DT 118 Revfinal

D E P A R T E M E N T T E C H N I Q U E
Guide ICCA* sur les indicateurs

de sécurité des procédés
* International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA)
DT 118
Mars 2017
Responsi ble Care ®

Guide ICCA sur les indicateurs de sécurité des procédés – Mars 2017
Avertissement
L'Union des Industries Chimiques décline toute responsabilité quant à l'usage qui sera fait de ce document.
Il reflète l'état des connaissances scientifiques et techniques au moment où il a été écrit.

La protection des hommes et de l’environnement constitue l’objectif le plus important pour les entreprises de
la chimie à l’échelle mondiale.
La mise en place d’un système efficace de management de la sécurité des procédés qui identifie, réduit, ou
élimine les risques associés aux opérations industrielles est un prérequis pour atteindre cet objectif.
Les performances en sécurité des procédés d’un site industriel s’évaluent, entre autres au travers
d’indicateurs de performance qui mesurent et analysent les incidents de sécurité des procédés.
L’ICCA (Organisation professionnelle internationale de l’industrie chimique) a établi un guide décrivant les
critères harmonisés pour qualifier les incidents de sécurité des procédés (PSE= Process Safety Event) afin
de de disposer d’un référentiel commun.
Le présent guide UIC DT118 est constitué de deux parties :
• Partie 1 : RESUME DU GUIDE ICCA SUR LES INDICATEURS DE SECURITE DES PROCEDES-
Version Française
• Partie 2 : GUIDE ICCA SUR LES INDICATEURS DE SECURITE DES PROCEDES- Version
Anglaise
Notes
Le guide ICCA annule et remplace le guide CEFIC de 2011 que l’UIC avait traduit.
Les évolutions proposées par l’ICCA par rapport au guide CEFIC de 2011, concernent les seuils de
soumission qui sont abaissés via le guide ICCA.
PARTIE 1
RESUME DU GUIDE ICCA SUR LES INDICATEURS DE SECURITE
DES PROCEDES
Version Française
RESUME DU GUIDE ICCA SUR LES
INDICATEURS DE SECURITE DES
PROCEDES
Version Groupe de travail « Responsible Care »

Mars 2017
Sommaire
Résumé ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
Données à collecter .................................................................................................................................. 3
Résumé des critères de sélection des PSE ................................................................................................ 3
Critères clefs pour définir un PSE (Process Safety Event) ......................................................................... 4
Critères détaillés pour définir un PSE ....................................................................................................... 4
Table 1 – Critères selon règlement CLP .................................................................................................... 7
Foire aux Questions .................................................................................................................................. 8
1
Résumé
Les critères qui permettent de savoir si un événement se produisant sur une unité de procédés est à
qualifier d’événement de sécurité des procédés sont résumés sur le logigramme en page 3.
Le groupe de travail ICCA estime que cette proposition de reporting permettra de constituer une base
de reporting des PSE commune aux industries chimiques et pétrochimiques dans le but de l’amélioration
continue de performances de sécurité des procédés.
Note UIC : les évolutions proposées par l’ICCA comparativement au guide CEFIC de 2011 traduit par
l’UIC concernent les seuils de soumission qui sont abaissés via le guide ICCA.
Remarque :
Le groupe de travail ICCA ayant rédigé le présent guide estime que les deux systèmes de reporting ICCA
et API 754 sont proches, mais recommande de ne pas comparer les données issues de deux sociétés
différentes, l’une utilisant l’ICCA et l’autre l’API 754.
En effet les critères retenus par l’ICCA pour qualifier un événement procédé d’événement sécurité des
procédés (PSE : Process Safety Event) sont identiques à ceux issus du guide API 754 niveau II.
La seule différence réside dans la quantité rejetée.
Note UIC : l’UIC préconise d’utiliser de préférence le système ICCA plus simple et basé sur le règlement
CLP plutôt que l’API 754 utilisé par les groupes pétroliers. C’est pourquoi l’UIC n’a traduit que la partie
du guide explicitant le système ICCA. Les entreprises qui souhaitent se référer à l’API 754 peuvent se
reporter en partie II page 12 du présent guide UIC.
2
Données à collecter
Les données à rapporter annuellement sont les suivantes :

 Nombre total d’heures travaillées (salariés organiques et d’entreprises extérieures)
 Nombre total d’événement sécurité des procédés (PSE : Process Safety Event)
Le taux PSE (PSER : PSE rate) sera normalisé comme suit :

Calcul du PSER pour 100 employés :
On considère que chaque employé travaille 2 000 heures 1par an.
Pour 100 employés il faut donc multiplier le PSER par 200 000 pour obtenir le PSER normalisé.
PSER normalisé = (nombre total de PSE / nombre total d’heures travaillées (employés et EE)) x 200 000
Résumé des critères de sélection des PSE
NON : Ne remplit pas le critère

NON de PSE (Process Safety Event) NON
Début
NON Il y–a- t-il eu rejet de
Une substance chimique OUI L’incident s’est-il produit
OUI substance ou d’énergie
ou un procédé chimique (feu, explosion,
est-il directement impliqué en unité de production, de implosion) depuis l’unité
dans les dommages ? distribution de stockage, de production ?
sur les utilités, en unité
pilote à l’intérieur du site ?
OUI
NON
Incident/accident Dommage Plan d’urgence
conduisant à arrêt de
NON ≥ 2500 euros NON déclenché (mise à
NON
travail, ou décès, de coût l’abri, Seuils tableau 1 ou
hospitalisation personne direct pour (évacuation…) API 754 Niveau II
sur site ou à l’extérieur ? l’entreprise ? atteints ?
OUI
OUI OUI
OUI
OUI : Process Safety Event rapportable
1
Note UIC : cette valeur peut paraître élevée. C’est la valeur retenue par le guide ICCA dans le cadre de la
normalisation
3
Critères clefs pour définir un PSE (Process Safety Event)
Nombre total d’heures travaillées
L’UIC devra rapporter le nombre total d’heures travaillées (heures des salariés organiques et heures
travaillées par les entreprises extérieures).
Les heures travaillées dans le cadre de nouvelles constructions ou d’extension majeure du site ne sont
pas à prendre en compte.
PSE
Un événement procédé est un PSE au sens du guide ICCA si les critères suivants sont réunis :
A - Une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique est impliqué et

B - L’incident se déroule en production, distribution, stockage, utilités, laboratoire pilote au sein
du site industriel et
C- Il y a un rejet de matière ou d’énergie (ex : feu, explosion, implosion) sur une unité et
D- Un ou plusieurs des seuils suivants sont dépassés
1- Sécurité / Blessure
 Blessure résultant d’un évènement rapportable (arrêt de travail, décès,
admission à l’hôpital d’une personne travaillant sur site ou à l’extérieur),ou
2. Coût direct des dommages
 feu, explosion ou nettoyage nécessaire pour éviter ou remédier à un dommage
environnemental avec un coût direct supérieur ou égal à 2,500 euros; ou
3. Mise à l’abri / Evacuation
 Mise à l’abri officielle (POI, PPI); ou
 Déclaration d’évacuation (sur site en zone sécurisée ou hors site); ou
 Mise à l’abri ou évacuation hors site par précaution ou
4. Seuil de matière relâchée
 La quantité rejetée est supérieure ou égale aux quantités définies au tableau 1
page 7 (masse rejetée sur une heure)
Critères détaillés pour définir un PSE
A. Substance chimique
Une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique est impliqué
Une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique est directement en cause dans l’incident. Le terme
« procédé » inclut l’équipement et la technologie pour la production pétrochimique, incluant réacteurs,
réservoirs, tuyauteries, échangeurs, tours de refroidissement, système de réfrigération, etc. Un incident
qui n’est pas lié directement à une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique, par exemple un feu
dans un bureau même si celui-ci est sur le site de production n’est pas rapportable en tant que PSE.
B. Localisation
L’incident se déroule en production, distribution, stockage, utilités, laboratoire pilote au sein du site
industriel
4
L’incident se déroule en production, distribution, stockage (réservoirs et entrepôt), utilités, laboratoire
pilote au sein du site industriel.
Cela inclut les parcs de stockage, les locaux annexes (type chaufferie, traitement des eaux usées) et les
canalisations de transport sous contrôle du site industriel.
Tous les incidents qui se déroulent dans un endroit exploité sous la responsabilité de l’entreprise sont à
rapporter.
Il faut donc prendre en compte les incidents se déroulant sur des zones où les travaux sont réalisés par
une entreprise extérieure. Dans le cadre d’un complexe multi-exploitant, l’entreprise qui opère l’unité
où se produit l’incident reporte l’évènement.
C. Rejet de substance
Il y a un rejet de matière ou d’énergie (ex : feu, explosion, implosion) sur une unité
Rejet de substance– rejet non planifié et non contrôlé de matière, incluant les substances non toxiques
et non inflammables (ex : vapeur, eau chaude, azote, dioxyde de carbone comprimé, air comprimé), issu
d’un procédé avec une conséquence telle que précisé ci-après au chapitre D.
Un rejet vers la torche ou un vers un système d’épuration n’est pas considéré comme relevant d’une
perte de confinement primaire dès lors que le système a fonctionné dans des conditions normales sans
rejets au-delà des seuils définis pour des opérations normales (standards de dimensionnement).
Un rejet vers un système de confinement secondaire (traitement des eaux ou rétention) est qualifié de
PSE car la substance a été rejetée au travers du système primaire avant d’atteindre le système
secondaire.
D. Seuils
Un ou plusieurs des seuils suivants sont atteints.
1. Sécurité / Blessure
Blessure résultant d’un évènement rapportable (arrêt de travail, décès, admission à l’hôpital d’une
personne travaillant sur site ou à l’extérieur)
Blessure rapportable : blessures liées au travail avec les conséquences suivantes : décès, arrêt de travail,
poste aménagé, traitement médical en plus des premiers soins, perte de conscience ou blessure
significative diagnostiquée par un médecin.
Décès ou blessure avec arrêt résultant d’une perte de confinement procédé, d’un feu, d’une explosion
et concernant :
 Employés (Accident avec arrêt/ou décès)

