Security, Drugs and Violence in Mexico: A Survey

NORTH AMERICAN FORUM
FORUM NORDAMÉRICAIN
FORO DE AMÉRICA DEL NORTE

2010

The integration of North America connects every geographical nook and
each financial aspect such that it is impossible to remain intact from the
economic downturns.

Difficult times foster human cooperation. The recent financial and
economic crisis and the current recovery boosted assistance between
monetary and financial institutions.

The 6th annual North American Forum provides a unique opportunity to
analyze the results of the mutually reinforcing goals of security,
prosperity and enhanced quality of life.

The overall goal of the Forum, as in previous years, is to advance in a
shared vision of North America, and to contribute to improve the
relations among the three neighbors. Our hope is to promote a better
global cooperation and the evaluation of the actions that governments
and private actors can take to recover from the recent economic
turmoil, as well as the return to a path of sustainable growth.

Peter Lougheed William Perry Pedro Aspe
Canada Co‐Chair United States Co‐Chair Mexico Co‐Chair

AGENDA

NORTH AMERICAN
COOPERATION IN A
CHALLENGING SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT

SAN MIGUEL DE ALLENDE,
GUANAJUATO, MÉXICO

SEPTEMBER 30, OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 2010
Sixth Annual North American Forum
September 30 – October 2, 2010
Hotel Casa de Sierra Nevada, San Miguel Allende, Mexico

Agenda

THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 30TH, 2010

6:00 PM Opening Reception
Casa Parque, Hotel Casa de Sierra Nevada

6:45 PM Welcome by CoChairs
Pedro Aspe, Former Finance Minister of Mexico
Peter Lougheed, Former Premier of Alberta
William J. Perry, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University; 19th US Secretary of Defense

7:00 PM Dinner
Garden, Casa Parque, Hotel Casa de Sierra Nevada

8:00 PM Keynote Address:
Enrique Peña, Governor, State of México

FRIDAY OCTOBER 1ST, 2010

8:00 AM Breakfast
Casa Principal, Casa de Sierra Nevada

9:00 AM Welcome and Review of Agenda
Pedro Aspe, Peter Lougheed, and William J. Perry
Casa Limón, Casa de Sierra Nevada

9:15 AM Keynote Address:
Paul N. Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, United
States

1
10:00 AM Session I: The Security Challenges: Combating the Drug
Cartels in Mexico
Moderator: Pedro Aspe
Panelists:
Genaro García Luna, Secretary of Public Security, Mexico
James Winnefeld, Commander, US Northern Command and
North American Aerospace Defense Command
Claude Carrière, Foreign and Defense Policy Advisor to the
Prime Minister of Canada and Deputy Secretary to the
Cabinet

11:00 AM Break

11:15 AM Session II: Collaborative Solutions: How the US and
Canada Can Assist
Moderator: Richard D. Downie, Director, Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies
Panelists:
William Elliott, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted
Police
Guillermo Valdés, Director, Center for Intelligence and
National Security (CISEN)
Don Chipman, Lieutenant Colonel, US Marine Corps

12:15 PM Break

12:30 PM Session III: Problem Solving: Open Discussion on
Strategy and Proposed Solutions
Moderator: William J. Perry, Co‐chair, North American
Forum
Open session with no panelists

1:30 PM Lunch

Carlos Pascual, US Ambassador to México

3:30 PM Break
2

3:45 PM Session IV: Energy Security in a Changing Climate:
Preparing for Cancun
Moderator: Mario Molina, Centro Mario Molina
Panelists:
Malcom Brown, Associate Deputy Minister, Natural
Resources, Canada
Eileen Claussen, President, Pew Center on Global Climate
Change
Mario Molina, Centro Mario Molina

4:45 PM Adjournment for the day

6:00 PM Callejoneada
Street walk through San Miguel colonial town

7:00 PM Dinner
Garden, Casa Parque, Casa de Sierra Nevada

Ernesto Cordero, Secretary of Treasury, Mexico

SATURDAY OCTOBER 2ND, 2010

8:00 AM Breakfast
Casa Principal, Casa de Sierra Nevada

Juan José Suárez Coppel, CEO, Pemex
Casa Limón, Casa de Sierra Nevada

Agustín Carstens, Governor, Banco de México

3

11:30 AM Session V: Economies in Recovery: Efforts and Impacts on
North America
Moderator: Thomas d’Aquino, Chairman and CEO,
Intercounsel Ltd. and Chief Executive, Canadian Council of
Chief Executives
Panelists:
Michael Horgan, Federal Deputy Minister of Finance
Gary Hufbauer, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, Peterson
Institute for International Economics
Jaime Zabludovsky, Executive President, ConMéxico

12:30 PM Break

12:45 PM Session VI: Conclusions by CoChairs
Pedro Aspe, Peter Lougheed, and William J. Perry

1:30 PM Lunch

2:30 PM Forum concludes

* * * * * * *
4

SECURITY, DRUGS, AND
VIOLENCE IN MÉXICO: A SURVEY

NORTH AMERICAN
COOPERATION IN A
ENVIRONMENT

GUANAJUATO, MÉXICO


SECURITY, DRUGS, AND
VIOLENCE IN MEXICO:
A SURVEY
PREPARED FOR THE SIXTH NORTH

AMERICAN FORUM 2010
Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez
(With the collaboration of Eunises Rosillo,

Roberto Arnaud and Ricardo Téllez)
i
Security, Drugs, and Violence in Mexico: A Survey
Preface
Acronyms
I. Diagnosis
1. The Security Sector
a. Main Areas
i. Federal Level
ii. State and Local Level
b. Budget
i. Federal Level
ii. State Level
c. Military and Police Forces
i. Military Forces
ii. Police Forces
(a) Federal Police
(b) State and Local Police
d. Regulatory Framework
e. Security Policy (2007-2010)
2. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime
a. Cooperation between Cartels and Gangs
b. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion, Vehicle Thefts
and Weapons Traffic
II. Organized Crime Violence

1. The Evolution of Violence
a. National Level
b. State and Local Levels
2. Causes of Violence
III. Government’s Strategy and Actions against Organized Crime

1. Strategy
2. Actions
a. Arrests
b. Seizures
i. Drugs
ii. Weapons and Vehicles
c. Dismantled Laboratories and Crop Eradication
ii
IV. Drug Market
1. Production
2. Prices
3. Data Analysis of Drug State Prices
4. Market Value and Estimated Income
5. Transportation and Distribution
a. Points of Entry, Routes of Transportation and Point of Exit
b. Violence and Geography of Business
6. Consumption
a. International Comparisons
b. Consumption at the State Level
V. Public Opinion and the War on Drugs
VI. A Final Assessment
Appendix
iii
Acronyms
AFI Agencia Federal de Investigación

[Federal Investigation Agency]
ATF U. S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives
CIDAC Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo
[Research for Development Center]
CISEN Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional
[Investigation and National Security Center]
CONADIC Consejo Nacional de Adicciones
[National Addictions Council]
CSN Consejo de Seguridad Nacional
[National Security Council]
FASP Fondo de Aportaciones a la Seguridad Pública
[Public Security Contributions Fund]
ICESI Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad
[Citizens Institute for Security Studies]
INEGI Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía
[National Institute of Statistics and Geography]
INM Instituto Nacional de Migración
[National Migration Institute]
INSYDE Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia
[Institute for Security and Democracy]
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement

NDIC U. S. National Drug Intelligence Center
PF Policía Federal
[Federal Police]
PFP Policía Federal Preventiva
[Federal Preventive Police]
PGR Procuraduría General de la República
[General Attorney Office]
PJE Procuraduría de Justicia del Estado
[State Attorney Office]
iv
SAT Servicio de Administración Tributaria
[Tax Service Administratio]
SEDENA Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional
[Secretary of National Defense]
SEGOB Secretaría de Gobernación
[Secretary of the Interior]
SEMAR Secretaría de Marina
[Secretary of the Navy]
SHCP Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público
[Secretary of Finance]
SIEDO Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en
Delincuencia Organizada
[Specialized Deputy Attorney on Organized Crime
Investigation]
SNSP Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública

[Public Security National Systema]
SRE Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
[Secretary of Foreign Affairs]
SS Secretaría de Salud
[Secretary of Health]
SSP Secretaría de Seguridad Pública
[Secretary of Public Security]
USAID United States Agency for International Development
v
Preface
This survey was written under the auspices of the North American Forum Co-Chair Pedro Aspe-Armella,
former Mexican Minister of Finance, to serve as a reference document at the Sixth North American Forum
(NAF). NAF is an annual meeting of American, Canadian and Mexican government and business
representatives to discuss a broad regional policy agenda that includes security, energy, and economic
issues. The Sixth NAF will be held at the city of San Miguel de Allende, Mexico (September 30 - October 2,
2010).
Pedro Aspe-Armella requested Eduardo Guerrero-Gutierrez the elaboration of the survey. The survey
provides an overview of the security sector in Mexico, the logic of Mexican organized crime, the dynamics
of organized crime violence, the government’s strategy and actions against organized crime, the main
features of the Mexican drug market, and the recent public opinion trends in Mexico regarding the “war on
drugs”.
Survey’s Data Sources
The survey exhibits extensive public data from Mexican government agencies, and from American and
international agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice and United Nations. Some tables and figures
derive from three databases constructed by the author, through the systematic recollection of information in
newspapers, weekly magazines, and press releases from official agencies.
The first database shows the number of organized crime executions. For its construction more than 25,000
news articles related to organized crime homicides were collected. These articles were taken from the
following 19 national and regional newspapers: Crónica, El Economista, El Financiero, El Gráfico, El Norte,
El Sol de México, El Universal, Excélsior, Imagen, Impacto, La Jornada, La Prensa, La Razón, La Segunda
de Ovaciones, Metro, Milenio, Ovaciones, Reforma, and UnoMásUno.
The second and third databases show the number of arrests, seizures, and dismantled laboratories. The
second database was constructed by analyzing 1,500 PGR press bulletins, and the third one was
constructed by collecting and analyzing around 20,000 press articles from the newspapers mentioned
above.
About the Author
Eduardo Guerrero-Gutierrez is a University of Chicago trained political scientist who, as a policy and
political analyst, has received the following awards: Joseph Cropsey Prize (University of Chicago), Carlos
Pereyra Award (Nexos Foundation, México), National Essay Award (Federal Electoral Institute, Mexico),
and the Accountability Award (Chamber of Federal Deputies, Mexico). Eduardo Guerrero has held
executive posts at the Ministry of Social Development, the Federal Institute of Access to Information, and
the Federal Electoral Institute. Eduardo Guerrero has also held advisory posts at the Office of the
President, the Center for Investigation and National Security, and the Chamber of Deputies. At present,
Eduardo Guerrero is partner of Lantia Consultores (www.lantiaconsultores.com), a consultant firm in public
affairs.
vi
I. Diagnosis
1. Security Sector
a. Main Areas
i. Federal Level
Despite the efforts made over the last decade to improve the coherence, coordination and cooperation of
the Mexican security sector, the problems of shifting and duplicated responsibilities in a number of
agencies, and of general instability, persist. These problems have resulted in uncoordinated efforts (and
often animosity) across federal, state, and local security and law enforcement agencies (particularly among
police agencies).
National security responsibilities are carried out by the president and seven cabinet ministries: the
Secretary of the Interior (SEGOB), the Secretary of Public Security (SSP), the General Attorney’s Office
(PGR), the Secretary of Finance (SHCP), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SRE), the Secretary of National
Defense (SEDENA), and the Secretary of the Navy (SEMAR). Two important security agencies are
subordinated to a couple of these ministries: the main agency of civil intelligence (CISEN) is a branch of the
SEGOB, and the Federal Police (PF) is a decentralized body of the SSP.
Security responsibilities are often duplicated across agencies because jurisdictional roles are not clearly
defined in the legislation, which in turn leads to overlapping jurisdictions. For instance, drug interdiction
activity is implemented by SEMAR, SEDENA, SSP and PGR.
While overlapping roles may provide checks and balances across agencies, the main issue is that there
seems to be confusion regarding hierarchy and responsibilities, which ultimately has led to bureaucratic turf
battles across agencies. The most recent case was a confrontation between SSP and PGR regarding the
scope and limits of PF investigative powers vis-à-vis the investigative power of the Ministerial Police. Such
confrontation ended with the resignation of the General Attorney in September 2009 and the approval in
Congress of a new PF law (June 2009) that created a branch of federal police with investigative powers
(see Appendix I Section d).
Five security agencies have experienced a high turnover rate at the executive level, which has produced
extreme instability. In the previous 45-month period, the following five agencies have switched their top
officials: the Ministry of Interior (four times), PGR (three times, the National Public Security System (four
times), the National Security Council (four times), and the PF (five times). (See Appendix I Table 1)
Each of the two chambers of Congress has a Commission on Public Security, and there is also a Bicameral
Commission on National Security. Formally, according to the Work Plan 2009-2010 of the Public Security
Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, its powers include the following: strengthening coordination
between institutions; promoting experience exchange and technical support among the three levels of
government; drafting studies about current criminal trends and rates; and creating and managing the crime
and violence database.
1
Formally, according to the Committee on Public Security of the Senate’s Work Plan 2006-20121, its lines of
work are the following: to learn about the national and international mechanisms of police functioning and
organization; to analyze, discuss, diagnose and determine the bills referred to this Committee; to
disseminate and establish a communication link with citizens and public agencies at the three levels of
government; to promote the allocation of adequate budgetary resources for public security and justice; and
to properly distribute the Federal Funds for Public Security to states and municipalities.
Formally, the policies and actions related to national security are subject to monitoring and evaluation from
the Congress through the Bicameral Commission for National Security. Formally, this commission has the
following powers: 1) to request specific reports to different public security sector institutions when
discussing a law or a case study concerning this subject; 2) to know the annual project of the National
Risks Agenda and issue an opinion about it; 3) to know the activity reports sent to the Executive Secretary
of the National Security Council (CSN) in order to make appropriate recommendations; 4) to know the
compliance reports given by the Executive Secretary of the CSN; and 5) to ask the appropriate authorities
the results of the reviews, audits and procedures to which they have been subjected.2
When the powers of the Bicameral Commission are reviewed, it is immediately perceived that legislative
monitoring and the evaluation of decisions and actions on national security matters are a mere aspiration.
Indeed, the powers of the Bicameral Commission are only directed at knowing the content of reports or
projects or, at best, to request information. Therefore, the Commission lacks the necessary de facto powers
to fully comply with its obligations to monitor and evaluate policies and actions related to national security.
So far, the only genuine, but limited, instrument of legislative oversight of national security agencies is the
Chamber of Deputies Audit Agency3, which reviews public accounts through financial audits related to
performance.
Finally, a crucial factor that has exacerbated the insecurity problem in Mexico has to do with the
performance of the judicial system. For example, about 75 percent of those arrested for alleged drug-
related crimes are acquitted. This is mainly due to two reasons: corruption in the courts and the
ineffectiveness of the investigative police and the public prosecutor (ministerio público, which is
subordinated to the Executive branch) to provide evidence.
ii. State and Local Level
The public security sector at the state level is composed by the state public security secretary, the state
attorney, the police corps (preventive and investigative) and the penitentiary system.
The role of the municipal police is to maintain order and peace in the community. To fulfill these functions,
the municipal police force and its subsidiary bodies should ideally perform the following activities: conduct
surveillance and take preventive measures over criminal activities, detention of felons and assistance
provision to the Public Attorney in prosecuting offenders, organize municipal criminal information and keep

1 Mexico, Cámara de Senadores. Retrieved from the Internet on September 6, 2010,
http://www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/LX/seguridadpublica/content/informe_plan/docs/plan_trabajo.pdf, Pp. 10-11.
2 Mexico, Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional. Retrieved from the Internet on September 6, 2010,
http://www.cisen.gob.mx/espanol/mecanismos_poder_leg_comision.htm
3 Auditoría Superior de la Federación.
2
databases, keep custody of municipal detention centers, communicate and coordinate efforts with state
police agencies, conduct surveillance of vehicles and pedestrians within the municipality and organize
municipal police archives.4
The situation of the penitentiary centers is an acute security problem in all the states. Overcrowding and
linkages between inmate groups and organized crime in these centers have compromised the control of the
authorities to such an extent that sometimes inmates carry out crimes outside the prison with the help of
the authorities. Recently, in July 2010, a group of inmates were allowed to leave the prison house to
execute 17 people in Durango. The prison authorities did not only let the inmates abandon the prison; they
also lent them their weapons and vehicles to commit the crime. The levels of penitentiary overcrowding in
Mexico can be illustrated with data.
Average national prison overcrowding was approximately 22% in 2009 and it is about 21% in 2010. The ten
states with the most severe problem of prison overcrowding are Distrito Federal, Nayarit, Sonora, Estado
de México, Jalisco, Morelos, Puebla, Chiapas, Guerrero and Tabasco. In these states, prison overcrowding
in 2010 ranges between 40 and 110 percent. The states with the largest penitentiary sub-population are
Zacatecas, Tlaxcala and Michoacán, where the population is 35 percent below its total accommodation
capacity.
b. Budget
i. Federal Level
SEDENA receives the largest share of the security budget (around 39 percent), while SSP has experienced
the largest budget increase in the last four years (from 22.2 percent of total security budget to 28.9
percent). It is worth mentioning that CISEN barely represents 1.9 percent of the total security budget.
SEDENA and SSP received most of the total expenditure budget allocated to the security sector (almost 70
percent). It is also striking to see the low amount of resources allocated to the national intelligence agency
(CISEN) in comparison to the other security agencies over the 2007-2010 period. This is consistent with the
federal strategic goal of developing a more professional and skilled federal police force. Finally, it is
important to consider that total security expenditures ranged between 5.6 and 4.6 percent of federal budget
from 2007 to 2010.

4Mexico, Secretaría de Gobernación. Retrieved from Internet on September 6, 2010,
http://www.inafed.gob.mx/wb/ELOCAL/ELOC_La_seguridad_publica_municipal
3
Table 1. Budget Expenditure by Security Agency (in Millions of Pesos)
Agency 2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010* %
SEGOB 6,827.3 7.4 7,712.0 8.1 9,695.9 7.7 8,370.6 7.5
SEDENA 39,623.0 43.1 39,493.1 41.4 49,407.1 39.3 43,632.4 38.9
SEMAR 14,113.2 15.3 16,123.0 16.9 17,938.0 14.3 15,991.9 14.3
PGR 10,949.9 11.9 9,521.8 10.0 11,906.0 9.5 11,781.5 10.5
SSP 20,447.4 22.2 22,490.3 23.6 36,879.6 29.3 32,437.8 28.9
SEGOB* (CISEN) 1,292.7 1.4 1,351.6 1.4 2,615.2 2.1 2,140.6 1.9
Total 91,960.8 100 95,340.2 100 125,826.5 100 112,214.2 100
Total as percentage of total federal government
5.6% 4.0% 4.7% 4.6%
expenditures
*Allocated budget.
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública Federal, 2007, 2008, 2009. A
GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each year, was used to calculate the budget amount at constant prices (2010
chained pesos).
Note: In 2007 the total exercised budget was 1,634,181.6 million pesos, in 2008 it was 2,371,510.7 million pesos, and in
2009 it was 2,703,128.5 million pesos. The total Federal Budget Expenditure in 2010 was 2,425,552.7 million pesos.
All security agencies experienced a budget increase between 2008 and 2009 (in the cases of SSP and
CISEN the increase was 64 and 93.5 percent, respectively). However, during 2010 all agencies experience
a budget decrease between 1.0 and 18.1 percent mainly due to the global economic crisis. The two
agencies that were least affected by these budget cuts were SEMAR and PGR, which suggests that these
two agencies are top priorities for the current administration.
Table 2. Annual Budget Variation by Security Agency

Agency 2008 2009 2010*
SEGOB 13.0 25.7 -13.7
SEDENA -0.3 25.1 -11.7
SEMAR 14.2 11.3 -10.8
PGR -13.0 25.0 -1.0
SSP 10.0 64.0 -12.0
SEGOB* (CISEN) 4.6 93.5 -18.1
Total 3.7 32.0 -10.8
*Assigned budget
Tables 3, 4 and 5 in Appendix I show the differences between assigned resources and spent resources by
each agency of the security sector in 2007, 2008 and 2009. In sum, in 2007 occurred an over-expenditure
of the budget with an average of 11.5 percent. It can be noted that SSP spent 29 percent more than its
assigned budget for 2007. In 2008, SEMAR is the agency that spent more (13.2 percent more in relation to
the assigned budget), while PGR spent 3.8 less of its assigned resources. Finally, for 2009, in average,
there is no under-expenditure in public security. Nevertheless, SEGOB and PGR have spent less, with an 8
and 12 percent respectively.
4
ii. State Level
As shown on Table 2 of Appendix I, the state5 with the largest expenditure on security and law enforcement
in the country is D.F. Its expenditure on security and law enforcement takes up the largest share of its total
budget (12.9 percent). The second state that spends most on security (as a percentage of its total budget)
is Baja California, with 7.9. A remarkable fact is that D.F. spends 27 percent of the total security budget
allocated to all states.
As shown on Figure 1, state level security spending is not statistically significant nor exist a strong
correlation associated with state levels of crime and violence. Note that there is no correlation between a
high incidence of crime and violence (as displayed in Chihuahua, Baja California, Estado de México,
Sinaloa, and Guerrero) and the proportion of the budget that each state allocates to security expenditure.
D. F. is by far the state with the largest per capita security and law enforcement budget and it is not the
state with the highest incidence of violence and crime. This may be a result of both the population density
and that it is the country capital and seat of the federal government, and as such it needs to invest more in
security and law enforcement due to the highest risks it faces.
Figure 1. Per Capita Budget on Security and Law Enforcement

vis-à-vis the Criminal Incidence and Violence Index (2009-2010)
2,000
DF
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
Per capita budget
1,000
COL
800
BCS TAB
QROO SON BC
CAM MICH SIN
600
ZAC AGS JAL NAY CHIH
GTO GRO
COA OAX
400 YUC NL MEX
TAM
TLA PUE DGO
GRO CHIA MOR
HGO VER
200
SLP
-
- 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Violence index

Source: Presupuestos de Egresos Estatales, 2010. Índice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009, CIDAC.
http://www.cidac.org/es/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1000087
The Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública (FASP) is a federal fund to transfer resources to
each state's public security budgets. These resources are intended for recruitment, training, evaluation of

5As stated in Article 44 of the Mexican Constitution, the Federal District is the seat of the Powers of the Union and
capital of Mexico.
5
public security human resources, police equipment, establishment of the national telecommunications
network, and the national emergency line. These resources are allocated using the following criteria:
number of inhabitants (35%), crime rates (10%), prison occupancy rate (20%), progress in implementing
the National Program of Public Security (10%), agreed national projects in progress (20%), application of
FOSEG6 resources in programs and/or preventive actions (4%), and resources spent by municipalities on
public security programs and/or actions (1%).

During 2009 (January to September) a total of 6337.3 million pesos were allocated to states through FASP,
an average of 198 million dollars per state. The three entities that received the greatest proportion of
resources were Estado de México (495.1 million pesos), Distrito Federal (390.5 million) and Veracruz
(299.5 million). The states that received the fewest resources were Colima (94.8 million), Aguascalientes
(97 million) and Campeche (97 million). However, these funds registered high under-expenditure levels. In
2009, for example, only 38.7% of the FASP was spent. Between January and September 2009, the states
with the highest levels of money spent were Baja California (78.7%), Colima (76.2%) and San Luis Potosi
(75.5%). The states with the lowest expenditure levels were Jalisco (8.6%), Quintana Roo (10.6%) and
Guanajuato (11.3%).

According to information contained in the quarterly reports submitted to the SHCP7, the main reasons why
the funds are not exercised in full are the following: (a) delays on both the presentation and the approval of
the Technical Annexes of the agreements of coordination by the Executive Secretary of the National Public
Security System; (b) delays in issuing guidelines for spending the resources; (c) the lack of timely
administration of budgeted resources by SHCP; (d) a prolonged bidding process for procurement contracts,
leases and services; and (e) a long and complicated process to analyze and determine the programs and
goals that will be carried out.
SUBSEMUN (Subsidio para la Seguridad Pública Municipal) is a group of federal resources transferred to
the states, which in turn must be transferred to previously chosen municipalities. The aim of these transfers
is to advance in the New Police Model by means of professionalization, equipment and infrastructure. The
criteria for their allocation are the following: a) that during the previous year the municipality was
incorporated in SUBSEMUN; b) to have a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants; c) to be geographically
located in the state border; d) to be part of a conurbation (two or more localities from different municipalities
with a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants).
The states with the largest amount of resources transferred by concept of SUBSEMUN are D.F. (338.6
million pesos), Estado de México (338.6 million pesos) and Baja California (275 million pesos). The states
with the fewest received resources are Baja California Sur, Campeche, Tlaxcala and Zacatecas, which
received 30 million pesos each.

6Fondos de Seguridad Pública, in which are summed together FASP resources and others from state contributions.
7“Formato Único” annexes to each of the quarterly reports published online by SHCP.
http://www.shcp.gob.mx/FINANZASPUBLICAS/Paginas/InformeTrimestral_2.aspx
6
c. Military and Police Forces
i. Military Forces
As can be seen in Figure 2, SEDENA personnel registered a gradual increase since 1991, from circa
150,000 soldiers to 200,000 soldiers in 2009. The increase in the number of soldiers means that, over a
period of 20 years, the number of SEDENA available soldiers grew by 35 percent. In contrast with the
ascending trend in SEDENA personnel, over the last 20 years the number of SEMAR personnel remained
relatively stable.
According with the Third Government Report of President Calderón, SEDENA elements have get better job
benefits than previous years. For example, in 2009 their benefits were 55.9 percent higher than in 2006;
they received 7,234 house loans; working hours were more flexible; and finally, the elements received
specialized training equivalent to more than 15 days. All these have decreased desertion by 39.98 percent
compared to 2008. On the other hand, SEMAR has only promoted members and increased technical
training by $1,000 pesos a month to class and marine rankings.
Figure 2. Number of Military Personnel

250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
SEDENA Average SEMAR Average

Source: Data from Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for
2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.
ii. Police Forces
In total, there are 2,122 independent police agencies in Mexico, with jurisdiction at the federal, state and
municipal levels (see Table 3). Most policing services are provided at the state and local levels. Currently,
Mexico has approximately 407,7088 federal, state and municipal police officers, but approximately 90
percent (361,133) are under the control of state and local authorities. The remaining 43,000 officers are
under federal control.
Of the universe of 2,440 municipalities in the country, 2,021 had a municipal police force (83 percent). This
raises excessively the number of police agencies. At the time this survey was written, legislators were

8 This figure results from adding up the elements of federal police (46,575), state police (195,646) and local police
(165,487).
7
discussing a reform proposal that aims to fuse municipal police corps into a single state police force. Some
analysts also defend the idea of a single national force that absorbs state and local agencies.
Table 3. Number of Police

Agencies by Government Level
Number of
Government Level Police
Agencies
Preventive, PGR (Judiciary),
Federal 3
Migration
Preventive 32
Judiciary 32
State Transit 11
Bank, Commercial, Auxiliary 13
Touristic, Rural, Others 10
Municipal 2,021
Total 2,122
Source: Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, 2009. Information
Request No. 2210300015709.
(a) Federal Police
The Federal Police structure includes personnel from three agencies: the SSP, PGR, and the National
Migration Institute (INM)9. In the case of SSP, there was a significant personnel increase of its preventive
police during the 2007-2009 period, when it doubled. INM personnel also increased, while the PGR
personnel was reduced.
There has also been a significant increase in the number of federal police personnel over the 2009-2010
period (more than 10 percent in the case of preventive police officers). The number of migration police
officers has shown a notable increase too (24 percent). In contrast, ministerial police officers shrank by 20
percent. This reduction could be due to the fact that the new Ley de la Policía Federal gives investigative
power to the preventive police.

