1nc

1nc
Arms refers to military equipment – not supplies
Fieleke, 91 - Vice President and Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Norman, “A Primer on the
Arms Trade” November/December 1991 New England Economic Review,
https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/neer/neer691d.pdf

The magnitude of the arms trade, of course, depends on how arms are defined. Stones can be deadly
weapons, yet hardly belong in the same category as Scud missiles. In the case of many other items, the
decision is not so easy. For example, chemicals that form the essence of certain weapons can also be put
to peaceful uses. The unavoidably arbitrary element in classifying such items calls to mind the assertion
of Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty: "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean--neither
more nor less.’’2

Recognizing that any definition will be rather arbitrary, we adopt, for purposes of measurement, the
definition used by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: arms are military equipment,
"including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities
designed for military use." This ACDA definition embraces tactical guided missiles and rockets, military
aircraft, naval vessels, armored and nonarmored military vehicles, communications and electronic
equipment, artillery, infantry weapons, small arms, ammunition, other ordnance, parachutes, and
uniforms. Dual use equipment--which can be used either for military or civilian purposes--is included
when its primary mission can be identified as military, although all foodstuffs, medical equipment,
petroleum products, and other such supplies are excluded. Also counted in arms transfers are the
construction of defense production facilities and licensing fees paid as royalties for the production of
military equipment, when they are incorporated in military transfer agreements by countries other than
the United States. Missing from this list is strategic weaponry, but ACDA flatly asserts, "There have been
no international transfers of strategic weaponry.’’3

Violation: The aff only reduces data services

Vote neg for limits – they allow miniscule permutations of technical data
 1nc
Substantial means 2.8 billion
Theohary, 16 - Specialist in National Security Policy and Information Operations at the Congressional
Research Service (Catherine, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-2015” CRS
Report, 12/19, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44716.pdf

The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2015 was $65.2 billion, a substantial
decrease from the $79.3 billion total in 2014 (Figure 1) (Table 1) (Table 3) (Table 4). In 2015, the value of all arms
deliveries to developing nations ($33.6 billion) decreased slightly from the value of 2014 deliveries ($36.2
billion). Deliveries since 2008 peaked in 2014 (Figure 7 and Figure 8) (Table 2) (Table 15).

Vote neg for predictable limits – they allow tiny affs that target the country or weapon
of the day which makes neg prep impossible
Lack of agent specification is a voting issue- kills specific politics and counterplans and
causes late breaking debates that favor the aff
 1nc
International competition constrains Chinese PMSCs now---capabilities pale in
comparison.
Fatoumata Diallo 18. 06-05-18. Fatoumata Diallo is a Junior Research Fellow at ISDP’s Stockholm China
Center. She recently obtained a Master’s in International Relations at Leiden University, the Netherlands
and holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and Chinese Studies from the INALCO, Paris. Her
topics of focus included, China’s foreign policy, non-traditional security, China’s political economy and
sociology. “Private Security Companies: The New Notch in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative?”
http://isdp.eu/private-security-companies-new-notch-beijings-belt-road-initiative // BBM

In the wake of the shifting security environment , and with the emergence of new security
threats , the protection of overseas citizens and interests has become a diplomatic priority for Beijing.
While much attention has been given to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) role in managing security needs abroad, few observers have taken
an interest in the role of Private Security Companies ( PSCs ). With Beijing’s global commercial footprint further expanding under
the Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) umbrella, those actors have assumed a growing role in filling the security
void , especially in lawless and volatile areas. The Challenges of Protecting Chinese Interests Overseas Beijing’s
international economic footprint has grown exponentially in recent years as evidenced by the presence of 30,000 Chinese companies overseas.
A large majority of workers are concentrated in an “arc of crisis” stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Horn of Africa, where security threats
are reportedly common. The 2004 attacks that resulted in the death of 11 Chinese workers in Afghanistan was among the first manifestations of
a trend that would only intensify overtime. Between January and March 2012 alone, a total of 56 Chinese workers were abducted. Those
incidents served as a catalyst for change in China’s foreign policy, materialized by the enshrinement of the concept of “protecting overseas
nationals” in the priority list of the 18th Party Congress and a strategic reassessment of Beijing’s longstanding principle of non-interference. In
recent years, the PLA and its Navy (PLAN) have taken a greater part in anti-piracy operations to protect Chinese merchant vessels and in the
carrying out of mass overseas evacuation drills. During the 2011 Libyan crisis, for instance, China successfully evacuated more than 35,000 of its
nationals, demonstrating a remarkable readiness and strong power projection capabilities. While recognizing the important role played by the
PLA, there is no denying that its capabilities are limited by diplomatic constraints . In many places a Chinese military
presence would have wider geopolitical and security implications. It would raise suspicion, create tensions, give more salience to the “China
threat” narrative, as well as increase Beijing’s prospects of being branded imperialistic. Chinese SOEs’ tend to oversee those considerations and
place too much faith in Beijing’s support and assistance. Engagement from the Chinese government, though, largely remains contingent on the
breadth and the nature of the threat. Crisis usually engender a large response but smaller-scale incidents are unlikely to trigger any military
intervention. In the latter case, Beijing has shown a preference to rely on host-nations security forces, although in many cases political
instability and corruption undermine their capabilities. Beijing’s “Shadow Army” The
changing security paradigm has led
Chinese firms to consider private security companies as a new option to secure their overseas
personnel and assets. In 2009, a new regulation legalized the use of PSCs in China and opened the
market to foreign investors . Since then about 5,000 Chinese private security companies have emerged
to provide a wide range of security services . While the majority of those companies provide security services at the domestic
level, a small leading group operates overseas . Africa has been a testing ground for many of them,
with companies such as DeWei or Hua Xin Zhong An conducting anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. However, the advancement of the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) allows Chinese PSCs to explore untapped opportunities . Launched in 2013, the BRI has
become a cornerstone of the Xi government’s foreign policy, designed to facilitate economic cooperation and connectivity between China and
65 countries. Despite its merits, the BRI, which ventures through volatile regions, has brought Chinese investments into close proximity with a
wide range of security challenges including political unrest and local opposition. Therefore, private
security companies are an
interesting option to fill the security vacuum surrounding Chinese personnel and assets . Chinese
PSCs are more attractive in terms of price since they are around ten times cheaper than foreign
contractors. National private security firms might also appeal more to Chinese SOEs because of their shared cultural background. DeWei,
for instance, has been hired by the China Road and Bridge Corporation to provide security for the $3.2 billion Nairobi-Mombasa railway and by
the Chinese Poly-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings for its $4 billion LNG project in Ethiopia. A Stand-in for the PLA? Due
to the relatively
recent legalization of the market, most Chinese PSCs still lack the professionalism and extensive training
to assume a protection role on the New Silk Road. Moreover, the Chinese Private security market is hindered by provisions in the
Chinese law. Although with some exceptions, Chinese security contractors are proscribed to use lethal weapons. Their competitiveness
and capabilities are thus greatly reduced in comparison with their international counterparts. While,
the new trend of Sino-foreign joint ventures , might alleviate some of these shortcomings , this type of
cooperation remains rare . Since the BRI is viewed with suspicious eyes by many countries, including India and the U.S., the use of
PSCs could stir up controversy. Some might see them as an extension of the PLA, raising concerns about possible hidden agendas. After all,
most companies recruit veterans from the PLA or other state security organs; and the blurred line between private and public sectors in China,
allows the national security apparatus to keep a firm grip on security companies that are “private” on paper. Others
might fear the
Chinese government will use PSCs as a layer of plausible deniability in case of conflicts , in the same way
Moscow has been doing.

Chinese PMSCs will exploit the security vacuum left by the aff---causes rapid
expansion.
Andrew Erickson & Gabe Collins 12. Andrew Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic
Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College. Gabe Collins is the co-founder of China SignPost
and a former commodity investment analyst and research fellow in the US Naval War College's China
Maritime Studies Institute. “Enter China’s Security Firms.” https://thediplomat.com/2012/02/enter-
chinas-security-firms // BBM

A security vacuum is developing around Chinese workers overseas . The recent kidnapping of 29 Chinese workers in
Sudan (where another worker was shot dead during the abduction) and 25 workers in Egypt has sparked a strong reaction in China. As a result,
Beijing is looking to bolster consular services and protection for Chinese citizens working and travelling overseas. On the corporate side, private
analysts are urging companies to do a better job of training employees before they are sent abroad. Yet with at least 847,000
Chinese citizen workers and 16,000 companies scattered around the globe , some of them in active conflict zones
such as Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, key projects and their workers are likely to require more than just an
expanded consular staff to keep them safe. It’s with an eye on this growing danger that new Chinese private security
providers see a business opportunity . Shandong Huawei Security Group appears to be a leader among Chinese security
providers, which thus far have predominantly focused on the country’s robust internal market for bodyguard and protective services.
Huawei provides internal services, but in October 2010, opened an “ Overseas Service Center ” in Beijing. The
company’s statement on the center’s opening explicitly cites the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Iraq, and the potential for a security vacuum to result, as key drivers of its decision to target the
Iraq market. Chinese investors are rapidly increasing their presence in Iraq. China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), for example, is helping to develop oil projects that will likely substantially eclipse its flagship Sudan operations in size, while
Chinese construction companies are also likely to play a central role in rebuilding and improving the country’s civil and energy-related
infrastructure, destroyed by years of war and neglect. Shandong Huawei and other emerging Chinese security providers will also
likely target the Afghan market. The U.S. government’s latest geological survey showed massive mineral potential in Afghanistan, with
reserves of lithium, copper, cobalt, iron ore, and other minerals potentially worth as much as $1 trillion. Chinese mining and
construction companies are likely to move aggressively into Afghanistan , following the example of state-
owned Metallurgical Corporation of China , which is developing the massive Aynak copper deposit . The
Aynak project has benefitted from the close proximity of troops from the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division, but as Washington
strives to pull U.S. forces out of Afghanistan by 2014 , Chinese miners will increasingly be on their own
for security. As the growing number of Chinese companies and workers in Iraq and Afghanistan are forced to adapt to an
environment without large U.S. military forces effectively providing a shield for their operations,
the heightened security risks from insurgent attacks, banditry, and other physical threats are
likely to drive them to seek new armed security providers – precisely the business opportunity that Shandong
Huawei and its peers seek. Filling the Void The first known attempt to create a foreign-focused private security firm in China came in 2004,
when a Ningbo businessman created a bodyguard firm alleged to have drawn staff from China’s special forces community and the paramilitary
People’s Armed Police (PAP). In contrast, Shandong Huawei’s venture into the Iraq security market appears to be both larger-scale and focused.
On its website, the company says it recruits its personnel from among retirees of special police and military units and the PAP. Huawei also
specifically notes that its employees include men who have served tours in Iraq, likely former PAP who guarded China’s Ambassador to Iraq. As
far as we know, there are no other Chinese security firms publicly declaring a desire to protect Chinese businesses working abroad.
Nonetheless, if Shandong Huawei’s efforts to generate business in Iraq succeed, it’s likely that more Chinese firms will target the overseas
market, particularly since the domestic private security market is becoming increasingly crowded. The global private security
market is an increasingly competitive one, though, so why would a Chinese company consider hiring a firm like
Shandong Huawei instead of Control Risks, G4S, or another established global security provider? One answer is a tried and true Chinese
advantage: price. Chinese sources say the cost per man for a private security guard from China range from
3,000-6,000 RMB per month ($476 to $952). Thus, a 12-man Chinese security detachment costs from $190 to
$381 per day. This is comparable to the prices for local private guards in Afghanistan , but much more
affordable than the rates that many Western providers would likely charge. Chinese firms would
probably retain their cost advantage even if demand for experienced ex-tactical operators in China rises and wages increase.
Skill also factors in. In terms of capabilities, Shandong Huawei is currently not a “Blackwater with Chinese characteristics,” but its
personnel are almost certainly very competent operators . Since the guards working for the overseas wing of most Chinese
security firms would likely be drawn from personnel who had served in elite police and military units like the Snow Leopard counter-terrorism
force, the general protective skill level would likely be much higher than that of local Iraqi or Afghan guards, and closer in quality to what a
company would get by hiring a Western security firm. The
personnel likely to form the ranks of China’s overseas private
security providers won’t have the combat experience of the men working for a firm like Academi (formerly
Blackwater/Xe), but they would also be conducting different types of operations , as they wouldn’t likely
become offensively-oriented participants in conflicts the way Blackwater did in Iraq , for instance.
Reliability is another selling point for a company like Shandong Huawei in the eyes of Chinese companies. The
track record of local forces protecting Chinese workers on overseas projects isn’t especially good . By our
count, at least 43 Chinese citizens have perished since 2004 in violent attacks outside of China, including in places like Sudan where local forces
are supposed to protect foreign workers. Also, with
respect to future danger spots, the reputation of local security
forces in Afghanistan is particularly poor . In October 2009, Taliban attackers were able to easily overpower Afghan police
guards and kill 11 people at a U.N. guesthouse in Kabul, including five U.N. staff. With local forces often unreliable and influenced by
complicated local and tribal politics, using a trustworthy protective service from one’s home country holds great appeal. The common language
and cultural familiarity of a competent Chinese private security firm is also likely to be comforting to company managers, as it would greatly
ease communication, particularly in an emergency.