 Entreprises Extérieures (Accident avec arrêt/ou décès)
 Tierce partie (Blessure/maladie conduisant à un décès ou à une admission à l’hôpital)
Admission à l’hôpital– admission formelle à l’hôpital en dehors d’un passage aux urgences non suivi
d’une hospitalisation
Exemples d’évènement PSE : brûlure résultant d’un jet de vapeur lors du nettoyage d’un équipement,
blessure physique suite à un test de pression, brûlure chimique lors d’une prise d’échantillon.
5
Exemples d’évènement ne relevant pas de la définition de PSE: chute de hauteur lors de travaux de
maintenance, brûlure suite à un feu de laboratoire ou à un feu de bureau.
2. Coût direct
Feu, explosion ou nettoyage nécessaire pour éviter ou réparer des dommages environnementaux avec
des coûts directs supérieurs ou égaux à 2 500 euros
Les coûts sont ceux attribués directement aux impacts tels que le remplacement d’un équipement, les
travaux de réparation, les nettoyages, les mesures d’urgence. Les coûts ne prennent pas en compte les
pertes d’exploitation.
3. Mise à l’abri / Evacuation

Mise à l’abri officielle (POI, PPI); ou déclaration d’évacuation (sur site en zone sécurisée ou hors site); ou
mise à l’abri ou évacuation hors site par précaution
Déclenchement officiel – Déclaration officielle (sécurité civile, pompiers) avec mise à l’abri, évacuation
Mesures de précaution – Evacuation ou mise à l’abri nécessaire par précaution pour protéger la sécurité
/ santé du public
Mise à l’abri – Utilisation d’un local dédié pour mise en sécurité
Evacuation – Déplacement des personnes d’un endroit pour protéger leur sécurité
4. Seuil de matière rejetée

Rejet de matière supérieur ou égal à ceux définis tableau 1, page 7 Note UIC : Seul le système basé sur le
règlement CLP est repris dans cette note.
Rejet – Rejet de matière selon les données du tableau 1
Système de décharge de pression (soupape, disque de rupture) : Les rejets prennent en compte ceux
vers un système dédié dès lors que la quantité est supérieure à celle définie au tableau 1 et que le rejet
conduit à une ou plusieurs des quatre conséquences ci-après :
1. Un entraînement de liquide ;
2. Un rejet en un lieu potentiellement non-sûr ;
3. Mise à l’abri officielle (POI, PPI); ou déclaration d’évacuation (sur site en zone sécurisée ou hors
site); ou mise à l’abri ou évacuation hors site par précaution
Les rejets vers un système conçu pour cela, tels que torche, laveurs, etc. n’ont pas à être rapportés s’ils
ne respectent pas les critères mentionnés ci-dessus.
Règle 1 heure de fuite
Les pertes de confinement sont mesurées sur une durée de 1 heure.
Si le taux de rejet d’une substance atteint ou dépasse le taux défini pour une période d’une heure, il est
rapportable.
Dans le cas où la durée de fuite n’est pas connue, on suppose que la durée est d’une heure.
6
Confinement primaire : un réservoir, une colonne, une tuyauterie sont considérés comme des
confinements primaires. Ils peuvent être reliés à un confinement secondaire, tels que une cuvette de
rétention, un système de collecte des eaux avec séparation des eaux huileuses, une double paroi pour
les réservoirs, etc…
Sévérité : Un tableau proposé par l’ICCA (non traduit sur ce résumé) peut permettre de hiérarchiser les
événements et de guider l’amélioration des performances.
Le niveau de sévérité est calculé pour chaque événement en additionnant pour chaque conséquence les
points proposés.
L’ICCA recommande d’utiliser aussi cet indice. Ce niveau permet de comprendre les événements de
façon plus pertinente.
Tableau 1 – Critères selon règlement CLP
Catégories Catégories Catégories

Dangers pour la santé
Toxicité aigüe Annexe 1 1 et 2 3 et 4 Non applicable
CLP point 3.1
Mentions de dangers CLP H300, H310 ou H301, 302, 311 , 312 , Non applicable
H330 331 ou 332
CMR (Cancérogène, Non applicable Non applicable Toutes catégories
Mutagène, Reprotoxique)
STOT exposition unique
Annexe 1 CLP point 3.5 à
3.8
Autres dangers pour la
santé
Annexe 1 CLP autres points
3.x non visés ci-dessus
Dangers physiques Annexe Non applicable Non applicable
1 CLP point 2.x
Dangers pour
l’environnement
Annexe 1 CLP point 2.x
Seuil (pour une durée de 1 ≥1 kg ≥10kg ≥100kg
heure)
7
Foire aux Questions
Applicabilité
Les entreprises doivent rapporter les incidents se déroulant sur des sites détenus ou exploités par l’entreprise, à
l’exception de :
1. Événement s’étant déroulé en dehors de la propriété de l’entreprise ;
2. Incident sur un bateau, un camion ou un wagon, sauf si le bateau, le camion ou le wagon est raccordé au site
industriel pour des opérations de chargement/déchargement ;
3. Émissions habituelles dans les limites des autorisations d’exploiter ;
4. Contaminations des sols qui ne sont pas induits par un événement procédé ;
5. Incidents se déroulant dans les locaux administratifs ;
6. Incidents touchant le personnel (chute, glissade, etc.) non directement associés à une perte de confinement ;
7. Perte de confinement d’équipements accessoires non liés au procédé ;
8. Rejet programmé et contrôlé ;
9. Interventions mécaniques conduites en dehors du procédé ou en atelier de maintenance.
Interprétations et exemples
PSE
Evénement rapportable Commentaires - Explications
ou non
LIEUX CONCERNÉS
Une citerne affrétée par une tierce
partie charge un liquide
inflammable sur le site de  La citerne est opérée par un tiers,
l’entreprise, doit faire face à une mais elle est connectée au
1 Oui procédé.
fuite suivie d’un incendie et des
dommages consécutifs évalués à  Les dommages dépassent 2 500 €.
7 000 € (coût direct).
La même citerne, après avoir quitté
le site, se retourne sur la route, à
L’accident s’est produit en dehors du
2 l’extérieur du site, avec pour Non site.
conséquence un incendie et la
perte du camion.
PERTE DE CONFINEMENT
La défaillance d’une jauge de
réservoir a pour conséquence le sur
L’incident concerne une fuite
remplissage d’un réservoir
soudaine de plus de 100 kg, sans
3 contenant des liquides Oui tenir compte du confinement
inflammables. Environ 700 kg de
secondaire.
liquide débordent dans la cuvette
de rétention.
8
Un salarié d’une entreprise
Evénement non intentionnel mettant
extérieure de maintenance ouvre
en jeu un équipement et une perte
une vanne procédé et reçoit une
de confinement. Dans le cas
4 projection d’acide sulfurique avec Oui d’accident mortel ou de blessures ou
pour conséquence de sévères
maladies, il n’y a pas de seuil-
brûlures et une incapacité
plancher.
temporaire.
Un opérateur ouvre un point
d’échantillonnage de contrôle
qualité pour un échantillon de
routine et, du fait du flacon de L’incident n’est pas lié à une perte de
5 verre qui se brise, se blesse à la Non confinement.
main, ce qui occasionne des points
de suture et un jour d’arrêt de
travail.
FUITES SOUDAINES
Alors qu’il repère un débit de gaz
naturel supérieur à la normale, un
opérateur détecte une vanne de
sécurité sur la ligne de gaz naturel qui Cela ne constitue pas un PSE
ne s’est pas refermée correctement et rapportable du fait que le taux de
6 qui laisse échapper du gaz à l’évent à Non fuite (≈ 10 kg/h) s’étale sur une
travers un séparateur. Après plus longue durée (inférieur à 100 kg/h
ample recherche, il est avéré que pour une vapeur inflammable).
100 000 kg de gaz naturel ont été
dégazés sur une période régulière de 6
mois.
TORCHÈRES OU SYSTÈMES D’ÉMISSIONS CONTRÔLÉS
Un produit chimique est dirigé vers Dès lors que le système a fonctionné
une torche ou un système dans des conditions normales sans
7 d’épuration (ex : laveur). Non rejets au-delà des seuils définis pour
des opérations normales (standards
de dimensionnement).
9
Une émission incontrôlée issue d’une
source autorisée ou réglementée – y
compris une soupape – d’une
quantité supérieure ou égale aux
seuils mentionnés au tableau sur une
période d’une heure, et ayant l’une
ou plusieurs des conséquences
Un laveur est saturé par un flux suivantes :
dépassant les conditions normales de
 Un entraînement de liquide ;
8 fonctionnement et laisse s’échapper Oui
une substance chimique au-delà des  Un rejet en un lieu
seuils rapportables. potentiellement non-sûr ;
 Mise à l’abri officielle (POI, PPI);
ou déclaration d’évacuation (sur
site en zone sécurisée ou hors
site); ou mise à l’abri ou
évacuation hors site par
précaution
doit être rapportée en tant que PSE.
SOUPAPES – DISQUES DE RUPTURE

