2003 P L C (C.S.

) 145

[Karachi High Court]

Before Saiyed Saeed Ashhad, C. J. and Zia Perwez, J

AIRLEAGUE OF PIA EMPLOYEES, UNION and another

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN/THE PRESIDENT/ CHIEF EXECUTIVE and

another

Constitutional Petitions Nos.D‑1574 and D‑2024 of 2001, decided on 29th March,

2002.

(a) Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (Suspension of Trade Unions and

Existing Agreements) Order [Chief Executive's Order 6 of 2001]---

‑‑‑Preamble, Arts. 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5‑‑‑Provisional Constitution Order (I of (999), Premable,

Arts.2(3) & 6‑‑‑Proclamation of Emergency by Chief executive of Pakistan dated
14‑10‑1999‑‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss.1(3), 2(xxviii) &
22‑‑‑West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
Ordinance (VI of 1968), Ss.2(a) & Sched.‑‑‑Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973),
Ss.2‑A & 4‑‑‑Constitution Of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 17 & 199‑‑‑Constitutional
petition‑‑‑Promulgation 4 Chief Executive's Order 6 of 2001‑‑‑Suspension of trade
unions activities ad agreements arrived at between unions and Corporation as a result
of ,eating obstacles. hurdles, problems in smooth and orderly running and functioning
of Corporation‑‑‑Contention of petitioners was that impugned order No.6 of 2001 was
in violation of the mandate given by Supreme Court Syed Zafar Ali Shah's case (PLD
2000 SC 869)‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Petitioners td not challenged authority of President/Chief
Executive to promulgate legislative measures in view of suspension of National
Assembly and Senate subsequent dissolution thereof‑‑‑Power of Parliament were
exercisable by President/Chief Executive‑‑‑Impugned Order could not be said to be in
excess of powers in view of the provisions of Proclamation of Emergency, Provisional
Constitution Order, 1999 and authority/powers exercisable by him for achieving the
declared objectives/goals embodied in cl. 6(a), (b), (c) of judgment of Supreme Court
(PLD 2000 SC 869)‑‑‑Impugned Order had not amended/modified, superseded or
repealed any law‑ nor provisions thereof were contradictory or violative of any
provisions of the Constitution, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, West Pakistan
Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and
Service Tribunals .Act. 1973‑‑‑Provision of Art.6 of Provisional Constitution Order,
1999, was sufficient to hold that country was in the state of emergency at the time,
when impugned Order was made by President/Chief Executive‑‑ Articles 2 & 4 of
impugned Order related to giving effect to such declared objectives, thus, same could
not be said to be redundant or surplusage, which should be considered as integral part
of the Order and were to be given the meanings appearing from plain reading
thereof‑‑‑Impugned Order was in exercise of the powers conferred by Supreme Court
as well as such authority would be derivable from Provisional Constitution Order,
1999‑‑‑High Court dismissed Constitutional petitions being without any force.

Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervaz Musharraf. Chief Executive of
Pakistan and others PLD 2000 SC 869; Mohatrama Benazir Bhutto v. President of
Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 388; Civil Aviation Authority, Islamabad and' others v. Union
of Civil Aviation Employees and another PLD 1997 SC 781; Madan Mohan Pathak
and another v. Union of India and others, (1978) 2 SCC 50 and Benazir Bhutto v.
Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1988 SC 416 ref.
(b) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑--

‑‑‑‑ Power of Legislature to legislate‑‑‑Scope‑‑‑Power of Court to strike down a

law‑‑‑Scope and limitations‑‑‑ Legislature was competent to legislate retrospectively
and retroactively and take away a vested right by express words or necessary
intendment ‑‑‑Courts would not hold such a legislation as ineffective and strike down
same‑‑‑Before striking down a law as being opposed to Constitutional provisions, one
would have to establish specifically violation of Constitutional provisions, in absence
whereof it could not be said that law was bad merely because same violated some
principle of justice and fair play.

Haider Automobile Ltd. v. Pakistan PLD 1969 SC 623 fol.

(c) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑‑

‑‑‑ Motive or policy of Legislature‑‑‑Duty of Court‑‑‑Scope‑‑‑Courts not to question

motives or policy of Legislature or refuse to give effect to a statute merely because
same appeared to be harsh or unreasonable or vindictive.

The Province Punjab v. Malik Khizar Hayat Khan PLD 1956 FC 200 fol.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑-

‑‑‑‑Art.25‑‑‑Expression "equal protection of law" ‑‑‑Connotation and scope.

Article 25 of the Constitution permits reasonable discrimination. It guarantees equal

protection of law, which means that all persons shall be treated alike under like
circumstances and conditions, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. It
does not mean that all citizens shall be treated alike under all sets of circumstances and
conditions, both in respect of privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. By the
expression "equal protection of law", it is envisaged that no person or class of persons
would be denied the same protection of law, which is enjoyed by person or class of
persons placed in like circumstances in respect of their life, liberty, property or pursuit
of happiness. This expression does not provide that every citizen is to be treated alike
in all circumstances, but permits reasonable classification founded on reasonable
distinction or basis.

Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited and another v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others
1998 PTD 1804 fol.

(e) Islamic jurisprudence‑‑

‑‑‑‑ Contract/agreement‑‑‑Obligation of party to perform acts thereunder‑‑

Essential‑‑‑Agreements entered into between parties are to be honoured by executing
parties, who would be under an obligation to perform all acts to give effect to
contract/agreement‑‑‑Such would be the case, when it could be established that
agreement/contract was arrived at, wig free‑will of contracting parties without
application of pressure, undue influence or coercion by any of them, so as to force into
submission the other party for agreeing to demands privileges and benefits, which
otherwise it would not agree to. [Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 10, 13, 14, 15 & 16.

(f) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑‑‑‑

----Legislature is competent to amend an earlier Act or declare its meaning by enacting

a new Act‑‑‑Legislature while doing so was competent to declare a meaning which is
not consistent or is in deviation of plain language of earlier Act‑‑‑A later statute
declaring a meaning of an earlier Act operates directly by its own force and not merely
as an aid to construction of earlier statute‑‑‑Legislature is competent to incorporate an
earlier Act or certain provisions thereof in a later Act‑‑‑When such is done, then
provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of later Act.

