ire

I. Introduction
a. Keeping a broken up Germany dependent on other countries or in internal
feud was both the Russian and French prerogative
b. Known as the Pulverization of Germany, it was a negative prerequisite to
the development of modern history
i. Without Pulverization, Europe’s economy and military would not be centrali
zed on Atlantic
ii. Russia’s military spread Baltic and into Poland
c. German’s became increasingly dissatisfied with their position and philosop
hical Germany trend to criticize westernization
i. Nationalistic during times of Napoleon, Germany life and political syste
m of its own
ii. Slavic Germans superior
iii. Philosophy and Hegel denounced westernization and believed everything wa
s for the collective good of the country. Bad times were only mere historical b
umps to a greater tomorrow.
iv. Skipped over individual liberty and focused on evolving history.
II. German States after 1848
a. A few Comments
i. 1848 revolutions unseated governments in place; in return Frankfurt asse
mbly congregated of private citizens met to make a German constitution. This id
ea failed because there was no power from a beurocratic support, nor military su
pport. Also, state of German people counterrevolutionary in nature; believed in
order and respect. As result, Germans felt affinity to power, die Macht.
ii. People stayed loyal to their independent states; wanted no Peidmont of I
taly
b. Advantages of Unity
i. Many German nationalist and liberals were confused after the failed revo
lution of 1848, and as consequence old German borders were re-established throug
h a revamping of the old confederation.
ii. But, within the old framework, new social and economic changes taking pl
ace
iii. Output of coal and iron x6 and was overcoming economic and social lag ch
aracteristic of the state since the last 300 years.
iv. A Zollverein, formed by Prussia in 1834, included almost all Germany out
side Austria and Bohemia and provided a large measure of economic unity.
v. Moreover, German cities growing and becoming more interconnected. Indust
rial workers and capitalists becoming more numerous.
vi. Now, Germans had a new respect for unity, but because they were jaded fr
om the events of 1848, had an exaggerated view of the collective good, state and
power, and looking at the events as a judgment of history, they fell into the a
rms of Prussia
III. Prussia in the 1860’s Bismarck
a. Introduction
i. Prussia smallest and most precarious, ruined after Napoleon’s invasions, P
russia built back up around a strong army, which gave the state internal charact
er and international influence.
ii. Fought fewer wars than other great powers.
iii. Prussia spread by conquest and diplomacy
iv. Taking of Silesia in 1740, parts of Poland, and of the Rhineland
v. 1850, leaders of Prussia apprehensive; their state had been shaken by re
volution.
vi. Spectators in Crimean war and Congress of Paris; a fear of waning power.
b. Parliamentary Politics
i. Since 1815, size of Prussia grew from 11 million to 18 million. They ha
d a clever idea to take the army, which had not grown at all and make it double
by enforcing conscription. Yes, this would increase the burden of financial obl
igations and would require increased financial appropriations.
ii. After 1850, Prussia had a parliament. Wealthy men controlled this parli
ament. Yes, there was some hope! Many wealthy capital owners of the Rhineland w
ere liberals who wished parliament to have control over government policies.
1. These guys, the wealthy Rhinelanders who were liberals, did not like pro
fessional armies or the Prussian Junkers, from whom the officer corps was recrui
ted and considered them to be the main rivals in the state.
iii. The king at this juncture, in 1862, appointed a new chief minister Otto
Von Bismarck
c. Bismarck
i. Junker from old Brandenburg East of the Elbe
ii. Accomplished man of the world who gave off the appearance of being a ruf
f country squire
iii. Intellectually more superior form the landlord class from which he spran
g and felt contempt for. Must not be overestimated though, he shared in many Ju
nker ideas while advocating a stout Protestant piety. While caring for the worl
d’s opinion, he never deterred from is actions. Criticisms left him untouched. H
e was not a nationalist and stayed true to his Prussia, he denounced the west as
militant and revolutionary.
iv. His affinities, like the Junkers, was with the East with the landowning
elements of the Baltic and Russian provinces.
v. Considered Parliament ignorant as a governing body and individual libert
y seemed disorderly and selfish. Hated liberalism, socialism, and democracy.
Stressed duty service order and fear of God.
vi. Idea of unifying Germany took along time to solidify in his mind, but wh
en it did he rationalized it as strengthening Prussia
vii. No ideology an end to himself, none bound him to his actions. Became re
al practiced of Realpolitik.
1. Time came when Junkers finally thought he was a traitor to the class. A
t times, even the king was afraid of him. He outraged and then mollified the aug
ust house of Habsburg, when he made friends with liberals, democrats, and even s
ocialists, and in turn made enemies of them.
