An Empirical Analysis of Judging Bias in Competitive Academic Debate

Clifford Chad Henson* Paul R. Dorasil

College of Law Department of Economics
College of Business, Department of Finance University of Florida
University of Illinois Gainesville, FL 32611
Champaign, IL 61820 paul.dorasil@cba.ufl.edu
henson1@law.illinois.edu

Abstract: Conventional wisdom among those involved in competitive academic debate holds
that, despite an emphasis on objective decision-making, factors other than skill affect the
outcomes of rounds. This study examines all debate rounds at the Lincoln Douglas Debate
Tournament of Champions from 2004-2009. We develop a panel logit model with fixed effects
across tournaments to estimate the marginal effects of various biases. In particular, we find
evidence of statistical bias related to sex, regional affiliation, and topic side. These factors may
explain the significant number of non-transitive outcomes in the data. Finally, we suggest some
policy remedies to mitigate the impact of biases.

*The authors would like to thank Andrew P. Morriss for supervising an earlier version of this
research, Ari Parker of Walt Whitman High School for his valuable coding assistance, and Aaron
Timmons of the Greenhill School and Jon Cruz of the Bronx High School of Science for their
assistance in obtaining data and feedback. We would also like to thank Craig Depkin III, Gary
Alan Fine, Scott Robertson, and Leslie Wexler for their valuable feedback. Finally, we thank
Victory Briefs Daily for hosting the authors’ “Debate by the Numbers” column and providing an
avenue for debaters and coaches to comment on the results and methodology. No external
funding was provided.

Clifford Chad Henson is a third-year graduate student pursuing a J.D. from the University of
Illinois College of Law and a Ph.D. in Finance from the University of Illinois College of
Business, where he is also the head coach of the intercollegiate policy debate team.

Paul R. Dorasil is a second-year graduate student pursuing a Ph.D. in Economics from the
University of Florida.
 Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1

II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE ....................................................................................................... 2

A. ECONOMIC THEORY AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JOB DISCRIMINATION ....... 2
B. OUTCOME PREFERENCES OF THIRD-PARTY DECISIONMAKERS .......................... 3
C. STUDIES OF DISCRIMINATION IN DEBATE ................................................................. 4

III. HIGH SCHOOL LINCOLN DOUGLAS DEBATE ................................................................ 8

A. COMPETITION ..................................................................................................................... 8
B. A COMMUNITY OF DEBATERS ..................................................................................... 10
C. THE TOURNAMENT OF CHAMPIONS ........................................................................... 13

IV. DATA...................................................................................................................................... 14
A. OBSERVATIONS ............................................................................................................... 14
B. SKILL PROXY .................................................................................................................... 15
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ........................................................................................... 16

V. MODEL AND ESTIMATION................................................................................................. 19

VI. RESULTS ............................................................................................................................... 21

VII. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 23
A. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................................... 23
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................... 25

REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................. 30

APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................... 35
I. INTRODUCTION

High school Lincoln Douglas Debate rounds consist of two debaters, an affirmative who

argues in favor of a resolution and a negative who argues in opposition to a resolution.

Preliminary debate rounds in competitive academic debate are evaluated by a single judge, who

awards each debater a win or a loss and a number of speaker points. While the “better debater”

should win each round, conventional wisdom among those familiar with the activity has long

held that sex, region, and side biases play a substantial role in the outcomes of individual debate

rounds and tournaments. Whatever “better debater” means, and some objective and subjective

elements of this are discussed infra at III, it undoubtedly does not include these three factors.

While a number of studies have indicated that statistical disparities in participation and success

rates exist in debate across multiple lines, no previous work has employed rigorous empirical

methods to predict and explain biases.

The purpose of this research is to identify factors that influence judge decision-making at

the Lincoln Douglas Debate Tournament of Champions (TOC). High school competitors and

coaches place enormous importance on the outcomes of these rounds, often spending several

years of training and preparation in order to increase the probability of participation and success

at the TOC. Success at the TOC (and other nationally-competitive tournaments) can often lead

to lucrative coaching opportunities for debaters and coaches. Additionally, the TOC provides an

interesting and unique dataset for investigating discrimination due to the abundance of round-

level data available and the one-on-one nature of competition. We investigate the ways that side

bias, region bias, and sex bias can be used to predict and explain competitor success. To do this,

we collect data for all competitors and judges in every round of the Lincoln Douglas Debate

1
Tournament of Champions for years 2004-2009. We develop a panel logit model with fixed

effects across tournaments to estimate the marginal effects of side, regional, and sex biases.

The remainder of this article will be structured as follows: Section II will list and explain

the previous literature on the economics of discrimination, empirical studies on economic

discrimination, and empirical research related to competitive debate. Section III will explain

high school Lincoln Douglas Debate and the Tournament of Champions. Section IV will

describe the data. Section V will explain the theoretical model and estimation method. Section

VI will report the results of the estimation. Section VII will conclude and offer some potential

remedies for judging bias.

II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE

A. ECONOMIC THEORY AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JOB DISCRIMINATION

Gary Becker (1957) authored the first theoretical economic explanation of discrimination,

positing that employment discrimination was based on taste differences. Arrow (1973) expands

on Becker’s work, focusing on discrimination in the labor market where employers face a

tradeoff between profits and discriminatory preferences. Coate and Loury (1993) expand on

Arrow’s model and find that affirmative action policies may perpetuate negative stereotypes

even if productivity is homogenous among groups when the program is repealed. While there

exist a number of studies on economic discrimination, most of these focus on wage gaps. Few

studies exist examining discrimination in hiring, and those that do seek to investigate such

discrimination either investigate discriminatory responses to applications only (e.g. Raich &

Rich, 1995) or are extremely small-n studies (e.g. Neumark, Bank & Van Nort, 1996). Blau and

Kahn (2000) investigate the gender pay gap in the United States. They find that the gap is

declining. Additionally, they find that much of the gap is attributable to gender-specific factors
2
such as differences in qualifications. Kahn (1991) provides a survey of the literature on

discrimination in professional sports. He reports evidence of race and gender discrimination in a

number of sports. Levitt (2004) investigates various forms of discrimination on the game show,

Weakest Link. He finds evidence of information-based discrimination against Hispanics and

taste-based discrimination against older contestants. He also finds evidence that contestants tend

to avoid voting for other contestants with whom they share a common gender or race (which

protects them from being eliminated). Ayres and Siegelman (1995) find evidence that car

dealerships charge higher prices to blacks and women than to white males. Bertrand and

Mullanaithan (2002) find that applicants with distinctly black names are less likely to be given

interviews than other candidates.

B. OUTCOME PREFERENCES OF THIRD-PARTY DECISIONMAKERS

Traditional economic models of discrimination typically assume that the decision-maker

is affected by the outcome of his or her choice, such as an employer seeking to hire an employee

is subsequently affected by bearing the cost of the decision to (not) hire a given person. More

analogous to the decision-making of debate judges is a situation where the decision-maker need

not bear the full cost of a wrong choice, such as when judges1 and juries decide cases in the legal

system. Fortunately, a substantial literature regarding these situations exists.

A number of juror studies have examined the effect of the race or sex of participants in

the justice system on court outcomes, with decidedly mixed results. The first study (Bridgeman

and Marlowe, 1979) found no effect of juror sex on either first-ballot voting or final verdict.2 In

1
Judge studies are more applicable than juror studies, given that judges may care about their reputations (Kozinski,
1993) while there is little reason to believe that similar incentives apply to jurors, who are not repeat-players.
Neither
2
All of the defendants were male, and little statistical information was reported.
3
that study, all of the defendants were male and little statistical information was reported. A later

study (Mills and Bohannon, 1980) found that women were more likely than men to initially vote

to convict in criminal trials, but were no more likely to vote to convict at the last stage of voting

for any crime other than robbery. Subsequent studies of gender effects on criminal (Helgeson

and Shaver, 1990; Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, 1984; Thompson et al., 1984) and civil (Green,

1968; Goodman et al., 1994; Denove and Imwinkelried, 1995) juries have also been mixed.

