PoliLaw2, RAM notesVIP

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
VOLUME III
Based on the outline of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
1996 Revised Edition
_______________
Compiled by Jose Salvador Y. Mirasol
Updated by UP Law Batch 1995
Updated and Enlarged by:
Rodell A. Molina
Case Digests by:
Ma. Glynda Bathan o Ma. Rosario Bernardo

Ma. Christine Falguera o Louella Ira
Suzette Legislador
UP LAW BATCH 1996

_______________
"To the succeeding batches of the UP College of Law upon whose shoulders
will fall the task of updating this work in the years to come."
--RAM
_______________
PART TWO
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS
LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW VOLUME III
Updated and Enlarged by UP College of Law Batch 1996
Glynda, Charo, Tin-tin, Bam, Suzette and RAM
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 502-562 (2d ed., 1977.)
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the

Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, notably
the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the
exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect individual rights.
The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do
to the individual.
A. Due process - Procedural and Substantive
Civil Procedural Due Process
In civil cases, the SC laid down its elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v.
Palanca:
a. Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant
c. Judgement rendered according to law.
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)
Criminal Due Process
In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People:
a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must answer.
b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after
the defendant was heard.
If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is

guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by
the accused regardless of the time that lapsed.
c. Judgment according to law
d. Tribunal with jurisdiction
Administrative Due Process
PAGE 2
In administrative proceedings, the elements were laid down in the case of Ang Tibay
v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary rights" in justiciable cases before administrative
tribunals:
a. There must be a hearing, where a party may present evidence in support of his
case.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by a party.
c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide the case correctly, its decision must be
supported by evidence.
d. The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial. Substantial evidence is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
e. The evidence must have been presented at the hearing or at least contained in the
record and known to the parties affected.
f. The tribunal must rely on its own independent consideration of evidence, and not
rely on the recommendation of a subordinate.
g. The decision must state the facts and the law in such a way that the parties can
know the issues involved and the reasons for the decision.
Substantive Due Process
Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 S 27 (1985)
F: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the
Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders,
proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend, among
others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.
HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date
of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its
publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable
to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia
legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
PAGE 3
the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is
needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be
bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. RAM.
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 S 446 (1986). Motion for reconsideration. xxx [T]he clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, w/c cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, w/o its previous
publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed w/
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
Conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law.-- The conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to
have any legal justification at all.
The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative
of Pres. Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.
RULE: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, w/c shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Coverage.-- Covered by this rule are PDs and EOs promulgated by the Pres. in the
exercise of legislative powers. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e., regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of the PD, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts, the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the OG
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. RAM.
Notes: In the original case, the SC ruled that as a matter of substantive due process, any
law must be published before the people can be expected to observe them. But, according to a
split decision, publication need not be made in the Official Gazette. It is enough that it be
published in a newspaper of general circulation.
After the EDSA revolution, upon the reconstitution of the SC, the original
judgment was reconsidered, and the SC now ruled that publication must be made in the
Official Gazette, pursuant to CA 638 and the Civil Code, unless a law "provides otherwise"
that is, a different mode of publication.
What must be published are (1) all laws of general application, and even those not of
general application like (2) private laws affecting only particular individuals, e.g., legislative
PAGE 4
grant of citizenship, (3) laws of local application, and (4) rules and regulations of a
substantive character. This means not only the title but the entire law. When? Forthwith, that
is, immediately. Where? Only in the Official Gazette. (See discussion under Administrative
Law)
In his concurring opinion, Justice Feliciano noted that even if a statute or decree states
that it shall take effect "immediately upon approval", this should be construed to mean
"immediately upon publication"; otherwise, a literal interpretation would render the law
unconstitutional. For the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in Art. 2 of the Civil Code
refers not to the necessity of publication (which is constitutionally mandated by the due process
clause and therefore cannot be provided otherwise by a mere law) but to the effectivity of the
law. The general rule is that the law will take effect 15 days after its in the Official Gazette
(pursuant to CA 638 and the Civil Code). The law, however, may "provide otherwise", e.g.
