1. Torres vs People, G.R. No.

175074, 31 August 2011 - MALVERSATION

An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office.[21]  The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the
fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to
account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not
malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee.  Hence, a school
principal of a public high school, such as petitioner, may be held guilty of malversation
if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.

Petitioner also posits that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the
Information without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the accusations
against him.  He maintains that the Information clearly charged him with intentional
malversation and not malversation through negligence, which was the actual nature of
malversation for which he was convicted by the trial court.  This too lacks merit.

Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of

public funds or property, or passively through negligence. [22]  To sustain a charge of
malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the
prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the
offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of
negligence because both  are equally punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.[23]

More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed
through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform
penalty therefor. Even when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for
malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves
the mode of commission of the offense. [24] Explicitly stated -

x x x  [E]ven on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a
case of malversation by negligence, but the information was for intentional
malversation, under the circumstances of this case, his conviction under the first mode
of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either
intentionally or by negligence.  The dolo or the culpa  present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the felony.  Even if the mode charged differs from mode
proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. x
xx

2. Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, 29 July 2015 – MALVERSATION THROUGH
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
At any rate, we hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner of the complex crime
of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.
Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or
misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any
other person to take such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. 19

The elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are the following: (a) that the offender be a public officer; (b) that he had custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that those funds or property were
public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to
take them. All these elements have been established by the prosecution.
We also agree with the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that falsification was a necessary means to commit
the crime of malversation.
It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of
her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public
funds or property if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public
officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or property.
the petitioner argues that she could not be convicted of malversation through consent,
abandonment, or negligence because this allegation was not contained in the Information.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the
offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. All that
is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds,
that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not
satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the
accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his
accounts. 27

3. Mesina vs People, G.R. No. 162489, 17 June 2015 – MALVERSATION

The crime of malversation of public funds has the following elements, to wit: (a) that
the offender is a public officer; (b) that he had the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that the funds or property were public
funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them.11 chanrobleslaw

The elements of the crime charged were duly established against the petitioner.

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa is

only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from
the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is still committed; hence, a
conviction is proper.12 All that is necessary for a conviction is sufficient proof that the
accused accountable officer had received public funds or property, and did not have
them in his possession when demand therefor was made without any satisfactory
explanation of his failure to have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence
of the personal misappropriation by the accused is unnecessary as long as he cannot
satisfactorily explain the inability to produce or any shortage in his
accounts.13 Accordingly, with the evidence adduced by the State being entirely
incompatible with the petitioner’s claim of innocence, we uphold the CA’s affirmance of
the conviction, for, indeed, the proof of his guilt was beyond reasonable doubt
In addition, the Court notes that both lower courts did not require the petitioner to pay
the amount of P37,876.98 subject of the malversation. That omission was plain error
that we should now likewise correct as a matter of course, for there is no denying that
pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. The omission, if unchecked and unrevised, would
permanently deprive the City of Caloocan of the misappropriated amount. Such
prejudice to the public coffers should be avoided.

4. Garcia vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197567, 19 November 2014 – RA 3019, 3E,
MALVERSATION VS TECHNICAL MALVERSATION

The elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), 62 RA 3019 are as follows: (a)
the offender must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury
to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 63 chanrobleslaw

When a matter is irregular on the document’s face, so much so that a detailed

examination becomes warranted, the Arias doctrine is unavailing.

While Garcia insists upon the sufficiency of his evidence to indict respondents for
Technical Malversation, the Court cannot pass upon this issue, considering that the
Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Ombudsman originally charged respondents not
with Technical Malversation under Article 220 73 of the RPC, but with Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under
Article 217,74 in relation to Article 17175 of the RPC, a complex crime.76 It bears
stressing that the elements of Malversation of Public Funds are distinctly different from
those of Technical Malversation. In the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, the
offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other
person to take such public funds for the latter’s personal use. On the other hand,
in Technical Malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his
administration not for his or another’s personal use, but to a public use other
than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. 77 Technical
Malversation does not include, or is not necessarily included in the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds. 78 chanrobleslaw

