industry has usually refrained from combat
services. But in recent years, a small number of commercial organisations have been providing exactly these services to governments. In 2013, the Nigerian government employed a PMSC to support its combat operations against Boko Haram, while the United Arab
Emirates hired a private company to build up a 800-member battalion of foreign troops to conduct “urban combat” or “destroy enemy equipment and personnel”. Although controversial, PMSCs are either deployed alongside or integrated into states’ armed forces.

That doesn’t entail the same risk of escalation as the practices of combat in international rivalries prior to the 19th century. But Russia has taken things further: it has deployed
combat PMSCs to fight against other states . Into the fray Since 2014, the Russian government has used several PMSCs in both Ukraine and Syria. In the first case, it employed PMSCs
alongside regular forces in Crimea, disarming Ukrainian forces, seizing military installations and preventing the Ukrainians from entering Crimea. Although used in an offensive posture in an interstate conflict, Crimea was annexed without large-scale violence. The
situation was somewhat different in Eastern Ukraine, where PMSCs were deployed in support of pro-Russian forces. This time, PMSCs engaged Ukrainian forces in combat. Eastern Ukraine has become an arena for a new kind of conflict. Pavalena via Shutterstock In
Syria, PMSCs have been deployed on a large scale alongside regular Russian and Syrian forces, and participated in several battles against violent non-state actors. While they most certainly had an impact on the internal conflict dynamic, it did not directly affect
interstate rivalry. Superficially speaking, the 2018 Deir ez-Zor attack smacked of the same strategy Russia followed in Ukraine. But whereas the Ukrainian conflict triggered a major international diplomatic dispute, there was relatively little risk that the PSMCs’ actions
there would trigger a major interstate war. By contrast, the attack on US soldiers in Syria means that PMSCs have been used to directly engage a powerful international rival in an extremely volatile arena. And there could be more to come. Clean hands Interstate
rivalries always have at least some potential to escalate. Diplomatic transgressions, accidental encounters, or violent incidents can prompt different sides to take tough stances and refuse to budge for fear of looking weak in front of domestic and international
audiences. And these incidents are difficult to manage at the best of times, never mind during a conflict as complicated as the one in Syria. Paradoxically, a way out of this conundrum could be the same means the attacker uses to conceal its involvement: plausible
deniability, which allows both parties to avoid looking weak. This requires the tacit collusion of all involved. Since each side knows the other is involved, it’s not about true concealment; the point is to defuse the situation. By accepting the attacker’s claim not to have
been involved, the target can avoid looking weak for not taking countermeasures. This practice was common during the Cold War, and it took the heat out of various potentially lethal encounters. During the Korean war, Russian pilots fought with North Korea – but

while the US and its allies were aware, both sides kept quiet about it to avoid escalation beyond the Korean peninsula. But relying on plausible deniability can also be very
risky . For a start, it relies on the assent of both parties, which in turn means they must agree on what kind of transgressions are actually acceptable. And while the Cold War’s two opposing blocs understood each other reasonably well, the boundaries that
govern today’s conflicts are far more blurred. Were Russian-hired contractors to kill 100 US soldiers, for instance, it’s not clear that the two sides would know each other’s minds well enough to agree on what the consequences should be. That brings us back to the

When PMSCs are deployed, they

hiring of private actors. During the Cold War, these sorts of actions were not outsourced to the private sector, meaning they were clearly associated with one party or another.

might work for one of two interstate rivals, but they can also work for a third party. Unclear
associations increase the likelihood of dangerous misperceptions and misattributions . To see combat PMSCs being

This is a watershed moment in the way states deploy private forces.

introduced into interstate rivalry is therefore more than a little disturbing.

And by crossing this line, Russia and others could bring major powers to the brink of direct
conflict .

rUS-Russia war is destroys life on earth

Starr ’17 (Steven Starr 17, Starr is the director of the University of Missouri's Clinical
Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social
Responsibility, 1-9-2017, "Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject
Nuclear Winter Studies," FAS, https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-
armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/)

detonation
The will instantly ignite fires
of an atomic bomb with this explosive power the over a surface area of three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that

blast, fire, and radiation could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those
from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs

worldwide in World War II, the long-term environmental

or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. However,

effects of the war could significantly disrupt the global weather which would result in a for at least a decade, likely

vast global famine nuclear firestorms would cause black carbon

. The scientists predicted that in the burning cities at least five million tons of

smoke form a global layer that

to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would stratospheric smoke

would remain for a decade absorb sunlight

more than produc
. The smoke would warming , which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, ing

ozone losses reaching UV-B indices

of 20 to 50 percent over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it would create
unprecedented in human history . In North America and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals. As the

would produce cold temperatures

smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface, it global the est average surface in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that

food production would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a five-year period following such a
war. the shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural
Medical experts have predicted that

production could cause up to two billion people to perish from famine. The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war
fought with the vastly more powerful modern thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an
atomic bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to 80 times more powerful than
the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT. Strategic nuclear weapons produce

much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square miles. A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and
Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles.
The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot and smoke, which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to 20 years, and it would block as much
as 70 percent of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight. Under such conditions,

would require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum temperatures to fall below
it only

freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two years. Average surface

Growing seasons would be

temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%.

completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would be too cold and dark to grow food
crops, which would doom the majority of the human population. NUCLEAR WINTER IN BRIEF The profound cold and darkness following nuclear war
became known as nuclear winter and was first predicted in 1983 by a group of NASA scientists led by Carl Sagan. During the mid-1980s, a large body of research was done by such groups as the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), the
World Meteorological Organization, and the U.S. National Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; their work essentially supported the initial findings of the 1983 studies. The idea of nuclear winter, published and supported by prominent
scientists, generated extensive public alarm and put political pressure on the United States and Soviet Union to reverse a runaway nuclear arms race, which, by 1986, had created a global nuclear arsenal of more than 65,000 nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this
created a backlash among many powerful military and industrial interests, who undertook an extensive media campaign to brand nuclear winter as “bad science” and the scientists who discovered it as “irresponsible.” Critics used various uncertainties in the studies
and the first climate models (which are primitive by today’s standards) as a basis to criticize and reject the concept of nuclear winter. In 1986, the Council on Foreign Relations published an article by scientists from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, who
predicted drops in global cooling about half as large as those first predicted by the 1983 studies and described this as a “nuclear autumn.” The nuclear autumn studies were later shown to be deeply flawed, but the proof came too late to stop a massive smear
campaign that effectively discredited the initial studies. Nuclear winter was subject to criticism and damning articles in the Wall Street Journal and Time magazine. In 1987, the National Review called nuclear winter a “fraud.” In 2000, Discover Magazine published an
article that described nuclear winter as one of “The Twenty Greatest Scientific Blunders in History.” The endless smear campaign was successful; the general public, and even most anti-nuclear activists, were left with the idea that nuclear winter had been
scientifically disproved. REJECTION BY LEADERS Yet the scientists did not give up. In 2006, they returned to their labs to perform the research I have previously described. Their new research not only upheld the previous findings but also found that the earlier studies
actually underestimated the environmental effects of nuclear war. Dr. Robock of Rutgers and Dr. Toon of the University of Colorado have spent years attempting to bring official attention to their work and get follow-up research studies done by appropriate agencies
in the federal government. In a recent (2016) interview, Dr. Toon stated: The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, which should be investigating this problem, have done absolutely nothing. They have not published a single paper, in the open
literature, analyzing this problem … We have made a list of where we think the important issues are, and we have gone to every [federal] agency we can think of with these lists, and said “Don’t you think someone should study this?” Basically, everyone we have
tried so far has said, “Well that’s not my job.” In the same interview, Dr. Robock also noted: The Department of Homeland Security really should fund this. They will fund you to study one terrorist bomb in New York City. When you explain to them that a war
between India and Pakistan is a much greater threat to the U.S. homeland than one terrorist bomb, as horrible as that is, they respond with “Oh, well that’s not my job, go talk to some other program manager” — who, of course, doesn’t exist. After the more recent
series of studies were published in 2007 and 2008, Drs. Robock and Toon also made a number of requests to meet with members of the Obama administration. The scientists offered to brief Cabinet members and the White House staff about their findings, which
they assumed would have a great impact upon nuclear weapons policy. Their offers were met with indifference. Finally, after several years of trying, Drs. Robock and Toon were allowed an audience with John Holdren, Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama on
Science and Technology. Dr. Robock also eventually met with Rose Gottemoeller, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Dr. Robock has written to me that, after these meetings, he and Dr. Toon were left with the impression that
neither Holdren nor Gottemoeller think the nuclear winter research “is correct.” But it is not only Holdren and Gottemoeller who reject the nuclear winter research. Greg Mello, of the Los Alamos Study Group, cites a source who confirms that the group that
determines the “full range of activities related to the development, production, maintenance (upkeep) and elimination (retirement, disassembly and disposal) of all United States nuclear weapons — the members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council — have stated
that “the predictions of nuclear winter were disproved years ago.” The members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council include: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Commander of the United States Strategic Command It is important to understand that some members of this group — especially the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) — also develop the policies that guide the use of nuclear weapons. Perhaps General John Hyten, Head of USSTRATCOM, who is in charge of the U.S. nuclear triad, and General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the second highest
ranking officer in the United States, have never seen or heard of the 21st century nuclear winter studies. Perhaps when they hear a question about “nuclear winter,” they only remember the smear campaigns done against the early studies. Or, maybe, they just
choose not to accept the new scientific research on nuclear winter, despite the fact that it has withstood the criticism of the global scientific community. Regardless, the rejection of nuclear winter research by the top leaders of the United States raises some
profoundly important questions: Do U.S. military and political leaders fully understand the consequences of nuclear war? Do they realize that even a “successful” nuclear first-strike against Russia could cause most Americans to die from nuclear famine? In 2010, Drs.
Toon and Robock wrote in Physics Today: We estimate that the direct effects of using the 2012 arsenals would lead to hundreds of millions of fatalities. The indirect effects would likely eliminate the majority of the human population. In 2013, Drs. Toon and Robock
wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that: A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in Self-

Assured Destruction. RENEWED COLD WAR Although president-elect Trump appears to favor a return to the policy of détente with Russia, many if not most U.S. political leaders appear to support the Obama administration’s policies of direct
confrontation with Putin’s Russia . Mainstream corporate media, including the editorial boards of The New York Times and The Washington Post, routinely engage in anti-Russian and anti-Putin rhetoric that

renewed the Cold War and engaged in

surpasses the hate speech of the McCarthy era. Under President Obama, the United States has with Russia, with little or no debate or protest, has subsequently

proxy wars with Russia in Ukraine and Syria, as well as threatening military action against China
in the South China Sea NATO has built up a “rapid-response
. In response to what NATO leaders describe as Russia’s “dangerous and aggressive actions,”

force” on the Russian border in the Baltic States and Poland.

of 40,000 troops This force includes hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery. NATO

within artillery range of St. Petersburg

troops stationed in Estonia are deployed its Aegis , the second largest city of Russia. The United States has Ashore Ballistic

BMD in Romania and is constructing another

Missile Defense ( ) system in Poland The Mark 41 launch such BMD system .

system in the Aegis Ashore systems can

used launch long-range nuclear-armed cruise be used to a variety of missiles, including

missiles In other words, the United States has built and is building launch sites for nuclear
.

missiles on the Russian border Russia

. This fact has been widely reported on Russian TV and has infuriated the Russian public. In June, Russian President Putin specifically warned that

would be forced to retaliate Russia appears to be preparing

against this threat. While Russian officials maintain that its actions are normal and routine, now

for war conducted a nation-wide civil defense drill that included 40 million
. On October 5, 2016, Russia of its people being

directed to fallout shelters Russia moved its Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad

. Reuters reported two days later that had nuclear-capable ,
which borders Poland. While the United States ignores the danger of nuclear war, Russian scholar Stephen Cohen reports that the danger of war with the United States is the leading news story in Russia. Cohen states: Just as there is no discussion of the most
existential question of our time, in the American political class — the possibility of war with Russia — it is the only thing being discussed in the Russian political class . . . These are two different political universes. In Russia, all the discussion in the newspapers, and
there is plenty of free discussion on talk show TV, which echoes what the Kremlin is thinking, online, in the elite newspapers, and in the popular broadcasts, the number 1, 2, 3, and 4 topics of the day are the possibility of war with the United States. Cohen goes on to

the leadership of Russia actually believes in reaction to what the United States and
say: I conclude from this that now,

NATO have said and done over the last two years, and particularly in reaction to the breakdown
of the proposed cooperation in Syria, and the rhetoric coming out of Washington, that war is a
real possibility Trump is
. I can’t remember when, since the Cuban Missile Crisis, that the Moscow leadership came to this conclusion in its collective head. Perhaps this narrative will change under president-elect . However, he

inheriting a situation fraught with danger which retains the possibility of direct military conflict ,

with Russia in Syria, Ukraine and as well as increasingly militarized confrontation with China in the South China Sea.
Scenario 2 is the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) –

PMC use in the Indian Ocean is effective, BUT lack of regulation ensures it fails –
greater ICOC enforcement is essential
James Brown 12, served as an officer in the Australian Defence Force prior to becoming
Military Fellow at the Lowy Institute “Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean’s
Private Security Boom,”
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/brown_pirates_and_privateers_web_0.pdf