(i) immediately, which means immediately upon publication, or (ii) one year after publication,
like the Family Code.
Likewise, he contended that if the law provided for a different mode of publication,
that is, in a newspaper of general circulation, then the requirements of due process would have
been satisfied.
E.O. 200 took the cue and amended Art. 2 of the Civil Code: Laws take effect 15
days after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless
otherwise provided by law.
Executive Order No. 200, June 18, 1987
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR

IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY.
WHEREAS, Art. 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided xxx;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the
Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court
in Tanada v. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. 63915, Deceber 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to
be said of the view that publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic
release and limited readership;"
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly;" and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Art. 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly
be amended so that laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Section 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided.
PAGE 5
Section 2. Art. 2 of the Republic Act 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Section 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the
Official Gazatte.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nine hundred
and eithty-seven.
So the state of the law at the present is as follows:
1. Laws must be published as a requirement of substantive due process.
2. These laws include (a) laws of general application, (b) private laws, (c) laws
of local application, (d) rules and regulations of administrative agencies of a
substantive character, and (e) circulars that carry penalty for their violation.
3. The publication can be made in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of

general circulation.
4. The law shall take effect 15 days after publication, unless it provide otherwise,
which could be anytime after publication (e.g. immediately, or one year or any other time).?
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate
to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the consitutionality of
the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of
the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this
petition for review.
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of
lower courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can
pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there
at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the
EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident
depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed any
where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the
animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing
their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit
their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos
PAGE 6
when ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The measures struck him at
once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him
elementary fair play.
(4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase may see fit is an
extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution. VV.
Montemayor v. Araneta University, 77 SCRA 321 (1977)
Lack of Due Process in Termination of Employment Remedied by Hearing in the NLRC.
F: Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was found guilty
of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investating committee. On
11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature against
petitioner. Petitioner, through cousel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19,
1974, but the w/c motion was denied. The committe then proceeded to hear the testimony of the
complainants and on 12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the
University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner's
employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages.
Judgement was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found
petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The Consti. assures to workers security of tenure. In the case of petitioner, this
guarantee is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom. In denying petitioner's motion for
postponement of the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due process to the
petitioner. This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference called at the Dept. of Labor
during w/c petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he was given the fullest opportunity to
present his case. Petition dismissed.
Petitioner filed a MFR contending that the hearing in the NLRC did not conform to ther
requirements of due process as the witnesses against petitioner were not called so that petitioner
could cross-examine them.
HELD: Pettioner did not object to the presentation of the testimony of the complainant and the
witnesses at the school investigation and did not assert his right to cross-examine them.
Petitioner waived his right to confront the witnesses, relying solely on the strength of his
evidence. Nor was it incumbent on resp. to present the witnesses in the NLRC. Petitioner's only
right is to be heard. VV.
Tanada v. Phil. Atomic Energy Commission, 141 SCRA 307 (1986)
Bias as Disqualification in Administrative Investigations
PAGE 7
F: Petition for prohibition brought by taxpayers, questioning the competence of members of the
PAEC to pass judgment on the safety of the Bataan Power Plant and charging them w/ bias and
prejudgment, based on their publications stating that the plant was safe.
HELD: (1) Where the validity of an appointment is not challenged in an appropriate proceeding,
the question of competence is not w/in the filed of judicial inquiry. The question of competence
is a matter addressed to the appointing power.
(2) In these publications, PAEC clearly indicated its prejudgement that the nuclear plant
is safe. The first was published in 1985. The other 2 were issued earlier, but as the majority of
the PAEC commissioners even then were already occupying responsible positions in the PAEC,
they cannot escape responsibility for these publications.
Petition granted and PAEC restrained from acting in the proceedings for issuance of
license. VV.