That expands Chinese influence and lack of regulations exacerbates instability

globally.
Meia Nouwens & Helen Legrada 18. 10-24-18. Meia Nouwens is an IISS research fellow and is
responsible for the analysis of Chinese defence policy and assessment of China’s international military
projection. She is a joint lead on the China Security Project, in collaboration with the Mercator Institute
for China Studies. She also contributes to assessments on China in The Military Balance. Helena Legarda
is an analyst for the Mercator Institute, whose research focuses on China’s foreign and security policies,
including their domestic sources and drivers, and their geopolitical impact. Prior to joining MERICS she
gained professional experience at the Delegation of the European Union to China and at research and
advisory firm China Policy in Beijing. Legarda holds a master’s in public policy degree with a focus on
International and Global Affairs from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and a BA in Chinese
Studies from the University of Oxford. She also studied Chinese language at Peking University. “Guarding
the Silk Road. How China's private security companies are going global.”
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/10/guarding-the-silk-road-how-chinas-private-security-
companies-are-going-global // BBM

growing arms
A military base in Djibouti, an expanding Shanghai Cooperation Organization under Beijing’s leadership, and rapidly
exports to countries around the world : China has left no doubt that it plans to become a global security
actor . The rapid expansion of China’s commercial and political activities around the globe is exposing Chinese citizens and
assets to the threats of transnational terrorism , civil unrest, and anti-Chinese sentiment. And domestic
expectations that Beijing will protect these interests , together with the Chinese government’s ambitions to shape global
norms, are pushing China to embrace force projection abroad. For the time being, Beijing is neither willing
nor able to deploy the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) overseas to protect Chinese companies and citizens. As a result, Chinese
private security companies ( PSCs ) are stepping in to fill this security vacuum. Out of the 5,000
registered Chinese private security companies , 20 provide international services, employing 3,200
security personnel in countries like Iraq , Sudan and Pakistan. The globalization of China’s security policy presents
challenges for countries around the world, but Beijing’s use of private actors to defend its international interests
carries with it its own unique set of issues. The presence of private security actors abroad – regardless of their
country of origin – is a complicated issue for host governments, due to the impact that these companies can
have on the interests and stability of the host country, as well as the difficulty in controlling their
activities . In the Chinese case, however, this issue is even more pronounced due to the blurry line
between public and private entities. Despite their nominally private status, Chinese private security companies
tend to operate with the tacit support and encouragement of the Chinese government and are often staffed by
former PLA officers with close, if indirect, ties to the Chinese authorities. This makes them complex , quasi-governmental
international actors whose behaviour is unregulated , since existing legal frameworks –
both at the domestic and international level – do not clearly specify who is responsible for policing their operations . The
potentially negative consequences of this are clear. For Beijing, there is the risk of these unregulated, relatively
inexperienced private security companies making mistakes in the international arena that could have
political consequences . If such mistakes accumulate, this could erode China’s international reputation, which is of utmost
concern now that party and state leader Xi Jinping has committed to turning China into a global power by 2049. And from the perspective of
European countries, Chinese PSCs’ international expansion can have an impact on their interests in regions around
the world, by potentially causing tension and instability in host countries and by helping Beijing increase its
influence in some of those countries. If current trends continue, Chinese private security actors will continue to
expand their activities in strategically important areas along the Belt and Road Initiative, coming ever closer to
the wider European neighborhood. It is, therefore, important to pay close attention to this issue and to encourage the regulation
of Chinese PSCs’ behaviour and operations overseas. A better understanding of the current state of the Chinese private security sector, its
overseas activities and the legal conditions is essential as it enables European governments to assess and deal with the impact that Chinese
PSCs’ activities may have on their interests and priorities The report's main findings and conclusions: Chinese private security companies (PSCs)
are going global, encouraged by the saturation of the domestic market, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Beijing’s preference for using
homegrown companies to protect its interests abroad. Projects related to the BRI have become a prime market for Chinese private security
companies, as Chinese investment expands into countries that are either experiencing or emerging from conflict. Chinese
private
security companies operate overseas in a legal grey zone : Chinese domestic law does not apply to
their international activities, and international law lacks regulation , so they only have to abide by
local host country laws, where those exist. The behaviour and operations of Chinese PSCs abroad vary widely from country to country,
depending on their contracts and local legislation, or lack thereof. Beijing’s use of private security companies to protect its overseas interests is
risky. Due to their relative inexperience, there is high potential for mistakes that could create political backlash for Beijing. European Union
member states’ interests will be affected by Chinese PSCs’ international expansion. The companies might contribute to an increase of instability
in regions that are strategically important for Europe. At the same time, they could help Beijing increase its influence
over host country governmxents.
Expanded Chinese influence ensures hotspot escalation.
Haddick 14 [Robert, an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command, Fire on the
Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 39-40]
Whether a Sinocentric structure in Asia is a subconscious Chinese goal or not, there are enough lingering fears elsewhere in the region about
this prospect to create active resistance to the concept. Simply put, we should expect Japan, India, Vietnam, the
Philippines, and many others to resist the establishment of a new Middle Kingdom . Should the United
States scale back its security role in the region, that resistance would also occur, only in more unstable and
dangerous forms. It is important to discuss why China's neighbors tolerate-indeed, even welcome-U.S. security hegemony
in the region and why, by contrast, these same countries would strongly resist Chinese hegemony. There is a
structural reason why this is so, and it relates to geography and is therefore enduring: China is a large neighbor in the region
and the United States is not. Because the United States has to project its presence across a vast ocean, it
requires the permission of most countries in the region to continue its role as the security hegemon. The
United States requires bases, access rights, and negotiated agreements with local governments to fulfill its security guarantees. If these
governments withdrew their permission due, say, to bad American behavior, the United States would find it
difficult and costly to sustain its presence across the ocean in the face of broad resistance. China, by contrast, is a
permanent presence in the region that the neighbors can never dislodge . Should China engage in the
same bad behavior, these countries cannot make China go away. They can only fight or accept
China's treatment. It is therefore easier for the countries in the region to enter into a security contract with an outside power,
knowing they have some bargaining leverage and an escape clause. When dealing with a powerful neighbor like China that
isn't going anywhere, the only way to achieve the same bargaining leverage is to match that neighbor's
power, especially its military power. And that implies arms races and spiraling security dilemmas .10 Thus, hegemons
are not all created equal. It is easier to strike a bargain with an outside hegemon than with a local one -an
immutable reason why the U.S. security presence will be welcome in the region. Even more crucially, U.S. service as the region's
security hegemon is much more likely to result in stability than if the region were left alone to find its
own stable structure (more on this below}. Adding to America's attractiveness as an outsider are the United States' seven-decade
record of keeping the region's commons open for all and its not having territorial disputes with
countries in the region. The logic behind why most countries in the region welcome the U nited States as the
security hegemon, and why most would resist China attempting to play the same role, is a strong
argument for maintaining this arrangement. Which brings us to Global Trends' second pathway, the Hobbesian scramble for
security, as the most likely outcome should the United States opt to reduce its costs by withdrawing from the region. As this chapter will later
explore, this outcome would very likely trigger multisided missile and nuclear arms races
across the region, with unpredictable and unstable consequences . The risk of military disaster inside the most
important economic region in the world would rise abruptly. The U.S. economy and standard of living would not
escape the risks and costs of these developments. It is easy to see how the absence of the United States
as an outside security provider could result in a dangerously unstable security competition in East Asia.
The rapid rise of China's military power would create the logic for an offsetting alliance by most
of its neighbors . Some however (perhaps, e.g., a future unified Korea) may choose to bandwagon with China instead, especially if
historical grievances make allying with some of China's adversaries politically unacceptable. Bandwagoning by some would
increase the security anxiety of the remainder that don't. Finally, some significant powers (e.g., Russia) might
choose to remain unaligned, which would compound the region's uncertainty because the players would have to ponder how these neutrals
would eventually act during a regional crisis.
Should one or more countries conclude that stability was unachievable
and conflict inevitable, the calculation would then turn to the logic of security trends and time pressure
and the possible advantage gained by striking first rather than waiting for adversaries to
grow even stronger in the future.
 1nc
The United States federal government should
- require Congressional authorization prior to the use of military force;
- restrict via statute the authority of the President to conduct first-use nuclear
strikes
- convict the President of the United States of high crimes and misdemeanors in a
senate trial and remove him from office
- Impeach and remove Mike Pence from office
- Impeach and remove federal judges appointed under the Trump administration
- Restrict the Executive’s power of the purse
- Make all relevant data about PMC usage open and accessible by the public
 1nc
Capitalism culminates in extinction – Warming, Inter-state conflict, social unrest,
resource wars, and lack of expansion ensures the system can’t recover
Robinson 19, February 2019, William I. Robinson, “Into the Tempest: Essays on the New Global
Capitalism”, https://www.powells.com/book/into-the-tempest-9781608469666/62-0 // dbw

deep contradictions in emergent world society make entirely uncertain the

Eighth,
very survival of our species , much less the mid- to long-term stabilization and viability of global
capitalism, and portend prolonged global social conflict. The structure of global production, distribution, and consumption
increasingly reflects the skewed income pattern. For instance, under the new global social apartheid, tourism is the fastest growing economic
activity and even the mainstay of many Third World economies. This does not mean that more people are actually enjoying the fruits of leisure
and international travel; it means that 20
percent of humanity has more and more disposable income
simultaneous to the contraction of consumption by the remaining 80 percent. This 80 percent is forced to provide
all sorts of ever more frivolous services to, and to orient its productive activity toward, meeting the needs and satisfying the sumptuous desires
of that 20 percent." By
the turn of the century, private security forces and prisons had become the number
one growth sector in the United States and the other Northern countries." Social apartheid spawns
decadence. Militarized fortress cities and spatial apartheid are necessary for social control under a
situation in which an ever-smaller portion of humanity can actually consume the essentials of life, much
less luxury goods." As national capitalism matured in the late nineteenth century in the North, the tendency inherent in capital
accumulation toward a concentration of income and productive resources, and the social polarity and political conflict this generates, was
offset by two factors. The first was the intervention of states to regulate the operation of the free market, to guide accumulation, and to
capture and redistribute surpluses. This intervention
was itself the outcome of mass working class struggles from
below that forced reform on the system. The second was the emergence of modern imperialism to offset the
polarizing tendencies inherent in the process of capital accumulation in the North, thereby transferring
global social conflict to the South. Both these factors therefore fettered, in the core of the world system, the social polarity
generated by capitalism. But by reducing or eliminating the ability of individual states to regulate czsapital
accumulation and capture surpluses, globalization is now bringing (at a worldwide level) precisely the
polarization between a rich minority and a poor majority that Karl Marx predicted. Yet this time
there are no "new frontiers," no virgin lands for capitalist colonization that could
offset the social and political consequences of global polarization. Endemic to
unfettered global capitalism, therefore, is intensified social conflict, which in turn
engenders constant political crises and ongoing instability, both within countries
and between countries. In the post-World War 11 period, the North was able to shift much social conflict to the South as a
combined result of an imperialist transfer of wealth from South to North and the redistribution of this wealth in the North through Keynesian
No fewer than 160 wars were fought in the Third World from 1945 to 1990. However,
state intervention.
globalization involves a distinct shift in global strife from interstate conflict (reflecting a certain correspondence
between classes and nations in the stage of national capitalism) to global class conflict. The UNDP's 1994 report underscores a shift
from "a pattern of wars between states to wars within states." Of the eighty-two armed conflicts between 1989 and 1992, only three were
between states. "Although often cast in ethnic divisions, many have a political or economic character," states the report. Meanwhile, global
military spending in 1992 was $815 billion ($725 billion of which corresponded to the rich Northern countries), a figure equal to the combined
income of 49 percent of the world's people in that same year." By 2015, military spending worldwide had more than doubled, to nearly $1.7
trillion.28 The
period of worldwide political instability we face ranged from the late twentieth into the early
twenty-first centuries from civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and in numerous African countries to
simmering social conflict in Latin America and Asia; major transnational wars in the Middle East;
endemic civil disturbances, sometimes low-key and sometimes high profile, in Los Angeles, Paris, Bonn,
Athens, and most metropoles of the Northern countries. Uncertain survival and insecurities posed by
global capitalism induces diverse forms of fundamentalisms, localisms, nationalisms, and racial and
ethnic conflict. These themes will be discussed in detail in later chapters. As the worldwide ruling class, the transnational
bourgeoisie has thrust humanity into a crisis of civilization. Social life under global capitalism is
increasingly dehumanizing and devoid of any ethical content. But our crisis is deeper: We face a
species crisis. Well known structural contradictions analyzed a century ago by Marx, such as
overaccumulation, underconsumption, and the tendency toward stagnation, are exacerbated by
globalization, as many analysts have pointed out. However, while these "classic" contradictions cause
financial turmoil, social crisis and cultural decadence, new contradiction s associated with twenty-first-
century capitalism-namely, the incompatibility of the reproduction of both capital and
of nature-is leading to an ecological [disaster] holocaust that threatens the survival of
our species and of life itself on our planet." Yet "most analyses of the environmental problem
today are concerned less with saving the planet or life or humanity than saving capitalism -the system at
the root of our environmental problem," note Foster and his colleagues. "Not only has this generated inertia with respect to
social change-indeed a tendency to fiddle while Rome burns-but it has also led to the belief that the crisis can be managed
by essentially the same social institutions that brought it into being in the first place ."3°