5. Venezuela vs. People, G.R. No. 205693, 14 February 2018 – MALVERSATION, PAYMENT AND
DEMAND

Parenthetically, the elements of malversation are (i) that the offender is a public officer,
(ii) that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office, (iii) that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable, and (iv) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. 56
Seeking to be exonerated from the crime charged, Venezuela claims that he had fully
paid the amount of the unliquidated cash advances.
This contention does not hold water.
To begin with, it bears stressing that payment or reimbursement is not a defense in
malversation.63 The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise on
the amounts or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission of the crime,
does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from the
penalty prescribed by the law. At best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the
offender's civil liability, and may be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender.64
As for his other defenses, Venezuela claims that he was incorrectly charged for
Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217. He points out that he had ceased to
hold office as municipal mayor on June 30, 1998, when the COA auditors sent the
demand letter ordering him to liquidate his cash advances. Thus, the offense that must
be charged against him should fall under Article 218 of the RPC or Failure of
Accountable Officer to Render Accounts, which punishes an officer (incumbent or
retired) who fails to render an account of his funds. 65
Suffice it to say, demand is not necessary in malversation. Demand merely raises
a prima facie presumption that the missing funds have been put to personal use. The
demand itself, however, is not an element of, and is not indispensable to constitute
malversation.66 Malversation is committed from the very moment the accountable
officer misappropriates public funds and fails to satisfactorily explain his inability to
produce the public finds he received. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument
that Venezuela received the demand after his term of office, this does not in any way
affect his criminal liability. The fact remains that he misappropriated the funds under
his control and custody while he was the municipal mayor. To claim that the demand
should have been received during the incumbency of the public officer, is to add an
element that is not required in any of the laws or jurisprudence.

6. People vs. Lumauig, G.R. No. 166680, 07 July 2014 – MALVERSATION, DEMAND

To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements
must be present: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;
(2) That said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. 17

On the other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code are: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated therefrom;
(2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial
auditor; and,
(4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account should be rendered.18

The glaring differences between the elements of these two offenses necessarily imply
that the requisite evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused would
certainly differ in each case. Hence, petitioner’s acquittal in the anti-graft case provides
no refuge for him in the present case given the differences between the elements of the
two offenses.

Prior demand to liquidate is not necessary to hold an accountable officer liable for
violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code

7. Ramiscal Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 16927-28, 18 August 2006- RA 3019 3E
On the last issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that the crimes committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their offices defined and penalized under the Anti-Graft Law do
not exclude prosecution for felonies defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and vice
versa. Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.–In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear then that one may be charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the
Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being
charged with a felony under the Code.
8. Jaca vs People, G.R. No 166967, 28 January 2013 – RA 3019 3E, ARIAS

Admittedly, the prosecution could have alleged in the information the mode of
committing a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 with technical precision by using
the disjunctive term "or" instead of the conjunctive term "and." Nonetheless, in the
early case of Gallego, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 55 the Court already clarified that the
phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence" are
merely descriptive of the different modes by which the offense penalized in Section 3(e)
of RA No. 3019 may be committed, and that the use of all these phrases in the same
information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses.
Notably, a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed either by dolo,
as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as
when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. 56 Unlike in the commission
of ordinary felonies however, the law requires that the intent or negligence, which must
attend the commission of the prohibited acts under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, should
meet the gravity required by law. Thus, in construing these phrases, the Court
observed that bad faith or partiality, on the one hand, and negligence, on the other
hand, per se are not enough for one to be held criminally liable under the law; that the
bad faith or partiality is evident or manifest, or, that the negligent act or omission is
gross and inexcusable must be shown.57 ?r?l1
Gross inexcusable negligence is negligence characterized by the want of even slight
care; acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care
which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own
property;58 in cases involving public officials, it takes place only when breach of duty is
flagrant and devious.59 ?r?l1

