OFF

OFF
Substantial reform requires a holistic approach to the overall criminal justice system.
Morris 78 — Norval Morris, Former Professor of Law at and Dean of the University of Chicago Law
School, Former Founder and Board Member of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons National Institute of
Corrections, holds a Ph.D. in Law and Criminology from the University of London, 1978 (“Reviewed
Work(s): Denial of Justice: Criminal Process in the United States by Lloyd L. Weinreb,” Harvard Law
Review, Volume 91, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, Accessed 08-21-2020, p.
1369-1370)
It is often unfair, though common, to criticize a book for not being a different book; an author may surely select his own topics. But in this case
holistic an approach to
one cannot but regret the failure to offer at least a primitive guide to the reformer's path. Few scholars take as
the criminal justice system as Lloyd Wein- reb does in Denial of Justice. Undoubtedly, such an
overarching perspective is essential to serious and substantial reform of our present anarchic,
inefficient, and unjust system; to leave the book with a sense of a chapter or chapters missing, however, is a dis- appointment.

The truly difficult task in criminal justice reform is to define politically viable courses of legislative,
regulatory, and judicial conduct which are capable of avoiding the formidable ability of existing
institutions to swallow changes without affecting the overall system . There should have been at least one long
chapter, of this prescriptive nature, sketching the path between the diagnosis in the first five chapters and Weinreb's utopian "alternative
model." Am I condemning Weinreb for not writing a different book? I think not. It may be true, as Weinreb argues, that fundamental
change in our criminal justice system is needed. But this does not necessarily imply that such a grand vision of a new goal
cannot be achieved by means of politically viable incremental steps. Weinreb, in neglecting (or rejecting) this pos- sibility, fails to fulfill the
promise of his earlier critical analysis of the criminal justice system and leaves this book troublesomely incomplete.

Violation — the affirmative is an individual change to policing.

Vote negative to preserve limits and ground — including reforms to individual criminal
laws and enforcement in all three areas explodes the topic and encourages small affs
that dodge the core controversy and generics. Unlimited topics structurally discourage
in-depth clash, decreasing content mastery and skill development.
 OFF
Failure to specify their agent is a voting issue – “reserving the right to clarify” lets the
2AC spike out of DA links and undermines core clash around the actor of CJR --- CX
can’t check because our 1NC is made pre-round and judges don’t flow it.
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Interp: Harsher penalties and orientation towards punitivity is not reform – criminal
justice “policy” can include new laws, criminal justice “reform” requires a conciliatory
or progressive approach
Wolff et al. 20 – Associate Prof of Criminal Justice & member of the doctoral faculty at John Jay College
of Criminal Justice
Douglas N. Evans, senior investigator with the Research and Evaluation Center focusing on barriers to reentry from prison, Gina Moreno, Senior Research Analyst,
Kevin T. Wolff, associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and a member of the doctoral faculty for the Program of Doctor Studies in Criminal Justice
at John Jay/ The Graduate Center, and Jeffrey A. Butts, Director of the Research & Evaluation Center at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Easily Overstated:
Estimating the Relationship Between State Justice Policy Environments and Falling Rates of Youth Confinement, January 2020,
https://johnjayrec.nyc/2020/01/01/easilyoverstated2020/ State officials,
policy advocates, and journalists often describe falling
rates of youth confinement across the United States as the result of reform . Indeed, youth confinement (out-of-home
placements ordered by juvenile justice authorities) began to decline in the 1990s after growing steadily during the 1970s and 1980s. By 2015, the rate of youth
confinement per capita was less than half the rate of 1997 (Sickmund et al. 2017). During the same period, the number of adults in U.S. prisons and jails grew 23
percent (BJS 2019). Periods of confinement in the youth justice system are much shorter, of course, than sentence lengths in the adult prison system. Youth
confinement rates may react more quickly to a general decline in incarceration. But,
what specific factors are involved? Policymakers
and advocates make ambitious claims about the effects of changes in policy and practice, suggesting
that more progressive youth justice approaches are responsible for the declining rate of confinement . While the
use of confinement often declines after the implementation of various policies, this is insufficient evidence of a causal relationship. Are youth justice
policies actually responsible for creating declines in youth confinement, or do public officials and
advocates overstate the association between policy reforms and reductions in confinement? Why have youth confinement
rates dropped sharply in the past two decades? Is it simply the result of falling youth crime, or may officials rightfully take credit for

reducing confinement with policy reform? If so, which practices and policies are most effective in lowering

the youth confinement rate and which states had the most success in reducing confinement ? Is the youth justice policy environment a likely cause of recent
changes in confinement rates? In this study, researchers analyzed data about economic factors, crime rates, political ideology, and youth justice policy to test the
association between state-level policy environments and recent changes in the use of confinement for adjudicated youth. Background Surprisingly little research has
examined fluctuations in rates of youth confinement and their relationship to policy structures. Research on adult incarceration is far more common. The
discrepancy may be due to the limited range of data available on youth confinement—especially before the mid-1990s—as well as the fact that the confined youth
population is very small relative to the number of incarcerated adults.1 The national number of incarcerated adults is often 40 to 50 times larger than the
population of youth in confinement, including those in long-term secure facilities, residential facilities, and group homes (Sawyer and Wagner 2019; Sawyer 2018).
1. The Census of Public and Private Juvenile Detention, Correctional, and Shelter Facilities, also known as the Children in Custody census, was conducted from the
early 1970s until the 1990s when the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement (CJRP) became the nation’s primary data series about juvenile confinement. Some
factors shaping the use of confinement may be similar in both the youth system and adult system, including crime rates, financial factors, political climate, and the
policies and decisions of police, prosecutors, and courts. Reviewing research literature on adult incarceration, therefore, may lead to sufficient understanding of
confinement trends. Some factors, however, may be quite different in youth justice. Research focusing specifically on youth confinement is essential for
policymakers and practitioners who need to identify the best methods for reducing unnecessary and ineffective uses of youth placements. The declining use of
confinement for youth began more than a decade before the decline in adult incarceration. Adult incarceration rates began to climb in the 1970s and continued for
more than three decades, leaving the U.S. with the highest incarceration rate in the world (Carroll and Cornell 1985; Phelps and Pager 2016). The adult prison
population dropped slightly beginning in 2010, down seven percent according to recent data (Carson 2018; Guerino, Harrison and Sabol 2011). Youth confinement
numbers, on the other hand, began falling in the mid-1990s. Between 1997 and 2015, the national number of youth in residential placements decreased 54 percent

—from 105,055 to 48,043 (Hockenberry 2018). Many factors likely contribute to the declining use of confinement, including some of
the reforms celebrated by advocates. Researchers, however, cannot test the direct effect of myriad
reforms at state and local levels. First, the concept of justice reform is so broad it makes the term almost
meaningless . Second, the detailed data required to study numerous state and local youth justice reforms do not exist. The popular notion
of reform in the context of justice policy could mean any intentional effort to improve the
effectiveness and fairness of the justice process as well as the impact of any subsequent interventions .
 Typical reforms include reducing punitive sentences and expanding the use of alternatives , or
limiting the influence of race and gender bias in sentencing decisions (Harmon 2013). The term reform ,
however, could also describ e changes in policy and practice o f a very different type . Some
policymakers could think of reform as increasing police surveillance , imposing stricter sentences ,
or making the terms of probation longer and more restrictive . In such a framework, reforms could
contribute to increases in incarceration , such as mandatory minimum sentences and Three Strikes
Laws , or they could be designed to reduce the ability of courts to impose non-incarcerative sanctions
and limit access to diversion for broad categories of offenses. “ Tough on crime” and “zero tolerance”
policies during the 1980s and 1990s led to an expansion of secure facility space in the U.S. and
increased the use of confinement (Scott and Saucedo 2013). Some officials may view these policies as
“ reform .” This study defined reform as the use of laws, policies, rules, and regulations to advance a
more “progressive” approach to youth justice . In other words, the study focused on reforms designed
to be rehabilitative and restorative rather than punitive , those that are compatible with the science of
adolescent development, that promote the use of the “least restrictive” setting for adjudicated youth, and are
generally respectful of civil liberties and maintain appropriate restraint on the power of government
even when those policies purport to ensure public safety . Even narrowing the meaning of reform in
this way , however, does not make a national analysis of youth justice policies simple or straightforward. To
establish a statistical connection between progressive reforms and youth confinement rates, researchers would need detailed, historical
measures about policies and practices implemented in states, counties, and cities over several decades. Anything less than a comprehensive, national database
of reform measures organized at the local level would render such research a type of case study. Of course, some useful research derives from case studies focused
on just one state or city (e.g., Fabelo et al. 2015). Case studies, however, fail to account for nationwide trends. Researchers examining one jurisdiction alone may be
tempted to see causation in a finding that actually reflects a broader, national phenomenon (McDowall and Loftin 2009). To create more robust measures,
researchers need comprehensive and reliable data about policies and practices in all states and for many years. Unfortunately, this
kind of information does not exist, but it is possible to obtain a few key variables from data series managed by the U.S. Department of Justice and to use these data
to model state-level characteristics pertaining to crime, justice processing, demographics, economics, and political ideology across all 50 states. State-level data

about law and policy will still produce a limited reflection of youth justice in practice. Removing a juvenile from home and placing them in a

facility follows a complex series of policy decisions. Because long-term confinement facilities are often an
endpoint in the justice process, the number of youth in these facilities depends on the decisions of many actors
throughout the justice system. Police officers have the discretion to arrest someone (or not ) for an
offense. Prosecutors have the authority to file charges (or not ). Judges and executive branch
agencies usually decide whether a particular case merits the use of confinement. Manipulating any
one of these factors may contribute to some change in the total rate of youth confinement, but no single factor is likely to

drastically reduce the volume of placements. Many other social and political factors influence such decisions, from
recent crime trends and public opinion to budget crises and even the lasting effects of one or two notorious cases that
generate public anxiety (Butterfield 1995). Most importantly, the United States (as with many other countries) has been experiencing falling crime for 25-years.
Adult and youth arrests have decreased nearly every year since the mid-1990s. The per capita rate of violent crimes fell 29 percent between 1999 and 2018 (FBI
2019). When crime falls, especially serious and violent crime, policymakers are more willing and more able to implement reforms. If the rate of confinement
continues to decline, officials are tempted to claim their reforms are responsible—even if rigorous research would show the two measures (reforms and
confinement rates) are associated but not causally related. With fewer arrests coming to court, the demand for secure confinement may fall regardless what
policies are being pursued to reduce confinement. Popular Claims Researchers, politicians, and advocates often claim incarceration rates fall due to the effects of
intentional reform. Referencing the nationwide drop in adult incarceration rates, researchers Lofstrom and Raphael asserted that declines were “driven by
sentencing reforms at the state level explicitly designed to reduce incarceration rates” (2016: 197). Governor John Bel Edwards of Louisiana was quick to celebrate
his state’s “significant decreases in prison populations and prison admissions following the first year of the state’s historic criminal justice reforms” (Toohey 2018).
Advocacy organizations are pleased to describe the declining use of incarceration for adults as the result of reform. “… South Carolina enacted a
modest criminal justice reform package… intended to safely reduce the prison population , save taxpayer
money, and produce a better public safety outcome. And it did just that” (Center for Criminal Justice Reform 2018). Similarly, youth advocates credit an array of
reforms for the declining number of youth held in secure facilities and other forms of placement. Typical reforms include funding for community-based alternatives,
diversionary policies, policies requiring the least restrictive placement for adjudicated youth, bans on out-of-home placement for youth adjudicated for certain types
of offenses (non-felony, non-violent misdemeanor, or low-level offenses, drug possession, prostitution), bans on confinement of foster care youth, and raising the

age of juvenile jurisdiction overall. Some of these reforms may have contributed to reductions in the use of confinement for adjudicated
youth, but without considering the effect of other factors it may be wrong to claim or even imply that reforms
are entirely responsible. Making causal claims, however, is quite popular. Two authors of this study, in fact, published a John Jay College report in 2011 that
identified policy choices as a key influence on youth confinement. “The scale of incarceration is not simply a reaction to crime. It