The aff’s retooling of regulation feeds the capitalist machine and re-entrenches
violence at a distance – the alternative is to fight back through an exposure of
capitalism’s true identity
Ranito 19 (Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito is Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of Porto, Portugal. “Regulating US Private
Security Contractors.” https://books.google.com/books?id=Wd2EDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=Jezdimirovic+Ranito,
+J.+(2019).+Regulating+US+Private+Security+Contractors.+doi:10.1007/978-3-030-11241-
7%5C&source=bl&ots=k5ZpSukTc1&sig=ACfU3U2KUl3m74c_UP8go_U5sYDY_TybTg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjdqreXqMLmA
hXVHM0KHWTLCq8Q6AEwAHoECAUQAQ#v=onepage&q=Jezdimirovic%20Ranito%2C%20J.%20(2019).%20Regulating%20US
%20Private%20Security%20Contractors.%20doi%3A10.1007%2F978-3-030-11241-7%5C&f=false)sw

With the downsizing of national armies after the end of the Cold War, Private Security Companies (PSC) gained a new place in
the market for force as a consequence of several factors: the demise of ideological confict and the
resulting necessity to be prepared to enter into direct combat with another state with a reduced
number of state troops (and consequently seeking support functions fulflled by contractors), the increase of UN peace missions, and ideological
demand for outsourcing a state’s provision of the services (Avant 2005, 30; Kinsey 2006, 151; Krahmann 2010, 4; Stanley 2015). The limited capacity of

national armies to respond rapidly to security threats, and an urgency factor highlighted by the 9/11
attacks, led to increasing security outsourcing to unimaginable proportions in order to attain ambitious
foreign and domestic policy goals (Avant and De Nevers 2011). In fact, on several occasions, the number of private contractors surpassed the
number of regular troops operating in hostile environments (Dunigan 2011, 52). Moreover, the lack of preparation for such a rapid increase often led to misconduct
on the part of contractors, a fact that alarmed decision-makers and highlighted the inadequacy of the existing regulation of this crucial sector (GAO 2005, 2006,
2012). This change in the structural relationship between the state—until then considered as the sole
provider of security services, and equipped to use violence outside its borders —and private actors was
systemic, and the rapid expansion in the provision of violence in the name of the state outside of
borders in volatile environments, unsurprisingly caused an outcry calling for more regulation . The
classical theories used by the International Relations (IR) have not been very effective in treating the problems
resulting from such a power shift, as the complexity of relationships affecting the regulatory process
could not be fully understood by them (Avant 2005; Krahmann 2010; Percy 2013). One of the most-used approaches to
explain regulatory struggles is neoliberalism , and later on regulatory capitalism , not only considering
security outsourcing but more broadly (Aglietta 2000; O’Brien 2005; Collins 2011; Moran 2002; Glaeser and Shleifer 2003; Shearing 2003). The neoliberal
thinking was often introduced in liberal democracies through regulatory policies. This became widespread in the
Western world, essentially in the last two decades of the twentieth century. There are many explanations of the changes brought by the regulatory state (Moran
2002; Scott 2000; Sunstein 1993), but here I use John Braithwaite’s defnition (2000). He assumes that the biggest change to the Keynesian
state (which he defnes as state-centric, and with a socialist orientation on the use of force, where the state does all the “rowing” and little of the “steering”) to
the new regulatory state, was the difference of deregulation, privatization, and for implementation of
“ governing at a distance ,” or shift from rowing for more and better steering (Braithwaite 2000, 225). The
dominance of this new paradigm of government that appeared with the regulatory approach, shifted
the focus from the delivery of services to their oversight and regulation , a transformation that some
criminologists entitled as a change from rowing to steering (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). The metaphor refers to a boat where the function of the state changes
from paddling the boat (executing the rowing component) to the state just being at the helm (steering the boat). Such transformation represents the structural

change that is referenced here: the structure where the state passes from monopolistic position
regarding a provision of security services to a supervisor of provision and opens
the market for competition . For instance, internally, such change can be noticed in the outsourcing of the
security provision in the commercial zones or protection of people and properties . The shift where the state has been
seen as a unique provider of those services is gone and has been altered to be one of the providers, opening the space for outsourcing of

those tasks, and occupying the primary role of the market regulator and transforming in one of the
providers. The change in which there is a multiplication of actors involved in regulatory space, the consequent social place they occupy in the regulatory
process and new dynamics created between all of the actors involved in these new regulatory processes are usually not explored by neoliberalism. What
neoliberalism proposed was to look at the world through well-established structured, well-defned categories and through the logic of a free market. It was looking
at the outcomes that came through such structures and explaining the realities through neoliberal doctrine that had an aim to privatize, deregulate, and diminish
the public sphere. Neoliberalism
was often employed to justify deregulation of state control over major
industries, shrinking and privatization of public services, and enhancement of international capital
mobility, among others, to catapult economic growth (Brenner and Theodore 2002, 350). In the security sector,
these goals have been faced with caution , because of the sensitivity of the topic, since the use of the
violence by private agents acting in the name of state was in question. The neoliberal structural
change, which implied inclusion of multiple actors and agents in regulatory
process, saw regulatory process as certain liberation of the state “claws” and
outsourcing security support services that previously have been executed solely by
the state. As a result, the private security contractors have been introduced in post-confict
operations, executing the tasks contracted by the state, under a regime different from the military.
Abrahamsen and Williams (2010) named such change as global security assemblages, the new set of relationships, where the blurring between public–private and
local–global division lost the importance it had held in the past. The
neoliberal analysis applied to the regulatory process of
private security providers focuses on structural level when responsibility for oversight and control of the
use of force passed from monopoly by state to outsourcing it to private agents. Neoliberal view, through
regulatory state approach, has a new take on the network relationships, where the old hierarchical
relationships are gone and a new sort of state and nonstate hybrid alliances are formed (Crawford 2006, 450).
Some may imply that security regulation in the old system, when outsourcing of sensitive functions that may imply civilian victims was marginal, had far less political
weight than the current one has. It certainly was more technocratic, with an established system of checks and balances. In
the new system, the
checks and balances applied to the military have not been expanded to the private entities providing
services. Instead, the industry started operating and growing in a certain legislative and procedural
vacuum and have been built upon. That is the space that Kimberly Brown (2013) suggested spreading accountability present
in the regular military to the private actors as benefcial for the new structure in order to

stabilize the power , limiting the effects that new structure caused. On ever present concerns over lack of tools and
structures that would successfully oversee and control security contracts, neoliberalism would defend
the benefts of putting those services at open market, which would promote competition and
consequently improve quality of the services provided . Considering regulations per se,
neoliberalism considers that monopoly represented “command and control” type
of regulation while neoliberalism offers more “managerial,” softer type of
regulation, the one that focuses on cooperation between regulator and regulated,
their solutions considering risk-based regulation, fortifying internal control
systems of companies and with aim to achieve regulation through self-regulation
(Baud and Chiapello 2017, 4). Neoliberal regulatory analysis would therefore focus on structures involved in these

regulatory solutions, and consequently ignore/tune-off analysis beyond structures and outcomes, like
dynamics between agents involved, and their effects on both process and outcomes. Such analysis would not be
bothered with process itself, and why some decisions have been made and not others, it would look to justify decisions made through neoliberal ideological
assumptions. The
multiplication of the agents involved directly or indirectly in the regulatory process (such as
NGOs , oversight institutions (i.e., GAO , SIGIR, SIGAR), academics, industry ) led to the
decentralization of regulation, where the state is not a unique regulatory input
anymore , emphasizing other regulatory infuences. The state’s role in the new context is to maintain a regulatory
network monitored by the state institutions established with such aim, jointly investing in legal coercion
as a method of its enforcement through the established bureaucratic hierarchy (King 2007, 63). The regulation of
standards of behavior and integrating the consequences for failure of compliance is an institutionalized process that defnes the practices rooted in everyday life
(Cetina et al. 2001). It implies the presence of the law, accompanied by control mechanisms, formal and direct, established with the explicit purpose of preventing
or reducing injustice, corruption, negligence, or incompetence (Teichert 2014). Regulation can take many forms among which state rules and regulations and self-
regulation by the private security industry itself are focused here. Under the concept of the state, regulations are considered forms and direct mechanisms through
which the state exercises control over the activities contracted to private security providers. Under the self-regulation of the industry are considered standards
established by trade (industry) associations that are voluntary and do not have legislative or criminal punishment as a means of enforcement. Civil society and
media, through their different forms, have been active in the security industry, particularly via denouncements of misconduct, in performing pressure toward
political elite and the industry itself, seeking more effcient regulation of the sector.
Adv 1
 AT: War Powers---1NC
Either the AFF results in an NFU OR it fails to solve.

Exec power deters adversaries.

John Hannah 18, Foundation for Defense of Democracies senior fellow, 4-16-2018, “Trump Was Right to Strike Syria,”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/16/trump-was-right-to-strike-syria/.

Let’s give credit where credit is due. First, U.S. President Donald Trump set a red line and enforced it . He warned that the large-scale use of chemical weapons by
the Syrian regime would trigger a U.S. attack. When Syrian President Bashar al-Assad crossed that red line a year ago, Trump responded with 59 cruise missiles that took out about 20 percent

of Syria’s operational aircraft. A year later, Trump has acted again after Assad chose to challenge him a second time. This attack
was twice as big and hit multiple targets, including what U.S. defense officials called the “heart” of Syria’s chemical weapons program, substantially degrading Assad’s ability to produce the

deadly agents. That ain’t peanuts. No, there’s no guarantee it will end Assad’s use of chemical weapons — in which case Trump and his
military have made clear that they’ll strike again, almost certainly harder than the time before. And no, nothing that happened Friday night will, in isolation, alter the trajectory of Syria’s

But the effective deployment of U.S. power in defense of a universal norm barring the use of some of the world’s worst
bloody civil war.

is nevertheless to be applauded — limited an objective as it may be. Also to be praised is

weapons against innocent men, women, and children

the possible emergence of a commander in chief whose threats to use force need to be
taken seriously by U.S. adversaries. Once established, this kind of credibility (while no panacea) can be a
powerful instrument in the U.S. foreign-policy arsenal. Once lost, it is hard to recover , and the
consequences can be severe. For evidence, just see the post-2013 results, from Crimea to Syria. A second important virtue of Friday night’s attack was its multilateral character. With barely a

Britain, France, and the United States, the three most powerful militaries of the trans-Atlantic
week’s notice,

alliance, all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, seamlessly operated on the
seas and in the skies of the Middle East to defend their common interests and values against a
murderous Russian and Iranian client. What’s the worth of that kind of unity, coordination, and seriousness of purpose? It’s hard to quantify precisely. But
anyone who’s ever toiled as a practitioner in the national security space knows, deep in their bones, that it matters — a lot. And it especially matters in the case of a U.S. president who has too
often unfairly — and, to my mind, dangerously — discounted the value of Europe, the West, and the post-World War II system of institutions and alliances that his predecessors built. In that
power and righteousness of the world’s leading liberal democracies acting in concert, there’s a significant value-added that no mere counting of ships, planes, and missiles can adequately
capture. Kudos to the president and his team for their skill in mounting this posse. It’s an important framework that they hopefully will continue to invest in to confront the multitude of urgent

Say what you will about the wisdom of some of the

international challenges now staring us in the face. A few other related observations:

president’s public messaging last week, but once he made clear that he again would act to enforce his
red line, U.S. adversaries took him deadly seriously . Russian ships dispersed from port. Syria
abandoned its own air bases and rushed to co-locate its aircraft near Russian military assets. And
Iranian-backed fighters, including Hezbollah forces, allegedly vacated certain positions and went to
ground for fear of a possible U.S. strike . Again, the fact that the United States’ worst
adversaries appear to take Trump’s threats with the seriousness they deserve is a very good thing, a
genuine national security asset that needs to be husbanded, reinforced, and carefully but systematically exploited
going forward. But hopefully last week’s experience also serves as a reminder to the president of the deep wisdom inherent in the criticism that he’s long leveled at his
predecessors: Don’t telegraph your military punch . Another observation: There was much nervous hand-wringing before the

strike about a possible U.S.-Russia confrontation. Rightly so. No one wants World War III to break out
over Syria. All prudent and appropriate measures should be taken to mitigate those risks . But in some circles,

the hyping of the concern threatened to become absolutely paralyzing, a justification (or excuse) for doing nothing in
the face of Assad’s abominable use of weapons of mass destruction.