The use of maritime PMSCs to guard against the piracy threat seems to have been effective, yet
the practice is not without risks. The boom in PMSCs responding to the piracy threat in the
Indian Ocean raises serious questions about the quality of the contractors. The shipping industry has
already acknowledged ‘significant competence and quality variations...across the spectrum of contractors’.70 The legal status
of armed PMSCs and, in particular, private armed patrol boats, is murky. The proliferation of
PMSCs seems already to have contributed to breaches of international conventions on the
movement of weapons. It is extremely difficult to prosecute illegal behaviour by private contractors or the companies that
support them because their legal status is unclear and there are so many overlapping jurisdictional issues associated with their use.
In particular, the possibility of private armed patrol boats intercepting and perhaps boarding other civilian vessels raises significant
legal questions, and there is significant potential for accidental confrontations at sea. Disputes
arising from contentious
and potentially lethal confrontations between PMSCs and pirates are likely. Dispute resolution in
the shipping industry is difficult enough because of its complexity and intersecting national
interests. As one commentator has noted ‘A ship [may be] built in Japan, owned by a brass-plate company in Malta, controlled
by an Italian, managed by a company in Cyprus, chartered by the French, skippered by a Norwegian, crewed by Indians, registered in
Panama, financed by a British bank, carrying a cargo owned by a multinational oil company’.71 Contractors involved in shooting
incidents, or detained by port states for illegal carriage of weapons, create consular and political difficulties for their home states.
The private hiring of national military personnel (VPDs) is potentially even more problematic, raising a range of legal and political
questions. For example, by ceding some authority for military personnel to shipping companies, national militaries risk becoming
embroiled in disputes beyond their control. In these disputes the state that has hired out its military personnel might ultimately be
held responsible for their actions. At the very least, this has the potential to do serious damage to national reputations and to cause
serious diplomatic incidents. An
incident at sea, or in a port, involving a VPD could easily entangle
several governments in serious legal and political disputes. Most governments and shipping industry
associations seem to assume that the use of PMSCs will be temporary. But it is far from clear that the current decline in pirate
attacks in the Indian Ocean will be permanent. And
given the apparently positive impact of PMSCs in the
Somali case their use is likely to become more common. Governments and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) need to accept that armed PMSCs have a legitimate and probably increasing, long-term role in the counter-
piracy fight and act therefore to recapture leadership of the policy and regulatory agenda related to their use. Greater regulation As
far as the regulatory agenda goes, the IMO and governments should build on a number of
initiatives that already exist to regulate the private security industry . Originally devised to cover
the use of private forces on land, the [ICOC] International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers has been an excellent tool for bringing together private companies,
international organisations, governments and NGOs. 72 The Code provides advice on the
responsibilities of companies, as well as advice on dispute resolution and jurisdictional issues. It
is developing protocols for accreditation of members through a regime of inspections and site
visits. Though this will be difficult to implement at sea, the cooperative discussion on maritime PMSCs in this forum is productive
and promising. 73 Regional organisations, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, should deepen discussions on maritime
PMSCs and the need for greater government oversight.
The IOR is the locus point of global security and sea lines of communication,
private contractors are critical to keeping the peace
Srilatha Vallabu 16, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Centre for Indian Ocean Studies,
Osmania University, India “Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel in Indian Ocean
Region,” https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01525277/document