Les vapeurs ou gaz émis à l’atmosphère
au travers d’une soupape, d’un disque de
rupture ou tout système similaire,
correctement conçu pour ce type
d’événement selon l’API 521 ou
Il se produit un incident suivi de équivalent sont exclus, tant que la fuite
l’ouverture d’une soupape à n’a pas pour conséquence un
9 l’atmosphère sans conséquence Non entraînement de liquide qui créerait un
néfaste. PSE relatif au liquide (ex : accident du
travail avec arrêt, décès, incendie ou
explosion causant plus de 2 500 € de
coûts directs, etc.) ou le déclenchement
d’une mise à l’abri ou de mesures de
protection du public.
Il se produit un incident suivi de la non-
ouverture d’une soupape à
l’atmosphère. Il en résulte une
surpression de l’équipement et un rejet
soudain de gaz inflammable sur une
bride. La quantité rejetée est supérieure
à 100 kg (en 1 heure). Les fuites de brides ne sont pas exclues
10 Oui du reporting PSE.
10
ACCIDENTS AVEC ARRÊT
Un opérateur marche, glisse et tombe,
ce qui entraîne un arrêt de travail. Cette Les accidents de déplacement qui ne
chute est due aux mauvaises conditions sont pas directement associés à une
11 météorologiques, au sol Non perte de confinement sont
perpétuellement gras et à des spécifiquement exclus du reporting PSE.
chaussures glissantes.
Même incident que le précédent, sauf
que l’opérateur se déplace pour faire L’opérateur est occupé à traiter une
12 face à une petite fuite de liquide Oui perte de confinement, indépendamment
inflammable (moins de 10 kg en 1 des quantités rejetées.
heure).
Même incident que le précédent, sauf
Les accidents de déplacement qui
que l’opérateur glisse et tombe
13 Non suivent un incident terminé ne sont pas
plusieurs heures après la fin de
rapportables.
l’incident.
Un échafaudeur est mis en arrêt de L’échafaudeur est tombé lors d’une
travail après une chute d’échafaudage évacuation consécutive à une perte de
14 lors d’une évacuation consécutive à une Oui confinement, indépendamment des
perte de confinement. quantités rejetées.
Un opérateur marche et passe devant
une purge de vapeur défectueuse. La Même si la perte de confinement
15 purge projette de la vapeur et Oui concerne de la vapeur, l’état physique du
l’opérateur est brûlé, occasionnant un matériel est en cause.
arrêt de travail.
Une enceinte a été intentionnellement
purgée avec de l’azote. Un employé
Il n’y a pas de perte de confinement non-
16 d’une entreprise extérieure ne respecte Non programmée et non-contrôlée.
pas les mesures de consignation, entre
dans l’enceinte et meurt.
Même accident que le précédent, sauf
Il s’agit d’un décès consécutif à une perte
17 que l’azote a été introduit de façon non Oui de confinement accidentelle.
intentionnelle dans l’enceinte.
Si l’alarme est déclenchée par une perte
Un opérateur se déplaçant pour une de confinement non-programmée et
alarme de fuite d’H2S tombe et est non-contrôlée d’H2S, l’incident est un
18 blessé. Oui/Non PSE rapportable. S’il s’agit d’une fausse
alarme, il ne l’est pas car il n’y a pas
réellement de fuite.
PIPELINES
Une fuite sur une tuyauterie occasionne
la perte de 1000 kg de vapeur
Le fait que la fuite se déroule en un lieu
19 inflammable sur le sol durant une Oui fermé ne permet pas l’exclusion.
heure. Cependant, la fuite se déroule
dans un lieu fermé à l’intérieur du site.
11
FEUX ET LIBÉRATIONS D’ÉNERGIE NON ASSOCIÉS AVEC UNE FUITE DE PRODUIT CHIMIQUE
En règle générale, un feu ou une libération d’énergie constitue un PSE rapportable seulement s’il est causé par
une fuite de produit chimique ou s’il engendre une fuite de produit chimique dépassant les seuils rapportables.
Exemples :
Un feu électrique impacte l’exploitation
La quantité répandue dépasse le seuil de
20 d’un procédé, avec pour conséquence la Oui 100 kg applicable au toluène.
fuite de 400 kg de toluène.
Un feu électrique, une perte
d’alimentation ou toute autre perte
Les dommages aux équipements n’ont
d’utilité entraîne un arrêt d’atelier suivi
pas été causés par un feu ou une
de dommages dépassant 2 500 € (ex. :
21 Non explosion lié au procédé et il n’y a pas eu
dommage aux équipements consécutifs
de rejet de substance chimique
à un arrêt d’urgence), mais ne cause pas
supérieur aux seuils mentionnés.
de fuite dépassant les seuils ou de
blessure grave ou de décès.
TRANSPORTS MARITIMES
Les incidents à bord de bateaux de
Une entreprise de transport maritime
transport maritime sont spécifiquement
22 déplore à bord une fuite soudaine de Non exclus, sauf si le bateau est relié à une
matière combustible supérieure à 100 kg.
unité pour chargement/déchargement.
Une barge est poussée par un
remorqueur et heurte le ponton d’une La barge n’est pas amarrée au ponton ni
23 entreprise chimique. Le réservoir de la Non engagée dans un processus de
barge est perforé et 1 000 kg de gazole chargement/déchargement.
se répandent dans la rivière.
CAMIONS ET WAGONS
Une citerne ferroviaire en circulation sur L’incident se déroule en dehors des

24 le réseau SNCF déraille et plus de 1000 kg Non limites du site industriel.
d’essence se répandent.
La citerne n’est pas raccordée à une
installation de
Une citerne routière se retourne à
chargement/déchargement. Cependant,
l’intérieur du site de l’entreprise ; il en
25 Non nous recommandons aux entreprises de
résulte une fuite soudaine de 1 000 kg
disposer d’indicateurs d’incidents de
d’essence.
transport vis-à-vis desquels cet incident
sera rapporté.
Un camion-citerne est en cours de
déchargement de soude caustique et le
flexible se désaccouple, créant une fuite
et un épandage de 2 500 kg de lessive La quantité de soude excède le seuil de
26 de soude. Oui 100 kg et la citerne est raccordée aux
installations de l’usine.
12
BUREAUX
Il se produit un feu de bouilloire dans les
Les événements se déroulant dans les
27 bureaux de l’usine et le coût des Non bureaux sont spécifiquement exclus.
dommages atteint 75 000 €.
INCIDENTS À L’INTERFACE HOMME/MACHINE

Un technicien est blessé lors de
l’installation d’un équipement dans une
Il n’y a pas eu de perte de confinement
28 usine de polymères. La blessure est Non de matière dangereuse.
causée par un élément mobile de la
machine.
MÉLANGES
Si un mélange est classé au titre de CLP, on utilisera cette classification pour déterminer le seuil. Si le mélange
n’est pas classé au titre de CLP, on doit revenir aux composants du mélange et prendre en compte la
contribution massique de chaque composant en la confrontant aux seuils correspondants et calculer un « rejet
équivalent ». Exemple :
Une fuite de 100 kg d’un mélange non
classé au titre de CLP sur une période
d’une heure contient 0,5 kg d’une
substance classée « toxique aigu »,
catégorie 1, portant la mention H300 ;
Ce résultat est supérieur à 1 et conduit à
4,5 kg d’une substance classée « toxique
qualifier l’incident de PSE rapportable,
aigu » catégorie 3, portant la mention
29 Oui même si aucun des composants, pris
H301 ; 40 kg d’une substance portant un
individuellement, ne dépasse le seuil
mention H indéterminée et 55 kg d’eau.
correspondant à sa catégorie.
La quantité équivalent est calculée
comme suit : 0,5/1 + 4,5/10 + 40/100 =
1,35 (les valeurs 1, 10 et 100 placées
aux dénominateurs sont les seuils
relatifs à chaque catégorie).
COÛT DIRECT DES DOMMAGES