Democratic peace is wrong --- democracies more likely to engage in war

Baliga 11—prof of managerial economics and decision sciences at Kellog School of Business, NU. PhD
from Harvard—AND—Tomas Sjöström—chaired prof of economics at Rutgers—AND—David O. Lucca—
economist with the Federal Reserve Board (Sandeep, Domestic Political Survival and International
Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?, The Review of Economic Studies, July 2011, 78;3)
The idea that democracy promotes peace has a long history. Thomas Paine argued that monarchs go to war to enrich themselves, but a more democratic system of
government would lead to lasting peace: “What inducement has the farmer, while following the plough, to lay aside his peaceful pursuit, and go to war with the farmer of
another country?” (Paine, 1985 p. 169). Immanuel Kant agreed that if “the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is
more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business” (Kant, 1795, 1903, p. 122). More recently, the democratic peace
hypothesis has influenced the “neoconservative” view of international relations (Kaplan and Kristol, 2003). U.S. policy makers of different political persuasions have
invoked it in support of a policy to “seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.”1 But some anecdotal

observations seem to support a more “realist” viewpoint. For example, after the breakup of Yugoslavia,
democratic reforms were followed by war, not peace. When given a chance in the legislative elections of 2006,
the Palestinians voted for Hamas, which did not have a particularly peaceful platform . Such anecdotes suggest

that democratization does not always promote peace . Even fully democratic countries such as the U.S. sometimes

turn aggressive: under perceived threats to the homeland, the democratically elected President George W. Bush declared war on Iraq. ¶ We develop a simple

game-theoretic model of conflict based on Baliga and Sjöström (2004). Each leader can behave aggressively or
peacefully. A leader's true propensity to be aggressive, his “type”, is his private information. Since actions are strategic complements, the fear that the other leader
might be an aggressive type can trigger aggression, creating a fear spiral we call “Schelling's dilemma” (see Schelling, 1960; Jervis, 1976, Jervis, 1978; Kydd, 1997). Unlike
Baliga and Sjöström (2004), we assume a leader may be removed from power. Whether a leader can stay in power depends on the preferences of his citizens, the political

The political system interacts with Schelling's dilemma

system, and the outcome of the interaction between the two countries.

to create a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace. ¶ Like the leaders, citizens
have different types. By hypothesis, the median type prefers to live in peace. This imposes a “dovish
bias” on a dyad of two full democracies (whose leaders can be replaced by their median voters). Thus, a dyadic democratic peace is likely to
obtain. However, when facing a country that is not fully democratic, the median voter may

support aggression out of fear and may replace a leader who is not aggressive enough. (For example,
Neville Chamberlain had to resign after appeasing Hitler .) This gives rise to a “hawkish bias”. Thus, in a fully

democratic country, a dovish bias is replaced by a hawkish bias when the

environment becomes more hostile . In contrast, a dictator is not responsive to the preferences of his
citizens, so there is neither a hawkish nor a dovish bias. Accordingly, a dyad of two dictators is less peaceful than a fully democratic dyad, but a dictator
responds less aggressively than a democratically elected leader to increased threats from
abroad.¶ In the model, the leader of a limited democracy risks losing power if hawks in his
population turn against him. For instance, the German leaders during World War I believed signing
a peace agreement would lead to their demise (Asprey, 1991, pp. 486–487, 491). Conversely, the support
of the hawkish minority trumps the opposition of more peaceful citizens . Thus, a
limited democracy experiences a hawkish bias similar to a full democracy
under threat from abroad but never a dovish bias . On balance, this makes
limited democracies more aggressive than any other regime type¶ . In a full democracy, if the
citizens feel safe, they want a dovish leader, but if they feel threatened, they want a hawkish leader. In dictatorships and limited democracies, the citizens are not powerful
enough to overthrow a hawkish leader, but the leader of a limited democracy risks losing power by appearing too dovish. This generates a non-monotonic relationship

Our empirical analysis reassesses the link between democracy and peace
between democracy and peace.¶

using a flexible semiparametric functional form, where fixed effects account for unobserved
heterogeneity across country dyads. We use Polity IV data to classify regimes as dictatorships, limited democracies or full democracies.
Following the literature on the democratic peace hypothesis, we define a conflict as a militarized dispute in the Correlates of War data set. The data, which span over the
period 1816–2000, contain many military disputes between limited democracies. In the nineteenth century, Britain had a Parliament, but even after the Great Reform Act
of 1832, only about 200,000 people were allowed to vote. Those who owned property in multiple constituencies could vote multiple times.2 Hence, Britain is classified as a
limited democracy for 58 years and becomes a full democracy only after 1879. France, Italy, Spain, and Germany are also limited democracies at key points in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These countries, together with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, were involved in many militarized disputes in Europe and
throughout the world. For much of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia had many skirmishes and outright wars in the “Great Game” for domination of Central Asia
(Hopkirk, 1990). France is also involved in many disputes and is a limited democracy during the Belgian War of Independence and the Franco-Prussian War. Germany is a
limited democracy at the start of the First World War.¶ Over the full sample, the data strongly support a dyadic democratic peace hypothesis: dyads consisting of two full
democracies are more peaceful than all other pairs of regime types. This is consistent with previous empirical studies (Babst, 1972, Levy, 1988, , maozrussett, Russett and

Oneal, 2001). Over the same period, limited democracies were the most aggressive regime type. In particular, dyads consisting of two limited
democracies are more likely to experience militarized disputes than any other dyads,
including “mixed” dyads where the two countries have different regime types. These results are robust to
changing the definitions of the three categories (using the Polity scores) and to alternative specifications of our empirical model. The effects are

quantitatively significant . Parameter estimates of a linear probability model specification,

suggest that the likelihood that a dyad engages in a militarized dispute falls roughly 35% if
the dyad changes from a pair of limited democracies to a pair of dictatorships . We also find that if some
country j faces an opponent which changes from a full democracy to another regime type, the estimated equilibrium probability of conflict increases most dramatically
when country j is a full democracy. This suggests that as the environment becomes more hostile, democracies respond more aggressively than other regime types, which is
also consistent with our theoretical model.¶ A more nuanced picture emerges when we split the data into subsamples. Before World War II, the data strongly suggest that
limited democracies were the most conflict prone. It is harder to draw conclusions for the post World War II period, when very few countries are classified as limited
democracies, and full democracies have very stable Polity scores. The Cold War was a special period where great power wars became almost unthinkable due to the
existence of large nuclear arsenals (Gaddis, 2005). Did the weakening and demise of the Soviet Union bring a return to the pre-1945 patterns? Although the time period is

It is commonly argued that a

arguably short, in the post-1984 period, it does seem that dyads of limited democracies are again the most prone to conflict.¶

process of democratization, e.g. in the Middle East, will lead to peace (Bush, 2003). But both theory and data
suggest that the relationship between democracy and peace may be complex and non-monotonic. Replacing a dictatorship with a

limited democracy may actually increase the risk of militarized disputes . Even
if a dictatorship is replaced by a full democracy, this may not reduce the risk of
militarized disputes if the region is dominated by hostile non-democratic
countries . In the data, only dyads consisting of two full democracies are peaceful.
Democratic countries such as Israel and India, with hostile neighbours, do not enjoy a low
level of conflict.
Adv 2
 1nc – at: Russia war
No Russia war
Andrew Korybko 18, member of the expert council for the Institute of Strategic Studies and
Predictions at the People’s Friendship University of Russia, "The World War III Media Hype is Misplaced:
The US-Russian Arms Competition Might Stabilize Their Standoff in Syria",
https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-world-war-iii-media-hype-is-misplaced-the-us-russian-arms-
competition-might-stabilize-their-standoff-in-syria/5635701

There are a lot of fast-moving events happening right now surrounding the latest Syrian Crisis, and it’s not the point of
this article to review them all in detail, which is why the author recommends that the reader check out his previous analysis about “The
Suspicious Timing Of The Latest Provocations In Syria” and his follow-up Facebook post from this morning about why the Alt-Media-driven hype
US-Russian standoff has rhetorically escalated to the point where
about World War III is totally misplaced. The
both Great Powers have to do something otherwise they’ll “lose face” and subsequent “prestige”, which
is why the US looks ready to hit Syria while Russia may very well militarily respond , but neither of these
actions are guaranteed to be “substantial” and could very likely just be “ superficial ” in order to
keep their delicate “dance” going. The US knows that endangering the lives of Russian servicemen
would automatically trigger the tripwire that would necessitate Moscow undertaking a decisive
military response, hence why this probably won’t happen and the so-called “deconfliction mechanisms”
will be relied upon instead to prevent this “dark scenario” from materializing. By the same token, Russia
knows that shooting down the US missiles will enrage Trump and prompt his “deep state” to push him into
escalating the crisis even further in order to avoid “embarrassment”, which is one argument as to why it might not
militarily respond to this predictably forthcoming assault apart from the fact that it officially declared last year after the first one happened that
it wouldn’t do if any new ones happened either. That said, the Russian rhetoric on this matter has gotten to such a point – and
been so widely misinterpreted by many – that there are very real expectations around the
world for it to respond in one form or another otherwise it will be “humiliated” and considered “unreliable”, and this soft
power-“constructivist” impression might actually end up influencing policy at the end of the day. However, it doesn’t mean that
Russia will intercept Trump and his allies’ cruise missiles with S-400 ones but just that it could react
through diplomatic or economic means like Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman and former Commander-in-Chief
of the Russian Airborne Troops Vladimir Shamanov warned earlier this week. Russia is also in a predicament when it comes to its possible
response because anything less than a 100% success rate with the S-400s might diminish their hard-earned international reputation as the
world’s best anti-air and anti-missile defensive weapons system, something that Moscow might not be willing to risk when considering that
billions upon billions of dollars of future revenue is dependent on their sales, which become even more important in the context of existing
sanctions. Because of the dangerous escalatory risk that could occur if Russia’s S-400s take down all of
Trump and his allies’ incoming munitions (something that Moscow said last year it wouldn’t do anyway), as well as the need
to avoid any unexpected “flukes” that could result in anything less than a 100% or other
similarly “convincing” showing of this defensive system’s first-ever battle-tested capabilities , Russia is
unlikely to militarily respond to the US in any “significant” way. Nor , for that matter, is
the US expected to “significantly” change the balance of power in Syria through its supposedly imminent
and potentially multilateral strike against the Arab Republic , meaning that both the US’ actions and
Russia’s reaction will probably be “ superficial ” in order for both sides to “ save face” and not risk
having the other “embarrass” them by upstaging their real military capabilities. Russia’s 100% deflection
of the US and its allies’ best missiles would prove that the S-400 is the most effective system for preventing American-led
aggression against any country in the world; conversely, anything less than that or similarly
“unconvincing” (and brought about by some kind of unexpected and unusual occurrence) would make the world think
whether rightly or wrongly that the S-400 doesn’t live up to its “hype” and is incapable of
“saving” its customers. Therefore, as paradoxical as it may sound , the US-Russian standoff in Syria
might actually be “stably” managed (key word, used relatively) precisely because of the military
competition between these parties’ offensive and defensive weapons respectively, with each of them
knowing full well that anything other than an “ideal” performance by either of them – which
is impossible for both sides to pull off given that they’d be challenging one another – would lead to a
profound erosion of their soft power, which is a risk that neither of them might be willing to take.
 1nc: at - china

No US-China war – nor accidental escalation

Timothy Heath 17, senior international defense research analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
Corporation and member of the Pardee RAND Graduate School faculty, and William R. Thompson,
Distinguished and Rogers Professor at Indiana University and an adjunct researcher at RAND, "U.S.-China
Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War", National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-china-
tensions-are-unlikely-lead-war-20411?page=0%2C1

Graham Allison's April 12 article, “ How America and China Could Stumble to War ,” explores how misperceptions and
bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into
an unwanted war. However , the article fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions
that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The

U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension , but the relative stability
and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely
unlikely. In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints
involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising
power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the
underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This
argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational
pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous. However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic
conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the United States and China are in a
situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War
example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic
and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through
proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis. By contrast , the U.S.-China relationship

today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States may be
experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter,
acrimonious rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor
Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy . Today’s rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues,
but they also view each other as important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns, such as

North Korea, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The
behavior of their respective militaries underscores the relatively restrained rivalry . The military
competition between China and the United States may be growing, but it operates at a far lower level of
intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff . And unlike their Cold War
counterparts, U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in major wars .
Moreover, polls show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views —a considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment expressed by

both preparations for major war and a constituency for

the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other. Lacking

conflict, leaders and bureaucracies in both countries have less incentive to misjudge crisis
situations in favor of unwarranted escalation. To the contrary, political leaders and bureaucracies currently
face a strong incentive to find ways of defusing crises in a manner that avoids unwanted
escalation. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane collision off Hainan Island in
2001 , and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft , such
as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a
dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory
options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely
propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one featuring an elevated risk of conflict. The
most important driver, as Allison
recognizes, would be a growing parity between China and the United States as economic, technological and

geostrategic leaders of the international system . The United States and China feature an increasing parity in the size of their economies,
but the United States retains a considerable lead in virtually every other dimension of

national power . The current U.S.-China rivalry is a regional one centered on the Asia-Pacific region, but it retains the considerable potential of
escalating into a global, systemic competition down the road. A second important driver would be the mobilization of public opinion behind the view that the other
country is a primary source of threat, thereby providing a stronger constituency for escalatory policies. A related development would be the formal designation by
leaders in both capitals of the other country as a primary hostile threat and likely foe. These developments would most likely be fueled by a growing array of
intractable disputes, and further accelerated by a serious militarized crisis. The cumulative effect would be the exacerbation of an antagonistic competitive rivalry,
repeated and volatile militarized crisis, and heightened risk that any flashpoint could escalate rapidly to war—a relationship that would resemble the U.S.-Soviet

if the relationship evolved towards a more hostile form of rivalry , unique

relationship in the early 1960s. Yet even

features of the contemporary world suggest lessons drawn from the past may have limited
applicability. Economic interdependence in the twenty-first century is much different and far more
complex than in it was in the past. So is the lethality of weaponry available to the major
powers . In the sixteenth century, armies fought with pikes, swords and primitive guns. In the twenty-first century, it is possible to
eliminate all life on the planet in a full-bore nuclear exchange . These features likely affect the
willingness of leaders to escalate in a crisis in a manner far differently than in past rivalries. More broadly, Allison’s
analysis about the “Thucydides Trap” may be criticized for exaggerating the risks of war. In his claims
to identify a high propensity for war between “rising” and “ruling” countries, he fails to clarify those terms, and does not distinguish the more dangerous from the
less volatile types of rivalries. Contests for supremacy over land regions, for example, have historically proven the most conflict-prone, while competition

for supremacy over maritime regions has, by contrast, tended to be less lethal . Rivalries also wax
and wane over time, with varying levels of risks of war . A more careful review of rivalries and
their variety , duration and patterns of interaction suggests that although most wars involve rivalries, many rivals avoid going
to war . Misperceptions and strategic accidents remain a persistent feature of international politics , and it
may well be that that mistakes are more likely to be lethal in periods of adjustment in relative power configurations. Rising states do have problems negotiating

