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 On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all
those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution
embodied the following pertinent provisions:

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Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art.
III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed
on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-
mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of
October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to
be unconstitutional.

Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petition was granted in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13, 1987.

þ Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation
Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can
this Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, receiving handout
materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination?

cThe Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated
as its basis that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-
equal bodies.

The respondent court erred when it placed the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Professional Regulation Commission in the same category. As already mentioned, with respect to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that
need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law
providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
Professional Regulation Commission.

Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be
reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo,this
rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:

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In view of the foregoing, we find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the
respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg.
129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:

 
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The contention is devoid of merit. In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final
order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved
exercised its quasi-judicial functions. This does not cover rules and regulations of general
applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and
functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to
preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil
Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts
even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the
respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a
watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.
It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must
be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees'
right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations.













 
 
  




Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for  with damages against
petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, asking that petitioners be compelled
to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, cum
laude, retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her all necessary credentials
evidencing her graduation with honors, and to pay her damages.

After trial, the lower court rendered its Decision dated January 29, 1986, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

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Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.The appellate court affirmed 
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decision of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a
Resolution of the appellate court dated July 7, 1987.

Hence, this petition where petitioners allege as grounds thereof-

(a) A university may not be compelled by  to grant graduation honors to any student
who, according to the university's standards, rules and regulations, does not qualify for such
honors; xxx

Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos (USC), during
the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of that school year,
she obtained a grade of "I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of "5's" (failures) in
Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.

The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC. Some
of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student were then carried over
and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good grades. However,
she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of Architecture and that the same would
be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall academic performance to determine if
she could graduate with honors.

The President of the USC informed the MECS that the university policy was that any failing grade
obtained by a student in any course would disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from
that policy would mean injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed to
graduate with honors; that the bad grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or
removed because her subjects were not "dropped" as required; that she had two failures and one
incomplete grade which became a failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade
within one year; and that while her three failures did not affect her graduation from the College of
Commerce, they nonetheless caused her disqualification from graduating with honors.

þWhether or not  is the proper remedy to compel a university to confer a degree
with honors. The secondary question is whether or not the refusal of that university to confer
honors would constitute bad faith so as to make it liable for damages.

cIt is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic
freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and
colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its
discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts
unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.

In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested
parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic achievements.
Therein it is provided, among others, that a student may not officially withdraw from subjects in
the curriculum if he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian.For an
incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or removal within the period
announced by the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically
becomes final. A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a
18
student from receiving honors.A failure in any subject disqualifies a student from honors. Good
moral character and exemplary conduct are as important criteria for honors as academic
achievements.

Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and is bound
to comply therewith.

It is precisely because she knew of these rules that she exerted all efforts to have her final grades
of "5's" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 be disregarded in the computation of honors.

Nevertheless, even if she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was still within the sound
discretion of the petitioners to determine whether private respondent was entitled to graduate with
honors. The Court finds that petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the
honors sought by private respondent under the circumstances. Indeed, the aforesaid change of
grades did not automatically entitle her to the award of honors.


 
  




Respondent-students as then applicants to the University of the Philippines College, of
Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) which was the cutoff score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM
Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the University Council (UC) on April 8,
1986. However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cut-off score prescribed by the
UPCM Faculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88. Upon
appeal of some concerned Pre-Med students, the BOR in its 996 resolution dated February 24,
1987 reverted to the NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. Subsequently, the University General
Counsel, pursuant to the instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an investigation on the
student's case and recommended 


the admission of all applicants obtaining a percentile
rating ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of right". The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not
heed the BOR directive for them to admit the students.

After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction, the BOR in its 1001st meeting resolved


 that "the act of fixing cut-off scores in any entrance examination required in any college
of the University is within the authority of the College Faculty. Any question regarding the
exercise of such act should be elevated and resolved finally by the University Council of the
autonomous campus."

Meanwhile, the BOR in its 1031 meeting dated June 28, 1990, invoking its plenary power under
the Charter of the University over matters affecting university affairs, resolved to approve the
admission of the students in the interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit
them. The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to follow the BOR directive. Consequently,
the UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an
Order for their Preventive Suspension.

þWhether or not the BOR could validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to the
college of medicine. 

c Yes.The powers vested in the BOR and the UC by the UP Charter (Act No. 1870) are
clear. To the former belongs the governance and the general powers of administration of the
university (secs. 4, 5 and 6) and to the latter, the power to fix the admission requirements to any
college in the university (sec. 9). On the other hand, the University Code, Title II, Chapter 43,
Article 324 thereofgrants to the College Faculty the power to determine the entrance
requirements of the college 

 
 


 
   
4.From the foregoing, it
is evident that any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear
the UC's approval. Otherwise, the same becomes unenforceable.

The BOR only exercised its power of governance and its duty in seeing to it that all the units
abide with the law, university rules and regulations. Since the faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off
score of 90 percentile had become legally inefficacious, the students have all the right to stay in
the college inasmuch as they met the cut-off score of 70 percentile imposed by the UC. Under the
Constitution, the students have the right to select a profession or course of study subject to a


 


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(Article XIV, Section 5(3)).
While it may be true that the UC could ratify the acts of the College regarding admission
requirements, the same should be done within a reasonable time.

With Our findings in these cases, petitioners' argument that the BOR violated their academic
freedom cannot be sustained. The individual faculty member has the freedom to pursue his
studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his
endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions
are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or
academic establishments (Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277). In contrast, the University has the
academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study (Garcia case, ,  Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 263 [19571). As a
corporate body, the University has entrusted to its academic staff the 
 control of its
function of admission and examination of students (
Garcia, ). Under the UP Charter, the
power to fix admission requirements is vested in the University Council of the autonomous
campus which is composed of the President of the University of the Philippines and of all
instructors holding the rank of professor, associate professor or assistant professor (Section 9,
Act 1870). Consequently, the UC alone has the right to protest against any unauthorized exercise
of its power.

Academic freedom may be asserted by the University Council or by the Board of Regents or both
in so far () as it relates to the functions vested in them by law which are essential to
institutional academic freedom.

The academic freedom claimed by the faculty to have been violated by the Board of Regents
when it issued the questioned order is related to the right of the University to fix admission
requirements. This right and power to fix admission requirements is clearly vested by law in the
University Council. The College Faculty was merely empowered by the Board of Regents under
Article 324 of the University Code to initially determine the admission requirements, subject to the
approval of the University Council and the President of the University.