(g) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑ Incorporation of former Act or some of its provisions/clauses into a subsequent Act
either by reference or. reproduction‑‑ ‑Legal effect of such incorporation‑‑‑Repeal or
amendment in former Act‑‑‑Effect on subsequent Act‑‑‑Statute incorporating
provisions of former Act‑‑‑Judging validity of such statute‑‑Criteria.

Incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for sake
of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of earlier Act
into the later. When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by
reference into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become pan and parcel of
later Act as if they had been "bodily transposed into it". If a subsequent Act brings into
itself by reference some of the clauses of former Act, the legal effect of that is to write
those sections into the new Act as if they had been actually written in it with the pen or
printed in it. The result is to constitute the later Act alongwith the incorporated
provision of earlier Act, an independent legislation, which is not modified or repealed
by a modification or repeal of earlier Act.

Where a single section of an Act is reproduced into another statute, then it has to be
read in the sense, which it bore in original Act and from which same was taken. Where
a subsequent Act. incorporated provision of a previous Act, then the borrowed
provision would become an integral and independent pan of subsequent Act and would
be totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in previous Act.

The validity of a statute, which incorporates the provisions of an earlier Act, is to be

judged with reference to powers of Legislature enacting the fresh statute and not with
reference to the powers of Legislature enacting the original legislation.

Principles of Statutory Interpretation Fourth Edition 1988, p.174; N.S. Bindra

Interpretation Statutes Eight Edition 1997, on page 276 and State of Kerala v. M/s.
Attesee Agra Industrial 'trading Corporation AIR 1989 SC 222 rel.

(h) Interpretation of statutes‑

‑‑‑‑ Duty of Court to so construe a statute that no part of same is to be rendered void
and nugatory‑ ‑‑Effect must be given, if possible, to all the words used in statutory
provision, for Legislature is deemed not to waste its words and same should not be
regarded as surplusage ‑‑‑Every Act or part of an Act not to be ignored or treated as
being meaningless, rather same must be construed as having some operating results.

(i) Interpretation of Statutes‑‑‑-

‑‑‑‑Intra vires or ultra vires statutes‑‑‑Presumption and rebuttal ,thereof‑‑ General

presumption is in favour of constitutionality of an enactment‑‑ Burden upon person,
who attacks such presumption, to show that there has been a transgression of
Constitutional principles.

Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited and another v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others
1998 PTD 1804 rel.

(j) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑--

‑‑‑‑ Words used in a statute‑‑‑Presumption of law is that each and every clause of
statute has been inserted for some useful purpose‑ ‑‑Statute must be read as a whole to
ascertain both its intent and general purpose and also the meaning of each part‑‑‑No
word or clause should ordinary be rejected as superfluous‑ Rule of interpretation does
not permit to treat words or clause as redundant, unless reading them in the statute
would lead to absurdity‑‑‑No provisions of Act should be rendered totally ineffective
as a result of interpretation‑‑ Statute is always allowed the privilege of using words not
absolutely necessary.

Income Tax Commissioner v. Pemsel 1891 AC 532 and Auchterader of Presbytery v.

Lord Kinnoull 6 CL & F 646, 686 rel.

M. L Shahani for Petitioners (in C. P. No. D‑1574 of 2001).

Farough Naseem for Petitioners (in C.P. No.D‑2024 of 2001).

Syed Zaki Muhammad Dy. A.‑G. for Respondents.

Javed Altaf for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 15th February, 2002.

JUDGMENT

SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J.‑‑‑In Constitutional Petition No. D‑1574 of 2001,

the petitioners have sought the following reliefs:‑‑

(i) ...... that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to declare and hold that the Order
No.6 of 2001, dated 5th July, 2001 have been passed without any lawful
authority and competence, therefore, nullity in the eyes of law and the
Constitution not capable of conferring any authority on any functionary
including the President and Chief Executive, therefore, un‑Constitutional and
quash the same.

(ii) Declare that the respondent No.3 cannot exercise the powers under the impugned
Legislation No.6 of 2001, could not be the basis of the impugned Rules and
orders at Annexures F, G, H, I, J and K respectively and declare them to be
unlawful and quash the same. In particular hold that the agreement could not be
suspended nor the unilateral rules could be imposed by the President and Chief
Executive and quash rules dated 17‑7‑2001.

(iii) Suspend the operation of the impugned orders and Rules pending disposal of the
main petition as per attached application.

(iv) Award costs.

(v) Any other relief as the circumstances may warrant and this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit."

In Constitutional Petition No. D‑2024 of 2001, the petitioners have sought the
following reliefs:

"(i) hold and declare that the impugned Order No.6 of 2001, dated 5th July, 2001 has
been. passed without authority and competence is nullity in law; not
enforceable, un‑Constitutional, in capable of conferring any authority on the
respondent No.3 management or for that matter on any other functionary and,
therefore. the same may be quashed.

(ii) hold and declare that the impugned actions taken by the respondent No.4 after the
promulgation and pursuant to the impugned Order No.6 of 2001 in the shape of
 admin, Order, Rules, Circulars, etc. (Annexures A/9 to A/11) and may be
pleased to strike down and quash the same.

(iii) hold and declared that the terms and conditions of employment and work settled
through Collective Bargaining Agreements could not be altered to the
disadvantage of the workers unilaterally and that the terms prevailing on 5th
July, 2001 continue.

(iv) suspend the operation of the impugned Orders, Circulars and Rules pending
disposal of the petitioner application.

(v) award costs.

(vi) any other relief as may be deemed. fit for proper in the. circumstances of the case."