BARLONGAY CASE:
In re Letter to Mrs. Maria Coronel, 238 SCRA 619
F: Benito Mapilisan was dismissed by the Supreme Court for dishonestry amounting to gross
misconduct occasioned by the loss, while in his custody, of a registered mail letter, the contents of which
were pilfered, as the P25,000 bank draft contained therein, eventually found its way for encashment with
payee bank, PNB. The contentions of this MFR hinge on the alleged violation of procedural due process
by claiming that there was no formal administrative complaint filed against him by either complainant
Maria Coronel or the CA nor was there a formal investigation conducted. Accroding to him, the letter
complaint of Maria Coronel failed to properly and formally charge the former since the letter complaint
was neither suscribed nor sworn to by the complainant.
ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of procedural due process.
HELD: NO
Under Sec. 6, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. By this power, the Supreme
Court can act on a subject complaint, particularly where , as in this case, an investigation thereon
had already been conducted and concluded by the CA prior to its referral to SC, with the
recommendation that movant be charged with gross negligence. The complaint, though
defective as to form, has been fully substantiated on the basis of the accompanying independent
investigation Report and Recommendation submitted to SC. As a matter of fact, the Court even
entertains anonymous complaints where the charge can be fully borne out by the evidence
offered, or continues proceeding with the administrative case despite withdrawal by complainant
of his complaint where an investigation thereto has been made by the Acting Court Administrator
prior to the filing of the complaint. Thus, what is given paramount importance by this Court in
instances where its power of administrative supervision over court employees is invoked is the
substantiation of the complaint rather than its conformity with the formal requirements. Suzette.
B. Due Process and Police Power
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid.
PAGE 8
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of
the energy crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC
(Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, Transportation, issued
memo. providing penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of
registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was
discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps. denied the petitioner's allegations and argued that
the suit amounted to a request for advisory opinion.
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's Kaiser
Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, have
standing to challenge the validity of the LOI.
(2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. It has behind it the presumption of
validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As underlying
the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record overthrowing the statute. The
LOI is an energy conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a problem.
(3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the
petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not include others
does not render it invalid. The govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none."
(4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does not authorize the impounding of
vehicles as a penalty, to that extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires. VV.
Ynot v. IAC, supra.
Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983)
Property Rights Are Subject to the Exercise of Police Power.
F: The petitioners were among 23 stevedoring and arrastre operators at the Mla South Harbor.
Their licenses had expired but they were allowed to continue to operate on the strength of temporary
permits. On May 4, 1976, the resp Phil Ports Authority decided to allow only one org. to operate the
arrastre and stevedoring services. On April 28, 1980, based on the report and recommendation of an
evaluation committee, the PPA awarded the exclusive contract for stevedoring services to the Ocean
Terminal Services Inc (OTSI). The petitioners brought suit in the CFI to annul the contract for exclusive
service. On motion, Ct issued a TRO enjoining PPA and OTSI from implementing the exclusive contract.
Later, the ct lifted the TRO prompting the petitioners to file an action for certiorari with the SC
contending that: (1) ex parte lifting of TRO constituted grave abuse of discretion; (2) the award would
impair the petitioners' contracts with foreign customers.
HELD: (1) Considering that the previous grant of TRO in favor of pets. was made ex parte and
w/o bond, notice and hearing of the lifting were not necessary, much less mandatory.
(2) Stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and in
the interest of the general welfare. A single contractor furnishing the stevedoring requirements of
a port has in its favor the economy of scale and the maximum utilization of equipment and
manpower. In return, effective supervision and control as well as collection and accounting of the
govt share of revenues are rendered easier than where there are 23 contractors to oversee. As resp
ct found from the evidence, the multiple contractor system has bred cut-throat competitions in
the port . Understandably, most contractors had been unable to acquire sufficient modern
facilities , observe labor standards, maintain efficiency, and pay PPA dues.
PAGE 9
The contention of pets. that due process was violated resulting in a confiscation of
private property is likewise without merit. In the first place, the pets were operating merely on
"hold over"permits. In the second place, the award of OTSI was the result of a evaluation of
performance of existing contractors made by a special committee created by the PPA. VV.