Considering the countless scenarios that may fall under the provisions of Section 3 of
RA No. 3019, particularly paragraph e, and the avowed purpose of the law to repress
certain acts of public officers constituting graft or corrupt practices or leading
thereto,60 the law considers the gravity of the bad faith (or partiality) or negligent act or
omission as a mode to commit the violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. In requiring
the negligence to be both gross and inexcusable, the law demands the neglect or
disregard of duty to be willful and intentional in order for a violation to exist, although it
may fall short of the required degree of bad faith, which must be evident, or of
partiality, which must be manifest.
Contrary to the petitioners claims, gross inexcusable negligence, on one hand, and
evident bad faith or manifest partiality, on the other hand, are not two highly opposite
concepts that can result in a fatally defective information should the terms be conjoined
in the information. The fact that the prosecution can properly allege these different
modes alternatively in the information only means that the conviction may lie based
simply on the evidence that is supportive of a particular mode. 61 Significantly, aside
from the petitioners polemics, they have not shown how their right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against them has actually been violated; in fact,
they advanced no claim that the wordings in the information prevented them from
preparing their defense.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 has "three elements: (1) the accused is a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) he or she must have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence; and (3)
[his or her] action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
[gave] any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his or her functions.
The Court has since applied the Arias ruling to determine not only criminal, 91 civil92 and
administrative93 liability, but even the existence of probable cause to file an
information94 in the context of an allegation of conspiracy.
The Arias ruling squarely applies where, in the performance of his official duties, the
head of an office is being held to answer for his act of relying on the acts of his
subordinate. In its Memorandum, 100 the prosecution submitted that the petitioners were
the heads of the three "independent" offices at the time material to the controversy,
i.e., the Office of the City Treasurer, the Office of the City Accountant and the Office of
the City Administrator. On this point alone, Gaviolas reliance on Arias already stands on
shaky grounds. However, the Court observes that the key functions of the City
Administrator do not relate either to the management of or accounting of funds of the
local government or to internal audit. 
9. Santillano vs People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, 03 March 2010 – RA 3019, PRIVATE PERSONS, ARIAS

Clearly, the law punishes not only public officers who commit prohibited acts
enumerated under Sec. 3, but also those who induce or cause the public official to
commit those offenses. This is supported by Sec. 9, which includes private persons as
liable for violations under Secs. 3, 4, 5, and 6.

In petitioner's case, the finding of conspiracy is not unfounded. In all three criminal
cases, the prosecution was able to establish that Ecleo, Jr. and Navarra approved of
overpayments made to Santillano. The Sandiganbayan did not give much weight to
their weak defense of alibi. What is more, it correctly ruled that the doctrine in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan[22] could not be used by Ecleo, Jr. to escape liability, as the documents
he had to approve were not so voluminous so as to preclude him from studying each
one carefully. On the contrary, if he had the best interest of his constituents in mind, he
should have examined all the project documents, as a good deal of taxpayers' money
was involved. Navarra's alibi was also not enough to acquit her. She was not precluded
from signing the documents relating to the subject projects while she was on leave. She
also did not establish any proof that her signatures were forged. Worse, both Ecleo, Jr.
and Navarra were parties to an agreement that approved disbursement of funds for a
bogus municipal guest house and they could not come up with a plausible justification
for such a gaffe

10. Escara vs. People, G.R. No. 164921, 08 July 2005 – RA 3019 3E, ARIAS

In Arias, we ruled that:

All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the
good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a
department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily
expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest
whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food
was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy,
propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine
each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or
commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are
hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that
routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even
more appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a
voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.40 (Underscoring supplied) Ï‚rαlαωlιbrαrÿ

While in Magsuci, we held that:

Fairly evident, however, is the fact that the action taken by Magsuci involved the very
functions he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties. There has been
no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either
or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might have indeed been lax and
administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official reports submitted by
his subordinate (Engineer Enriquez), but for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that
there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product
of negligence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts. 41
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that Arias  and Magsuci find no application to the
instant case. What distinguishes petitioner's case from Arias and Magsuci is his
foreknowledge of the existence of an anomaly. 
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 requires proof of the following facts, viz:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official
duty or in relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross,
inexcusable negligence; and cralawlibrary

4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties. 45
11. Rivera vs People, G.R. No. 156577, 03 December 2014 -RA 3019 3E ARIAS
 Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The essential elements of such crime are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of the
functions of the accused. 33

The Court has consistently held that there are two ways by which a public official violates Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any
party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or both. The disjunctive
term"or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. 34

It is not enough that undue injury was caused or unwarranted benefits were given as these acts
must be performed through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 is enough to convict. 35

The terms partiality, bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence have been explained as follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they
are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong;
a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud."
"Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious in difference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take
on their own property
Perez invokes the Arias doctrine  which states that "[a]ll heads of offices have to rely to a
58

reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
supplies, or enter into negotiations." He contends that he merely relied on the vouchers and reports
prepared by his subordinates and released the paymentsin good faith.
To clarify, the Ariasdoctrine is not an absoluterule. It is not a magic cloak that can be used as a
cover by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates and necessarily
escape liability. Thus, this ruling cannot be applied to exculpate the petitioners in view of the peculiar
circumstances in this case which should have prompted them, as heads of offices, to exercise a
higher degree of circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared. 59