Even so , the probability of war between China and

status quo changes with states that have staked out their predominance earlier.

the United States is almost certainly far less than the 75 percent predicted by Allison. If the leaders of both countries can
continue to find ways to dampen the trends towards hostile rivalry and maintain sufficient cooperation to manage differences, then there is good reason to hope
that the risk of war can be lowered further still.
 turn
South Asian nuclear use now will be limited to an Indian counterforce strike
Vipin Narang 17, Professor @ Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Plenary: Beyond the Nuclear
Threshold: Causes and Consequences of First Use", https://fbfy83yid9j1dqsev3zq0w8n-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Vipin-Narang-Remarks-Carnegie-Nukefest-2017.pdf

Everybody thinks they know the likeliest pathway to nuclear first use in South Asia. It is called
a conventional wisdom for a reason. It starts with a terrorist attack presumed to be from Pakistan on an Indian metropole that
kills scores of civilians. Unable to exercise restraint anymore due to domestic political pressures baying for blood, the Government of

India orders the mobilization of its three main strike corps and commences offensive operations across the international border,
not limiting its response to the Jammu and Kashmir sector and the Line of Control. The deepest thrust is undertaken by XXI Corps and its
supporting elements in the desert sector. XXI Corps threatens to bisect Pakistan’s northsouth communications, putting Pakistani conventional forces on its heels.
Unable to slow down XXI Corps, Pakistan flushes out Nasr tactical nuclear weapons batteries or Abdali missiles and
its Strategic Plans Division (SPD) authorizes their use either in demonstration shots , against concentrated XXI Corps
armored divisions, or bridgeheads and logistics behind the main thrust to slow down the Indian offensive. India then promises what most

presume is massive countervalue retaliation against Pakistani cities , leaving aside how credible or incredible that might be.
This is how nuclear first use would unfold in South Asia, right? Well, maybe not so fast . There is increasing
evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first . And that India’s opening salvo may not be
conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theater, but a full ‘ comprehensive
counterforce strike’ that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear
weapons so that India does not have to engage in iterative tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its
own cities to nuclear destruction . This thinking surfaces not from fringe extreme voices
such as Bharat Karnad or retired Indian Army officers frustrated by the lack of resolve they believe their government has shown in
multiple provocations, but from no less than a former Strategic Forces Command C-in-C Lt Gen BS

Nagal and, perhaps more importantly and authoritatively, from the highly respected and
influential former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon in plain sight in his
recent 2016 book Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. In short, we may be witnessing what I call a
‘ decoupling’ of Indian nuclear strategy between China and Pakistan. The force requirements
India needs in order to credibly threaten assured retaliation against China may allow it to
pursue more aggressive strategies —such as escalation dominance or a ‘ splendid first
strike’—against Pakistan . We may be seeing the emergence of this decoupling, or at least 2
serious mainstream thinking about it, with the intention being a disarming strike against
Pakistan.

It's successful and wipes out Pakistan’s nukes---India has supersonic missiles---BMD
fails against those
Christine Leah 18, visiting fellow at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), working on conventional arms sales and
conventional and nuclear arms control in South Asia, “Counterforce to counter what?”, https://nation.com.pk/31-Jan-2018/counterforce-to-
counter-what
With India developing its indigenous defence industry , and acquiring technology from the West as well, it seems to be on a
track to gain an edge over its South Asian neighbors, especially Pakistan . This includes the
acquisition/development with other countries on technology such as cruise missiles , Airborne
Warning and Control Systems ( AWACS ), and strike aircraft . Of these, inciting concern is
India’s growing air combat and ground strike capacity based on Su-30 MKI, Mirage-2000H ,
Jaguar strike aircraft, Tu-22M backfire bombers , and more recently, C-295 transport aircraft ,
and the French Rafale which augment its capacity to go after its counterforce targets.
Moreover, major arms sales to India in the last decade include U.S. F-16s and guided bombs for

Jaguar aircraft . From France, the sales include 36 French-built Rafale planes , six
Scorpene submarines , upgrades to 49 Mirage-2000-5, air-to air missiles for these planes and a
huge sale of 126 multi-role medium combat aircraft . Similarly, Russia has exported combat
aircraft such as 270 Su-30s, 45 naval Mig-29Ks, 150 Mi-17 transport helicopters and ten Ka-31
helicopters. In 2006, the DRDO and a Russian venture jointly developed the BrahMos cruise
missile — a supersonic missile that combines Russian propulsion technology and new Indian guidance
technology. BrahMos cruise missile can reach supersonic speed and thus bypass
surface-to-air missile defense systems . Israel has also transferred electronic warfare
technology and precision-guided munitions. The Indian-Israeli arms trade amounts to more than $2 billion annually. In 2004, the British
company BAE Systems won a deal to sell advanced jet trainers to the Indian Air Force. In 2007, India paid the United States $50 million

for the amphibious USS Trenton, and in 2009, Boeing won a $2 billion order for eight P-8 maritime
reconnaissance aircraft and Lockheed Martin won a $1 billion contract for six C-1301J transport aircraft .
Together with former U.S. President Barack Obama also offered to sell C-17 and F-414 aircraft. More so, India’s inclusion into the Missile

Technology Control Regime gives it access to technology that is normally restricted for
non-members . By stark contrast, the Pakistan Air Force has been denied state of the art aircraft
acquisitions for two decades, and has been limited to refurbishing older high-performance aircraft. India is also expanding its naval capabilities,
including a sea-based strike force as the logical step in its quest for an assured retaliatory capability. In turn, Pakistan’s naval nuclear developments are fueled by
nuclear developments on the Indian side, an understandable reaction but one which has drawn considerable criticism. The drone technology which has been easily
accessible to India is another controversial issue. Recently, the U.S. made a sales agreement with New Delhi for naval drones. It has been reported that Washington
does not deem its sale of naval drones to India to be threatening for Pakistan, as it considers that these are not armed but are only intended for surveillance across

AWACS , drones , and other sophisticated surveillance and

the Indian Ocean. However,

reconnaissance capabilities make India’s conventional strikes more effective , as well as enabling it
to achieve air superiority more quickly . The accumulation of all this has increased threat to the
survivability of Pakistani nuclear delivery systems . Indeed, it is capabilities like precision-
guided munitions/guided bombs, in this particular strategic context, that make Pakistan more
vulnerable to an Indian pre-emptive strike.

Otherwise, Pakistan’s nukes are vulnerable---causes global nuclear war

William Pitt 9, a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to
Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence”, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?
mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several
children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and
government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other
militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole
new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave
 Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos , and is doing so with nuclear
and growing threat to us all.

weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the
world . The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a
blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an
The fact that
ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century.

Pakistan , and India , and Russia , and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same
space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open
the very gates of Hell itself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest
Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007
and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a
negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed
a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About
1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic
law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it
was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their
guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The
United States, already embroiled in a
war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse
under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there . Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to
proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so
alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'"
"Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland.
The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its
full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American
feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it
has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear
weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist
Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. " As
the
insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan ," reported the Times last week, "senior American
officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal,
including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers
into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation
that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of
the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the
Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear
weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them
are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani
officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble
If Pakistani militants ever
for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario.

succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be
galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or
nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured,
the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could

place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster . We have all been
paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front
burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.
Even if Pakistan retaliates, no extinction now---India has BMD and it works to protect
cities from current Pakistani nukes
Zachary Keck 18, very intelligent, Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, "India's Missile Defenses Can Now
Take on Decoys. That's a Really Big Deal.", National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/indias-missile-defenses-can-now-take-
decoys-thats-really-big-deal-28627

India’s efforts to build a homegrown ballistic missile defense system achieved a major
success. On August 2nd, India tested its Advanced Area Defence (AAD)/Ashvin Advanced Defense
interceptor missile against decoy targets for the first time. “One target among
simultaneously incoming multiple targets was selected on [sic] real time , the weapon
system radars tracked the target and the missile locked on to it and intercepted the target with a
high degree of accuracy ,” India’s government announced in a press release . The test was against a medium-range
ballistic missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers. Franz-Stefan Gady of The Diplomat speculates that this was the first test of the new indigenous imaging
infrared (IIR) seeker, which was developed to help the interceptors distinguish warheads from decoy/dummies. This capability is increasingly

necessary as countries like China and Pakistan develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
( MIRV ) and multiple reentry vehicles ( MRVs ). MIRVs allow a single missile to aim warheads at different targets whereas MRVs

contain multiple warheads but at the same target. The use of decoys are a more cost effective way to try to confuse missile

defense systems enough so that the warheads get through to their target . Either way, though, India’s missile
defense systems will need to be able to engage multiple targets simultaneously. The most recent test was overseen by
the Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO), the premier defense technology agency within India’s Ministry of Defense. It took place at Abdul Kalam
Island, Odisha in the Bay of Bengal. The AAD is a single-stage solid-fueled hit-to-kill interceptor missile that destroys hostile missiles in the terminal phase of flight.
The press release says it is capable of destroying targets at altitudes of 15 and 25 kilometers. The AAD had been tested at least five times before this most recent
one. Those include tests in December, March and February 2017 as well as one a piece in 2016 and 2015. TheDiplomat’s Gady says the earlier
tests were all against Prithvi-II or III short-range ballistic missiles. Given the range cited in the press
statement, the test this month was against a different and more powerful missile. The Prithvi missiles are also the basis for the other

missile defense system that India is seeking to build . The Prithvi missile defense interceptors are used for
exo-atmospheric intercepts (i.e. those outside the atmosphere) whereas the AAD are for endo-atmospheric
intercepts. Prithvi Air Defense missile is more developed than the AAD having been first tested in 2007. Besides trying to build its own
missile defense systems, India is also looking to purchase them from abroad. For years there have been
reports that India is interested in buying Russia’s S-400 air and missile defense system. At the
October 2016 BRICS summit in Goa, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a $5 billion deal for Delhi to acquire the
S-400 Triumf air defense system. There was increased chatter that a deal was imminent in December 2017. "We hope that the S-400 deal will be signed with India
soon," Russian Vice-Premier Dmitry Rogozin said late last year. Around the same time, Viktor N. Kladov, director
for international
cooperation and regional policy of Rostec , a massive Russian conglomerate, made similar comments, saying that
negotiations over the S-400 had reached a “very profound stage.” It appears that this sale might have been slowed because of
fears that the United States would sanction India for purchasing the Russian system. The recently passed 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided
a waiver for India from Russia related sanctions. Thus, the deal might soon go through. India also recently announced it
would spend $1 billion to purchase a National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II
(NASAMS-II) to protect the capital city of Delhi . Built by the U.S. firm Raytheon and the Norwegian
company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace, India intends to use the NASAMS to deal with cruise
missile and other aerial threats against the capital. “Once the Phase-I of the BMD [ballistic missile defense] system is
operational,” a source told the Times of India , referring to the AAD and Prithvi systems, “it will be deployed to protect cities like Delhi

and Mumbai... The NASAMS, in turn, is geared towards intercepting cruise missiles, aircraft, and
drones .”
2nc
 2nc - cp
The United States federal government should substantially increase regulation of
Foreign Military Sales involving Private Security Service Providers in Latin America
who lack International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
certification or Department of State licensing
The United States federal government should apply maximum diplomatic pressure to
ensure compliance of the relevant countries
2NC – Condo – T/L
 2NC – No China War - Heath
4 – Geography
Keck 13 (Zachary, Associate Editor of The Diplomat. He has previously served as a Deputy Editor for E-
IR and as an Editorial Assistant for The Diplomat, "Why China and the US (Probably) Won’t Go to War",
July 12, thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/12/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-
war/)

Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China war , but it could be nearly as
important as nuclear weapons . Indeed, geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and
works against a U.S.-China war in a couple of ways. First, both the United States and China are immensely large countries—according to the
Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China are the third and fourth largest countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km respectively.
They also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually unconquerable by another power . This is an
important point and differentiates the current strategic environment from historical cases where power transitions led to war. For example, in Europe where many
of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely had to worry that the other side could increase their power capabilities to such a degree that they could
credibly threaten the other side’s national survival.Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears , and this
will lessen their insecurity and therefore the security dilemma they operate within. Besides being immensely large countries, China and the U.S. are
also separated by the Pacific Ocean, which will also weaken their sense of insecurity and threat perception towards

one another. In many of the violent power transitions of the past , starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the
European ones, the rival states were located in close proximity to one another. By contrast, when great power

conflict has been avoided , the states have often had considerable distance between them , as was the
case for the U.S. and British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War. The reason is simple and similar to the one above : the difficulty of

projecting power across large distances—particularly bodies of waters— reduces each side’s concern
that the other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests . True, the U.S. operates
extensively in China’s backyard, and maintains numerous alliances and partnerships with Beijing’s neighbors. This undeniably heightens the risk of conflict. At the
same time, the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere, most notably in Canada, and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system in Western
Europe throughout the Cold War. Even with the U.S. presence in Asia, then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the largest body of
water in the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history is any guide at least. Thus, while
every effort should be
made to avoid a U.S.-China war, it is nearly unthinkable one will occur.