is a policy choice . Some lawmakers invest heavily in youth confinement facilities. In their jurisdictions,
incarceration is a key component of the youth justice system. Other lawmakers invest more in
community -based programs” (Butts and Evans 2011). Other organizations have been even more confident in their attributions of cause and
effect. Nationally known organizations such as the Council of State Governments, the National Juvenile Justice Network, the National Center for Youth Law, the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the Crime and Justice Institute, and Pew Charitable Trusts have published reports suggesting that policy and practice
reforms were responsible for lowering the rate of secure confinement for adjudicated youth. In 2019, the Crime and Justice Institute examined changes in the
demand for secure youth confinement space in West Virginia and implied that a small amount of improvement was due to the recent passage of state legislation.
“One primary goal of the S.B. 393 policy changes was to reduce the number of West Virginia youth in secure facilities. Examining the number of youth admitted to
restrictive settings versus the number referred to community alternatives like the YRCs is a quantifiable way to measure progress toward this goal. From 2015
through 2017, the overall number of BJS admissions decreased from 2,073 to 1,877. At the same time, the data show a steady increase in the percentage of
juveniles referred to community-based interventions, from 37 percent in 2015 to 39 percent in 2017. The trend continued into 2018, with 42 percent of admissions
referred to non-residential programs” (Crime and Justice Institute 2019: 4). A 2012 report from the National Center for Youth Law and the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency reviewed youth justice reforms implemented by the State of Arkansas and confidently declared them successful without investigating other
explanations, such as the national crime decline and subsequent reductions in demand for secure space. “Arkansas leaders, like their counterparts in other states,
have embarked on a planned course to transform the state’s juvenile justice system. … In just a short period of time, Arkansas has achieved significant positive
results from reform efforts. From 2008 to 2011, commitments to state custody have been reduced by 20%, including those for low-level, non-dangerous youthful
misbehaviors; the average length of stay in state residential treatment centers has been shortened by 19%; and the number of beds at the state’s largest juvenile
secure facility, the Arkansas Juvenile Assessment and Treatment Center, was reduced by 30%” (Arthur and Hartney 2012: 1). The National Juvenile Justice Network
collaborated with the Texas Public Policy Foundation to publish a 2013 report on youth confinement trends. While the report acknowledged that declines in youth
arrests “helped explain” the falling rate of youth confinement, it also asserted that state policies “shape” the changes leading to reduced confinement (National
Juvenile Justice Network 2013: 2). In 2017, the Council of State Governments Justice Center described the nationwide drop in youth confinement as the result of
efforts by “state and local leaders.” “State and local leaders across the country have made concerted efforts to scale back juvenile incarceration, and their efforts
have yielded significant results: the national juvenile incarceration rate has been cut in half over the last decade. As a result, a greater number of youth in the
juvenile justice system are now being supervised in their communities, which research shows leads to lower re-arrest rates, and states are increasingly allocating the
majority of their juvenile justice resources to community-based supervision and services” (CSG 2017). Similarly, the enactment of youth justice reforms in Kentucky
inspired the Pew Charitable Trusts to conclude the policies had a direct effect. “Juvenile justice reforms enacted by Kentucky in 2014 are creating substantial
benefits for youth, families, and communities throughout the state. Between fiscal years 2014 and 2017, the number of youths held in Department of Juvenile
Justice facilities fell 34 percent, reflecting a reduction in detentions and commitments for lower-level offenses” (Horowitz and Pheiffer 2018). Researchers at Pew
saw other causal connections in Georgia: “After Georgia enacted a 2013 reform package, the state’s juvenile residential population fell 35 percent” (Horowitz and
Carlock 2017). An assistant commissioner of the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice joined the argument, saying “juvenile reform in Georgia has made it
possible not only to avoid construction of new facilities, but to reduce the population in existing facilities” (Vignati and Edwards 2018). An online data brief from
Pew used federal data to depict changes in youth confinement from 2006 to 2015 and reported that all 50 states and Washington, DC showed decreases ranging
from –1 percent to –83 percent. The Pew brief ended by implying that reforms were likely behind the change because the general trend of reduced youth
confinement “comes as a growing number of states adopt policies that prioritize costly space in residential facilities for youths adjudicated for serious crimes”
(Horowitz 2017). A comprehensive report from Texas used data from 2007 to 2012 to claim that policy changes deserved
credit for reduced confinement in that state: “the first of a series of reforms was enacted , and over the next
five years, the number of youth incarcerated in state facilities did not grow as projected but instead plunged ” (Fabelo et
al. 2015: 30). The authors concluded that: “State efforts to reduce the number of youth in state juvenile correctional facilities
have delivered on the promise made when they were enacted . Thousands more youth are living at home now (or are being
supervised closer to home) than before the reforms” (Fabelo et al. 2015: 81). Advocacy groups are often eager to report a connection between reforms and rates of
confinement. The Vice President of the Advocates for Children of New Jersey (ACNJ) wrote that the “[Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternatives
Initiative] has resulted in far fewer youth being incarcerated in longer-term Juvenile Justice Commission facilities without risk to public safety” (Coogan 2017). ACNJ
relied on a subtle turn of phrase to imply a causal relationship between reforms and reduced confinement, stating that “New Jersey is a national leader in a rapidly
advancing juvenile justice reform movement. The state is locking up thousands fewer young offenders, while safely addressing their needs in their communities”
(ACNJ 2018). The 2014 Annual Report of the Annie E. Casey Foundation was less subtle, lauding a 43 percent drop in juvenile detention in several states as the
“result” of its efforts to reduce detention in those states (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2014). Journalists often endorse correlational claims by public officials and
advocates. The Arkansas Times reported that “[statewide youth justice] reforms have reduced both the number of youths detained locally in juvenile detention
centers and those committed to (state) facilities” (Hardy 2017). A Kansas news outlet noted that, “juvenile arrests and placement of youths in group homes or
detention facilities declined at the same time Kansas moved to funnel budget savings into community-based therapy and intervention programs designed to keep
families together” (Carpenter 2019). Another article about Kansas opened with the following assertion: “Reforms to the Kansas juvenile justice system have slashed
the number of young people in confinement by 63 percent over the past two years” (The Crime Report 2019). A recent article about Vice, the HBO documentary
about criminal justice reform, opened with this observation: “The U.S. has significantly reduced the amount of incarcerated youths via state reforms from 2001 to
2015” (Vice Impact 2018). Even celebrities join those seeing a direct, causal connection. Musician and justice advocate John Legend once observed: “When Illinois
instituted comprehensive reforms over the past several years to build age-appropriate responses to crime, day-reporting centers, and community-based mental
health services for youth in cities including Chicago, the state incarcerated 44 percent fewer youth, reserving incarceration only for those who were a public safety
threat” (Spark Action 2017). Policy reforms may contribute to confinement reductions, but other factors—social conditions, economic trends, cultural shifts—likely
play a part. This study tested the claim that state policies are responsible for falling youth confinement rates and examined what happens to that relationship when
other explanatory factors are included. If the study indicates that the effects of the policy environment are reduced or nullified by covariates, it would cast doubt on
the widely assumed causal relationship between reforms and reductions in youth confinement. The Changing Rate of Youth Confinement The rise and fall of youth
confinement occurred in the midst of America’s wave of mass incarceration. The number of incarcerated adults surged in the U.S. during the past 50 years. The
adult incarceration rate had been relatively stable until the early 1970s, when it started to increase exponentially. From 1972 to 2008 the rate of individuals
incarcerated in jails and state or federal prisons increased from 161 inmates per 100,000 residents to nearly 756 per 100,000 residents (Travis, Western, and
Redburn 2014; Maguire, n. d.). The incarceration boom affected people of all age groups, as adult crime and incarceration rates tend to affect youth confinement
rates as well (Mears 2006). Most research on incarceration continues to focus on adult populations, but this study concentrates on youth confinement and factors
that influence it. The widespread decline in youth confinement that began in the mid-1990s followed a period of growth during the 1980s and early 1990s. During
periods of either increasing or decreasing confinement, nationwide trends obscure differences between states. In 1997, for example, rates of placement for
juveniles age 10 and older varied from a low of 70 per 100,000 in Vermont to a high of 583 per 100,000 in Louisiana (Sickmund 2000). Sizeable disparities in
confinement rates present an opportunity for researchers. By analyzing state variations, it may be possible to identify key factors affecting the use of youth
confinement. Some factors, such as demographic shifts, economic changes, and the introduction of new policies, may be measurable. Others, such as the political
climate and cultural norms, are more difficult to capture in national studies. “Tough on crime” legislation, for example, certainly contributed to increasing
confinement rates in the 1980s (Tonry 1999). Being “tough” became the standard for elected officials in the criminal (adult) justice arena and had spillover effects
on youth justice policy as well (Wool and Stemen 2004; Mears 2006). Aggressive policies were also a response to sharp increases in youth violence during the 1980s
and early 1990s (Butts and Mears 2001; Van Vleet 1999). News media at the time sensationalized crimes involving youth and some prominent academics even
argued that certain juveniles were “superpredators… capable of committing the most heinous acts of physical violence for the most trivial reasons” (Dilulio 1995).
Such claims likely motivated policymakers to implement more tough-on-crime policies aimed especially at youth. After peaking in the mid-1990s, youth crime rates
—especially violent crimes—began to fall. Youth confinement rates followed suit. The national number of confined youth decreased nearly every year since the late
1990s (Sickmund et al. 2015). The reduced demand for confinement was largely a response to falling youth crime. Juvenile courts placed fewer youth out-of-home
in absolute terms, but the proportion of court cases resulting in out-of-home placement remained stable between 1996 and 2016 (Butts and Pfaff 2019). If the
overall decline in youth confinement coincided with falling crime rates, is it still possible that some of the recent changes were also due to policy changes? Factors
that Influence Incarceration Incarceration rates respond to a combination of micro factors pertaining to individuals involved in the criminal justice process
(defendants, police, prosecutors) and macro factors (societal changes potentially affecting the entire population) (Pfaff 2013). At the micro-level, police officers have
the discretion to arrest someone suspected of committing a crime, or they can decide not to make an arrest. Prosecutors can charge an arrestee with a range of
criminal offenses or they can decide not to file charges. Judges usually determine a convicted defendant’s length of sentence, and parole boards determine if an
inmate can leave prison before some pre-determined release date. Parole officers issue restrictions on their parolees and have the discretion to revoke parole and
send them back to prison. Micro factors affect the likelihood and severity/length of criminal sanctions and may explain some of the increase in incarceration that
started in the 1970s and continued into the 2010s. Macro factors, of course, affect these micro factors, including efforts by lawmakers to restrict the discretion of
justice officials to make decisions about individual cases. Other macro factors include the broad array of social policies, economic conditions, unemployment rates,
demographic characteristics, and the political ideologies prevalent in a given area. Disentangling how all these factors affect incarceration is difficult because
changes in one factor may correlate with changes in others. The war on drugs was a macro-level policy that influenced police departments and officers to target
people suspected of drug offenses, which helps to explain the increase in people incarcerated for drug offenses (Blumstein and Beck 1999). The likelihood of prison
became more common as prosecutors recommended severe sentences more often and judges agreed with them more often (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014).
One study of prosecutions in 34 states (the only states for which felony filing data were available) indicated that while arrests fell about 10 percent between 1994
and 2008, felony court filings increased more than 37 percent (Pfaff 2013). Other research shows that macro-economic factors, such as income and financial
inequality, unemployment, and poverty, may also influence incarceration rates. Crime rates tend to be higher in communities beset by financial inequality and the
association is consistent across multiple countries and time periods (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 2002). Although inequality may not have a direct effect on
incarceration, its effect may operate through other factors. Even government assistance programs may be related to incarceration. A study exploring welfare
recipients and incarceration rates found that states spending less on social welfare had higher incarceration rates (Beckett and Western 2001). Unemployment and
poverty are often positively related to incarceration rates (Sorensen and Stemen 2002). Poor and unemployed people do not necessarily commit more crime, but
there is a relationship between the number of people living with limited financial means and the justice system’s prioritization of incarceration. Researchers find
that a rise in unemployment can affect increases in crime (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001). The relative poverty rate in a neighborhood may be indicative of the
extent of incarceration among residents from that neighborhood. The criminal justice system may disproportionately affect individuals from high poverty
communities along with other social problems such as violent crime, mental illness, and substance abuse (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). On the other hand,
unemployment could actually contribute to reductions in youth confinement. Unemployed parents may spend more time at home, allowing them to supervise their
children directly, potentially leading to fewer delinquent acts and fewer youth confinements. The political preferences and voting behavior of an area may also
affect incarceration rates. Conservative politicians could use claims of “crime problems” to offer tough-on-crime solutions that result in political gains, or
conservative citizens may demand harsher punishments for law violators (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001). Politically conservative states may adopt
more punitive justice policies, perhaps in response to increases in populations of color in areas that were once predominantly White (McGarrel
1991; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). Conservative-leaning states also tend to adopt more severe sentences for some crimes, including rape, assault, and robbery
(Bowers and Waltman 1993). Some researchers find a positive correlation between the number of conservative citizens and a
state’s incarceration rate (Sorensen and Stemen 2002; Greenberg and West 2001). Policies in the criminal and juvenile justice systems are not easily
comparable because criminal justice policies tend to be more punitive. However, criminal justice policies can
demonstrate the effects of reforms on incarceration rates. Determinate criminal justice sentences ,
including mandatory minimums and three-strikes laws , are often cited as a driver of mass
incarceration . Some argue that a shift toward determinate sentencing and longer sentences influenced the growth of incarceration (Mauer 2001). Others,
however, suggest that determinate sentencing laws are not associated with increases in incarceration for most states and may actually decrease incarceration in
some states (Marvell and Moody 1996). A study of sentencing practices in all 50 states, including voluntary sentencing, presumptive sentencing, three-strikes laws,
parole abolition, and truth-in-sentencing laws, found that with the exception of parole abolition, sentencing practices were not strongly correlated with changes in
prison populations (Zhang, Maxwell and Vaughn 2009).