The Indian Ocean, covering 20% of the world’s oceans, is an important transit route for
international maritime cargo for the Persian Gulf, Africa, Asia Pacific and Europe . The Indian
Ocean region contains one third of the world’s population, one fourth of its landmass, 40% of
the world’s oil and gas reserves. It is the locus of important international sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) as more than 80% of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through
Indian Ocean choke points, with 40% passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 35% through the
Strait of Malacca and 8% through the Bab el-Mandab Strait1 . UN data highlights that assuming no major
upheaval in the world economy, global seaborne trade is expected to increase by 36% in 2020 and to double by 2033 2. With
eight choke points and a number of regional hotspots, stability and safety in the Indian Ocean
region is crucial for the global economy. The region faces a multitude of security problems that range from terrorism,
piracy, WMD proliferation, to human trafficking and organized crime. From the geostrategic perspective, Robert
Kaplan, in his book Monsoon, theorizes that the Indian Ocean is where the rivalry between the
United States and China in the Pacific interlocks with the regional rivalry between China and
India, and is central to America’s fight against Islamic terrorism in the Middle East 3. As China seeks to
expand its influence through "String of Pearls", the Indians and the Chinese will enter into a dynamic great power rivalry in these
waters4. As both regional and extra- regional players interest interlock in Indian Ocean for secure maritime trade and good order at
sea, it requires policymakers to consider a range of issues from naval power capabilities, private shipping practices, international
legal regimes, secure shipping for the Law of Sea to function seamlessly. II Need For Private Security: Their origin Maritime Security
has existed in the private sector for a number of years for the protection of luxury super yachts, oil platforms and cable laying vessel
projects. Post-Cold War shipping in Indian Ocean has become vulnerable to various forms of transnational threats. Somalia piracy
that emerged in the late 1990s, developed into a serious global threat to maritime shipping with violent attacks on ships and hefty
ransom payment for release of the crew, ship and cargo. Somali pirates collected an estimated ransom of $58 million in 2009, $238
million in 2010 and $160 million in 20115. Ransoms made up for only one of the calculable direct and indirect economic costs of
piracy. Others included bypassing the Gulf of Aden, adding three thousand miles and increase of voyage from two to three weeks,
additional fuel costs of $3.5 million per year for tankers and $74.4 million per year for the liner trades6. Payment of higher insurance
premiums, that increased from $500 in 2007 to approximately 20,000 per ship per voyage, excluding injury, liability, and ransom
coverage7. Indian Ocean High Risk Area The global shipping industry as a part of its counter-piracy measures,
represented at international confederation levels by bodies such as BIMCO, ICS, INTER-CARGO, INTER-TANKO, OCIMF etc., brought
out in 2008 a document known as Best Management Practices (BMP) by, of and for the shipping industry. This was in the form of
advisories and guidances for self-protection of merchant ships and their crew from piracy attacks and hijack situations while
transiting in those intensely piracy prone waters. These
vulnerable areas were defined as High Risk Area
(HRA), characterized by piracy attacks and / or hijackings. At the same time round the clock naval patrolling of
the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) was conducted by Operation Atlanta [European Union], Task Force 150 [NATO]
and individually operated naval deployments by Russia, China and India etc. The pirate attacks in the high-risk area thus have fallen
precipitously and the last reported hijacking and ransom of a merchant vessel by Somali pirates was in 20128. But pirates limited to
the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden expanded their reach farther into the Indian Ocean and the levels of piracy,
frequency, severity, and locations of these attacks varied over the decades. Subsequently in 2011, the industry body known as the
Round Table (headquartered at London, UK), extended the HRA geographical coordinate in the Indian Ocean to East of 78 degrees
East longitude, which came up to the west coast of India. It forced ship owners and charterers to find alternative ways to mitigate
risk. Many governments were reluctant to provide forces for the anti-piracy operations indefinitely as an annual budget of collective
cost of naval anti-piracy operations outstretched to two billion dollars. They were ready to embrace sea-going guards as a way to
shift some of the expense of defence to the shipping industry. The realization that naval forces cannot provide sufficient protection,
and hull insurance underwriters and Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs refused to offer acceptable Additional War Risk Premiums
[AWRP] unless armed security teams are embarked. A lucrative market of ‘On-board’ private security forces emerged as the best
cost-effective mitigation strategy. As number of countries reversed long standing legal bans and serious restrictions on the direct
arming of merchant ships, an explosion of the Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) resulted that contracted Private
Contract Armed Security Personnel [PCASP] to individual vessels9. Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel As
90% of the
world trade travels by sea, today there are well over 200 PMSC’s in operation, with PCASP teams
embarked on an estimated 30%-60% of the ships that transit the Indian Ocean each year10 . In
2011 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) changed its stance on Shipping Companies employing PCASP onboard Merchant
Vessels. IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) has approved Employment of PCASP on board ships transiting the high-risk piracy
areas in the Indian Ocean and reported that it was a matter for Flag State Approval. The Oxford University Small Arms Survey of 2012
reported that the percentage of ships employing armed guards rose from 10% to 50%11. Paying almost $5,000 a day for a four-man
armed team,on duty for four to 20 days for the voyage through the Gulf of Aden, shipping companies around the world in 2011
alone spent over one billion dollars on security equipment and PCASP’s12. While success rate of deterring acts of piracy is reported
to be 100% for the shipping companies hiring PCASP’s. Some bigger PCASP supplying companies have improved their turnover by
350 %.13 The severe risk of piracy in the Indian Ocean region has also translated into a tenfold increase in insurance premiums for
ships transiting the Gulf of Aden. Marine insurance firms have started offering to reduce premium costs by as much as 40% for any
vessels hiring private security.14 A
Lowy Institute military analyst, James Brown, stated as many as 2700
armed guards operate aboard merchant ships plying the Indian Ocean trade routes . Some countries
are also getting into the private security business, hiring out small elements of their navies to escort commercial vessels along the
most dangerous sections of the trans-Indian Ocean voyage. Thus by 2013, inspite of decline in Somali piracy about 35%-40% of the
estimated 65,922 merchant vessels transiting across the IndianOcean’s HRA carried PCASP on board.15 The hiring of armed private
security teams became the norm rather than the exception due to the gaps in maritime security. Maritime PMSCs provide two types
of service: armed contractors and armed convoy escort vessels. Armed Contractors are typically ex-Navy personnel with shipping
industry-accredited safety and training qualifications, and work in teams of 3-6.16 Maritime
PMSCs offer a full suite of
counter-piracy services, including hardening of vessels in accordance with industry standards,
crew counter-piracy training, and preparation of onboard citadels. Contractors embark with
body armour, medical kits, satellite comm unications, night-vision equipment and weapons
usually small arms such as AK47s and RPK light machine guns.17 Armed Convoy Escort Vessels: PCASP’s with
Private armed patrol boats are attractive to shipping companies as they do not require weapons-carriage on company ships hence
do not compromise their right to innocent passage through territorial waters and any consequences of firing weapons are
outsourced to the captain of the private armed patrol boat. Presently 40 private armed patrol boats operate in the Indian Ocean and
the most sophisticated of these private navies is outfitted with three large boats in Singapore - each with a crew of 20, capable of
carrying 40 private marines, and equipped with a helicopter and drones.18 They operate by establishing exclusion zones around the
client ship and challenging suspicious boats that approach them.The status of private armed patrol boats under international law is
unclear as they could themselves even be defined as ‘pirates’ as they use aggressive force on the high seas without government
authority.19 Vessel Protection Detachments or VPDs: A VPD is a team of military personnel, usually from the Marine force of the flag
state. With shrinking defense budgets, governments are privately hiring out their soldiers to provide security onboard commercial
ships. VPD’s are hired out to individual shipping companies for protective duties in high risk transit areas or aboard World Food
Program vessels.The list of countries offering VPDs has increased in the past five years in spite of blurring the lines between
‘sovereign services’ and ‘mercenaries’.VPD teams are commonly offered by African nations to assist companies operating in their
territorial waters. European naval forces offered VPDs to cruise liners and World Food Program ships in the piracy high-risk
area.There are a number of problems associated with the use of vessel protection detachments, which are often more expensive
than private alternatives and often in short supply.20 Short supply of VPD further increased usage of maritime private security as a
way to reduce state liability and avoid the domestic political costs and diplomatic externalities arising from the use of state military
personnel21. Floating Armouries: Due to the tightening of state regulation over the use of land based armories, restrictions on
weapons in some territorial waters, as well as the high cost of permits and storage in government-owned, land-based armories,
maritime PSCs increasingly, turned towards floating armories for convenience, economy, and safety. These are vessels used to store
weapons, ammunition, and related equipment such as body armour and night vision goggles and provides other logistics support
including accommodation, food and medical supplies storage for PCASP’s engaged in vessel protection. They are typically
commercially owned vessels, often anchored in international waters.These vessels are not purpose built, but ships that have been
converted and retrofitted. Such as ships that were previously offshore tugs, anchor handlers, research vessels, patrol boats and a roll
on-roll off ferry22. Presently located in the Gulf of Oman, in the Red Sea and off the coast of Sri Lanka, floating armories allow quick
turn-around time of personnel, allowing them to service more clients and services more cost effective. One company may own
and/or run several floating armories weapons and other equipment may be embarked or disembarked at any of the armories. They
even serve as rental platforms to lease firearms to under-equipped PMSCs. Critics opine that the armories themselves could be
targets for attack by pirates or terrorists. An industry newsletter in 2012 stated that there were between 10 and 12 armories
operating at any one time and the EU Naval Force reported that there were about 20 floating armories in the area.23 However,
information released in September 2014 by the UK Government suggests that the number of floating armories may be significantly
higher as it confirmed that as of September 2014 it had granted licenses for 90 UK-registered PMSCs to use 31 floating armories. As
this number only represents floating armories licensed for use by UK PMSCs the actual number of armories may be higher24.
Maritime PCASP’s are able to offer many potential benefits to the shipping, marine insurance
companies and coastal governments by preventing loss of life and property; supplementing the
NATO flotilla warships and reducing marine insurance premiums . With on going demand, classifying PMSCs
is complicated as some consisted of few employees; others are large, publicly-traded corporations. Many PMSCs are based
out of large consumer states, such as the [US] United States and the United Kingdom, while
others are indigenous to the states in which they operate . While some PMSCs hire mostly ex-military or police
personnel from their home states, others draw heavily on "third-country nationals" (TCNs).25 Initially only British and European
guards were deployed as armed security guards and they were paid as much as 3000 USD for a month. With growing competition
amongst PMSCs and the entry of Indian, Nepalese, Philippines and eastern European Sea Marshalls, some companies provide Sea
Marshalls for as low as 700 USD a month.26 Thus
there is concern as to whether some of the armed guards
deployed have sufficient competency and skill to use weapons, and apprehension that the use
of weapons may escalate an already dangerous situation. Such vari-ance in the function and
character of PMSCs, makes attempts at categorization challenging .