There also exists a robust empirical literature on the factors that influence judicial

decisions, with judges and scholars offering their respective views of what motivates judicial

behavior. (Kozinski, 1993). Cross (2003) provides a typical example of such studies and a

thorough review of the early literature. The “standard pattern” of empirical courts scholarship is

some variation of Republican appointees preferring more conservative outcomes than Democrat

appointees, tempered by other effects. (Miles & Sunstein, 2008). In perhaps the most

comprehensive examination of the effect of judicial background and demographic characteristics

upon judicial decision-making, it was discovered that race (but not sex) significantly impacted

the outcome of judicial decisions, and certain background factors related to the education and

employment history of judges also played a role in decisions (Sisk et al., 1998). One recent

comparative study (Henson, 2010) has found that in certain areas of law, while extra-legal

factors do influence outcomes, they add little explanatory power when controlling for case-

specific factors that should be legally significant and legal factors such as standard of review.

C. STUDIES OF DISCRIMINATION IN DEBATE

Competitive speech and debate has its origins in a time where women were not permitted

to vote or participate in higher education, much less expected to contribute valuably to the

analysis of pressing issues of the day. (Greenstreet, 1989). Participation and success at speech in
4
debate has never been equal; differential participation has been a cause of concern for over 70

years (Knee, 1939; Cole, 1957), and early forensics competitions separated men and women into

separate divisions because of “the belief that the male is generally superior to the female in

forensic endeavors[.]” (Hensley & Strother, 1968). The attitude that women are not (at least

potentially) the competitive equal of men has diminished over the years, and men and women no

longer compete in separate tournaments or divisions.3

Nonetheless, participation and success rates of men and women in debate are not equal.

“In general, it appears that regardless of the forensic activity, male domination ranges from

‘slight’ to ‘overwhelming’.”(Friedley and Manchester, 1985). This is widely recognized by

debate organizations; recommendations from a conference jointly sponsored by the American

Forensics Association and Speech Communication Association (McBath, 1975) included

investigating the causes of low female participation rates. The 1984 National Developmental

Conference at Northwestern University endorsed a resolution that would investigate barriers to

participation by women and other underrepresented groups (Friedley and Manchester, 1985).

The American Forensic Association funded research into diversity in U.S. forensics, resulting in

a (Allen et al) 2004 report.

Those involved in speech and debate have certainly answered the call for investigations

into this phenomenon. Leaving aside dozens of articles in popular and academic forensic

publications that examine female participation and success from an anecdotal perspective,

offering their own explanations of and solutions to this problem (Beattie, 1996; Basinger, 1996;

3
Periodically, an all-women’s tournaments, debate camps, or other debate-oriented events have been held as a
networking and consciousness-raising opportunity.
5
Bile, 1999; Bartanen, 1995; Crenshaw, 1996),4 empirical studies on the subject have been carried

out for nearly 50 years. One of the earliest studies found that mixed-sex two-person debate teams

out-performed their two-male and two-female counterparts over five years at a tournament that

did not have any divisions (either skill-or sex-related), while all-male and all-female teams

performed about equally, in college (Hensley and Strother, 1968) and in high school (Rosen et

al., 1978).

Later studies report participation, retention, and success rates of debaters. An early study

of results (Friedley and Manchester, 1985) at the 1984 National Debate Tournament (the

collegiate equivalent of the high school TOC) found that female participation at the tournament

began at 15% of all competitors and declined steadily except for the final round, where a single

female comprised 25% of the four remaining competitors. This same study revealed that at

comparable intercollegiate speech tournaments, though participation rates by women were

higher, women were less successful than men as indicated by decreased participation levels in

later elimination rounds – particularly in the more intellectually rigorous original speaking and

limited preparation events. Another study examining high school and intercollegiate national

championship participation rates (Martin, 1988) found that the National Catholic Forensic

League (high school) had female participation rates of between 15-30% while the National

Debate Tournament had female participation rates between 14-20%. This has been confirmed in

more recent years (Stepp, 1997).

4
A large, separate literature on sexual harassment in debate also exists, but is not cited here. The purpose of this
article is to report on judge behavior rather than attempt to explain student participation. The authors’ own
experience at the TOC and with the coaches and judges present there indicate that it is highly unlikely that the
number of rounds hinging on sexual quid pro quo is large enough to be driving our results.
6
 Success (or even qualifying to compete) at national tournaments is just the end result,

however. Even at the earliest levels of participation, participation in debate and certain speech

events is dominated by men, while participation in other speech events tends to be dominated by

women (Martin 1980). A decade-old study seeking to explain different participation and success

rates (Stepp and Gardner, 2001) found that retention of women lagged behind retention of men.

Furthermore, this study found that while women made some significant gains in participation

rates as competitors during the 1990’s, their representation among coaches and directors

decreased. While Allen et al (2004) found that women constituted a slight majority of all those

involved in all aggregated competitive forensics activities (including individual events, debate,

mock trial, etc.), women are involved in competitive debate at lower levels than their

representation in the undergraduate population might predict (Stepp, 1997).

At the high school level, there are more women than men serving as debate coaches, as is

true of all high school teachers. (Fine, 2001). Though no empirical study of coaches on the

national circuit at the high school level exists, the authors have personally observed that the vast

majority of high school coaches at the TOC are male.

Debate judge behavior has also been empirically investigated. Early attempts at ballot

studies occurred decades earlier, but the different behavior of male and female judges was first

studied in the 1980’s in speech events. One such study (Kay and Aden, 1984) found that for

some events women judges varied less than men judges in the rankings given to a set of

competitors, while the opposite was true in other speech events. The study reasonably concluded

that with respect to their gender findings, “Further study is needed to determine the relationship

between judging standards, event, and gender.” The same study examined regional differences in

judging, finding regional patterns in agreements among judges. Region and sex variables were
7
never interacted, and the study merely reported descriptive statistics rather than significance

levels.

Bruschke and Johnson (1994) perform the most rigorous analysis of discrimination in

competitive debate to date. They analyze results from the NDT, and find that female judges tend

to award males negatives more speaker points than female negatives, and find that male judges

tend to award more points to same-sex teams. However, their results may be suspect due to their

controlling for the winner of the round as an independent variable. This creates an endogeneity

problem because any preferences that lead a judge to discriminate in allocating speaker points

between debaters may also lead the judge to discriminate when deciding the winner of the round.

Our analysis here is unique in that it involves data from high school Lincoln-Douglas debate,

exploits information on regional affiliation, and focuses on discrimination in wins rather than

speaker points. Wins are more important to debaters than speaker points because they determine

which debaters will qualify for elimination rounds. Following the economic literature on

discrimination, we provide a more rigorous statistical analysis.

III. HIGH SCHOOL LINCOLN DOUGLAS DEBATE

A. COMPETITION

High school Lincoln-Douglas debate (LD) is a one-on-one debate format. Debaters are

assigned a topic,5 known prior to the tournament, and are required to debate each side at some

5
The National Forensic League (NFL) Topic Wording Committee releases 10 potential topics each year at their
National Tournament. Member schools vote on these topics, and the top 5 are selected to be debated in the calendar
year following the vote. The 3rd-place topic is debated in January and February, the 2nd-place topic is debated in
March and April, the 1st-place topic is debated at NFL Nationals, the 4th-place topic is debated in September and
October, and the 5th-place topic is debated in November and December. Other leagues release topics as well (e.g.
the University Interscholastic League for some local debate in Texas, the National Catholic Forensic League for
their Grand Finals), but the NFL topics are widely used and the Tournament of Champions uses the
January/February topic. During the period of the sample, these were:
8
point during the preliminary rounds of the tournament. Topics are worded as statements, and in

each round one debater is assigned to debate the “affirmative” while the other debater is assigned

to debate the “negative.” Debaters give alternating speeches designed to persuade the judge to

vote for them, constrained by strictly-enforced time limits,6 with the affirmative speaking first

and last.