2. First made wars , insisted peace; Enmities and alliances were passing co
nveniences. Enemy today friend tomarrow.
d. Constitutional Struggle
i. Bismarck’s duty to outface liberals in the Parliament of Prussia. For fou
r years from 1862-1886 he did wage this struggle.
ii. Parliament refused to pass taxes, but the government collected them anyw
ay because it was only proper and orderly because collectors represented public
authority.
iii. Triumph of military policy occurred because of the limitations of Prussi
an liberalism, docility of population, respect for officialdom, and belief king
and ministers were wiser than elected deputies.
iv. Army thus, made larger, reorganized, retrained, and reequipped. Bismarc
k fended off abuse from liberal authority in the chamber.
v. Liberals declared the actions of the government unconstitutional. Bisma
rck responds by saying the constitution ought not undermine government and state
. King makes statement, which says rest of Germany looks to Germany for its pow
er, power which can’t be undermined by constitution or parliament.
vi. Prussia must not be undermined and the unsteady boundaries carried over
from 1815 must be restructured by the acquisition of more land.
vii. “Not by speeches and majority notes are the great questions of the day dec
ided – that was the great error of 1848/9 –but by blood and iron.
IV. Bismarck’s Wars: The North German Confederation, 1867
a. The Dutch War
i. Danish peoples wanted to annex the duchy of Schlewswig, in internal part
of Denmark, which Germany had holdings in. Naturally, the German confederation
didn’t want to see the German population part of the duchy be annexed outright, t
hus declared a war upon the Danes. Bismarck did not want to support or strength
en the German confederation, but he didn’t want an all out German war. Thus, Prus
sia became involved. To disguise his actions, he acted jointly with Austria, bo
th powers combined crushed the Danish people. Bismarck’s intention was to annex Ho
llstein and Schlewsig, gaining protection from future Austrian trouble. Disputes
erupted, but he pretended to regulate while they ripened.
b. Bismarck as a Democrat
i. Bismarck began to discredit and isolate Austria. British government non-
interventionist. Russian empire was in no position for action; a reform program
then at its height divided it internally. In a mode of hostility to Austria, be
cause of the Crimean War and well disposed with Prussia and Bismarck because Bis
marck helped protect against the Polish uprising.
ii. To win over Italy Bismarck lured Venetia.
iii. France, Napoleon III embarrassed by domestic discontents and had his arm
y committed to adventures in Mexico. Oral interview where Bismarck persuaded Fr
ance to a modernization of the European map.
iv. To weaken Austria within Germany Bismarck pretended to be a democrat and
threw around the word democracy to undermine all established interests that sto
od in his way
1. Proposed a restructured German confederation, and a popular chamber elec
ted by universal male suffrage.
c. Seven Weeks’ War
i. The Schleswig- Holstein condition did in fact ripen to the point of Aust
ria taking the matter to the German federal diet, whose functions was to prevent
war between its members. Bismarck declared diet had no authority, and declared
Austrians of aggression and ordered Prussian army to enter Hollstein.
ii. Austria called for sanctions which called for an all German force agains
t Prussia.
iii. Prussia, in 1866, no longer at war with just Austria, but with most othe
r German states. Prussian Army proved its superiority.
iv. They had abstract strategy, the needle gun and the skill of von Moltke,
the Prussians overthrew Austrians at the battle of Sadowa and defeated the other
German states soon thereafter.
v. Bismarck hastened to make peace before others in Europe realized what ha
ppened.
vi. Prussia annexed outright, together with Schleswig Holstein the entirety
of Handover, the duchies of Nassau and Hesse Cassel, and the free city of Frankf
ort.
vii. Here entire governments just disappeared before the axe of the red react
ionary.
viii. German Federal union disappeared likewise
ix. Bismarck organized in its place a North German Confederation, in which n
ewly enlarged Prussia joined with 21 other states, all of which it greatly outwe
ighed
x. Italy annexed Venetia
xi. States south of Main, Austria Baveria, Wurttemberg, etc. remained outsid
e new organization.
d. A New Constitution
i. Bismarck established a new constitution for the North German Confederati
on. New structure was federal and much stronger than the defunct Confederation
of 1815. King of Prussia became its hereditary head. Ministers were responsible
to him. 2 chamber parliament. Upper chamber, represented states as such, thoug
h not equally. Lower Chamber, or Reichstag was deemed to represent people and wa
s elected through universal male suffrage.
ii. Bismarck’s flirting with democracy seemed outrageous because no their coun
try except France illustrated universal suffrage in Europe on a large scale. Ju
nker or liberal unsteady. Old-fashioned neither conservative nor genuine libera
l could take much satisfaction.
iii. Great Britain’s voting rights extended to less than half male population.
iv. Bismarck felt in the masses an ally of strong government against private
interests. Negotiated with socialists, who had arisen with industrialization o
f the past decade, and who, in Germany were followers of Lasalle.
v. Lassallean socialists unlike Marxian, believed it theoretically possible
 to improve working class conditions through the action of existing governments.