5 – Self-interest
Bandow 12 (May 7, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to
President Ronald Reagan, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-china-seeking-
cooperation-finding-confrontation)

*Note: Zhongnanhai is the compound that houses the Communist Party

Beijing does
Still, while the PRC’s trajectory is uncertain, China almost certainly will become a stronger competitor to the U.S. Even so,
not want conflict . Commerce has brought riches, which have helped satisfy an emerging middle class. Derail
the economic gravy train and the unelected Communist Party will lose its legitimacy . Challenge America
militarily and risk losing a devastating war. The residents of Zhongnanhai are ambitious, not suicidal . Anyway,
the U.S. would do better to improve its game than complain. Washington’s dominance over the last two or three decades has been unnatural
and will inevitably decline. Accommodating rather than resisting change will better preserve American power and influence. Particularly
important will be strengthening economic competitiveness and diplomatic skills. Instead of simply issuing demands when it wants something
from the PRC, such as support against Iran and North Korea, America will need to persuade Beijing that the policy is in the latter’s interest as
well. As for security, the
U.S. and China are bound to have disagreements over the years, but none should threaten
vital American interests and thus lead to conflict. Rather than confront militarily a nuclear-armed power in its own region over
interests which it views as essential, Washington should expect its allies to do much more in their own defense. Perhaps the toughest challenge
will continue to be human rights. Washington long has supported democracy and liberty only in the breach. During the Cold War the U.S.
backed a gaggle of thugs since they were anti-Communists. Even today Washington cheers democracy activists in the Middle East—except in
Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Human rights in Central Asia are a painful afterthought when it comes to U.S. military bases. Anti-democratic
excesses among friends such as Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore are passed by. And grievous human rights problems in Afghanistan and Iraq
are embarrassments best ignored. Still, the fact that Washington often is hypocritical doesn’t change the fact that Beijing remains a tough
authoritarian system which sometimes deploys brutal repression. Human rights are universal and Americans should promote liberty when
possible. Yet the Chen saga reminds us that principle must be leavened with pragmatism when dealing with other nations. U.S. power is limited.
Washington has found it impossible to compel smaller and weaker, even impoverished, starving states—Burma, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Serbia,
Syria—to do its bidding. All of these ignored ever tougher sanctions, several rebuffed military threats, and a couple even resisted military
attacks. America’s ability to compel China to respect human rights is even less. Wei Jingsheng, another courageous Chinese human rights
activist, complained: “The
Chinese leadership does not fear the United States government; it only fears the loss of its
power.” But that is simple reality. War is unthinkable . Sanctions would leave America friendless across
Asia and Europe, undermine the weak U.S. economy, and turn Beijing into an active adversary if not
enemy. Which leaves diplomacy and publicity.

6 – Nuclear detterence
Zackary Keck 8/26/17 – Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center, “The 2 Forgotten Reasons China and America Probably Won't Go to War,” The National interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-2-forgotten-reasons-china-america-probably-wont-go-
war-22061?page=0%2C1

between the United States and China is not unthinkable. Although this is true, there
In recent years, many observers have woken up to the fact that a war

are still strong pacifying forces. Two factors strike me as the most important. The first , and most obvious one, is that
both sides maintain secure nuclear arsenals . As Thomas Schelling and others have pointed out, nuclear weapons
are not a game-changer simply because of their massive destructive capabilities . The speed
and certainty of nuclear retaliation is just as important. These two characteristics simply aren’t present with
conventional weapons. Leaders can delude themselves into thinking their conventional forces, however improbably, will end up victorious in battle. In any case, the
consequences of being wrong are far in the future. For instance, Imperial Japanese leaders knew it was a tremendous gamble to take on the United States. Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese
admiral who planned Pearl Harbor, warned his civilian leadership beforehand: “In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory
upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.” After the American economic embargo, however, Japanese leaders were only faced with bad options:
capitulating in the face of American pressure or fighting a more powerful enemy in a likely futile effort. In these circumstances, Tokyo decided to gamble. After all, it was conceivable that
America would be so exhausted from fighting Nazi Germany in Europe that it would ultimately sue for peace in Asia, especially in the face of fierce Japanese resistance. Can America and Its

While the outcome of conventional wars hinges on a number of unknowable

Allies "Play Fort" against China Deadly Missiles?

factors, nuclear retaliation is certain . And, unlike with conventional weapons—especially before airplanes and
missiles—one doesn’t have to defeat the other side’s military to wreak havoc on its cities . Nuclear

weapons can do so immediately . Moreover, as Robert Jervis points out , when two countries with secure,
thermonuclear arsenals go to war, “ the side that is ‘losing’ the war as judged by various measures
of military capability can inflict as much destruction on the side that is ‘winning’ as the ‘winner’
can on the ‘loser.’” This changes the calculation of leaders , and makes it inconceivable that
rational leaders would opt for total war. This is not foolproof of course— there is still the possibility that miscalculations, gradual escalation, or the “threats that leave

something to chance” will produce an outcome neither side wanted— but it is a strong incentive for peace. While it is widely

recognized that nuclear weapons make a U.S.-China conflict less likely, the pacifying effect of
geography is often overlooked. Geography works to attenuate tensions in two interrelated ways. First, both China and the United
States are massive countries that would be extremely difficult to conquer and occupy .
Second, both are separated by the largest ocean on earth , and it is extremely difficult to
project power over large bodies of water . As John Mearsheimer has written : “When great powers are
separated by large bodies of water, they usually do not have much offensive capability against each
other, regardless of the relative size of their armies. Large bodies of water are
formidable obstacles that cause significant power-projection problems for attacking
armies.” These two geographical factors reduce the intensity of the so-called security dilemma.
Despite all their disputes over issues like Taiwan and the East and South China Seas, China and the United
States generally do not have to fear that the other side will seek to invade and conquer them.
This has usually not been the case for rising and ruling powers that went to war. In many
of these instances, the rivals were located on the same continent or even shared a border, which generated significant insecurity and led to conflict. As Mearsheimer again explains ,

Great powers located on the same landmass are in a much better position to attack and conquer each
“

other. That is especially true of states that share a common border. Therefore, great powers separated by water are likely to fear each other less than great powers that can get at each
other over land.”
 2nc – at: russia war
No impact
Maral Margossian 14, columnist for the Massachusetts Daily Collegian,, 3/27/14, Five reasons why
Russia won’t start World War III, http://dailycollegian.com/2014/03/27/five-reasons-why-russia-wont-
start-world-war-iii/

The recent events in Eastern Europe involving Russia and Ukraine have spawned, at their most extreme,
apocalyptic claims. Here are five reasons why Russia won’t start World War III, or any other war for that
matter: 1. The world is MAD. The end of World War II ushered the world into a precarious atomic age
that characterized the international atmosphere during the Cold War. Luckily, the Cold War never
escalated to nuclear war. Why? Because of mutually assured destruction (or MAD). Russia knows that if it pushes
that big red button, we have our own even bigger, redder button to push in retaliation. The odds of a nuclear war with
Russia are extremely unlikely . 2. The impact of economic sanctions on the Russian economy is
far too crippling for Russia to fund a war. As a part of a globalized world, economic sanctions are more
than mere slaps on the wrist. Already the sanctions imposed on Russia have begun to take their toll. The
West has yet to attack Russia’s strongest economic assets, but the declining strength of the
Russian economy puts Putin far from a position to wage a world war . 3. Putin’s
actions demonstrate his longing for Russia’s glory days before the fall of the Soviet Union. His
annexation of Crimea is more out of fear than strength. Putin feels threatened by Russia’s changing role in world affairs and
is using Crimea to tell the world that Russia still matters. 4. Russia is already seen as the “big bad wolf” of Europe.
Though Putin may have been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his involvement in the Syrian
chemical weapons deal, Russia’s popularity among many Western countries is not very high. The recent
suspension of Russia from the G8 group is a symbolic action that demonstrates that Russia will have to
face a united front of world powers if it chooses to start a war. 5. There is just too much at stake. War
between Ukraine and Russia is one thing; Russia’s military is large enough and strong enough to easily
defeat Ukraine. However, if Russia decides to take further aggressive action, it must also contend with
surrounding European Union member nations and their potential involvement in the war. Moreover,
Russia’s involvement in other international affairs will be affected. For example, the ongoing effort to normalize
relations between Iran and the rest of the world will be jeopardized, considering Russia is involved in those efforts. Crimea may have
symbolic meaning close to the hearts of Russians, but it isn’t worth risking the domino effect of events
that can potentially occur. So, those of you who feel abnormally unsettled by the recent turn of events
can rest easy. While Russia’s actions can’t be brushed aside and should be taken seriously, the chances of this
confrontation escalating to a great war are slim — assuming these countries act rationally.
 AT: Escalation
Russia conflict never escalates—empirics
Amos Zeeberg 18, freelance science journalist based in Tokyo, 1/15/18, “Why Hasn’t the World Been
Destroyed in a Nuclear War Yet?,” http://nautil.us/blog/-why-hasnt-the-world-been-destroyed-in-a-
nuclear-war-yet

But afterall these nuclear near-misses , one starts to wonder if it really is plain dumb
luck . The Nash equilibrium accurately describes a certain kind of rational , perfectly logical
approach to choices under conflict. And exactly in keeping with game theorists’ advice, the USSR and U.S. went to
great lengths to make sure their arsenals would be feared as legitimate threats. Yet each time they had an
opportunity to make good on those threats —to launch a crushing response to an
apparent attack or mercilessly exploit a weakness , as many armchair analysts recommended— something
held them back : a disobedient soldier , a circumspect engineer , an optimistic
leader . The two nations were engaged in a battle of wills, staring each other in the eyes, and they both blinked .
Repeatedly .

Maybe, when millions of lives hang in the balance , people are not so rationally cold-
hearted as those old game-theory models imply. Or maybe they’re using a different kind of
rationality .
1nr
 2NC – M – O/V

Specifically, causes U.S.-Russia war---extinction

Barrett et al. 13 – PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security
Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State
University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND
Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Anthony, 24 June 2013,
“Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical
Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest
of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food
production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even
the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various
routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or
unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear
weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from
leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the
attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies
incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years,
nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were
taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For
purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and
Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack
by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack . However, concerns about the extreme
disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control
capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-
attack before suffering damage from the first attack . 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold
War and with improved relations between the U nited States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war
was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the
United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk . 7 While the United States and Russia
are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear
missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of
events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-

terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on

room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second,

either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation
by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb , 10 especially if such an event occurs
during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are
possible . 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the
United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long
been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis

conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the
future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the U nited

States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks . 16
Other nuke wars are comparatively smaller
Barratt et al. 17 — Owen Cotton-Barratt, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research
Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out
nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to
be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast , fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be
much worse : the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the
atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear
winter . According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global
temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years . This could leave
some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat
of extinction from other sources would be great . An exchange on this scale is only
possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear
weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small
regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion
people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic .13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to

lead to outright human extinction , but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to
threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area
where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt,
would have high returns.

BUT counterforce now is key---waiting lets Pakistan acquire workable supersonic

missiles---makes BMD irrelevant
Vishnu Som 19, "Game-Changing Chinese Missile To Pak Could Dent Navy's BrahMos Advantage", NDTV, https://www.ndtv.com/india-
news/game-changing-chinese-missile-to-pakistan-could-dent-navys-brahmos-advantage-1975148

A game-changing Chinese anti-ship missile , capable of flying at three times the speed of sound ,
could erode a key missile advantage the Indian Navy has enjoyed over the Pakistani Navy since 2005. An export variant of the YJ-12
missile, the CM-302, is likely to be the primary weapon on board four new Chinese frigates being built for the

Pakistan Navy at the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard in Shanghai . The CM-302 matches both the supersonic
speed and the range of the Indian Navy's BrahMos anti-ship cruise missiles , which have been deployed
on several front-line frigates and destroyers of the Navy. Senior defence officials monitoring the sale of new generation Chinese Type 054 frigates to Pakistan have told NDTV
that the ships are likely to come armed with the CM-302, which they identify as a "new threat which represents a new capability." But these officers also tell

NDTV that "there is a long way to go for these missiles to become a credible threat for the Indian Navy" since

the Pakistan Navy still lacks long-range sensors which need to target Indian platforms
before a CM-302 can actually be fired . "Possessing accurate targeting data, surveillance capability,
and having the ability to penetrate a dense [Indian Navy] electronic counter-measures environment are a part of
a complex matrix " that the Pakistan Navy's new frigates would need to overcome before they can
attempt a missile launch . Still, the acquisition of the CM-302 onboard the new
Chinese-built frigates that will be inducted from 2021 means a lethal new
capability for the Pakistan Navy.
AND Pakistan would retaliate with countervalue attacks
Sadia Tasleem 16, lecturer at Quaid-i-Azam University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, "Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine",
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-use-doctrine-pub-63913

India and Pakistan have fought at least three wars and had five major military crises in the past sixty eight years. Some scholars argue that though there may not be any formal mechanism for
escalation control in South Asia, the region’s history and culture indicates an implicit tendency toward restraint from escalation. They further argue that the restraint shown by India and
Pakistan in their wars of 1965 and 1971—choosing not to attack each other’s industrial complexes and irrigation dams—reflected a tacit understanding of each other’s vulnerabilities. However,

the presence of nuclear weapons has fundamentally altered some of these ground realities. For instance, given
Pakistan’s existing countervalue-targeting strategy , which does not distinguish between
civilian and military targets, it might be hard to integrate restraint into the larger context of
military strategy. A close look at the crises that erupted and were successfully managed between the nuclear-armed neighbors, though, may offer some insights about the
dynamics of escalation control between India and Pakistan.