Notes:
The policy adopted by the Philippine Ports Authority to allow only one organization to
operate the arrastre and stevedoring services of each port was upheld by the SC as a valid
exercise of police power. For the "one port, one operator" rule makes possible the better
supervision, collection, efficiency and improvement of services, and prevent cut-throat
competition and non-maximal utilization of equipment and manpower. However, in the awarding
of contracts, the procedures must allow only the capable operator to get the franchise.
In this case, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued without notice to the
other party. As the TRO was lifted also without hearing, the person in whose favor it was
originally issued cannot complain of the lifting of the TRO without prior hearing.
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983)
Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering Massage Services Valid.
F: The ordinance was enacted for a two-fold purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to collect a
fee for operating massage clinics separately from those operating barber ships and (2) To prevent
immorality w/c might probably arise from the construction of separate rooms.
HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on general welfare clause.
VV.
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to
stop the Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets,
and dance h alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of
the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated
but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted
municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs
and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to
give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of
nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to
municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as
granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to
construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC
(BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard
pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted.
VV.
PAGE 10
C. Due Process and Eminent Domain
The taking by the State of private property in an expropriation proceeding must be: (1)
for public use, (2) with just compensation, and (3) upon observance of due process.
Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be take for public use without just
compensation.
Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense,
establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to
public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government.
1. Taking either for public use or public purpose.
Public Use
Public use is equivalent to public purpose. It is not confined merely to use by the public
at large (e.g. roads). It is enough that it serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a large group
of people short of the public in general (e.g. expropriating property for the relocation of
squatters).
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220
F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay
Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the
property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The charter of the
PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a
sports complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform
program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts.
HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been
discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners have
not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have
been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never
been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain. VV.
Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of
25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private lands
for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They
brought this suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224.
HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation proceedings
is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an
evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the
PAGE 11
expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are
vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only.
Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The
test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the
number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested with
broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose objections
merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. The
provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions
which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on
judicial prerogatives. VV.
2. Just compensation must be judicially determined
Just Compensation
Just compensation is the fair and reasonable equivalent of the loss sustained by the
owner of the property due to the taking; it is the fair market value of the property measured at
the time of the taking, no matter how long ago it was taken (e.g. the time of the taking was in
the 1920's, the time of payment was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and Amigable cases, supra),
and using the conversion rates at the time of taking (because according to those cases, Art.
1250 of the Civil Code applied only to contractual obligations).
EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City
which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court recommended that
the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a petition for
certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and current market value
declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have the
power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the decree, its task would
be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or
the assessor. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this
case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the
declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the
basis of those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory. VV.
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog
in Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos,
PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due
PAGE 12
process and equal protection since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated
and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the
chance to oppose such expropriation. The government on the other hand contends that the power of
eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature or the President through his law-making
powers exercises this power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the
just compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the
NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly
expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding
whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the
signing of the decree. No deposit before the taking is required. There is not provision for any
interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the owners given absolutely no
opportunity to contest the expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by the decree,
but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670
are declared unconstitutional.
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM
Tuason v. LTA that the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken adn
how much may be condemned thereof must be duly recognized, leaving only as a judicial
question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of
partiality and prejudice. The SC now rules that such singling out of properties does not foreclose
judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due process
and equal protection and just compensation guarantees of the Constitution. VV.
Tuason v. Register of Deeds 157 SCRA 613 (1988)
F: Petitioners bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in Caloocan City by virtue of
which they were issued a title in their names and they took possession of their property. In 1973,
President Marcos, exercising martial law powers, issued PD 293 cancelling the certificates of titles of
Carmel Farms and declaring the lands covered to be open for disposition and sale to members of the
Malacañang Association Inc.
HELD: The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. Since he
was never vested with judicial power -- such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the SC
and such inferior courts as may be established by law -- the judicial acts done by him were under
the circumstances alien to his office as chief executive. VV.