A single judge adjudicates each debate round.7 The judge is a supposedly neutral party,

hired by neither team, but often affiliated with some other party competing at the tournament

(such as the coach of another debater) and sometimes hired by the tournament. The judge awards

one debater the win and provides each debater with speaker points. This information is

submitted, along with comments about the debaters’ respective performances and a reason for

the judge’s decision, on a ballot that is turned into the tournament director. In addition to

comments on the ballot, it is customary for the judge to offer some comments to the debaters

orally and provide (and sometimes defend) their reason for decision. The required elements of a

successful advocacy are themselves subject to debate in the round, making debate a highly fluid

2004: Resolved: A government’s obligation to protect the environment ought to take precedence over its obligation
to promote economic development.
2005: Resolved: Democracy is best served by strict separation of church and state.
2006: Resolved: The use of the state’s power of eminent domain to promote private enterprise is unjust.
2007: Resolved: The actions of corporations ought to be held to the same moral standards as the actions of
individuals.
2008: Resolved: It is just for the United States to use military force to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weaponsby
nations that pose a military threat.
2009: Resolved: The United States ought to submit to the jurisdiction of an international court designed to
prosecute crimes against humanity.
The topic in 2010 was: Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives
6
In LD, the first speech is the “Affirmative Constructive,” (AC) a 6-minute speech offered by the affirmative
speaker (Aff) advocating that the judge vote for them. Following the AC, the negative speaker (Neg) asks the Aff
cross-examination questions (CXes) for 3 minutes. Subsequently, the Neg gives a 7-minute “Negative Constructive”
(NC), and the AffCXes the Neg for 3 minutes. The Aff then gives a four-minute rebuttal (1AR), followed by a 6-
minute rebuttal by the Neg (NR), followed by a 3-minute rebuttal by the Aff (2AR).
7
Preliminary rounds are adjudicated by a single judge. For elimination rounds, it is customary for odd-numbered
panels of judges to decide the outcome. Speaker points in elimination rounds are not relevant.
9
game (Snider, 1984), and there is substantial disagreement (Rowland, 1982; Zarefsky, 1982;

Lichtman & Rohrer, 1982; Ulrich, 1982) over how the game should be played by the debaters

and evaluated by the judges.

B. A COMMUNITY OF DEBATERS

These competitions and discussions about competition take place within a social context.

An excellent sociological study of the high school debate community has already been conducted

(Fine, 2001) and is beyond the scope of this article. This section provides only that information

useful for understanding the motivations and abilities of the participants in the round. In addition

to the aforementioned study, the authors draw largely on their own observations, as both have

been involved in debate at various levels for over a decade.8

The community of debaters and judges is a non-random group. Fine (2001) indicates that,

relative to their peers, high school debaters are from wealthier families and communities, more

likely to be white or Asian, more likely to be male, and more academically successful (in terms

of grades, standardized test scores, and college matriculation). Moreover, the community of

debaters and coaches tends to be highly invested in the activity, with intra-community social

status corresponding primarily to competitive success. Though the rise of Urban Debate Leagues

is increasing racial and socio-economic diversity in high school (and thus intercollegiate) policy

debate, there has not been any appreciable effect in Lincoln Douglas debate.

8
Both were high school Lincoln Douglas debaters in Texas. Chad Henson competed in policy debate in college,
coached a national circuit high school team, became a private coach and judge for hire (in both policy and Lincoln-
Douglas) on the local and national high school circuits, and later coached intercollegiate policy debate at the
University of Illinois. Paul Dorasil left debate for several years after high school, and then became a prominent
judge at local and national circuit tournaments in Texas before coaching a high school transitioning from the local to
national circuits in Florida. It is this familiarity with the debate community that permitted the efficient collection and
coding of data; without it, the lack of publicly available information would have made gathering and coding the data
a much more expensive proposition.
10
 Despite these commonalities among all aspects of the debate community, there are

significant regional differences. Some states (e.g. Texas) have strong local debate cultures,

significant mingling of local- and national-circuit teams, a large number of TOC tournaments

available in the state, and a history of national success. Other states have few or none of these

things. The local debate culture can influence debater and judge behavior. Some arguments are

considered more acceptable in some regions than others. Local judges in Texas, for example,

tend to be very comfortable with a high rate of speed and technical evaluation of debates, while

local judges in most regions tend to resist this trend.

Moreover, the national circuit is a community all its own. While most (but not all)

tournaments on the “national circuit” have large contingents of local debaters who attend that

tournament but do not generally travel nationally, the elimination rounds of those tournaments

are typically dominated by debaters who travel nationally and adjudicated by judges with a

national reputation. Even on the national circuit, argumentation differences by region exist. For

example, the use of continental philosophy to critique the discourse of an opposing debater

would be considered an acceptable argument by more judges at the Victory Briefs Tournament

(California) than the Crestian (Florida). Texas debaters are known for being particularly fast and

technical. California debaters were among the first to experience success with “debate theory”

arguments.9 Some, but not all, judges on the east coast tend to dislike debate theory or critical

argument, even on the national circuit.

9
These are arguments about what sort of arguments competitors are permitted to make and how judges should
evaluate them. Whether a negative debater is permitted to advocate two conflicting positions would be an issue that
is resolved by debate theory, with the negative debater attempting to persuade the judge that debate is better (i.e.
more fair and educational) when this is permitted, and the affirmative saying debate is better when this is prohibited.
11
 At the national level, and in some local circuits, coaching and judging is a highly

lucrative activity for college students. A student so-inclined could earn upwards of $10,000 in a

year and engage in what many would consider a leisure activity at others’ expense, all working

part-time while enjoying high status among a close-knit group of elite participants. Though the

per-hour rate for debate coaching may or may not be particularly high, depending on the types of

coaching or judging activities in which the student engages, it is difficult for young people to

find higher-status work or work better-suited to a student’s schedule. Debate coaching and

judging is also an activity of the young, with much of the day-to-day non-administrative work

being done by current college students or those recently graduated from college, augmented by a

small cadre of elite senior coaches (often involved heavily in tournament administration) and

another group of “lifers” who have been in debate for the entirety of their post-pubescent lives.

In addition to the monetary rewards, there are significant social incentives facing debaters and

judges. A substantial portion of the friends of judges and debaters are themselves fellow

debaters. Loss of one’s social place in the community without the ability to quickly or easily

replicate a similar social place in another community can itself be damaging – one reason why

some young coaches remain coaches, foregoing the opportunities in law, financial services, or

entrepreneurship that frequently attract debaters.

As a community norm, judges are bound to adjudicate the round based on the arguments

made by the debaters to the extent possible, avoiding biases.10 Though there is some allowance

made for a diversity of viewpoints about how rounds should be evaluated, judges who deviate

from this norm to an unacceptable degree are punished through loss of social capital and

10
A judge who evaluates rounds with a detectable bias is known as a “hack,” and the act of doing so as “hacking.”
These are not kind terms in the debate community.
12
decreased ability to access lucrative judging and coaching contracts. Judges are also supposed to

make “correct” decisions, meaning that they should vote for the “better debater” in the round.

Since outside observers are not typically in the round, this typically means making decisions

consistent with other judges, voting for debaters that end up doing well and against debaters who

end up doing poorly.

C. THE TOURNAMENT OF CHAMPIONS

The sine qua non of elite debate is participation (and success) at the Tournament of

Champions. The Tournament of Champions (TOC) is held at the University of Kentucky each

year in late April or early May. This tournament is the national championship of the national

circuit debate community. There are two days of preliminary round competition, where all

debaters compete in seven preliminary rounds against seven different opponents. Each

competitor will affirm and negate at least three times, with the 7th round being randomly

assigned. The top sixteen11 debaters advance to single-elimination competition, like the Sweet

Sixteen in NCAA Basketball, until a champion is determined.

In order to qualify to compete at the TOC, debaters must earn two “bids” at designated

tournaments throughout the year.12 Approximately 70-75 debaters each year qualify to compete.

Competing at these tournaments is an expensive and time-consuming enterprise, and most

competitors have access to substantial resources through private means or through their school.

11
Every debater who wins at least five of their seven preliminary rounds will debate at least one more round.
Seeding is determined by number of wins, followed by various measures of the number of speaker points awarded
by judges. If more than sixteen debaters won five rounds, which occurred each year in our sample, then there is a
round held among the lowest seeds to fill the contested slots. For example, if twenty debaters won at least five
rounds, then the 13th-seeded debater would face the 20th-seed to determine who would compete in further rounds.
The results of these “bubble rounds” are not included in our sample, as they are evaluated by three-judge panels.
12
A debater who advanced to elimination rounds the previous year automatically qualifies. Under certain conditions,
a debater who earns a single bid may qualify.
13
College coaches frequently attend the TOC and TOC-qualifying tournaments to identify

potential recruits, sometimes serving as judges.

Each debater is responsible for fulfilling his or her judge obligation, which requires that

he or she provide a person willing and able to judge four preliminary rounds and remain

available to judge until one round past that debater’s elimination from the tournament. If a judge

is willing to judge every round, that judge can fulfill the judging obligation for two debaters.