That’s the only thing that causes nuke winter

Stuart Arsmtrong 12, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, 3/16/12, “Old threats never
die, they fade away from our minds: nuclear winter,” http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2012/03/old-threats-never-die-they-fade-away-from-
our-minds-nuclear-winter/

nuclear winter. This boosted the death toll of all-out nuclear war from ‘only’ 200-500 million to
In 1983, scientists published a paper on

the very real possibility of the complete extinction of the human race *. But some argued the report
was alarmist, and there did seem to be some issues with the assumptions. So – a military phenomena that might cause megadeaths, possibly true but requiring further study, and a huge
research defense budget that could be used to look into this critical phenomena and that was already spending millions on all aspects of nuclear weapons – can you guess what happened
next? Correct – the issue was ignored for decades. For over twenty years, there were but a tiny handful of papers on the most likely way we could end our own existence, and a vague and

persistent sense that nuclear winter had been ‘disproved’. But in 2007, we finally had a proper followup - with the help of modern computers,
better models and better observations, what can we now say? Well, that nuclear winter is still a major threat;
the initial fear was right . Their most likely scenario was : A global average surface cooling of –7°C to

–8°C persists for years , and after a decade the cooling is still –4°C [...]. Considering that the global average cooling at the depth of the last ice age 18,000 yr ago
was about –5°C, this would be a climate change unprecedented in speed and amplitude in the

history of the human race . The temperature changes are largest over land [...] Cooling of more than –20°C occurs over large areas of North America and of
more than –30°C over much of Eurasia, including all agricultural regions. Also, precipitation would be cut in half and we’d lose most of the ozone layer . But there

was a more worrying development: it also seems that a small-scale nuclear war could generate its own mini nuclear winter. It’s important to understand that nuclear winter

would not be a direct consequences of the nuclear explosions, but of the burning of our cities in
the wake of the war (given enough heat, even roads and pavements will burn), generating clouds of very black smoke that rise into
the stratosphere. The clouds do need to reach these heights: any lower and they’ll get rained out. This is what
happened during the burning of the Kuwaiti oil wells in 1991: Carl Sagan, one of the fathers of the theory, predicted a nuclear winter-like scenario. But he wasn’t paying attention to the climate
models: as they predicted, the local damage was severe, but the smoke didn’t reach the stratosphere, and global damage was avoided.
 2NC – AT: Draw In
No draw in---demonstrating the effectiveness of Indian counterforce deters China and
Russia because it shows getting involved creates unacceptable losses---that’s Narang

China has officially stated they won’t get involved

Economic Times 17, "Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China broke the ice: Chinese diplomat",
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/rajiv-gandhis-visit-to-china-broke-the-ice-chinese-
diplomat/articleshow/61066662.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

Li China would not get

who made a reciprocal trip to New Delhi in 1991 clarified during his talks with the then Indian Prime Minister, P V Narasimha Rao that "

involved in any dispute between India and Pakistan hoping that the
issues could be resolved in a reasonable manner through peaceful consultation Zeng wrote. ",

The US won’t get involved either---Trump doesn’t care

Hannah Haegeland 18, analyst in the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program, "Who Will Prevent the Next India-Pakistan War?", Defense
One, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/12/who-will-prevent-next-india-pakistan-war/153236/

Since then, nuclear and conventional arms buildup in the region has raised the potential costs of escalation . The possibility of a future
India-Pakistan crisis remains high—all against a backdrop of heightened firing across the Line of Control, growing fissile material stockpiles, evolving strategic doctrines, and developments in

U.S. leverage in Pakistan is in decline , and both the preparedness and

nuclear delivery systems. Meanwhile,

inclination of the Trump administration to play the traditional U.S. third-party crisis manager
role in a future India-Pakistan standoff is uncertain .

Especially because he hates Pakistan

Athar Hussein 18, "Trump pledges to end foreign aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan over bin Laden inaction",
https://www.rt.com/news/444383-trump-pakistan-bin-laden/

President Trump has promised to cut aid to countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan that “do nothing for us,” and
has accused Pakistan of sheltering Osama bin Laden since 9/11. “Of course we should have captured
Osama Bin Laden long before we did. I pointed him out in my book just BEFORE the attack on the World Trade Center,” Trump tweeted on Monday, seemingly
hinting that he knew bin Laden was bad news before 9/11. “President Clinton famously missed his shot. We paid Pakistan Billions of Dollars & they

never told us he was living there. Fools !” “We no longer pay Pakistan the $Billions because they would
take our money and do nothing for us, Bin Laden being a prime example , Afghanistan being another,” he
continued. “They were just one of many countries that take from the United States without giving

anything in return . That’s ENDING !” The Trump administration has already cut almost $800
million off its $1.3 billion yearly military aid to Pakistan this year , arguing that the Pakistani government
has not done enough to clamp down on Taliban extremists operating within its borders. In an interview with Fox
News on Sunday, the president said that the Pakistanis “ don’t do a damn thing for us,” again
mentioning their alleged complicity in sheltering Osama bin Laden.
No draw-in OR extinction
Dyer 2 (Gwynne, Ph.D. in War Studies – University of London and Board of Governors – Canada’s Royal Military College,
“Nuclear War a Possibility Over Kashmir”, Hamilton Spectator, 5-24, Lexis)

For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the damage would be
largely confined to the region . The Cold War is over, the strategic understandings that
once tied India and Pakistan to the rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no
outside powers would be drawn into the fighting . The detonation of a hundred or so
relatively small nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not cause grave harm to
the wider world from fallout . People over 40 have already lived through a period when the great
powers conducted hundreds of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and they are mostly still here.
 2NC – Counterforce – O/V
TS goes nuclear but I’ll group their roblin and barno crds and answer them here

Counterforce is effective---India has a ton of new tech from the world powers---new
attack aircraft, better targeting and surveillance systems, and supersonic cruise
missiles---each make Pakistan’s nuclear assets useless---that’s Leah
AND no impact because of Indian BMD---that’s Keck

South Asian nuclear use now will be limited to an Indian counterforce strike
Vipin Narang 17, Professor @ Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Plenary: Beyond the Nuclear
Threshold: Causes and Consequences of First Use", https://fbfy83yid9j1dqsev3zq0w8n-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Vipin-Narang-Remarks-Carnegie-Nukefest-2017.pdf

Everybody thinks they know the likeliest pathway to nuclear first use in South Asia. It is called
a conventional wisdom for a reason. It starts with a terrorist attack presumed to be from Pakistan on an Indian metropole that
kills scores of civilians. Unable to exercise restraint anymore due to domestic political pressures baying for blood, the Government of

India orders the mobilization of its three main strike corps and commences offensive operations across the international border,
not limiting its response to the Jammu and Kashmir sector and the Line of Control. The deepest thrust is undertaken by XXI Corps and its
supporting elements in the desert sector. XXI Corps threatens to bisect Pakistan’s northsouth communications, putting Pakistani conventional forces on its heels.
Unable to slow down XXI Corps, Pakistan flushes out Nasr tactical nuclear weapons batteries or Abdali missiles and
its Strategic Plans Division (SPD) authorizes their use either in demonstration shots , against concentrated XXI Corps
armored divisions, or bridgeheads and logistics behind the main thrust to slow down the Indian offensive. India then promises what most

presume is massive countervalue retaliation against Pakistani cities , leaving aside how credible or incredible that might be.
This is how nuclear first use would unfold in South Asia, right? Well, maybe not so fast . There is increasing
evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first . And that India’s opening salvo may not be
conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theater, but a full ‘ comprehensive
counterforce strike’ that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear
weapons so that India does not have to engage in iterative tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its
own cities to nuclear destruction . This thinking surfaces not from fringe extreme voices
such as Bharat Karnad or retired Indian Army officers frustrated by the lack of resolve they believe their government has shown in
multiple provocations, but from no less than a former Strategic Forces Command C-in-C Lt Gen BS

Nagal and, perhaps more importantly and authoritatively, from the highly respected and
influential former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon in plain sight in his
recent 2016 book Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. In short, we may be witnessing what I call a
‘ decoupling’ of Indian nuclear strategy between China and Pakistan. The force requirements
India needs in order to credibly threaten assured retaliation against China may allow it to
pursue more aggressive strategies —such as escalation dominance or a ‘ splendid first
strike’—against Pakistan . We may be seeing the emergence of this decoupling, or at least 2
serious mainstream thinking about it, with the intention being a disarming strike against
Pakistan.
AND the Agni-V missile is a game-changer and certainly gives them CF capability
Navneet Bhushan 16, defense research expert at Craffiti, holds a Post Graduate Diploma in IPR Law (NLSIU, Bangalore), Diploma Patent
Information (The Netherlands), M.Tech (Computer Science & Engg) IIT Madras, M.Sc (Software Science) Allahabad University B.Sc (Hons.)
Physics (Delhi University), "The Importance Of Agni-V to India’s Security", Simply Decoded, http://www.simplydecoded.com/2016/02/10/the-
importance-of-agni-v-to-indias-security/

Agni-V will be ready for induction

The fourth Agni-V test is scheduled to be conducted during the month of February 2016. This will be the second canister launch.

after few more tests – especially the test of its multiple independent targeting re-entry vehicles ( MIRV )
capability . Although its induction and deployment is some years ahead, it has already produced interesting reactions. The key discussion has been about its range – whether it is
5000 km or 8000 km and above, and whether it should be truly called an ICBM. There has also been some buzz about the multiple independent targeting re-entry vehicles (MIRV) capability and

it is a major feature and technology that will catapult

their ability to carry 3-10 different warheads in a single missile. Indeed,

India to a very small set of nations with this capability . The ability to carry 1-1.5 tons
warhead over 5,000+ kilometers range is definitely another feature of the missile that puts it in a
different category than whatever missiles India has. A 500 Kg payload can give the earlier missiles ability to carry nuclear warheads with 20KT yield, or something
similar to what was exploded above Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With three times the payload, India now has the capability , in theory, at least, to carry

higher yield , say 150KT to 1 MT yield nuclear warheads to distances more than 5000 km away . This
gives India a real counterforce capability if our doctrine and strategy
warrants that option . Counter-Force versus Counter-Value nuclear strategies If a country has the capability to strike population centers of the adversary
with nuclear weapons, it is considered to have counter value capability in nuclear strategy terminology. These targets include population centers including big cities, large industrial complexes,
power centers, dams, oil refineries etc. The counter value targets typically are “non-military targets” of the adversary, mostly population centers. As these are mostly larger spread and “soft”
targets, the lower yield nuclear weapons, say with a yield of 20 Kilo Tons (KT) of TNT or so, are considered sufficient to pronounce this capability. Further, for counter value nuclear forces, one
need a delivery weapon – can be a ballistic missile – which need not have a very high accuracy. One can understand, that if a nuclear bomb explodes above the center of the city or few
kilometers away, the devastation of the city will be immense, and in the long term there will not be much qualitative difference in terms of impact on the city – say killing 1 million people
immediately or 500,000 people immediately – which one will you take? The obvious answer is none. The counter value nuclear forces are giving this message to the adversary – we will take a
couple of your cities – whether our missile takes 1 million or 0.5 million people of your city is not important – we can destroy a couple of your main cities if you attack or threaten us with a
nuclear weapons strike. The counter value nuclear weapons are the forces to deter the adversary. These are indeed deterrence forces. On the other hand, counter force nuclear forces are
meant to destroy adversary’s nuclear delivery capability. The counter force nuclear weapons need to deliver high KT or even Mega Ton (MT) of TNT equivalent nuclear yield to the enemy
nuclear weapons housed inside the hardened, underground, nuclear shielded sites. Besides, high yield and very high accuracy (typically a Circular Error Probability of 0.01% of the range), the
nuclear explosion has to be a surface burst rather than an air burst as in the case of counter value weapons. The surface burst will create large ground craters and take the earth along with
adversary’s missiles in the protected silos – to the atmosphere – thereby destroying enemy’s nuclear missiles and also creating the dreaded nuclear fallout and radioactive rains that may
continue for many months in future. These are truly horrendous nuclear weapons – not only in the capabilities but also the intentions of their possessors. India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD) India conducted its first peaceful nuclear test in 1974. In 1998, India was forced to conduct nuclear tests so that Pakistan could come out as an overt nuclear
weapons state. India should be given due credit for speaking the language of a nuclear weapons free world and acting on it till 1998. Only because one-sided treaties such as NPT, CTBT, and
FMCT, were coming to force, India conducted its nuclear tests. Also, within a couple of years, it published its draft nuclear doctrine, which clearly termed the policy of No First Use (NFU) of
nuclear weapons. This is a very consistent communication and definitely a responsible behavior, that none can dispute. With the NFU doctrine, India does not need counterforce capabilities.
This is true, against any adversary or potential adversary. The counterforce nuclear weapons developed during the cold war period into what in the nuclear parlance is called the Mutually
Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine. It is clear that MAD is the doctrine of a country that will take the nuclear attack as the first option in the escalatory spiral of any conflict. However, India
has very clearly stated it is not following the MAD line and is therefore not developing any first strike capability against any adversary at any range. However, given the proliferation of nuclear
weapons around the world and pressure by the world powers that are increasingly developing more and more powers, India needs to develop a second strike capability, that remains potent

The world is definitely becoming

after a first strike by the adversary and is capable of delivering counter value punches at any range across the world. Why ‘at any range’?

multi-polar and also the threat of force as a coercive influence to shape the future is pursued
by different power centers in multiple ways . Further, a nation in the globalizing world has to identify its national interests and safeguard these globally.
Hence, India needs a potent second-strike ICBM-range capability for counter value nuclear strikes as a deterrence to any potential adversary that may have designs to either threaten or