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987), supra.
3. Due process must be observed
De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road
Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on,
however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on
Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new
PAGE 13
route withh save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the
owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner.
HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrayr and should not receive
judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so
minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of
functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while
the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue.
While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress
and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried
out for the benefit of the people. VV.
Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990)
F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets
which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the construction
of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the
expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower
court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary.
The case was remanded to the lower court.
No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the
Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP
340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. The lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal.
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of
the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties
for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the
laws. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary
negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was based on supervening events that
occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The social impact
factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared.
Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in
thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to the
propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the
corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of
enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent legislative
fiat. Charo.
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, Napocor's lines have to
pass the lands belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right
of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the
land traversed by its transmissin lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domain results in
the taking or appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no
PAGE 14
cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the
owner of the condemned property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." In this
case, the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the
nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC
against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an
indefinite period deprives private respondents of ts ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just equiivalent has always been
understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its
character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just cmpensation.
Charo.
D. Equal Protection
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition
of property and its increments.
1. Economic equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
in accordance with law. They shall be entitle to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making process
affecting the rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including concil-
iation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing
the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
PAGE 15
Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Id., Sec. 2. xxx

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively
to Filipino citizens.
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
There are areas of economic activity which can be limited to Filipinos. The Constitution
itself acknowledges this in various places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII, Sec. 2 par.
2), certain areas of investment (Art. XII, Sec. 10), to name a few.
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law
which nationalized the retail trade. For the protection of the law can be observed by the national
interest.
Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937)
But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away for the simple reason that they
cannot be deprived of a common means of livelihood, especially when they are admitted to the
country as immigrants.
In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978), the SC invalidated a city
ordinance imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens who wish to engage in the pursuit of an
occupation. The SC noted that this violated the uniformity of taxation, and deprived aliens of the
right to earn a common livelihood.
PAGE 16
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)
F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any occupation or
business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent,
an alien, employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the ordinance
null and void.
HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider
substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on
uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and therefore
permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due
process and the equal protection of the laws. VV.
In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979), Sec. 169 of the NIRC requiring manufacturers
of skimmed milk (non-fat) to put on its label the warning that the milk is harmful for infants, was
struck down as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not require the same labeling in the case
of filled milk (coco-fat added)
At that time of the decision thought, the law was already inoperative.
Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of filled milk products. They brought an
action in the CFI for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 169 of the Tax Code. This provision
required that "all condensed skimmed milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed
totally or in part or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate
containers with the words: This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.
HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA 344. At any rate, Sec. 169 applied
only to skimmed milk and not to filled milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against respondent
manufacturers of filled milk but not against manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus denying them
the equal protection of the laws. VV.
2. Political equality
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide candidates to public office shall be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination.
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of
Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials who have received retirement benefits
and would have been 65 years old at the start of the term. It does not violate equal protection, for
it gives younger blood the opportunity to run the local government.
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
PAGE 17
F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that "any retired elective provincial, city ot municipal official
who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall
have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected,
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired." Petitioner,
Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of the law on the ground that it
was contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantee of the Constitution.
HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the application of the provision. No petition seeking his
disqualification has been filed against him. His petition is a mere request for advisory opinion.
Nevertheless, because of public interest, the question should be resolved. The purpose of the law
is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments and therefore, not invalid. The
retired employee in effect declares himself tired and unavailable for the same government work.
VV.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, the disqualification of candidates

convicted or simply charged with national security offenses was struck down as unconstitutional,
for violating the presumption of innocence and thus ultimately the equal political protection.
Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and member of the bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., as taxpayer
and voter, sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of which provides for the
disqualification as candidate of any person convicted of subversion, insurrection or rebellion or similar
offenses.
HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified
from being candidates for local elective positions. They have no personal or substantial interest at
stake and therefore no locus standi. Neither can they sue as taxpayers because the statute does not
involve disbursement of public funds. VV.