Debaters then select the judges who will be eligible to adjudicate the rounds in which they

compete.13 A judge considered roughly equally suitable by both competitors will evaluate a

round between them. Judges for this tournament tend to be highly qualified, having years of

experience as successful competitors and/or coaches. The vast majority make some information

about how they evaluate debates available to debaters in advance, so debaters can seek to adapt

their strategy to the judge’s predilections.

IV. DATA

A. OBSERVATIONS

We collect data from all preliminary rounds of the Lincoln-Douglas Debate Tournament

of Champions held in years 2004-2009 that meet certain conditions.14 Our data contain

13
During three years in the sample (2004, 2005, 2009), debaters assigned judges an “A”, “B”, “C”, or “Strike”
ranking. Judges struck by a debater were absolutely barred from judging that debater. Debaters were instructed to
assign a certain number of eligible judges to each rank. This system has been explained and critiqued in some detail
by Decker and Morello (1984). During the other three years (2006-2008), debaters were provided a larger quantity
of strikes but not permitted to rank un-struck judges.
14
Originally, all rounds were coded. Rounds were subsequently excluded if there were not two competitors (i.e.
there was a bye) or consistent results were not reported for both competitors (e.g. one competitor dropped from the
competition prior to completion and did not appear in the results packet for the tournament).These rounds were
excluded for four reasons: (1) quality control was made more difficult when one competitor’s data could not be
checked against the other’s; (2) speaker point differential could not be calculated due to the absence of speaker point
information for these competitors; (3) controlling for the characteristics of the missing debater would have been
possible only by utilizing private information (e.g. asking the competitor who s/he debated against and coding that
person); and (4) the performance of a debater incapable of completing the tournament was likely affected by
whatever caused them to drop from the tournament (e.g. severe illness).
14
information on the side (affirmative/negative), outcome (win/loss), and the sex and region of the

affirmative, negative, and judge. Summary statistics are found in Table A1. We excluded the

first and second rounds at each tournament in order to ensure that the results only include rounds

between evenly-matched competitors. In rounds 3-7, debaters are paired against each other based

on their previous record and speaker points (“power matched”); the first two rounds are

randomly paired. Each debate generates a single observation.15

The dependent variable in our sample is the round outcome. AffWin is an outcome

dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the affirmative debater won, 0 if the affirmative

debater lost. This is the ultimate measure for the outcome of the round because wins are the sole

determinant of who advances to elimination rounds at this tournament, and speaker points are

only relevant to debaters that (1) have sufficient wins to be concerned about seeding in

elimination rounds or (2) have sufficient speaker points to be in the running for a top speaker

award. Furthermore, judges can only award one win per round, making this the only direct

competition for a scarce “resource.”

B. SKILL PROXY

In order to control for the relative skill of each debater, we develop a proxy we call

skillprox. While it is impossible to perfectly quantify skill, we exploit as much information as is

available in order to reach the best approximation. Ideally, there would exist an independent

rating of each debater that would be developed throughout the season, similarly to how chess

players are rated.16 Since such a rating system is unavailable, we use our own data to

15
Our dataset includes 1567 rounds of competition prior to the exclusion of rounds 1 and 2, and 1099 rounds after
those two rounds are excluded.
16
There is now, in fact, such a system created by Fantasy Debate (fantasydebate.com). It did not exist during our
sample period. Efforts to obtain sufficient data to retroactively create this system failed.
15
approximate skill. Skillprox consists of two components: the “transitivity” component and the

“other-wins” component. Each of these presents a different way of predicting a round’s outcome

by exploiting information from other rounds. The transitivity component increases by 1 for every

opponent (excluding the current one) the affirmative defeated who defeated the negative in a

different round, and decreases by 1 for every opponent the negative defeated who defeated the

affirmative in a different round. This ranges between +/- 4 prior to normalization. The second

component, other-wins, is the raw number of affirmative wins (excluding the current round)

minus the raw number of the negative wins (also excluding the current round). Skillprox is

calculated as a weighted sum of the two components, where each component is normalized to

have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.The transitivity component is given twice as

much weight as the other-wins component17. The variable femskillprox takes the value of

skillprox if the judge is a female and zero otherwise. We include this interaction term to control

for potential differences in how male and female judges evaluate skill.

We expect a positive parameter estimate associated with skill because better debaters

should win more often. We expect the parameter estimate associated with femskillprox to be

insignificant as there is no reason to think that female judges evaluate skill differently than male

judges.

C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Each debater and judge was identified by sex.18 PF is a dummy variable taking the value

of 1 if P is female, 0 otherwise, where P = AFF for Affirmative, NEG for Negative, and JDG for

17
We assume the transitivity component contains more information than the other-wins component.
18
There were no transsexual or transgender debaters or judges in the sample, as far as we know. On a similar note,
we do not attempt to identify the sexual orientation or gender identification of the (largely adolescent and young-
adult) competition and judging pool. This coding represents our best efforts at identifying the biological sex of each
16
judge. Female competitors constituted approximately 26% of the sample, while female judges

constituted approximately 13% of the sample. We also include sex interaction terms for each

combination of affirmative, negative, and judge.

Each competitor, opponent, and judge was also identified as belonging to a particular

state.19 States were aggregated into seven regions. Table A2 reports the regional aggregations.

Debaters were coded as belonging to the region where the school for which they were competing

that year is located. The coding for judges was somewhat complicated. A judge’s regional

affiliation is important because it may indicate both paradigmatic differences and political

affiliations. The authors associated each judge and debater in each year with a primary state

affiliation (e.g. Texas for Henson in 2005 and 2006, but Illinois if we were to code rounds for

2010). We then coded each judge as affiliated with a particular region in the year they judged.

There is a somewhat high degree of turnover among coaches and judges, with college-aged

judges often switching school affiliations. Full-time school-affiliated coaches were identified as

belonging to the region where their school was located. All other judges were identified as

belonging to the region where they were engaged in most of their debate-related coaching or

judging activities or, if that was unclear, where they were physically located. If no information

on the judge’s location or employment was available, they were coded as affiliated with the

region where they competed as students.20

person represented in the sample, many of whom are personally known to the authors and those who assisted them.
To the extent that sex is a proxy for gender, our findings apply to gender.
19
All competitors and judges are from the contiguous United States.
20
Despite the care taken to get precise judge affiliation information, we recognize that some cases of regional
affiliation may be open to question. To minimize the likelihood of outright error and maximize our available
information, we enlisted the assistance of a regionally diverse group of coaches and ex-debaters to review our initial
coding.
17
 Pr is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if P is affiliated with region r, where P =

AFF for affirmative, NEG for negative, and JDG for judge and r takes the value of the region

number. We have no a priori expectation regarding the value of the parameters associated with

region. Region 1 is used as the constant. We also include interaction variables for each

combination of affirmative, negative, and judge region.

Our expected parameter estimate is ambiguous for all regional interactions other than

those where the competitor and judge are from the same region. For those, we expect that judges

may favor debaters from their own regions. For example, if the judge is from the same region as

the negative, then, the coefficient should be negative. The reason for this expectation is three-

fold. First, non-controversially, a competitor from the same region as his or her judge

presumably has more familiarity with the particular predilections of his or her judge and can

adapt his or her behavior to conform more closely to that judge’s desires. Second, non-

controversially, a competitor from the same region as his or her judge has some affinity for the

same debate style as that judge, to the extent that region is partially responsible for stylistic

preferences. Third, controversially, judges from a given region may be inclined to favor (or

disfavor) competitors from that region, either consciously or subconsciously, because of their

frequent interaction with the competitors and those competitors’ coaches. A judge might prefer

to dictate an outcome favorable to those with whom that judge frequently associates. It is

important to note that because we cannot distinguish among these three motivations for bias, it is

not possible to directly deduce from a general finding of region bias whether the biases are licit

biases (i.e. debaters from the a given region “debate better” in front of judges from that region)

or illicit biases (i.e. debaters do not “debate better,” but rather the judge rewards them,

consciously or subconsciously, for reasons external to their manifest debate skill.)