Agni-V can be a second strike

actually think about taking out Indian nuclear missiles in the first strike. It is in this context that Agni-V MIRV ICBM should be viewed and considered.

counter force capability – A game changer Agni-V with its higher payload and MIRV
capability – with high accuracies – does give India a counterforce capability . This is definitely a
higher order message to potential adversaries . With Agni-V, India says to the world that although
we stick to a no first use policy we now have a counter-force capability to strike at the
nuclear strike forces of the adversary . Also, with MIRVs even if one Agni-V survives a first strike by the
enemy and reaches the adversary ’s capital city it will unleash complete devastation . This should make an adversary see the
futility of striking against India.
Official statements prove India can effectively end Pakistan’s deterrent via targeted
airstrikes---locations are known
Uday Singh Rana 17, international politics @ CNN News 18, citing IAF Chief Birender Singh Dhanoa and Air Vice Marshall (Retd) Manmohan
Bahadur, "How India Can Go After Pakistan's Nuclear Stockpile", https://www.news18.com/news/india/how-india-can-go-after-pakistans-
nuclear-stockpile-1539223.html

New Delhi: Indian Air Force (IAF)Chief Birender Singh Dhanoa on Thursday said “if the need arises”, the IAF had the
capability to disarm Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by conducting what he called a “ full-
spectrum” operation . But when would such a “need” arise? What situation would cause India to strike back and how does India’s ‘no-first-use’ doctrine affect such
an operation? News18 tries to answer some of these questions. Addressing a press conference on the eve of Air Force Day, Dhanoa said, “Air Force has the

capability to locate , fix and strike across the border.... We are ready to take on any challenge." Dhanoa’s statement
came in response to questions on Pakistan’s claim of possessing short-range nuclear weapons to counter the
“cold start doctrine adopted by the Indian Army”. According to reports, Pakistan has stored its nuclear stockpiles in six different
at least

locations . These are reportedly in Akro (Sindh), Gujranwala (Punjab), Khuzdar (Balochistan), Pano Aqil
(Sindh), and Sargodha (Punjab). Except for the base in Khuzdar, all bases are in provinces that share a border with India. A report by US-based experts

Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris released last year estimated that Pakistan had anywhere between 130-140 nuclear

weapons, as opposed to India’s estimated stockpile of 110-120 weapons. The report also suggested that Pakistan had modified its F16 fighter jets, of which it reportedly has 76, to carry
nuclear weapons. Unlike Pakistan, India has a ‘no-first-use’ policy on nuclear warfare. This means that India has vowed never to be the aggressor in a nuclear war but will retaliate with full
force if weapons of mass destruction were used against it. So does that mean India does not necessarily need nuclear weapons to destroy Pakistan’s stockpile? Air Vice Marshall (Retd)
Manmohan Bahadur said, “Obviously, you can’t go full-Rambo and pull out their nuclear weapons through a non-nuclear operation. I think what the Chief meant when he made those

comments was that India was tracking Pakistan’s stockpile and would continue to do so in both
peace times and war times . No country in the world, not even the US, has the capability to perform what is called a ‘Splendid Nuclear Strike’ – a strike that
would entirely obliterate a country. But we can easily destroy the Pakistani arsenal if we are able to track it effectively.” So how does the no-first-use
policy affect India’s response? According to Bahadur, “Pakistan has coined a term called Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TWNs), which it claims it can use for strategic advantage in war. This term is
absolute sense. There is no such thing as a ‘tactical or regular nuclear weapon. A nuke is a nuke. The correct term for these TNWs would be battlefield ballistic missiles. The only difference is in
yield. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 20 Kiloton while this one will be much lighter. Naturally, the blast radius would also be limited to the battlefield” A “TNW” or Battlefield Ballistic
Missile is meant to be used not on civilian targets but on military targets. Pakistan, Bahadur said, plans to use these low-yield missiles on Indian troops if India were to cross a so-called “Red
Line”. He added, “When they say Red Line, they probably mean a scenario in which Indian troops manage to enter Pakistani territory or are close to breaking up Pakistan like we did in 1971. Of
course, India has made it clear that a so-called TNW is a nuclear weapon and it would make Pakistan a nuclear aggressor. If such a situation ever arises, India would then be free to retaliate

with full force and obliterate the Pakistani stockpiles.” While Pakistan is now modifying its F16s to carry nuclear weapons and, if reports are to be believed, it has a
marginally larger stockpile than India ; it is at a disadvantage when it comes to nuclear weapon
delivery. Pakistan relies heavily on surface-to-surface missiles and even though it may have nuclear capable F16s, the size of the
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fleet is less than half that of the IAF. PAF reportedly has around 800 active fighter aircraft in total while the

IAF has over 1,700 . Pakistan Navy does not have any known nuclear capable submarines. “They
(Pakistan) are also trying to modify some of their ships to carry nuclear weapons . However, ships will

be very ineffective when it comes to stealth missions. We will easily be able to detect
their ships through our satellites,” Bahadaur said. India, on the other hand, can deliver nuclear weapons
through air, surface and submarines . The IAF would become very critical in such a scenario . IAF
has three different aircraft - Sukhois, Mirages and Jaguars – that have the capability to carry
nukes. These aircraft make up around 425 fighter jets in the IAF, although it is unclear how many can carry a nuclear payload. Bahadur
said, “Because of our no-first-use policy, we are not on 24X7 trigger alert. However, in the event of a nuclear confrontation, India would have ample warning signs. A nuclear buildup will take

once we have activated our nukes, it would be a matter of minutes before our
time before the threat is immediate. But

missiles reach any point in Pakistan.”

New tech answers all their warrants!
Kunal Singh 19, former researcher at the Center for Policy Research, citing an upcoming report by Christopher Clary and Ankit Panda,
"Why is India’s no first use policy under so much strain?", https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/why-is-india-s-no-first-use-policy-under-
so-much-strain/story-tbjRJj1fXb9UzDZCbymu6I.html

Second, India’s conventional advantage has been blunted by Pakistan through a clever use of sub-
conventional assets (read terrorists) and threat of using tactical nuclear weapons against any Indian conventional response to a 26/11 type of an attack. India’s nuclear doctrine, that professes massive
retaliation even against use of midget nukes, does not help. Pre-emptive counterforce (CF) strikes , if they can be executed, seem to be a

way out of this problem. Nagal has openly advocated this strategy and Shivshankar Menon , the
former national security advisor, has indicated openness to the idea. Third, India today has access to
much better technology than it had in 2003 when it released its nuclear doctrine . In their
forthcoming paper, “India’s Counterforce Temptations”, two US-based scholars, Christopher Clary and
Vipin Narang, list out the technologies that enable a CF posture for India . New Delhi now
has more missiles and more accurate ones . It has high quality surveillance platforms . It
can access commercially available remote sensing technologies . It is developing MIRVs (multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicles) and investing in missile and air defence systems . While most of these developments may be relevant for

China, they also make India more capable than ever before of executing CF strikes

against Pakistan . However, it should be noted at this point that India is still a long way away from possessing the capability of executing successful CF strikes. And it may never reach there because
Pakistan is rapidly increasing its arsenal size and improving the survivability of its nuclear weapons. India’s solid fuel missiles have enabled it to move towards

canisterised systems for storing its land-based ballistic missiles. Such systems can reduce
turnaround times — earlier India used to rely on physical separation of components to prevent
unauthorised use — and hence are suitable even for pre-emptive strikes in case the rival
is shown to be readying its nuclear assets for use. Canisterisation has further enabled India’s nuclear deterrent to move to the seas. With INS
Arihant, a nuclear propelled ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), India has a credible sea-based deterrent . With a couple of more SSBNs, it can boast of a genuine nuclear triad. But
SSBNs involve pre-mating of warheads with ballistic missiles, and hence increase the strain on command and control, especially with the NFU policy intact. Both canisterisation and sea-based deterrence thus increase the strain on
NFU policy.

This has been true for decades---if other countries can do it, India can too---they have
all our tech
Eric Arnett 98, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban”,
https://www.sipri.org/publications/1998/nuclear-weapons-and-arms-control-south-asia-after-test-ban

Arms suppliers have furnished India with the technology that could make a counterforce attack
against Pakistan's air bases successful , creating a much greater incentive for Pakistan to deploy nuclear armed ballistic missiles and perhaps
more nuclear warheads and the materials of which they are made. Despite the common perception that India does not receive much

Western military support, almost every major arms exporter has provided counterforce or

strategic defence technology to India, including France , Israel , Italy , Russia , Sweden ,
the UK , and the USA .
 2NC – AT: Nuke Winter
Counterforce targeting massively limits fallout – won’t trigger a nuclear winter
Lieber and Press 13 – Keir, Professor @ Georgetown, Daryl, Professor @ Dartmouth, “The New Era of Nuclear
Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict,” 7(1), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162442/spring_2013.pdf

The first set of arguments is about an important, yet virtually unnoticed, consequence of changes in military technology and the balance of
power. In a nutshell, the same revolution
in accuracy that has transformed conventional warfare has had equally momentous
consequences for nuclear weapons and deterrence.2 Very accurate delivery systems, new
reconnaissance technologies, and the downsizing of arsenals from Cold War levels have made both
conventional and nuclear counterforce strikes against nuclear arsenals much more feasible than
ever before . Perhaps most surprising, pairing highly accurate delivery systems with nuclear weapons permits
target strategies that would create virtually no radioactive fallout, hence, vastly reduced
fatalities.

Even if there’s a nuke war

an Indo-Pak nuke war only kills 1% of India and 7% of Pakistan!

Rabb Khan 9, professor @ King Khalid University, Abha, Saudi Arabia, he specializes in security issues, foreign relations and terrorism,
“Price of an Indo-Pak War”, Newstrack India, 1/20/2009, http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/62680

Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC), the New York

Let us turn to unprecedented casualty in case of a nuclear conflict:

based global think tank, in its report, “The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan”
has [been] calculated the human costs of an Indo-Pak nuclear conflict. As per NRDC estimates, both countries have a total of 50
to 75 nuclear weapons. Depicting a nuclear war Scenario (10 bombs on 10 South Asian cities), it says that attack on 10 major cities – 5

each in India and Pakistan – would result in a combined death toll of 2,862,581, with 1,506,859 severely injured and 3,382,978 slightly injured. On
Indian side, death toll is estimated at 1,690,702, while 892,459 and 2,021,106 would be severely and slightly injured respectively. On Pakistan side, a total of 1,171,879 people would die, while,
614,400 and 1,361,872 are to be severely and slightly injured. In another scenario (24 Ground Bursts), NRDC calculated the consequences of 24 nuclear explosions detonated on the ground –
unlike the Hiroshima airburst – resulting in significant amounts of lethal radioactive fallout, which is far more severe nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. The report was first

Contrary to ground burst, exploding a

appeared in the January 14, 2002, issue of Newsweek (A Face-Off with Nuclear Stakes).

nuclear bomb above the ground does not produce fallout . For example, can we imagine the consequences of ground
burst if the “Little Boy” detonated by the US above Hiroshima at an altitude of 1,900 feet could kill 70,000 people in the immediate effect with some 200,000 died up to 1950? NRDC calculated
that 22.1 million people in India and Pakistan would be exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 roentgen equivalents in man or REM (a large amount of radiation) or more in the first two days
of the attack. In addition, about 8 million people would receive a radiation dose of 100 to 600 REM causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death. In all, as many as 30 million people
of both countries would be eliminated by nuclear war. Besides fallout, blast and fire would cause substantial destruction within roughly a mile-and-a-half of the bomb craters. However,

even after such a devastating annihilation of population, about 99 percent of the population
in India and 93 percent of the population in Pakistan would survive the second scenario and their respective
military forces would still be intact to continue the conflict. In short, there is nothing to gain from a war, just plenty to lose. Albeit loss of human life would

be immense it would not be large enough to result in extinction of Indo-Pak populations

or even prevent continuation of a military conflict. Thus, the consequences, though horrific, are not strong enough to rule out Indo-Pak conflict in future. Had size of the Indo-Pak nuclear
arsenals equal to those of the US and Russia, a complete annihilation of entire population of the Indian sub-continent would have been possible.

Nuclear war between India and Pakistan won’t cause nuclear winter
Eland 3 (Ivan, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty – Independent Institute and Assistant Editor – Independent
Review, “The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex: Book Review”, Independent Review, 8(2), Fall,
http://www.independent.org/tii/content/pubs/review/books/tir82_caldicott.html)

Caldicott’s far-fetched arguments do the most harm to the cogent parts of her book. She asserts that in a possible nuclear exchange
between India and Pakistan, “if any of either Russia or America’s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were
launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth” (p. xiii). Even
if the dubious nuclear-winter thesis is accepted, a mini-nuclear war on the Asian subcontinent plus
one Russian or U.S. nuclear warhead is unlikely to bring about such cataclysmic climate
change.
 2nc – at: border
War scares China out of border disputes once and for all
Mohan Malik 2, PhD, came to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in February 2001 from Deakin University in
Australia where he was Director of the postgraduate Defense Studies Program, “Nervous Neig” The World Today, Vol. 58, No. 10
(October 2002), pp. 20-23

Should the Indo-Pakistani conflict escalate into a nuclear one , neither the geopolitical nor radioactive fallout would
remain in South Asia. China would face difficult choices. Open support for its most allied ally would jeopardize relations with the US and India. But non- intervention on

could encourage India to solve the Pakistan 'problem' once and for all , tilting the

Pakistan's behalf 

regional balance of power decisively in its favor .  Unrestrained Indian power  could

eventually threaten China's security  along its soft underbelly - Tibet and Xinjiang.