Le coût direct des dommages pris en compte pour le seuil de 2 500 € se rapporte au coût attribué directement
au feu ou à l’explosion, tels que la valeur de remplacement de l’équipement ou des structures perdus, le coût
des réparations, le nettoyage et la remédiation environnementale, le coût du plan d’urgence, les amendes
éventuelles. Il ne comprend pas les coûts indirects tels que les pertes d’exploitation, le coût d’achat de produit
à l’extérieur pour livrer les clients. Exemples :
Une fuite de gaz inflammable se produit
sur une conduite de traitement de gaz.
Dans le même temps, une défaillance du
procédé permet à de l’air d’entrer dans
Considérant le coût de réparation des
la conduite. Une explosion se produit et
30 Oui dégâts occasionnés par le feu ou
la surpression endommage la conduite
l’explosion
et l’équipement situé en amont incluant
une garde hydraulique. Personne n’est
blessé. Le coût de réparation atteint
12 000 €.
13
Après un événement PSE, une
entreprise rejette 50 kg d’une substance La quantité rejetée est inférieure au seuil
inflammable qui cause 2 000 € de associé aux substances inflammables
31 dégâts aux équipements. La substance Non (100 kg) et le coût des dommages directs
rejetée est clef pour les activités de est inférieur à 2 500 €.
l’entreprise, laquelle doit faire face à
une perte d’exploitation de 50 000 €.
CATASTROPHES NATURELLES
Les catastrophes naturelles peuvent constituer un risque substantiel vis-à-vis des procédés chimiques et
occasionner des dommages aux équipements pouvant causer des pertes de confinement de substances
dangereuses. Lorsque le potentiel pour un ou plusieurs types de catastrophes naturelles est jugé significatif vis-
à-vis des opérations du site, des mesures de maîtrise des risques appropriées doivent être mises en œuvre.
Si votre site est confronté à une catastrophe naturelle qui peut déclencher une perte de confinement au-
32
delà des seuils, elle doit être rapportée comme un PSE.
MESURE DE PRÉCAUTION VIS-À-VIS DU PUBLIC
Une mesure vis-à-vis du public peut résulter de la mise en place de mesures de précaution. Par exemple,
une entreprise peut exiger de ses salariés qu’ils se mettent à l’abri en cas de perte de confinement dont
les conséquences n’ont pas été évaluées. Par exemple, les autorités peuvent ordonner une mise à l’abri,
33
une évacuation ou des mesures de protection publique (ex. : barrage routier), en l’absence d’information
de l’entreprise qui doit faire face à un PSE, par crainte de changement de direction du vent ou dans le cas
où des populations sensibles pourraient être affectées (école, maison de retraite, etc.).
ENTREPÔT « ACTIF »
Un entrepôt « actif » est un hangar sur site dans lequel sont stockés des matières premières, des
intermédiaires ou des produits finis utilisés ou produits sur site. De ce point de vue, un entrepôt actif est
l’équivalent d’un réservoir de liquide ou de gaz liquéfié. En l’occurrence, les matières premières, les
34
intermédiaires ou les produits finis sont stockés dans de petits contenants (fûts, bidons, conteneurs,
etc.). Tout incident mettant en jeu des quantités supérieures aux seuils mentionnés est donc susceptible
d’être un PSE rapportable.
14
PARTIE 2
GUIDE ICCA SUR LES INDICATEURS DE SECURITE DES PROCEDES
Version Anglaise
GUIDANCE FOR
REPORTING ON THE ICCA
GLOBALLY HARMONIZED
PROCESS SAFETY METRIC
June
The Responsible Care® Leadership Group
2016
Contents
Background ............................................................................................................................................... 2
Executive Summary................................................................................................................................... 2
Data to be reported by RCLG Associations to RCLG ................................................................................. 4
Overview of ICCA Process Safety Event Criteria as a Flow Chart .............................................................. 5
Key Criteria for Reporting Process Safety Events to RCLG ........................................................................ 6
Detailed Guidelines on Identifying a Process Safety Event ...................................................................... 7
Table 1 – GHS Classification Table ....................................................................................................... 11
Table 2 – API RP 754 Tier II Classification Table ................................................................................. 12
Appendix A – Severity Table: Using A Severity Weighting System is Encouraged for All Associations . 14
Appendix B – Frequently Asked Questions ............................................................................................. 16
Appendix C – List of RCLG Taskforce Members ...................................................................................... 22
Appendix D – Detailed Schedule of Events ............................................................................................. 23
Appendix E – Optional Excel Reporting Form ......................................................................................... 24
FINAL DRAFT
June 15, 2016
1
Background
The Responsible Care® initiative began in 1985 and as the chemical industry’s commitment to
continuous performance improvements. Process Safety has been a pillar of Responsible Care
since its inception, and many regional approaches to tracking and reporting process safety
performance have developed over the 30 years of Responsible Care implementation, yet no
globally harmonized system had been put into place. In 2012, in the wake of several high profile
process safety events, the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) Board of
Directors directed the Responsible Care Leadership Group (RCLG) to develop a
recommendation for a globally harmonized process safety performance reporting by no later than
2015.
Throughout 2013 and 2014, a Taskforce comprised of multinational companies and RCLG
associations, chaired by Dr. Peter Schmelzer, Head of Health, Safety and Environmental
Protection Bayer HealthCare AG, worked to develop a globally harmonized ICCA approach to
process safety performance reporting. A list of Taskforce members can be found in Appendix C.
During the same timeframe, the American Petroleum Institute (API) also initiated a process to
update its Recommend Practice 754 (RP-754) – Leading and Lagging Process Safety Metric
Standard. RP-754 is broadly used in the refining and petrochemical sector and in the Americas
region to track process safety performance. To optimize global adoption of a unified standard,
the RCLG Taskforce strived to achieve full harmonization of its recommendation with the
revised API RP 754 metric, expected to be finalized in the first quarter, 2016.
Executive Summary
After more than 2 years of discussion, research, debate and feasibility assessment, the Process
Safety Harmonization Taskforce recommends that ICCA adopt a process safety event rate
metric. The adoption of this metric would require each RCLG association to collect the number
of process safety events experienced by their members on an annual basis, as well as total
number of worker hours (employees and contractors) experienced by their members each year.
The process safety event rate is the ratio of events to hours. The Taskforce also recommends that
reporting of these data points to the RCLG be phased in over the next 3 years, allowing regions
with the desire and ability to report immediately to do so, while also allowing additional time to
companies and organizations that are developing the ability to track these data for the first time.
The criteria that determine whether a process-related event qualifies as a process safety event are
based on a loss of primary containment of a chemical or a release of energy triggering thresholds
any one of four impact areas: 1) safety/human health consequences; 2) direct cost due to damage
from incident; 3) community impact; and 4) chemical release quantity (see the flow chart
showing reporting triggers). These four impact areas in the recommended ICCA process safety
event definition are identical to the impact areas in the RP-754 Tier II incident standard. The
thresholds for reporting are also identical in all areas with the exception of the chemical release
quantity thresholds. To address this difference, the ICCA process safety event definition will allow
companies the use of either the GHS-based reporting thresholds developed by ICCA for the
chemical release criteria, or the UN Dangerous Goods (UNDG)-based reporting thresholds used
in the RP-754 standard for Tier II incidents. The Taskforce believes that the two systems,
though different, are comparably robust in the universe of chemicals covered and the severity of
incidents captured by reporting. While there will be relatively little difference in the numbers of
2
events captured and reported using the two different threshold approaches, there may be
differences that would be most clearly seen at the company level based on raw material and
product use; hence the Taskforce cautions companies not to compare their results with
companies that use a different chemical release threshold approach. Regardless, under the RCLG
proposal, companies can choose the chemical release thresholds by which they report in to their national
and regional associations. If associations are interested in translating results based on one
reporting approach to another, the RCLG will provide a translation table. However, given the
complexity of this exercise and the need to access raw incident data, the Taskforce does not
believe that this adds value and recommends against it.
The Taskforce believes that this proposal for process safety event reporting will enable broad-
based global reporting of process safety performance across the chemical and petrochemical
industries. It will provide a roadmap for regions, associations and companies that are currently
not tracking process safety performance to recognize the benefits that tracking and reporting will
bring. For regions, associations and companies that are already experienced in gathering process
safety data, this recommendation allows for broader global alignment and focus on continuous
improvement in process safety performance. The systems that are built to improve process
safety performance are informed by robust process safety event data, and this is the major
objective of this initiative.
3
Data to be reported by RCLG Associations to RCLG
On an annual basis, RCLG Associations will be asked to report two data points into ICCA using
the RCLG KPI Reporting Website on the schedule provided below.
1. Total Member Company Worker Hours for Association (employee and contractor)
2. Total Number of Process Safety Events
ICCA will use the above two data points to report process safety performance in the form of
Process Safety Event Rate (PSER), normalized per 100 employees where an employee works
2,000 hours a year.
(Total Events / Total Hours) x 200,000 = PSER
Recommended Reporting Schedule

The Taskforce recommends a phased-in approach for reporting process safety event rate. Such a
schedule will allow more experienced companies and associations to report in the next several
years, while allowing other companies and associations to begin reporting by 2019. RCLG
Associations would be asked to report the two process safety event rate data points annually to
the ICCA through the RCLG KPI metrics reporting system: http://kpi.responsiblecare.eu If you
do not know your association’s username and password, please contact the RCLG.
The proposed schedule for process safety event rate reporting by RCLG associations is as
follows:
April 2015 RCLG considers Taskforce proposal

June 2015 ICCA Board of Directors considers RCLG final
recommendation
July 2015 RCLG releases the first detailed reporting guidance
document for associations and member companies
Feb, 2016 RCLG Reporting RCLG initiates process safety reporting pilot program
through association volunteers with updated an enhanced
guidance document; RCLG rolls out final guidance
document in June, 2016
2017 RCLG Associations begin collecting data from its
membership
2018-2019 RCLG Reporting Optional process safety data reporting by RCLG
Associations
2020 Reporting RCLG includes process safety as a mandatory metric in
the KPI reporting program
See Appendix D – Detailed Schedule of Events
4
Overview of ICCA Process Safety Event Criteria as a Flow Chart
NO: Does not meet the criteria

for a Process Safety Event
NO NO
Start
NO Release of material, fire,
Was a chemical substance YES Incident in production,
YES explosion or implosion
or a chemical process from/at a chemical
distribution, storage,
directly involved? process unit?
utilities, pilot plants
within a company’s
facility?
YES
NO
Officially declared
shelter in place or Substance Release
Recordable injury evacuation? Thresholds met?
Damage
Or NO ≥ $2,500 NO Or Precautionary NO
hospital admission of off site shelter in
direct cost
people on or off site? place or
to company?
evacuation?
ICCA or API 754 Tier II
chemical release
YES YES YES thresholds exceeded?
Yes: Reportable as a Process Safety Event YES
5
Key Criteria for Reporting Process Safety Events to RCLG
Total Worker Hours