Violation: the Aff is a criminal justice policy by instituting a new punitive law

Standards:
1 --- Limits --- they explode limits by allowing any minute action to suddenly be
criminalized in the topic; this allows potentially hundreds of thousands of affs that
criminalize one section or action and explode predictable education and lit base
context
2 --- Ground --- by avoiding the implementation of actual CJR, they pivot out of key
neg generics like Elections/PTX, actor CPs and circumventionargs - bidirectionality kills
creative neg strategies and absorbs neg CP ground
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The affirmative perpetuates the myth that criminal justice is a force that can achieve
social progress---that cements carceral social relations
Hadar Aviram 19, UC Hastings law professor, 10-23-2019, “Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of
Punitive Social Control to Advance Social Justice Ends,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3404276
These newer works expand the field of responsibility by arguing that conservative actors (lawmakers, legal actors, law enforcement officials) did
not corner the market on relying on the criminal justice apparatus as the quintessential solution to society’s ills. As Jonathan Simon argues in
Governing Through Crime (2007) the
pressure to address social malaise through the metaphor of crime is a
feature of late modernity, exercising pressure on Republican and Democrat politicians alike to appear
“tough on crime.” In other words, institutions and actors across the political spectrum have regularly
approached social problems with a criminal justice hammer in hand , and it is therefore no surprise that all these
problems looked like criminal justice nails. The tendency to recur to criminal justice methods to solve systemic problems has been exacerbated
by two additional features of the punitive turn. The first is the rising importance of victims as the leading constituency in shaping values and
priorities. In Governing Through Crime (2007), Simon argues that the quintessential defining metaphor of the American citizen has come to be
the potential victim, replacing the yeoman farmer and small businessman of yesteryear. Indeed,
a very particular kind of victims-
rights discourse has come to dominate criminal justice conversations—a discourse portraying the
criminal justice system as a zero-sum game between the opposing categories of offenders and victims , in
which harsher punishment for the former is an unqualified good for the latter (Roach 1999; Page 2011; Aviram

2015). This perspective narrows the American imagination to punitive perspectives as the only available
method for expressing care for victims’ experiences , and marginalizes alternative important avenues to
honor victims, such as restorative justice, victim-offender mediation, and coalitions to end violence.
The second important feature of the punitive turn is, of course, that it is deeply embedded structural inequalities and its effects are unevenly
distributed across class, gender, and race. It is now widely acknowledged that, while 1 in 100 Americans is behind bars, that figure is much
higher for particular segments of the American population: 1 in 9 young Black men is incarcerated, and 1 in 3 is under some form of correctional
supervision (Pew 2008). Racial and class inequalities are found at every turn; in policing (Epp et al. 2014), in criminal courtrooms (Van Cleve
2016), and in sentencing (Tonry 2018), to name just a few. Many criminal justice critics, in academia and in the activist realm, treat this
overrepresentation not as a coincidence, but rather as part of a systemic project of crystallizing and enhancing inequalities (Alexander 2010;
Butler 2010; Epp et al. 2014; Van Cleve 2016; Davis 2017). The third feature shared by conservative and progressive punitivism relates to the
role of high profile individual cases—“redball crimes”—as powerful rhetorical devices for systemic reform. Conservative punitivism has
succeeded in transforming public opinion and public policy through the visibility and symbolism of Willie Horton, whose crimes were prominent
in George H.W. Bush’s presidential campaign (Anderson and Enberg 1995; Schwartzapfel and Keller 2015). Each of these cautionary tales served
the conservative punitive agenda by Progressive punitivism ; Richard Allen Davis, murderer of Polly Klaas, was the trigger for the Three Strikes
Law (Zimring 2003); and the Manson family murders figured prominently in the creation of California’s “extreme punishment trifecta”: the
return of the death penalty, the birth of life in prison without parole, and the punitive turn in parole policies (Aviram 2020). Progressive
punitivism seeks to make individual cases into “conversation starters” as well: the Kavanaugh hearing (Aviram 2019) and Brock Turner’s
sentencing (Hamilton-Smith 2019) are just two examples. But while this rhetorical device—relying on a case with high emotional valance to
make a systemic argument—works well in service of conservative goals, it backfires when used in service of progressive goals, for reasons I
explain in the next section. These characteristics of the punitive turn are now firmly seared into the American psyche. Not only is criminal
justice perceived as the default avenue for addressing social problems, but it is inexorably linked to the idea of group identity (for both accusers
and accused) and victims (the notion that victims and offenders are not mutually exclusive groups, albeit true, is firmly rejected in the American
punitive rhetoric.) As a conservative program, punitivism has had destructive effects on people and communities which have been widely
documented in the literature. But as I detail next, progressive
punitivism also poses disturbing questions about values,
priorities, and alliances, which raise objections about its promise as a problem-solving paradigm. F.
Challenges and Problems Highlighting the discontents of progressive punitivism should not imply that its targets are blameless, or that they
ordinarily suffer a harsher fate than the usual people on the receiving end of the legal process. These criticisms are best understood, therefore,
as implying that progressive activism expends unnecessary energy on pursuing the accountability of individuals, some more deserving than
others, that would be better spent elsewhere. I offer here some preliminary thoughts about the problems of viewing the progressive reform
project through a punitive prism. First, the emphasis on punishment of individual wrongdoers as an educational
lesson confounds personal pathology with situational evil . The lessons of Stanley Milgram’s renown obedience to
authority experiment (2009[1963]), as well as the Stanford prison experiment (Haney et al. 1972) are well taken: bad behavior, including
serious displays of cruelty and sadism, is largely situational. It
is perhaps ironic that movements that set out to highlight
the systemic power imbalances that enable evils like abuse of power to prevail have focused their
efforts on a method of redress that is best suited for adjudicating personal pathologies . One of the best
examples of this mimsmatch is the progressive outrage about the confirmation hearings of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court. As I argue
elsewhere, the focus on Kavanaugh’s personal pathology, dishonesty, and (to his detractors) misogyny has weakened the broader takeaway
from the hearings: that Kavanaugh, lamentably, is a man of his time and place, and that the effort to individually pathologize them create a risk
of normalizing the cultural Petri dish in which he and others operate (Aviram 2019). This problem is also evident in the movement to remove
due process protections for individual police officers for incidents of abuse of lethal force, as well as for people who engage in hate crimes.
While the animus behind such initiatives (much like the Persky recall campaign) is understandable, to the extent that they focus primarily on
individuals, the animus is misdirected. As Franklin Zimring explains in When Police Kill (2017), a systematic examination of lethal force incidents
reveals some important avenues for change in police training, equipment, and culture, and the effort, energy, and outrage directed at the
pursuit of justice against individual officers fails to address any of these more productive solutions. Such initiatives raise two serious problems,
the worse of which is that removing constitutional and legal protections only for unlikeable criminals, while framed as an effort to correct a
structural imbalance, could have an overall corrosive effect on due process. The lesser harm is the expenditure of precious activist energy on

vindictiveness and schadenfreude rather than on structural reform. Second, criminal justice is limited as a paradigm of
reform by its very nature : waiting for an incident to occur so that the social reaction to it will trigger
reform hangs the success of reform on the happenstance of particular occurrence . The dependence "case and
controversy" to seek an opportunity of reform means that the lightning rod for public ire is largely left to chance, or to a movement's
preferences and idiosyncrasies. Sometimes, instances of poor behavior—racism, sexual assault, police brutality—that come to light in the
context of an individual lawsuit are less egregious than the ones that remain in darkness. But because
grand juries, courts, and
legislative hearings approach reality on a case-by-case basis, the individual incidents that become the
focal point of discussion offer little knowledge of the scope and breadth of a particular problem . Again,
while the Kavanaugh hearings yielded a “national conversation” of questionable quality, they did not teach us much about the scope of the
problem or how to address it. Third, even if individual instances of public outrage are laudable, in the aggregate,
they can drain the movement of energy and resources . The emphasis on criminalization and harsh
sentencing draws efforts away from other laudable, systemic reforms , that are less attractive to the
public and thus less visible. Movements to reform social ills must spend their limited energy and resources in directions that might
prove most productive. To focus a movement on mobbing and stigmatizing one particular person is to spend
finite capital--money, time, verve--on a particular case under the unproven assumption that the case will
produce systemic change. Fourth, some difficult questions must be asked of the American tendency of
both progressives and conservatives to place victims at the forefront of policy and reform, and to. The
validation and empowerment of victims is deeply compromised by the way in which victim-centered punitive processes reify victimization to a
point that is unhealthy not only to offenders, but also to the victims themselves, and sets up "victimization competitions." The conservative
victims’ rights movement brought about many of the excesses of the 1990s and the 2000s, and its progressive counterpart, albeit considerably
less destructive overall, can wreak havoc in cases that do not merit punitivism, merely because of the strength and power of the
interlocutorvictims. The empirical debate on the percentage of false complaints of sexual abuse, which was reignited by the Kavanaugh
hearings (Baker 2018; Egan 2018; Aviram 2019), does not have an easy resolution precisely because it is difficult to know, empirically, the
correct answer (Ferguson and Malouf 2016); progressives and conservatives disagree not only on the rate of false accusations, but also on the
existence or absence of incentives to falsely accuse (de Zutter 2018). Some progressive commentators openly accept the possibility of false
accusations, but claim that such miscarriages of justice are “acceptable casualties” in the broader war against sexual misconduct (Klein 2014;
Tolentino 2018). This argument may be persuasive to some in the progressive left, but it is understandable why it would leave many moderates
and progressives unimpressed. More importantly,
making victimization the centerpiece of reform is dangerous in
that it strengthens the already unhealthy premise that a necessary condition to having a stake in social
reform is claiming a status of oppression and victimization, which requires people to marinate in their
victimization experience longer than their healing requires (Aviram 2020; Young 2016 ). And finally,
emphasizing retribution as a central tool in the reform arsenal places the onus on victims to
complain and to position themselves against offenders, marginalizing the voices of many victims
for whom there is no clear dichotomy between victim and offender, and whose take on their
predicament does not take an accusatory tone (Roach 1999). Fifth, the reliance on identity as the logic underpinning
targets for criminal enforcement poses problems of consistency, believability, and plausibility. Because progressive punitivism is characterized
by drawing attention particularly to the plight of particular groups of victims associated with underprivileged status, calls for reforming the
criminal process in a punitive direction often carry a mandate to categorically believe, or disbelieve, not just individuals but collectives of
people. But in a universe of intersectional identities, the consequences of this mandate are unclear. Consider the case of "Cornerstore
Caroline," a woman who complained about being harassed by an 8-year-old boy (the complaint was ultimately unfounded) (Phillips 2018). In a
world in which categorical alliances are inexorably linked to identities, what is the appropriate resolution of such a case? If we want women to
be categorically believed, where does that leave the boy who was falsely accused? Moreover, where does that leave all the men and boys of
color who, throughout America’s fraught history with hypersexualized black masculinity, have been falsely accused of sexually inappropriate
behavior with white women, such as Emmett Till (McLaughlin and Grinberg 2018) and the Scottsboro Boys (Goodman 2013 [1995])? By
contrast, if our primary allegiance is to people of color, where do we leave victims of color, given the robust empirical evidence that most crime
is committed intra-racially (Wilbanks 1985)? Confounding the personal with the political, the individual facts with the interest of protecting
groups and identities, leave these dilemmas unanswered, particularly if moderate voices calling for case-by-case assessments of truth are
vilified (Wagner 2019). But
worse, the rhetorical device of using high-profile cases to prove an individual point,
which has so effectively galvanized politicians and voters alike for conservative causes, backfires when
used for progressive causes—for the very reasons that progressives so often decry . When conservatives warn of
the dangers of another Willie Horton and propose to address them by increasing punishment across the board, their individual case matches
their general policy, resulting in overall “total incapacitation” for all prisoners (Simon 2014). By contrast, when progressives call
for harsh punishment and highlight a case in which the defendant is powerful , the first people in line
to suffer from an overall harsh punishment policy will be the much more frequent sufferers in the
criminal justice web: poor defendants of color who look nothing like the individuals showcased in
the progressive punitive campaign . Judge Persky’s recall campaign is a classic example: sending a
message to judges that leniency can result in mob retaliation is likely to make judges harsher across the
board, and since the criminal defendant population is disproportionately poor, black, or brown, the
effects of the campaign will be felt far more acutely by the people that very same progressive campaign
seeks to protect (Salonga 2019). The punitive effects of election threats is supported by robust empirical research: A Brennan Center
study found that judges sentence defendants convicted of serious felonies to longer sentences the closer they are to reelection; in states that
retain judges through elections, the more supportive the public is of capital punishment, the more likely appellate judges are to affirm death
sentences; and in the 37 states that heard capital cases between 2001 and 2015, appointed judges reversed death sentences 26 percent of the
time, judges facing retention elections reversed 15 percent of the time, and judges facing competitive elections reversed 11 percent of the time
(Berry 2015). Sixth, engaging in a framework that feeds on outrage takes an emotional toll . Progressive punitivism
builds largely on a platform of understandable, and often justifiable, rage. Efforts to criticize the underlying angry animus of the movement are
often categorized as “tone policing” and rejected (Portwood-Stacer and Berridge 2014). But
what we know about rage suggests
that it has an ambiguous contribution to social change. On one hand, anger can drive one to action when channeled in a
useful direction (Rothberg 1971). On the other hand, anger is a generative emotion; feeling and expressing rage leads to feeling and expressing
more rage (Tarvis 1984). Pursuing
justice through punitive means, particularly in the frequent cases in which
the system falls short of delivering it, can intensify anger and rage, and lead to potential spillovers in
which rage can be directed at undeserving targets . Finally, punitivism is countereffective in coalition
building. As progressives know all too well from decades of being on the receiving end of shaming and
excoriation, these are not particularly effective techniques for garnering cooperation and building
coalitions. If the ultimate goal of the movement is to bring about social change, a considerable aspect of
the reform effort should be directed at building bridges and opening opportunities for cooperative,
inclusive discussion. Unfortunately, when the weapons of choice are stigma and calls for indictments,
incarceration, and shaming, political opponents are more likely to leap to the defense of the target than
to come to the table in the spirit of cooperation. Unfortunately, being on the receiving end of a shaming
experience without appropriate opportunities for reintegration merely fosters a sense of enmity and
rancor (Braithwaite 1989), and therefore an unsatisfying platform for building alliances.