Both the aforesaid petitioners are the trade unions of workers employed in the
establishment of M/s Pakistan International Airlin Corporation (hereinafter referred to
as "PIAC"). Petitioner Airleague of PIA Employees Union is the present Collective
Bargaining Agent in the establishment of PIAC. Petitioner Peoples Unity of PIA
Employees was the Collective Bargaining Agent in the establishment of PIAC until
1‑10‑1997 Both the petitioners in their respective petitions submitted that in view of
the concluded agreements relating to the terms and conditions of service and work the
office‑bearers of Collective Bargaining Agent union were exempted from duties and
were also granted other facilitates' like provisions of vehicles, fuel, driver, telephone at
the union office and residences and passage for free travel. The petitioners further
submitted that on 12‑10‑1999 the elected Government was ousted and the Chief of the
Army Staff after dismissing the Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies assumed the
powers by taking over the administration of the country as Chief Executive and in
violation of the mandate given by the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Zafar Ali
Shah and others v. General Pervaz Musharraf. Chief Executive of Pakistan and others.
reported in PLD 2000 SC 869 assumed the office of the President of Pakistan. The
petitioner further submitted that on 5‑7‑2001 the President of Pakistan promulgated
Chief 'Executive Order No.6 of 2001 suspending the activities of the union in PIAC as
well as the agreement arrived at between the union and PIAC. It was further submitted
that the aforesaid order also contained a provisions for removal or retirement of the
employees of PIAC in contravention of the Administrative Manual. The petitioners
further submitted that as a result of the impugned Order No.6 of 2001 the management
of PIAC started capitalizing thereupon and withdrew the facilities which were
conferred on the office‑bearers of the union and unilaterally changed their terms and
conditions of service to their disadvantage, increased the number of working hours,
reduced the rest hours, allowances and ordered reassessment of suitable cabin crew. It
was further submitted that such actions were not being taken in good faith and with
honest intention but the object thereof was to ground all those who were not liked by
the management. The petitioners further submitted that Chief Executive Order No.6 of
2001 was also discriminatory as it only suspended the activities of the petitioners
unions in PIAC in Pakistan whereas the trade unions and the Collective Bargaining
Agents formed in the, foreign airlines operating in Pakistan as well as the trade unions
operating in the establishment of PIAC in foreign countries were not suspended which
amounted to victimization of the office‑bearers of the petitioner unions. The petitioners
further submitted that as there was no other alternative adequate and efficacious
remedy available to the petitioners for their grievance, they approached this Court
under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

Comments/objections were filed by the respondents Federation of Pakistan and PIAC.

In the comments filed on behalf of respondent Federation of Pakistan objections were
raised with regard to the maintainability of the Constitutional petitions on the ground
that no process could be issued against the President of Pakistan or the Chief Executive
under Article 248 of the Constitution. The maintainability was also objected on the
ground that it was barred by the Proclamation of Emergency dated 14‑10‑1999, the
Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999 (thereinafter referred to as "PCO") as
amended from time to time and Chief Executive Order No.6 of 2001. The contention
that the impugned order was in violation of the mandate given by the Supreme Court in
the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief
Executive of Pakistan and others, (supra) was vehemently denied and it was submitted
that the Supreme Court while validating over throw of the elected Government and
taking over the reins of Government by President and Chief Executive, 'empowered
President and Chief Executive to exercise the powers and perform the functions as
enumerated in clauses (1) to (18) of at pages 1219 to 1223 of the cited case and the
powers specified in clause 6(i)(a), (b), (c), 67(iv) and (v) fully empowered and
authorised President and Chief Executive to pass an order in the nature of Order No.6
of 2001. Factually it was submitted that petitioners in their capacity as the sole
Collective Bargaining Agent/trade union had caused unwarranted and wasteful
expenditure of Rs.9,69,13,105 from 1‑10‑1997 to 6‑7‑2001 which was a staggering
loss to the national airline which had virtually crippled the airline as its financial state
stood reined, which ultimately effected‑ the working of the airline resulting not only in
further financial loss to the airline of the contrary but also depriving the citizens of the
country proper travelling facilities and handling cargo. It was further submitted that
suspension of trade union of PIAC was in public interest reasonable and for advancing
public good of maintaining smooth communication and good order for running the
airline within and outside Pakistan and to prevent hardship to the public.

Respondent PIAC also filed written reply wherein they also raised preliminary
objections with regard to the maintainability of the Constitutional petitions. The first
such objection was that the petitioners had tiled the aforesaid Constitutional petitions
for protecting and safeguarding the terms and conditions of the employees in the
establishment of PIAC. who were civil servants in view of section 2‑A of the Service
Tribunals Act, and Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
barred invocation of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution as
their remedy lay before the Federal Service Tribunal. The petitions were also objected
on the ground that they involved resolution of disputed questions of facts which could
not be made the subject‑matter of a Constitutional petition and further that they were
filed with mala fide intention with a view to enforce the rights, privileges and
entitlements which were not sanctioned by law. On facts PIAC admitted that the
office‑bearers of union had been exempted from duties and were also provided other
facilities but submitted that these privileges were extended under great pressure
coercion and duress of the petitioners unions. It was further submitted that even
otherwise these facilities which consisted of travel hotel accommodation, vehicles, fuel
and telephone at union offices were provided for legitimate use but the same were
misused and abused which was a sourse of huge financial loss of PIAC. It was further
submitted that in view of derogatory financial position of PIAC the only solution was
to cancel the privileges as they were neither the requirement of law nor had any legal
sanction but were made available due to political pressure, coercion and duress from
1988 onwards. It was further submitted on behalf of PIAC that the Supreme Court in
the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervaz Musharraf Chief
Executive of Pakistan and others (supra) held that the fundamental rights contained in
Article 17 would continue but their continuance was not to cause hindrance in the
working of the Government. It was further submitted that the order was bona tide as
PIAC was facing considerable problem due to manufacturing and mismanagement
requiring serious action to make it fully viable. Further that if the relevant action had
not been taken, PIAC would have been in total disarray being its management to resort
to wide scale retrenchment and downsizing to make operative which would cause
injury and harm to a large number employees. It was also denied that Order No.6 of
2001 was violative Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 24 of the Constitution as the
judgment in the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf
Ch Executive of Pakistan and others, (supra) authorised President and Chi Executive to
make any law notwithstanding the provisions of the aforesaid Articles. It was also
denied that the said order was discriminatory and invalid in view of Article 25 of the
Constitution as it did not suspend the working of the trade unions either in the
establishment of the foreign airlines operating in Pakistan or in the establishment of
PIAC in foreign countries inasmuch as the trade unions/Collective Bargaining Agents
in the foreign airlines or in the establishment of PIAC in the foreign countries were not
causing obstacles, hazards, financial loss, mismanagement, misuse and abuse of the
benefits and privileges in the working of PIAC and the other airlines:

The petitioners had tiled rejoinder/further reply to the written reply filed by
respondents Federation of Pakistan and PIAC, wherein they had denied the stand taken
by the respondents and had reiterated the facts stated by them in their petitions.