RCLG Associations should report the total number of employee hours worked for each member
company in their association and the total number of contractor hours worked for each member
company as a combined, single number. For the purposes of this guidance document, each
association should refer to their local and regional definitions for employee and contractor. The
goal for reporting total hours is to include all individuals who are involved with chemical
manufacturing, except where those individuals are tasked with major construction projects such
as large scale investments with specific, one-time project organizations created for design,
engineering, and construction of new or significant expansion to existing process facilities. When
reporting total worker hours, companies should report the same hours used for reporting
personnel hours. This way, companies can have the same data set for occupational and process
safety. Personnel hours should include those hours from all chemical manufacturing operations,
not just from facilities where a process safety incident occurred.
Process Safety Event

For the purposes of this ICCA Reporting, a process safety event has occurred when:
A. When a chemical substance or a chemical process is directly involved; AND

B. The incident occurred in production, distribution, storage, utility, pilot plant within the
site boundaries of company’s facility; AND
C. There was a release of material or energy (e.g. fire, explosion, implosion) from a process
unit; AND
D. One or more of the following Reporting Thresholds have been met:
1. Safety / Injury
 Injury resulting in a Recordable, Lost Time Accident or Fatality; or
Hospital admission of anyone on or off site; OR
2. Direct Damage Cost
 A fire, explosion or clean up necessary to avoid/remediate environmental
damage resulting in a direct cost equal to or greater than $2,500 USDs;
OR
3. Shelter in Place / Evacuation
 An officially declared shelter in place (on or off site); OR
 An officially declared evacuation (on or off site); OR
 A precautionary off site shelter in place or evacuation OR
4. Threshold Release
 The material released meets one of the GHS thresholds in Table 1.
(measured in amount released during one hour)
As an alternative, companies can choose to use the release thresholds contained in the API RP-754
standard – Table 2. Note – Individuals who would like to view the API RP-754 Standard may purchase
and download that standard at - http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/health-and-safety/process-
safety/process-safety-standards
6
Detailed Guidelines on Identifying a Process Safety Event
A. Chemical Involvement
When a chemical substance or chemical process is directly involved
A chemical or chemical process must have been directly involved in the event or incident. For
this purpose, the term "process" is used broadly to include the equipment and technology needed
for petrochemical production, including reactors, tanks, piping, boilers, cooling towers,
refrigeration systems, etc. An incident with no direct chemical or process involvement, e.g., an
office building fire, even if the office building is on a plant site, is not reportable.
B. Location
The incident occurred in production, distribution, storage, utility, pilot plant within the site
boundaries of company’s facility
The incident occurs in production, distribution, storage (including active storage areas such as
warehouses – see FAQ section), utilities or pilot plants of a facility reporting metrics under these
definitions. This includes tank farms, ancillary support areas (e.g., boiler houses and waste water
treatment plants) and distribution piping under control of the site. All reportable incidents
occurring at a location will be reported by the company that is responsible for operating that
location. This applies to incidents that may occur in contractor work areas as well as other
incidents. At tolling operations and multi-party sites, the company that operates the unit where
the incident initiated should record the incident and count it in their reporting.
C. Release of Material
There was a release of material or energy (e.g. fire, explosion, implosion) from a process unit
Release of Material – an unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material, including non-toxic

and non-flammable materials (e.g. steam, hot water, nitrogen, compressed CO2 or compressed
air), from a process that results in consequences that exceed one or more of the 4 Reporting
Thresholds listed in this document.
A release to a flare or scrubber is still considered to be within the primary containment as long as
the mitigation system (e.g. scrubber, flare) is operated under normal conditions without any
release above the thresholds defined for normal operation. A release to a secondary containment
(e.g. waste water treatment or dike) will qualify as a process safety event because the substance
is leaving the primary process system.
7
D. Thresholds
One or more of the following Reporting Thresholds must be met for reportable process safety
events.
1. Safety / Injury
Injury resulting in a Recordable, Lost Time Accident or Fatality; or Hospital admission of
anyone on or off site;
Recordable injuries are work-related injuries that results in any of the following: death, days
away from work, restricted work or transfer to another job, medical treatment beyond first aid,
loss of consciousness, or a significant injury diagnosed by a physician or other licensed health
professional.
Lost time injuries and fatalities that occur as a result of process related loss of primary
containment, fire, or explosion are those that fit into one of the following categories:
 Employee (Lost time and/or Fatality)

 Contractor and Subcontractor (Lost time and/or Fatality)
 Third Party (Injury/illness resulting in Hospital Admission or Fatality)
Hospital Admission – formal acceptance by a hospital or other inpatient health care facility of a
patient who is to be provided with room, board, and medical service in an area of the hospital or
facility where patients generally reside at least overnight. Treatment in the hospital emergency
room or an overnight stay in the emergency room would not by itself qualify as a “hospital
admission.”
Examples of injury or fatality cases that would be reportable include a burn injury resulting from
steam released during cleaning; a physical injury from a cap blown off by pressure during a
pressure test; or a chemical burn from a spill while taking a sample. Examples of injuries or
fatality cases that would not be reportable include a fall from an elevated work station while
performing maintenance; a burn from a fire in a laboratory or office building; or injuries from an
excavation cave-in. None of these cases are directly due to the release of energy or material from
the process.
2. Direct Damage Cost

A fire, explosion or clean up necessary to avoid/remediate environmental damage resulting in a
direct cost equal to or greater than $2,500 USDs
Costs to be considered for this threshold should be those costs directly attributed to the fire
and/or explosion, such as the replacement value of equipment lost, structures lost, cost of repairs,
environmental cleanup (on and off site), emergency response and/or fines. Direct cost does not
include indirect costs, such as business opportunity losses, loss of profits due to equipment
8
outages, cost of obtaining or operating temporary facilities or cost of obtaining replacement
products to meet customer demand (product losses).
3. Shelter in Place / Evacuation

An officially declared shelter in place or evacuation either on or off site OR a precautionary
shelter in place or evacuation off site
For the purposes of this reporting, an officially declared shelter in place or evacuation, on or off
site, OR a precautionary shelter in place or evacuation is declared off site would trigger this
threshold
Officially Declared – A declaration by a recognized community official (e.g. fire, police, civil
defense, emergency management) or delegate (e.g. Company official) authorized to order the
community action (e.g. shelter-in-place, evacuation).
Precautionary Declaration - A precautionary public response is a measure taken from an

abundance of caution and issued by a recognized community official or delegate whom has
reasonably determined that such an evacuation or shelter in place was necessary to protect the
public health and safety.
Shelter in Place – is the use of a structure and its indoor atmosphere to temporarily separate
individuals from a hazardous outdoor atmosphere
Evacuation – the act or process of removing persons from a place for reasons of safety or
protection
4. Threshold Release
An acute release that exceeds one of the GHS thresholds in Table 1 or in the API 754 standard
for Tier II process safety release thresholds in Table 2 (measured in amount released during one
hour)
As mentioned in the Executive Summary, the ICCA process safety event definition allows use of
either GHS-based reporting thresholds developed by ICCA for the chemical release criteria, or
the UN Dangerous Goods (UNDG)-based reporting thresholds used in the RP-754 standard for
Tier II incidents. The GHS thresholds are listed in Table 1. It is intended for companies to
decide which table to use and to allow companies the option to use one system globally.
Acute Release – A release of flammable, combustible, or toxic chemicals from the primary
containment (i.e., vessel or pipe) greater than the chemical release threshold quantities is
described for GHS Classification Table 1 and in the API 754 standard for Tier II process safety
release thresholds in Table 2.
9
Pressure Relief Device: Acute Releases, defined above, include releases to a properly designed
and operating pressure relief device if a quantity is released greater than or equal to the threshold
quantities in Table 1 OR in the API 754 standard for Tier II process safety release thresholds
Table 2, that results in one or more of the following four consequences:
1. Rainout;
2. Discharge to a potentially unsafe location;
3. A n on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation, excluding precautionary on-site shelter-
Ain-place or on-site evacuation;
4. Public protective measures (e.g., road closure) including precautionary public protective
measures.
Releases to a properly designed and operating pressure relief device (such as a flare, scrubber,
etc.) do not have to be reported if they do not meet one of the four criteria above.
Individuals who would like to view the API RP-754 Standard may download that standard at -
http://www.api.org/environment-health-and-safety/process-safety/process-safety-
standards/standard-rp-754.
1 Hour Rule
For the purpose of the reporting under this metric, release thresholds are established for materials
over a one-hour time frame. If the release amount of a material reaches or exceeds the reporting
threshold in a 1-hour time period or less, it is reportable. Typically, acute releases occur in 1-
hour or less. If the duration of the release cannot be determined, the duration should be assumed
to be 1 hour.
Primary Containment – A tank, vessel, pipe, rail car or equipment intended to serve as the
primary container or used for the transfer of the material. Primary containers may be designed
with secondary containment systems to contain and control the release. Secondary containment
systems include, but are not limited to, tank dikes, curbing around process equipment, drainage
collection systems into segregated oily drain systems, the outer wall of double walled tanks, etc.
Severity Table Severity weighting can provide additional useful information about process safety
events that may help drive performance improvement. Appendix A is the RCLG methodology for
calculating a severity weight for process safety events. Using Appendix A, a severity weight for each
process safety event may be calculated by summing the points associated with each consequence
category. The ICCA strongly encourages the use of a severity weighting system as the use of such a
system increases the ability to communicate performance and is an easier way for our stakeholders
to understand process safety events. Also, the severity weight will not be comparable among other
process safety metric reporting formats.
10
Table 1 – GHS Classification Table
11
Table 2 – API RP 754 Tier II Classification Table
Threshold Threshold Threshold

a,c,d,e,f
Release Material Hazard Classification Quantity Quantity
b
Category (outdoor release) (indoor release)
T2-1 TIH Zone A Materials ≥ 0.5 kg (1.1 lb) ≥ 0.25 kg (0.55 lb)
T2-2 TIH Zone B Materials ≥ 2.5 kg (5.5 lb) ≥ 1.25 kg (2.75 lb)
T2-3 TIH Zone C Materials ≥ 10 kg (22 lb) ≥ 5 kg (11 lb)
T2-4 TIH Zone D Materials ≥ 20 kg (44 lb) ≥ 10 kg (22 lb)
Flammable Gases
OR
Liquids with Normal Boiling Point  35 °C (95 °F) and Flash Point
T2-5 ≥ 50 kg (110 lb) ≥ 25 kg (55 lb)
 23 °C (73 °F)
OR
Other Packing Group I Materials (excluding acids/bases)
Liquids with Normal Boiling Point  35 °C (95 °F) and Flash Point  23 ≥ 100 kg (220 lb) ≥ 50 kg (110 lb)
°C (73°F)
T2-6 OR or or
Other Packing Group II Materials (excluding acids/bases)
≥ 0.7 bbl ≥ 0.35 bbl
Liquids with Flash Point  23 °C (73 °F) and  60 °C (140 °F)