18
V. MODEL AND ESTIMATION

We employ a simple model motivated by Arrow (1973). A judge’s utility is a function of

his or her own characteristics and the characteristics of each of the debaters


 

     

 
  

  
 

       

where J, A, and N are vectors of judge characteristics, affirmative characteristics, and negative

characteristics, respectively. S represents the relative skill of the chosen debater while B

represents the relative judging bias associated with the chosen debater. S and B are each

functions of V, which debater the judge votes for. Judging bias is defined as anything that

influences a judge’s decision other than the skill of the debaters and is a function of the

characteristics of the judge, the affirmative, and the negative. Reputation, R, is a function of

being perceived as a good (accurate) judge, G, minus being perceived as a biased judge, H. The

probability that bias is detected is θ, which is distributed between 0 and 1. F, making friends, is

the value the judge receives from exercising bias without detection.21 Judges make decisions to

maximize utility constrained only by the requirement that they award exactly one win. We

assume the following first order conditions:






21
This could potentially take the form of any benefit the judge could receive indirectly by making the winner or the
winner’s coach happy. These might include future judging contracts or a position as a camp instructor. A judge
whose bias is detected would not thereafter be rewarded for this bias.
19
 
  

    
   

As such, judges may face a trade-off between maintaining a good reputation and making friends

by exercising bias. Thus, we can simplify the estimation considerably.

Our model deviates from Arrow’s in that there is no explicit production function. A

judge does not benefit directly, in monetary terms, from a debater’s arguments or from a

debater’s success later in the tournament. As such, a judge faces no direct trade-off between bias

and profit. However, judges develop reputations as good or bad judges based on the decisions

they render. If a judge consistently votes for debaters who are later successful, his or her

reputation will improve and vice versa. Second a judge’s reputation will decrease if he or she

becomes known as a biased judge, Judges have significant incentives to improve their reputation,

detailed infra at III.B. To this extent, the analogue of the traditional production function is the

reputation function.

A debater’s in-round performance provides a judge with the best indication of how a vote

for the debater will affect the judge’s reputation. Similarly to the productivity of an individual

worker, we do not observe debaters’ in-round performance. However, we use skillprox,

described earlier, to serve as a proxy for the potential contribution of each debater to the judge’s

reputation. Bias, therefore, can be interpreted as a factor other than skill influencing a judge’s

decision. Due to the nature of our data, we are unable to distinguish between taste-based

discrimination and information-based discrimination.

The model is estimated as follows:

 !"## 

$% &  $% ' 

$% (  $% )  $% *
$% +  $% * $% ,  
$% * $% -  .$  /$%

20
where the dependent variable, WinAff takes the value of 1 if the affirmative won the round. S is

the skill proxy described earlier. J, A, and N are vectors of sex and region characteristics for the

judge, affirmative, and negative. γ is a vector of fixed effects across years. ε is a zero-mean

error term. The subscripts y and r denote the year and round. & ' ( 0 1 2 3456 are vectors

of parameters to be estimated. We include fixed effects across years in order to control for the

effects from unobservable factors that vary from tournament to tournament. For example, these

fixed effects help account for minor rule changes22 and differences in policy regarding

competitor qualification.23

VI. RESULTS

Table A3 displays the full results of the estimation of the model. Table A4 displays the

full results of the marginal effects. Table 2 displays just those marginal effects significant at the

p < 0.11 level.

Table 2. Significant Marginal Effects

Variable N Margin Standard Error p-value

Neg (const.) -0.22 0.09 0.01
skillprox 0.04 0.01 0.00

AF 297 -0.09 0.05 0.06

JF 151 0.12 0.06 0.07
JF*AF*NF 12 0.65 0.40 0.10

J1N1 61 -1.22 0.31 0.00

J1A6 77 -0.58 0.27 0.03

J2N2 40 -0.84 0.36 0.02

22
E.g. in three years of the sample, competitors used mutual judge preference, while in three other years,
competitors had an increased ability to strike judges but no ratings of judges.
23
The qualifying tournaments change from year to year, as does the number of competitors entitled to compete and
the number of at-large bids awarded.
21
 J3A7 7 -1.37 0.44 0.00

J5N1 11 -0.70 0.39 0.07

J5N5 2 -0.58 0.36 0.11

A2N1 39 -0.62 0.36 0.09

A4N1 42 -0.85 0.37 0.02
A6N4 51 -1.15 0.34 0.00
A7N6 36 -1.03 0.40 0.01

The marginal effect of the constant term is -0.22. We interpret this as side bias in favor

of the negative since the dependent variable is WinAff. Side bias in favor of the negative is well-

known in high school Lincoln-Douglas Debate. The marginal effect of skillprox is 0.04,

indicating that more skilled debaters are more likely to win. The marginal effect of AF is -0.09

providing marginal evidence that female affirmatives lose more often in front of male judges

than female judges. The marginal effect of JF is .12, which provides marginal evidence that

female judges are more likely to vote affirmative than male judges. The marginal effect on the

interaction term JF*AF*NF is 0.65, which provides marginal evidence that rounds involving a

female affirmative, negative, and judge are more likely to result in an affirmative victory than

those with a male affirmative, negative, and judge. However, this result is questionable as only

12 of these rounds appear in the sample.

The marginal effect of J1N1 and J1A6 are -1.22 and -0.58 respectively, indicating that

Texas judges are more likely to vote for Texas negatives and against Northeast Affirmatives.

The marginal effect of J2N2 is -0.84, indicating that California judges are more likely to vote for

California negatives. The marginal effects of J3A7, J5N1, and J5N5 are all significant or

marginally significant with values of -1.37, -0.70, and -0.58 respectively. This indicates that

22
Southwest judges are more likely to vote against Southeast affirmatives, and Northeast judges

prefer Texas negatives and Northeast Negatives. However, the low cell-counts associated with

these interaction terms (7, 11, and 2, respectively) make these results unreliable.

The marginal effects of A2N1 and A4N1 are -0.62 and -0.85, respectively, indicating that

Texas negatives perform particularly well against affirmatives from California and the Midwest.

The marginal effect of A6N4 is -1.15, indicating that Midwest negatives perform particularly well

against Northeast affirmatives. The marginal effect of A7N6 is -1.03, indicating that Northeast

negatives perform particularly well against Southeast affirmatives.

VII. CONCLUSION

A. DISCUSSION

We use six years of annual tournament data to investigate potential side, sex, and region

biases at the high school Lincoln-Douglas Tournament of Champions. Taken together, these

results provide significant evidence of judging bias at this tournament. Judges tend to prefer

debaters of their own sex and region. There is also strong and significant evidence of side bias in

favor of the negative. Additionally, we find evidence that male judges are more likely to vote

against female affirmatives, Texas judges are more likely to vote for Texas negatives and against

Northeast Affirmatives, and California judges are more likely to vote for California negatives.

Taken as a whole, these results may indicate that a known negative bias allows judges to

express other biases without detection when voting for the debater representing the negative side.

It has long been well-known in the debate community that debating on the negative is

advantageous. This known side bias may provide judges with a means of expressing bias with a

lower probability of detection. The evidence of bias shows up almost exclusively when judges

vote negative. We find evidence that male judges are more likely to vote against female
23
affirmatives, Texas judges are more likely to vote for Texas negatives and against Northeast

Affirmatives, and California judges are more likely to vote for California negatives.

These results may indicate that debate judges feel more comfortable expressing biases

when voting negative because a negative win is the more expected outcome and negative ballots

will be less likely to be called into question by anyone other than the losing debater. This

increased expression of illicit preferences when detection is least likely is consistent with the

findings of scholars of judicial decision-making, who find increased willingness of appellate

court judges to pursue their preferred outcomes when detection becomes less likely due to the

absence of a judge with differing political preferences signaling the majority’s deviation from

legal rules (Cross & Tiller, 1998). It does not, however, indicate that the biases are conscious. An

illicit desire to vote for debaters of one’s own region and sex coupled with conscious evasion of

detection is certainly a possible explanation for this finding. However, it is also true that judges

may be more conscientious when they affirm than when they negate, taking greater care to

justify their decisions and thus being less subject to subconscious biases.