9 The INM is a decentralized agency of SEGOB.
8
Table 4. Federal Police Personnel Variation (2007 and 2009)
SSP
Federal Police
Agencies Percentage Percentage
2007 2009 2010
Variation Variation
Preventive Police 15,464 32,276 108.7 35,712 10.6
Jail Guards 1,301 1,670 28.4 2,055 23.1
Total 16,765 33,946 102.5 37,767 11.3
PGR
Ministerial Police 5,900 4,347 -26.3 3,472 -20.1
Total 5,900 4,347 -26.3 3,472 -20.1
INM
Preventive Police 2,832 4,298 51.8 5,336 24.2
Total 2,832 4,298 51.8 5,336 24.2
Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010.
(b) State and Local Police
Article 21 of the Federal Constitution mandates that public security is a shared responsibility among the
federal, state and municipal authorities. Nevertheless, due to low wages, lack of professionalization, and
inadequate recruiting processes, corruption is a widespread phenomenon especially among local police
officers.
The laws and programs related to public security implemented by Presidents Zedillo and Fox underlined
the importance of cooperation and collaboration among the three levels of government. Under President
Calderón, the issue of interagency coordination was again included, but it has not been achieved. When he
started its campaign against organized crime, President Calderón’s government found local police deeply
infiltrated by organized crime.
Figure 3 shows that there seems to be no strong correlation between the number of municipal and state
police officers, and criminal and violence incidence.
9
Figure 3. State and Municipal Police Officers
per 10,000 Inhabitants and Criminal Incidence and Violence (2009)
100
90 DF
State and Municipal Police Officers per 10,000 Inhabitants
80
70
60
50
TAB
40
MEX
YUC BCS
QROO
TLA OAX GRO
30
JAL MOR SIN
HGO SLP COL PUE
CAM
VER CHIA NL TAM
20 AGS MICH SON BC
GTO
ZAC COA NAY DGO CHIH
GRO
10
-
- 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Violence index

Lack of cooperation and coordination among the three levels of government is the major weakness of the
current Mexican struggle against drug trafficking organizations. States and municipalities do not collaborate
with the Federal Government. The reasons behind this situation might be the following: 1) current
legislation indicates that organized crime related felonies are under federal competence; thus state and
municipal governments shy away from getting involved in these type of incidents; 2) state and municipal
authorities (especially municipal police corps) are highly infiltrated by organized crime; and 3) the federal
authorities frequently deploy operatives against organized crime in different states without previous
consultation with local authorities, bringing about frictions among levels of government. Sometimes these
interventions by the federal government trigger waves of violence.
The lack of involvement in the federal strategy against organized crime on the side of state and local police
agencies is in part a byproduct of assigned legal jurisdictions, which depend on the type of the crime. This
typology distinguishes crimes on “common” or “federal” jurisdictions.
“Common” jurisdiction felonies (delitos del fuero común) are those whose effect falls on the affected person
because of the behavior of the criminal (for example, threats, property damage, sexual offenses, frauds,
homicides, house robbery, vehicle theft). These crimes are prosecuted by the Common Jurisdiction Public
Attorney, investigated by justice attorneys and judged by the Judiciary branch of each state.
“Federal” jurisdiction felonies (delitos del fuero federal) are those that affect the health, economy and
security of the country or the interests of the federation (for example, attacks to transport or communication
routes, smuggling, fiscal fraud, ecological crimes, drug trafficking, illegal possession of weapons, copyright
violations, money laundering, human trafficking, electoral crimes, etc). These crimes are prosecuted by the
10
Federal Public Attorney, investigated by the General Attorney and judged by the Federal Judiciary
branch.10
The lack of state and local police collaboration and involvement in the strategy against organized crime is
patent when we observe the evolution of the number of police officers in each state over the last few years.
For example, as shown in Table 5, Chihuahua (the most violent state in the country) did not increase its
number of police officers between 2007 and 2010. In fact, during this period the number of police officers in
this state decreased 3.3 percent. Something similar happened in Guerrero, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Baja
California, Durango and Tamaulipas between 2007 and 2009. In all these states, where there is a high
presence of organized crime, the efforts to strengthen police forces seem to be below the required level.
Finally, it is important to point out the increase in the number of police forces between 2009 and 2010 in
states such as Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo, Baja California, Guerrero, Nayarit, Zacatecas and
Durango.

10 Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre Inseguridad, Retrieved from the Internet on Septmeber 6, 2010,
http://www.icesi.org.mx/publicaciones/gacetas/federalismo_e_inseguridad.asp
11
Table 5. State Police Officers Variation
State Police
State Percentage Percentage
2007 2009 2010
Variation Variation
Aguascalientes 469 491 4.7 524 6.7
Baja California 403 447 10.9 980 119.2
Baja California Sur 18 15 -16.7 258 1,620.0
Campeche 627 939 49.8 917 -2.3
Coahuila 606 732 20.8 712 -2.7
Colima 658 631 -4.1 705 11.7
Chiapas 4,501 4,501 0.0 4,438 -1.4
Chihuahua 1,217 1,217 0.0 1,177 -3.3
Distrito Federal 77,132 80,803 4.8 83,973 3.9
Durango 126 172 36.5 255 48.3
Guanajuato 870 1,187 36.4 1,333 12.3
Guerrero 2,395 2,395 0.0 5,140 114.6
Hidalgo 2,586 2,707 4.7 2,707 0.0
Jalisco 4,213 5,361 27.2 5,800 8.2
México 30,694 35,367 15.2 36,675 3.7
Michoacán 3,091 3,091 0.0 3,117 0.8
Morelos 1,597 1,623 1.6 1,738 7.1
Nayarit 185 185 0.0 346 87.0
Nuevo León 2,062 2,072 0.5 2,176 5.0
Oaxaca 5,750 6,009 4.5 6,009 0.0
Puebla 6,892 6,710 -2.6 6,712 0.0
Querétaro 775 720 -7.1 720 0.0
Quintana Roo 945 299 -68.4 1,060 254.5
San Luis Potosí 3,759 3,882 3.3 3,882 0.0
Sinaloa 396 1,303 229.0 1,303 0.0
Sonora 261 719 175.5 417 -42.0
Tabasco 2,975 5,008 68.3 3,862 -22.9
Tamaulipas 1,192 1,464 22.8 1,428 -2.5
Tlaxcala 2,067 1,711 -17.2 1,954 14.2
Veracruz 10,437 11,826 13.3 11,651 -1.5
Yucatán 2,525 3,075 21.8 3,075 0.0
Zacatecas 295 400 35.6 602 50.5
Total 171,719 187,062 8.9 195,646 4.6
Average 5,366 5,846 8.9 6,114 4.6
In contrast with the increase of 4.6 percent in the state police corps between 2009 and 2010, municipal
police forces increased, on average, 3.8 percent. The only state that notably increased its number of
municipal police officers was Chihuahua (the most violent state in the country) with a 61.9 percent increase.
According to the Federal Public Security Secretary, organized crime spends 1,270 million pesos each year
in municipal police bribery, equivalent to a monthly payment of 7,967 pesos to each municipal police
officer.11 This represents a 155 percent increase in relation to the monthly average salary of a municipal
police officer in 2009.

11 Reforma, “Completa Narco Sueldo de Policías”, Sección Justicia, Retrieved from the Internet on August 6, 2010,
http://www.reforma.com/nacional/articulo/569/1136782/
12
Table 6. Municipal Police Officers Variation
Municipal Police
State Percentage Percentage
2007 2009 2010
Variation Variation
Aguascalientes 2,111 2,141 1.4 2,244 4.8
Baja California 6,697 6,528 -2.5 6,371 -2.4
Baja California Sur 1,837 2,005 9.1 2,387 19.1
Campeche 957 920 -3.9 869 -5.5
Coahuila 3,528 3,973 12.6 3,664 -7.8
Colima 1,186 1,126 -5.1 1,330 18.1
Chiapas 5,956 7,187 20.7 7,187 0.0
Chihuahua 4,603 4,482 -2.6 7,258 61.9
Distrito Federal * *
Durango 2,336 2,678 14.6 2,693 0.6
Guanajuato 8,061 8,848 9.8 9,198 4.0
Guerrero 6,885 6,885 0.0 7,838 13.8
Hidalgo 3,448 3,499 1.5 3,499 0.0
Jalisco 12,278 13,505 10.0 13,622 0.9
México 18,875 22,650 20.0 23,156 2.2
Michoacán 5,203 5,203 0.0 6,113 17.5
Morelos 3,546 3,578 0.9 3,651 2.0
Nayarit 1,691 1,691 0.0 1,865 10.3
Nuevo León 6,395 8,055 26.0 7,897 -2.0
Oaxaca 4,299 4,688 9.0 4,688 0.0
Puebla 6,208 6,460 4.1 6,460 0.0
Querétaro 1,922 2,357 22.6 2,357 0.0
Quintana Roo 3,146 3,528 12.1 3,528 0.0
San Luis Potosí 3,037 3,240 6.7 3,230 -0.3
Sinaloa 6,008 6,144 2.3 6,144 0.0
Sonora 4,637 4,777 3.0 4,912 2.8
Tabasco 3,819 4,172 9.2 4,265 2.2
Tamaulipas 5,384 5,777 7.3 5,617 -2.8
Tlaxcala 1,540 1,700 10.4 1,829 7.6
Veracruz 7,748 5,913 -23.7 5,913 0.0
Yucatán 1,329 3,465 160.7 3,465 0.0
Zacatecas 2,115 2,237 5.8 2,237 0.0
Total 146,785 159,412 8.6 165,487 3.8
Average 4,735 5,142 8.6 5,338 3.8
The next figure shows that the states which have a number of police officers (per 1,000 inhabitants) above
the UN recommended average are D.F. (with an excessive figure of 9.5 police officers per 1,000
inhabitants), Baja California Sur, Guerrero, Estado de México, Tabasco, Quintana Roo, Yucatán, Colima,
Tlaxcala, Morelos, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosí and Sinaloa (that is 13 out of 32). States with a high organized
crime presence such as Coahuila, Durango, Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Baja California, Michoacán and
Chihuahua are below the UN recommended average.
13
Despite the fact D.F. has almost the double of population than Nuevo León (96.5 percent more), the
number of police officers per 1,000 inhabitants in D.F is far superior because it employs 83,973 officers,
compared to 2,176 officers employed in Nuevo León.
Figure 4. Number of Police Officers in the Mexican States and the Minimum
Number of Police Officers Recommended by the United Nations Per 1,000 Persons (2010)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Guerrero
México
Tabasco
Colima
Tlaxcala
Oaxaca
Jalisco
Sonora
Nayarit
Campeche
Quintana Roo
Yucatán
Sinaloa
Hidalgo
Puebla
Distrito Federal
Nuevo León
Guanajuato
Zacatecas
Durango
Baja California Sur
San Luis Potosí

Morelos
Chiapas
Baja California
Chihuahua
Aguascalientes
Tamaulipas
Veracruz
Michoacán
Coahuila
Querétaro
2010 ONU

Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010. Population: CONAPO 2005-2050
projection.
Out of the most relevant eleven federal legislative pieces that relate to security and organized crime, four
have been approved during the current presidential term (see the topics of Appendix I Section d). These
laws regulate the intergovernmental public security system, the federal police law, the domain extinction
law, and the new PGR organic law. The laws are the following:
1. Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República (General Attorney Organic Law): This
law aims to organize the General Attorney’s Office.
2. Ley de la Policía Federal 2009 (Federal Police Law): This law regulates the organization and
operation of the Federal Police in its respective area of competence.
3. Ley Federal de Extinción de Dominio 2009 (Federal Law on Domain Extinction): This law regulates
forfeiture of property by the State.
4. Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública 2009 (General Law of the National Public
Security System): This law regulates the integration, organization and operation of the National
Public Security System.
To a certain extent, at the state level, public security efforts have been expressed through public security
laws, public programs, and other kinds of regulations. In this regard, all states have their own Public
14
Security Law; fourteen states (out of 32) have a Public Security Program, and only six states have
regulations on police professionalization. States with a high criminal incidence like Baja California,
Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Michoacán, Nuevo León and Sinaloa, do not have a public security
program or regulations over police professionalization.
Also, during the current administration have been reformed two constitutional articles in relation to public
and security (see Appendix I Section d). These articles are the following:
1. Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution (2008): Before the reform, this article gave the sole
responsibility over criminal investigations to the public prosecutor, it did not state any principles
over which police actions shall be carried out, or provided a description of public security and the
principles that govern the actions of the respective agencies. The reform of the Article 21 covered
three dimensions: judiciary procedures, police professionalization and public security.
2. Article 29 of the Mexican Constitution (2007): Article 29 states the procedure to suspend civil
guarantees in the whole country or in a determined place. This article was reformed in 2007.
Before the reform, the article said that in case of “invasion or a grave disruption of public peace
that puts the society in danger or conflict” (Art. 29, paragraph 1), the President, in accordance with
the state ministers, administrative departments, PGR and with the approval of Congress, can
suspend guarantees in the whole country or in certain parts.
Security policy objectives

1. Disruption of criminal organizations (short term)
2. Recovery of public spaces (short term)
3. Institutional strengthening (long term)
4. Decrease drug consumption (long term)
Policy achievements
1. In relation with the first objective, the government has implemented an active strategy. However,
high-level organized crime arrests have provoked, in some cases, divisions within the cartels and
with this the emergence of new organizations. These divisions and the retaliatory actions of
organized crime against the government have caused an abrupt increase of violence.
2. Regarding the second objective, the fragmentation of criminal organizations has led to their
geographic dispersion throughout the national territory, which has impeded the recovery of public
spaces. Now, criminal organizations maintain a stable presence in more municipalities than they
used to have back in 2006.
3. Regarding institutional strengthening, the federal government has moved ahead with the following
actions:
 Creation of a new federal police with rigorous professional standards and investigative
powers.
 Strengthening of the Attorney General’s Office. Two kinds of actions have been intensified:
professionalization of public attorneys and the detention of networks of public officials linked
to organized crime groups.
15
 Consolidation of the criminal database Plataforma Mexico in order to implement the
Sistema Único de Información Criminal (Single System of Criminal Information), which
centralizes information shared by federal, state and municipal governments.
 Strengthening of the Armed Forces. Considerable increase in the armed forces budget,
which has had two main effects: important improvements in personnel wages (especially in
low ranking officers) and improvement in equipment and operative capacity.
 Reform of the criminal justice system. The penal justice system has adopted oral trials,
become more simplified and transparent, as well as a regime of victims’ rights protection.
 In terms of public opinion, the government has recently made some changes that should
improve its communications efforts and capacity to manage information. Calderón recently
appointed Alejandro Poiré as Technical Secretary of the National Security Council and
spokesperson. Till now there was no federal government spokesperson for public security
issues, so Poiré’s appointment could solve the issues in communicating the federal strategy
to the public
 The government has recently made significant strides in setting up the means for going
after the financial side of cartel activities, including efforts to limit and monitor cash deposits,
money exchanges, and cash purchases, as well as legislation to help the government tackle
money laundering.
4. Finally, regarding drug consumption levels, the most recent national addictions surveys from 2002
and 2008 reveal an important increase in cocaine consumption patterns (which grew by 100
percent during this period). In the case of marijuana, the increase in the level of consumption was
20 percent. This shows that despite the preventive efforts of the government, drug consumption is
on an ascending trend. However, the number of Mexican citizens that consume drugs is still very
small in comparative terms.
High-Profile Arrests
1. Compared with previous administrations, the current government has been especially efficient in
arresting or killing criminal bosses.
2. During the first four years of the current administration the number of bosses arrested (18) has
dramatically increased in relation to previous administrations. They are the following: four from the
Sinaloa Cartel (Sandra Ávila Beltrán, Jesús Zambada García, Vicente Zambada Niebla and Ignacio
Coronel); six from the Beltrán Leyva Cartel (Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, Ever Villafañe Martínez, Carlos
Beltrán Leyva, Gerardo Álvarez Vázquez ,Édgar Valdez Villareal and Enrique Villareal Barragán);
three from the Tijuana Cartel (Eduardo Arellano Félix, Teodoro García Simental and Manuel
García Simental); one from the Zetas Cartel (Jaime González Durán); three from La Familia
Michoacana Cartel (Alberto Espinoza Barrón, Rafael Cedeño Hernández and Arnoldo Rueda
Medina); and one from the Juárez Cartel (Vicente Carrillo Leyva).
3. Current governmental actions against organized crime have also resulted in the death of some
important cartel bosses. This has been the case with the deaths of Arturo Beltrán Leyva in
December 16, 2009, boss of the Beltrán Leyva cartel, and Ignacio Coronel Villareal in July 29,
2010, boss of the Sinaloa cartel.
2. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime
According to new institutional economic literature, criminal organizations are companies that provide illicit
goods and services for which there is a high demand. Two essential features allow these companies to
operate successfully: the exercise of violence and the exercise of bribery. The first allows them to maintain
16
internal discipline, resolve disputes, prevent the entry of competitors, monitor their territory, and respond to
military or police harassment. The ability to corrupt, in turn, decreases or neutralizes the government's
action against the organization, which reduces the incentives of its members to defect and strengthens
internal cohesion.12
Once the criminal organization has a monopoly of violence in a given territory (a few blocks or a
neighborhood), its aspiration is to exercise quasi-governmental functions such as charging taxes (extortion)
and selling protection. So far, in several Mexican municipalities no organization has successfully imposed
itself over the others, hence the ongoing violence between drug cartels.
Number of Cartels, Internal Structure, and Modus Operandi. Within the Mexican illegal drug market two
types of organizations coexist: i) the large cartels that have the capacity to coordinate at the national and
international levels and which are involved mainly in illegal drugs exports to the United States; and ii) the
smaller organizations that compete locally for drug distribution and selling. The largest criminal
organizations have achieved a high level of vertical integration, which gives them a high degree of
coordination.13 In general, the larger criminal organizations strive to achieve some of the next features: a
centralized and hierarchical structure that maintains internal cohesion and reduces infiltration risks;
controlling monopoly prices to save resources by avoiding competition; increasing their corrupting capacity;
and, finally, obtaining access to the international financial markets.14
Typically, cartels have a hierarchical structure of five levels: the first is the “bosses” level; in the second
level are the specialized operators such as lawyers and accountants; in the next level are the lieutenants
and military leaders, known as logistics operators; the gunmen are located in the fourth level; and the
lowest level is the operative base, composed by drug dealers, drivers and drug smugglers. Kinship and
cronyism are important foundations for authority and legitimacy within the organization. Based on these
criteria, the cartels are able to maintain high, though vulnerable, levels of cohesion and internal solidarity.
Geographical Location. Zetas, Sinaloa, and Golfo are the three cartels with the most extended presence, in
19, 16 and 9 states, respectively. In six states there is only one established drug cartel: Campeche (Golfo),
Distrito Federal (La Barbie), Hidalgo (Zetas), Tabasco (Zetas) and Zacatecas (Zetas). The presence of just
one cartel is relevant because territorial struggles between two or more cartels leads to higher levels of
violence. In the absence of competition, the average number of executions per state is 37 per year; on the
contrary, in a contested territory the number of executions increases to 378 per year.15 Tlaxcala is the only
state without record of stable drug cartel presence.

12 Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, “Introduction”, in The Economics of Organized Crime, New York:
Cambridge University Press.
13 Vertically integrated companies are united through a hierarchy and share a common leader. The members of this
hierarchy combine different tasks to accomplish a common goal: to generate economies of scale in each company,
and synergies within the corporation to increase profits. Oil companies, for example, have a high level of vertical
integration as they have under their control such diverse tasks such as exploration, drilling, production,
transportation, refining, marketing and sales.
14 Fiorentini and Peltzman, Op. Cit., pp. 5-6.
15 This figure resulted from a MCO regression with a dummy variable. The figure is not significant at a 10 per cent
level, which may be due to the size of the sample (it only considers data from 2009), however it still shows an
existing correlation.
17
Table 7. Cartel Presence per State (As of August 2010)16
State ZET SIN OTH GOL LB LF MIL PS JUA DZP TIJ
Aguascalientes X X X
Baja California X X
Baja California
X
Sur
Campeche X
Coahuila X X X
Colima X X
Chiapas X X X X X
Chihuahua X X X
Distrito Federal X
Durango X X
Guanajuato X X X X
Guerrero X X X X
Hidalgo X
Jalisco X X X X
México X X X X X
Michoacán X X
Morelos X X X X
Nayarit X X X
Nuevo León X X
Oaxaca X X X
Puebla X X X
Querétaro X X
Quintana Roo X X X
San Luis Potosí X X
Sinaloa X X
Sonora X X
Tabasco X
Tamaulipas X X X
Tlaxcala
Veracruz X X
Yucatán X X
Zacatecas X
Total 19 16 11 9 5 5 4 4 3 1 1

16Cartel Key: ZET: Zetas, SIN: Sinaloa, OTH: Others, GOL: Golfo, LB: La Barbie, LF: La Familia, MIL: Milenio, PS:
Pacífico Sur, JUA: Juárez, DZP: Díaz Parada, and TIJ: Tijuana.
18
Over the last four years there has been an increase in the number of Mexican cartels. In 2007 there were
seven large cartels: Sinaloa, Golfo-Zetas, Tijuana, Juárez, La Familia Michoacana, Milenio and Díaz
Parada. By 2010, three new organizations appeared. First appeared the Zetas, originally Golfo hitmen. This
group is present in 19 states, and is considered to be the most aggressive and dangerous. Secondly, we
have La Barbie Cartel and, thirdly, the Pacífico Sur Cartel. These last two appeared as a result of a split
within the Beltrán Leyva cartel after the death of its leader, Arturo Beltrán Leyva. However, La Barbie was
arrested on August 30, 2010, so its small organization is at risk of disappearing.
Between 2007 and 2010, the number of intercartel conflicts has grown from four to eight. Yet, as the
number of conflicts between cartels has increased so has the number of alliances among them. Each cartel
is continually looking for ways to geographically expand its presence and control new points of entry/exit
and transport routes. This leads to local alliances among cartels as a way to ensure safe passage through
certain areas or to counterbalance rival cartels. In 2007 there were three cartel alliances (Sinaloa and
Juárez; Golfo and Zetas; and Sinaloa and Milenio); in 2010 there are six (Sinaloa and a faction of Tijuana;
Zetas and a Beltrán Leyva faction; Juárez and Zetas; Sinaloa, Milenio and La Familia; Golfo, Sinaloa and
La Familia; and Zetas and Juárez). The Sinaloa and Zetas cartels are the most active alliance-seeking
cartels.
From April 2008 to December 2009 the geographical location of criminal organizations radically changed.
This was, in part, a consequence of the Beltrán Leyva cartel split from the Sinaloa cartel. The Beltrán Leyva
organization (which rapidly became a cartel itself), made alliances in nine states with the Tijuana, Juárez,
and Zetas cartels to remove the Sinaloa cartel from strategic places for drug trafficking.
The ensuing confrontation between the Beltrán Leyva Cartel (and its allies) against the Sinaloa Cartel
drastically increased the levels of violence in the municipalities where the confrontations took place. The
death of the Beltrán Leyva cartel leader (Arturo Beltrán Leyva) in December 2009 divided the organization.
Interestingly, the drastic increase of violence between April 2008 and December 2008, and between
December 2009 and May 2010 have their immediate causes on federal government action aimed at
arresting Alfredo Beltrán Leyva in March 2008, and Arturo Beltrán Leyva (who died in the confrontation) in
December 2009.
The Beltrán Leyva Cartel allied itself with three cartels (Tijuana, Zetas and Juárez) to extend its presence in
nine states. The Beltrán Leyva cartel saw the alliance alternative as a practical way to gain entrance to new
markets and counterbalance rival organizations with a strong presence in those states.
Cartel Presence in Central America and the Southern Border
More than 200 gangs, with some 3,000 members, operate in the Mexican southern border states and
Central America. They control illegal traffic of people, drugs and weapons from Central America to Mexico
and the United States.17 Some of these gangs have established close connections with drug cartels,
assisting them in drugs and weapons traffic along the border. For example, Zetas are settling in
Guatemala, establishing training camps and recruiting former Kaibiles (Guatemalan elite soldiers).18

17USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, April 2006, p. 6.
18El Universal, “Presumen que Zetas y Kaibiles Entrenan Juntos,” March 30, 2008, retrieved from the Internet in July
12, 2010: http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/494002.html
19
Table 8. Cartels in the
Southern Border States
State Cartel
Zetas
Golfo
Chiapas Sinaloa
Milenio
Zetas
Quintana Roo Sinaloa
Golfo
Campeche Golfo
Tabasco Zetas
In January 2009 the Chief of the Colombian National Police informed that the “gravity center” of the Latin
American drug trafficking industry was in Mexico and that Colombian cartels only performed a subordinated
role in it.19 Now Colombian drug cartels are partners to their Mexican counterparts; they are mainly drug
producers and do not control transport routes and distribution networks in the U.S., at least not to the same
extent as Mexican drug cartels.20 Proof of this relationship was the detention in Mexico in July 2008 of Ever
Villafañe Martínez, considered one of the seven most important Colombian cartels bosses. Villafañe, boss
of the Colombian Norte del Valle Cartel, was Arturo Beltrán Leyva’s partner in a cocaine production and
distribution network that started in Colombia, passed through Mexico and concluded in the U.S. In this
relationship the Colombians were just drug providers; the Mexicans bestowed transportation routes and
distribution networks into every major American city.
The 2009 Latinobarómetro21 notes that the citizens of Central America have not rejected the idea of a
military government, and many feel a coup d’état would be acceptable in circumstances of state corruption
or where crime has been allowed to get out of control. The perception that crime is out of control often
leads to the perception that the police are incompetent, undermining public confidence in the government
as a whole. Even worse, in many areas of this region, the police are viewed as actively contributing to the
crime problem.
a. Cooperation Between Cartels and Gangs
Mexican cartels are dynamic organizations with a high adaptation capacity to new conditions. The logic of
the war waged by the government against drug cartels and other criminal organizations, together with the
business logic of expanding markets and rising profits, have pushed the cartels to take decisive steps
towards their professionalization. One of these steps is the practice of outsourcing specialized services
provided by the gangs, with which the cartels have established a relationship of mutual convenience.
Gangs offer various services to the cartels in the areas of drug enforcement, freight transport, distribution
and sale. Together with the cartels, gangs are also actively forayed into kidnapping, extortion, human
trafficking, money laundering, vehicle theft, and weapons traffic, which are typical organized crime
activities.