OR
Liquids with Flash Point  60 °C (140 °F) released at a temperature at
or above Flash Point ≥ 200 kg (440 lb) ≥ 100 kg (220 lb)
OR
T2-7 strong acids/bases (see definition Refer to draft RP 754 document) or or
OR
UNDG Class 2, Division 2.2 (non-flammable, non-toxic gases) excluding ≥ 1.4 bbl ≥ 0.7 bbl
air
OR
Other Packing Group III Materials
≥ 1000 kg ≥ 500 kg
Liquids with Flash Point  60 °C (140 °F) and  93 °C (200 °F) released
at a temperature below Flash Point (2200 lb) (1100 lb)
T2-8 OR
Moderate acids/bases or or
≥ 7 bbl ≥ 3.5 bbl
12
It is recognized that threshold quantities given in kg and lb or in lb and bbl are not exactly equivalent. Companies should select one of the
pair and use it consistently for all recordkeeping activities.
In determining the Threshold Release Category for a material, one should first use the toxic (TIH Zone) or flammability (Flash Point and
Boiling Point) or corrosiveness (Strong Acid or Base vs. Moderate Acid or Base) characteristics. Only when the hazard of the material is not
expressed by those simple characteristics (e.g., reacts violently with water) is the UNDGL Packing Group used.
a Many materials exhibit more than one hazard. Correct placement in Hazard Zone or Packing Group shall follow the rules of DOT 49 CFR
173.2a [14] or UN Recommendations on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods, Section 2 [12]. See Annex F.
b A structure composed of four complete (floor to ceiling) walls, floor and roof.
c For solutions not listed on the UNDG, the anhydrous component shall determine the TIH zone or Packing Group classification. The
threshold quantity of the solution shall be back calculated based on the threshold quantity of the dry component weight.
d For mixtures where the UNDG classification is unknown, the fraction of threshold quantity release for each component may be calculated.
If the sum of the fractions is equal to or greater than 100 %, the mixture exceeds the threshold quantity. Where there are clear and
independent toxic and flammable consequences associated with the mixture, the toxic and flammable hazards are calculated
independently. See Annex E, PSE Examples & Questions 49 - 53.
e A LOPC of Liquids with Flash Point > 60 °C (140 °F) and  93 °C (200 °F) released at a temperature below Flash Point cannot be Tier 1
PSE based upon quantity released no matter the volume.
f A LOPC of a moderate acid/base cannot be Tier 1 PSE based upon quantity released no matter the volume.
13
Appendix A – Severity Table: Using A Severity Weighting System is Encouraged for All Associations
Event Incident Categories

Severity Direct Cost from Fire or Material Release Environmental Impact
Level Safety/Human Health Community Impact
Explosion Within 1-Hr Period [off-site]
Level 4  Injury requiring treatment  Resulting in Direct  Release volume  Officially declared shelter-in-place  Acute Environmental
beyond first aid to an Damage Cost of between or officially declared evacuation Remediation Cost
employee, contractor, or (on or off site)
subcontractor.  Precautionary off site shelter in
1 point
$2.5 K ≤ up to $25 K 1x ≤ TQ < 40x place or evacuation $2.5 K ≤ up to $25 K
(Meets local regulations)
≤ 3 hours
Level 3  Days Away From Work injury to  Resulting in Direct  Release volume  Officially declared shelter-in-place  Acute Environmental
an employee, contractor, or Damage Cost of between or officially declared evacuation Remediation Cost
subcontractor, or (on or off site)
 Injury requiring treatment  Precautionary off site shelter in
3 points
beyond first aid to a third party $25 K ≤ up to $250 K 40x ≤ TQ < 160x place or evacuation $25 K ≤ up to $250 K
3 hours ≥ up to 12 hours
Level 2  A fatality of an employee,  Resulting in Direct  Release volume  Officially declared shelter-in-place  Acute Environmental
contractor, or subcontractor, or Damage Cost of between or officially declared evacuation Remediation Cost
 A hospital admission of a third (on or off site)
party  Precautionary off site shelter in
9 points
$250 K ≤ up to $25 MM 160x ≤ TQ < 640x place or evacuation $250 K ≤ up to $25 MM
12 hours ≥ up to 24 hours
Level 1  Multiple fatalities of  Resulting in Direct  Release volume  Officially declared shelter-in-place  Acute Environmental
employees, contractors, or Damage Costs of or officially declared evacuation Remediation Cost
subcontractors, or (on or off site)
 multiple hospital admission of  Precautionary off site shelter in
27 points
third parties, or ≥ $25 MM ≥ 640x TQ place or evacuation ≥ $25 MM
 A fatality of a third party
(Meets local regulations) ≥ 24 hours
14
(K = 1,000 MM = 1,000,000) (For Environmental Impact, companies and associations should agree on input criteria where definitions aren’t readily available)
Severity Table (Appendix A) Details
Appendix A above is designed to be used with the GHS Classification System ONLY (Table 1). If your company is using the API RP 754 Tier II Process Safety
Metric Threshold Table, Table 2 in this document, please use the API RP 754 Process Safety Severity Table. It is important to state that the severity table in the
API RP 754 Standard is for Tier 1 incidents only. Comparing the relative severity of events using different tables will not be statistically valid.
Acute Environmental Cost - Cost of short-term cleanup and material disposal, associated with a PSE with off-site environmental impact. Companies may choose
to assign severity to costs associated with off-site environmental impacts in a separate category.
Rate Adjusted Metrics
Utilizing the severity table described above, there are a variety of rate-based metrics which can be generated. These include:
Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR): Total event incidents x 200,000 ___
Total Worker Hours
Process Safety Incident Severity Rate (PSESR) (i.e., severity-weighted Process Safety incident rate formula):
Total severity score for all events incidents x 200,000___

PSESR = Total Worker Hours
In determining this rate, 1 point is assigned for each Level 4 incident attribute, 3 points for each Level 3 attribute, 9 points for each Level 2 attributes, and 27
points for each Level 1 attributes. Theoretically, a process safety event could be assigned a minimum of 1 point (i.e., the incident meets the attributes of a Level 4
incident in only one category) or a maximum of 135 points (i.e., the incident meets the attributes of a Level 1 incident in each of the five categories.)
PS Level “X*” incident rate: Total Severity Level “X*” PS incidents x 200,000
Total employee, contractor & subcontractor work hours
Where X* can be the total count of Severity Level 4, 3, 2, or 1 incidents. The severity level of an incident is the maximum severity rating of the five consequence
categories.
Normalization – In some associations and member companies, process safety events are normalized on a ‘per 100’ employee basis given that a one worker
averages 2,000 per year. So, to normalize on a ‘per 100’ employee basis, events are multiplied by 200,000 worker hours. In other associations and member
companies, events are normalized on a ‘per 500’ employee basis and events are multiplied by 1,000,000 worker hours. Associations and members should discuss
this option and come to a conclusion together. The above formulas are set at a ‘per 100’ employee rate.
15
(K = 1,000 MM = 1,000,000) (For Environmental Impact, companies and associations should agree on input criteria where definitions aren’t readily available)
Appendix B – Frequently Asked Questions
Applicability
It is recommended that companies record and report Process Safety Events occurring at Company-owned or
operated facilities, except as noted below:
1. PSEs that originated off Company property

2. Marine transport vessel incidents, except when the vessel is connected to the facility for the purposes of crude
or product transfer
3. Truck and/or rail incidents, except when the truck or rail car is connected to the facility for the purposes of
crude or product transfer
4. Routine emissions that are allowable under permit or regulation
5. Underground contamination that had no process safety consequences. Note: The exclusion does not apply if
the release resulted in an aboveground reportable PSE, such as release of toxic vapors or pooling of
flammable liquids
6. Office building incidents (e.g., office heating equipment explosions, fires, spills, releases, personnel injury or
illness, etc.)
7. Personnel safety "slip/trip/fall" incidents that are not directly associated with evacuating from, or responding
to a loss of containment incident
8. Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) incidents from ancillary equipment not connected to the process (e.g.,
small sample containers)
9. Planned and controlled drainage of material to collection or drain system designed for such service (Note:
Exclusion does not apply to an unintended and uncontrolled release of material from primary containment
that flows to a collection or drain system)
10. Mechanical work being conducted outside of process units or in maintenance shops
Interpretations and Examples – Based on GHS Table 1