This avoidance of detection is also compatible with both taste- and information-based

discrimination – at least in the case of region. It is possible that there is something unique about

negating that enables a negative debater to take advantage of a judge being from the same region

where an affirmative debater could not. Since the negative debater speaks second, and thus

knows the affirmative debater’s initial strategy position, it may be that choosing the correct

response strategy against a position for a particular judge is more important than choosing the

correct initial strategy. If judges publicly reported on the strategies of both sides, as has become

the norm at some tournaments in intercollegiate policy debate, this hypothesis could be tested

24
empirically. It seems difficult to reconcile the information-based discrimination with a sex bias

that only appears when females affirm in front of male judges.24

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

These results indicate that substantial side, region, and sex bias exist at the TOC. Because

these biases make the outcomes of debates less dependent upon the skill of the debaters,

permitting bias to exist in debate may undermine the goals of competitive fairness and education

that are central to debate as a competitive academic activity. Debaters invest a great deal of

effort into the activity of debate largely in order to gain competitive success and the attendant

social and financial rewards that come from that success. If success in debate is determined by

something other than skill, those who do not possess that something (e.g. maleness or residency

in a region that sends a large contingent of judges to the TOC) may be less likely to compete, and

the incentive for research and intense training diminishes when the marginal effect of a small

change in ability to debate is less important than the results of a coin flip. In this way, bias may

reduce both the number of people participating in debate and its value to those who do

participate, in addition to harming those against whom discrimination directly occurs.

Loss of participation in debate is important not only for the debate community, but for

society as a whole. Competitive debate conveys a large number of benefits to its participants:

research skills, speaking skills, the ability to think quickly on one’s feet, knowledge of current

events, and the personal attendant personal empowerment the acquisition of these brings

24
In order for this to be information-based discrimination, it would have to be true that: (1) female debaters are
worse at affirming than male debaters are, and (2) male judges are better at identifying this deficiency than female
judges are. Though this is possible, it is unlikely. Whatever sex differences may occur in the debate population as a
whole, it is unlikely they would be replicated in an elite pool where no effort is made to ensure equal gender
representation among either the competitors or judges. In fact, females display less of a side bias than males do;
female judges would thus appear to be superior to male judges from the standpoint of competitive equity.
25
(Edwards, 2008). Participation in competitive debate also positively contributes to participants’

ability to successfully pursue careers in many prestigious and remunerative fields such as

academia, business management, and law (Zompetti & Driscoll, 2002). In more immediate

terms, scholarships for competitive debate, and are attached largely to high school success. Sex

bias in debate, reducing the success and participation rates of female participants, may thus be

contributing to sex disparities later in life.

The most prevalent form of bias in high school Lincoln Douglas debate is the side bias in

favor of the negative. The effects of negative side bias are difficult to overstate. First, while the

estimated marginal effect of the side bias is not the largest, it is the most pervasive: side bias is

the only form of bias that is potentially present in every round. Second, the marginal effect of

side bias is large enough to be problematic on its own; debating on the negative is substantially

preferable to a small but positive skill proxy advantage, which may be why the transitivity study

indicates that competent judging does not produce results statistically different from random

decisions. In other words, given side bias, it is better to be lucky (through random assignment to

the negative) than good. Additionally, the prevalent negative bias may provide a means for

judges to shield other expressed biases from detection. In this way, side bias may exacerbate

both imbalances in competitive equity at national tournaments and anti-female sex bias. Side bias

must be corrected in order to make debate a fair activity – especially for female debaters and

those less familiar with the judges at any given tournament, but also for the community as a

whole.

One potential source of side bias relates to speech times. The affirmative is allowed three

short speeches (6, 4, and 3, minutes) while the negative is allowed two long speeches (7 and 6

minutes). There are two intuitive explanations for the effect of speech times on side bias. First,
26
because any argument not refuted is considered true for the purpose of the debate, affirmative

debaters are required to “cover” 7 minutes of negative speech time in 4 minutes, then cover 6

minutes of negative speech time in 3 minutes. Due to the large number of arguments presented in

each round, the negative may possess a substantial advantage over the affirmative due to this

convention. Second, judges only consider arguments discussed in each debater’s last speech,

ignoring any that both sides “drop.” The negative has more time to bring up relevant and helpful

arguments and explain their significance, while the affirmative must attempt to diminish the

importance of the negative’s arguments and bring up their own in half the time due to the 2:1

ratio of NR time to 2AR time.25 Another potential source of side bias relates to organizational

difficulty stemming from the number of speeches. Because each side is only allotted a limited

amount of “prep time,” or free time to prepare their next speech, organization becomes more

difficult with a greater number of speeches.26

One potential remedy would be to allow each debater to give the same number of

speeches with equal speech times. Another remedy would be to provide an even number of

preliminary debate rounds to ensure that each debater represents the affirmative and negative

sides an equal number of times. With seven rounds, debaters who represent the negative in four

25
The first of these explanations is more popular among debaters. An analysis of the time differences in other
formats of debate (such as the National Debate Tournament style) where side bias is not known to exist, however,
indicates that side equality can survive time disparities in middle speeches (e.g. the 15-minute Neg Block vs. the 6-
minute 1AR in NDT format or the 13-minute Neg Block vs. the 5-minute 1AR in CX). In each of these formats,
however, the 2NR and 2AR (functional equivalents of the NR and 2AR in LD) are of equal time. NDT and CX
debaters frequently consider the 2NR the most difficult speech. Interestingly, every form of competitive debate of
which the authors are aware has the same speaker (or team) speak first and last, leaving the team that speaks second
with larger blocks of time. This may be intended to counterbalance the advantage gained from speaking first (and
thus setting the terms of the debate) and last (and thus having the only opportunity to “move” after all of the other
relevant “moves” have taken place.
26
Obviously, the affirmative need not expend any prep time prior to the 1AC. The NC, however, often contains
substantial pre-scripted elements that do not vary substantially based on the affirmative’s advocacy. Thus, the NC is
easier to prep than the 1AR.
27
rounds have an advantage over those who represent the negative in only three rounds. Of course,

this would do nothing to solve for potential side bias in elimination rounds.27 A final potential

remedy may be the most effective, but is also the most difficult to implement. If debate judges

were to substantially alter their accepted norms to be more affirmative-friendly, then competitive

equity could be achieved without the need to wait for policy change. For example, a norm for

evaluating arguments that gave the affirmative substantial leeway regarding what constitutes

addressing an argument or makes the affirmative’s interpretation for how the round should be

evaluated the one a judge accepts by default (subject, of course, to the negative’s ability to show

that this interpretation is unreasonable) may give the affirmative a competitive advantage to

offset the structural disadvantage imposed by the time limits.

Second, we find significant evidence of region bias. Specifically, Texas and California

judges prefer negative debaters from their regions.28 A simple remedy for region bias might be to

require that rounds be judged by someone unaffiliated with either of the debaters’ regions.29

This is done successfully at the National Forensics League National Tournament, which defines

regions at the state level. Our analysis suggests that a wider aggregation may be appropriate.

Alternatively, since the most significant evidence of bias appears when the negative debater and

judge are from the same region, the tournament could merely prohibit judges from evaluating

27
We do not study side bias in elimination rounds. Anecdotal evidence indicates that side bias is actually worse in
elimination rounds than it is in preliminary rounds.
28
While these results may mistakenly be understood to indicate that only Texas and California judges express
regional bias, it is important to remember that Texas and California send large numbers of competitors to the TOC
and, unlike the Northeast, are net suppliers of judging. This means that (1) Texas and California had the most
opportunities to display this bias and (2) despite evidence of this bias, debaters outside Texas and California tend to
prefer Texas and California judges. Further, though statistical significance could not always be inferred, the
marginal effect on affirmative wins of the negative debater and judge being from the same region was either
negative, zero, or non-estimable for all regions.
29
Currently, mutual judge preference/strikes and conflicts of interest are the sole constraints on judges evaluating
debaters. This would be an additional constraint; it cannot be a viable replacement for mutual preference or strikes.
28
negative debaters from their region, while permitting judges to evaluate debaters from their own

regions on the affirmative. This bias may be particularly pernicious at non-national tournaments,

such as the TOC-qualifying tournaments, where the region in which the tournament is located is

likely to have significantly more judges and the cost of discriminating against debaters or teams

one may not see again is low.

Finally, we find moderately significant evidence that male judges tend to vote against

female affirmatives. This is troubling given that females judge only 13% of rounds in our

sample. Clearly, more needs to be done to promote equal participation among debaters and

judges. Some empirical examination of the judge preference forms filled out by debaters under

different rules would be useful, as certain systems of judge preference may systematically

exclude female judges (or judges of certain regions). Furthermore, the TOC might benefit from

actively recruiting qualified female judges to avoid a male-dominated judging pool that may

produce decisions biased against female debaters. Reversal of its policy of refusing to hire judges

would enable the TOC to ensure that it obtains qualified female judges from underrepresented

regions, simultaneously helping resolve problems with sex bias and region bias.