The petitions came up for hearing on 19‑9‑2001 when it was decided by the learned
counsel for the parties that both the petitions would be heard and disposed of on merits
at Katcha Peshi stage. We have heard the arguments of Mr. M.L. Shahani the learned
counsel for petitioner Airleague of PIA Employees Union in C.P. No.D‑1574 of 2001.
Mr. Farogh Naseem the learned counsel for petitioner Peoples Unity of PIA Employees
in Cl. No.D‑2024 of 2001 Mr. Javed Altaf the learned counsel for PIAC and Mr. Syed
Zaki Muhammad, the learned Dy. A.‑G., who appeared on behalf of the Federation of
Pakistan:

Mr. M.L. Shahani appearing on behalf of petitioner Airleague of PIA Employees

Union assailed Order No.6 of 2001 on the following grounds:

(1) that it was ultra vires of Article 17 of the Constitution:

(2) that it was against the declared objectives and the authority given by the Supreme
Court to President and Chief Executive by its judgment in the case of Syed Zafar Ali
Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan and others.
(supra):

(3) that it was discriminatory thereby violating Article 25 of the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan;

(4) that it was redundant as it contained provision for situations/actions for which
provisions already existed in other laws/regulations.

(5) that it was in derogation of the Constitution of the Islamic .Republic of Pakistan as
fundamental rights even if suspended could not be violated; and

(6) that it could not suspend agreements/contractual obligations mutually arrived at by

the contracting parties in view of Article 2A of the Constitution.

In support of his above contentions he placed reliance on the cases of (i) Syed Zafar
Ali Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive of Pakistan and
others (supra): (2) Mohatrama Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan, reported in
PLD 1998 SC 388; (3) Civil Aviation Authority, Islamabad and others v. Union of
Civil Aviation Employees and another, reported in PLD 1997 SC 781; and (5) Madan
Mohan Pathak and another v. Union of India and others, reported in (1978) 2 SCC 50.

Mr. Farogh Naseem, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Peoples Unity of
PIA Employees in C.P. No.D‑2024 of 2001 adopted the arguments of Mr. M.L.
Shahani and submitted following further arguments.

(1) That the decision of the petition required interpretation of Article 17 of the
Constitution needing the enquiry as .to whether the impugned order was in accordance
with the provisions and requirements of the said Article 17 and the judgment in the
case of reported in Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another reported in
PLD 1988 SC 416; and

(2) that suspension of agreement/contractual obligations arrived at between the parties

was violative of Article 2A of the Constitution.

Mr. Javed Altaf, the learned counsel for the PIAC vehemently refuted the arguments
advanced by the leaned counsel for the petitioners and supported the impugned Order
No.6 of 2001 on the following grounds:

(1) that the order was in pursuance of the authority and power given by the Supreme
Court to President and Chief Executive in its judgments in the case of Syed Zafar Ali
Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive of Pakistan and others
(supra) detailed in 6(i)(a) (b) and (c):

(2) that the Constitution had empowered, the Parliament to suspend fundamental rights
during emergency period:

(3) that the order was not violative of Article 25 of the Constitution as the existence of
trade unions and the activities of the trade unions in PIAC office in foreign countries,
were to a very limited extent and were not detrimental to the welfare smooth working
and profit earning by the PIAC:

(4) that the orders of suspension of the trade unions and subsequent order suspending
the agreements/contractual obligations arrived at between the petitioners unions and
the establishment of PIAC were not violative of Articles 2A and 17 inasmuch as all
such agreements/contracts were not voluntary or due to freewill by were on account of
illegal pressure coercion duress and brute force used by the trade unions forcing the
establishment of PIAC to surrender to their illegal and lawful demands.

Mr. Javed Altaf in support of his first arguments relied upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah and other v. General Pervez
Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan and others, (supra). With regard to his
contention at Serial Nos. 3 and the elaborated that after 1988 the trade
unions/Collective Bargaining Agents in the establishment of PIAC were having the
support and backing of the Governments in power as a result of which they had
assumed the role of pressure groups who were always at war with establishment of
PIAC and threatened to create hindrances obstacles and hazardous in the smooth
working of PIAC if the demands put by them for their members relating to provisions
of facilities and benefits over and above the facilities and benefits provided to the
members and office‑bearers by the labour laws to the nature already mentioned above
were not provided to them. He further submitted that in view of such backing and
support the establishment. PIAC had no alternate but to concede to the illegal and
unlawful demands put forward by the petitioners unions granting the office‑bearers and
members benefits, facilities and advantages to which they were not legally entitled,
which resulted in colossal and enormous financial burden and drain on PIAC virtually
bringing it to financially ruination. He further submitted that such agreements/contracts
could not be said to have been arrived at with free consent and will of the
establishment of PIAC and could not by any stretch of imagination be considered to be
legal, valid and in accordance with law so as to be protected by Article 2A of the
Constitution.

Mr. Syed Zaki Muhammad, the learned Dy. A‑G. while adopting the arguments of Mr.
Javed Altaf drew out attention to paras. 7 and 10 of the comments filed by PIAC. He
further submitted that the Supreme Court in the case tit Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others
v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive of Pakistan and others, (supra) had given
wide powers to the President and Chief Executive to perform all such acts and
promulgate all legislative measures in respect of the following matters:
(a) All acts or legislative measures which are in accordance with, of could have been
made under the 1973 Constitution, including the power to amend it;

(b) All acts which tend to advance or promote the good of the people:

(c) All acts required to be done for the ordinary orderly running of the State: and

(d) All such treasures as would establish or lead to the establishment of the declared
objectives of the Chief Executive.