19 El Universal, “México, Centro de Gravedad del Narco: Colombia,” January 25, 2009, retrieved from the Intenet on
August 31, 2010: http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/571796.html
20 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2010. National Drug Threat Assessment, Washington: U.S Department of
Justice, p. 9.
21
Latinobarómetro 2009, Retrieved form Internet on September 10, 2010 http://www.latinobarometro.org/
20
There are at least five factors for which cartels hire gangs and the services they can provide:

1. The first factor is risk reduction and protection for the cartels. When they operate with semi-
autonomous cells, the leaders of the cartels reduce the probability of infiltration by government
agents or other criminal groups. Also, when gang members are arrested by the authorities or
recruited by rival cartels, they cannot provide information about the modus operandi of the cartel
because they simply do not have it: they have worked for the cartel but outside of it.
2. A second factor is related with the logistical, informational and operational advantages. The gangs
are located in various parts of the country and each one knows in detail the space they inhabit.
Cartel-gang collaboration allows them to carry out their activities swiftly, and it also increases
information flows between the leaders and its various cells across the country. In addition,
outsourcing increases versatility and specialization within the cartel.

3. A third factor is the effective exercise of violence. The gangs’ ability to display gang violence
throughout the country (especially in border areas in the north and south), is increasingly being
employed by the cartels. The ability to inflict high degrees of violence, together with the capacity to
bribe and corrupt, are essential assets for any organized crime organization.

4. The fourth factor is of economics nature: with gangs, cartels save resources. Outsourcing a gang
to perform certain tasks is cheaper than maintaining a bloated bureaucracy of gunmen.

5. Finally, the fifth factor is gang members are often drug consumers, resulting in considerable sales
and profits for the cartels.

Cooperation between gangs and cartels is maintained and assured in terms of mutual convenience. There
are at least five reasons why the gangs would collaborate with the cartels.

1. The first reason is financial gain. The cartels have resources to pay for the gangs’ services, to
reward efficiency and loyalty, and to encourage future cooperation. In addition, they often give
"concessions" to the gang to collect rents from retail drug dealers.

2. Second, by allying themselves with cartels, gangs ensure regular supplies of drugs (with
discounts).

3. Third, the link between gangs and cartels protects the gangs from police interference, and also
makes them immune to arrests or convictions.

4. Fourth, gang affiliation to a cartel creates a sense of solidarity between them and ensures their
continuity.

5. Finally, with this alliance gangs receive recognition from a drug cartel, which in turn strengthen its
group identity.

In Ciudad Juárez there are between 300 and 500 gangs, of which 30 have between 500 and 1,500
members. The largest gangs, like Barrio Azteca and Mexicles, exceed two thousand active members.
These two gangs cooperate, respectively, with the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels. However, these are not the
only two cartels that have developed networks with gangs in Juárez. Other large and aggressive gangs
21
have links with the cartels of Tijuana, Golfo and Zetas.

According to reports from the U.S. Department of Justice, Barrio Azteca is a "transnational" gang that
operates in both Mexican and American territory with a degree of sophistication rarely seen in groups of
that nature. According to the U.S. authorities, Barrio Azteca’s capacities are largely due to the financial and
logistical support it received from the Juárez cartel. The degree of organization of Barrio Azteca is such that
to avoid interception of their messages they have developed secret codes based on Náhuatl numerology
and phrases.
Another place where there has been an abrupt increase in the number of street gangs in Nuevo León,
where 1,500 gangs exist, of which 700 are located in the Monterrey metropolitan area. Information from the
local police indicates that 20 of these gangs are linked with the Zetas cartel. These gangs are smaller than
the Juárez gangs and are low drug consumers. Given hostile police actions towards them, gang leaders
induce their members to collaborate with drug cartels as a way to protect themselves from police
harassment. Local police officers frequently extort gang members, and cartels punish the police officers
who assault gang members.

In summary, youth gangs are becoming an important asset for Mexican cartels. With them, drug dealers’
criminal activities have multiplied and become more efficient. Furthermore, gangs that operate with cartels
have become more effective in avoiding and confronting law enforcement agencies. The overwhelming
presence of gangs in several parts of the country provides almost unlimited human resources for the
cartels. Hence, in order to disarticulate the gang-drug cartel link the Mexican government will have to
deploy, alongside the military and police offensive, a comprehensive policy that combines social and
security issues.
b. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion, Vehicle Thefts and

Weapons Traffic
In absolute figures the states with the highest incidence of kidnappings are Chihuahua, Estado de México,
Baja California, Michoacán and D.F. Regarding extortion, the states with the highest incidence are D.F.
Estado de México, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Veracruz and Chiapas. Finally, the states with the highest
incidence of vehicle theft are Estado de México, Baja California, D.F., Chihuahua and Nuevo León. These
three are typical organized crime felonies.
There is a strong and positive correlation between executions and kidnappings (0.75), vehicle thefts and
kidnappings (0.77) and vehicle thefts and extortions (0.78). Interestingly, the correlation between execution
and extortion is very low: 0.05. This shows that extortion is closely linked to intimidation activities against
civilians that are threatened in several ways but who are not killed to obtain potential financial gains. As
shown in organized crime theory, in the areas where extortion is prevalent the objective is not to generate
violence, but to perform criminal activities. Finally, the correlation between kidnapping and extortion is 0.43.
Weapons Traffic. Weapons smuggled through the Northwest border region have contributed to escalated
violence in Mexico. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Mexican
cartel members or associates acquire thousands of weapons each year in Arizona, California and Texas
and smuggle them across the border to Mexico.
22
One of the main reasons behind the increasing traffic of weapons has been the neglect of the U.S.
authorities to contain the problem. In 2004, neither Congress nor the Executive ratified the Assault
Weapons Ban, or any laws prohibiting the sale of high-powered weapons and other lethal weapons. Since
then, weapons are sold almost without restriction in the United States. In the American Southern border
states there are more than 7,000 gun shops.

To illustrate the extent of this problem, note that during the last three and a half years more than 76,000
weapons have been seized, of which more than half are assault rifles. Over 90 percent of these seized
weapons were produced and sold in the U.S. In addition, the government has seized more than 5,400
grenades and more than 8 million cartridges. Most of the weapons seized by the Mexican government were
bought in the border states of Texas, California and Arizona.
Well-armed traffickers increasingly outgun Mexican authorities, and nearly all of the illegal guns seized in
Mexico have been smuggled in from the United States. The weapons trade in many ways mirrors the
dynamics of the drug market. Drugs flow north from Mexico to the United States, and guns flow south from
the United States to Mexico. In 2004, it was estimated that there were 16.5 million illegal weapons in
Mexico. ATF data show that 90-95 percent of the guns used in drug violence in Mexico enter illegally from
the United States. Official numbers reveal that, between December 2000 and December 2005, Mexican
customs officials were able to confiscate a mere 1,791 weapons: not even one per day. In 2007, the
number of guns confiscated jumped to 9,000.
In addition, in 2007, the ATF started Project Gunrunner, an effort to stop the smuggling of guns into Mexico.
In 2005, ATF reported that more than 6,400 guns had been sent illegally into Mexico from the United
States. By the end of September 2007, after Project Gunrunner had been implemented, that estimate had
dropped to about 3,200.22

22Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Benjamin Bahney and Kevin Jack Riley, 2009, Security in Mexico. Implications for U.S.
Policy Options, Santa Monica: RAND, p. 37.
23
II. Organized Crime Violence
a. National Level
What are the main patterns of Mexican violence? In general, it is a selective type of violence led by rival
organizations and police and military authorities, driven by the chronic instability of criminal networks (to
which the government has contributed significantly), and their goal to win and retain routes and territories
for drug trafficking.
Figure 5 shows a dramatic increase in the number of executions in Mexico over the last 44 months. In
February 2007 there were approximately 100 executions per month; in August 2010 there were about
1,100. From January 2007 to June 2008 the number of executions oscillated between a 100 and 400
margin. However, in July 2008 the number of executions began to grow systematically until it reached its
current figure. There are two violence cycles triggered by a cartel boss detention in January 2008, which
caused the split of the Beltrán Leyva faction from the Sinaloa Cartel, and the death of Arturo Beltrán Leyva
in December 2009. Cartel’s boss detentions have increased the national levels of violence.
Figure 5. Number of Executions per Month at the National Level (Jan. 2007-Aug. 2010)
Source: Own elaboration with data retrieved from Reforma (2007-2009). Data for 2010 was collected from execution information from 19 national and
regional newspapers.
For 2007: Rolando Herrera, “Cimbra al país narcoviolencia”, Reforma, January 7, 2008, retrieved from Internet on August 11, 2010:
http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/reforma/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa_libre.aspx?ValoresForma=944688-
1066,ejecutadospormes2007&md5libre=5ea8feb75f2d7d3041e9188d3ba5ab0d
For 2008: “Ejecutómetro”, Reforma, retrieved from Internet on August 11, 2010:
http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_2009/
For 2009: Benito Jiménez, “Superan ejecuciones la cifra de todo 2009”, Reforma, August 8, 2010, retrieved from Internet on August 11, 2010:
http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/reforma/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa_libre.aspx?ValoresForma=1204495-
1066,ejecuciones2009&md5libre=3683c5148a45ffe5766715585a0f4237
24
Recently, the Mexican government has revealed some figures related to Mexican violence. According to
the National Security Council Technical Secretary, from December 2006 to July 2010 there have been
28,353 organized crime related homicides. According to this version, 80 percent of the organized crime
related violence was caused by seven conflicts among cartels. These conflicts are the following:
1. Cártel de Sinaloa versus Cártel de Juárez (Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa)

2. Cártel de Sinaloa versus Cártel de los Beltrán Leyva (Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Nayarit, Jalisco
and Guerrero)
3. Cártel de Sinaloa versus Cártel del Golfo (Durango, Coahuila, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Tabasco,
Quintana Roo and Chiapas)
4. Cártel de Sinaloa versus Cártel de Tijuana (Baja California)
5. Cártel de La Familia Michoacana versus Cártel de los Zetas (Michoacán, Estado de México,
Guerrero and Guanajuato)
6. Cártel del Golfo versus Cártel de los Zetas (Tamaulipas and Nuevo León)
7. Cártel de La Familia Michoacana versus Cártel de los Beltrán Leyva (Guerreo and Morelos)
Furthermore, according to the federal government, this 80 percent of the executions have taken place in
162 municipalities around the country.
If the killings continue to increase at the current rate the total number of executions will rise to about 75,000
by the time the government's term in office ends in December 2012.
25
b. State and Local Level
Violence increased in 21 of Mexico's 32 states during the first half of 2010. In 12 states (which include the
six northern border states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas)
the growth of violence has been associated with increased collaboration between gangs and cartels.
Table 9. Violence Trends by Mexican State

(Based on January-June 2010 Executions)
State Trend State Trend
Aguascalientes  Morelos 
Baja California  Nayarit 
BCS  Nuevo León 
Campeche  Oaxaca 
Coahuila  Puebla 
Colima  Querétaro 
Chiapas  Quintana Roo 
Chihuahua  SLP 
Distrito Federal  Sinaloa 
Durango  Sonora 
Guanajuato  Tabasco 
Guerrero  Tamaulipas 
Hidalgo  Tlaxcala 
Jalisco  Veracruz 
México  Yucatán 
Michoacán  Zacatecas 
Note: Trends calculated with a linear projection by
the least squares method based on the known
information.
In Ciudad Juárez, for example, located in Chihuahua, the largest and most violent gangs (such as Barrio
Azteca or Mexicles, each with about 3,000 members) are employed by drug cartels to smuggle, import
weapons, murder, extort and kidnap. Frequent police action against gangs is often the decisive factor that
pushes them to co-operate with the cartels, which offer them protection, among other benefits.
But in Mexico there are other types of violence that are not associated with gangs, which have distinct
dynamics. For example, in states such as Sinaloa, Michoacán and Durango violence is not linked to gangs,
but to clashes between disciplined bureaucracies of gunmen engaged in transporting and guarding drug
routes and territories.
Table 10 shows that the five most violent states in terms of executions between January 2007 and June
2010 were Chihuahua (5,708), Sinaloa (2,935), Guerrero (1,766), Michoacán (1,605), Durango (1,492) and
Baja California (1,463). In nine states the number of executions decreased from 2008 to 2009, these states
are: Aguascalientes (38-34), Baja California (617-320), Campeche (3-2), Estado de México (360-354),
Hidalgo (37-36), Oaxaca (49-6), San Luis Potosí (40-7), Tamaulipas (110-49) and Yucatán (17-0). The
national total grew from 5,207 in 2008 to 6,587 in 2009.
26
Table 10. Number of Executions by State
State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* Total
Aguascalientes 2 27 38 34 11 112
Baja California 163 154 617 320 209 1,463
Baja California Sur 1 1 0 1 6 9
Campeche 3 2 3 2 6 16
Coahuila 17 29 53 151 188 438
Colima 2 0 5 12 20 39
Chiapas 14 12 30 30 34 120
Chihuahua 130 147 1,652 2,082 1,697 5,708
D.F. 137 145 138 173 72 665
Durango 64 124 272 637 395 1,492
Estado de México 31 111 360 354 251 1,107
Guanajuato 25 40 61 146 56 328
Guerrero 186 253 294 638 395 1,766
Hidalgo 16 37 37 36 8 134
Jalisco 45 92 148 212 160 657
Michoacán 543 238 233 371 220 1,605
Morelos 10 17 28 77 84 216
Nayarit 1 2 5 22 109 139
Nuevo León 50 107 79 99 217 552
Oaxaca 17 33 49 6 59 164
Puebla 4 2 15 26 19 66
Querétaro 0 4 7 14 6 31
Quintana Roo 9 34 18 27 26 114
San Luis Potosí 1 13 40 7 26 87
Sinaloa 350 346 686 767 786 2,935
Sonora 61 125 137 152 218 693
Tabasco 19 24 20 54 22 139
Tamaulipas 181 88 110 49 379 807
Tlaxcala 0 1 1 3 0 5
Veracruz 25 48 30 55 45 203
Yucatán 0 1 17 0 1 19
Zacatecas 12 13 24 30 7 86
Total 2,119 2,270 5,207 6,587 5,732 21,915
Source: Own elaboration with data from Reforma for 2006, 2007, 2008
and 2009, and 2010 from a database with data from 19 national and
state newspapers.
http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_
2009/
Note: Data for 2010 is from January to June 2010
27
During the first semester of 2010 the most violent municipalities have been Juarez (17.5 percent of the
executions), Chihuahua (4.7), Culiacán (4.5), Tijuana (3.3), Torreón (2.7), Gómez Palacio (2.3) and
Mazatlán (2.3).
At the local level, violence is concentrated in six clusters or high-violence zones. The following table enlists
the municipalities that integrate each of these clusters and map 2 shows the clusters locations
Table 11. Six Clusters of Violent Municipalities (2007-2010)

Zone 1 (Baja Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Zone 6
California) (Chihuahua) (Chihuahua) (Sinaloa) (Michoacán) (Guerrero)
Ensenada Casas Grandes Chihuahua Ahome Morelia Zihuatanejo
Tijuana Ascensión Cuauhtémoc San Ignacio Uruapan Petatlán
Tecate Juárez Delicias Guasave Apatzingán Técpan
Guadalupe Camargo Sinaloa La Huacana Acapulco
Ahumada Hidalgo del Parral Salvador Alvarado Lázaro Cárdenas Chilpancingo
Mocorito Iguala
Navolato Arcelia
Culiacán Pungarabato
Badiraguato Coyuca
Source: Own ellaboration.
28
Map 1. Six Violent Municipalities Clusters (2007-2010)
29
At the local level, during 2010 the phenomenon of executed majors has intensified. As September 2010
nine mayors have been executed by organized crime (two from Chihuahua, two from Oaxaca, and one
from Guerrero, Durango, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas and San Luis Potosí). (See Appendix III Table 18)
Ciudad Juárez: Causes and Mechanisms of Violence
Given the exceptional violence levels reached in Ciudad Juárez, maybe here it is possible to see more
clearly the internal mechanisms that generate, amplify, escalate and spill over violence. Ciudad Juárez is,
by far, the most violent municipality in the country. During the January 2007-June 2010 period around
4,500 executions have been registered in this municipality. In mid-2008 the number of executions in Ciudad
Juárez increased till it accumulated 20 percent of national total of executions. This trend has sustained
along 2009 and 2010. Probably, Ciudad Juárez will close the year with 2,861 executions; this is about 21
percent of the national projected total.23 How did violence arrive to Ciudad Juárez? Why it has increased
exponentially? Along the process of violence in Ciudad Juárez can be distinguished the following groups of
events:
1. Alfredo Beltrán Leyva arrest → Detachment of the Beltrán Leyva faction from the Sinaloa Cartel
→ Frame of a coalition of organizations (Beltrán Leyva-Zeta-Juárez) to displace the Sinaloa Cartel
from the border passage in Ciudad Juárez-El Paso. This sequence of events had the effect of
activating or "igniting" the conflict in Ciudad Juarez, so this is called the "igniting effect."
2. The conflicting cartels hired teams of hitmen to undertake and sustain the war → There was a
massive recruitment of gang members by cartels → There was an alignment of gangs with the
warring sides in Ciudad Juárez → The cartels provided weapons to the gangs. This sequence of
events has the effect of "amplifying" the conflict, to swell the manpower and weaponry of each
side; this is why it is named the "amplification effect."
3. Neither side have sufficient capacity to defeat the other → The authorities are not involved in direct
confrontation to the sides in dispute → Security and law enforcement agencies are not able to
investigate the vast majority of violent events and to enforce the law. There were a few random
arrests. These events have the effect to "escalate" the conflict and the levels of violence, so it is
categorized as the "escalation effect."
4. The exacerbation of violence encouraged the involvement of more criminal organizations and
gangs in the dispute to strengthen the ranks of each party → The decapitation of such
organizations and gangs often encouraged fragmentation → Territorial disputes provoked that
some criminal organization and gangs move to other places. These events have the effect of
"spreading" violence to other areas, thus increasing violence in new, towns or municipalities that is
why it is referred to as "spillover effect".

23Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on the known information from a
database retrieved from 19 national and local newspapers.
30
2. Causes of Violence
Even though a systematic study about the causes of the increasing violence in Mexico has not been made,
there are two promising hypotheses. According to the U.N. 2010 World Drug Report, one reason behind the
violence in Mexico is that drug traffickers are fighting over a shrinking cocaine market. Indeed, cocaine
consumption has fallen significantly in the United States over the past few years. The retail value of the
U.S. cocaine market has declined by about two-thirds in the 1990s, and by about one quarter in the past
decade. However, the U.N. 2010 World Drug Report does not elaborate on this idea and does not mention
the specific mechanisms that have triggered Mexican violence.
The second hypothesis has to do with the effects of arrests and seizures on executions. A detailed analysis
of the data available reveals the following patterns of impact for detentions:
1. The impact of arrests on violence spreads to several months after they were performed.
2. The arrests of drug cartel bosses increase levels of violence, regardless of the cartel to which they
belong.
3. The arrests of cartel members operating for the Juárez, Tijuana and Beltrán Leyva cartels have
decreased violence (probably several of them were hitmen leaders). The same thing happened in
2009 with the arrests of members of the Golfo Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel members (although in
the latter case, the violence took a month to drop).
4. However, in the case of arrests of members from La Familia Michoacana and Zetas detentions
have increased levels of violence.
In the case of seizures:

1. The impact of seizures on violence can extend several months after the seizures event, and their
effect is also mixed: there are seizures that increase violence and others that decrease it.
2. Seizures of heroin, cocaine and marijuana have steadily increased the levels of violence in the past
three years.
3. The seizure of weapons and money systematically decreased violence.
This type of analysis could be useful in designing a new strategy that, in addition to weaken organized
crime, avoids triggering uncontrollable waves of violence. But for such strategy to be viable two conditions
are required: that the security agencies have the ability to implement a targeted strategy of arrests and
seizures; and that the decrease, or at least the containment, of violence becomes the new additional
objective of the government strategy.
A focused strategy of arrests and seizures means favoring police actions that reduce violence, such as the
arrest of hitmen leaders and multi-homicides and the seizures of weapons and money. It must also be
designed a specific strategy to confront the most violent cartels such as Zetas or La Familia Michoacana.
This is because these cartels’ organization, and their operation and deployment tactics, make them a
singular threat.24

24Eduardo Guerrero, “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico (2007-2009): Empirical Explorations.” Mexico, D.F.:
Lantia Consultores, April 2010, 36 pp.
31
III. Government Strategy and Actions against Organized Crime
1. Strategy
The main objective of the Mexican government with its “war on drugs” seems to be the generation of
hundreds of small criminal organizations that do not represent (for their size) a threat to the state and its
monopoly on the use of force (as in Colombia). This implies the replacement of current large cartels in
extended parts of the country with a variety of small drug enterprises. Without denying that this goal could
be achieved at some point, the fact is that given the size, number, resources, capacities (of violence,
among others), and the social base that the Mexican cartels currently have, the transition could be long and
costly in terms of social welfare and human lives. Moreover, in this hypothetical scenario the drug market
would not be affected; quite on the contrary, there would be a more competitive market composed of
businesses that, because of their small size and high mobility, would be more elusive to the authorities.
President Calderón has deployed an estimated 40,000 troops since December 2006, launching his first
military antidrug operation (Operación Michoacán) on December 11 of that year. Michoacán was
particularly hard hit by violence in 2006: there were more than 560 murders and 17 beheadings, and six
police officers were assassinated. This mixed operation involved 7,000 personnel, 5,300 of whom came
from various forces, and included armored cars, aircraft and surface vessels. Also, in 2006, Mexico
launched the Northern Border Initiative, a federal-state effort to fight violence that included the deployment
of 800 federal police officers to Nuevo Laredo, who joined the 300 federal officers already deployed there
under Operación México Seguro.
According to President Calderon Third Government Report (2009), SEDENA has deployed a monthly
average of 48,750 soldiers (24.1 percent of the total) that have participated in anti-drug operatives between
September 1, 2008 and June 2009. Hence, from January 2008 to June 2008 and 2009 periods, SEMAR
has deployed a monthly average of 7,324 navy elements (14.1 percent of the total for both years) in anti-
drug traffic operatives. In sum, the total number of military elements deployed by both agencies is 56,074,
which represents 22 percent of the total in 2008 and 2009.
2. Actions
a. Arrests
The number of detainees in 2004 rose well above the national average registered between 1994 and 2003.
During the first half of the current government, however, the number of detainees was similar to those from
the last two years of the previous government. Thus it can be said that the number of detainees per year
has been stable since 2004.
32
Figure 6. Detainees Related to Drug Trafficking Activities (1994-2009)
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
-
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Detainees Average
Source: Data from Informes de Gobierno from 1994 to 2008 (Government Reports). 2009 figures are
lineally projected based on the same year’s monthly average.
When we classify the number of detainees by hierarchical level, the distribution is quite uneven: 96 percent
of detainees belong to the lowest two ranks of organized crime organizations, 0.2 percent of detainees are
top members, and 3.8 percent are specialized or logistics operators.
Figure 7. Percentage of Detainees by Hierarchy Level

0.2% 2.0%
1.8%
Boss
Specialized Operator
55.2%
Logistics Operator
40.8% Hitmen/Guardian
Operative Base

Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins
The following table shows that the current government has made great efforts to increase the number of
detainees belonging to the three highest levels within criminal organizations. That is, although the total
number of detainees linked to organized crime remains more or less the same since 2004, top-level arrests
have increased year by year from 2007 to 2010 (as shown in Table 12 below). For example, Sinaloa, Golfo,
Zetas, La Familia Michoacana and Beltrán Leyva suffered the highest number of boss detentions during
2009 in comparison with those suffered in the first two years of this government. It is quite likely that the
increase in bosses’ arrests is linked with the increase in conflicts and confrontations among criminal
organizations and between criminal organizations and the government.
33
Table 12. Detainees by Cartel and Hierarchy Level
Cartel Hierarchical Level 2007 2008 2009 Total
Bosses 1 1 2
Sinaloa/Pacífico Specialized Operator 2 1 9 8 12 9 23 18
Logistics Operator 1 2 3
Bosses 1 1
Golfo Specialized Operator 10 2 9 3 19 10 38 15
Logistics Operator 8 6 8 22
Bosses 3 3
Zetas Specialized Operator 3 10 16 6 29 6
Logistics Operator 3 10 7 20
Bosses 1 1
Beltrán Leyva Specialized Operator 0 2 8 4 10 4
Bosses 3 3
La Familia Michoacana Specialized Operator 0 1 12 3 13 3
Bosses 1 1
Tijuana / Arellano Félix 4 0 0 4
Specialized Operator 3 3
Bosses 1 1
Juárez / Carrillo Fuentes Specialized Operator 1 11 1 1 13 1
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins. This table does not include data for
Milenio, Díaz Parada and Colima cartels.
Six cartel bosses have been extradited to the U.S during the current administration. One of them was a
Colombian cartel boss and partner of the Beltrán Leyva cartel. PGR information reveals that until February
2010, 316 criminals have been extradited, of which 299 have been extradited to the U.S.
Table 13. Cartel Bosses Extradited to U.S. During

the Current Administration (December 2006 to August 2010)
Name Organization Extradition Date
Héctor Palma Salazar Sinaloa January 19, 2007
Osiel Cárdenas Guillén Golfo January 20, 2007
Miguel Caro Quintero Sonora February 25, 2009
Beltrán Leyva and Norte del
Ever Villafañe Martínez April 17, 2009
Valle (Colombia)
Vicente Zambada Niebla Sinaloa February 18, 2010
Óscar Arriola Márquez Los Arriola March 4, 2010
b. Seizures
i. Drugs
From December 2006 to February 2010, 90.4 percent of the national marijuana seizures took place in only
10 states, and 26.4 percent of the total occurred in Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua alone, the region
known as the “Golden Triangle”. In the case of cocaine seizures, the vast majority of seizures occurred in
Oaxaca, with 26.5 percent. Also, the number of cocaine seizures was highly concentrated in 10 states. In
the case of heroin seizures, 59.5 percent occurred in three states: Sonora, Sinaloa and Chihuahua. Finally,
34
99.6 percent of methamphetamine seizures happened in just six states, in which Baja California
represented 25.7 percent of the seizures. In an aggregated sense, Michoacán, Estado de México and
Jalisco consistently appeared on the top four seizures list.
Table 14. States with the Largest Proportions

of Drug Seizures (December 2006 - February 2010)
Methamphetamine
Marijuana Seizures Cocaine Seizures Heroin Seizures
Place Seizures
State % State % State % State %
1 Sonora 21.3 Oaxaca 26.5 Sinaloa 26.3 Baja California 25.7
2 Tamaulipas 13.5 D.F. 13.8 Sonora 21.1 Michoacán 10.5
3 Sinaloa 12.4 Sonora 10.4 Chihuahua 12.1 México 10.1
4 Baja California 11.8 Chiapas 5.9 Nayarit 10.5 Jalisco 9.9
5 Durango 7.3 México 5.8 D.F. 10.0 Sinaloa 8.1
6 Chihuahua 6.7 Tamaulipas 5.6 Baja California 4.7 Sonora 7.9
7 Nuevo León 6.2 Guerrero 4.6 Jalisco 4.2 Colima 7.7
8 Michoacán 4.5 Quintana Roo 4.5 Michoacán 3.7 Chiapas 4.2
9 Coahuila 3.4 Campeche 3.5 Zacatecas 3.2 D.F. 4.0
10 Jalisco 3.3 1.3
Total 90.4 81.7 95.8 88.1
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from nine national
newspapers, and ten regional or state newspapers.
As shown in the following figures (Figures 8, 9,10 and 11), the amount of marijuana seized during the
current administration is similar to the amount seized during President Fox’s administration, and both are
well above the amounts seized during President Zedillo’s term. Regarding cocaine seizures, 2007 was well
above average. In the case of opium gum seizures, the average has decreased in comparison with 2001
and 2004 levels. Heroin seizures have been constant between 2000 and 2009.
According to U.S. authorities, the Mexican government’s increased pressure on cartels coincided with
cocaine shortages in 37 U.S. cities and a 24 percent increase in the retail price of cocaine, from $95.89 to
$118.70 per gram, from January to September 2007.25
According to the National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 (NDTA), the decrease registered since 2007 in
the amount of seized marijuana is because the army is focused on the campaign against organized crime
instead of crop eradication. Besides its regular duties in case of an emergency caused by natural disaster,
the army also participates in public security responsibilities and surveillance over strategic sites.