29
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34
 APPENDIX

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Continuous
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
skillprox 1116 -0.05 2.22 -11.38 10.33
femskillprox 1116 0.02 0.71 -8.07 6.26

Binary
Variable N Mean
WinAff 493 0.44

AF 297 0.27
NF 292 0.26
JF 151 0.13
JF*AF 46 0.04
JF*NF 34 0.03
AF*NF 71 0.06
JF*AF*NF 12 0.01

35
 Table A1 continued.
Variable N Mean Variable N Mean Variable N Mean
A1 225 0.20 N1 226 0.20 J1 280 0.25
A2 183 0.16 N2 184 0.16 J2 233 0.21
A3 54 0.05 N3 51 0.05 J3 37 0.03
A4 191 0.17 N4 197 0.18 J4 212 0.19
A5 33 0.03 N5 34 0.03 J5 43 0.04
A6 290 0.26 N6 283 0.25 J6 184 0.16
A7 143 0.13 N7 144 0.13 J7 130 0.12

J1*A1 62 0.06 J1*N1 61 0.05 A1*N1 49 0.04

J1*A2 34 0.03 J1*N2 36 0.03 A1*N2 33 0.03
J1*A3 14 0.01 J1*N3 15 0.01 A1*N3 12 0.01
J1*A4 42 0.04 J1*N4 51 0.05 A1*N4 36 0.03
J1*A5 13 0.01 J1*N5 9 0.01 A1*N5 5 0.00
J1*A6 77 0.07 J1*N6 78 0.07 A1*N6 63 0.06
J1*A7 38 0.03 J1*N7 30 0.03 A1*N7 27 0.02
J2*A1 51 0.05 J2*N1 48 0.04 A2*N1 39 0.03
J2*A2 43 0.04 J2*N2 40 0.04 A2*N2 27 0.02
J2*A3 14 0.01 J2*N3 11 0.01 A2*N3 8 0.01
J2*A4 47 0.04 J2*N4 33 0.03 A2*N4 30 0.03
J2*A5 6 0.01 J2*N5 10 0.01 A2*N5 8 0.01
J2*A6 50 0.04 J2*N6 59 0.05 A2*N6 49 0.04
J2*A7 22 0.02 J2*N7 32 0.03 A2*N7 22 0.02
J3*A1 5 0.00 J3*N1 7 0.01 A3*N1 12 0.01
J3*A2 9 0.01 J3*N2 2 0.00 A3*N2 11 0.01
J3*A3 4 0.00 J3*N3 1 0.00 A3*N3 1 0.00
J3*A4 6 0.01 J3*N4 8 0.01 A3*N4 6 0.01
J3*A5 (empty) J3*N5 2 0.00 A3*N5 (empty)
J3*A6 6 0.01 J3*N6 11 0.01 A3*N6 17 0.02
J3*A7 7 0.01 J3*N7 6 0.01 A3*N7 7 0.01
J4*A1 35 0.03 J4*N1 41 0.04 A4*N1 42 0.04
J4*A2 38 0.03 J4*N2 43 0.04 A4*N2 31 0.03
J4*A3 7 0.01 J4*N3 11 0.01 A4*N3 7 0.01
J4*A4 36 0.03 J4*N4 34 0.03 A4*N4 36 0.03
J4*A5 2 0.00 J4*N5 5 0.00 A4*N5 10 0.01
J4*A6 61 0.05 J4*N6 51 0.05 A4*N6 36 0.03
J4*A7 33 0.03 J4*N7 27 0.02 A4*N7 29 0.03
J5*A1 12 0.01 J5*N1 11 0.01 A5*N1 8 0.01
J5*A2 6 0.01 J5*N2 9 0.01 A5*N2 5 0.00
J5*A3 (empty) J5*N3 2 0.00 A5*N3 3 0.00
J5*A4 8 0.01 J5*N4 6 0.01 A5*N4 10 0.01
J5*A5 1 0.00 J5*N5 2 0.00 A5*N5 1 0.00
J5*A6 11 0.01 J5*N6 10 0.01 A5*N6 4 0.00
J5*A7 5 0.00 J5*N7 3 0.00 A5*N7 2 0.00
J6*A1 35 0.03 J6*N1 35 0.03 A6*N1 54 0.05
J6*A2 31 0.03 J6*N2 35 0.03 A6*N2 52 0.05
J6*A3 9 0.01 J6*N3 5 0.00 A6*N3 13 0.01
J6*A4 32 0.03 J6*N4 38 0.03 A6*N4 51 0.05
J6*A5 9 0.01 J6*N5 5 0.00 A6*N5 5 0.00
J6*A6 50 0.04 J6*N6 39 0.03 A6*N6 78 0.07
J6*A7 18 0.02 J6*N7 27 0.02 A6*N7 37 0.03
J7*A1 25 0.02 J7*N1 23 0.02 A7*N1 22 0.02
J7*A2 22 0.02 J7*N2 19 0.02 A7*N2 25 0.02
J7*A3 6 0.01 J7*N3 6 0.01 A7*N3 7 0.01
J7*A4 20 0.02 J7*N4 27 0.02 A7*N4 28 0.03
J7*A5 2 0.00 J7*N5 1 0.00 A7*N5 5 0.00
J7*A6 35 0.03 J7*N6 35 0.03 A7*N6 36 0.03
J7*A7 20 0.02 J7*N7 19 0.02 A7*N7 20 0.02

36
 Table A2: Regional Aggregation of States
Region 130 Oklahoma, Texas
Region 2 California
Region 331 Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah
Region 4 Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Wisconsin
Region 5 Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, Wyoming
Region 6 Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont
Region 7 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia

30
Despite the strong local debate culture in Texas, Texas and Oklahoma were grouped together because there were
few competitors or judges from Oklahoma, and those who were affiliated with Oklahoma also frequently competed
and/or judged in Texas. There is no TOC-qualifying tournament located in Oklahoma, and Texas tournaments are
closest for those teams.
31
In regions 3-7, it is not the case that every state sent a competitor to the TOC. We have included the entire
contiguous United States in order to facilitate efforts to replicate results with different datasets. In these instances,
the authors are unaware of the “debate cultures” of the states sending no competitors nationally, and group them
based entirely on geography. These groupings should not be read to imply that debate in Georgia (a state well
known for its successful policy debate) and West Virginia (which is responsible for no observations in our sample),
for example, are at all similar.
37
 Table A3: Regression Results
Standard
Variable Coefficient Error
Negative -0.964 0.443
Skillprox 0.146 0.035
Femskillprox 0.049 0.108

AF -0.375 0.202
NF 0.219 0.195
JF 0.473 0.272
JF*AF -0.067 0.513
JF*NF 0.195 0.604
AF*NF 0.603 0.391
JF*AF*NF -0.935 1.016

Affirmative Region
TX Constant
CA -0.52 0.66
SW -0.19 0.92
MW -0.66 0.61
NW -0.57 1.23
NE -0.45 0.55
SE 0.30 0.69

Negative Region
TX Constant
CA 0.91 0.62
SW 1.31 0.99
MW 0.90 0.59
NW -1.26 1.67
NE 1.26 0.52
SE 1.16 0.73