Neoliberalism guarantees extinction and social crisis---the judge has an intellectual

obligation to evaluate the social relations that underpin the plan
Pala Basil Mera 14, Victoria University of Wellington philosophy PhD, Accounting For Apocalypse Re-
Thinking Social Accounting Theory And Practice For Our Time Of Social Crises And Ecological Collapse,
https://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/3686/thesis.pdf?sequence=2

Ecologically too, the situation is dire. Of the many measures of ecological well-being – topsoil loss, groundwater
depletion, chemical contamination, increased toxicity levels in human beings, the number and size of “dead zones” in the
Earth’s oceans, and the accelerating rate of species extinction and loss of biodiversity – the increasing evidence suggests that the
developmental trajectory of the dominant economic culture necessarily causes the mass extermination of non-human communities, the

systemic destruction and disruption of natural habitats, and could ultimately cause catastrophic destruction of the
biosphere . Ecological drawdown, increasing toxicity, habitat destruction, and mass extinction The latest Global Environmental Outlook
Report published by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the GEO-5 report, makes for sobering reading. As in earlier reports, the
global trends portrayed are of continuing human population growth, expanding economic growth,6 and as a consequence severe forms of
ecological degradation (UNEP, 2012; see also, UNEP, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2007). The
ecological reality described is of ecological
drawdown (deforestation, over-fishing, water extraction, etc.) (UNEP, 2012, pp. 72, 68, 84, 102-106, ); increasing toxicity
of the environment through chemical and waste pollution, with severe harm caused to human and non-human communities alike (pp. 173-
179); systematic habitat destruction (pp. 8, 68-84) and climate change (33-60), which have decimated the number of
species on Earth, threatening many with outright extinction (pp. 139-158). Climate disruption The most serious ecological threat
on a global scale is climate disruption, caused by the emission of greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels, other industrial activities, and land
destruction (UNEP, 2012, p. 32). The GEO-5 report states that “[d]espite attempts to develop low-carbon economies in a number of countries,
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases continue to increase to levels likely to push global temperatures beyond the internationally
agreed limit of 2° C above the pre-industrial average temperature” (UNEP, 2012, p. 32). Concentrations of atmospheric methane have more
than doubled from preindustrial levels, reaching approximately 1826 ppb in 2012; the scientific consensus is that this increase is very likely due
predominantly to agriculture and fossil fuel use (IPCC, 2007). Scientists
warn that the Earth’s ecosystems are nearing
catastrophic “tipping points” that will be marked by mass extinctions and unpredictable changes on a scale
unseen since the glaciers retreated twelve thousand years ago (Pappas, 2012). Twenty-two eminent scientists warned recently in the journal,
Nature, that humans are likely to have triggered a planetary-scale critical transition “with the potential to transform Earth rapidly and
irreversibly into a state unknown in human experience”, which means that “the biological resources we take for granted at present may be
subject to rapid and unpredictable transformations within a few human generations” (Barnofsky et al., 2012). This means that human beings
are in serious trouble, not only in the future, but right now. The pre-industrial level of carbon dioxide concentration was about 280 parts per
million (ppm). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates concentrations could reach between 541 and 970 ppm by the
year 2100. However, many climate scientists consider that levels should be kept below 350 ppm in order to avoid “irreversible catastrophic
effects” (Hansen et al., 2008). “Catastrophic warming of the earth” would mean a planet that is too hot for life – that is, any
life, and all life (Mrasek, 2008). Where are we heading? We need to analyze the above information and ask the simple questions: what
does it signify and where will it lead? In terms of the social crises of inequalities, the pattern of human development suggests clearly that
although capitalism is capable of raising the economic productivity of many countries as well as international trade,
it also produces social injustices on a global scale. The trajectory of capitalist economic development that people

appear locked into is of perpetual growth that also produces significant human and social suffering . In
terms of the ecological situation, the mounting evidence from reports, such as those published by UNEP, suggest that a full-scale ecocide
will eventuate and that a global holocaust is in progress which is socially pathological and biocidal in its scope (UNEP, 2012; see also,
UNEP, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2007). Assuming the trends do not change, the endpoint of this trajectory of perpetual economic growth,
ecological degradation, systemic pollution, mass species extinction and runaway climate change, which human beings appear locked into, will

be climate apocalypse and complete biotic collapse. 1.1 ACCOUNTING RESEARCH AND INTELLECTUAL FAILURE Given the serious and life-
threatening implications of these social and ecological crises outlined above, it would be reasonable to expect they should be central to
academic concerns, particularly given the responsibilities of academics as intellectuals. As the people whom society subsidizes to carry out
intellectual work,7 the primary task of academics is to carry out research that might enable people to deepen their understanding of how the
world operates, ideally towards the goal of shaping a world that is more consistent with moral and political principles, and the collective self-
interest (Jensen, 2013, p. 43). Given that most people’s stated philosophical and theological systems are rooted in concepts of
justice, equality and the inherent dignity of all people (Jensen, 2007, p. 30), intellectuals have a particular responsibility to
call attention to those social patterns of inequality which appear to be violations of such principles, and to
call attention to the destructive ecological patterns that threaten individual and collective well-being. As a “critic and conscience of society,” 8
one task of intellectuals is to identify issues that people should all pay attention to, even when – indeed, especially when – people
would rather ignore the issues (Jensen, 2013, p. 5). In view of this, intellectuals today should be focusing attention on the hard-to-
face realities of an unjust and unsustainable world. Moreover, intellectuals in a democratic society, as its “critic and conscience”, should serve
as sources of independent and critical information, analyses and varied opinions, in an endeavour to provide a meaningful role in the formation
of public policy (Jensen, 2013c). In order to fulfil this obligation as “critic and conscience,” intellectuals need to be willing to
critique not only particular people, organizations, and policies, but also the systems from which they emerge . In other
words, intellectuals have to be willing to engage in radical critique. Generally, the term “radical” tends to suggest images of extremes, danger,
violence, and people eager to tear things down (Jensen, 2007, p. 29). Radical, however, has a more classical meaning. It comes from the Latin –
radix, meaning “root.” Radical critique in this light means critique or analysis that gets to the root of the problem. Given that the patterns of
social inequality and ecocidal destruction outlined above are not the product of a vacuum, but instead are the product
of social systems, radical critique simply means forms of social analysis, which are not only concerned about these social
and ecological injustices but also trace them to the social systems from which they emerged, which would subject these
very systems to searching critiques. Such searching critique is challenging because, generally, the dominant groups which
tend to subsidize intellectuals (universities, think tanks, government, corporations) are the key agents of the social
systems that produce inequalities and destroy ecosystems (Jensen, 2013, p. 12). The more intellectuals choose
not only to identify patterns but also highlight the pathological systems from which they emerge , the
greater the tension with whoever “pay[s] the bills” (ibid .). However, this may arguably be unavoidable today, given that
the realities of social inequality and ecological catastrophe show clearly that our social systems are already in crisis, are pathological, and in
need of radical change.9 To adopt a radical position, in this light, is not to suggest that we simply need to abolish capitalism, or to imply that
if we did so all our problems would be solved. For one thing, such an abstract argument has little operational purchase in terms of specifying
how to go about struggling for change. For another thing, as this thesis will discuss, capitalism is not the only social system that we ought to be
interrogating as an important systemic driver of social and ecological crises. Moreover, to adopt
a radical position does not mean
that we have any viable “answers” or “solutions” in terms of the alternative institutions, organizations and social
systems that we could replace the existing ones with. There is currently no alternative to capitalism that appears to be viable,
particularly given the historical loss of credibility that Marxism and socialism has suffered. As history has shown, some of the self-proclaimed
socialist and communist regimes have had their own fair share of human rights abuses and environmental disasters, and the global left has thus
far not been able to articulate alternatives that have managed to capture the allegiances of the mainstream population. Furthermore, given
the depth, complexity, and scale of contemporary social and ecological crises, I am not sure if there are
any viable alternatives or, for that matter, any guarantees that we can actually prevent and change the disastrous course of
contemporary society. I certainly do not have any solutions. What I would argue, however , is that if we are to have any
chance of not only ameliorating but also substantively addressing these social and ecological
problems, before we can talk about alternatives or potential “solutions”, we first need to develop a
clear understanding of the problems. And, as argued above, this involves, amongst other things, exploring why and
how the existing social systems under which we live are producing the patterns of social inequality and
ecological unsustainability that make up our realities today.10 To adopt a radical stance, in this light, is simply to insist that we
have an obligation to honestly confront our social and ecological predicament and to ask difficult questions
about the role that existing social systems might be playing in producing and exacerbating them.
 OFF
The National Governors’ Association ought to inform the White House that, because it
is in the vital economic and national security interests of the United States, state
cooperation with federal initiatives will be contingent upon the passage of the End
Racial and Religious Profiling Act of 2019.

The CP solves by forcing federal follow-on AND is an aggressive use of uncooperative

federalism
Heather Gerken 17, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law at Yale Law School, JD from the University of
Michigan Law School, AB from Princeton University, and Joshua Resevz, JD from Yale Law School, BA in
Political Science from Yale University, now Civil Attorney with the Appellate Staff at the United States
Department of Justice, “Progressive Federalism: A User’s Guide”, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas,
Number 44, Spring 2017, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/44/progressive-federalism-a-users-
guide/TK

Progressives have lost power in Washington. Every national institution now lies in the hands of the Republican Party. Given the slim
chances of Democrats’ winning back Congress in 2018, many think that the best progressives can do is hunker down for the next

four years, blocking legislation on the Hill and challenging it in court. It’s a depressing picture for those on the left. No one wants to be a member of a

party whose “victories” are all in the kill, whose only role in national politics is that of the gadfly. But if progressives can simply look outside

the Beltway, they will find that they still have access to one of the most powerful weapons in politics:
federalism . Using the power they wield in states and cities across the country, progressives can do a good deal

more than mourn and obstruct. They can resist Washington overreach, shape national policies , and force the