25 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Drug Control Policy Report (October 2007).

35
Figure 8. Marijuana Seizures (Tons)
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
-
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Marijuana Average
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth
Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report);
and Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for
2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
Figure 9. Cocaine Seizures (Tons)

60
50
40
30
20
10
-
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Cocaine Average
Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe
Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally
projected based on monthly averages.
Figure 10. Opium Gum Seizures (Kilograms)

600
400
200
-
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Opium Gum Average
Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and
Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are
lineally projected based on monthly averages.
36
Figure 11. Heroin Seizures (Kilograms)
600
400
200
-
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Heroine Average
There has been an important increase in the number of weapons and vehicles seizures. These two are
fundamental resources for organized crime business. In the case of weapons seizures it is possible that
this increase might be related to a higher availability of weapons in the country.
Figure 12. Weapons Seizures (Units, Includes Long and Short Weapons)
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Weapons Average
Source: Own elaboration with data from Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third
Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.
In the case of vehicles, organized crime frequently uses them for drugs and weapons transportation. It is
remarkable that the amount of confiscated vehicles over the last three years is superior to the amount
seized during the previous 13 years.
37
Figure 13. Seized Vehicles (Units)
15,000
10,000
5,000
-
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Vehicles Average
In terms of dismantled laboratories and crop eradication, these actions have been concentrated in nine
states. Between these two actions there is also a high degree of concentration of dismantled laboratories in
Michoacán, with 22.9 percent; and crop eradication in Sinaloa, with 28.4 percent (see Appendix IV Table
27).
Regarding marijuana and poppy crop eradication, it is possible to note that during President Calderon’s
administration, the amount of eradicated crops is below the registered average since 1994. Above average
eradication occurred between 1999 to 2006 in the case of marijuana, and 2000 to 2006 in the case of
poppy.
The next figure shows a dramatic increase in the number of dismantled illegal drug laboratories. In the first
two years of President Calderón’s term, the levels were kept within the average from previous years.
Figure 14. Dismantled Laboratories (2000-2009)

250
200
150
100
50
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009
Laboratories Dismantled Average
Source: Vicente Fox, Quinto Informe de Gobierno (Fifth Government Report); Felipe Calderón, First,
Second and Third Government Reports; Fifth Attorney General Management Report (2005).
Note: There is no available data for 2006.
38
Figure 15. Marijuana Eradication (Hectares)
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
-
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Marijuana Average
Figure 16. Poppy Eradication (Hectares)

25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
-
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Poppy Average
In terms of the number of drug seizures, Baja California occupies the first place in amphetamine stimulant
seizures, Sinaloa is the first one in eradicated crops and heroin seizures, Sonora holds the first place in
marijuana seizures and marijuana eradication, and Oaxaca is first place regarding cocaine. (See Appendix
IV Table 22)
Table 15 shows that eradication of marijuana decreased in 2009 with relation to 2007 and poppy
eradication increased in the same period. The number of seizures of marijuana and cocaine dropped in
2009 with relation to 2007. On the contrary, opium, heroin, vehicles and weapons seizures increased
during this period. In relation to detentions, they only decreased in the case of foreigners detained.
39
Table 15. Variation in Seizures,
Crop Eradication and Detentions (2007 and 2009)
Concept 2007 2009* Variation
Crop Eradication Marijuana 23,316 15,994 -31.40
(Hectares) Poppy 11,411 19,133 67.68
Marijuana (ton.) 2,213 1,349 -39.06
Cocaine (ton.) 48 24 -50.00
Opium (kg.) 307 312 1.37
Seizures
Heroin (kg.) 317 407 28.37
Vehicles (iu.) 5,400 11,764 117.85
Weapons (iu.) 9,527 60,064 530.46
Mexicans 22,184 22,594 1.85
Foreigners 100 90 -10.00
Detentions
Publicly Released* 1,028 2,820 174.3
Affiliated to Cartels 338 1,811 435.80
*These detentions appeared in PGR press bulletins from 2007 to 2009.
40
IV. The Drug Market
1. Production
According to the National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 the production of heroin in Mexico increased from
17 pure metric tons in 2007 to 38 pure metric tons in 2008. The same source shows that marijuana
production in Mexico also increased from 15,800 metric tons in 2007 to 21,500 metric tons in 2008. NDTA
also indicates that methamphetamine production has increased sharply in Mexico because of traffickers’
ability to circumvent restrictions on chemical precursors and employ alternative production methods,
despite strong restrictions on ephedrine and pseudoephedrine imports on the side of the Mexican
Government. Finally, NDTA points out that it is very likely that the amount of cocaine being transported
from Colombia through the U.S-Mexico border decreased in 2009.
Marijuana, poppy, heroin and amphetamines are produced in states such as Chihuahua and Sinaloa. In
the cases of Durango and Guerrero, marijuana, poppy and heroin are produced. There are states where
just one kind of drug is produced like Puebla (poppy) or Tamaulipas (heroin). The states with the highest
illegal drug production incidence are Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacán,
Nayarit, Baja California, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Oaxaca and Zacatecas. (See Appendix V
Table 28)
2. Prices
The next figure shows the wholesale prices of different drugs in the U.S, Canada and Mexico. In all cases,
the lowest wholesale prices are found in Mexico. Drug prices increase according to how far they are from
its place of origin. Thus, a drug produced in Mexico tends to be more expensive in Canada than in the U.S.
This is because usually the protractor or distributor has to pay to local personnel in order to move its illegal
drug shipment.
Figure 17. Wholesale Price in USD per Kilogram (2008)

140,000 119,431
120,000
100,000
80,000 57,500
60,000 38,761
35,000 36,660
40,000 26,500
12,500 16,687
20,000 5,935 6,690 7,846
80
0
Heroin Cocaine Cannabis Herb Methamphetamine
Canada USA Mexico
Source: Own elaboration with data from U.N. 2010 World Drug Report. Data for amphetamines in Mexico taken from
Encuesta Nacional de Adicciones 2008, Secretaría de Salud.
Prices at the state level. The Mexican National Addictions Survey has been conducted twice: in 2002 and
2008. The price per dose for twelve different drugs is publicly available in the 2008 survey. The available
data and information regarding prices in the survey has several limitations, so a caveat exists to the
analysis resulting from it. This is, however, the only public and systematic available information on the
41
matter in Mexico. Limitations include that the price of a drug is based on a "dose" measurement, and thus it
is not clearly specified. Also, the price of an illicit substance greatly depends on its level of purity, and this
factor is not considered in survey answers. Finally, figures are shown for just one year and not all illicit
substances have enough observations to estimate a state-level representative price for the illicit drug.
Tables 29 and 30 in the Appendix show that drug prices differ across the country. There are states, such as
Chiapas and Estado de México, where the maximum drug price for one heroin dose is 3,000 and 2,000
pesos respectively, while in states like Durango and Aguascalientes the highest price for the same drug
dose is 100 and 50 pesos, respectively. Regarding marijuana, the minimum dose price is 50 pesos
(Yucatán) and the maximum is 1,500 pesos (Tlaxcala). In the case of cocaine, the highest price is 1,000
pesos (Baja California and Tabasco) and the lowest is 200 pesos (Coahuila, Colima, Hidalgo, Morelos,
Puebla, Sinaloa and San Luis Potosí). Finally, the price for an amphetamines dose varies from 15 pesos
(Oaxaca) to 1,200 pesos (Estado de México).
Using a geometric mean26, the states where are found the cheapest illicit drug doses are Chihuahua (where
none of the drug prices is above average, except hallucinogens), Hidalgo and Michoacán (where only one
drug price is above average). The states with the most expensive drugs are Campeche (where 12 drug
prices are above average), Estado de México, Quintana Roo and Tabasco (where nine drug prices are
above average). The most expensive drug dose in the country is a tranquilizer dose in Morelos (547.7
pesos) and the cheapest drug dose is a sedative/barbiturates dose in Colima (2.0 pesos). At the national
level, the highest drug price for a dose is for heroin (186 pesos) and the lowest average drug price is for
inhalable drugs (27.1 pesos).
The drugs with the widest price variation per dose are tranquilizers (29.2-547.7 pesos), ecstasy (38.7-353.6
pesos), heroin (50-350 pesos), others (20-300 pesos) and hallucinogens (26.6-300 pesos). On the
contrary, the drugs with narrowest price variations per dose are marijuana (21.8-88.7 pesos), inhalable
drugs (11.1-100), cocaine (82.5-184.6 pesos), crack (46.8-173.2 pesos) and sedatives and barbiturates (2-
202.1 pesos).
Based on price ranges, the cheapest drugs are opium and inhalable drugs, and the most expensive drugs
are heroin, sedatives/barbiturates, cocaine and ecstasy. It is important to note that the one peso dose is
sometimes used as a means to “hook” potential consumers, that is, as an introductory price for consumers
with the purpose to promote addiction and, consequently, increase the price of the same drug in future
transactions.
3. Data Analysis of Drug State Prices
An exploratory analysis of state price data for 2008 leads to interesting findings regarding the factors that
influence price variations of the major drugs in Mexico (marijuana, heroin, cocaine and amphetamine). The
factors which influence state-level prices are the following: consumption, state ranking for each drug
seizure, level of detentions, number of elements in the state police and number of elements in the
municipal police.

26
A geometric mean allows considering all the prices, nevertheless it gives less weight to extreme values, eliminating
bias provoked by outliers.

42
The next figure illustrates a statistically significant relationship between the price of marijuana and the
national ranking of the seizures of marijuana. This relationship implies that as states are positioned among
the first places in marijuana seizures, they have lower prices compared to those states that are positioned
below in the ranking. This allows us to infer that in the marijuana market, seizures do not reduce the
quantity offered and consequently the price of this drug is not affected when scarcity increases. Under this
premise the states with the highest seizure events and lowest prices are those that can be considered
major marijuana producers in Mexico. Such is the case in the states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango,
Tamaulipas, Chiapas and Baja California.

Figure 18. Correlation between State Ranking in Number of Marijuana Seizures and Prices
100
Marijuana Mean Average Prices
90 GTO CHIS
80 TAB
70 MOR
MÉX HGO
60 MICH QROO
CAMP TLAX
50 NL ZAC QRO PUE
40 BC COAH GRO COL AGS
TAM JAL BCS SLP VER
30 CHI NAY OAX DF
SIN DUR
20 YUC
SON
10
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
State Ranking on Marijuana Seizures

On the other hand, data analysis shows that, in the case of Mexico, the price of one dose of heroin
increases 6.8 pesos (equivalent to an increase of 4.6 percent) for every position increase in the national
ranking of heroin seizures. This also applies to marijuana, where a higher position in the marijuana seizures
ranking increases the price of a dose by 2.6 percent. It is interesting to note that the increase in state and
municipal police officers has a positive impact, although very marginal, in the increase in prices of doses of
marijuana and heroin.
43
4. Market Value and Estimated Income
Recently the Federal Secretary of Public Security produced an estimate of the potential consumption and
wholesale market in Mexico. According to these figures, it is a market of around $560 million USD.
Table 16. Mexican Drug Wholesale Market

Potential Wholesale Market
Drug
Consumption (Tons) (million dollars)
Marijuana 514.9 41.2
Cocaine 27.7 345.7
Heroin 3.9 138.2
Amphetamine 4.3 33.7
Total 550.7 558.8
Average 137.7 139.7
Source: Informe del Estado de la Seguridad Pública en
México. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atención Ciudadana de la
Policía Federal (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública)
http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_
publica.pptx.
The size of the Mexican market contrasts with the American market, which according to SSP data has an
estimated retail value of $61,384.2 million USD.
Table 17. U.S. Drug Market Value
Potential Wholesale Wholesale Retail Value Retail Market

Estimate
Drug Consumption/Potential Value per Ton Market (USD per Ton (USD (USD
Gross Profit
Export (tons) (USD millions) millions) millions) millions)
Marijuana 4,067.3 2.0 8,134.6 10.4 42,299.9 34,165.3

Cocaine 88.0 28.5 2,508.3 97.4 8,572.2 6,063.9
Heroin 43.3 71.2 3,081.5 131.6 5,696.7 2,615.2
Amphetamine 37.7 65.8 2,479.5 127.7 4,815.4 2,335.9
Total 4,236.3 16,203.9 61,384.2 45,180.3
Source: Informe del estado de la Seguridad Pública en México. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atención Ciudadana de la
Policía Federal (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública)
http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx.
The drug that generates the largest income to Mexican drug traffickers is cocaine, followed by marijuana.
Given the lack of reliable data about the drug market, the estimated income ranges are wide. Other studies
have estimated the income of the illegal drug trade to be between $2,660 and $7,980 million USD.
44
Table 18. Estimated Income for the Illegal Drugs Trade
Value per tons (USD Estimated Income (USD
Export Volume (tons)
Drug millions) millions)
Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit
Cocaine 165 320 10 15 1,650 4,800
Marijuana 1,000 2,000 1 1 550 2,000
Heroin 6 10 50 70 300 700
Methamphetamine 16 32 10 15 160 480
Total 1,187 2,362 2,660 7,980
Source: U.N. 2010 World Drug Report and Informe del Estado de la Seguridad Pública en México. 2010. Centro
Nacional de Atención Ciudadana de la Policía Federal (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública)
http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx.
In relation to drug traffic income, various American agencies give different estimates: the National Drug
Intelligence Center estimates between $13,600 and $48,400 million USD (for Mexico and Colombia); U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement estimates between $19,000 and $29,000 million USD (Mexico
only); and the drug Enforcement Agency estimates between $8,300 and $24,900 million USD (only
Mexico). The U.N. 2010 World Drug Report states that total income for cocaine, heroin and marijuana
would be $5,300 million USD. Clearly there is no agreement regarding this information.
5. Transportation and Distribution
a. Points of Entry, Routes of Transportation and Points of Exit
The next tables and map show that there is a close relationship between organized crime violence and the
geography of the drug business. Table 19 shows municipalities considered strategic points of entry or exit
for drug traffic in Mexico. Coincidentally, most of these municipalities register high levels of violence. It is
important to note that all the points of entry are located along the Pacific Ocean, and all the points of exit
are located along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Table 19. Violent Municipalities in Drug Entry and Exit Zones

Entry or Exit Zone
Municipalities
Number
Acapulco, Tecpan de Galeana, Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo and Coyuca (Guerrero),
Entry Zone 1
Lázaro Cárdenas (Michoacán)
Entry Zone 2 Mazatlán, Navolato, San Ignacio and Ahome (Sinaloa)
Entry Zone 3 Ensenada and Punta Baja (Baja California)
Exit Zone 1 Reynosa (Tamaulipas)
Exit Zone 2 Ciudad Juárez and Guadalupe de Bravo (Chihuahua)
Exit Zone 3 Nogales (Sonora)
Exit Zone 4 Mexicali, Tecate and Tijuana (Baja California)
Table 20 shows violent municipalities located between points of entry and exit within Mexico forming drug
transport routes. However, not all of them show the same degree of violence. Low levels of violence may
be a delineating result of the following circumstances: 1) there is a predominant cartel in the municipality
and it exerts control over the route; 2) the municipal police is corrupted and controlled by the predominant
cartel; and, 3) there are no internal disputes within the predominant cartel. For example, the cases of Salina
45
Cruz, Oaxaca, and Manzanillo, Colima are two points of entry along the Pacific Ocean with low violence
rates.
Table 20. Violent Municipalities in Drug Transport Routes

Entry and Exit Zones Transport Routes Violent Municipalities
Route 1 Chilpancingo, Iguala, Cuernavaca and Distrito Federal
Entry Zone 1 to Exit Zone 1 Route 2 Ciudad Altamirano, Morelia and Monterrey
Route 3 Apatzingán, Uruapan, Morelia and Monterrey
Ciudad Altamirano, Uruapan, Aguascalientes, Torreón-Gómez
Route 1
Palacio, Camargo, Delicias and Chihuahua
Ciudad Altamirano, Uruapan, Guadalajara, Durango, Hidalgo
Entry Zone 1 to Exit Zone 2 Route 2
del Parral and Chihuahua
Apatzingán, Uruapan, Guadalajara, Durango, Hidalgo del
Route 3
Parral and Chihuahua
Pueblo Nuevo, Durango, Torreón-Gómez Palacio and
Monterrey
Route 1 Pueblo Nuevo, Durango, Hidalgo del Parral and Chihuahua
Culiacán, Badiraguato, Guadalupe Calvo, Hidalgo del Parral
Route 2
Entry Zone 2 to Exit Zone 2 and Chihuahua
Guasave, Guamuchil, Mocorito, Badiraguato, Guadalupe
Route 3
Calvo, Hidalgo del Parral and Chihuahua
Culiacán, Guamuchil, Guasave, Ciudad Obregón and
Hermosillo
Culiacán, Guamuchil, Guasave, Ciudad Obregón, Hermosillo
and Caborca
Note: There are no violent municipalities in the route between Entry Zone 3 and Exit Zone 4.
b. Violence and the Geography of Business
The next map shows the points of entry in the southern region of the country, and the exit points along the
Mexico-U.S. border. The red spots show violent municipalities that are also drug points of entry and exit.
The green lines are drug transport routes to Mexico; the orange lines indicate land transport routes within
Mexico; the blue lines show sea transport routes within Mexico; and the grey lines show routes into the
U.S.
46
Map 2. Drug Trafficking Routes and Violent Municipalities
47

6. Consumption
a. International Comparisons
Levels of consumption have grown in the United States and Mexico in all cases. However, in contrast with
the United States the problem is not yet a social security problem in Mexico. In the United States almost
half of the population has tried a drug at least once in a lifetime, while in Mexico this figure is 5.2 percent.
Table 21. U.S.* and México**

Illicit Drug Consumption Comparison
2002 2008
Period U.S. Mexico U.S. Mexico
Millions
At least once in lifetime 108.3 2.89 117.3 3.9
Last year 35.1 0.57 35.5 1.1
Last month 19.5 0.34 20.1 0.7
Percentage of population
At least once in lifetime 46.0 4.2 47.0 5.2
Last year 14.9 0.8 14.2 1.4
Last month 8.3 0.5 8.0 0.9
* Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 2008 and U.S. Census Bureau
** Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud,
Mexico
The most commonly used drug, in both the United States and Mexico, is marijuana by far, followed by
cocaine, methamphetamines and heroin. The United States registered a slight decrease in the
consumption of methamphetamines. This phenomenon had no equivalence in Mexico, where the levels of
consumption for this drug increased during the same period.
Table 22. U.S.* and Mexico** Illicit Drugs

Consumption Comparison: At least one dose in lifetime
2002 2008
Drug U.S. Mexico U.S. Mexico
Millions
Marijuana 94.9 2.43 102.4 3.1
Cocaine 33.9 0.86 36.8 1.8
Heroin 3.7 0.06 3.8 0.1
Methamphetamines 15.4 0.06 12.6 0.2
Marijuana 40.4 3.5 41.0 4.2
Cocaine 14.4 1.2 14.7 2.4
Heroin 1.6 0.1 1.5 0.1
Methamphetamines 6.5 0.1 5.0 0.3
*Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 2008 and U.S. Census Bureau
** Source: National Addictions Survey 2002 and 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de
Salud, Mexico
48

The age distribution among drug users has a similar pattern in both countries. Both countries have their
largest share of consumers between the ages of 35 to 65. In Mexico, cocaine use doubled from 1.2 percent
to 2.4 percent between 2002 and 2008.
b. Consumption at the State Level
At the state level, 13 states are above the national average on marijuana use. The five states with the
highest incidence are Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, Baja California, Hidalgo and Distrito Federal.
Figure 19. Cumulative Incidence for

Marijuana Use by State Total Population (12 to 65 Years Old)
10
8
6
4
2
0
Tabasco
Jalisco
Sonora
Oaxaca
Nayarit
Guerrero
Veracruz
Tlaxcala
Zacatecas
Estado de México
Hidalgo
Distrito Federal
Baja California Sur
Michoacán
Nuevo León
Guanajuato
Puebla
Coahuila
Quintana Roo
Querétaro
Durango
Campeche
Sinaloa
Yucatán
San Luis Potosí
Colima
Tamaulipas
Chihuahua
Morelos
Aguascalientes
Chiapas
Baja California
% Marijuana Average
Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud, Mexico.

Note: The adjective “Cumulative” refers to the “consumption history” of the individual who answers the
survey.
In the case of cocaine use incidence, 13 states are above the national average. The five states with the
highest incidence are Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango and Hidalgo.

Cocaine use by State Total Population (12 to 65 Years Old)
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Tabasco
Nayarit
Zacatecas
Baja California Sur
Estado de México
Durango
Hidalgo
Michoacán
Jalisco
Nuevo León
Campeche
Coahuila
Colima
Oaxaca
Puebla
Quintana Roo
Guerrero
Distrito Federal
Sonora
Querétaro
Veracruz
Tlaxcala
Yucatán
San Luis Potosí
Tamaulipas
Chihuahua
Sinaloa
Morelos
Chiapas
Baja California
Guanajuato
Aguascalientes
% Cocaine Average
Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud, Mexico
49

For amphetamines, nine states are above the national average. The five states with the highest
amphetamine incidence are Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Hidalgo and D.F.