38
 Table A3 continued.
Texas Judge Neg Region Texas Judge Aff Region
Texas Aff TX Constant Texas Neg TX Constant
CA 0.91 0.62 CA -0.52 0.66
SW 1.31 0.99 SW -0.19 0.92
MW 0.90 0.59 MW -0.66 0.61
NW -1.26 1.67 NW -0.57 1.23
NE 1.26 0.52 NE -0.45 0.55
SE 1.16 0.73 SE 0.30 0.69
California Judge Neg Region California Judge Aff Region
Texas Aff TX Constant Texas Neg TX Constant
CA -1.34 0.68 CA 0.84 0.67
SW -0.78 1.05 SW -0.51 0.97
MW -0.71 0.66 MW 0.20 0.63
NW -0.44 2.00 NW 0.07 1.37
NE -0.75 0.58 NE -0.03 0.58
SE -0.34 0.73 SE 0.20 0.71
Southwest Judge Neg Region Southwest Judge Aff Region
Texas Aff TX Constant Texas Neg TX Constant
CA 23.81 68488.23 CA -1.43 1.70
SW -25.32 100003.80 SW -2.15 2.07
MW -2.00 1.39 MW 0.77 1.95
NW -2.23 2.24 NW (empty)
NE 0.05 1.41 NE -1.70 1.96
SE -2.43 1.91 SE -2.65 1.80
Midwest Judge Neg Region Midwest Judge Aff Region
Texas Aff TX Constant Texas Neg TX Constant
CA -0.63 0.68 CA 1.15 0.70
SW -0.05 1.04 SW 2.09 1.25
MW -1.26 0.69 MW 0.81 0.68
NW 0.92 2.00 NW -21.48 76517.24
NE -1.26 0.61 NE 0.36 0.60
SE -0.99 0.77 SE -0.65 0.72
Northwest Judge Neg Region Northwest Judge Aff Region
Texas Aff TX Constant Texas Neg TX Constant
CA -0.08 1.26 CA 1.80 1.41
SW -23.13 71424.33 SW (empty)
MW 0.66 1.49 MW 1.13 1.21
NW -0.23 3.43 NW 23.86 104073.10
NE 0.75 1.20 NE -2.01 1.35
SE -0.89 1.64 SE 0.05 1.30
Northeast Judge Neg Region Northeast Judge Aff Region
Texas Aff TX Constant Texas Neg TX Constant
CA 0.18 0.72 CA 0.07 0.76
SW -0.62 1.29 SW -0.06 1.08
MW 0.33 0.68 MW 0.50 0.71
NW 3.05 1.81 NW 0.67 1.30
NE -1.09 0.66 NE 0.66 0.61
SE -0.28 0.78 SE -0.23 0.82
Southeast Judge Neg Region Southeast Judge Aff Region
Texas Aff TX Constant Texas Neg TX Constant
CA -0.57 0.86 CA -0.19 0.83
SW -23.48 46281.02 SW 1.16 1.27
MW 0.32 0.77 MW -0.22 0.83
NW 21.95 110290.20 NW -45.56 87171.84
NE -0.41 0.71 NE -0.02 0.70
SE 0.29 0.88 SE -0.25 0.80

39
 Table A3 continued.
Texas Judge
Aff Neg
CA CA -0.33 0.74
CA SW -0.80 1.22
CA MW 0.66 0.73
CA NW 3.69 2.01
CA NE -0.34 0.64
CA SE -0.39 0.80
SW CA -1.58 1.20
SW SW -2.32 116863.10
SW MW -0.46 1.23
SW NW (empty)
SW NE -0.26 0.94
SW SE 0.45 1.24
MW CA 0.49 0.73
MW SW -0.65 1.43
MW MW 0.16 0.70
MW NW 0.61 2.04
MW NE 0.74 0.66
MW SE 0.06 0.77
NW CA 0.17 1.66
NW SW 0.37 1.75
NW MW -0.63 1.18
NW NW -20.04 108897.40
NW NE -0.43 1.77
NW SE 22.85 62094.02
NE CA -0.23 0.66
NE SW -0.45 1.07
NE MW -0.79 0.66
NE NW 2.64 2.28
NE NE 0.26 0.57
NE SE 0.33 0.73
SE CA 0.02 0.80
SE SW -1.35 1.31
SE MW -0.23 0.81
SE NW 0.49 1.84
SE NE -1.26 0.73
SE SE -0.93 0.91

40
 Table A4. Marginal Effects
Variable Margin p-value
Neg -0.22 0.01
Skillprox 0.04 0.00
Femskillprox 0.01 0.65

AF -0.09 0.057
NF 0.05 0.256
JF 0.12 0.072
JF*AF -0.14 0.279
JF*NF 0.06 0.8
AF*NF 0.07 0.759
JF*AF*NF 0.65 0.099

Affirmative Negative
Region Region
TX -0.16 1 TX -0.79 0.997
CA -0.27 0.999 CA 0.35 1
Not
SW Estimable SW -4.83 0.999
MW -0.21 1 MW -0.37 0.999
Not Not
NW Estimable NW Estimable
NE -0.58 0.999 NE -0.17 0.999
SE -0.61 0.999 SE 0.59 1

Judge Region
TX -0.4552561 0.998
CA -0.1770847 0.999
Not
SW Estimable
MW -1.029753 1
Not
NW Estimable
NE -0.0988201 1
SE -1.804766 1

41
 Table A4 continued.
Texas Judge Neg Region Texas Judge Aff Region
TX -1.22 0 TX -0.12 0.665
CA -0.41 0.271 CA -0.64 0.117
SW -0.54 1 SW Not Estimable
MW -0.46 0.133 MW -0.49 0.161
NW Not Estimable NW 1.40 1
NE -0.01 0.976 NE -0.58 0.031
SE 0.55 1 SE -0.34 0.326
California Judge Neg Region California Judge Aff Region
TX -0.31 0.308 TX -0.01 0.969
CA -0.84 0.021 CA 0.31 0.36
SW -0.41 1 SW Not Estimable
MW -0.27 0.495 MW -0.18 0.58
NW Not Estimable NW 1.58 1
NE 0.15 0.603 NE -0.50 0.119
SE 1.11 1 SE -0.03 0.951
Southwest Judge Neg Region Southwest Judge Aff Region
TX Not Estimable TX 4.56 1
CA Not Estimable CA 2.61 1
SW Not Estimable SW Not Estimable
MW Not Estimable MW 4.96 1
NW Not Estimable NW Not Estimable
NE Not Estimable NE 2.40 1
SE Not Estimable SE 1.68 1
Midwest Judge Neg Region Midwest Judge Aff Region
TX -1.05 1 TX -0.50 0.164
CA -0.87 1 CA 0.13 0.708
SW -0.43 1 SW Not Estimable
MW -1.55 0.999 MW -0.06 0.867
NW Not Estimable NW -20.45 1
NE -1.09 1 NE -0.59 0.042
SE -0.28 1 SE -1.37 0.002
Northwest Judge Neg Region Northwest Judge Aff Region
TX Not Estimable TX -1.08 1
CA Not Estimable CA 0.20 1
SW Not Estimable SW Not Estimable
MW Not Estimable MW -0.33 1
NW Not Estimable NW 24.30 1
NE Not Estimable NE -3.55 0.999
SE Not Estimable SE -1.26 1
Northeast Judge Neg Region Northeast Judge Aff Region
TX -0.70 0.068 TX -0.02 0.956
CA 0.29 0.424 CA -0.47 0.263
SW -0.65 1 SW Not Estimable
MW 0.38 0.283 MW 0.11 0.777
NW Not Estimable NW 2.18 1
NE -0.58 0.107 NE 0.18 0.557
SE 0.78 1 SE -0.47 0.419
Southeast Judge Neg Region Southeast Judge Aff Region
TX -2.06 0.999 TX -0.07 1
CA -1.82 0.999 CA -0.79 1
SW -24.87 1 SW Not Estimable
MW -0.98 1 MW -0.66 1
NW Not Estimable NW -44.11 1
NE -1.26 1 NE -0.55 1
SE 0.00 1 SE -0.54 1

42
 Table A4 continued.
Texas Judge
Aff Neg
TX TX -0.5039513 0.112
TX CA 0.73 1
TX SW -3.92 1
TX MW 0.06 0.868
TX NW 1.30 1
TX NE 0.16 0.561
TX SE 0.27 0.538
CA TX -0.62 0.088
CA SE 0.29 1
CA SW -4.83 0.999
CA MW 0.60 0.14
CA NW 4.86 1
CA NE -0.29 0.357
CA SE -0.24 0.623
SW TX Not Estimable
SW CA Not Estimable
SW SW Not Estimable
SW MW Not Estimable
SW NW Not Estimable
SW NE Not Estimable
SW SE Not Estimable
MW TX -0.85 0.021
MW CA 0.88 1
MW SW -4.91 0.999
MW MW -0.12 0.725
MW NW 1.56 1
MW NE 0.56 0.116
MW SE -0.02 0.96
NW TX Not Estimable
NW CA Not Estimable
NW SW Not Estimable
NW MW Not Estimable
NW NW Not Estimable
NW NE Not Estimable
NW SE Not Estimable
NE TX -0.91 0.004
NE CA 0.10 1
NE SW -4.77 0.999
NE MW -1.15 0.001
NE NW 3.53 1
NE NE 0.01 0.952
NE SE 0.19 0.616
SE TX -0.43 0.361
SE CA 0.82 1
SE SW -5.19 0.999
SE MW -0.10 0.817
SE NW 1.85 1
SE NE -1.03 0.01
SE SE -0.59 0.271

43