Republicans to compromise . Cities and states have long been at the center of the fight over national values. And it’s time progressives
recognized that federalism isn’t just for conservatives. Unfortunately, the moment one mentions federalism many progressives stop listening. The language of
“states’ rights” has an ugly history, invoked to shield slavery and Jim Crow. Federalism’s checkered past led political scientist William H. Riker to remark in 1964 that
“if one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.” Even today, many progressives think of federalism as a parochial anachronism, better suited for
stymieing change than for effecting it. But they are making a mistake. This is not your father’s federalism. These days, state and local governments are often led by
dissenters and racial minorities, the two groups progressives think have the most to fear from federalism. And this has allowed them to not only take

advantage of the enormous power that federalism confers within their own cities and states, but to affect

national debates , influence national policy , and force national actors to the bargaining

table . Their success shows that federalism is a neutral and powerful tool for change, not an intrinsically conservative quirk of U.S. government. The call for
progressive federalism is not a new one. In 2004, Duke law professor Ernie Young invited liberals to come to the “Dark Side” and embrace the power of the states.
(And one of the authors of this essay has spent more than a decade arguing—including in the pages of this journal— that federalism doesn’t have a political
valence.) But having a Democrat in the White House was just too tempting for most progressives. They turned their attention to Washington while neglecting what
was going on in California, Massachusetts, or New York City. We suspect that most progressives aren’t even aware that the Democrats have lost 27 state legislative
chambers since 2008. But perhaps the 2016 election will help progressives shake loose the notion that D.C. is the center of the political universe. Needless to say,

though, the devil is in the details . So below we offer a “user’s guide” that identifies four ways that progressive leaders—from Jerry

Brown and Bill de Blasio to small-city mayors—can push back against federal policy and force compromise . And, in
doing so, we hope to persuade even the most fervent nationalist to become a fan of federalism. While we fashion this as a progressive user’s guide, it could, in
theory, work just as well for conservatives should they lose the presidency in 2020. That’s precisely the point. Types of Resistance We often forget that the

federal government’s administrative capacity is modest , relatively speaking. Excluding the military, it employs just
short of three million personnel. Its 2015 budget (excluding defense, Social Security, and mandatory spending obligations) was less than $600
billion. Together, state and local government s [swamp] dwarf these figures , with more than 14 million workers and a
combined budget of more than $2.5 trillion. Because of this, Washington can’t go it alone . When Congress makes a
law, it often lacks the resources to enforce it. Instead, it relies on states and localities to carry out its
policies . Without those local actors, the feds cannot enforce immigration law, implement
environmental policy, build infrastructure , or prosecute drug offenses. Changing policies in these
areas—and many more —is possible only if cities and states lend a hand. This arrangement creates

opportunities for federal-state cooperation. But it also allows for “uncooperative federalism” : State and local official s
can use their leverage over the feds to shape national policy . This means that states can shape
policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government. This form of resistance involves more than mere
obstruction. It allows progressive states to help set the federal agenda by forcing debates that conservatives

would rather avoid and by creating incentives for compromise . When states opt out of a federal

program, it costs the federal government resources and political capital. That’s why President Trump has

a lot more incentive to compromise with Democrats in Sacramento than with those on the
Hill .

Decentralization’s vital to effective bioterror response---mandated co-op hamstrings

operations
Dr. Paul Posner 3, Ph.D., Recognized National Expert on U.S. Federalism, Managing Director, Federal
Budget Issues, Strategic Issues for the General Accounting Office, 3/24/2003, “The Federalism Challenge:
The Challenge for State and Local Government,” p. 20

For example, in public health, let’s examine what a local gov ernment faces to prep are for bioterror ism. It
has to improve the capacity of its local health departments, the human capital that has been woefully neglected in recent
years reportedly. It has to update its technology so that it at least can communicate problems to the CDC in Atlanta over the Internet. It has to

achieve agree ments with hospitals to develop surge capacity and support from doctors and other medical personnel. It has to
develop lab oratory infrastructure to at least know where the labs are and reach some kind of agreements on how to process
samples of suspicious materials. And most importantly, what we’re finding increasingly in the local health departments, it has to
develop surveil lance systems to produce real-time data on day-to-day incidences , to help get early warning of
suspicious health trends and incidents to facilitate an expeditious response to health problems where time is such a critical variable influencing
potential health outcomes for those exposed.

Baltimore is one of the pioneers . They can show daily the numbers of admittances to emergency rooms, the veterinarians’
reports, daily school absences. They are trying to get pharmacies to report daily on medications prescribed. The point is they can monitor these
things and look for variations and look for puzzles and, fortunately, they haven’t found any. That’s the kind of surveillance system
that is under development in some communities and illustrates the political challenges in gaining the
cooperation of numerous independent actors at the local level.

Framing the Problem

The way the problem is framed determines the framework and the modality or the process that we use to address it. For example, if we
define the homeland security problem as a response problem , as a first responder’s problem, then the
model will have a local orientation . City managers have told me that when you’re dealing with the
response to an incident, the most effective thing for the effective management of response is for the
federal government to stay out of our way . These managers feel they know their communities best. As one
said, “Give us money but let us control the action.”

Extinction
Diane DiEuliis 19, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., USA; Andrew D. Ellington, University
of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA; Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security,
Department of Environmental Health and Engineering, Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of
Public Health, Baltimore, USA; Michael J. Imperiale, Department of Microbiology and Immunology,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA. 2019. “Does Biotechnology Pose New Catastrophic Risks?”
Global Catastrophic Biological Risks, edited by Thomas V. Inglesby and Amesh A. Adalja, Springer
International Publishing, pp. 107–119. Springer Link, doi:10.1007/82_2019_177.
4 Modifying Viral and Bacterial Genomes

In addition to recreating or resurrecting viruses , synthetic biology facilitates the introduction of new
traits onto viral genomes. For example, a significant amount of effort is underway in the gene therapy field to produce viruses that target specific cells or tissues through modifications of their
receptor tropism (Asokan and Samulski 2013; Goins et al. 2016). Unfortunately, the same techniques used to introduce therapeutic genes (transgenes)
into viruses may also be used to introduce genes that encode harmful proteins or toxins . For gene therapy, transgenes
are usually expressed from viruses that have been engineered to be replication-defective, non-pathogenic, or both. However, some viruses, especially large DNA viruses ,
can accommodate extra genetic “payloads” without sacrificing pathogenicity or replication ability. The fitness of

these viruses in the wild would not be tested and so may not be effective—and it might not be a legitimate biomedical research activity.

Another potential biosecurity consideration is the possibility that a malicious actor could “mix and match” genes from different viruses to
produce a more virulent pathogen . The largest constraint on this approach is that viral genome size and organization have been finely tuned through evolutionary processes. A telling
demonstration of this is the finding that simply switching the order of the genes of vesicular stomatitis virus results in a greatly attenuated virus (Wertz et al. 1998). Thus, producing a chimeric virus
that exhibits enhanced virulence —particularly virulence that could be predicted by its designer—would be extremely difficult . However,
synthetic biology affords an actor the possibility to interrogate a large amount of sequence space
without any preconceived notion of what will work , i.e., to try many options at once (as long as an appropriate selection
for the desired trait can be developed and there is sufficient access to resources). Such an approach could present a significant biodefense problem
if expertly applied.
The advent of synthetic biology has added to previous biosecurity concerns about laboratory
manipulations of pathogens, for example, introducing a nti b iotic r esistance to bacteria, a longtime biodefense concern.
Synthetic biology has provided a more facile route to the diversification of threats, which are challenging to
mount defenses against. Manipulating bacterial genomes to introduce new features has been generally technically more straightforward than manipulating viruses, without synthetic biology. For
example, transformation using plasmids is a routine laboratory technique and may be used to either introduce resistance to clinically useful antibiotics or introduce genetic pathways encoding the synthesis of toxic products. Single-
cell eukaryotic organisms may also be modified by introduction of foreign DNA. As the understanding of biosynthetic pathways and the ability to engineer enzymatic functions grow, however, these capabilities will become
technically more straightforward to achieve. This is one of the areas that the NASEM report deemed to be of highest relative concern, namely using an organism to deliver a toxic product in situ, for example, by introducing the
organism into the host microbiome.

The ability to mix and match (or, in the parlance of synthetic biology, “plug and play”) the pathogenic characteristics of

known species has expanded as an understanding of gene expression across a wide range of bacteria (or “chassis”) has become
known . For example, in the past, trying to express a toxin gene in a heterologous bacterial strain would
have proven challenging. Now, there are tools to help : Expression cassettes and constructs have been
widely introduced across species, and tools such as T7 RNA polymerase have been adapted to function across multiple platforms. Secretion systems are better characterized, and the movement of genes

not only within but between otherwise distantly related bacterial species (i.e., between Gram-negative and Gram-positive species) is commonplace. Thus, a toxin “payload” may not be restricted to a single type of bacteria, but
could be introduced into virtually any species, including ones that are thought to be harmless. This allows for the manipulation of pathogenesis characteristics, including host range, tropism, and transmission frequency and mode.
The effect of these multitudinous changes to the fitness of the resulting chimera may be unknown, but also may be unimportant for some weaponization or terrorism purposes.

Synthetic biology has also brought about the ability to make very large pieces of DNA and put them into organisms—including multiple genes encoding synthetic pathways for complex small molecules. This could be used to make
weapons that were not possible before. In the past, the idea that any organism other than Aspergillus could make aflatoxin would have seemed fantastical, but the production of this toxin (and many others) is enabled with
synthetic biology tools. More complex misuse of these tools could be binary biological weapons or complex pathogenic responses following biological signals (e.g., signals present following a successful infection using quorum
sensing or products of human physiology).

The burgeoning capabilities of large DNA synthesis make possible not only serial expansion of
biothreats, but their parallel expansion, as well. The design— build—test cycle that is at the heart of
synthetic biology practice relies on the notion that design need not be overly precise , as many different

constructs can be made and tested at the outset, allowing repetition to hone toward optimal design. There is

still the question of whether a weapon would be effective—but it is possible that many different constructs could be made
and released in parallel , let ting natural selection determine which construct has the greatest capability for
infection and spread. This may mean that multiple potential pathogens could be released earlier in the
development cycle, a very different model than was exploited by biological weaponeers in the past.

Finally, synthetic biology’s contribution to biothreats is to redefine what a biothreat is, from an organism to DNA. In the past, the organism was the unit of replication. Now, DNA vectors on
their own can potentially provide a means of spread, either as broad-host-range vectors or as phages. Just as the use of P1 transduction and lambda lysogeny were essential tools for the early
development of molecular biology, the engineering of transmission between bacterial strains and even species is becoming a signature of synthetic biology efforts to move beyond a single
organism and into the realm of the microbiome as a whole (e.g., the discovery and engineering of highly transmissible integrative and conjugative elements (ICEs) in Gram-positive bacteria).
This may allow the possibility of deliberately introduced “commensal DNA,” which spreads throughout a microbiome, and then to others’ microbiomes. The original bacteria may be gone by
the time such an engineered construct is triggered or before a person shows symptoms.

The microbiome is an area of active research, and there is some suggestion that the composition of the microbiome affects human disease states that are both obvious (diabetes) and much
less obvious (schizophrenia). This could be amenable to weaponization for which current biodefense systems are not prepared. The targeting and spread of this kind of threat would be
difficult, because the composition of the microbiome seems to be most effectively regulated by human behavior. However, as the adaptive mechanisms of microbes to the gut and other
reservoirs (dermal, nasopharyngeal, oral, vaginal) are better delineated, possibilities for engineering will become available. This brings up the longer-term possibility of a sophisticated
adversary introducing self-replicating DNA molecules (again, broad-host-range vectors, phage) that subtly impact the microbiome, leading to greater overall incidences of disease or
dysfunction that are extremely difficult to detect or attribute (a horizontally transmitted element might be expected to be a chimera, while an organism with foreign DNA is far more suspect).
Thankfully, the subtlety of such an attack would seemingly place it out of bounds for many types of adversaries.

5 The Role of Synthetic Biology in Response to Global Catastrophic Events

Historical records of plague , smallpox , and in flu enza outbreaks that decimated human populations
demonstrate the lethal consequences of the spread of infectious disease. With a densely
interconnected population and increased connectivity through modern transport ation, the adverse
effects of even a relatively small event are more likely than a century ago. Disease may spread much more

rapidly globally , becoming a catastrophic event that outpaces the ability to respond .
 OFF
The Supreme Court should rule that federal, state, and local law enforcement
targeting people based on gender identity or sexual orientation is unconstitutional
citing the 8th amendment and human dignity.

Courts are the essential institution for managing criminal justice – they’re the
backbone of the entire system
Epps & Ortman 20 [DANIEL EPPS is an associate professor of law at Washington University in St. Louis.
WILLIAM ORTMAN is an assistant professor of law at Wayne State University. "One Change That Could
Make American Criminal Justice Fairer." https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/america-
needs-defender-general/608002/]

Understanding that job, and that person’s role in shaping criminal law in this country, reveals a serious, hidden problem: no equal office
exists for the country’s defendants . Over time, that imbalance has worked to undermine the Supreme Court’s
acknowledged responsibility to provide “equal justice under law.”