Amphetamine-Type Stimulant Use by State Total Population (12 to 65 years old)
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Jalisco
Michoacán
Sonora
Tabasco
Colima
Guerrero
Campeche
Oaxaca
Nayarit
Veracruz
Tlaxcala
Zacatecas
Baja California Sur
Estado de México
Hidalgo
Distrito Federal
Durango
Sinaloa
Nuevo León
Guanajuato
Puebla
Querétaro
Yucatán
Coahuila
Quintana Roo
San Luis Potosí

Chihuahua
Tamaulipas
Aguascalientes
Morelos
Chiapas
Baja California
% Amphetamine-type Stimulants Average
Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud
50

V. Public Opinion and the War on Drugs
The Evolution of Public Support over Governmental Actions. A February 2010 survey conducted by
Buendía y Laredo shows that most of the public considers that the country is less safe now as a result of
President Calderón’s public security policies: 50 percent of the population thinks that the country is less
safe because of the government strategies, 21 percent thinks the country is now safer and 20 percent
thinks that the current strategy has had no repercussion on security.27 The same survey by Buendía y
Laredo also indicates that for 47 percent of the population the current insecurity situation in the country is a
sign of the Government’s strategy failure.28 Another Buendía y Laredo survey from May 2010 ranks
President Calderón’s approval at 59 percent, while 52 percent considers that the current administration
must change its course because the main problems have not been properly addressed.29 (See Appendix VI
Figure 10)
Evolution of Public Confidence over Security Forces. While trust in Mexican public institutions has
historically been low, confidence in the police is particularly worrying. According to opinion polls, police
officers are considered corrupt by 80 percent of Mexico’s population, while the armed forces are the most
highly respected public institution in the country.30 A national survey conducted by the Citizen’s Institute for
Security Studies (ICESI) in 2009, showed that 72 percent of the respondents do not trust local police, and
57 percent of the population does not trust federal police either.31 The same survey asked the respondents
to grade, from 1 to 10, the service they received from several public security agencies: the Federal Police
received a 6.6 and the local police (state and municipal) received a 5.7.32 (See Appendix VI Figure 12)
Evolution of Public Perception over Insecurity. Personal security concerns include increased crime and
lawlessness, police corruption and street gangs. These concerns are apparent in available survey data. For
instance, in one survey conducted by ICESI in 2009, 65 percent of respondents reported not feeling safe in
the state they inhabit.33 These ICESI surveys also reveal public perceptions about insecurity in Mexico at a
municipal and state level. In the case of D.F. where there is no strong presence of cartels, the high
perception of insecurity is a result of predatory criminal activities, such as robbery. However, in states such
as Durango, Chihuahua, Baja California, Coahuila or Sinaloa, the public perception of insecurity is closely
related with the presence of organized crime. At the municipal level the results do not differ greatly, where
Chihuahua, D.F., Durango and Baja California also appear with the highest perceptions of insecurity.34
(See Appendix VI Figure 13)
Another survey by Buendía y Laredo shows that the three most worrying issues for Mexicans are related
with organized crime: kidnapping, drug cartel violence and robbery, which represented 76 percent of
answers.35

27 Buendía y Laredo, February 2010, Encuesta Nacional. Seguridad y Narcotráfico, p.11.
28 Ibid., p. 13.
29 Buendía y Laredo, May 2010, Encuesta Nacional. Aprobación Presidencial, p. 7.
30 Gereben et al, Op. Cit. p. xiii.
31 ICESI, 2009, Sexta Encuesta Nacional sobre Inseguridad, p. 81.
32 Ibid., p. 86.
33 Ibid., p. 66.
34 Ibid., p. 66-67.
35 Buendía y Laredo, February 2010, Los Miedos de México, p.3.
51

A survey made by Consulta Mitofsky in June 2010 showed that economic and security issues are the most
worrisome topics for the Mexican people. Consistently, over the last four years economic issues have been
above security issues. However, since January 2010 the gap between the two has been closing: in January
2010 the difference was 46.8, in June the difference was 21.9.36 (See Appendix VI Figure 9)

36 Consulta Mitofsky, July 2010, Economía, Política y Gobierno, p. 7.
52

VI. Final Assessment
1. Lack of a precise initial diagnosis. Given the results of the Mexican “war on drugs”, during the last three
years it seems that the federal government lacked strategic information regarding the following issues.
About the enemy:
a. Its modern, diverse and powerful set of weapons. Its highly sophisticated logistics. The ease
with which weapons enter the national territory.
b. Its high intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities. The cartels have penetrated the upper
echelons of the SSP and the PGR, as has been revealed by the arrests of Fernando Rivera
(SIEDO Intelligence Director), Noé Rodríguez Mandujano (SIEDO), Édgar Enrique Bayardo
(PFP Operations Inspector), Gerardo Garay (PFP Commissioner), Francisco Navarro (PFP
Head of Special Operations), and Jorge Cruz (PFP Tactical Analysis Director).
c. Its abundance of human resources (typically young men grouped into gangs or farmers from the
central and southern regions of the country), which allows it to sustain a long and costly war.
d. The social protection that it has in countless communities across the country, given its role as a
populace benefactor.
e. The specific capabilities and vulnerabilities of each of the cartels.
About its own capabilities:
a. Low intelligence capabilities among the military and the preventive and ministerial police.
b. Organized crime penetration in the highest ranks of security governmental agencies.
c. The inadequate regulatory framework for undertaking a war against organized crime.
d. Bureaucratic conflicts among various security agencies that obstruct their coordination, a key
condition of a successful strategy.
e. Deficient collaboration and support from the state and municipal forces. Even in some cases,
local police agencies have boycotted the work of the federal police and the army.
2. Multiple, vague and sometimes incompatible objectives of the antidrug strategy. The strategy pursues
objectives of diverse nature. These objectives lack precise indicators to measure progress. Finally,
achieving certain objectives of the strategy hinders the achievement of others. One example: the
disarticulation of criminal organizations not only obstructs the recovery of public spaces, but brings
about the invasion of new territories.
3. The strategy is focused on processes, not outcomes. The government favors a strategy where high
profile arrests and several types of seizures are central components. However, these actions have not
had an impact on indicators related to typical organized crime offenses, like kidnapping and extortion.
4. The federal strategy is not backed by state and municipal governments. Probably, this is the major
weakness of the federal antidrug strategy. State and municipal authorities have not taken actions to
strengthen their institutional capabilities. At the state and municipal levels of government, the security
sector budgets are stable, and processes like police professionalization are stagnated.
5. The federal government has advanced in its ambitious agenda of institutional reforms (including a
reform to the penal code, the Attorney General’s Office, police professionalization and certification,
53

data management technology, etc.). However these reforms will not have an immediate impact on the
dynamics of the Mexican security sector nor in the logic of organized crime activities.
6. Violence has increased systematically in the last three and a half years. Violence trends announce
more and more violence in the near future. Government authorities conceive violence as an
unavoidable consequence of the strategy, and do not consider it as an indicator of failure.
7. Mexican violence is a phenomenon with distinctive features in each region, linked to specific traits of
drug cartels and the presence (or absence) of gangs. Other variables that may change the local
dynamics of violence depend on the type of activity in which the violent actor is involved with in the
drug market, the extent of police corruption in the region, and the level of social collusion with
organized crime. All these factors should be addressed by any program that seriously aims to stabilise
or reduce violence in Mexico in the near future.
54

Appendix I. Diagnosis
c. Main Areas
Table 1. Instability in Directive Positions in the Security Sector (December 2006-August 2010)
Name of the Agency Name of the Public Official Date of Appointment Date of Resignation
Francisco Ramírez Acuña December 2006 January 2008
Juan Camilo Mouriño January 2008 November 2008
Secretaría de Gobernación
Fernando Gómez Mont November 2008 July 2010
José Francisco Blake Mora July 2010 Present
Eduardo Medina Mora December 2006 September 2009
Procuraduría General de la
Juan Miguel Alcantara Soria September 7, 2009 September 24, 2009
República
Arturo Chávez Chávez September 2009 Present
Roberto Campa December 2006 September 2008
Sistema Nacional de
Monte Alejandro Rubido September 2008 March 2009
Seguridad Pública (Executive
Jorge Tello Peón March 2009 December 2009
Secretary)
Juan Miguel Alcántara Soria January 2010 Present
Sigrid Arzt December 2006 April 2009
Consejo de Seguridad
Monte Alejandro Rubido April 2009 September 2009
Nacional (Technical
Jorge Tello Peón January 2010 August 2010
Secretary)
Alejandro Poiré August 2010 Present
Ardelio Vargas Fosado December 2006 March 2007
Edgar Millán Gómez March 2007 May 2008
Policía Federal
Gerardo Garay May 2008 November 2008
(Commisioned)
Rodrigo Esparza Cristerna November 2008 June 2009
Facundo Rosas June 2009 Present
d. Budget
i. Federal Level
Table 2. Security Sector Agencies

Expenditure Budget (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
Agency 2007 2008 2009 2,010
SEGOB 5,896.6 7,167.1 10,543.9 8,370.6
SEGOB (CISEN) 1,292.7 1,351.6 2,615.2 2,140.6
SEDENA 37,353.4 37,087.3 47,942.3 43,632.4
SEMAR 12,703.7 14,237.4 17,649.3 15,991.9
PGR 10,691.3 9,902.2 13,528.6 11,781.5
SSP 15,851.2 20,970.4 36,175.8 32,437.8
SSP (PF) 5,477.1 8,449.8 16,757.7 15,681.1
Total 82,496.3 89,364.4 125,839.9 112,214.2
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación 2007, 2008, 2009 y 2010. A GDP deflator, based on the first
quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (based in 2010).
55

Table 3. Expenditure Compared with the Budget of the
Security Sector Agencies, 2007 (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
2007
Agency
Budget Expenditure % Variation
SEGOB 5,896.6 6,827.3 15.8
SEDENA 37,353.4 39,623.0 6.1
SEMAR 12,703.7 14,113.2 11.1
PGR 10,691.3 10,949.9 2.4
SSP 15,851.2 20,447.4 29.0
Total 82,496.3 91,960.8 11.5
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública
Federal, 2007. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used
to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (2010 base).

2008
Agency
SEGOB 7,167.1 7,712.0 7.6
SEDENA 37,087.3 39,493.1 6.5
SEMAR 14,237.4 16,123.0 13.2
PGR 9,902.2 9,521.8 -3.8
SSP 20,970.4 22,490.3 7.2
Total 89,364.4 95,340.2 6.7
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública Federal,
2008. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate
the amount of the budget at a constant value (2010 base).

2009
Agency
SEGOB 10,543.9 9,695.9 -8.0
SEDENA 47,942.3 49,407.1 3.1
SEMAR 17,649.3 17,938.0 1.6
PGR 13,528.6 11,906.0 -12.0
SSP 36,175.8 36,879.6 1.9
Total 125,839.9 125,826.5 0.0
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública Federal,
2009. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate
the amount of the budget at a constant value (2010 base).
56

ii. State Level
Table 6. State Budgets

Percentage of Total FASP Federal
Budget SSP and Percentage in Percentage
Security Sector Budget Transfer
State PGJ Relation to State of Spent
Assigned by Mexican (millions of
(millions of pesos) Budget FASP (3)
State pesos) (3)
Aguascalientes 706.4 6.1 1.1 97.0
49.7
Baja California (1) 2,217.0 7.9 3.6 253.2
78.7
Baja California Sur (1) 420.9 5.6 0.7 125.0
48.8
Campeche 508.5 4.1 0.8 97.0
62.3
Chiapas 1,650.0 3.0 2.7 259.5
12.1
Chihuahua 1,945.7 5.2 3.1 214.8
66.9
Coahuila 1,164.4 3.9 1.9 175.8
27.3
Colima 510.9 7.5 0.8 94.8
76.2
Distrito Federal 16,685.0 12.9 27.0 390.5
11.6
Durango 524.6 2.9 0.8 147.2
34.5
Guanajuato 2,380.8 5.9 3.8 224.8
11.3
Guerrero 1,545.0 4.6 2.5 185.3
36.0
Hidalgo 636.0 2.9 1.0 156.5
29.2
Jalisco 3,578.6 5.8 5.8 279.1
8.6
México 6,087.6 4.5 9.8 495.1
32.8
Michoacán 2,433.9 5.9 3.9 224.4
44.2
Morelos 598.4 4.1 1.0 133.1
14.8
Nayarit 544.4 4.3 0.9 119.9
26.6
Nuevo León 1,905.9 4.1 3.1 238.6
30.3
Oaxaca 1,639.5 4.2 2.6 196.4
41.4
Puebla 2,064.5 4.2 3.3 236.2
40.3
Querétaro 653.1 3.7 1.1 118.7
39.0
Quintana Roo 855.8 5.1 1.4 127.4
10.6
San Luis Potosí 332.9 1.3 0.5 179.3
75.5
Sinaloa 1,667.4 5.6 2.7 176.9
32.5
Sonora 1,763.4 5.4 2.8 252.4
72.1
Tabasco (2) 1,521.6 4.1 2.5 144.4
21.4
Tamaulipas 1,268.4 4.4 2.0 231.0
17.4
Tlaxcala 416.1 6.0 0.7 115.9
30.8
Veracruz 2,076.3 3.0 3.4 299.5
58.2
Yucatán 825.0 4.8 1.3 134.6
59.9
Zacatecas 772.1 4.3 1.2 212.9
37.9
Total 61,900.2 6,337.3
Average 1,934.4 4.9 3.1 198.0
38.7
1. Figures corresponding to State Budget Expenditures 2009
2. Figures corresponding to State Budget Expenditures 2008
3. FASP figures corresponding to January-September 2009, http://www.cefp.gob.mx/notas/2009/notacefp0902009.pdf
57

Table 7. SUBSEMUN Contributions to Each State
2008 2009
State Federal Municipal Federal Municipal
Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
Aguascalientes 87.3 29.1 86.2 28.7
Baja California 287.2 95.7 275.0 91.7
Baja California Sur 18.0 6.0 30.0 10.0
Campeche 18.0 6.0 30.0 10.0
Chiapas 66.5 22.2 108.4 36.1
Chihuahua 240.7 80.2 230.0 76.7
Coahuila 96.5 32.2 104.9 35.0
Colima 27.0 9.0 41.5 13.8
Distrito Federal 287.2 95.7 338.6 112.9
Durango 40.1 13.4 44.8 14.9
Guanajuato 152.4 50.8 182.5 60.8
Guerrero 79.1 26.4 94.9 31.6
Hidalgo 18.0 6.0 40.0 13.3
Jalisco 236.9 79.0 266.6 88.9
México 287.2 95.7 338.6 112.9
Michoacán 131.2 43.7 159.0 53.0
Morelos 27.0 9.0 56.4 18.8
Nayarit 31.4 10.5 54.6 18.2
Nuevo León 187.9 62.6 198.3 66.1
Oaxaca 23.6 7.9 36.3 12.1
Puebla 125.2 41.7 135.0 45.0
Querétaro 121.8 40.6 125.0 41.7
Quintana Roo 58.3 19.4 66.0 22.0
San Luis Potosí 118.8 39.6 136.6 45.5
Sinaloa 178.1 59.4 174.2 58.1
Sonora 146.9 49.0 152.7 50.9
Tabasco 57.6 19.2 97.5 32.5
Tamaulipas 155.4 51.8 158.8 52.9
Tlaxcala 18.0 6.0 30.0 10.0
Veracruz 126.8 42.3 200.9 67.0
Yucatán 121.1 40.4 115.0 38.3
Zacatecas 18.0 6.0 30.0 10.0
Total 3589.4 1196.5 4137.9 1379.3
Average 112.2 37.4 129.3 43.1
Source: Cámara de Diputados, 2008 and 2009.
http://www.cefp.gob.mx/notas/2008/notacefp0172008.pdf
http://www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara/content/download/223013/576691/file/pres
entacion_subsemun.pdf
58

Figure 1. Percentage of Security and
Enforcement Budget and Crime Incidence per State (2008-2009)
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Guerrero
México
Sonora
Oaxaca
Jalisco
Tlaxcala
Tabasco
Nayarit
Sinaloa
Quintana Roo
Colima
Zacatecas
Durango
Coahuila
Michoacán
Puebla
Yucatán
Campeche
Hidalgo
Veracruz
Guanajuato
Querétaro
Distrito Federal
Nuevo León
Baja California Sur
San Luis Potosí

Baja California
Chiapas
Chihuahua
Tamaulipas
Morelos
Aguascalientes
Incidence (2008) Budget (2009)

Source: Presupuestos de Egresos Estatales, 2010. Índice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2008 y 2009, CIDAC.
http://www.cidac.org/es/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1000087.
Figure 2. State and Municipal Police Officers

per 1,000 Inhabitants and Security Spending (2009)
14
12
10
0
Colima
Puebla
Guerrero
Nayarit
Quintana Roo
Sonora
Jalisco
México
Tabasco
Tlaxcala
Oaxaca
Michoacán
Campeche
Hidalgo
Coahuila
Guanajuato
Sinaloa
Yucatán
Chihuahua
Zacatecas
Querétaro
Distrito Federal
Nuevo León
Veracruz
Durango
Baja California Sur
San Luis Potosí

Baja California
Aguascalientes
Tamaulipas
Chiapas
Morelos
Budget (2009) Police per 1,000 inhabs. (2009)

Source: Own elaboration with State Budget Expenditures, 2009 and information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

59

e. Military and Police Forces
iii. Military Forces
Table 8. Military Personnel

SEDENA SEMAR
Year
Elements Specialized Training Elements Specialized Training
1980 102,975 76 2,990 32 632
1985 124,497 216 3,044 34,164 79 512
1990 151,178 246 3,589 41,816 136 2,206
1991 155,218 214 4,145 43,737 168 1,278
1992 157,142 249 4,225 46,687 113 1,138
1993 162,169 237 5,619 48,072 95 2,535
1994 168,773 276 5,056 48,170 156 1,683
1995 171,952 242 3,642 53,128 184 2,955
1996 179,038 665 4,271 53,128 148 2,151
1997 182,328 357 9,506 54,247 141 957
1998 182,328 496 9,991 53,566 159 2,418
1999 182,329 396 9,031 54,972 124 2,044
2000 182,329 598 10,079 55,223 144 3,159
2001 185,143 4,173 10,790 49,165 186 1,550
2002 188,143 1,106 6,874 50,026 1,138 1,124
2003 191,143 740 4,705 47,304 1,043 1,410
2004 191,143 799 5,329 47,316 445 1,040
2005 191,143 402 5,618 47,644 432 1,764
2006 196,767 320 4,640 47,471 381 1,152
2007 196,710 325 5,489 50,032 387 1,125
2008 202,355 333 5,781 51,680 259 1,761
2009 202,355 60* 2,485* 52,350 216* 802*
Average 174,871 594 5,924 49,043 283 1,647
Source: Data from Felipe Calderón, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report).
*Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.
60

Figure 3. SEMAR Personnel
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
SEMAR Average

Figure 4. SEDENA and SEMAR Personnel (1980-2009)

300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
SEDENA and SEMAR Average

Federal laws and recent Constitutional reforms linked to security and criminal issues:

1. Ley de Extradición Internacional 1975 (International Extradition Law): This law establishes the
cases and conditions to deliver to the requesting States indicted or convicted individuals for
ordinary crimes, when there is no international treaty.
61

2. Ley Orgánica del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos 1986 (Mexican Army and Air Force Organic
Law): This law establishes that the Mexican Army and Air Force are permanent armed forces and
have the following general missions:
a. Defend the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the nation;
b. Ensure internal security;
c. Assist the civilian population in cases of public necessity;
d. Perform civic actions and social work that strives for the progress of the country;
e. In the event of a disaster, assist in law enforcement duties, rescue of persons and
property, and reconstruction of the affected areas.
3. Ley Federal contra la Delincuencia Organizada 1996 (Federal Law against Organized Crime): This
law establishes rules for investigation, prosecution, punishment, and enforcement of penalties for
crimes committed by organized crime members.
4. Ley de Seguridad Nacional 2005 (National Security Law): It aims to establish the basis for
institutional coordination by the authorities responsible for preserving national security in their
respective areas of responsibility. It also establishes the means and terms in which the state and
municipal authorities work with the federal authority in this task.
5. Ley Federal de Seguridad Privada 2006 (Federal Law on Public Security): This law aims to
regulate the provision of private security services when these are provided in two or more states.
6. Ley General que Establece las Bases de Coordinación del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública
1995-Repealed on January 2, 2009 (General Law that Establishes the Basis of Coordination of the
National Public Security System): This law establish the basis of coordination among the
federation, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities for the integration and operation of
the National System of Public Security.
7. Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República 2002-Repealed on May 29, 2009 by the
new Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República (General Attorney Organic Law):
This law aims to organize the General Attorney’s Office. It was based on principles of certainty,
legality, objectivity, impartiality and professionalism in the exercise of its functions and actions of
law enforcement.
8. Ley de la Policía Federal Preventiva (Federal Preventive Police Law)1999-Repealed on June 1,

2009 by the Ley de la Policía Federal 2009 (Federal Police Law): This law regulates the
organization and operation of the Federal Police in its respective area of competence. The Federal
Police is a decentralized administrative agency of the Secretary of Public Security.
9. Ley Federal de Extinción de Dominio 2009 (Federal Law on Domain Extinction): This law regulates
forfeiture of property by the State. It establishes the procedures and actions corresponding to the
authorities involved, the effects that the issued decision has, and the means of intervention by third
parties affected by the action.
10. Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública 2009 (General Law of the National Public
Security System): This law regulates the integration, organization and operation of the National
62

Public Security System. It establishes the distribution of competences and coordination among the
federal, state and municipal governments in this sphere.
Reform to the Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution (2008)
Before the reform, this article gave the sole responsibility over criminal investigations to the public
prosecutor, it did not state any principles over which police actions shall be carried out, or provided a
description of public security and the principles that govern the actions of the respective agencies. The
reform of the Article 21 covered three dimensions: judiciary procedures, police professionalization and
public security.
Judiciary procedures.
The reform changes the situation of all participants in a criminal proceeding: the public prosecutor now
shares the duties of the investigative police (Art. 21, paragraph 1), and loses exclusive control over penal
action because the victims in this area receive greater guarantees, and in certain case, specified by law,
these guarantees can be exercised before a judicial authority by criminal proceedings (Art. 21, paragraph
2).
Police professionalization.
Regarding police forces it recognizes their participation during the investigation of a crime (Art. 21,
paragraph 1). It continues by stating that police operations shall be civil, disciplined, professional and
coordinated and that these principles must guide the three levels of government in the national public
security structure (Art. 21, paragraph 10).
Public security.
It introduces a description of public security "... it is a task of the Federation, the Federal District, states and
municipalities, including the prevention of crimes, the investigation and prosecution to make it effective, and
the penalties of administrative offenses, under the terms of the law"(Art. 21, paragraph 9). It adds to the
principles that govern the actions of public security institutions (principles of legality, efficiency,
professionalism and honesty) the principles of objectivity and respect for Human Rights (Art. 21, paragraph
9).
Reform to the Article 29 of the Mexican Constitution (2007)
Article 29 states the procedure to suspend civil guarantees in the whole country or in a determined place.
This article was reformed in 2007. Before the reform, the article said that in case of “invasion or a grave
disruption of public peace that puts the society in danger or conflict” (Art. 29, paragraph 1), the President, in
accordance with the state ministers, administrative departments, PGR and with the approval of Congress,
can suspend guarantees in the whole country or in certain parts.
The 2007 reform removed the administrative departments of the list of governmental agencies needed to
be in accordance with the President to suspend guarantees. This reform to the article facilitates the process
of suspension of civil guarantees.
63

Table 9. Legal Framework of Public Security at the State Level
Public Security Law Public Security Program Police Professionalization
State (Date of Last (Years Comprised in the Regulation
Amendment) Program) (Date Passed in Local Congress)
Aguascalientes 1-09-2008 2004-2010 No Regulation
Baja California 6-09-2007 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Baja California Sur 8-07-2008 2005-2011 No Regulation
Campeche 3-03-2008 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Chiapas 20-12-2006 2007-2012 No Regulation
Chihuahua 1-04-2009 As Part of Sexennial Plan 1-04-2009 (Law)
Coahuila 19-06-2009 As Part of Sexennial Plan 14-09-1999
Colima 17-07-2006 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Distrito Federal 20-05-2003 2007-2012 No Regulation
Durango 24-07-2005 2005-2010 No Regulation
Estado de México 26-03-1999 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Guanajuato 20-05-2005 As Part of Sexennial Plan 17-09-2007
Guerrero 16-02-2007 2005-2011 No Regulation
Hidalgo 8-08-2005 2005-2011 No Regulation
Jalisco 24-02-2007 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Michoacán 12-02-2008 2008-2012 No Regulation
Morelos 11-05-2005 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Nayarit 23-05-2009 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Nuevo León 22-09-2008 2009-2015 No Regulation
Oaxaca 22-03-2005 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Puebla 2-09-2002 2005-2011 No Regulation
Querétaro 14-09-2006 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Quintana Roo 27-11-2007 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
San Luis Potosí 30-08-2003 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Sinaloa 4-02-2009 2005-2010 No Regulation
Sonora 12-12-2003 As Part of Sexennial Plan No Regulation
Tabasco 13-09-2006 2007-2012 No Regulation
Tamaulipas 17-08-2006 As Part of Sexennial Plan 4-7-2000
Tlaxcala 25-09-2006 2005-2011 No Regulation
Veracruz 12-08-2005 As Part of Sexennial Plan 14-03-2008
Yucatán 31-05-2004 As Part of Sexennial Plan 26-06-1994
Zacatecas 24-12-2008 2004-2010 No Regulation
The Penal System Reform (2008)
An extensive penal reform regarding public security, criminal justice and organized crime was published on
June 19, 2008. In some areas, it represents an improvement to the judiciary system; in other sectors it
means a clear draw back. A major challenge to this reform would be the terms of implementations of
improvements to the system, lack of professionalization, structural inertia and conflicting interests.
1. Oral Trial System. It consists of a set of institutions that seek to achieve a qualitative and quantitative
improvement to the criminal justice system. It constructs an accusatorial system (a balance between
powers of prosecutors and the judge, giving greater relevance to criminal proceedings and not to the
preliminary investigation) and adversarial (equality between the prosecutors and the defense), with oral,
64

publicity and balance between formal authority and citizen guarantees (Art. 20). Key highlights regarding
this aspect of the reform include: a) the judge becomes the axis of the criminal justice system; she rules the
process and controls the police and prosecuting authorities; b) all oral hearings shall be recorded; c) there
will be a process with an impartial judge between the parties; d) the public hearing gives transparency to
the process; e) system of alternative solutions: for a system that seeks to efficiently and effectively
implement this process model, a requirement is that no more than 7% or 10% of cases reach oral trial. The
remaining cases are channeled to "alternative solutions." This system of alternate exits is covered by the
new constitutional text (Art. 17, paragraph 3): "The laws provide mechanisms for alternative dispute
resolution. It should be implemented in criminal matters, it will ensure reparation of damages and it
establishes the cases in which judicial oversight is required.” These mechanisms are compounded by the
possibility that the prosecution may justify the termination of the investigation: "The prosecutor may
consider employing criteria of opportunity for the exercise of criminal proceedings in the cases and
conditions determined by law" (Art. 21, paragraph 7).
2. New roles for actors in the criminal procedure. The reform changes the situation of all participants in a
criminal proceeding: a) Judges: The judge becomes the key player restoring its status as ruler of the
process; b) Prosecutor: The prosecutor's office receives the challenge to reinvent itself as a public servant
to investigate through modern means all that allows him to assist in pursuing the offender effectively and
with respect to Human Rights; the prosecution now shares the duties of the investigative police (Art. 21,
paragraph 1), and loses sole control over penal action because the victims in this area receive greater
guarantees. In exchange it gains the ability to overturn the investigation of minor crimes where there is
insufficient evidence and win a strategic role in the use of alternative solutions; c) Victims: It gives more
rights to victims (Article 20, paragraph C), including the possibility that in certain cases specified by law,
they can be exercised before a judicial authority by criminal proceedings (Art. 21, paragraph 2); d) Lawyers:
A system such as this demands more professionalism and expertise on the side of the lawyers involved in
the criminal justice system, so defenders are required to be lawyers. The reform notes that an adequate
system of public defenders must be developed in order to avoid a disadvantageous process for poor people
(Art. 17, paragraph 6 ); e) Police: Regarding police forces it recognizes their participation during the
investigation of a crime (Art. 21, paragraph 1 ), whose operations shall be civil, disciplined, professional and
coordinated (Art. 21, paragraph 10). In relation to municipal police, it links their performance with guidelines
established by the state legislature and introduces the possibility that the municipal police can receive
orders from the state governor (Art. 115): "The preventive police will be under the Major’s command in
terms with the ‘The State’s Public Security Law’. It will comply with the orders of the State Governor of the
State in those cases where considered of serious disturbance of public order."
3. Preventive incarceration. The prosecutor is no longer required to prove or "demonstrate" to the judge the
evidence he has against a certain person in order to be able to capture him (Art. 16, paragraph 2) or initiate
a penal process (Art. 19, paragraph 1) against him. Now it only requests to present data that "... establishes
that the individual has performed an action that the law considers a crime and that there is a likelihood that
the suspect participated in it” (Art. 19, paragraph 1). The "standard" processing is reduced, in accordance
with the new model, but the preventive detention regime retains many of the previous system’s features.
Although the new law indicates that preventive incarceration would be the last measure to be considered, it
establishes “inexcarcelable” crimes, that is, the commission of any of these crimes is sufficient for the
process to be started and the person must stay in jail until sentencing. The reform establishes as
“inexcarcelable” crimes: "... in cases of organized crime, homicide, rape, kidnapping, crimes committed by
violent means such as weapons and explosives" (Art. 19, paragraph 2). It also establishes that the law may
also consider preventive detention for crimes "... against national security, the free development of
65

personality and health" (Art. 19, paragraph 2).
4. Organized crime. The new adversarial model or system of oral trials, bets on a professional investigative
service and judicial control in favor of the guarantees of the accused and the victims. However, in cases in
which the authorities accuse a person on the grounds of organized crime, it is acceptable to preserve many
of the vices of the previous system in order to "facilitate" prosecution of these crimes. That is, it reduces the
guarantees that the reform gives to the rest of the people in the new system and maintains "grants" to poor
prosecution, granting benefits to the public prosecutor. In all cases the individual accused of organized
crime will suffer preventive incarceration detention, he may be held in a special detention center, and the
accused may be held without charge, detained for up to 80 days.
5. Public Security. This reform gives powers of investigation to the police (Art. 21, paragraph 1). It
introduces a description of public security "... it is a task of the Federation, the Federal District, states and
municipalities, including the prevention of crimes, the investigation and prosecution to make it effective, and
the penalties of administrative offenses, under the terms of the law"(Art. 21, paragraph 9). It adds to the
principles that govern the actions of public security institutions (principles of legality, efficiency,
professionalism and honesty) the principles of objectivity and respect for Human Rights (Art. 21, paragraph
9). Emphasis is placed on the provisions on professionalizing guidance and coordination that must guide
the three levels of government in the national public security structure.
6. The Terms of the Reform. Part of the complexity of this reform is that some of the provisions already
established in the Constitution will take effect in different terms. For example, reforms aimed at the
restoration of the accusatorial system and oral trials, and alternative solutions would take effect in no more
than eight years. The referred actions relating to public security would take effect in six months, and the
adjustments to local legislation must be passed a year after the reform was passed. The prison reforms
(change the term "rehabilitation" for "reinsertion" and the establishment of a sentences control judge) would
take effect in three years. The provisions regarding organized crime must come into effect immediately.
Source: Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona. 2008. “La Reforma Constitucional en Materia Penal de Junio de 2008.
Claroscuros de una Oportunidad Histórica para Transformar el Sistema Penal Mexicano” in Análisis Plural,
no. 3.
66