The case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan  carved out an exception to the Arias doctrine, stating that:
60

Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional circumstance which should
have prodded petitioner, if he were out to protect the interestof the municipality he swore to serve, to
be curious and go beyond what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine, the added
reason contemplated in Arias which would have put petitioner on his guard and examine the check/s
and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before signing the same was obtaining in this
case.
In the case at bench, Perez should have placed himself on guard when the documents and vouchers
given to him by his subordinates did not indicate the retention money required by P.D. No. 1594.
Moreover, when he personally inspected the construction site of PAL Boat, he should have noticed
the financial weakness of the contractor and the defective works. Deplorably, Perez kept mum and
chose to continue causing undue injury to the government. No other conclusion can be inferred other
than his manifest partiality towards PAL Boa
12. People vs Sandiganbayan and Perez, G.R. No. 188165, 11 December 2013 RA 3019 3B
n its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265, the Sandiganbayan
relied on the ruling in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,  in which the principal issue was whether or not
81

the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by petitioner Soriano, Jr., then a
Fiscal, was a "contract or transaction" as to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, which punished any public officer for "[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law." The Soriano, Jr. Court ruled
in the negative, and pronounced:
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was
it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which
precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in
credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to
have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. (Emphasis supplied)
The State now argues, however, that the Sandiganbayan thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the
term transaction in Soriano, Jr. considering that the term transaction should be construed more
liberally, and positing that Soriano, Jr. was already abandoned by the Court, citing for that purpose
the rulings in Mejia v. Pamaran,  Peligrino v. People,  and Chang v. People.
82 83 84

We disagree with the petitioner, and find for the respondents.

First of all, the interpretation in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 has not been overturned by the Court.
And, secondly, it does not help the State any that the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and liberally, considering
that laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and laws imposing penalties and forfeitures are to be
construed strictly against the State or against the party seeking to enforce them, and liberally against
the party sought to be charged. 86

Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the information
for failing to properly state the fourth element of the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019.
13. Enrile vs People, G.R. No. 213455, 11 August 2015 PLUNDER

the elements of plunder are: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other
persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
 series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback
or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection
with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or
any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment
in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]

The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a public officer who acts by
himself or  in connivance with x x x.” The term “connivance” suggests an agreement
or consent to commit an unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate
or take part secretly with another.91 It implies both knowledge and assent that may
either be active or passive.92 redarclaw

Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other
persons, and the Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila
Reyes conspired with one another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and
John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an essential element of the
offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been
acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of plunder, the
amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is
immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated
is at least P50 million.

We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by itself but
only as the mode of committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of
reciting its particulars in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged.

Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at
least P50 million by means of a combination or series of overt acts. 97 Under these
terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed
amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth –
whether through a combination or series of overt acts under Section 1(d) of
R.A. No. 7080 – is an important element that must be alleged.

When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for
example, raids on the public treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph
(1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under
Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].

On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Section 1,
paragraph (d) [for example, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public
treasury, all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)]. 98 redarclaw

The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt or
criminal acts.” Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at
least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if
this resulted from a single criminal act.

hus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall scheme or
conspiracy must not be generally stated; they should be stated with enough
particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be able to prepare the corresponding
refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.

We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In
the language of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth. 102 redarclaw

The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of action or method that
the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve
their common criminal goal. In the alternative, if no overall scheme can be found or
where the schemes or methods used by the multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal
acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common criminal goal. 103 redarclaw

Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege that a set of acts
has been repeatedly done (thereby showing a ‘pattern’ of overt criminal acts), as has
been done in the present case, we point out that this section does not dispense with the
requirement of stating the essential or material facts of each component or predicate
act of plunder; it merely prescribes a rule of procedure for the prosecution of
plunder

14. Arroyo vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016 - PLUNDER

15. Del Rosario vs. People, G.R. No. 199930, 27 June 2018 - SALN
16. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 147026-27, 11 September 2009 – 3019 PUBLIC
OFFICER

17. Nava vs Palattao, G.R. No. 160211, 28 August 2006 – RA 3019 3G

18. Ambil vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175457, 06 July 2011 – RA 3019 3E

19. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, 26 February 2002 – PLUNDER CONSPIRACY