Non-state actors will target SLOCs – that causes global insecurity and Indian
economic decline
Tim Sweijs et al 10, Willem Cleven, Mira Levi, Joelle Tabak, Zinzi Speear, Jeroen de Jonge
Editing Aurélie Basha i Novosejt, HCSS & Taalcentrum Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Graphs
Richard Podkolinski, Nanna Spakler & Willem Cleven “The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean,”
https://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/HCSS_FI-13_09_10_Indian_Ocean.pdf

The Indian Ocean is, and will probably continue to be, a major transit route for inter-continental
and regional trade in commercial goods and fossil fuels. The foresight studies unanimously predict that
commercial shipping along the Indian Ocean SLOCs will expand in the coming decades. If the Chinese and Indian
economies continue on their path of economic growth and increasing dependence on
international trade in order to meet key resource needs and access export markets, new port
facilities will continue to be developed in order to strengthen the Ocean’s routes from Africa
and the Gulf Region towards India and East-Asia, including Australia . These shifts are increasingly
transforming the Indian Ocean into a maritime center of gravity, or the ‘strategic heart of the maritime world.’4 Because of the
extraordinary growth rates recorded by the economies of China, India, and other countries in southern and eastern Asia, experts are
predicting that the world’s economic center of gravity will gradually shift to the East. This is largely the result of the particular
economic policies of these countries, which are premised on export-led growth. At the same time, these countries are also heavily
dependent on imports (especially the Chinese and Indian economies) in order to meet the rapidly expanding energy needs of their
burgeoning industries and expanding populations. In the coming decades, as the energy demands of China
and India’s economies translate into a growing dependency on Middle Eastern and African
imports for their energy and resource needs, the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean’s
SLOCs will increase accordingly. Even China’s efforts to diversify energy imports away from the Middle East (and most
probably towards Africa) are likely to intensify China’s use of the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean.5 The fact that vast mineral
deposits worth at least USD one trillion have been discovered in Afghanistan is likely to
contribute to the strategic importance of the SLOCs as well . In addition, thirteen of the world’s busiest ports
are currently located in Asia (with Singapore heading the list, having processed almost 30 million containers in 2008) and are directly
dependent on the safety of the Indian Ocean’s SLOCs for their business.6 More
than 90% of the world’s trade is
currently transported by sea, and the total volume of seaborne trade increased by more than
35% between 1998 and 2008.7 As the total volume of seaborne trade continues to expand, most of this growth is likely to
originate from or be destined for Chinese and Indian ports. For example, energy transports from the Middle East have little
alternative but to pass first through the Strait of Hormuz and then cross the ocean to pass through the Strait of Malacca on their way
to China or, if their aim is to reach Europe, to navigate through the Bab-el-Mandeb in the western part of the Indian Ocean.8 In
conclusion, the increased use of the Indian Ocean’s SLOCs will place further pressure on key maritime choke points in the region,
thereby providing these states with further motivation to control these SLOCs. Vulnerability of sLOCs and the Threat of Non-state
Actors The increased use of the Indian Ocean’s SLOCs makes them vulnerable to regional
instability, spillover violence from regional conflicts, and the actions of pirates, terrorists, and
criminal organizations. Furthermore, most of the strategically important SLOCs and maritime choke points are adjacent to
failed states and areas with weak governance systems. As such, they are particularly vulnerable to disruption,
with no viable alternative shipping routes available. Despite the economic and political rise of India and a
number of countries within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), many of the Indian Ocean’s littoral states have a
poor record in governance and stability. The transit to Bab- el-Mandeb, the only maritime passage from the Gulf of Aden to
European waters (with the exception of the much longer route around the African continent), is situated between Somalia, which is
the leading case study of a failed state, and Yemen, which could soon follow suit.9 At the other end of the Ocean, the Strait of
Malacca is the major connecting point between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, as well as the Pacific Ocean. It is
bordered by the historically unstable Aceh region of Indonesia. In addition to these two choke points, the Strait of Hormuz is the
only waterway connecting the Ocean to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz will continue to be vulnerable
to potential instability in Iran. Twenty percent of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait, amounting to about seventeen
million barrels a day. Considering the strategic importance of this choke point, it is obvious that a disruption in maritime security
would have a severe impact.10 Finally, in addition to these choke points, several of the ocean’s littoral states (e.g., Pakistan,
Myanmar, and – until recently – Sri Lanka) are struggling with internal conflicts that may also weaken the Ocean’s security in the
future. Indeed, the lack of state control along the Ocean’s shores may increasingly create a breeding ground for three types of
violent non-state actors: pirates, terrorists, and international criminal organizations. Pirates figure most prominently in the
contemporary security discourse on the Indian Ocean, and foresights suggest an increase in piracy in the Indian Ocean during the
coming decades. Approximately a quarter of all maritime piracy is targeted at shipments of fossil fuels. This happens primarily in the
Strait of Malacca (see Figure 2).11 The foresights devote more attention to the actions of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden,
however, predicting that they will continue to attract new recruits, due to the profitability of the enterprise. Some scenarios suggest
that these pirates may be joined by Yemeni counterparts in the future. In
addition, pirates – whose activities are
currently concentrated around the maritime choke points at each end of the Indian Ocean – are
also expected to venture progressively further into the Indian Ocean proper. The growing
strategic importance and economic significance of the SLOCs, combined with their vulnerable
position adjacent to failed states, make them an attractive target for terrorist groups looking to
disrupt global trade. Indeed, the sinking of only a few ships could seriously affect traffic through the narrow straits of Hormuz
and Malacca, making them particularly vulnerable to potential actions undertaken by such groups as Al Qaeda (in the Strait of
Hormuz) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (in the Strait of Malacca). Maritime infrastructures (e.g., India’s offshore oil facilities) may be
targeted as well, as has happened in other areas (e.g., attacks on facilities off the shores of the Niger Delta in the Gulf of Guinea).
Moreover, since the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, seaborne access to onshore targets has emerged as another dimension of
maritime security that policymakers must consider.

Indian economic decline causes Indo-Pak war

Robinson 10, Dr. David Robinson, History lecturer at Edith Cowan University in Perth, Western Australia and published
author that holds a PhD in History, and is mid-way through a Master of International Relations degree. “The Regional and Global
Implications of India’s Rise as a Great Power.” – June 17th, 2010 – made available at http://lfort.wordpress.com/2010/06/17/indias-
rise-as-a-great-power/#_ftn21

Over the last decade there has been an increasing focus on India’s economic and military expansion, and its
consequences for South Asia and the world. India is rapidly rising to become a great power, but its ascent depends on

maintaining relative domestic stability, and carefully crafting its policies towards the U nited States and its
neighbours Pakistan and China. All four states are nuclear powers, so the consequences of any