Table 10. Important Arrests (2006-2010)

Cartel Name Function/Rank Date
Money laundering
Sandra Ávila Beltrán aka “La Reina del
Sinaloa network boss, contact September 28, 2007
Pacífico”
with Colombian cartels
Beltrán Leyva Alfredo Beltrán Leyva aka “El Mochomo” Boss January 20, 2008
Beltrán Leyva’s principal
Beltrán Leyva Ever Villafañe Martínez cocaine supplier from July 31, 2008
Colombia
Sinaloa Jesús Zambada García Boss October 22, 2008
Tijuana Eduardo Arellano Félix Boss October 26, 2008
Zetas Jaime González Durán aka “El Hummer” Boss November 7, 2008
La Familia
Alberto Espinoza Barrón aka “El Fresa” Boss December 30, 2008
Michoacana
Vicente Zambada Niebla aka “El Money laundering
Sinaloa March 18, 2009
Vicentillo” network boss
Money laundering
Juárez Vicente Carrillo Leyva April 2, 2009
network boss
La Familia
Rafael Cedeño Hernández Boss April 20, 2009
Michoacana
La Familia
Arnoldo Rueda Medina aka “La Minsa” Boss July 11, 2009
Michoacana
Beltrán Leyva Carlos Beltrán Leyva Boss December 30, 2009
Tijuana Teodoro García Simental aka “El Teo” Lieutenat January 12, 2010
Manuel García Simental aka “El
Tijuana Hitmen boss February 7, 2010
Chiquilín”
Beltrán Leyva Gerardo Álvarez Vázquez aka “El Indio” Fraction boss April 21, 2010
Beltrán Leyva Édgar Valdez Villareal aka “La Barbie” Fraction boss August 30, 2010
Enrique Villareal Barragán aka “El
Beltrán Leyva Fraction boss September 12, 2010
Grande”
Table 11. U.S.* and México**

Illicit Drugs Consumption Comparison by Ages (2008)
At least one dose in
Last month Last year
lifetime
Age U.S. Mexico U.S. Mexico U.S. Mexico
Millions
12-17 6.7 1.4 4.9 0.2 2.4 0.1
18-34 19.3 1.1 11.4 0.6 6.7 0.4
35-65 93.8 1.4 20.1 0.2 11.5 0.2
Total 117.3 3.9 35.5 1.1 20.1 0.7
12-17 26.2 4.8 19.0 1.5 9.3 0.8
18-34 56.6 7.4 33.5 2.0 19.6 1.3
35-65 48.0 4.5 10.3 0.6 5.9 0.6
Total 47.0 5.2 14.2 1.4 8.0 0.9
* Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2008 and U.S. Census Bureau
** Source: National Addictions Survey 2002 and 2008, CONADIC, Secretaría de Salud, Mexico
67

Table 12. Cumulative Drug Use Incidence by State
% % % Amphetamine- % Illegal
State % Heroin
Marijuana Cocaine type Stimulants Drugs
Aguascalientes 3.3 2.6 0.1 0.1 4.8

Baja California 7.5 3.9 2.7 0.4 9.3
Baja California Sur 6.0 3.8 1.6 0.0 7.2
Campeche 4.6 1.7 0.2 0.0 5.0
Coahuila 2.5 1.7 0.2 0.2 3.1
Colima 1.7 1.5 0.3 0.1 2.4
Chiapas 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.7
Chihuahua 6.2 4.8 1.0 1.0 7.5
Distrito Federal 6.6 3.1 0.8 0.5 7.8
Durango 5.8 4.0 0.8 0.1 7.8
Guanajuato 3.1 2.1 0.4 0.0 5.7
Guerrero 3.4 3.4 0.3 0.0 4.7
Hidalgo 6.7 4.0 0.9 0.1 8.3
Jalisco 4.1 1.9 0.7 0.1 5.0
México 3.9 1.8 0.4 0.3 4.6
Michoacán 3.2 2.4 0.6 0.0 4.3
Morelos 3.5 2.0 0.1 0.1 4.1
Nayarit 4.8 3.9 0.5 0.0 6.6
Nuevo León 3.2 1.9 0.5 0.2 4.1
Oaxaca 2.7 1.4 0.0 0.0 3.4
Puebla 2.8 0.9 0.4 0.0 3.4
Querétaro 6.2 2.3 0.4 0.1 6.7
Quintana Roo 8.6 6.0 0.4 0.1 10.1
San Luis Potosí 2.7 0.6 0.1 0.1 3.0
Sinaloa 3.8 3.7 0.7 0.1 6.3
Sonora 3.6 2.9 0.6 0.0 5.1
Tabasco 5.5 2.2 0.3 0.0 5.9
Tamaulipas 8.3 6.0 0.3 0.1 10.3
Tlaxcala 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.2
Veracruz 2.6 0.9 0.1 0.1 2.7
Yucatán 3.8 0.7 0.3 0.1 3.9
Zacatecas 4.9 3.3 0.5 0.0 6.0
Average 4.3 2.6 0.5 0.1 5.4
Source: National Addictions Survey 2008.
68

Appendix II. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime
Table 13. Intra and Inter Cartel Conflicts

Year 2007 2010
Sinaloa vs. Tijuana
Golfo vs. Juárez
Sinaloa vs. Tijuana Sinaloa vs. Golfo-Zetas
Cartels in Sinaloa vs. Juárez La Familia vs. Zetas
dispute Sinaloa vs. Golfo-Zetas Sinaloa vs. Beltrán Leyva
La Familia vs. Zetas Sinaloa vs. Beltrán Leyva-Zetas
Golfo vs. Zetas
Pacífico Sur vs. La Barbie
Total 4 8
69

Figure 5. Intra and Inter Cartel Confrontations
2007 2008
2009 2010

Note: Red arrows represent conflict, blue arrows represent alliance.
70

Figure 6. Inter Cartel Alliances
2007 2008

2009 2010

71

a. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion and Vehicle Thefts
Table 14. Kidnapping, Extortion

and Stolen Vehicles Per State (2009)
Vehicles
States Kidnapping Extortion
Theft
Aguascalientes 16 319 2,199
Baja California 103 694 25,142
Baja California Sur 3 160 837
Campeche 0 373 51
Chiapas 12 1,138 1,511
Chihuahua 204 797 22,546
Coahuila 17 392 2,123
Colima 1 106 304
Distrito Federal 85 8,465 26,210
Durango 37 263 2,626
Guanajuato 78 1,386 6,365
Guerrero 51 475 3,277
Hidalgo 15 368 2,665
Jalisco 17 2,039 7,313
México 127 8,316 39,647
Michoacán 98 532 4,968
Morelos 33 639 4,135
Nayarit 4 86 735
Nuevo León 13 897 12,797
Oaxaca 33 397 1,700
Puebla 27 826 3,817
Querétaro 3 776 1,825
Quintana Roo 6 507 1,206
San Luis Potosí 21 506 1,970
Sinaloa 18 402 5,864
Sonora 4 281 4,372
Tabasco 16 813 1,722
Tamaulipas 52 696 5,837
Tlaxcala 3 176 522
Veracruz 0 1,216 2,567
Yucatán 0 876 408
Zacatecas 31 237 1,186
Total 1,128 35,154 198,447
Average 35 1,099 6,202
Source: Extortion reports from Informe del estado de la
Seguridad Pública en México. 2010. Centro Nacional de
Atención Ciudadana de la Policía Federal (Secretaría de
Seguridad Pública).
http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_pu
blica.pptx; and Kidnapping and Vehicle Theft reports, INEGI,
http://www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/default.aspx?s=est&c=15274
72

Table 15. Extortion Reports Registered by the Federal Police (2008-2009)
2008 2009
State Total Total
Accomplished Attempts Accomplished Attempts
Reports Reports
Aguascalientes 930 60 870 319 22 297
Baja California 765 73 692 694 79 615
Campeche 442 31 411 373 27 346
Coahuila 735 74 661 392 32 360
Colima 293 19 274 106 3 103
Chihuahua 1,079 107 972 797 90 707
Chiapas 993 81 912 1,138 88 1,050
Distrito Federal 11,223 964 10,259 8,465 734 7,731
Durango 433 46 387 263 31 232
Guerrero 825 92 733 475 81 394
Guanajuato 2,249 205 2,044 1,386 116 1,270
Hidalgo 618 59 559 368 40 328
Jalisco 2,532 222 2,310 2,039 188 1,851
México 11,318 1,197 10,121 8,316 944 7,372
Michoacán 936 105 831 532 66 466
Morelos 1,014 83 931 639 50 589
Nayarit 293 19 274 86 9 77
Nuevo León 1,017 103 914 897 92 805
Oaxaca 635 57 578 397 57 340
Puebla 1,073 123 950 826 108 718
Querétaro 1,183 79 1,104 776 64 712
Quintana Roo 1,169 71 1,098 507 33 474
Sinaloa 560 66 494 402 58 344
San Luis Potosí 1,021 81 940 506 46 460
Sonora 232 29 203 281 38 243
Tabasco 979 62 917 813 56 757
Tamaulipas 816 79 737 696 52 644
Tlaxcala 276 24 252 176 21 155
Veracruz 1,874 187 1,687 1,216 151 1,065
Yucatán 956 55 901 876 43 833
Zacatecas 464 45 419 237 28 209
Total 49,118 4,513 44,605 35,154 3,459 31,695
Average 1,535 141 1,394 1,099 108 990
Source: Extortion reports from Informe del estado de la Seguridad Pública en México. 2010. Centro Nacional
de Atención Ciudadana de la Policía Federal (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública).
http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx
73

Appendix III. Organized Crime Violence
a. National Level
Figure 7. Number of Drug related Executions from

January 2007 to June 2010 (Linear Projection from July 2010 to December 2012)
2500
75,370
2000 63,799
53,190
28,354 43,542
1500 34,857
1000 19,800
500
0
Feb-07
Mar-07
Feb-08
Mar-08
Feb-09
Mar-09
Feb-10
Mar-10
Feb-11
Mar-11
Feb-12
Mar-12
Apr-07
Apr-08
Apr-09
Apr-10
Apr-11
Apr-12
Aug-07
Sep-07
Nov-07
Dec-07
Aug-08
Sep-08
Nov-08
Dec-08
Aug-09
Sep-09
Nov-09
Dec-09
Aug-10
Sep-10
Nov-10
Dec-10
Aug-11
Sep-11
Nov-11
Dec-11
Aug-12
Sep-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
Jan-07
Jun-07
Jan-08
Jun-08
Jan-09
Jun-09
Jan-10
Jun-10
Jan-11
Jun-11
Jan-12
Jun-12
Jul-07
Jul-08
Jul-09
Jul-10
Jul-11
Jul-12
May-07
May-08
May-09
May-10
May-11
May-12
Oct-07
Oct-08
Oct-09
Oct-10
Oct-11
Oct-12
January 2007 - July 2010 (1) January 2007 - July 2010 (2) July 2010 - December 2010 January 2011 - June 2011
July 2011 - December 2011 January 2012 - June 2012 July 2012 - December 2012
Note 1: Own elaboration with data from Reforma (January 2007-December 2009), and from a database retrieved from 19
national and local newspapers (January-June 2010).
http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_2009/
Note 2: These figures are calculated based on official public information from Diálogos por la Seguridad (28,353 executions from
December 2006 to July 2010).
Note 3: Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on information adjusted from a 30.17
percent subestimation in relation to the total for the same period (19,800) obtained from newspaper’s information.
74

Figure 8. Execution by Year (2001-2010*)
25000
22181
20000
18333
15578 18207
15000
14481
11803
10000 9025
7136
6587
5000 3118 5207
1230 1290 1776 2119
1080 1304 2270
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Executions (1) Executions (2) Projected Executions (1) Projected Executions (2)

Note 1: Own elaboration with data from Trans-Border Institute (2001-2009), and from a database retrieved from 19
national and local newspapers (January-June 2010).
Note 2: These figures are calculated based on official public information from Diálogos por la Seguridad (28,353
executions from December 2006 to July 2010).
Note 3: Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on information adjusted from 30.17
percent under-estimation in relation to the total for the same period (19,800) obtained from newspaper’s information.
75

b. State and Local Level
Table 16. Municipalities with the Highest

Number of Executions (Second Semester 2009)
July 2009 to December 2009
State Municipality Total %
Chihuahua Juárez 1078 28.8
Sinaloa Culiacán 198 5.3
Baja California Tijuana 156 4.2
Chihuahua Chihuahua 122 3.3
Durango Gómez Palacio 98 2.6
Guerrero Acapulco de Juárez 60 1.6
Sinaloa Mazatlán 57 1.5
Sinaloa Navolato 53 1.4
Sonora Nogales 53 1.4
Coahuila Torreón 37 1.0
Durango Pueblo Nuevo 33 0.9
Guerrero Chilpancingo de los Bravo 31 0.8
Chihuahua Nuevo Casas Grandes 29 0.8
Chihuahua Guadalupe 28 0.8
Durango Durango 26 0.7

Total 2057 55
Source: Own elaboration with data from 19 national and state
newspapers.
76

Table 17. Municipalities with the Highest
Number of Executions (First Semester 2010)
January 2010 to June 2010
State Municipality Total %
Chihuahua Juárez 968 17.5
Chihuahua Chihuahua 262 4.7
Sinaloa Culiacán 249 4.5
Baja California Tijuana 182 3.3
Coahuila Torreón 151 2.7
Durango Gómez Palacio 129 2.3
Sinaloa Mazatlán 124 2.3
Sinaloa Ahome 91 1.7
Sonora Nogales 90 1.6
Durango Durango 81 1.5
Guerrero Acapulco de Juárez 78 1.4
Sinaloa Navolato 69 1.2
Nayarit Tepic 64 1.2
Tamaulipas Miguel Alemán 60 1.1
Tamaulipas Reynosa 58 1.0
Total 2657 48
Source: Own elaboration with data from 19 national and
state newspapers.
Table 18. Mayors Killed in 2010

Name Municipality Date
1. Ramón Mendívil Sotelo Guadalupe y Calvo, Chihuahua February 18
2. Manuel Estrada Escalante El Mezquital, Durango February 23
3. José Santiago Agustino Zapotitlán Tablas, Guerrero April 28
4. Jesús Manuel Lara Rodríguez Guadalupe, Chihuahua June 19
5. Óscar Venancio Rivera San José del Progreso, Oaxaca June 20
6. Nicolás García Ambrosio Santo Domingo de Morelos, Oaxaca June 30
7. Edelmiro Cavazos Leal Santiago, Nuevo León August 15
8. Marco Antonio Leal García Hidalgo, Tamaulipas August 29
9. Alexander López García El Naranjo, San Luis Potosí September 8
77

Appendix IV. Government Strategy and Actions Against Organized Crime
1. Actions
a. Arrests
Table 19. Detainees by Hierarchy Level

Hierarchical Level 2007 2008 2009 Total %
Boss 1 1 11 13 0.2
Specialized Operator 11 30 68 109 2.0
Logistics Operator 17 35 42 94 1.8
Hitmen/Guardian 214 667 1,288 2,169 40.8
Operative Base 785 737 1,411 2,933 55.2
Total 1,028 1,470 2,820 5,318 100
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins.
b. Seizures
i. Drugs
Table 20. Illicit Drugs and Vehicles Seizures (1994-2009)

Seizures
Year Opium
Marijuana Cocaine Heroin Psychotropics Vehicles
gum
(Tons) (Kilos) (Units)
1994 133 6 n.d. n.d. n.d. 139
1995 273 7 n.d. n.d. n.d. 231
1996 428 7 n.d. n.d. n.d. 683
1997 440 12 n.d. n.d. n.d. 679
1998 528 13 n.d. n.d. n.d. 718
1999 750 28 n.d. n.d. n.d. 658
2000 2,054 23 469 299 3,418,369 3,297
2001 1,841 30 517 270 8,350,246 2,679
2002 1,635 13 310 283 5,343,064 2,029
2003 2,248 21 199 306 8,894,604 2,059
2004 2,213 27 465 303 21,834,732 2,705
2005 1,787 31 276 459 11,359,511 2,173
2006 1,902 21 124 334 3,364,768 1,521
2007 2,213 48 307 317 2,657,002 5,400
2008 1,685 19 183 296 32,154,760 9,306
2009* 1,349 24 312 407 17,839,030 11,764
Average 1,343 21 316 327 11,521,609 2,878
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno
(Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government
Report); and Felipe Calderón Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report).
*Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages., n.d.= no data
available.
78

Table 21.
Illicit Crop Eradication (1994-2009)
Illicit Crop Eradication (hectares)

Year
Total Marijuana Poppy
1994 17,908 8,956 8,951

1995 28,393 15,811 12,582
1996 27,694 16,444 11,249
1997 30,004 17,043 12,961
1998 30,704 17,807 12,897
1999 37,799 25,659 12,140
2000 46,779 31,061 15,718
2001 47,852 28,735 19,117
2002 49,933 30,775 19,158
2003 56,619 36,585 20,034
2004 46,778 30,852 15,926
2005 52,452 30,843 21,609
2006 47,051 30,162 16,890
2007 34,726 23,316 11,411
2008 31,751 18,561 13,190
2009* 35,127 15,994 19,133
Average 38,848 23,663 15,185
Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto
Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government
Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno
(Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Calderón
Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government
Report).
*Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on
monthly averages.
79

Table 22. State Ranking of Drug Seizures Frequency (December 2006 - February 2010)
Dismantled Eradicated Marijuana Cocaine Heroin Methamphetamine
State
Laboratories Crops Seizures Seizures Seizures Seizures
Aguascalientes 7
Baja California 8 4 6 1
Baja California
Sur
Campeche 9
Coahuila 9
Colima 7
Chiapas 9 4 8
Chihuahua 6 3
Distrito Federal 6 2 5 9
Durango 3 5
Guanajuato
Guerrero 4 7
Hidalgo
Jalisco 2 2 10 7 4
México 3 5 3
Michoacán 1 5 8 8 2
Morelos
Nayarit 10 4
Nuevo León 9 7
Oaxaca 1
Puebla
Querétaro
Quintana Roo 8
San Luis Potosí
Sinaloa 4 1 3 1 5
Sonora 5 6 1 3 2 6
Tabasco
Tamaulipas 10 2 6
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
Yucatán
Zacatecas 8 7 9
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from nine national
newspapers and ten regional or state newspapers.
80

Table 23. Confiscated

Weapons (1994-2009)
Years Weapons
1994 4,026
1995 11,589
1996 12,237
1997 9,743
1998 9,002
1999 7,271
2000 7,494
2001 8,466
2002 8,381
2003 5,626
2004 5,577
2005 5,115
2006 4,220
2007 9,527
2008 21,046
2009* 30,032
Average 9,960
Source: Own elaboration with
data from Felipe Calderón,
Tercer Informe de Gobierno
(Third Government Report).
*Figures for 2009 are linearly
projected based on monthly
averages.
81

Table 24. Percentage of Seized
Weapons (December 2006 to February 2010)
Percentage of Seizures
State Short Long
Artillery Cartridge Explosive
Guns Guns
Aguascalientes 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0
Baja California 3.4 3.9 0.0 2.7 1.6
Coahuila 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.1
Colima 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chiapas 1.7 2.0 0.0 2.0 3.1
Chihuahua 4.0 4.6 0.0 2.7 3.1
Distrito Federal 35.4 19.5 25.0 35.6 15.6
Guanajuato 1.7 2.0 0.00 2.0 3.1
Guerrero 3.4 3.9 0.00 1.3 3.1
Hidalgo 0.6 1.3 0.00 0.7 0.00
Jalisco 6.3 6.5 12.5 5.4 6.3
México 4.0 3.3 12.5 5.4 4.7
Michoacán 14.3 19.5 25.0 15.4 25.0
Morelos 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nayarit 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.6
Nuevo León 1.1 2.6 12.5 2.0 1.6
Oaxaca 1.1 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.0
Puebla 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Querétaro 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0
Quintana Roo 1.7 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0
Sinaloa 1.7 3.9 0.0 3.4 1.6
Sonora 2.3 4.6 0.0 4.7 4.7
Tamaulipas 9.7 14.3 0.0 10.1 14.1
Tlaxcala 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.6
Veracruz 4.0 3.3 12.5 1.3 6.3
Zacatecas 0.56 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Own elaboration with data from PGR press bulletins.
82

Table 25. Guns Seized from Each Cartel (From December 2006 to February 2010)
Cartels
State Beltrán La Familia
Sinaloa Golfo Zetas Tijuana Juárez Milenio Díaz Parada
Leyva Michoacana
Aguascalientes 100.0
Baja California 10.0 90.0
Coahuila n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Colima
Chiapas 100.0
Chihuahua 100.0
Distrito Federal 10.0 20.0 15.0 25.0 10.0 15.0 5.0
Guanajuato 100.0
Guerrero 11.1 55.6 33.3
Hidalgo 25.0 75.0
Jalisco 33.4 11.1 11.1 22.2 11.1 11.1
México 28.6 14.3 14.3 42.9
Michoacán 3.3 10.0 3.3 83.3
Morelos 100.0
Nayarit 33.3 66.7
Nuevo León 50.0 33.3 16.7
Oaxaca 50.0 50.0
Puebla n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Querétaro n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Quintana Roo 66.67 33.3
Sinaloa 66.7 33.3
Sonora 60.0 40.0
Tamaulipas 66.7 26.7 6.7
Tlaxcala 33.3 66.7
Veracruz 28.6 71.4
Zacatecas 100.0
Source: Own elaboration with data from PGR press bulletins.
n.d.: There is information about weapon seizures happening in these states; however, this information does not specify to which
cartel the weapons belonged to.
83

Table 26. Weapons Seizures in
Each State (December 2006 to February 2010)
Number of Seizures
State Short Long Total
Artillery Cartridges Explosives
Guns Guns
Aguascalientes 1 1 0 1 0 3
Baja California 6 6 0 4 1 17
Coahuila 2 0 0 1 2 5
Colima 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chiapas 3 3 0 3 2 11
Chihuahua 7 7 0 4 2 20
Distrito Federal 62 30 2 53 10 157
Guanajuato 3 3 0 3 2 11
Guerrero 6 6 0 2 2 16
Hidalgo 1 2 0 1 0 4
Jalisco 11 10 1 8 4 34
México 7 5 1 8 3 24
Michoacán 25 30 2 23 16 96
Morelos 0 1 0 0 0 1
Nayarit 1 1 0 1 1 4
Nuevo León 2 4 1 3 1 11
Oaxaca 2 2 0 1 0 5
Puebla 1 1 0 0 0 2
Querétaro 0 0 0 2 0 2
Quintana Roo 3 1 0 1 0 5
Sinaloa 3 6 0 5 1 15
Sonora 4 7 0 7 3 21
Tamaulipas 17 22 0 15 9 63
Tlaxcala 0 1 0 1 1 3
Veracruz 7 5 1 2 4 19
Zacatecas 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 175 154 8 149 64 550
Average 6.48 5.70 0.30 5.52 2.37 20.37
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from
nine national newspapers and ten regional or state newspapers.
84

Table 27. Dismantled Laboratories and

Eradicated Crops (December 2006 - February 2010)
Dismantled Laboratories Eradicated Crops
Place
State % State %
1 Michoacán 22.9 Sinaloa 28.4
2 Jalisco 14.3 Jalisco 16.6
3 México 11.5 Durango 10.2
4 Sinaloa 8.6 Guerrero 10.0
5 Sonora 7.2 Michoacán 9.7
6 D.F. 6.9 Sonora 9.5
7 Aguascalientes 6.6 Zacatecas 4.7
8 Zacatecas 6.3 Baja California 3.1
9 Nuevo León 5.7 Chiapas 2.8
10 Tamaulipas 3.7 Nayarit 2.6
Total 93.7 97.6
Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press
bulletins and with data from nine national newspapers and ten
regional or state newspapers.
85

Appendix V. Drug Market
1. Production
Table 28. Illegal Drug Production in the Mexican States

State Marijuana Poppy Heroin Amphetamines
Aguascalientes
Baja California X X
Baja California Sur X X
Campeche
Chiapas X
Chihuahua X X X X
Coahuila
Colima X
Distrito Federal X
Durango X X X
Estado de México
Guanajuato
Guerrero X X X
Hidalgo
Jalisco X X X
Michoacán X X X
Morelos
Nayarit X X X
Nuevo León X
Oaxaca X X
Puebla X
Querétaro
Quintana Roo
San Luis Potosí
Sinaloa X X X X
Sonora X X X
Tabasco
Tamaulipas X
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
Yucatán
Zacatecas X X
Source: PGR press bulletins and data from 19 national and regional
newspapers.
86

2. Prices
Table 29. Drug Price Variation per State (Maximum and Minimum Price)
Source: Own elaboration with data retrieved from the National Addictions Survey 2008 database
87

Table 30. Drug Price Variation per State (Geometric Mean)
Source: Own elaboration with data retrieved from the National Addictions Survey 2008 database.
88

Appendix VI. Public Opinion and the War on Drugs
Figure 9. In your Opinion, What is the Major Problem in the Country?