He further submitted that in the same judgment the Supreme Court while holding that
the fundamental rights provided in Part‑II. Chapter I of the Constitution would
continue to hold the field empowered the Chief Executive/State to make any law or to
take any executive action in deviation of Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 24 and further
that these acts or legislative measures were to be performed and carried out by means
of orders issued by the Chief Executive or through Ordinances on his advice. Mr. Syed
Zaki Muhammad further submitted that in view of the above provisions the President
and Chief Executive had absolute authority to take any action qtr promulgate any
legislative measures which in his opinion was necessary for achieving the goals
enumerated above and the declared objectives.

Elaborating their arguments the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners
submitted that it was not denied that the President and Chief Executive could exercise
legislative power which authority or power was not challenged as they conceded that
in the absence of Parliament he was exercising powers of the Parliament and in such
capacity was entitled and authorised to promulgate legislative treasures. Their
contention was that it exercise of his such authority/power he could not promulgate
legislative measures which the Parliament itself did not have the power to legislate and
all such legislative measures were to be promulgated within the framework of the
power available to the Parliament under the Constitution. It was further, submitted that
what could not be enacted or made by the Parliament. President and Chief Executive
could not do the same. According to them Order No.6 of 2001 was derogatory of the
provisions of Constitution as it was violative of the fundamental rights which were
holding the field and further that even if they had been suspended no legislative
measures could be promulgated by violating the fundamental rights. The main thrust of
the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the order
was in derogation of Articles 2A, 17 and 25 of the Constitution. It was described to be
ultra vires of Article 2A of the Constitution by which the objectives resolution had
been made a substantive provisions of the Constitution thus embodying the provision
of the Qur'an and Sunnah in the Constitution. It was submitted that the petitioners had
entered into an agreement with PIAC whereby certain rights and privileges were
allowed or provided by PIAC to the office‑berarers/members of the petitioners and
under Islamic law a contract or agreement entered into between the contracting parties
was a solemn transaction which bound both the parties to observe and fulfil their
respective duties and obligations under such contract or agreement and its
cancellation/suspension unilaterally by one party was only an un-Islamic act but also
violative of Article 2A of the Constitution thus rendering Order No.6 of 2001 as ultra
vires of the Constitution and a nullity fit law. The learned counsel if! support of their
aforesaid contention had placed reliance on the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others
v. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistani and others, (supra).

Another ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that Articles 3 and
4 Order No.6 of 2001 were redundant as provisions for dealing with the matters and
situations to which they related already existed in the Industrial and Commercial
Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Ordinance of 1968) and the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred
to as "the I.R.O.") respectively.
It was further submitted that both the petitioners were trade unions duly registered
under the I.R.O. in accordance with the provisions relating to formation of trade union
and could only he cancelled suspended or removed in accordance with the provisions
contained in the I.R.O. for cancellation of the registration and further that when the
lava had provided a mode for cancellation of registration of a trade union then neither
any legislative measure therefore was required for authorising the President and Chief
Executive to suspend the activities of the trade union nor its activities could be
suspended in a manner other that the manner provided in the I.R.O. In support of the
above reliance was placed on the case of Civil Aviation Authority Islamabad and
others v. Union of Civil Aviation Employees and another reported in PLD 1997 SC
781.

For resolving the issue/question as to whether Order No.6 of 2001 by the President and
Chief Executive of Pakistan could have been validly made by him or was ultra vires of
the Constitution or contrary to the authority and, powers conferred can him by the
Supreme Court, it will be necessary to examine the provisions of the P.C.O. and the
pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah and
others v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive of Pakistan and others (supra).
The relevant provision of the P.C.O. for this purpose is Article 2(3) and it will be
necessary to reproduce the same, which is as under:‑

"(3) The Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution, not
in conflict with the Proclamation of Emergency or any Order made thereunder from
time to time shall continue to be in force."

Article 6 of the P.C.O. is also material for decision of this issue and it is reproduced as
under:‑‑

"The Proclamation of Emergency issued on 28th day of May, 1998, shall continue but
subject to the provisions of Proclamation of Emergency, dated 14th day of October.
1999 and this Provisional Constitution Order and any other Order made thereunder."

The Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v.
General Pervez Musharraf. Chief Executive of Pakistan and others, (supra) while
validating the intervention by the Armed Forces on 12th day of October, 1999 through
an extra‑Constitutional measures held that General Pervez Musharraf, Chairman. Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief o: Army Staff had validly assumed the powers by
means of an extra Constitutional step by the aforementioned Proclamation of
Emergency dated 14‑10‑1999 followed by the P.C.O. No. 1 of 1999. He was authorised
to perform acts and promulgate legislative measures as under:‑‑

(a) All acts or legislative measures which are in accordance with, or could have been
made under the 1973 Constitution, including the power to amend it;

(b) All acts which end to advance or promote the good of the people;

(c) All acts required to be done for the ordinary orderly running of the State: and

(d) All such measures as would establish or lead to the establishment of the declared
objectives of the Chief Executive.