The following interpretations and examples have been prepared to help clarify areas of potential uncertainty in
the evaluation of reportable Process Safety Incidents (PSE).
COMPANY PREMISES
1. A third-party truck loading a flammable product on Company Premises, experiences a leak and
subsequent fire and property loss damages of $7,000 (direct costs). Although the truck is "Operated-by-
Others", it is connected to the process. The incident would be a reportable PSE if property losses in direct
costs were equal to or greater than $2,500 or some other PSE threshold was met or exceeded (e.g., a
fatality).
2. Similar example as #1. The truck loaded with flammable product overturns in route out of the plant,
resulting in a fire and loss of the truck. This would not be reported as a PSE since the truck is no longer
connected to the plant.
16
LOSS OF CONTAINMENT
3. A faulty tank gauge results in the overfilling of a product tank containing “flammable liquids”.
Approximately 700 kg of liquid overflows into the tank's diked area. This incident is a reportable PSE
since it is an "acute" spill greater than 100 kgs, regardless of secondary containment.
4. A maintenance contractor opens a process valve and gets sprayed with sulfuric acid resulting in a severe
burn and lost time injury. This would be a reportable PSE. It is an unintended event involving a material
and a loss of containment. For fatalities and days away from work injuries and illnesses, there is no
release threshold amount.
5. An operator opens a quality control sample point to collect a routine sample of product and receives a
bad hand laceration requiring stitches due to a broken glass bottle and misses the next day of work. This
is not a reportable PSE because it is not related to a loss of containment.
ACUTE RELEASES
6. While troubleshooting a higher-than-expected natural gas flow rate, operating personnel find a safety
valve on the natural gas line that did not reseat properly and was relieving to the atmospheric vent stack
through a knock-out drum. Upon further investigation, it is determined that a total of 100,000 kg of
natural gas was relieved at a steady rate over a 6 month period. This is not a reportable PSE as the release
rate (~10 kg per hour) is not “acute”, (i.e. does not exceed the 100 kg TQ for flammable vapors per 1
hour time period).
FLARES & EMISSION CONTROL DEVICES (e.g., scrubbers)
7. If a chemical is routed to a flare or emission control device (e.g., scrubber), it would not be classified as a
PSE as long as that flare or control device operates as designed.
8. If a scrubber is overwhelmed by a flowrate greater than the design of the scrubber system and discharges
a chemical in excess of the reporting threshold, it would be reported as a PSE as noted about in this
document.
As a note, an upset emission from a permitted or regulated source – including pressure relieve devices -
of a quantity greater than or equal to the threshold quantities in Table 1 or 2 in any one-hour period, that
results in one or more of the following four consequences:
o rainout;
o discharge to a potentially unsafe location;
o an on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation, excluding precautionary on-site shelter-in-place
or on-site evacuation;
o public protective measures (e.g., road closure) including precautionary public protective
measures;
Should be reported as a PSE.
17
SAFETY RELIEF DEVICE / SYSTEM
9. There is a unit upset and the relief valve opens to an atmospheric vent which has been designed, resulting
in a gas release to the atmosphere with no adverse consequences. This would not be a reportable PSE
since vapors and gases released to atmosphere from safety valves, high-pressure rupture disks, and
similar safety devices that are properly designed for that event per API Standard 521 or equivalent are
excluded, as long as the release did not result in (1) a liquid carryover that created a reportable PSE
related to the liquid (e.g., lost time incident, fatality, a fire or explosion that caused $2,500 or more of
direct cost, liquid release or toxic aerosol release at or above threshold amounts, etc.), or (2) activation of
a shelter-in-place response on or off-site, or (3) public protective measures be taken.
10. There is a unit upset and the relief valve fails to open, resulting in overpressure of the equipment and an
"acute" release of flammable gas from a leaking flange. The amount released is above the 100 kg (within
1 hour) threshold. This is a reportable PSE. Releases from flanges are not excluded from PSE reporting.
DAYS AWAY FROM WORK INCIDENTS
11. An operator is walking, then slips and falls to the floor and suffers a lost time injury. The slip/fall is due
to weather conditions, "chronic" oily floors and slippery shoes. This is not a reportable PSE. Personnel
safety "slip/trip/fall" incidents that are not directly associated with evacuating from or responding to a
loss of containment incident are specifically excluded from PSE reporting.
12. Same as above, except that the operator slipped and fell while responding to a small flammable liquid
spill (e.g., less than 10 kg in 1 hour). This would be PSE reportable since the operator was responding to
a loss of containment incident. A PSE is reportable if the loss of primary containment occurs on
Company Premises and results in a lost time incident or fatality. For fatalities and lost time incidents,
there is no release threshold amount.
13. Same as above, except that the operator slipped and fell several hours after the incident had concluded.
This would not be PSE reportable. The terms "evacuating from" and "responding to" in the reporting
exclusion mean that the loss of containment and associated emergency response activities are on-going.
Slips/trip/falls after the event have concluded (such as "after-the-fact" clean-up and remediation) are
excluded from PSE reporting.
14. A scaffold builder suffers a lost time injury after falling from a scaffold ladder while evacuating from a
loss of containment incident on nearby equipment. This is a reportable PSE.
15. An operator walks past an improperly designed steam trap. The steam trap releases and the operator's
ankle is burned by the steam, resulting in a lost time injury. This is a reportable PSE because even though
the loss of containment was steam (vs. hydrocarbon or chemical), the physical state of the material was
such that it caused a lost time injury.
18
16. An enclosure has been intentionally purged with nitrogen. A contractor bypasses safety controls, enters
the enclosure and dies. This is a reportable fatality, but not a reportable PSE since there was no
unplanned or uncontrolled loss of primary containment.
17. Same as above, except that nitrogen inadvertently leaked into the enclosure. This would be a reportable
PSE (and fatality) since there was a fatality associated with an unplanned loss of primary containment.
18. An operator responding to an H2S alarm collapses and has a injury. If the alarm was triggered by an
actual unplanned or uncontrolled H2S LOPC, the event would be a reportable PSE. If the alarm was a
false alarm, the event would not be a reportable PSE because there was no actual release.
PIPELINES
19. A pipeline leaks and releases 2000 lbs (900 kgs). of flammable vapor above ground within 1 hour.
However, the release occurred in a remote location within the site. The release is PSE reportable, since
"remoteness" is not a consideration.
FIRES or ENERGY RELEASES NOT ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL RELEASE
As a general rule, a fire or energy release is reported as a PSE only if caused by chemical release or results in
a chemical release in excess of the reporting quantities. Examples include:
20. An electrical fire impacts the operation of the process resulting in the release of 400 kg of toluene. This
event would be reported as a PSE since if the chemical release exceeds the 100 kg reporting threshold for
toluene.
21. An electrical fire, loss of electricity, or any other loss of utility occurs which may cause a plant shutdown
and possibly incidental equipment damage greater than $2,500 (e.g., damage to reactors or equipment
due to inadequate shutdown) but does not create a chemical release greater than the threshold quantity, or
cause a fatality or serious injury. This event would not be reported as a PSE since the equipment damage
was not caused by a chemical process fire/explosion and there was not a chemical release greater than the
threshold quantity.
MARINE TRANSPORT VESSELS
22. A company operated Marine Transport Vessel has an onboard "acute" spill of combustible material
greater than 100 kg. The event is not PSE reportable since Marine Transport Vessel incidents are
specifically excluded, except when the vessel is connected to the refinery, petrochemical, or chemical
manufacturing facility for the purposes of crude or product transfer.
23. A third-party barge is being pushed by a tug and hits the company dock. A barge compartment is
breached and releases 1,000 kg of diesel to the water. The event is not a reportable PSE since the marine
vessel was not berthed at the dock and actively involved in crude or product transfer operations.
19
TRUCK AND RAIL
24. A company railcar derails and spills more than 1,000 kg of gasoline while in transit. The incident is not
PSE reportable since rail incidents off company property are specifically excluded.
25. A third-party truck/trailer overturns while in the Company Premises, resulting in an "acute" spill of
gasoline greater than 1,000 kg. The incident is not reported as a PSE reportable if the truck is no longer
connected to the loading/unloading facilities. However, it is recommended that companies also have
transportation incident metrics, which would capture this event.
26. A contract truck hauler is unloading caustic and the hose separates and generates an airborne aerosol
and/or liquid caustic spill of 2500 kg. The event is a reportable PSE since the caustic TQ of 100 kg was
exceeded and the truck was still connected to the loading/unloading facility immediately prior to the
incident.
OFFICE BUILDING
27. There is a boiler fire at the Main Office complex, and direct cost damages totaled $75,000. The incident
is not PSE reportable since Office Building incidents are specifically excluded.
MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE INCIDENTS
28. An operations technician is injured while working around the finishing equipment in a polymers plant.
The injury is caused by the mechanical, man-machine interface with the equipment. This would not be a
reportable Process Safety Event because there was no loss of containment of hazardous material.
MIXTURES
29. If a mixture by itself has a GHS classification you use that classification to determine the threshold. If the
mixture itself does not have a GHS-classification, we go back to the individual components of the
mixture and based on kg released per threshold group calculate a ‘weighted’ contribution to the
thresholds. Example: a release of 100 kg of a mixture in a one hour period that consists of 0.5 kg of a
substance classified as acute toxic H300, 4.5 kg of substance classified with H301 and 40 kg of a
substance with another H-number and the remaining 55 kg of water with no GHS classification would be
calculated as 0.5/1 + 4.5/10 + 40/100 = 0.5 + 0.45 + 0.4 = 1.35 is exceeding 1 and would be counted as a
reportable process safety incident even though none of the individual hazardous components exceeded
the threshold for the individual substance.
DIRECT DAMAGE COSTS
30. Direct damage costs are considered for this threshold should be those costs directly attributed to the fire
and/or explosion, such as the replacement value of equipment lost, structures lost, cost of repairs,
environmental cleanup, emergency response and/or fines. Direct cost does not include indirect costs,
such as business opportunity losses, loss of profits due to equipment outages, cost of obtaining or
operating temporary facilities or cost of obtaining replacement products to meet customer demand
(product losses).
20
31. As an example, a leak of flammable gas occurred in a vent line connected to a gas treatment system. At
the same time, a failure in the process allowed air to enter in the same vent line. An explosion occurred
and the over pressure damaged the vent line and associated upstream equipment including a seal pot.
Nobody was hurt. The cost for repair was about $12,000. This is a PSE considering the cost to repair the
equipment due to the explosion and fire.
32. As an example, after a PSE event, a company releases 50 kg of a very special, GHS Category 5 product
which causes $2,000 of damage to equipment. The product released was a very special blend of
materials and the company incurs over $50,000 in materials associated with the product loss. This event
is not reportable as PSE since the reportable threshold for GHS Category 5 releases is 100 kgs and
product losses do not count as Direct Damage Costs.
NATURAL DISASTERS
33. Natural disasters can present substantial risks to chemical process operations and damage to plant
equipment which may result in a loss of containment of hazardous substances. Where the potential for
one or more types of natural disasters is deemed relevant to plant operations, process safety and
operational systems shall address the applicable risk in terms of hazards and consequence analysis, plant
design, operating procedures for loss of utilities and process shutdown, and emergency planning and
response.
Types of natural disasters includes hurricanes and typhoons (including associated storm surge) , floods,
tornadoes, earthquakes, derechos (straight line wind storms) , wildfires, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis,
and avalanches.
If your facility experiences a natural disaster that triggers one or more of the thresholds, it should
be reported as a process safety event.
PRECAUTIONARY PUBLIC RESPONSE
34. A precautionary public response is a measure taken from an abundance of caution. For example, a
company may require all workers to shelter-in-place in response to an LOPC independent of or prior to
any assessment (e.g., wind direction, distance from the LOPC, etc.) of the potential hazard to those
worker. For example, a recognized community official (e.g., fire, police, civil defense, emergency
management) may order a community shelter-in-place, evacuation, or public protective measure (e.g.,
road closure) in the absence of information from a company experiencing a process safety event, or ‘just
in case’ the wind direction changes, or due to the sensitive nature of the potentially affected population
(e.g., school children, the elderly).
ACTIVE WAREHOUSE
35. An active warehouse is an on-site warehouse that stores raw materials, intermediates, or finished
products used or produced by a process. From a process perspective, an active warehouse is equivalent
to a bulk storage tank. Rather than being stored in a single large container, the raw materials,
intermediates, or finished products are stored in smaller containers (e.g., totes, barrels, pails, etc.).
21
Appendix C – List of RCLG Taskforce Members
Name Affiliation
Peter Schmelzer Bayer, CEFIC - Chairman
Americo Diniz Carvalho Neto Braskem