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Sep-09 Nov-09 Feb-10 Mar-10 May-10 Jun-10 Aug-10
Public Security Economic Political
Source: Own elaboration with data from Buendía & Laredo (September-2009, February-2009, June-
2010, August-2010) and GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010).
http://www.buendiaylaredo.com/publicaciones/120/APROBACION_INFORME.pdf
http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/GIMX1005p.pdf
Figure 10. How Do You Grade the Federal

Government in Relation to… (Very Good, Good, Bad, Very Bad)?
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Very Good Good Bad Very Bad
Combating drug trafficking Combating insecurity Fighting Corruption
Source: Own elaboration with data from Buendía & Laredo (September-2009, February-2009,
June-2010, August-2010)
http://www.buendiaylaredo.com/publicaciones/120/APROBACION_INFORME.pdf
89

Figure 11. How Successful has been the Federal
Government in Relation to...? (Answers with “Very Successful”)
30
25
20
15
10
0
Combating drug trafficking Combating insecurity Fighting Corruption
Mar-10 May-10
Source: Own elaboration with data from GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010).
Figure 12. Do You Agree or Disagree with the

Direct Participation of the Army in Combating Drug Traffic Organizations?
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
May-08 Aug-08 Nov-08 Mar-09 Nov-09 Mar-10 May-10
Agree Disagree
90

Figure 13. In Comparison with Six Months Ago, Do You Think
that Today Insecurity in the Country is Higher, Same, or Lower?
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Mar-09 May-09 Aug-09 Nov-09 Mar-10 May-10
Higher Equal Minor
91

Appendix VII. Illicit Drugs Glossary
This section provides information on the five categories of illicit drugs (narcotics, stimulants, depressants or
sedatives, hallucinogens and cannabis). These categories include many drugs legally produced and
prescribed by doctors as well as those illegally produced and sold outside of medical channels.37
Amphetamine: Is a psychostimulant drug that is known to produce increased wakefulness and focus in
association with decreased fatigue and appetite.
Cannabis (Cannabis sativa): Is the common hemp plant, which provides hallucinogens with some sedative
properties, and includes marijuana (pot, Acapulco gold, grass, reefer), tetrahydrocannabinol (THC,
Marinol), hashish (hash) and hashish oil (hash oil).
Coca (mostly Erythroxylum coca): Is a bush with leaves that contain the stimulant used to make cocaine.
Cocaine: Is a stimulant derived from the leaves of the coca bush.
Depressants (sedatives): Are drugs that reduce tension and anxiety and include chloral hydrate,
barbiturates (Amytal, Nembutal, Seconal, phenobarbital), benzodiazepines (Librium, Valium),
methaqualone (Quaalude), glutethimide (Doriden), and others (Equanil, Placidyl, Valmid).
Drugs: Are any chemical substances that produce a physical, mental, emotional, or behavioral change in
an individual.
Drug abuse: Is the use of any licit or illicit chemical substance that results in physical, mental, emotional,
or behavioral impairment in an individual.
Hallucinogens: Are drugs that affect sensation, thinking, self-awareness, and emotion. Hallucinogens
include LSD (acid, microdot), mescaline and peyote (mexc, buttons, cactus), amphetamine variants
(PMA, STP, DOB), phencyclidine (PCP, angel dust, hog), phencyclidine analogues (PCE, PCPy,
TCP), and others (psilocybin, psilocyn).
Hashish: Is the resinous exudate of the cannabis or hemp plant (Cannabis sativa).
Heroin: Is a semisynthetic derivative of morphine.
Mandrax: Is a trade name for methaqualone, a pharmaceutical depressant.
Marijuana: Is the dried leaf of the cannabis or hemp plant (Cannabis sativa).
Methaqualone: Is a pharmaceutical depressant, referred to as mandrax in Southwest Asia and Africa.
Narcotics: Are drugs that relieve pain, often induce sleep, and refer to opium, opium derivatives, and
synthetic substitutes. Natural narcotics include opium (paregoric, parepectolin), morphine (MS-
Contin, Roxanol), codeine (Tylenol with codeine, Empirin with codeine, Robitussin AC), and
thebaine. Semisynthetic narcotics include heroin (horse, smack), and hydromorphone (Dilaudid).
Synthetic narcotics include meperidine or Pethidine (Demerol, Mepergan), methadone (Dolophine,
Methadose), and others (Darvon, Lomotil).
Opium: Is the brown, gummy exudate of the incised, unripe seedpod of the opium poppy.
Opium poppy (Papaver somniferum): Is the source for the natural and semisynthetic narcotics.
Poppy straw: Is the entire cut and dried opium poppy-plant material, other than the seeds. Opium is
extracted from poppy straw in commercial operations that produce the drug for medical use.
Psychotropics: Are generally defined as any chemical substance that crosses the blood-brain barrier and
acts primarily upon the central nervous system where it alters brain function, resulting in changes in
perception, mood, consciousness, cognition and behavior. However, the United Nations Office on

37 Definitions from Central Intelligence Agency, 2010, The World Factbook. Definitions and References, retrieved
from the Internet on August 3, 2010: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#I and United Nations, 1971, Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Vienna:
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 28.
92

Drugs and Crime gives in its Convention on Psychotropic Substances a list with the chemical
substances considered psychotropic. The drugs enlisted in the convention are the ones considered
psychotropic in this report.
Qat (kat, khat): Is a stimulant from the buds or leaves of Catha edulis that is chewed or drunk as tea.
Quaaludes: Is the North American slang term for methaqualone, a pharmaceutical depressant.
Stimulants: Are drugs that relieve mild depression, increase energy and activity, and include cocaine
(coke, snow, crack), amphetamines (Desoxyn, Dexedrine), ephedrine, ecstasy (clarity, essence,
doctor, Adam), phenmetrazine (Preludin), methylphenidate (Ritalin), and others (Cylert, Sanorex,
Tenuate).
93

PARTICIPANTS

NORTH AMERICAN
COOPERATION IN A
ENVIRONMENT

GUANAJUATO, MÉXICO

CANADIAN PARTICIPANTS AT THE 6th ANNUAL NORTH AMERICAN
FORUM
SEPTEMBER 30, OCTOBER 1 AND 2

§

Jon Allen Harold “Sonny” Gordon
Assistant Deputy Minister, Chairman
Americas Dundee Corporation
Foreign Affairs and International
Trade Canada Fen Osler Hampson
Director
Malcolm Brown Normal Paterson School of
Associate Deputy Minister International Affairs
Natural Resources Canada Carleton University

Claude Carrière Paul Hill
Foreign and Defence Policy Chairman, President and Chief
Advisor to the Prime Minister Executive Officer
and Deputy Secretary to the Harvard Developments Inc. – A
Cabinet Hill Company
Privy Council Office
Michael Horgan
Thomas d’Aquino Deputy Minister of Finance
Chairman and Chief Executive Government of Canada
Intercounsel
Michael Kergin
William Elliot Senior Business Advisor
Commissioner Bennett Jones LLP
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Former Ambassador of
Canada to the U.S.
Dick Fadden
Director The Honourable Peter
Canadian Security Intelligence Lougheed
Service Counsel
Bennett Jones LLP
and Former Premier of Alberta

1
Michael Martin Guillermo Rishchynski
Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet Ambassador of Canada to Mexico
(Operations)
Privy Council Office Berel Rodal
Government of Canada President
Berel Rodal Associates
Reid Morden
President Morris Rosenberg
Reid Morden & Associates Deputy Minister of Foreign
and Former Director of Canadian Affairs
Security Intelligence Services Foreign Affairs and International
Trade Canada
Stephen Rigby
President The Honourable Michael H.
Canada Border Services Agency Wilson
Chairman
Barclays Capital Canada Inc.
Former Ambassador of Canada
to the United States of America

2
UNITED STATES PARTICIPANTS AT THE 6th ANNUAL NORTH
AMERICAN FORUM

§

Robert C. Bonner Carla A. Hills
Senior Principal Chairman and Chief Executive
Sentinel HS Group Officer
Hills and Company
Eileen Claussen
President Donna J. Hrinak
Pew Center on Global Climate Senior Director
Change Latin America Government
Affairs, PepsiCo, Inc.
Don Chipman
Lieutenant Colonel Gary Clyde Hufbauer
US Marine Corps Reginald Jones Senior Fellow
Peterson Institute for
Kenneth W. Dam International Economics
Emeritus Professor of Law
University of Chicago William Irwin
Manager
Tomás Díaz de la Rubia International Government
Deputy Director for Science and Affairs
Technology Chevron Corporation
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory George H. Miller
Director
Richard D. Downie Lawrence Livermore National
Director Laboratory
Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies Mary Anastasia O'Grady
Editorial Board Member and
Clark Kent Ervin Americas Column Editor
Director The Wall Street Journal
Homeland Security Program
The Aspen Institute

3
Carlos Pascual The Honourable George P.
Ambassador of the United States Shultz
to Mexico Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford
Distinguished Fellow
The Honourable William J. Hoover Institution
Perry and Former U.S. Secretary of
Professor State
Stanford University
19th US Secretary of Defense Paul N. Stockton
Assistant Secretary
William Schneider, Jr. Defense for Homeland Defense
Senior Fellow and Americas’ Security Affairs
Defense Science Board
David G. Victor
Andrew Selee Professor and Director
Director Laboratory on International Law
Mexico Institute and Regulation
Woodrow Wilson Center University of California at San
Diego

Jane Wales
President and Chief Executive
Officer
World Affairs Council
Northern California

James A. Winnefeld
Commander
U.S. Northern Command
4
MEXICAN PARTICIPANTS AT THE 6th ANNUAL NORTH AMERICAN
FORUM

§

Héctor Aguilar Camín Claudio X. Gonzalez
Director Chairman
Nexos Kimberly‐Clark de México

Dr. Pedro Aspe Eduardo Guerrero
Co‐Chairman Partner
Evercore Partners Lantia Consultores
and Former Secretary of Finance
Alejandro Junco
Francisco Barrio Terrazas President and Chief Executive
Ambassador of Mexico to Canada Officer
Reforma
Dr. Enrique Cabrero
General Director Dr. Mario Molina
Center for Economic Research President
and Teaching (CIDE) Center Mario Molina for
Strategic Studies on Energy and
Dr. Agustín Carstens Environment
Governor
Bank of Mexico Enrique Peña Nieto
Governor
Ernesto Cordero State of México
Secretary
Finance and Public Credit Alejandro Poiré
Technical Secretary
Genaro García Luna National Security Council
Secretary
Public Security Andrés Rozental
President
Andrés Garza Herrera Rozental & Asociados
General Director
Qualtia Alimentos

5
Juan José Suárez Coppel Dr. Luis Videgaray
General Director President
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) Budget and Public Account
Commission in the lower house
Jorge Tello
Presidential Advisor on Security Jaime Zabludovsky
And Vice‐chairman of Executive President
International Information ConMéxico
Development
CEMEX

Guillermo Valdés
Director
Center of Investigation and
National Security (CISEN)

Carlos Valenzuela
President and Chief Executive
Officer
Dynamica Housing

6

PARTICIPANTS BIOGRAPHICAL
NOTES

NORTH AMERICAN
COOPERATION IN A
ENVIRONMENT

GUANAJUATO, MÉXICO


Jon Allen
Assistant Deputy Minister, Americas
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

Jon Allen joined the then Department of External Affairs in Ottawa in
1981. In addition to postings abroad in Mexico City (1983‐85), New
Delhi (1989‐92) and Washington (1997‐2001), Mr. Allen spent his early
career in the Legal Bureau where he represented Canada in disputes
under the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement and worked in the areas of
human rights, humanitarian and environmental law. Mr. Allen held the
positions of Director General, North America Bureau, (2001‐2004)
where he was responsible for Canada’s relations with the US and Mexico
and Minister (Political Affairs) at the Canadian Embassy in Washington
(2004‐2006). From 2006‐2010, he was Ambassador of Canada to Israel.

Héctor Aguilar Camín
Director
Nexos

Héctor Aguilar Camín is a writer, journalist and historian. In 1986 he
received Mexico's Cultural Journalism National Award and three years
later he received a scholarship from the John Simon Guggenheim
Memorial Foundation. As a journalist, he has written for La Jornada
(which he also co‐edited), Unomásuno and currently for Milenio. He is
director of Nexos, one of the leading cultural magazines in Mexico.

1

Dr. Pedro Aspe
CoChairman
Evercore Partners
and Former Secretary of Finance

Pedro Aspe is Co‐Chairman of the Board of Evercore Partners, a leading
investment bank in the United States, and Chief Excecutive Officer of
Protego, the leading investment bank boutique in Mexico. In public life,
he was named Mexico´s Secretary of Budget in 1987 and Secretary of
the Treasury in 1988. He is a member of the board of McGraw‐hill
Companies and the Carnegie Foundation in New York and Televisa in
Mexico City.

Francisco Barrio Terrazas
Ambassador of Mexico to Canada

Francisco Barrio Terrazas has been Mexico’s Ambassador to Canada
since February 2009. At the beginning of President Vicente Fox’s
administration, he was appointed to head the Federal Comptroller’s
Secretariat, the government’s primary anti‐corruption agency. Later, he
served as a Federal Deputy and coordinated the Parliamentary Group of
the National Action Party, of which he is an active member. In the course
of his political career, he has served as Mayor of Ciudad Juárez and
Governor of the State of Chihuahua, a post he held from 1992 to 1998.

2

Robert C. Bonner
Senior Principal
Sentinel HS Group

Robert Bonner is the Senior Principal of the Sentinel HS Group, a
Washington, D.C.‐based homeland security consulting firm. Previously,
he was appointed U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California by
former President Reagan in 1984 and was then appointed by former
President Bush in 1989 to serve as a Judge on the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California. From 1990 to 1993, Bonner served as
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. From 1993 to
2001, Judge Bonner was a partner in the Los Angeles and Washington,
D.C. law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, an international law firm. On
June 24, 2001 President George W. Bush nominated Judge Bonner as
Commissioner of the United States Customs Service, later known as U.S.
Customs and Border Protection. On June 4, 2009, Homeland Secretary
Janet Napolitano appointed him to the Homeland Security Advisory
Council's Southwest Border Task Force.

Malcolm Brown
Associate Deputy Minister
Natural Resources Canada

Malcolm Brown joined Natural Resources Canada as Associate Deputy
Minister in October 2009. Prior to this appointment, Mr. Brown was
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Strategic Policy & Research at Human
Resources & Skills Development Canada. From March 2005 to
September 2007, Mr. Brown was Assistant Deputy Minister of Strategic
Directions and Communications and then Assistant Deputy Minister of
Strategic and Program Policy at Citizenship & Immigration Canada.
From January 2003 to March 2005, Mr. Brown assumed several
Assistant Deputy Minister‐level positions at Human Resources and
Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) and Human Resources
Development Canada (HRDC) and most recently was Assistant Deputy
Minister, Employment Programs Policy & Design.
3

Dr. Enrique Cabrero
General Director
Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)

Enrique Cabrero is the General Director of the Center for Economic
Research and Teaching (CIDE), where he is also a research professor in
the Division of Public Administration. He has been a visiting professor at
the Ecole Normale Superieure in France, at the University of
Birmingham in Britain and at the Autonomous University of Barcelona
in Spain, among others. He is also a member of the National System of
Researchers (SNI) level III and his research areas include: political
decentralization and organizational analysis, public management, public
finance and fiscal federalism, municipal management and public policy.

Claude Carrière
Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor to the Prime
Minister and Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet

Claude Carrière is Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor to the Prime
Minister and Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet. He served as Associate
Deputy Minister of Natural Resources, becoming Foreign and Defence
Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister and Deputy Secretary to the
Cabinet, Privy Council Office, effective June 16, 2008. He also served as
Minister (Economic) and Deputy Head of Mission at the Canadian
Embassy in Washington, D.C.

4

Dr. Agustín Carstens
Governor
Bank of Mexico

Agustín Carstens is an economist who serves as Governor of the Bank of
Mexico since 1 January 2010. He previously served as Secretary of
Finance (2006–09), as Deputy Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund (2003–06). Prior to taking his position as Deputy
Managing Director at the IMF, he was Mexico's Deputy Secretary of
Finance. From 1999‐2000, Mr. Carstens served as an Executive Director
at the IMF (representing Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Spain and Venezuela), after a career at the Banco de
México, where his positions included those of Director General,
Economic Research and Chief of Staff in the Governor's office.

Eileen Claussen
President
Pew Center on Global Climate Change

Eileen Claussen is the President of the Pew Center on Global Climate
Change and Strategies for the Global Environment. Ms. Claussen is the
former Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Prior to joining the Department of
State, Ms. Claussen served for three years as a Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Global Environmental Affairs at the
National Security Council. She has also served as Chairman of the United
Nations Multilateral Montreal Protocol Fund. Ms. Claussen was Director
of Atmospheric Programs at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Ms. Claussen is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the
Singapore Energy Advisory Committee, the Ecomagination Advisory
Board, the Natural Gas Council, the Harvard Environmental Economics
Program Advisory Panel, and the U.S. Commodity Future Trading
Commission’s Advisory Committee.

5

Ernesto Cordero
Secretary
Finance and Public Credit

Ernesto Cordero is the Secretary of Finance and Public Credit. He was
appointed Director General of the Miguel Estrada Iturbide Foundation,
an institution that provides technical advice for legislative projects for
members of the PAN Parliamentary Group in the Chamber of Deputies.
He was Integral Risk Management Director at Banco Nacional de Obras
y Servicios Públicos. At the Energy Secretariat, he directed the Technical
Advisory and Institutional Liaison Unit and subsequently served as
Undersecretary of Energy Planning and Technological Development. He
served as Under‐Secretary of the Secretariat of Finance and Public
Credit from December 2006 to January 2008.

Don Chipman
Lieutenant Colonel
US Marine Corps

Lieutenant Colonel Don Chipman, representing the U.S. Marine Corps,
was a national security affairs fellow for 2009–2010 at the Hoover
Institution. Chipman is a 1991 graduate of the United States Naval
Academy and has a Master of Science degree in management from Troy
State University. He is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College. An
aircraft maintenance officer by trade, he has supported nearly every
platform in marine aviation. He has deployed with the 31st Marine
Expeditionary Unit, first as part of the Unit Deployment Program in the
Western Pacific and then in support of Operations Southern Watch and
Iraqi Freedom. Other assignments include being an action officer at U.S.
Strategic Command, the aviation logistics strategy and plans officer at
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and the commanding officer of Marine
Aviation Logistics Squadron 11, 3rd Marine Air Wing. His research at
Hoover focused on current and future national security issues.

6

Thomas d’Aquino
Chairman and Chief Executive
Intercounsel

Thomas d´Aquino is Chairman and Chief Executive of Intercounsel, and
Senior Counsel at Gowlings, Canada’s largest law firm, where he chairs
the firm’s Business Strategy and Public Policy Group. He is the
Distinguished Visiting Professor, Global Business and Public Policy
Strategies at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs, and Honorary Professor at the University of
Western Ontario’s Richard Ivey School of Business. From 1981 to 2009,
Mr. d’Aquino was Chief Executive Officer and President of the Canadian
Council of Chief Executives, an organization composed of the chief
executives of 150 of Canada’s leading enterprises and pre‐eminent
entrepreneurs. A lawyer, entrepreneur, educator and strategist, Mr.
d’Aquino served as special assistant to Prime Minister Tradeau. He is
the recipient of the Aguila Azteca Award from President Ernesto Zedillo.

Kenneth W. Dam
Max Pam Professor Emeritus
And Senior Lecturer
University of Chicago Law School

Kenneth Dam is Max Pam Professor Emeritus and a Senior Lecturer at
the University of Chicago Law School. He served as Deputy Secretary in
the Department of Treasury (2001‐2003) and in the Department of
State (1982‐1985). In 1973 he was Executive Director of the Council on
Economic Policy, a White House office responsible for coordinating
domestic and international economic policy. Past activities include
serving as corporate vice president for law and external relations of IBM
and as a board member of various public policy institutions including
the Council on Foreign Relations and the Bookings Institution.

7

Tomás Díaz de la Rubia
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Tomás Díaz de la Rubia is the Deputy Director for Science
and Technology at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Prior to
becoming the Deputy Director for Science and Technology in 2010,
Tomás was the Associate Director for Chemistry and Materials Science
from 2002 to 2007, the Associate Director for Chemistry, Materials,
Earth and Life Sciences from 2008 to 2009 and the Laboratory Chief
Research and Development Officer from 2009 to 2010.

Richard D. Downie
Director
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Richard D. Downie is the Director of the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies (CHDS). During a distinguished military career in which he held
a wide variety of command and staff positions, he served as an
Infantryman and also as a Foreign Area Officer specializing in Latin
America. Dr. Downie had several assignments in Germany; was an
exchange officer in Colombia, where he completed the LANCERO
(International Ranger) School as the distinguished graduate; worked at
both the U.S. Army South and the United States Southern Command in
Panama; coordinated Western Hemisphere affairs on the U.S. Joint Staff;
served with the Multinational Specialized Unit in Bosnia; and was the
Defense and Army Attaché in Mexico. His final U.S. Army assignment
was in command of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security
Cooperation (WHINSEC), where he served as the Institute’s first
Commandant.

8

William Elliot
Commissioner
Royal Canadian Mounted Police

William J. S. Elliott is the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police. He was appointed the Associate Deputy Minister of Public Safety
by Prime Minister Stephen Harper on 1 May 2006 and then to the RCMP
in 6 July 2007. Formerly he was appointed the National Security Advisor
to the Prime Minister of Canada by the former Prime Minister, Paul
Martin.

Clark Kent Ervin
Director
Homeland Security Program
The Aspen Institute

Clark Kent Ervin is the Director of the Aspen Institute’s Homeland
Security Program. He joined the Institute in 2005. Before doing so, he
served as the first Inspector General of the United States Department of
Homeland Security, from January, 2003 to December, 2004. Prior to his
service at DHS, he served as the Inspector General of the United States
Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, from
August, 2001 to January, 2003. His service in the administration of
President George W. Bush is preceded by his service as the Associate
Director of Policy in the White House Office of National Service in the
administration of President George H.W. Bush.

9

Dick Fadden
Director
Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Richard Fadden was appointed Director of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service in June 2009. His previous positions include Deputy
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada; Deputy Minister of
Natural Resources Canada; President of the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency; and Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Privy Council
Office. He joined the federal public service in 1977.

Genaro García Luna
Secretary
Public Security

Genaro García Luna is the Secretary of Public Security. From 1989
onwards, for a period of nearly ten years, he was employed by the
Center for Research and National Security (CISEN) as a researcher in the
Sub‐Department of Foreign Affairs. From 1998 to late 2000, he was
General Intelligence Coordinator for Prevention in the Federal
Preventive Police Force. He has held a number of posts and
commissions, such as Technical Secretary for the Sub‐Committee for the
Prevention of Arms Dealing, Explosives and Munitions, a position in
which he coordinated joint actions with the organizations comprising
the Sub‐Committee for the Top Level Mexico‐United States Contact
Group, and drafted and implemented the Manual for the Identification
and Tracking of Arms and Explosives. He is currently head of the
Federal Investigation Agency.

10

Andrés Garza Herrera
General Director
Qualtia Alimentos

Andrés Garza Herrera took over as General Director of Qualtia
Alimentos, reporting to the President and General Director of Xignux as
of June 2 of this year. He has a trajectory spanning over 20 years in the
organization, he has held various operative and management positions
in the Automotive Division of Xignux, including Production, Production
Engineering, Plant Manager, Regional Operations Manager, Director of
Operations and finally as Director of the Harnesses Business Unit. This
last position concluded in September 2009 upon completion and
disvestiture of the agreement with Yazaki Corporation. Afterward, he
held the position of Director of Planning and Development of the
Infrastructure Division. Likewise, he has participated in various
organizations and institutions, including being an Advisor to Ciudad de
los Niños (City of Children), the Himalaya School, President of the Nuevo
Leon Chamber of Transformation Industries (CAINTRA) and President
of CINTERMEX.

Claudio X. Gonzalez
Chairman
KimberlyClark de México

Claudio González is Chairman of the board of Kimberly‐Clark de México,
Chairman of Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios, and Former
Chairman of the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial. He is a Director of:
Fondo México (Mexico Fund), Grupo Alfa, Grupo Carso, Grupo México,
Grupo Televisa and Investment Company of America (America Funds‐
Capital Group).

11

Harold “Sonny” Gordon
Chairman
Dundee Corporation

Harold "Sonny” Gordon, Q.C., was born in Montreal, Canada and
educated at McGill University in Commerce and Law, Concordia
University in Arts and The Wharton Graduate School of Finance at the
University of Pennsylvania. After qualifying as a member of the Bar, Mr.
Gordon was a ministerial assistant for a minister of the Government of
Canada. Mr. Gordon is currently Chairman of Dundee Corporation, a
public Canadian corporation, and also a director of several public and
private and not‐for‐profit corporations, including Dundee Corporation,
Dundee Wealth Inc., Dorel Industries Inc., Pethealth Inc.,
Transcontinental Inc and Fibrek Inc. Mr. Gordon is also Chairman for
the Sauvé Scholars Foundation. Previously Mr. Gordon was managing
partner of Stikeman Elliott and then becamen Vice Chairman of Hasbro
Inc.