The Supreme Court further pronounced that the fundamental rights provided in Part II
Chapter I of the Constitution would continue to hold the Held but nevertheless
authorised the State/Chief Executive to make any law or take any executive action in
deviation of Articles 15, 16. 17, 18, 19 and 24 of the Constitution as contemplated by
Article 233(1) of the Constitution keeping in view the language of Articles 10, 23 and
25 thereof.
The petitioners have not challenged the authority of President and Chief Executive to
promulgate legislative measures in view of suspension of the National Assembly and
the Senate and the subsequent dissolution thereof. File powers of 'Parliament were
exercisable by the President and Chief Executive. It is the case of the petitioners that
Order No.6 of 2001 was in excess of the authority that vested in President and Chief
Executive to take any action or enact legislative measures, Notwithstanding the
abeyance of the provisions of the Constitution the country was subject to the P.C.O.
and any other orders made by Chief Executive to be governed as nearly as may be, in
accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the case of Syed Zafar Ali
Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan and others.
(supra) had authorised the Chief Executive to take all acts and promulgate all
legislative measures which were in accordance with or could have been made under
the 1973 Constitution, including power to amend it Besides, the Supreme Court also
authorised/empowered the Chief Executive to perform all acts and promulgate all
legislative measures which had the effect of advancing or promoting the good of the
people; for the ordinary orderly running of the State and for establishing or leading to
the establishment of the declared objectives of the Chief Executive. The Supreme
Court also observed that fundamental rights provided in Part II. Chapter I of the
Constitution would continue to hold the field but the State/Chief Executive would be
authorised to make any law or take any executive action in deviation of Articles 15, 16,
17, 18, 19 and 24 of the Constitution. Article 21 of the P.C.O. read with clauses 6(i)(a),
(b), (c) and 6(iv) to have given authority or power to President and Chief Executive to
take all 'actions and promulgate all legislative measures which in his opinion were
necessary for advancement or promotion of the good of the people, for the ordinary
orderly running of the State and for establishment or leading to the establishment of the
declared objectives. PIAC is an establishment which was established by the
Government and is being controlled, managed and run by the Federal Government. It
is one of the most' important organizations/establishment in the country as it is the
national flag carrier and is operating flights throughout the country. The performance
and working of PIAC is also linked with the advancement or promotion of the good of
the people as it provides travel facilities to a very large number of people of the
country who have to undertake travel within the outside the country on official tours,
Business and trade purposes education and transportation of huge volume of cargo in
and out of the country and if the performance and the working of PIAC is not efficient,
satisfactory and up to the mark then the people of the country would suffer adversely.
There cannot be any dispute with the contention that PIAC is not part of the
Government in the sense as a ministry division or department of the Government but
nevertheless it is an establishment controlled, managed and run by the Federal
Government and its ordinary orderly running would reflect on the overall orderly
running/performance of the Government. Poor performance or working of PIAC would
not only result in depriving the people of the country to avail facilities of travelling and
transportation of cargo but would also place the entire establishment in the peril of
disintegration resulting in loss of employment to thousands of its employees, putting
great financial burden on Government, sending massages to the entire world of
malfunctioning and inefficiency within Pakistan. Such events would have very adverse
and undesirable affects on the financial and economy advancement of the country
which is the cherished goal of the Government. Such would also have very undesirable
and adverse affects on the working of other Government controlled establishments
would bring pessimism and frustration in a large number of people.

The reasons for inefficient unsatisfactory and poor performance of PIAC were said to
be the obstacles, hurdles and problems created by the petitioners unions as well as
malfunctioning mismanagement, inefficiency and corruption by officers/employees
inducted on political basis without having the requisite qualifications. These factors
joined together entailed financial drains on account of the expenditure on uncalled for
an illegal facilities obtained by the petitioners unions for their office‑bearers by way of
harassment coercion and influence exerted by it on the PIAC management on account
of their links with the political Governments of the past. It was submitted that both the
petitioners unions were linked to one or the other Governments of the past and in
that‑capacity they brought enormous pressure and influence on the management in the
appointments, transfers and posting and also got for themselves benefits facilities and
privileges which the office‑bearers or the members of the trade unions would not be
entitled to under the law resulting in heavy drain on the finances of the PIAC and it
was virtually on the brink of disaster. Extreme remedial measures were required to
make PIAC to continue its operations which besides providing financial assistance
required appropriate action for controlling and ultimately bringing and end to the
wasteful expenditure being incurred on the benefits facilities and provisions obtained
by the office‑bearers of the aforesaid two unions by way of coercion, influence and
pressure tactics and removal of the inefficient, incompetent and corrupt
officers/employees. This was the situation which forced the President and Chief
Executive to make Order No.6 of 2001. The said order cannot be said to be in excess
of his powers of in view of the provisions of the Proclamation of Emergency, the
P.C.O. and the authority/powers exercisable by him in pursuance of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervez
Musharraf, Chief. Executive of Pakistan and others, (supra), The contention that the
same was illegal and void as had the Parliament being in existence such
orders/legislative measures could not have been promulgated by the Parliament does
not hold good as the Parliament being the supreme law making authority had vast
powers to enact any law and to amend modify, annul or repeal any law. The Supreme
Court in the case of Haider Automobile Ltd. v. Pakistan reported in PLD 1969 SC 623
pronounced that Legislature was competent to legislate retrospectively and
retroactively and take away a vested right by express words or necessary intendment. It
was further observed that the Courts would not hold such a legislation as ineffective
and strike down the same. The Supreme Court further declared that to strike down a
law as being opposed to a Constitutional provisions one would have to establish
specifically the violation of the Constitutional provision in absence whereof it could
not be said that the law was bad merely because it violated some principle of justice
and fair play. In the case of The Punjab Province v. Malik Khizar Hayat Khan (PLD
1956 FC 200) the Federal Court pronounced that it was not for the Courts to question
the motives or policy of the Legislature or to refuse to give effect to legislation merely
because it appeared to be harsh or unreasonable or vindictive. Order No.6 of 2001 did
not amend/modify, supersede or repeal any law nor the provisions thereof are
contradictory or violative of the provisions of Constitution, the I.R.O. Service
Tribunals Act and the Ordinance of 1968, as was submitted by the learned counsel for
the petitioners. This observation is based on the authority/power which has been
conferred/vested in him by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Syed Zafar Ali Shah
and others v. General Pervez Musharraf. Chief Executive of Pakistan and others,
(supra) to take all actions and promulgate legislative measures in deviation of Articles
15, 16, 7, 18, 19 and 24 of the Constitution as contemplated by Article 233(1) of the
Constitution and Articles 2(3) and 6 of the P.C.O. which have been reproduced herein
above.