3. Social equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition
of property and its increments.
.
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE
A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
PAGE 18
purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable,

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section,
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
1. Requirements for Search Warrants
Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940)
F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda, the Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, a SW
was issued to search the store and premises of the petitioner, accused of violating the Anti-Usury Law.
Receipt books, PNs and other articles were seized and retained in the possession of the Anti-Usury Board.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with.
RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made his own
personal investigation and ascertained that petitioner is lending money without a license,
charging usurious rates." The witness he presentted testified before the judge and swore that he
knew that YEE was lending without a license because he personally investigated the victims who
secured loans from the petitioner. Their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they could be
held liable for perjury. The existence of probable cause has been determined by the justice of the
peace before issuing the warrant complained of, as shown in the warrant itself. Charo.
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)
F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2
orders of the resp. judge, & the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by
an agent of the Anti-Usury Board.
Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
Tarlac, a SW, commanding any officer of the law "to search the person, house or store of the petitioner
for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents & other papers relating to her activities as userer."
On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the PC, went to the office of the
petitioner, and after showing the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper, Salas, & w/o the presence of the
petitioner, who was ill and confined at that time, proceeded w/ the execution thereof. Two packages of
records & a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a
receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. Separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner. Petitioner
demanded the return of the documents seized. Bu motion, pet. challenged the legality of the SW and the
devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution, the resp. judge of CFI denied the petitioner's
motion for the reason that though the SW was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.
The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to be nullified in
these proceedings.
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a
SW to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
PAGE 19
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or another; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; & (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
In the instant case, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge
himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by
agent Almeda. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the prop. to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the
receipt issued is sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of the law, the prop. seized were not
delivered to the court w/c issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over
to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner. Considering
that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the petitioner, the
averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis.
IS THERE A WAIVER? No express waiver.

IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.
To constitute a waiver of constitutional right, it must appear first that (1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; (3) that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made.
She could not have objected bec. she was sick & was not present when the warrant was served
upon Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures,
being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except by the person whose rights are invaded
or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. The failure on the part of the
petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not
constitute an implied waiver of the consti. right. It is but a submission to the authority of the
law. The delay in making the demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to
result im implied. waiver. RAM.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom
F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of QC, the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and
the We Forum were search and printing machines, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used
in the printing, publication and distribution of the newspapers as well as papers and other literature seized
on the ground that they were used in the commission of the crime of subversion. Petitioners brought and
action to annul the warrants and compel the return of the things seized.
HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. When addressed to a newspaper publisher or editor, the
application for a warrant must contain a specification stating with particularity the alleged
subversive materials he has published or intending to publish. Broad statement in the application
is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Another
factor that makes the search warrants constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature
of general warrants. In Stanford v. State of Texas, the US SC declared this type of warrant void.
VV.
PAGE 20
Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)
F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner
in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper
dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The
petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable
words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable. VV.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971)
F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through Rev. Examiner de Leon filed an application for a SW
against Bache & Co. and its pres., Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the NIRC. As Judge Ruiz
was then conducting a hearing, the deposition of de Leon and his witness, Logronio, was taken by the
Dep. Clerk of Court. The deposition was later read to the judge who asked the witness to take an oath as
to the truth of his statements. The judge then signed the SW and accordingly issued the same.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with.
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The
judge did not have the opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and to propound
initial and follow-up questions which his judicial mind, on account of his training, was in the
best position to conceive. This is important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-importatnt
question of w/n there was probable cause. Charo.
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990)
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj. Dimagmaliw, supported by a "Deposition of Witness,"

executed by P/Lt. Angeles, issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of arms, ammunitions and
explosives in the premises of the PUP which were supposed to be in possession of Dr. Prudente. In
enforcing the warrant, 3 fragmentation grenades were found in the bathroom of the office of Dr.
Prudente.
ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid.
RULING: NO.