To see how this plays out, begin with the fact that the Supreme Court is the most important institution —for all
practical purposes, the only institution —that regulates criminal justice for the nation as a whole. By
interpreting the Constitution, the justices set rules for criminal cases at the federal, state, and local
levels. If you’ve ever watched a cop show on TV (or, for that matter, been arrested), you’ve heard the Miranda warnings. Those come
from the Supreme Court. So do many more rules that govern police investigations, the use of forensic evidence,
punishment for crimes, and many other crucial parts of the process that determines potentially life-
changing legal consequences for millions of people each year.
 OFF
Dems will win the Georgia run-offs that will decide the senate---the reps are tied to
Trump and behind in motivation, which is key
Phillips 11/6 (Amber, Reporter for The Washington Post’s The Fix, focusing on congress, “What are
the odds of Democratic wins in the Georgia runoffs?,”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/06/what-are-odds-democratic-wins-georgia-
runoffs/, Snider)

Senate Democrats’ chances to flip the Senate have been close to nil all week. They needed to flip a
minimum of three seats and win the White House; so far they’ve netted just one. But as the presidential race in
Georgia narrows as more votes are counted, Dem ocrat s have another opportunity to unseat Republicans. Two opportunities ,
in fact, in the form of runoffs in January. If they can win both — an if — and win the White House, they’d have a 50-50
deadlocked Senate and a vice president who can break ties. Or in other words: the majority . Here’s what’s
happening. Georgia election rules set up a runoff between the top two vote-getters if no candidate gets 50 percent of the vote. There’s a
special election Senate race that was already certain to go to a runoff. It will feature the incumbent, appointed Sen. Kelly Loeffler (R), and
Democrat and first-time candidate and pastor Raphael Warnock. Georgia’s original 2020 Senate election with Sen. David Perdue (R) trying for a
second term has suddenly come back online for Democrats. Perdue had more than 50 percent of the vote after initial votes were counted, but
that’s steadily and slowly narrowed as Georgia finishes counting its ballots. With 99 percent of the vote in, Perdue has 49.8 percent. Democrat
Jon Ossoff is exactly two points behind, 47.8 percent. Which means Ossoff
and Warnock will get another chance to unseat
these two Senate Republicans in a little under two months. But if you look at the data from November’s election,
you’d rather be the Republicans than Democrats in this next round of races . Let’s start with the special election.
Warnock actually got the plurality of the vote of any candidate, winning with nearly 33 percent to Loeffler’s 26 percent. But Loeffler wasn’t the
only major Republican in this crowded race; she beat Rep. Douglas A. Collins (R). When you add in Collins’s votes into the general Republican
tally, you get 46 percent voting for a Republican senator, a full 13 points more than Warnock. That’s not to say Loeffler is that far ahead of
Warnock right now — there hasn’t been any polling yet post-election. But in this race, there were just more people willing to vote for a
Republican senator than a Democrat. (Republicans also point out that another, much lesser known Democrat on the ballot got a relatively
strong showing of 6.6 percent of the vote, rather than people voting for Warnock.) Both
sides say that the electorate in Jan uary
will be smaller and much more focused on base voters. Georgia is certainly proving itself to be a purple
swing state, but that’s a relatively new phenomenon. So the question for Dem ocrat s is whether there are more
of their base motivated to vote than Rep ublican s . Perdue is in a similar situation to Loeffler, where the raw vote data
should make him feel like he has the upper hand. He looks set to finish November’s race with 98,000 more votes than Ossoff. And that’s after
Ossoff received the most votes of any statewide Democratic candidate in Georgia, ever. That includes 2018 gubernatorial candidate Stacey
Abrams, who narrowly lost the governor’s race and showed the nation that Georgia could be competitive for Democrats. “Georgia is a state
that wants Republican senators,” said a Republican strategist who works on Senate races in Georgia. “That’s the message we got here. We’re
just going to have to work a little harder to make sure that happens.” Here’s why Democrats feel like they have a shot to win these
races: Georgia is rapidly changing . Dem ocrat s harnessed those demographic changes to perform
remarkably well in the suburbs and outer suburbs. They had record turnout in counties outside Atlanta, and

they managed to get a lot of people to successfully vote by mail. “There is a demographic change
happening in Georgia that is only accelerating every year,” said a Democratic strategist who has worked on Senate races in

Georgia. “The state is diversifying and urbanizing at an incredible clip.” Democrats also think that Perdue and
Loeffler , both of whom have tied themselves extremely closely to the president , are weaker without him.
If Perdue’s votes track almost exactly to Trump’s, then where will he be without Trump on the
ballot? (Republicans counter that they think it was Democrat Joe Biden who pulled Perdue to his record votes.) The open question is what
happens when these two races become nationalized, even more than they were before. There won’t be a presidential race alongside them. But
millions will be spent on both sides to get voters the message that the Senate majority hangs in the balance. Democrats will message to their
voters that they need a governing majority in Washington to improve health care, the climate, pass coronavirus relief and any other number of
issues. Republicans will message to their voters that it’s just them standing between one-party control of Washington (since Democrats already
have the House majority and could win the White House). And especially given that these two races will largely be run over the holidays, with

voters tired of ads and being told to vote, it will probably narrow the base even more to each side’s hardcore supporters. “ This isn’t
about persuasion anymore ,” said the Republican strategist. ”… It’s just a matter of who wants it more .”

Demands for CJR drive democratic enthusiasm and turnout---it overcomes republican
voter advantage in non-general elections
Bluestein 20 (Greg, Political reporter who covers the governor's office and state politics for The
Atlanta Journal Constitution, 6/19, "Record primary turnout fuels Georgia Dems’ excitement about
November," https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/record-primary-turnout-fuels-
georgia-dems-excitement-about-november/SSIUqSIILbCHt9UJWlLWiI/, Snider)

Partisans from either side of the aisle need not worry about drawing a contrast . One of the defining narratives in
this election is that Democratic leaders and rank-and-file members who once steered clear of liberal approaches
are now embracing them . Abrams proved in 2018 that supporting stiff gun control measures, pressing for gay rights or opposing
illegal immigration crackdowns are not the campaign-killers in statewide races they were once thought to be, and Democrats even in

competitive suburban districts have followed that lead. This year , the party has taken up the call of demonstrators
who demand structural changes to the c riminal j ustice s ystem, and many candidates include decriminalization of marijuana, a
repeal of citizen’s arrest laws and new limits on police use of force as part of their campaign platforms. "For the next 11 days, there will be
no peace in the Capitol unless we get some of these things done ," Democratic state Rep. Erica Thomas said
as state legislators returned to the Capitol this week. Republicans aim to exploit the shift. State Rep. Trey Kelley, a Cedartown
Republican, once called the leftward tilt of Democrats in the state "as Georgian as drinking a Pepsi at a Mets game," and his fellow
conservatives counsel a stick-with-what-you-know approach. "We have a record of helping us out of the Great Recession, doing
c riminal j ustice r eform and reforming the way we fund transportation in Georgia," said House Speaker David Ralston, R-Blue
Ridge. “It’s even more important, as we begin the recovery from the pandemic, that we follow a model that’s already been proven and tested
rather than turn around and go in a completely opposite direction,” Ralston said. This election could offer Democrats plenty
of fodder to counter . Marjorie Taylor Greene, the front-runner in an August GOP runoff for an open U.S. House seat in northwest
Georgia, has a history of making racist and xenophobic remarks on camera — and Democrats aim to make her the face of the state GOP. "She

placed first by a mile in the primary because of these videos," said state Sen. Elena Parent, D-Atlanta, "not despite them." There's little
question after last week's primary that Dem ocrat s are energized . Democratic turnout soared past 1.1
million to outpace Republicans, passing a previous high set during the 2008 presidential primary, thanks partly to an
unprecedented number of absentee ballots. Republicans lagged behind with more than 960,000 votes, but they also
had no competitive statewide contest on the ballot since Trump had already captured the party's nomination and Perdue faced no primary

opposition. More troubling to Republicans were discouraging signs in a spate of down-ticket

contests . Dem ocrat s outpaced Rep ublican s in Georgia's 6th and 7th congressional districts , the premier
U.S. House races in the state, and about a dozen state legislative seats held by Republicans. The party needs to flip 16 GOP seats
to retake the Georgia House — and influence the redrawing of political maps in 2021. Heath Garrett, a veteran Rep ublican
operative, said Dem ocrat s had an enthusiasm edge, though he cautioned that the turnout spike was a
“warning sign but not game over ” for his party. “We know Georgia will be more competitive, but Rep ublican s still have a
voter advantage as long as our voters are motivated ,” he said. “I believe they will be for the general
election.”

Flipping the Senate solves climate change

Cama 19 (Timothy Cama covers politics and lobbying, with a focus on political campaigns, money in
politics, lobbying and influence at E&E News. He previously worked at The Hill covering energy and
environment policy, covered highway safety and environmental regulation at Transport Topics and
worked at numerous local newspapers. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Bard College and Simon’s
Rock and is a native of northeastern Pennsylvania, "CAMPAIGN 2020: 7 Senate races to watch on energy
and environment," E&E News, 12-20-2019, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061847217, accessed 7-2-
2020, SShaf)

While the 2020 presidential race rages on, the year's Senate election cycle is shaping up to potentially shift
environmental, energy and climate change policy in a dramatic way. Democrats and their allies think they can
flip their current 47 seat minority into a majority, bringing them a giant step closer to passing major climate
change legislation. There are 45 Democrats in the Senate, but two independents caucus with the party. "[President] Trump and [Senate
Majority Leader] Mitch McConnell [R-Ky.] are actively putting our health at risk, allowing more dirty pollution in our air and
water, and denying climate change , while the climate crisis is getting worse," said Pete Maysmith, senior vice president for