The contention that the order was discriminatory and was violative of Article 25 of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the ground that the trade unions
established in the foreign airlines having their offices in Pakistan as well as the trade
unions established in the offices of PIAC abroad were not suspended and were carrying
on their functions and business in accordance with the provisions of the I.R.O. is also
without any force as Article 25 permits the reasonable discrimination. It guarantees
equal protection of the laws which means that all persons shall be treated alike under
like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. It does not means that all citizens shall be treated alike under all set of
circumstances and conditions, both in respect of privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed. By the expression "equal protection of law" it is envisaged that no person or
class of person's would be denied the same protection of law which is enjoyed by
person or class of persons placed in like circumstances in respect of their life. Liberty,
property is pursuit of happiness. This expression does not provide that every citizen is
to be treated alike in all circumstances and permits of reasonable classification founded
on reasonable distinction or basis. If any authority is required to support or the above
proposition, the same is available in the Full Bench judgment in the case of Pakistan
Burmah Shell Limited and another v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others, reported in
1998 PTD 1804. It now requires examination whether the petitioners unions and the
unions operating in PIAC offices abroad and the foreign airlines in Pakistan were
placed in similar alike circumstances and conditions. The office‑bearers of the trade
unions operating in foreign airlines having their offices in Pakistan and the trade
unions operating in the offices of PIAC as well as the offices and employees abroad
did not indulge in the acts of omissions and commission leading to malfunctioning,
mismanagement and hindrance in the smooth running and functioning causing colossal
financial losses in the PIAC offices abroad as well as in the offices of foreign airlines
operating in Pakistan as was being done by the office‑bearers of the petitioners unions,
officers and employees in the PIAC establishment in Pakistan nor were they creating
obstacles, hurdles and problems in the smooth and ordinary orderly running and
functioning of PIAC as a result of which it was not found necessary to include the
trade unions operating in the establishment of foreign airlines and in the establishment
of PIAC abroad in Order No.6 of 2001.

Relative to suspension of petitioners unions activities guaranteed by Article 17 it was

submitted that for an action for suspending any of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the aforesaid Article it was necessary that there was state of emergency in the
country which was a condition precedent or tie impugned action/order which required
a Proclamation of Emergency by the President and Chief Executive but the same was
admittedly not in existence, thereby rendering Order No.6 of 2001 void to the extent of
,suspension of unions operation. Such contention is devoid of any force in view of
Article 6 of the P.C.O. whereby Proclamation of Emergency issued on 28‑5‑1998 was
continued and was to remain in force. Provision of Article 6 of the P.C.O. is sufficient
to hold that the country was in a state of emergency at the time when Order No.6 of
2001 was trade by the President and Chief Executive.

It was submitted that the Order was violative of the Article 2A of the Constitution as,
well as the Sharia law as an agreement/contract mutually arrived at between the two
parties was a sacred transaction requiring the contracting parties to perform their
respective duties and obligations thereunder as well as creating rights and privileges
and such duties and obligations as well as rights and privileges could not be brought to
an end or suspended by the Parliament: This contention would have merited
consideration if it had been established that the contracts/agreements arrived at
between PIAC and the petitioners unions were executed mutually as a result of the
freewill and consent of both the parties and that none of the parties had exerted under
pressure influence or coercion for forcing the other party into submission to accept the
demands, benefits and facilities which in the normal course were not available to it. It
was emphatically asserted that the petitioners union during their tenure as the
Collective Bargaining Agents had managed and succeeded in obtaining for their
office‑bearers and the members benefits, facilities and privileges on account of the
abnormal pressure, influence and coercion applied by them on account of the backing
and support by the political Governments in Pakistan at the relevant times and the‑
management of PIAC had no other alternative but to submit to the illegal demands
facilities and benefits made by the petitioners anion. There can be no dispute with
regard to the principle that under the Sharia law agreements entered into between the
parties are to be honoured by the executing parties who would be under an obligation
to perform all acts to give effect to the contract/agreement but such would the case
when it could be established that the agreement/contract was arrived at with freewill of
the contracting; parties without application of pressure, undue influence or coercion by
anyone of the contracting parties so as to force into submission the other party for
agreeing to demands, privileges and benefits which otherwise it would not agree to. In
the circumstances the contention has no force and is rejected.
The contention that Articles' 2 and 4 of Order No.6 of 2001 were redundant, as
appropriate provisions were available in other Statutes for dealing with the situations
enumerated in the aforesaid two Articles is equally without any force. It is within the
authority of the Legislature to amend an earlier Act or to declare its meaning by
eancting a new Act and in doing so it is even competent to so declare a meaning which
is not consistent or is in deviation of the plain language of the earlier Act. According to
the "Principles of Interpretation of Statute" a later statute declaring a meaning of " an
earlier Act operates directly by its own force and not merely as an aid to construction
of the earlier statute. Similarly the Legislature has the authority to incorporate an
earlier Act or certain provisions thereof to a later Act. When such is done then the
provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act. It will be
appropriate to reproduce a passage from the book of Justice (Retd.) G.P. Singh titled
"Principles of Statutory. Interpretation" Fourth Edition 1988, appearing on page 174 as
under:‑‑

"Incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for the
sake of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the
earlier Act into the later. When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are
incorporated by reference into a later Act the provisions so incorporated become part
and parcel of the later Act as if they had been bodily transposed into it. The effect of
incorporation is admirably stated by LORD ESHER, M.R.; It a subsequent Act brings
into itself by reference some of the clauses of former Act, the legal effect of that, as has
often been held, is to write those sections into the new Act as if they had been actually
written in it with the pen, or printed in it. 'The result is to constitute the later Act
alongwith the incorporated provisions of the earlier Act, an independent legislation
which is not modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier Act."

The validity of a statute, which incorporates the provisions of an earlier Act is to be