conflict between them are potentially dire.[1] India has found the post-Cold War international environment amenable to
expansion of its bilateral ties with all the major powers simultaneously, and has thus pursued a strategy of ‘poly-alignment’ – seeking to be a ‘bridging
power’ between the sometimes competing poles of the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union.[2] This inverts India’s traditional non-
alignment policy, allowing India to reap the benefits of closer economic and strategic ties while maintaining the same spirit of balanced international
relations.[3] To a degree this arises from uncertainty about the shape of the emerging international order, and India’s own lack of a credible vision of its
place in that environment.[4] Nonetheless, its growing wealth and population is now enabling India to build up its military
might, and as “a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic democracy… India is being asked to shoulder global responsibilities in consonance with its rising global
stature”.[5] This paper will consider India’s rise as a global power, and the likely regional and global implications, through a specific focus on its relations with its strategically significant neighbours Pakistan and China, and argue that fundamentally the
balance of power between them will not change dramatically in the near future. As Indian power increases it will inevitably challenge existing political, economic and military patterns, but as Harsh Pant argues, “India continues to be ambivalent about power, it has
failed to develop a strategic agenda commensurate with its growing economic and military capabilities … throughout history, India has failed to master the creation, deployment and use of its military instruments in support of its national objectives”.[6] From
independence in 1947 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pursued a strategy of non-alignment that sought to avoid participation in the Cold War, prioritising multilateral institutions and the Non-Aligned Movement. Indian policy was always opposed to the use
of military force in international relations.[7] However, as India begins to assert itself as a regional power it is today moving to convert its ‘brown-water’ navy into a ‘blue-water’ navy and is expanding the reach of its air force, moving beyond border control and
demonstrating greater concern for strategic issues, such as the protection of shipping lanes.[8] While maintaining constructive relations with the United States, India has also been involved in trilateral dialogue with China and Russia, increasingly sharing their vision
of a multipolar world based on consensus among the major powers. India has also become a non-voting member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), through which China and Russia have sought to strategically counterbalance NATO advancement into
the Middle East and Central Asia.[9] At the same time, it is China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities that many argue remain the primary military threat to India’s security and the key motivation for India’s own nuclear weapons program; while the United States,
under the G.W. Bush administration, negotiated a substantial deal that would assist India’s ‘civilian’ nuclear development. India’s other major challenge comes from its unstable neighbour Pakistan, with which full-scale war and nuclear exchange have been avoided
despite clashes in the Kargil region of Kashmir in 1999, and attacks on India by Pakistani-backed terrorists in 2001 and 2008.[10] The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War confronted India with an unprecedented financial crisis, as India simultaneously
lost access to Eastern European markets, global oil prices spiked, and over 100,000 Indians were repatriated from the Gulf region, thus precluding their remittances. These economic shocks forced a dramatic rethink of Indian economic and foreign policies. Under
Prime Minister NarasimhaRao India steered towards greater economic liberalisation and diplomatic diversity. The Rao government sought greater engagement with the United States and China, as well as making overtures to Israel and seeking improved relations
with Southeast Asia through a ‘Look East’ policy.[11] Since then India’s average GDP growth rate has hovered at around 7 percent, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has predicted that in spite of the global financial crisis, India’s growth should remain at 6.5
percent in 2010.[12] Not only has India maintained this amazing economic growth, but it is also envisaged that in the next two decades India’s population “will surpass China’s to make it the world’s most populous country, and its rapidly expanding middle class may
constitute up to 60 percent of its 1.3 billion-plus people”.[13] Internationally the Indian diaspora now numbers over 20 million, and is relatively affluent, successful, and well-integrated – spreading India’s ‘soft’ cultural influence.[14] While the approximately 3.7
million Indian nationals now living in the six Gulf (GCC) states specifically remit around $8 billion annually.[15] Despite India’s meteoric economic development, it can be said India has both the best of the First World and the worst of the Third World within its
borders, and faces unprecedented human security challenges.[16] India now has 410 million people living below the U.N. poverty line – 37.2 percent of its population and actually 100 million more people than in 2004 – and millions of India’s rural poor are faced
with food price inflation of up to 17 percent.[17] 60 percent of Indian labour is still agricultural, and the integration of hundreds of millions of peasants into a modern economy may be an extremely painful process.[18] And while Indian infrastructure such as roads,
civil aviation, ports, and telecommunications have experienced noticeable improvements in recent years, electricity, railways, and irrigation all still need significant investment; and India continues to lag in social infrastructure, such as education and healthcare.[19]

These social inequalities have fuelled the widespread ‘Naxalite’ Maoist insurgencyaffecting vast areas throughout
eastern and central India, and whose 20,000 insurgents current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh identified as the “greatest internal security threat”
facing the nation.[20] These internal issues pose the first challenge to India’s rise as a great power, as external projection must be based on a firm
foundation of domestic stability. The requirements for domestic stability also shape India’s international needs. Pant asserts that, The biggest
challenge for India remains that of continuing to achieve the rates of economic growth that it has enjoyed in
recent years. Everything else is of secondary importance. … Unless India can sustain this momentum, its larger foreign policy