Bradford Johnson American Chemistry Council
David Cummings DuPont
Debra Phillips American Chemistry Council
Hans Schwarz BASF
Kathryn Walton Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association
Kazuyuki Akita Japanese Chemical Industry Association
Kelly Keim ExxonMobil Chemical Company, API Representative
Kenan Stevick Dow
Kiyokazu Murata Japanese Chemical Industry Association
Larry Bowler SABIC
Lorna Young Chemical Industry Association of Canada
Louisa Nara Center for Chemical Process Safety
Luiz Shizuo Harayashiki Associação Brasileira da Indústria Química
Masatoshi Kumamoto Japanese Chemical Industry Association
Milton Lacerda Petrobras
Phil Scott Chemical Industries Association
Piet Knijff DSM, European Process Safety Centre
Scott Donaldson and Eamon Shell
Chandler
Scott Wallace Olin Corporation
Shakeel Kadri Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
22
Appendix D – Detailed Schedule of Events
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Feb - April Jan - Dec Jan – Feb Jan – Feb Jan – Feb
RCLG PS Pilot Program RCLG Association Reporting of process safety Reporting of process safety Reporting of process safety
membership begin incidents to RCLG begins incidents to RCLG begins incidents to RCLG begins
collecting PS data from for associations with data for associations with data for all associations
May – their members (2017 data) (2018 data)
Adjustments/clarification Process Safety incident
to guidance document April April reporting becomes part of
RCLG reviews outcomes, RCLG reviews outcomes, the recommend base set
June Jan – Dec challenges and raw data challenges and raw data of RCLG KPI metrics (2019
Report outcomes of pilot Associations hold from the first reporting from the second reporting data)
program to RCLG and ICCA workshops on Process cycle cycle
Board Safety and performance (internally) (internally) April
reporting, utilizing RCLG RCLG reviews outcomes,
July - December funds and experts if challenges and raw data
 RCLG associations needed June June from the second reporting
consider guidance RCLG share draft data with RCLG share draft data with cycle
and develop ICCA Board ICCA Board (internally, consider
reporting external reporting)
methodology for July - December July - December
their memberships Update and adjust Update and adjust June
 RCLG associations guidance as necessary guidance as necessary RCLG share draft data with
can request ICCA ICCA Board
capacity building Associations hold Associations hold
funds for PS workshops on Process workshops on Process
reporting Safety and performance Safety and performance
workshops for reporting, utilizing RCLG reporting, utilizing RCLG
members, if funds and experts if funds and experts if
needed needed needed
23
Appendix E – Optional Excel Reporting Form
When member companies begin tracking process safety events, a single form should be utilized for all member companies to make data analysis
easier and to allow all members to work from the same tracking sheet. The RCLG has developed an optional tracking sheet that members and
associations can start with when developing their own tracking sheet.
DOWNLOAD TRACKING SHEET HERE:
ICCA Process Safety

Event Tracking Sheet.xlsx
This document consists of a contact page, the survey itself, and a ‘do not edit’ page where the drop down menu answer are stored.
24

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D E P A R T E M E N T T E C H N I Q U E

Guide ICCA* sur les indicateurs

Responsi ble Care ®

Il reflète l'état des connaissances scientifiques et techniques au moment où il a été écrit.

Le présent guide UIC DT118 est constitué de deux parties :

Version Groupe de travail « Responsible Care »

Les données à rapporter annuellement sont les suivantes :

Le taux PSE (PSER : PSE rate) sera normalisé comme suit :

Résumé des critères de sélection des PSE

NON : Ne remplit pas le critère

Nombre total d’heures travaillées

A - Une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique est impliqué et

Critères détaillés pour définir un PSE

Un ou plusieurs des seuils suivants sont atteints.

 Employés (Accident avec arrêt/ou décès)

3. Mise à l’abri / Evacuation

Mise à l’abri – Utilisation d’un local dédié pour mise en sécurité

4. Seuil de matière rejetée

Rejet – Rejet de matière selon les données du tableau 1

Règle 1 heure de fuite

Les pertes de confinement sont mesurées sur une durée de 1 heure.

Tableau 1 – Critères selon règlement CLP

Catégories Catégories Catégories

TORCHÈRES OU SYSTÈMES D’ÉMISSIONS CONTRÔLÉS

SOUPAPES – DISQUES DE RUPTURE

Une citerne ferroviaire en circulation sur L’incident se déroule en dehors des

INCIDENTS À L’INTERFACE HOMME/MACHINE

COÛT DIRECT DES DOMMAGES

MESURE DE PRÉCAUTION VIS-À-VIS DU PUBLIC

(Total Events / Total Hours) x 200,000 = PSER

Recommended Reporting Schedule

April 2015 RCLG considers Taskforce proposal

See Appendix D – Detailed Schedule of Events

NO: Does not meet the criteria

Yes: Reportable as a Process Safety Event YES

Total Worker Hours

Process Safety Event

A. When a chemical substance or a chemical process is directly involved; AND

Release of Material – an unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material, including non-toxic

 Employee (Lost time and/or Fatality)

2. Direct Damage Cost

3. Shelter in Place / Evacuation

Precautionary Declaration - A precautionary public response is a measure taken from an

Threshold Threshold Threshold

T2-3 TIH Zone C Materials ≥ 10 kg (22 lb) ≥ 5 kg (11 lb)

T2-4 TIH Zone D Materials ≥ 20 kg (44 lb) ≥ 10 kg (22 lb)

Liquids with Flash Point  23 °C (73 °F) and  60 °C (140 °F)

≥ 7 bbl ≥ 3.5 bbl

Event Incident Categories

Rate Adjusted Metrics

Total severity score for all events incidents x 200,000___

1. PSEs that originated off Company property

Interpretations and Examples – Based on GHS Table 1

FLARES & EMISSION CONTROL DEVICES (e.g., scrubbers)

DAYS AWAY FROM WORK INCIDENTS

FIRES or ENERGY RELEASES NOT ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL RELEASE

MARINE TRANSPORT VESSELS

MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE INCIDENTS

DIRECT DAMAGE COSTS

PRECAUTIONARY PUBLIC RESPONSE

Americo Diniz Carvalho Neto Braskem

DOWNLOAD TRACKING SHEET HERE:

ICCA Process Safety