judged with reference to the powers of the Legislature enacting the fresh statute and
not with reference to the powers of the Legislature enacting the original legislation.
While dealing with the powers of the Presiding and Chief Executive to make Order
No.6 of 2001 it has already been held that he exercised authority and power to take all
actions and promulgate all legislative measures which were necessary for achieving the
declared objectives as well as the goals embodied in clause 6(a), (b) and (c) of the
judgment of Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief
Executive of Pakistan and others, (supra) on pages 1221 and 1222 and authority/power
enumerated in Articles 2 and 4 of Order No.6 of 2001 related to giving effect to the
aforesaid objectives. According to the "Principles of interpretation of Statute" it is the
duty of the Court to so construe a statute that no part of its is to be rendered void and
nugatory and effect must be given, if possible, to all the words used in the statutory
provision for the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words and the same should not
be regarded as surplusage. Every Act or part of an Act is not to be ignored or treated as
being meaningless and it must be construed as having some operating results N.S.
Bindra in his book "Interpretation of Statutes" Eight Edition 1997, on page 276 while
dealing with such a situation wrote that where a single section of an Act was
reproduced into another statute then it was to be read in the sense which it bore in the
original Act and from which was taken. On the same page there was further discussion
that where a subsequent Act incorporated provision of a previous Act, then the
borrowed provisions would become an integral and independent part of the subsequent
Act and would be totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act.
This is based on the pronouncements made by the Supreme Court of India in the case
of State of Kerala v. M/s. Attesee (Agra Industrial Trading Corproation), reported in
AIR 1989 SC 222. In this case the Supreme Court has also enumerated cases where the
aforesaid principle would not be applicable, but the present case does not fall within
the cases enumerated by the Supreme Court of India. In law there is a general
presumption in favour of Constitutionality of the an enactment and the burden is upon
him who attacks to show that there has been a transgression of Constitutional
principles. Reliance for the above is placed on the judgment of a Full Bench of this
Court in the case of Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited and another v. Federation of
Pakistan and 3 others (1998 PTD 1804). According to this rule, the Courts of law have
to Presume that a particular law is intra vires and not ultra vines with further
presumption that the power conferred shall be exercised for the purpose for which it
has been conferred and shall be exercised reasonably. It is also a presumption in law
that each and every clause of the statute has been inserted for some useful purpose,
and, therefore, the instruments must be read as a whole to ascertain both its intent and
general purpose and also the meaning of each part and no word or clause should
ordinarily be rejected as superfluous. The rule of interpretation does not permit to treat
words or clause as redundant unless reading them in the statute would lead to asburdity
and the general rule is that no provision of the Act should be rendered totally
ineffective as a result of interpretation. It sometime happens that the Legislature may
insert provision in statute merely by way of abundant caution and an Act of Parliament
may be found to contain exceptions, which were already covered by a general
exceptional in another statute as was observed in the case of Income Tax
Commissioner v. Pemsel, reported in 1891 AC 532. Such a situation was amply
discussed by. Lord Brougham in the case of Auchterader of Presbytery v. Lord
Kinnoull (6 Cl & F 646. 686) as under:

"A statute is always allowed the privilege of using words not absolutely necessary."

By way of analogy it could be said that inserting a provision relating to declaration of

employees or respondent PIAC as civil servants, empowering the officers of PIAC to
dismiss, remove, retire, and to suspend the trade union activities were inserted in Order
No.6 of 2001 as an precautionary measure. Articles 2 and 4 of Order No.6 of 2001
cannot be said to be redundant or surplusage, which should be considered as integrat
part of the Order and are to be given the meanings which appear from plain reading
thereof.

The learned counsel for the petitioners had placed reliance on the cases of; (i) Syed
Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive of Pakistan
and others (supra) and (ii) Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another
reported in PLD 1988 SC 416 in support of their contention that President and Chief
Executive had exceeded the authority allowed to him by the Supreme Court in taking
any action or promulgate legislative measures. However, they were not able to refer to
any part of the judgments on the basis of which it could be held that Order No. 6 of
2001 was in excess of the authority exercisable by President and Chief Executive. As a
matter of fact Order No.6 of 2001 was in exercise of the power/authority conferred by
the Supreme Court in the clauses paragraphs referred to above in the case of Syed
Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive of Pakistan
and others (supra) as well as such authority would also be derivable from the P.C.O.

Reliance was also placed on the cases of Civil Aviation Authority Islamabad and others
v. Union of Civil Aviation Employees and others reported in PLD 1997 SC 781 in
support of the contention that the right of' formation of a trade union was a statutory
right provided to the workers in accordance with the provisions of' the I.R.O., which
also provided for cancellation/suspension of a registered trade union and could not be
resorted to by a mode other than the one provided in the I.R.O. and further that the
same was also violative of Article 17 of the Constitution. From a perusal of the afore-
cited case we are not able to find any observation to the above effect and the Supreme
Court held that the effect of exclusion of application of the provisions of I.R.O. to the
Civil Aviation Authority and Pakistan Television Corporation was that there was no
other statute available under which the employees of either of above two
establishments could get their unions registered or could agitate their grievance
through an orderly mechanism. It was further pronounced that Article 17(1) of the
Constitution could not be effectively invoked for the purpose of formation and
operation of a union. Reliance was also placed on this case as well as on the case of
Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another, reported in PLD 1988 SC 416 by
Mr. Farogh Nasim in support of his contention that reasonable restrictions on his
contention that reasonable restrictions on the formation/working of a trade union could
be imposed only if it was established that non‑imposition thereof would be harmful to
the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality. The pronouncements
made in the aforecited case are not applicable to the facts of this case as in the present
case as the President and Chief Executive had full authority/power to pass an order in
deviation of Article 17 of the Constitution as has been held hereinabove. Therefore, the
Observations and pronouncements made in the aforecited two cases, would nave no
application to the facts of this case.

For the foregoing reasons and discussion there is no doubt that these Constitutional
petitions are without any force and do not merit consideration.

On behalf of respondents objections were raised with regard to the maintainability of

the aforesaid Constitutional petitions on the ground that the petitioners in effect have
approached this Court for revival of the benefits/facilities and demands embodied in
the contracts/agreements entered into between the unions and the managements of
PIAC which related basically to the terms and conditions of service of the
office‑bearers of the two unions thus attracting the bar contained in Article 212 in the
Constitution and the petitioners were prudence from invoking the jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The
respondents also objected to the maintainability of the petitions on the found that the
petitioners unions could not spouse the cause of the office‑bearers by way of a
Constitutional petition in view of the settled principle of law that a party cannot file a
Constitutional petition for spousing the acts of another persons and it would be
necessary that the aggrieved person or persons should themselves resort to the filing of
a Constitutional petition. However, in view of the conclusion arrived at that these
Constitutional petitions are found to be without any substance and force, we do not
propose to deal with the aforesaid objections.

Upon the above discussion both the Constitutional petitions stand, dismissed alongwith
the C.M.As. with no orders as to costs.

S.A.K./A‑364/L Petitions dismissed.

;