ambitions cannot be realized”.[21] The political stability of India (and similarly its neighbour China) “is
absolutely dependent on continued economic dynamism, which is in turn dependent on energy and resources which must be imported”[22], thus the process of
diversifying and securing access to international energy sources is a vital element in avoiding domestic social and political turbulence.[23] In this context Indian oil and gas companies have been encouraged to invest abroad, and have the long-term aim of producing
tens of millions of tons of oil a year overseas by 2025. India has thus been developing strategic relationships with the major oil-producing Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, Central Asian states such as Turkmenistan, and
increasingly Iran, as potential sources of energy. Multinational oil and gas pipeline projects have been high on India’s agenda for over a decade, though poor relations with its neighbours Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar have prevented such a scheme; while the
United States has used its significant leverage to insist India chooses between pipeline projects or a US-supported nuclear energy programme.[24] The United States has been particularly concerned by India’s relations with Iran, which the international community
has worked to isolate for some time. In this case the US is battling the logic of supply and demand as Iran has the world’s third largest reserve of oil, is nearby to India, and India is a resource-hungry customer. But India and Iran also have a convergence of other
economic and strategic interests. The ‘Road Map to Strategic Cooperation’ signed by Indian Prime Minister AtalBihari Vajpayee and Iranian leader Mohammad Khatami in 2003 also mapped out cooperation for increased bilateral trade, and developments like Iran’s
Chahbahar port complex, the Chahbahar-Fahranj-Bam railway link, and a Marine Oil Tanking Terminal.[25] The broader aim of these facilities is a North-South Transport Corridor with Russia that would help facilitate the flow of goods across Central Asia, taking cargo
from Iran’s ports of Bandar Abbas or Chahbahar via rail to the Caspian Sea and on to Russia’s Caspian ports. This route would significantly reduce travel time and transport costs for exporters like India.[26] India and Iran also share concerns about Sunni Islamist
power in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there are reports of a strategic deal allowing Indian access to Iranian military bases and equipment in the event of war with Pakistan.[27] Politically, Iran has recognised Kashmir as a legitimate part of India; while India is
thought to have transferred sensitive nuclear and rocket technology to Tehran, with direct security consequences for Europe and the United States.[28] So, with energy pipelines still far from reality, and only a nascent civilian nuclear programme, India remains
highly dependence on energy imports and increasingly seeks to secure sea shipping lanes for the transportation of oil, from nations like Iran and Myanmar, to as far abroad as Sudan and Nigeria.[29] Nearly half of global seaborne trade passes through the Indian
Ocean, around 40 percent of offshore oil production comes from the Indian Ocean, and 65 percent of the world’s oil and 35 percent of its gas reserves are found in the littoral states of the Ocean. This makes the region generally strategically significant. With India’s
ever-growing reliance on imported energy, any disruptions in the Indian Ocean (which are particularly feasible at ‘choke points’ such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca) can lead to serious consequences for the Indian
economy. While a key danger is interruption of supply during a time of war, today non-state actors, such as organised criminals, pirates or terrorists, are also an increasing threat.[30] As India increasingly sees itself as a great power, and defines its security in terms of
the entire Indian Ocean basin, its strategic frontiers will stretch from the African coast, to the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, and potentially southwards as far as Antarctica. Continentally, India already looks to the economic and strategic importance of
Central Asia, and has made moves to consolidate its strategic footing, including two airbases in Tajikistan.[31] The US government’s recent National Intelligence Council ‘Global Trends 2025’ report projects that, “Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale
for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue-water naval capabilities”.[32] Indeed India spent $10.5 billion between 2004 and 2007 on creating the world’s fourth-largest military[33], and is projected to spend more
than $45 billion on arms purchases between 2009 and 2013.[34] These will include long-range aircraft, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines that are intended to make India a formidable force in the Indian Ocean.[35] The Indian Navy is planning over the next
decade to create a fleet of 130-140 vessels comprising three aircraft carrier battle groups, and has created a Far Eastern Naval Command, headquartered on the Andaman Islands – 190 nautical miles from Chinese facilities at Great Coco Island.[36] Meanwhile, India’s
longer-term plans involve constructing a fleet capable of projecting power into the South China Sea.[37] There is also much speculation around India’s production of the new ‘Surya’ ICBM, which may use technology from India’s civilian space programme. India’s Agni
medium-range ballistic missile programme currently consists of missiles with ranges of upwards of 700kms, 2,000kms, and 3,000kms. The Surya project will result in missiles with ranges of 5,000 kms, which can hit Chinese targets; 8,000-12,000 kms, which can reach
the United States and Europe; and 20,000 kms, which will have a global reach. These will have the option of a nuclear payload, and potentially multiple warheads.[38] The reported 12,000km-range Surya-2 in particular is tailor-made to target the United States.[39]
This expansion of India’s missile capacity may create increased tensions with China, and may hinder cooperation with Europe and the United States.[40] Today the United States remains the key external actor in the Indian Ocean, with its military presence stretching
from north and east Africa to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, east to Singapore, and southwards to Diego Garcia. “America’s raw power in the region has made it imperative that New Delhi court the United States”.[41] From the time of Indian independence some
American analysts already saw the potential for India to compete for influence with Communist China, but as India took its non-aligned path the US found a willing ally in Pakistan, which provided military bases in exchange for economic and military aid.[42] The US
relationship with Pakistan led to them taking financial and political actions against India following the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars, despite Pakistan being the aggressor. Eventually President Reagan made moves to close the diplomatic gap with India in an
effort to wean New Delhi away from dependence on Moscow, thus the 1982-1991 period witnessed a gradual warming of US-Indian relations. The collapse of superpower competition in 1991 then allowed the United States to move away from its Pakistani ally and
engage with India.[43] By March 2000 President Clinton made this new relationship clear while visiting India, stating that, “we are convinced that it is time to chart a new and purposeful direction in our relationship”.[44] This was enacted through the ‘Next Steps in
Strategic Partnership’ agreement of January 2004, which announced expanded cooperation in civilian nuclear activities and space programs, as well as missile defence. A senior official made the strategic design of this relationship clear, announcing that America’s,
“goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century … We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement”.[45] As part of this emerging relationship the United States has subsequently held joint military
operations with India, encouraging them to actively patrol the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, and President G.W. Bush sponsored agreements facilitating the development of India’s nuclear program.[46] President Bush signed the US-India Peaceful Nuclear
Cooperation Bill into law in December 2006, which will result in up to $40 billion in trade with India in defence and energy products.[47] Contrary to non-proliferation goals, the deal leaves India free to develop its military nuclear capabilities and increases its ability
to access uranium and nuclear technologies.[48] Supporters of the deal see it as President Bush’s, “greatest foreign policy achievement. This success, if sustained through wise policies and skilful diplomacy by future administrations, will portend enormous
consequences for the future balance of power in Asia and globally to the advantage of the United States”.[49] Subsequently, under the Obama administration, the Indian government signed a $2.1 billion contract with the US for eight long-range maritime
reconnaissance aircraft, capable of anti-submarine and anti-surface naval warfare.[50] Despite India’s advocacy of a non-polar world, Indian policymakers recognise the benefits of American sponsorship; and both nations agree that it serves neither American nor
Indian interests for a powerful authoritarian China to dominate the Asian landmass, or for radical Islamic to wage wars that threaten the security of both states.[51] Thus, as the United States perceives strategic advantage from assisting India’s rise to great power
status, and India is receiving tangible military and economic benefits from this relationship, for the foreseeable future India’s continued ascendance will be supported by the global hegemon. India’s geographically closest and most frequently problematic
relationship is with its neighbour and prodigal twin Pakistan. India’s rise as a great power will most immediately impact the extremely dangerous stalemate between these two states. Many security concerns converge in Pakistan, which has been a key supporter of
the Taliban in Afghanistan, factions of which the Pakistani Army is now fighting in a de facto civil war; elements within the state support Islamic terrorist organisations that periodically attack India, provoking regional crises; and, the Pakistani Army has a growing
nuclear arsenal, which could be vulnerable to misuse by malicious elements within the state.[52] India and Pakistan engaged in wars in 1965 and 1971, with crises surrounding continuing Pakistani support for an indigenous insurgency in the disputed Indian state of
Jammu and Kashmir erupting periodically, and threatening war in 1990.[53] Following Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistani incursions across the Line of Control in the Kargil region of Kashmir led to another limited war, and the veiled nuclear
threat by Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed, “We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity”.[54] Major terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir on 1 October 2001, and in the Indian capital Delhi on 13 December
2001, again threatened war though merely resulted in major military manoeuvres by India – code-named Operation Parakram.[55] The lack of military retaliation by India despite grave provocation seems to suggest that India is successfully deterred by Pakistan’s
nuclear capability, and this in turn only fuels the eagerness of elements within Pakistan to provoke them.[56] Pakistan has adopted an ‘asymmetric nuclear escalation posture’, which has deterred Indian conventional military power and thus enabled Pakistan’s
“aggressive strategy of bleeding India by a ‘thousand cuts’ with little fear of significant retaliation”.[57] India is four times larger and seven times more populated than Pakistan, and as Pakistan averages only 300 miles in width it is susceptible to a central assault that
would spilt the country in two. A number of important Pakistani cities also lie close to the international border in the Indus River basin.[58] As Pakistan is thus extremely vulnerable to conventional attack by India’s larger military, it defines such an attack as an
existential threat to the Pakistani state. Pakistani Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai thus outlined that Pakistan would use its nuclear weapons if India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces; India
blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically; or India pushes Pakistan into a state of political destabilisation.[59] This asymmetric escalation posture is designed for a rapid first use of nuclear weapons against conventional attacks, thus leaving India
without the ability to punish terrorist attacks through conventional retaliation.[60] As elements within Pakistan continue to provoke India, this creates an extremely dangerous imbalance reliant on India’s restraint to maintain peace. VipinNarang notes that,

most of the
“Scholars who study the South Asian nuclear balance have argued that if a limited clash between India and Pakistan were to expand into a full-scale conventional war, escalation to the nuclear level would likely result”.[61] And