Eduardo Guerrero
Partner
Lantia Consultores

Eduardo Guerrero is Consulting Partner of Lantia Consultores, which
offers services on transparency and access to information. He
previously served as Executive Director of Professional Services and
Chief of Staff Election of President of the General Council, the Federal
Electoral Institute (IFE). He has also served as Director General for
Research and International Relations, Federal Institute of Access to
Public Information (IFAI), Director General of Social Organization in the
Ministry of Social Development, Advisor to the Secretary General,
Research Center and National Security (CISEN), as well as Deputy
Director of Public Policy at the Technical Secretariat of the Economic
Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic. Throughout her teaching
experience he has been a professor and researcher at El Colegio de
Mexico and the Center for Interdisciplinary Research in the Humanities,
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM).
12

Fen Osler Hampson
Director
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University

Fen Hampson is Professor and Director of The Norman Paterson School
of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa. He has served
on advisory panels for the Social Science Research Council in New York
City, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and Senior
Advisory Committee, Project on Global Issues, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. He is Senior Consultant to the United States
Institute of Peace, a bipartisan, Congressionally funded think tank in
Washington, D.C.

Paul J. Hill
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
Harvard Developments Inc. – A Hill Company

Paul Hill is President of The Hill Companies and Chairman of Harvard
Developments Inc., A Hill Company, which operates in the areas of real
estate, insurance, broadcasting, oil and gas, manufacturing and
technology in Canada and the United States. In addition, he is Chairman
of Urban Forest Recyclers Inc. and Western Surety Company, and Vice
Chairman of Harvard Energy. He is actively involved in public policy
through his board participation in the C.D. Howe Institute, The Fraser
Institute, The Conference Board of Canada and the Canadian Council of
Chief Executives.

13

Carla A. Hills
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Hills and Company

Carla A. Hills is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Hills &
Company, International Consultants, which advises companies on global
trade and investment issues, particularly in the emerging markets. She
served as U.S. Trade Representative (1989‐93), in which capacity she
was President Bush's principal advisor on international trade policy.
She served as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development in the Ford Administration. From 1974‐75, she was
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
Currently, she serves on a number of corporate boards. She is Vice Chair
of the National Committee on U.S.‐China Relations, the U.S.‐China
Business Council, and the Inter‐American Dialogue; Trustee of the
Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of International
Economics; Member of the Board of the Asia Society; and a Member of
the Trilateral Commission.
Michael Horgan
Deputy Minister of Finance
Government of Canada

Michael Horgan became Deputy Minister of Finance on September 8,
2009. During his 31‐year federal public service career, he has served in
a wide range of capacities, including President of the Atlantic Canada
Opportunities Agency; Associate Deputy Minister of Environment; and
Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund for the Canadian,
Irish and Caribbean constituency.

14

Donna J. Hrinak
Senior Director
Latin America Government Affairs, PepsiCo, Inc.

Donna Hrinak is senior director of Latin America government affairs at
PepsiCo, Inc. She has served as U.S. ambassador to four countries: Brazil,
Venezuela, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic, and as deputy assistant
secretary of state for Mexico and the Caribbean. She also had
assignments in Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and Poland. Ambassador
Hrinak’s honors include the U.S. government’s Distinguished Public
Service Award and the State Department’s Career Achievement Award.
In 2005, she was named international businesswoman of the year by the
Miami chapter of the Organization of Women in International Trade. She
serves on the board of directors of the Inter‐American Dialogue and on
the board of counselors of McLarty Associates.

Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Reginald Jones Senior Fellow
Peterson Institute for International Economics

Gary Clyde Hufbauer resumed his position as Reginald Jones Senior
Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in 1998.
Previously he was the Marcus Wallenberg Professor of International
Financial Diplomacy at Georgetown University, and served in the U.S.
Treasury Department from 1974 to1980. Dr. Hufbauer holds an A.B
from Harvard College, a Ph.D. in economics from King College at
Cambridge University, and a J.D. from Georgetown University Law
Center. His co‐authored publications include Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered, third edition (2007), US Taxation of Foreign Income
(2007), US‐China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes (2006), and
NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges (2005).

15

William Irwin
Manager
International Government Affairs
Chevron

William Irwin is Manager, International Government Affairs, for
Chevron’s Washington D.C., office. In this position he coordinates
activities in support of the company’s international businesses as they
relate to the United States Government, the diplomatic corps, the United
Nations, and U.S. trade associations. Mr. Irwin is on the advisory board
of the Global Strategy Institute at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and the Center for Latin American Studies at
George Washington University.

Alejandro Junco
President and Chief Executive Officer
Reforma

Alejandro Junco is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Grupo
Reforma, Latin America's largest print media company. The company's
holdings include the newspapers El Norte in Monterrey, Reforma in
Mexico City and Mural in Guadalajara. Combined daily circulation is
about 1.4 million copies. Previously he was President of Editora el Sol.

16

Michael Kergin
Senior Advisor
Bennett Jones LLP
and Former Ambassador of Canada to the U.S.

Michael Kergin was Ambassador of Canada to the United States from
2000 to 2005. His previous postings included the Canadian Mission to
the United Nations in New York, and Canadian Embassies in Cameroon
and Chile. He served as Ambassador to Cuba from 1986 to 1989. He held
various senior positions in the Department of Foreign affairs at the
level of Assistant Deputy Minister until 1998, when the Prime Minister
asked him to serve as his Foreign Policy Advisor, as well as Assistant
Secretary to the Cabinet for Foreign and Defense Policy. Mr. Kergin is
now senior Advisor at the law firm of Bennett Jones LLP and a senior
fellow at the United States Chamber of Commerce.

The Honourable Peter Lougheed
Counsel
Bennett Jones LLP
and Former Premier of Alberta

Peter Lougheed, former Premier of Alberta, is Counsel to Bennett Jones
LLP. He is the Canadian Co‐Chair of the North American Forum and was
the Co‐Chairman of the Canadian Alliance for Free Trade and Job
Opportunities, the business alliance that supported the Canada‐United
States Free Trade Agreement in 1988. Mr. Lougheed is a Director of a
number of Canadian corporations, including Keyera Energy
Management Ltd. and Quorum Funding Corporation. He also acts as a
special advisor to a number of other Canadian corporations.

17

Michael Martin
Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations)
Government of Canada

As Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations), Mr. Martin provides
policy advice to the Clerk of the Privy Council, the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet on a wide range of domestic policy and program issues. A
career public servant, Mr. Martin joined Canada’s Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 1984 following studies at the
University of Victoria and Yale University. He served overseas in
Islamabad, Tokyo and Beijing, as well as in a variety of assignments in
Ottawa, including as Director of Policy for the 2002 Kananaskis G8
Summit and as Assistant Deputy Minister for Strategic Policy at the
Department of the Environment. In 2008 he was appointed Chief
Negotiator and Ambassador for Climate Change for Canada for the
negotiations leading up to the Copenhagen climate conference.

George H. Miller
Director
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

George Miller is Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a
position he assumed in March 2006 after a long and distinguished
career in national security work at the Laboratory. As Director, he is
responsible for the management of the Laboratory and led the
institution through its transition to a new management contractor,
Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS), LLC, in October 2007. He
provides advice to the commander of the United States strategic
command through his membership on the USSTRATCOM strategic
advisory group and as chairman of its science and technology panel.

18

Dr. Mario Molina
President
Center Mario Molina for Strategic Studies on Energy
and Environment

Mario Molina serves on the boards of several environmental
organizations and scientific committees, including the U.S. President’s
Committee of Advisors in Science and Technology, the Institutional
Policy Committee, the Committee on Global Security and Sustainability
of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Mario
Molina Center. He was a co‐recipient of the 1995 Nobel Prize in
Chemistry for his work highlighting the threat posed by
chlorofluorocarbon gases on the Earth’s ozone layer. His current work
focuses on air quality and climate issues.

Reid Morden
President
Reid Morden & Associates
and Former Director of Canadian Security Intelligence
Services

Reid Morden is President, Reid Morden & Associates, which provides
advice and comment on intelligence, security, and public policy issues.
He has been Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and President and CEO of Atomic
Energy of Canada Ltd. From 2004‐06 he was Executive Director of the
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Iraq Oil‐For‐
Food Program (Volcker Inquiry) and has also served as advisor to
Justices O’Connor and Iacobucci in their terrorism‐related Inquiries. He
lectures on foreign policy, security and intelligence matters at Wilfred
Laurier University and serves on the Board of Directors of that
University’s Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Affairs.

19

Mary Anastasia O'Grady
Editorial Board Member and Americas Column Editor
The Wall Street Journal

Mary O’Grady is a member of the editorial board at The Wall Street
Journal and writes on politics, economics and business in Latin America
and Canada. Previously she was an option strategist, product manager
and sales manager with Merrill Lynch & Co. In 2009 she received the
Thomas Jefferson Award from The Association of Private Enterprise
Education. She is a past recipient of the Bastiat Prize for Journalism and
the Inter American Press Association’s Daily Gleaner Award for editorial
commentary.

Carlos Pascual
Ambassador of the United States to Mexico

Carlos Pascual is the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico. Pascual joined the US
Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1983. From October
2000 to August 2003, Pascual served as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. In
February 2006, Pascual took his first private sector position as Vice
President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the
Brookings Institution, a highly influential, center‐liberal policy think
tank in Washington, DC. While at Brookings, Pascual co‐authored a book
on foreign policy, Power & Responsibility: Building International Order
in an Era of Transnational Threat.

20

Enrique Peña Nieto
Governor
State of México

Enrique Peña Nieto is governor of State of México since 2005. Between
1993 and 1998, during Emilio Chuayfett’s term as governor, he was
chief of staff for the Secretary of economic development of the State of
Mexico. In the period between 2000 and 2002 Peña Nieto exercised
different tasks for the state's administration: government
administration secretary, president of the directive council for the Social
Security Institute of the State of Mexico and its municipalities, president
of the internal council of the Health Institute of the State of Mexico and
vice‐president for the State of Mexico’s government board for the
Integral Family Development System (DIF).

The Honourable William J. Perry
Professor
Stanford University
19th U.S. Secretary of Defense

William J. Perry is the Michael and Barbara Barberian Professor at
Stanford University, with a joint appointment at FSI and the School of
Engineering. From 1994 to 1997 he was United States Secretary of
Defense, having previously served as Deputy Secretary of Defense and
as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Among
other honors, he is a recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the
Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal, and Outstanding
Civilian Service Medals from the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and the
Defense Intelligence Agency.

21

Alejandro Poiré
Technical Secretary
National Security Council

Alejandro Poiré Romero was appointed Technical Secretary of National
Security Council on August 19th 2010. Previously, President Felipe
Calderón appointed him State Secretary for Population, Migration and
Religion Affairs, at the Ministry of Interior, where he had been serving
as Lead Adviser to the Minister since November 2008. From 2007 to
2008, Mr. Poiré was Director of Political Analysis at President
Calderón’s Office, and was then commissioned to the office of Political
Development at the Ministry of Interior.

Stephen Rigby
President
Canada Border Services Agency

Stephen Rigby has been President of the Canada Border Services Agency
since August 2008. Earlier in his career he held a number of senior
positions at Revenue Canada, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency,
and the Canada Revenue Agency. In 2005, he joined the Privy Council
Office as Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence.
The following year he became Executive Vice‐ President of the Canada
Border Services Agency. In March 2008, he joined Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada as Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

22

Guillermo Rishchynski
Ambassador of Canada to Mexico

Guillermo Rishchynski is Ambassador of Canada to Mexico. He
graduated from McGill University in Montréal, Québec, in 1975, and
worked in private business in Montréal and Ottawa before joining the
foreign service. During his 28‐year diplomatic career, he has been
posted to Jordan, Indonesia, Australia and the United States. In addition
to Brazil, where he also served as a consul in the 1980s, he also held
ambassadorial rank in Colombia. He was appointed Canadian
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Brazil on August 2,
2005. In late 2007, Rishchynski took up a new posting as Canada's
ambassador to Mexico.

Berel Rodal
President
Berel Rodal Associates

Berel Rodal provides strategic advice and related services to select
clients in both the private and public sectors. He serves, as well, as a
partner, advisor to, or on the Boards of growth‐oriented, innovative
investment and technology enterprises, NGOs, and think tanks in North
America, Europe, and Asia. His professional experience as a senior
official in the Government of Canada included policy, planning, and
executive responsibilities in the foreign affairs, international trade,
defense, security, economic, and social domains. He is a founder of the
North American Forum.

23

Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

Morris Rosenberg is Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Previously, he
was appointed Deputy Minister of Health in December 2004. Prior to
this appointment, Mr. Rosenberg served as Deputy Minister of Justice
and Deputy Attorney General of Canada from July 1998 to December
2004. Mr. Rosenberg began his public service career with the
Department of Justice in 1979. From 1989 to 1993 he served as
Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Affairs and Legislative Policy in
the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. From 1993 to 1996,
he served as Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Economic and Regional
Development Policy, at the Privy Council Office. He was appointed
Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations) in 1996.

Andrés Rozental
President
Rozental & Asociados

Andres Rozental is President of Rozental & Asociados and was former
Mexican Ambassador to the United Kingdom (1995 to 1997). He was a
career diplomat for more than 35 years, serving as Deputy Foreign
Minister, Ambassador to Sweden, and permanent representative of
Mexico to the United Nations in Geneva, among other positions. He
currently holds non‐executive Board positions in several multinational
corporations in Spain, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom and
Mexico. He was the founding President of the Mexican Council on
Foreign Relations and currently chairs its Board of Trustees.

24

William Schneider, Jr.
President
International Planning Services, Inc.

William Schneider Jr., is President of International planning services,
Inc., a Washington‐based international trade and finance advisory firm,
and an Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute. He was formerly under
Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology
(1982‐1986). He currently serves as Chairman of the Department of
State’s Defense Trade Advisory Group, and is a member of its Arms
Control and Non‐Proliferation Advisory Board.

Andrew Selee
Director
Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute

Andrew Selee is Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico
Institute, which promotes dialogue and policy research on U.S.‐Mexico
relations. He served previously as Senior Program Associate of the Latin
American Program and as professional staff in the U.S. House of
Representatives and worked for five years in Mexico. He is an Adjunct
Professor of Government at Johns Hopkins University and has been a
Visiting Scholar at El Colegio de México. He is a Board member of the
U.S.‐Mexico Fulbright Commission (Comexus), a Contributing Editor to
the Handbook of Latin American Studies, and a Term Member of the
Council on Foreign Relations. A long‐time volunteer of the YMCA, Selee
served for five years on the National Board of the YMCA of the USA and
chaired its International Committee.

25

The Honourable George P. Shultz
Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford
Distinguished Fellow
Hoover Institution
and Former U.S. Secretary of State

George Shultz has had a distinguished career in government, in
academia, and in the world of business. He served the Reagan
Administration as Chairman of the President’s Economic Policy Advisor
Board (1981‐82) and Secretary of State (1982‐89). In the Nixon
Administrator, he was Secretary of Labor, Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and Secretary of the Treasury. A recipient of
the Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor, he is now
Chairman of the Governor of California’s Economic Advisory Board and
the J.P. Morgan Chase International Council, and a Director of Accretive
Health and Fremont Group.

Paul N. Stockton
Assistant Secretary
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security
Affairs

Paul Stockton serves in the Administration of President Barack Obama
as Assistant Secretary of Defense Homeland Defense and Americas´
Security Affairs. In this position, he is responsible for the supervision of
homeland defense activities, defense support of civil authorities, and
Western Hemisphere security affairs for the Department of Defense.
From 2002 to 2006, he served as Director of the Center for Homeland
Defense and Security, where he helped develop the curricula to
strengthen all‐hazards preparedness at local, state and federal levels.
Prior to his confirmation, Assistant Secretary Stockton was a senior
research scholar at Stanford University’s Center for the International
Security and Cooperation.

26

Juan José Suárez Coppel
General Director
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX)

Juan José Suárez Coppel is a Mexican the general director Pemex, the
Mexico's state‐owned petroleum company. He has served as Director of
Finance in Pemex, Chief advisor to former Mexican Secretary of Finance
Francisco Gil Díaz, as Adjunct‐Director for Derivatives in Banamex, as
Treasurer of Televisa, and as Vice President of Finance in Grupo
Modelo; the largest Mexican brewery. He has lectured in Economics at
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, at the Autonomous
University of Barcelona and at Brown University.

Jorge Tello
Presidential Advisor on Security
and Vicechairman of International Information
Development
CEMEX

Jorge Tello is Presidential Advisor on Security and Member of the
National Security Cabinet. He also serves as Vice‐Chairman of
International Information Development for CEMEX. From March 2009
until August 2010 he was Executive Secretary of the National Public
Security System. He has served as Director of the Center of Investigation
and Nation Security, Commissioner for the National Institute to Combat
Drugs for the Attorney General’s Office and Under‐Secretary of the
Interior.

27

Guillermo Valdés
Director
Center of Investigation and National Security
(CISEN)

Guillermo Valdés is Director of the Center of Investigation and National
Security (CISEN) since January 15, 2007. He held several charges in
units as Presidence, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Social
Development and Ministry of Planning and Budget, where he served in
strategic analytical work and policy for holders of the secretariats and in
the direction of social programs nationwide. He also served as head of
the political and consultant for the Group of Economists Asociados
(GEA), a political consulting firm. He has taught courses in social theory,
political system, policy analysis and research methods applied in the
ITAM and the Universidad Iberoamericana.

Carlos Valenzuela
Dynamica Housing

Carlos Valenzuela studied Industrial and Systems Engineer at
Monterrey’s Technological Institute and holds a degree on
Owners/President Management by Harvard Business School. He
participates in different regional advisory boards which include Citi‐
Banamex, BBVA Bancomer, among others. He is President and Chief
Executive Officer of Dynamica Housing, a successful firm dedicated to
low income housing. This company integrates all the housing sale cycle,
from its construction to its sales and finance plan for the client.
Dynamica was founded in 1993 and is bases in Guadalajara. He is one of
the largest housing developers in Mexico.

28

David G. Victor
Professor and Director
Laboratory on International Law and Regulation
University of California at San Diego

David G. Victor is a professor at the School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies and director of the School’s new International Law
and Regulation Laboratory. Most recently, Victor served as director of
the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at the Freeman
Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, where
he was also a professor at Stanford Law School. Previously, he directed
the science and technology program at the Council on Foreign Relations
(CFR) in New York, where he directed the Council's task force on energy
and was senior adviser to the task force on climate change.

Dr. Luis Videgaray
President
Budget and Public Account Commission in the
lower house

Luis Videgaray is President of the Budget and Public Account
Commission in the lower house of the Congress of the Union. He has
served as Minister of Finance of the State of Mexico Government. Prior,
he was Director of State and Municipal Public Finance in Protego where
he designed and negotiated projects on debt refinancing for the States of
Mexico, Sonora, Oaxaca, and Durango. He has also held office as
Associate Director of Investment Banking, Advisor to the Ministry of
Energy, External Advisor to Deputy Office of Financial Engineering
within Banobras and Advisor to the Ministry of Public Expenditures and
Finance.

29

Jane Wales
World Affairs Council of Northern California

Jane Wales is President and Chief Executive Officer of the World Affairs
Council of Northern California and the Global Philanthropy Forum. She
is also Vice President, Philanthropy and Social innovation, at the Aspen
Institute. She served in the Clinton administration as special assistant to
the President, Senior Director of the National Security Council and
Associate Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy. During her tenure as National Executive Director of Physicians
for social responsibility, the organization’s international arm was
recipient of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize.

The Honourable Michael H. Wilson
Chairman
Barclays Capital Canada Inc.
Former Ambassador of Canada to the United States of
America

Michael Wilson is the Chairman of Barclays Capital Canada Inc. He
joined the firm in June, 2010 and is currently responsible for managing
Barclays Capital’s client relationship in Canada. Mr. Wilson was
Ambassador of Canada to the United States of America from 2006 to
2009. Prior to that he was Chairman of UBS Canada, an operating
division of UBS AG. From 1984 until 1991 he served as Canada’s
Minister of Finance, and then became Minister of Industry, Science and
Technology and Minister for International Trade, where he had
responsibility for the NAFTA negotiations.

30

James A. Winnefeld
Commander
U.S. Northern Command

James A. Winnefeld is a United States Navy admiral who serves as the
fourth and current Commander, U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and the 21st Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD). He previously served as Director for
Strategic Plans and Policy, The Joint Staff which he concurrently served
as the Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Military Staff
Committee. Prior to that, he served as Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet. He
assumed his current assignments on May 19, 2010.

Jaime Zabludovsky
Executive President
ConMéxico

Jaime Zabludovsky is Executive President of the Consejo Mexicano de la
Industria de Productos de Consumo A.C. (ConMéxico) and a founding
partner of Soluciones Estrategicas, S.C. In 1994, he was appointed
Mexico’s Deputy Secretary for International Trade Negotiations. In that
capacity he developed Mexico’s trade negotiating strategy and oversaw
the implementations of the North American Free Trade Agreement as
well as bilateral trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, Bolivia,
Colombia and Venezuela. From 1998 to 2001 he served as Mexico’s
Ambassador to the European Union and Chief Negotiator of the first
transatlantic free trade agreement.
31

CITY MAP

NORTH AMERICAN
COOPERATION IN A
ENVIRONMENT

GUANAJUATO, MÉXICO


San Miguel de Allende City Map

1. Hospicio #42.
2. Registration of all guests and for all hotels will be at Casa Principal.
Hospicio #35.
3. Dinner will be at Casa Parque. Sta. Elena #2.
4. Meetings will be at Casa Limón. Hospicio #44.
5. Casa Fuente. Hospicio #48.
6. Casa Caballo. Hospicio #41.
7. Hotel La Morada.
8. Parking Garage.
9. Casa San Miguel. Hospicio #13.
10. City Main Square (El Jardín)

The History of San Miguel de Allende

San Miguel de Allende, is located in the mountainous central region of
Mexico, part of what is referred to as the Bajío of the state of
Guanajuato. This low region averages about 7000 feet, but is so called
for being a relatively flat area ringed by mountains.

Originally known as San Miguel El Grande, it was founded by a
Franciscan monk named Juan de San Miguel in 1542. It was an
important stop over on the Antigua Camino Real, part of the silver route
from Zacatecas.

When the Mexican War of Independence began in the nearby town of
Dolores September 16th, 1810, an act now celebrated as El Grito, the
rapidly growing revolutionary army came to San Miguel El Grande.
Dolores Hidalgo is now known as the Cradle of National Independence,
while San Miguel de Allende calls itself the Forge of National
Independence.

It was in San Miguel that General Ignacio Allende joined the army as
Padre Miguel Hidalgo's chief lieutenant and led the army to several
victories. Allende is now a national hero, and San Miguel el Grande
renamed itself San Miguel de Allende in 1826 in honor of his actions.

As the mineral wealth waned, the many caravans ceased, and by 1900,
San Miguel de Allende was in danger of dying out. Having been declared
a national monument in 1926, the old Centro district still has the
colonial style elegance of its wealthy past.

San Miguel de Allende is world famous for its mild climate, colonial
architecture, and large expatriate population, which estimates number
from 8,500 to 10,000.

San Miguel de Allende City Map

San Miguel de Allende City Map ('E' = parkings)
1. City Main Square (El Jardín)
2. Parish Church
3. Mayor’s Office
4. House of Ignacio Allende
5. House of Canal (Colonial house)
6. School of Fine Arts (Former convent)
7. Temple of the nuns (Church)
8. Teatro Angela Peralta (Theater)
9. Public library
10. Oratory of San Felipe Neri
11. Church of Nuestra Señora de la Salud
12. College of Sales
13. Plaza of Allende (City’s civic square)
14. Temple of San Francisco
15. House of the Inquisitor (Spanish Inquisition’s representative
house)
16. Institute of Allende (School of Arts)
17. Parque Juárez (Park with 100‐year‐old trees)
18. El Chorro (Springs where the city was founded) and Los
Lavaderos (Place where people still washes)
19. Handcraft Market
20. Mirador of San Miguel de Allende (Panoramic view of the
historic district)
21. Bullring

Security, Drugs and Violence in Mexico: A Survey

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Security, Drugs and Violence in Mexico: A Survey

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PREPARED FOR THE SIXTH NORTH

(With the collaboration of Eunises Rosillo,

II. Organized Crime Violence

III. Government’s Strategy and Actions against Organized Crime

V. Public Opinion and the War on Drugs

VI. A Final Assessment

AFI Agencia Federal de Investigación

NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement

SNSP Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública

USAID United States Agency for International Development

Survey’s Data Sources

About the Author

ii. State and Local Level

Table 2. Annual Budget Variation by Security Agency

Figure 1. Per Capita Budget on Security and Law Enforcement

Figure 2. Number of Military Personnel

SEDENA Average SEMAR Average

ii. Police Forces

Table 3. Number of Police

(a) Federal Police

(b) State and Local Police

San Luis Potosí

e. Security Policy (2007-2010)

Security policy objectives

2. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime

Cartel Presence in Central America and the Southern Border

a. Cooperation Between Cartels and Gangs

b. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion, Vehicle Thefts and

1. The Evolution of Violence

1. Cártel de Sinaloa versus Cártel de Juárez (Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa)

Table 9. Violence Trends by Mexican State

Table 11. Six Clusters of Violent Municipalities (2007-2010)

Ciudad Juárez: Causes and Mechanisms of Violence

In the case of seizures:

Figure 7. Percentage of Detainees by Hierarchy Level

Table 13. Cartel Bosses Extradited to U.S. During

Table 14. States with the Largest Proportions

Figure 9. Cocaine Seizures (Tons)

Figure 10. Opium Gum Seizures (Kilograms)

Opium Gum Average

ii. Weapons and Vehicles

c. Dismantled Laboratories and Crop Eradication

Figure 14. Dismantled Laboratories (2000-2009)

Laboratories Dismantled Average

Figure 16. Poppy Eradication (Hectares)

Figure 17. Wholesale Price in USD per Kilogram (2008)

Canada USA Mexico

3. Data Analysis of Drug State Prices

Table 16. Mexican Drug Wholesale Market

Table 17. U.S. Drug Market Value

Potential Wholesale Wholesale Retail Value Retail Market

Marijuana 4,067.3 2.0 8,134.6 10.4 42,299.9 34,165.3

5. Transportation and Distribution

a. Points of Entry, Routes of Transportation and Points of Exit

Table 19. Violent Municipalities in Drug Entry and Exit Zones

Table 20. Violent Municipalities in Drug Transport Routes

b. Violence and the Geography of Business

Table 21. U.S.* and México**

Table 22. U.S.* and Mexico** Illicit Drugs

b. Consumption at the State Level

Figure 19. Cumulative Incidence for

Baja California Sur

San Luis Potosí