campaigns at the League of Conservation Voters. "The 2020 elections are our last best chance to combat the climate
crisis , so we both can and must get a new majority leader in there ," he said. For the Republicans, 2020 is a
year to defend their majority, which has reinforced Trump's regulatory rollbacks while confirming
administration officials and judges. If a Democrat wins in the presidential race but Republicans keep the
Senate, the GOP led by McConnell would be a firewall against the House and president. Here are seven races
that are key to seeing how energy and environmental policy shakes out during the next decade . Alabama The
Senate GOP's best shot at building on its majority — or stopping the Democrats from taking the reins — in 2020 is in deep-red Alabama. A
switch in the chamber's control would mean McConnell, who has resisted allowing votes on climate change
and other Democratic priorities, would no longer set the agenda . Sen. Doug Jones (D), a former prosecutor, won an upset in a
special 2017 election against controversial Republican nominee Roy Moore. The seat opened up when Jeff Sessions (R) resigned to become
Trump's attorney general. Now Sessions, who was a vocal climate change skeptic in the Senate, wants his seat back. Moore is also running, as
are Rep. Bradley Byrne, former Auburn University football coach Tommy Tuberville and several other Republicans. There has not been much
polling, but what's been done shows Sessions with a big lead. In a poll released last week commissioned by his campaign, he had the most
support, 44%, of GOP primary voters. Tuberville was a distant second at 21%. Thus far, candidates in the primary have tried to make the race
primarily about allegiance to Trump and conservative values. "I was there for the Trump agenda every day, I was there, there's no doubt about
it. I was the first Republican, the first senator to endorse him," Sessions said on Fox News last month when he launched his campaign.
Environmental groups and energy interests are thus far taking a wait-and-see approach on the Alabama race. Jones has mostly toed the
Democratic Party line — except in some votes such as judicial nominees and confirming Secretary of State Mike Pompeo — so his allies are
likely to jump in to help him if the race gets close. 2016 presidential result: Trump 62.1%, Hillary Clinton 34.4% Last Senate race result: 2017
special election, Jones (D) 50%, Moore (R) 48.3% Arizona In the Grand Canyon State, retired astronaut Mark Kelly is the
leading Democrat running for the seat held by Sen. Martha McSally (R). McSally lost the 2018 race for Arizona's other seat to Sen.
Kyrsten Sinema (D), but Gov. Doug Ducey (R) appointed her to replace the late Sen. John McCain (R). She faces a special election on Election
Day. Kelly
frequently speaks about the need to fight climate change coming from the scientific
perspective, linking it to his career as an engineer and scientist. He's earned the backing of the League of Conservation Voters
Action Fund and 314 Action, an organization that works to elect scientists. "We've got to figure out a way to get from fossil fuels to more
renewable energy. And I think we've got a decade or so to figure it out, but we can't wait," he said in a recent appearance on ABC's "The View."
He also spoke about how he could see the impacts of climate change from multiple space shuttle missions, including deforestation from
wildfires. Kelly's been leading on the money front, having raised nearly $4 million more than McSally. McSally was a top target for
environmental groups in 2018, and she has continued to be a target in the Senate. For example, weeks after being sworn into the Senate, the
Environmental Defense Action Fund ran an ad criticizing her vote to confirm Andrew Wheeler to be EPA administrator. "Martha McSally voted
to put a former coal lobbyist in charge of the Environmental Protection Agency, a coal lobbyist who wants to undermine limits on mercury and
other toxic chemicals that can hurt our kids," the ad said. McSally sits on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee and has used that post
to further her energy priorities. She is a co-sponsor of two bills to incentivize energy storage and is the leading sponsor of a bill meant to
streamline renewable energy permitting on federal land. She was the lead sponsor this year of bipartisan legislation to authorize the Interior
Department to implement drought contingency plans for the Colorado River. And she joined Democrats and a handful of Republicans in the
Energy Committee in voting to boost funding for the Land and Water Conservation Fund. 2016 presidential result: Trump 48.1%, Clinton 44.6%
Last Senate race result: 2018, Sinema (D) 50%, McSally (R) 47.6% Colorado Colorado
is, in many ways, ground zero for energy and
environment battles in the 2020 Senate race. Sen. Cory Gardner (R) won his last race in 2014 in part on a clean energy
message. On the one hand, he stood in front of a wind farm and argued he was a "new kind of Republican" who supports action against climate
change. But opponents say he hasn't lived up to his promises and has instead stood with the GOP and Trump in backing
environmental rollbacks and supporting the fossil fuel industry . To a degree, he has embraced that label. He has been
outspoken against the Green New Deal, labeling it "radical" and "socialist." He released an ad in October presenting himself as
an ally to the oil and natural gas industry who would push back against Democrats' attempts to further regulate it.
"Don't let the radical left destroy Colorado jobs," it declares. The leading contender in the Democratic primary now is former Gov. John
Hickenlooper. He entered the race in August after his moderate campaign for president failed to take off. Hickenlooper is also a critic of the
Green New Deal, saying aspects such as the job guarantee are unnecessary. He touts his history on the issue, including negotiating with the oil
and gas companies on methane standards as governor. The industry is a major presence in Colorado and key to its economy. Andrew Romanoff,
former speaker of Colorado's state House, has emerged as the chief progressive challenger to Hickenlooper. He's embraced the Green New
Deal and has released an ad on climate this week depicting a post-apocalyptic future in Colorado while highlighting current climate impacts.
"This is not the stuff of fiction, or some far-off threat," he says in the ad. "A catastrophe of our own creation. A climate crisis that condemns our
children to an ever-hotter planet." Romanoff earned a key endorsement in the race from the Sunrise Movement. 2016 presidential result:
Clinton 48.2%, Trump 43.3% Last Senate race result: 2016, Michael Bennet (D) 50%, Darryl Glenn (R) 44.3% Maine One of the biggest Senate
races of the year could come out of the Pine Tree State. Sen. Susan Collins (R), long an outspoken moderate and advocate for climate change
policy, is running for reelection in what would likely be her most competitive election fight yet. Her leading opponent is Maine House Speaker
Sara Gideon (D). Collins has long bucked the GOP on climate. She's been harshly critical of Trump's actions, such as repealing the Clean Power
Plan and exiting the Paris Agreement, and has been a leading sponsor on environmental legislation. In the past, her position as a leading
Republican on environmental issues has earned her the endorsement of groups such as the League of Conservation Voters Action Fund. But in
November, LCV abandoned Collins and got behind Gideon. If Gideon wins, it will likely come down to Collins' numerous votes to confirm some
of Trump's more controversial nominations, including Interior Secretary David Bernhardt and Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh. The
Kavanaugh vote is particularly contentious because many activists believe he will be environmentally destructive. "Protecting our environment
and fighting climate change are some of the most pressing challenges we face," Gideon said in a statement. Collins is making climate change
and clean energy key parts of her campaign and her time in the Senate before the election. She was the only Republican to sign a letter earlier
this month to Patricia Espinosa, executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, saying that despite
Trump's actions to exit the Paris Agreement, the United States is still committed to fighting climate. Collins is also the lead GOP sponsor of
legislation to extend a tax credit incentive for offshore wind energy. 2016 presidential result: Clinton 47.8%, Trump 44.9% Last Senate race
result: 2018, Angus King (I) 54.3%, Eric Brakey (R) 35.2%, Zak Ringelstein (D) 10.4% Massachusetts In the deep-blue Bay State, Sen. Ed Markey's
(D) main hurdle to a second full term is a primary challenge from Rep. Joe Kennedy III (D). Kennedy, at 39, is much younger than the 73-year-old
Markey. Kennedy has made a name for himself for loudly standing up for LGBT people, immigrants and others, and comes from a well-known
political family. Markey, meanwhile, is focusing his defense largely on his climate change activism. He chaired the House Select Committee on
Energy Independence and Global Warming from 2007 to 2011 and played a major role in both the successful Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007 and the unsuccessful American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. Nowadays, Markey is best known as the lead Senate sponsor
of the Green New Deal. "We need a new agenda; that's what the Green New Deal is," Markey said at a November forum with opponent
Shannon Liss-Riordan that Kennedy declined to attend because he believed it should have been in 2020 and held in a minority neighborhood.
"It's meant to create a political revolution in our country that will change the way in which people view these issues," Markey said.
Environmental groups have lined up behind the incumbent, including the Sunrise Movement and the League of Conservation Voters. Kennedy
has taken on some environmental justice battles in recent weeks, including fighting a proposed electricity substation in East Boston and a
natural gas compressor station in Weymouth. 2016 presidential result: Clinton 60%, Trump 32.8% Last Senate race result: 2018, Elizabeth
Warren (D) 60.3%, Geoff Diehl (R) 36.2% Michigan Sen. Gary Peters could be in the sleeper contest in the 2020 Senate cycle. Six years ago
was a blowout year for the GOP, and Peters was the only new Democrat to win. He has been an ally for environmentalists and
said he supports "aspects" of the Green New Deal, though he hasn't signed on as a co-sponsor to the resolution. That's enough for
conservatives to slam him, though not enough for climate activists such as the Sunrise Movement, which organized a sit-in at his Lansing office.
The Restoration political action committee, a group backed by Illinois businessman Richard Uihlein, has already put nearly $1 million into efforts
to unseat Peters, using disputed arguments about the Green New Deal. "Is it the 1.4 million fewer jobs you support, or the part where we
abolish gasoline cars, or airplanes, or red meat?" a voice-over says in a television ad the group produced, a question directed toward Peters
during a February forum. "How about the $40,000 extra it'll cost each family?" The incumbent was one of LCV's first endorsements of the 2020
Senate cycle. John James, a businessman who unsuccessfully challenged Sen. Debbie Stabenow (D) last year, is the leading Republican
candidate and has the National Republican Senatorial Committee's support. Bob Carr, another businessman, is also running. 2016 presidential
result: Trump 47.5%, Clinton 47.3% Last Senate race result: 2018, Stabenow (D) 52.3%, James (R) 45.8% North Carolina North
Carolina is
a swing state, so any attempt by Democrats to take the Senate majority likely runs through the Tar Heel
State. Sen. Thom Tillis (R) is running for a second term. Former state Sen. Cal Cunningham has the support of
the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee and LCV. State Sen. Erica Smith is also running. Thus far, Tillis' main hurdle has
appeared to be the GOP primary. While he has Trump's support, the state's Republicans have been skeptical about him, and a crowd at a Trump
rally in September booed when Tillis came to the stage. Tillis' leading rival for the nomination was businessman Garland Tucker, but he dropped
out this month. Rep. Mark Walker, a conservative Republican, also toyed with running against Tillis but decided against it; Walker said Trump
indicated he would support him in a 2022 Senate run. Beyond LCV's endorsement of Cunningham, energy and environmental groups might
jump more fully into the race once it ramps up. A September poll from left-leaning Public Policy Polling found he had just a 33% approval rating
and would lose to Cunningham by 2 percentage points. LCV's lawmaker scorecard gives him just 7%, and environmental
groups see
climate as a major issue of interest in the coastal state with a big tourism industry. "Taking on climate
change is going to be a priority of mine because of the impact it's having right here in North Carolina," Cunningham said in an ad
earlier this year that highlighted increasingly severe hurricanes and other climate-linked impacts in the state. The Trump administration's now-
paused plan to allow offshore drilling along the entire Atlantic Coast was unpopular in North Carolina, and Tillis' support for drilling and refusal
to denounce the plan could also play into the race. 2016 presidential result: Trump 49.8%, Clinton 46.2% Last Senate race result: 2016, Richard
Burr (R) 51.1%, Deborah Ross (D) 45.4%

Climate change causes extinction---latest studies.

Sprat and Dunlop 19 (David Spratt and Ian Dunlop, *Research Director for Breakthrough National
Centre for Climate Restoration and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action;
**member of the Club of Rome AND formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive,
chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company
Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading,
"Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach," Breakthrough National Centre for
Climate Restoration, 5-30-2019,
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_90dc2a2637f348edae45943a88da04d4.pdf, Date Accessed: 7-5-
2019, SB)

2050: By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that system

tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a
sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well
before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C.
The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised , and Earth is headed for another degree or more of
warming, especially since human greenhouse emissions are still significant. While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by
2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by
more than 25 metres. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global
population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of
human survivability. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity
and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and , together with the further
slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from
devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer
monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are severely reduced by the loss
of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and
rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail.
Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in
southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the
south-western United States. Impacts: A number of ecosystems collapse , including coral reef systems, the Amazon
rainforest and in the Arctic. Some poorer nations and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments
for their populations, become unviable. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in
West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which together with land
degradation and rising sea levels contributes to 21 perhaps a billion people being displaced. Water
availability decreases sharply in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting about two
billion people worldwide. Ag riculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. Most regions in the world
see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events , including
heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and food
prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content
of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic
water shortages , and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower

agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of
reaches of the
some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City,

Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned . Some small islands become uninhabitable . Ten percent
of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people . According to the Global Challenges Foundation’s Global
Catastrophic Risks 2018 report, even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated
due to sea-level rise, and In high-end scenarios “the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with
a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end ”. 22
Case
 Framing
Existential risks outweigh.
Farquhar et al. 17 – Sebastian Farquhar, Computer Science DPhil Student at the University of Oxford.
John Halstead, Political Philosophy DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Owen Cotton-Barratt, Pure
Math DPhil at the University of Oxford. Dr. Stefan Schubert, Philosophy PhD at Lund University. Haydn
Belfield, a BA. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Philosophy PhD Student at the University of Oxford. [Existential
Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project, 1-23-17, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]//BPS
In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to
recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought
experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as
another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of
flourishing , and would therefore have extremely large value . In standard risk analysis, when working out how to
respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will
prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential
catastrophe is so vast , even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value .67

Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68
Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument.

In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste
storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this

policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations
ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development
require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.71

However, when it comes to existential risk , it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational
equity . Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current
generations ; it would give them nothing . Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost
for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this,
relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity ,
they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks.

1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a
result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks.

1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in

There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory
predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the
globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only
a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs . Countries thus have strong
incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common
interest.

Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good : most of the
benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the
problem is temporal free riding : the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future
generations bear the costs .

Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented
and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance
instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard
to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available.

Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any
catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the
misapplication of the availability heuristic , a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important
only if it can be readily recalled .

Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect . In a seminal 1992 study , three
groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from
drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had

little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving
lives when the numbers get too large . 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential
risk because the numbers at stake are so large . Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat
existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other
cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

There is no coherent moral theory that ignores magnitude AND probability is

overweighted now.
Shrader-Frechette 91. K. S. Shrader-Frechette, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Notre Dame &
O'Neill Family Professor, Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy, at the University of
Notre Dame. (1991. “Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for Populist Reforms.” University of California
Press. pp. 94-98)//pacc

There are, however, a number of reasons for arguing that, in certain cases, risk consequences are more important
than the accident probabilities . For one thing, greater social disruption arises from one massive accident than
from a number of single-fatality accidents , even though the same number of people may be killed. The law of torts also recognizes the
heightened importance of high-consequence events, apart from their probability of occurrence. In fact, for the rule of strict liability, risk is based almost totally on
grave potential consequences, regardless of the associated probability.32 Part of the justification for this judicial emphasis on accident consequences is apparently
the fact that the parties involved in litigation over catastrophic accidents—the injured persons and those liable for the injury—are not equal in bargaining power.33
The representative of some technological or industrial interest usually has more clout than the person damaged by it. Moreover, as Chapter Twelve will argue in
more detail, a person is more deserving of compensation according to strict liability when she is victimized by an impact that she did not voluntarily accept or help
to create. For all these reasons, societal risk
evaluation of potentially catastrophic technologies ought to focus on the accident
consequences as well as on their probabilities.

This point is clear if one consider s a rational response to the invitation to play Russian Roulette next hit. Suppose the probability
that a bullet is in a chamber when the trigger is pulled is 1 in 17,000 —the same likelihood, per reactor-year, as a nuclear
core melt. Even with such a small probability , a person could still be rational in her refusal to play the
game. She could even maintain that the probability in question is irrelevant . Any probability of fatality might be
too high if the benefits deriving from taking the risk were not great enough. And if so, then probabilities might not be as
important, in environmental risk evaluation, as proponents of the probabilistic strategy suggest. As one expert expressed it, current debate over whether a given
technology has a particular risk probability is a spurious issue. "Risk assessors tend to choose methods and data that support the position to which they are already
committed."34 If so, then debate over environmental risks is likely to be over many factors other than probability.