Bulk of socialists in Germany reached understanding with Bismarck – in return fo
r a democratic suffrage they agreed to accept the e North German Confederation.
Bismarck made use of democratic and socialist sentiment, won popular approval f
or emerging empire.
V. Franco – Prussian War
a. An Introduction
i. A very unstable situation. First, small southern states in Germany exis
ted independently and needed to form alliances and fast. Unfortunately, France
was angry of Napoleon’s policy because a fiasco in Mexico. Italy was rising on Fra
nce’s borders. Strong and independent power spread over the whole of Germany. Ev
eryone felt a war coming on between France and Prussia. Bismarck played on the
fears of France felt in south German states
ii. South Germany, sufficiently nationalistic to consider such subvergance a
s with France disgraceful.
iii. Bismarck felt this war would increase the chances of subduing the small
southern German states, leaving only Austria out of the Northern Confederation,
while France felt a war won against Prussia would bring back Bonaparte dynasty.
Thus, no responsible parties worked for peace in these countries.
b. France Thwarts New Spanish King
i. Revolution in Spain driven the reigning queen into exile, and a Spanish
government invited Leopold of Hohenzollern, the King of Prussia’s cousin, to be co
nstitutional king of Spain.
ii. To entrench Prussia’s royal house in Spain would naturally be distasteful
to France. Three times he refused the Spanish offer. Bismarck, who could not c
ontrol such decisions but who foresaw the possibility of a usable incident, devi
ously persuaded Spanish to issue a forth invitation.
iii. July 2, 1870, Paris heard Leopold accepted. French ambassador to Prussia
, Benedetti, at the direction of his government, met the king of Prussia at the
bathing resort at Ems, where he demanded the acceptance withdrawn. Withdrawn on
July 12, Bismarck disappointed.
iv. French government went further and told Benedetti to approach the king a
t Ems and demand never to become candidate to Spanish thrown, ever.
v. King politely declined and telegraphed conversation back to Bismarck at
Berlin. He received it and it became famous as the Ems Dispatch, saw a new oppor
tunity as he put it to wave a red flag before the Gallic bull. He condensed the
telegram for publication, to make it appear a hostile exchange. Prussians now be
lieved their king had been insulted and French felt ambassador snubbed. War part
ies demanded satisfation and Napoleon III declared war.
c. A Short War
i. Again, war was short. Bismarck had taken care to isolate his enemy in a
dvance. British felt France wrong. Alarmed by French Mexico, which recreated a
French American empire ambition. The Italians had long been awaiting the chance
to seize Rome for use against Prussia. The Russians had been awaiting the chan
ce to upset a clause of the Peace of 1856 that forbade vessels in the Black Sea.
ii. Failed to be a General European struggle. Prussia supported by south Ge
rman states. France had no allies. French army proved to be technically backwa
rd compared with the Prussian. War began on July 19, lasted to September 2, aft
er the battle of Sedan, the principle French army surrendered to the Germans. N
apoleon III was himself taken prisoner. On September 4 an insurrection in Paris
proclaimed the Third Republic. Paris never capitulated
VI. The German Empire, 1871
a. German rulers assembled at Versailles. Bismarck caused German Empire to
be proclaimed on January 18, 1871
b. The King of Prussia received the hereditary German emperor. The other G
erman rulers, except Austria, accepted his imperial authority. France had no go
vernment with which Bismarck could make peace, it was not clear what government
the country wanted.
c. Bismarck’s Demands
i. Election of a Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage. Demanded Fran
ce pay the German Empire a war indemnity of five billion gold francs and cede to
it the border region of Alsace and most of Lorrain.
ii. Peace dictated by Bismarck was embodied in the Treaty of Frankfurt of Ma
y 10, 1871. Thereafter, as will be seen, the French Constituent Assembly gradua
lly proceeded to construct the Third Republic.
d. The Strength of the German State
i. Consolidation of Germany transformed the face of Europe. Reversed the d
ictum not only of the Peace of Vienne,but even the Peace of Westaphilia.
ii. German Empire strongest state on the continent of Europe.
iii. Rapidly industrialized, became more potent still. Bismarck, by consummat
e astuteness, by exploitation, offered by a Europe in flux brought what statesme
n of many nationalities had long said should at all costs be prevented.
iv. Before such success, Prussian liberals capitulated and parliament passed
an indemnity act. Parliament legalized the disputed tax collections ex post fa
cto, agreeing to forgive and forget in view of the victory over Austria and its
consequences. Liberalism withered away to nationalism
v. German Empire received the constitution of the North German Confederatio
n. Federation of monarchies each based in theory on divine or hereditary right.
At the same time, in Reichstag elected by universal male suffrage, it rested on
a kind of mass appeal and was in a sense democratic. Yet, ministers were respon
sible to the emperor not the chamber.