‘war-game’ scenarios played out by the US military also foresee any conventional conflict between
India and Pakistan escalating to the use of nuclear weapons within the first 12 days .[62] New analyses of
this eventuality reveal that a conflict between India and Pakistan, in which 100 nuclear bombs were dropped on cities and industrial areas within the
two countries, would kill more than 20 million people from the blasts, fires and radioactivity. However, in addition, the explosions could produce
enough smoke to cripple global agriculture.Smoke generated by burning cities could createa climatic response that immediately reduces sunlight, cools
the planet, and reduces precipitation worldwide. This‘nuclear winter’would reduce or eliminate agricultural production over vast areas, simultaneously
decreasing crop yields nearly everywhere at once. Approximately one billion people worldwide today live on marginal food supplies and would be
directly threatened with starvation.[63] While some analysts maintain that nuclear weapons would only be used in a measured way, the chaos, fear and
interruption of communications that would follow nuclear war’s commencement leads some to doubt that attacks would be limited in any rational
manner.[64] Additionally, Pakistan could face a decision to use its entire nuclear arsenal quickly or lose it to Indian forces which seize its military bases.
[65] Thus unrestrained nuclear war in South Asia potentially has cataclysmic regional and global consequences. Following the terrorist attack by
Kashmiri militants in December 2001 and the subsequent military standoff with Pakistan in Operation Parakram, the Indian Army announced a new
limited war policy in April 2004 called the Cold Start doctrine, which aims to allow conventional retaliation without posing an existential threat to
Pakistan.[66] Under Cold Start the Indian army would avoid delivering a catastrophic blow to Pakistan, and instead deliberately only make shallow
territorial gains, 50–80kms deep, that could be used in post-conflict negotiations. This doctrine aims to deny Pakistan the justification of ‘regime
survival’ for employing nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Indian attack.[67] However, Walter C. Ladwig foresees that, “An operational Cold
Start capability could lead Pakistan to lower its nuclear red line, put its nuclear weapons on a higher state of readiness, develop tactical nuclear
weapons, or undertake some equally destabilizing course of action”.[68] The danger of escalation is further compounded by the relatively immature
‘command and control’ and early warning systems of both India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals.[69] Scott Sagan also points out the danger of nuclear
accidentas, if
one of the nations accidentally blows up a nuclear warhead on one of its own military bases, it
probably will not have adequate surveillance intelligence to know it has not been attacked by its
enemy, and thus may falsely ‘retaliate’ against the other country. [70]

Indo-Pak war goes nuclear – kills billions.

Zachary KECK 17. Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
George Mason University. “Billions Could Die If India and Pakistan Start a Nuclear War.” The
National Interest. July 21. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/billions-could-die-if-india-
pakistan-start-nuclear-war-21623?page=2.

Billions Could Die If India and Pakistan Start a Nuclear War With the world’s attention firmly fixated on North Korea,
the greatest possibility of nuclear war is in fact on the other side of Asia. That place is what could be called the
nuclear triangle of Pakistan, India and China. Although Chinese and Indian forces are currently engaged in a standoff,
traditionally the most dangerous flashpoint along the triangle has been the Indo-Pakistani border.

The two countries fought three major wars before acquiring nuclear weapons, and one minor one afterwards. And
this doesn’t even include the countless other armed skirmishes and other incidents that are a regular
occurrence. At the heart of this conflict, of course, is the territorial dispute over the northern Indian state of Jammu and
Kashmir, the latter part of which Pakistan lays claim to. Also key to the nuclear dimension of the conflict is the fact
that India’s conventional capabilities are vastly superior to Pakistan’s . Consequently, Islamabad has
adopted a nuclear doctrine of using tactical nuclear weapons against Indian forces to offset the latter’s
conventional superiority. If this situation sounds similar, that is because this is the same strategy the U.S.-led NATO forces adopted
against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the face of a numerically superior Soviet military, the United States, starting with the Eisenhower
administration, turned to nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe from a Soviet attack. Although nearly every U.S. president, as well as countless
European leaders, were uncomfortable with this escalatory strategy, they were unable to escape the military realities undergirding it until at least the
Reagan administration. At an event at the Stimson Center in Washington this week, Feroz Khan,
a former brigadier in the
Pakistan Army and author of one of the best books on the country’s nuclear program, said that Pakistani military leaders
explicitly based their nuclear doctrine on NATO’s Cold War strategy . But as Vipin Narang, a newly tenured MIT
professor who was on the same panel, pointed out, an important difference between NATO and Pakistan’s

strategies is that the latter has used its nuclear shield as a cover to support countless terrorist
attacks inside India. Among the most audacious were the 2001 attacks on India’s parliament and the 2008 siege of Mumbai, which killed
over 150 people. Had such an attack occurred in the United States, Narang said, America would have ended a

nation-state. The reason why India didn’t respond to force, according to Narang, is that—despite its alleged Cold Start doctrine— Indian
leaders were unsure exactly where Pakistan’s nuclear threshold stood. That is, even if Indian
leaders believed they were launching a limited attack, they couldn’t be sure that Pakistani
leaders wouldn’t view it as expansive enough to justify using nuclear weapons . This is no accident: as Khan
said, Pakistani leaders intentionally leave their nuclear threshold ambiguous. Nonetheless, there is no

guarantee that India’s restraint will continue in the future. Indeed, as Michael Krepon quipped,
“Miscalculation is South Asia’s middle name .” Much of the panel’s discussion was focused on technological

changes that might exacerbate this already-combustible situation. Narang took the lead in describing how India
was acquiring the capabilities to pursue counterforce strikes (i.e., take out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in a preventive
or more likely preemptive strike). These included advances in information, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to be able to track and target
Islamabad’s strategic forces, as well as a missile-defense system that could take care of any missiles the first strike didn’t destroy. He also noted that
India is pursuing a number of missile capabilities highly suited for counterforce missions, such as
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MARVs) and the highly accurate
BrahMos missiles that Dehli developed jointly with Russia. “BrahMos is one hell of a counterforce weapon,” even without nuclear warheads,
Narang contended. As Narang himself admitted, there’s little reason to believe that India is abandoning its no-first-use nuclear doctrine in favor of a
first-strike one. Still, keeping in mind Krepon’s point about miscalculation, that doesn’t mean that these technological changes don’t increase the
potential for a nuclear war. It is not hard to imagine a scenario where the two sides stumble into a nuclear
war that neither side wants. Perhaps the most plausible scenario would start with a Mumbai-style attack that
Indian leaders decide they must respond to . In hopes of keeping the conflict limited to
conventional weapons, Delhi might authorize limited punitive raids inside Pakistan , perhaps targeting
some of the terrorist camps near the border. These attacks might be misinterpreted by Pakistani leaders, or else

unintentionally cross Islamabad’s nuclear thresholds . In an attempt to deescalate by escalating , or

else to halt what they believe is an Indian invasion, Pakistani leaders could use tactical nuclear weapons against the Indian

troops inside Pakistan. With nuclear weapons introduced, Delhi’s no-first-use doctrine no longer
applies. Indian leaders, knowing they’d face incredible domestic pressure to respond, would
also have no guarantee that Pakistani leaders didn’t intend to follow the tactical use of nuclear
weapons with strategic strikes against Indian cities . Armed with what they believe is reasonable intelligence about the locations
of Pakistan’s strategic forces, highly accurate missiles and MIRVs to target them, and a missile defense that has a shot at cleaning up any Pakistani
missiles that survived the first strike, Indian leaders might be tempted to launch a counterforce first strike . As
former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon wrote in his memoirs (which Narang first drew people’s
attention to at the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in March): “India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to

carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In
other words, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a

comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.”