Probabilities Are Often Uncertain

The claim that probabilities are central to risk evaluation, and that "the bulk of disagreement" over environmental hazards has been caused by "intuitive estimates
of unreasonably high risk," also errs in ignoring reasonable disagreement over risk probabilities. Risk assessment has been repeatedly criticized as an
"arcane expert process" that is over-dependent on probability estimates of assessors.35 Many risk assessors appear to
believe that it is "perfectly valid to base public policy on expert estimates and data," but that, once a risk expert has spoken, any disagreement is unreasonable and
intuitive.36 Such a notion is doubly questionable.

It is in part implausible because it presupposes a far more objective picture of probabilistic risk data than is now available. Even the authors of the most complete
hazard analysis ever accomplished, WASH-1400, cautioned that their probability estimates were deficient, unprovable, possibly incomplete, assumption laden, and
saddled with "an appreciable uncertainty." They said that "the present state of knowledge probably will not permit a complete analysis of low-probability accidents
in nuclear plants with the precision that would be desirable."37 More generally and more recently, risk assessors have pointed out that "uncertainties of six orders
of magnitude are not unusual" in any probabilistic risk analysis.38 In the face of such caveats, alleged certitude about which risk probabilities are correct, and which
are incorrect, may be doubtful. As this chapter has noted, often the scientific mechanisms causing a hazard are unknown, as in the case of methylene chloride.39
And, as the previous chapter also argued, accident probability often cannot be determined on the basis of observed accident frequency.40 On the one hand, very
low values of an accident probability per LNG trip, or per reactor-year, for example, are consistent with an assumed record of zero accidents in 800 voyages, or zero
core melts in 17,000 reactor-years. On the other hand, an annual accident probability as high as 1 in 100 or 1 in 200 would still be consistent with the current LNG
accident-frequency record, just as a yearly probability as high as 1 in 2,000 would be consistent with the existing record for nuclear accidents. Even though an
accident record may be consistent with very low risk-probability values, this frequency alone "does not prove that the values are low."41

Proponents of the probabilistic strategy also err, in emphasizing risk probabilities , because they are unable to account for the
reasonable controversy—among Nobel Prize winners, the American Physical Society, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the American Nuclear Society—over various risk probabilities.42 Reputable assessors affirm that many of the most serious
environmental risks , such as global warming from burning of fossil fuels, are "highly resistant to quantification.43 Moreover,
for a number of reasons, nuclear probabilities , for example, are especially resistant to accurate estimation. Compound
events, sequential component failures, sabotage or human error, and weapons proliferation are not amenable
to quantification.44 Rasmussen computed the probability of having a Three Mile Island type of accident as anywhere from I in 250 to 1 in 25,000 reactor-
years.45 All this suggests that certain accidents are not really "impossible," because many low probabilities are not believable. For example, the probability for a
royal flush is 1 in 464,000. Yet, in a card game the probability is actually much higher, since the probability of cheating is likely to be as high as 1 in 10,000. Likewise,
although the probability of a given environmental or technological accident may be only very slight, the higher probability of sabotage or terrorism is likely to

increase this number by several orders of magnitude. Real risks , then, are likely to include so-called "outrageous events" or " rogue
events ," which are difficult to handle in probabilistic risk assessment .46 Indeed, human error causes a majority of most
industrial, marine, and transportation accidents.47

In claiming that the public overestimates many risk probabilities, such as those for nuclear accidents, many assessors
assume that, in some of the most controversial, untested, and potentially catastrophic areas of technology, it is possible to judge clearly
when a risk probability is accurate and when it is not . This is an appeal to authority , an appeal that (given the
history of science) simply does not hold up.
Risk assessors' emphasis on the importance of probability estimates is especially vulnerable because the characteristics that, according to various experts, influence
judgments of perceived and acceptable risks are highly intercorrelated; involuntary hazards, for example, "tend also to be inequitable and catastrophic."48
.Therefore, as noted in Chapter Six, it is especially difficult to determine whether society's expressed concern about involuntary risks, for example, is merely an
artifact of the high correlations between involuntariness and other undesirable risk characteristics. There are numerous allegedly causal explanations, all consistent
with the same "observed" phenomena. Kasper makes an analogous observation:

Even the best of epidemiological studies is confounded by the myriad explanations for low-level neurobehavioral effects; the same effects attributed to lead may be
caused by exposure to low levels of many other trace metals, and indeed by exposure to the pace and stress of urban life itself. The result is that careful studies
yield not proof but only suggestions.49

Or, as Cox and Ricci put it, "multiple models, having quite different implications at low doses, may all adequately 'fit' the observed dose-response data.50

Precisely because their hypothesis about misperceived probabilities is consistent with other explanations, proponents of the probabilistic strategy are not
warranted in singling out the public's alleged misperceived probabilities as the cause of its high aversion to societal risks. Rather, as the previous chapter argued, the
distinction between expert/objective and lay/subjective determination of environmental risks will not hold up. Because of problems of actual risk calculation (prior
to any alleged evaluation), many hazard estimates are merely the intuitive guesses of individuals. Authors of a recent study conducted at the
Stanford Research Institute admitted , for example, that analytic techniques could not handle probability estimates for certain human-
caused events. They concluded: "We must rely on expert judgment, quantified, using subjective probabilities."51 Likewise, the loss of the astronauts in the

Challenger disaster, as well as the death of three astronauts on the ground at Cape Kennedy, demonstrated that even the best systems-analytic

approaches cannot anticipate every possibility . In fact, one of the most famous nuclear risk probabilities, widely touted as "objective,"
is highly value laden. This is the reactor-year probability of a core melt in a nuclear plant, 1 in 17,000. As defended in WASH-1400, this probability is notoriously
laden with value judgments about the effectiveness of evacuation in the face of catastrophe, the probability of weather stability, and the Gaussian Plume rise of
radioactivity.52 The problem, however, is not that such "objective" probabilities (as given by experts) are value laden but that they are apparently not recognized as
such by proponents of the probabilistic strategy.

Lessons Learned from Experts' Claims about Societal Risks

The tendency of proponents of the probabilistic strategy to overemphasize the importance of risk probabilities and to
condemn the public's alleged "misperceptions" of societal risks reveals an important flaw in contemporary environmental risk analysis. Assessors presume that, if
there is a public preference for a risk whose probability of fatality is statistically higher than that of an alternative, then this preference is a result of misperceived

probabilities, not a legitimate value system.53 Their failure to recognize the value components of allegedly objective probability estimates goes hand in
hand with assessors' tendencies to define ethical and political issues as merely technical ones, as the naive
positivists are prone to do .54 They assume, incorrectly, that agreement about technical matters is sufficient for resolving
normative disputes .

Apparently, they make this assumption because they are afraid of damaging "the scientific pretenses of their work."55 As a consequence, their emphasis on

the importance of abstract, "objective" science helps both to disguise the often exploitative way in which technology is used and to condone a

passive acceptance of the status quo . It allows assessors to dismiss as irrational or unscientific (as

Okrent, Starr, Whipple, Maxey, Cohen, Lee, and others have done) any attempts to challenge our contemporary ethical or political values.56
But, as Dickson has argued, "the use of supposedly objective models of . . . social behavior serves to legitimate the imposition of social policy," because the real
risk concerns of laypersons can then be dismissed as subjective.57 As one critic puts it, this is "like playing Monopoly
with the Mafia: they always start the game owning Boardwalk ."58
 Adv
Biden solves
Baker and Dragunas 12-16 [Carrie N. Baker, J.D., Ph.D., is a Professor in the Program for the Study
of Women and Gender at Smith College. Anna Dragunas is a senior at Smith College majoring in the
study of women and gender with a certificate in reproductive Health, rights and justice.] 12/16/20, Ms.
Magazine, “What to Expect From a Biden Presidency: On LGBTQ+ Equality”
https://msmagazine.com/2020/12/16/joe-biden-lgbtq-agenda/ | ahsBC

Protecting LGBTQ+ People from Violence

President-elect Biden has pledged to protect LGBTQ+ people from violence in their homes, communities and when coming into this country. To
do this, Biden seeks to include sexual orientation and gender identity nondiscrimination protections in the Family Violence Prevention and
Services Act reauthorization and supports permanent funding for the National LGBTQ Institute on IPV to prevent and address LGBTQ+ intimate
partner violence.

To address hate crimes, Biden promises to enforce and strengthen the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act by
increasing funding for anti-bias and hate crimes investigation training. To improve hate crime reporting and data collection, Biden supports
passing the Jabara-Heyer NO HATE Act and updating the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports Supplementary Homicide Reports (UCR-SHR) to include
sexual orientation and gender identity or expression.

He also pledges to make prosecuting the murderers of transgender women of color a priority and direct federal resources to help prevent
violence against transgender women—particularly transgender women of color.

To address bias against LGBTQ+ people in the criminal justice system, Biden will work to pass the End Racial and Religious
Profiling Act and create protections for incarcerated transgender individuals. He will also end Trump’s
detrimental asylum and immigration policies that discriminate against LGBTQ+ people.

Can’t solve dehumanization --- it functions as a social factor that can’t be captured
through the political economy of police reform --- murders of queer people in inter-
personal conflicts outside the realm of policing prove.

Rather, the social effect of uniforms, roles and obedience invariably results in brutality
Langley 14, Ferguson Protests, Riots, Power Abuse, and Not-So-Quiet Rage, Psychology today,
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/beyond-heroes-and-villains/201408/ferguson-protests-
riots-power-abuse-and-not-so-quiet-rage Travis Langley, PhD, authored the acclaimed book Batman and
Psychology: A Dark and Stormy Knight and edits the Popular Culture Psychology series which launched
with The Walking Dead Psychology: Psych of the Living Dead and Star Wars Psychology: Dark Side of the
Mind in 2015. Captain America vs. Iron Man: Freedom, Security, Psychology followed in 2016 along with
volumes on Game of Thrones and Doctor Who followed; Wonder Woman Psychology: Lassoing the
Truth, Star Trek Psychology: The Mental Frontier, and Supernatural Psychology: Roads Less Traveled in
2017; Daredevil Psychology: The Devil You Know and Westworld Psychology: Violent Delights in 2018;
Black Panther Psychology: Hidden Kingdoms and The Joker Psychology: Evil Clowns and the Women
Who Love Them in 2019. Dr. Langley received his B.A. in psychology from Hendrix College and his M.S.
and Ph.D. in psychology from Tulane University. A distinguished professor of psychology at Henderson
State University, he teaches on crime, social behavior, mental illness, and media, including courses titled
"Batman" and "Psych of the Living Dead." HC

Is Milgram's obedience experiment really more relevant than Zimbardo's prison simulation, or is it simply better known? Stanley Milgram
(1965) conducted the most famous study in the history of psychology, in which he directed participants
to deliver painful and potentially lethal electric shocks to another test subject (the researcher's confederate, who
did not really get shocked and only pretended to be hurt). Milgram found that about two thirds of all participants would
deliver the maximum, most dangerous shocks when directed to do so by an authority figure. That was about
obedience. There are most likely officers who are intimidating protestors out of obedience to their own
superior officers, but the worst of what's going on often involves the initiative of individual officers,
starting with the one who gunned down an unarmed young man. Philip Zimbardo's 1971 prison simulation study,
however, demonstrated how people's roles and uniforms shape their behavior. Zimbardo demonstrated that
power corrupts. In the Stanford prison experiment, as it is commonly known, he randomly assigned volunteers to play the roles of either
guards or prisoners in what was supposed to be a two-week experiment but ended after 6 days. Guards got carried away with how harshly they
often treated prisoners; many prisoners became dehumanized and thought only of escape, survival, and hatred toward the guards; and
Zimbardo himself lost sight of the project's cruel reality partly because he made the mistake of casting himself as the prisoner superintendent .
Even the smart, analytical, well trained psychologist fell into his role and under the thrall of the power of
the situation. When I was in graduate school, I attended a talk Zimbardo gave at a meeting of the American Psychological Association. After
Phil previewed the documentary Quiet Rage about the Stanford prison experiment, a Russian psychologist said (via translator) that seeing the
film made him realize that his own country had undergone one massive experiment in which everybody fell into such roles over the course of
too many decades. Mob behavior is a different issue, also one involving the power of the situation. Zimbardo's obedience study was not about
group influence, though. Zimbardo's study reveals
more about the intricacies of group influence and the dangerous
influence of roles. Zimbardo's study shows that power corrupts and the consequences of corruption can
escalate.

Can’t solve rhetoric --- the act has no mechanism to address how officers view and
interact with people