(1) The warant was not issued on the basis of personal knowledge of the applicant and
his witness. The probable cause required under the Constitution for the issuance of a search
warrant must be in connection with one specific offense, and the judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavit submitted. However, in the
case at bar, Dimagmaliw merely stated in his application that his knowledge was based "on
gathered infrmation from verified sources." The same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles.
PAGE 21
Moreover, the judge did not examine Angeles in the form of searching questions and
answers. What appears on the record are leading questions answereable by yes or no.
(2) As to the claim that the SW failed to particularly describe the place to be searched,
the SC ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.
Here, the SW described the place as PUP, with its address and specifically mentioned the offices
of the "Dept. of Military Science and Tactics on the ground floor and the Office of the President
at the 2nd floor and the other rooms in that floor." This is deemed sufficient.
(3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW was issued for one specific offense. The
warrrant was issued for violation of PD 1866 which punishes several offenses. While there was
failure to state the particular provision of the law violated, the warrant itself qualified the
description of the offense as "illegal possession of firearms, etc." This suffices to cure the defect.
The fact that the word "etc." was added to refer to ammunitions and explosives did not
violate the rule on single offense, for notwithstanding that possession of firearms, explosives and
ammunitions are punished in different sections of the PD, they are treated as belonging to a
single specie. An exception to the rule that a warant shall be issued for a single offense is when
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Charo.
Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp. judge was invalid. They also question the
extrajudicial confession taken from them without according them the right to assistance of a counsel. The
articles seized by virtue of the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as evidence for violation
of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act.
RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states that it is in connection with "the
violation of RA 6425," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "there is probable cause to
believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his possession and control, marijuana dried stalks
which are suject of the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the law is not
stated, there is no question at all that the specific offense alleged to have been committed as
basis for determining probable cause is alleged. Furthermore, the SW specifically described the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
As to the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, the same are deemed inadmissible
against them. In People V. Galit, the Court declared that: " At the time the person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the wiaver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation
of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence."
PAGE 22
These requirements were even made stricter under the 1987 Constitution which provides
that the rights of a person under custodial investigation cannot be waived except when made in
writing and in the presence of counsel. Charo.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, 171 SCRA 348 (1989)
F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve as the President's arm called upon to
combat the vice of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange.
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be authorized by law" to issue warrants
under the 1973 Constitition.
RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of the PASTF under its enabling law, sees
nothing that will reveal a legislative intendement to confer upon the body, quasi-judicial
responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by PD 1883. Its undertaking is simply to
determine w/n probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court,
meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend
action of appropriate authorities.
The Court agrees that PASTF exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers,
and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to determine the
existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is
naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see to it that justice if
done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the accused," he stands invariably, as the
accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue warrrants and indeed, warrants of
arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. This makes to our
mind and to that extent, PD 1636 as amended by PD 2002, unconstitutional.
The "responsible officer" referred to under the Cosntitution is one not only possessing
the necessary skills and competence but more significantly, the neutrality and independence
comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. Charo.
Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO 1022, POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered
the closure of the recruitment agency of Horty Salazar, having verified that she had no license to operate
a recruitment agency. He further ordered the seizure of the documents and paraphernalias, being used or
intended to be used as the means of commiting illegal recruitment. This order was enforced on 26
January 1988. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.
Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue warrants of serach and seizure (or
arrest ) under Art. 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022, now embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code,
are the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments. Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the
1987 Constitution, it is only judges and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search.
The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President of
the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for
the purpose of deportation. The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no longer issue search or
PAGE 23
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we
declare Art. 38, par. C of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. Suzette.
(not in VV's revised outline)
a. Existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as would reasonably make a prudent man
believe that a crime have been committed and that the documents or things sought to be searched
and seized are in the possession of the person against whom the warrant is sought. Without
probable cause, there can be no valid search warrant.
See Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)
In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967), 42 search warrants were issued for alleged
violation of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, and the Revised Penal
Code. The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it was impossible for the judge to have
found probable cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have been violated by the
petitioner. How could he even know what particular provision of each law had been violated? If
he did not know this, how could it be determined if the person against whom the warrant was
issued was probably guilty thereof? In truth, this was a fishing expedition, which violated the
sanctity of domicile and privacy of communications. To establish the requirement of probable
cause, the rule is: One crime, one warrant.
b. As determined by a judge
Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue a warrant; the offensive and much
abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973
Constitution has been removed
In Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963), the SC doubted the power of
the President to issue an order of arrest, even assuming the grant of such power under sec. 39 of
the Rev. Admi. Code since under the 1935 Constitution, the power to order the arrest of a person
has been unmistakably a judicial power. It was even more doubtful if the President could
delegate such a power to the Deportation Board.
The Court noted that unlike in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 in
which the right to be secure is one's person, house, papers and effects was granted only to
citizens; under the 1935 Constitution, it became a popular right available to citizens and aliens
alike.
It was not until the case of Viva v. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 (1968) that the SC settled the
doubt and ruled that the Deportation Board could only issue an order of arrest to carry out a
deportation order, and not, to summon an alien in order to answer charges filed against him, a
distinction already hinted at by the Qua Chee Gan ruling. In other words, while it can issue a
warrant for the purpose of implementing an order, it cannot issue a warrant for the purpose of
prosecution.
PAGE 24
Under the 1973 Constitution, the Deportation Board was deemed included in the phrase
"other responsible officer authorized by law."
The effect of the 1987 Constitution on this power is still uncertain, for although it
restores the 1935 provision, its intent seems clearly to confer the power of issuing warrants to
judges alone.
c. After personally examining under oath or affirmation the complainant

and his witness.
The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of searching questions.
The requirement that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses means that the actual examination cannot be delegated to someone else, like the clerk
of court.
So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971). In this case,
when the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a hearing, the judge
suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to examine and take the testimony of the
witnesses in his chambers. After he was through with the hearing, he went back to his chambers
and finding that the examination was finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they
affirmed what they what they testified to, after which he issued the search warrant in question.
d. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts that they are
testifying to.
The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be based on the
affidavit of one who has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. The testimony
cannot be based on mere belief. Neither can it be based on a report. Otherwise, the warrant is
void.
Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984), reiterating the 1937 case of
Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper We Forum
was used for subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge and so was inadmissible.
Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985), the testimony based on
investigation reports that certain items in the Philippine Times were subversive were held to be
not personal knowledge, and thus the search warrant issued was not valid.
e. The search warrant must describe particularly describe the place to be

searched and the things to be seized.
Failure to state with particularity the place to be searched and items to be seized makes
the warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void.
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description which read "subversive documents, leaflets,
papers to promote the objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines, the Light a Fire
Movement, and the April 6 Movement" were held not to be particular descriptions, thus making
the warrant a general warrant.
PAGE 25
In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine
Times, subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and
typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again invalidated for the description was not at all particular
or specific, thus making the warrants general warrants.
When it comes to printed matters, the offensive material need not be set out in full. It
is enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the articles. The instruction to seize
"subversive materials" is not valid because the determination of whether a material is subversive
or not is not for the police officer to decide; no unfettered discretion must be granted to him.
The matter is different if goods were searched and seized because of their intrinsic
quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled), than if the goods were searched for the ideas they
contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is sought). In the latter case, a more detailed
description of the physical features of the item is required to avoid delegating the appreciation of
ideas, and thus threaten free expression. Mirasol Notes.
2. When Search May Be Made without a Warrant
(a) When search is made of moving vehicles
The reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant has to be applied for the mean
time. In the Tariff and Customs Code, customs agents are specifically authorized to search and
seize vehicles even without a warrant.
Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on the purpose (e.g. apprehend a
suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g. probable cause that the criminal is inside the car).
There is no question that when a child has been reported kidnapped in a community, the police
can stop all cars and check if the detained child is in any one of them.
Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
F: This is an orig. action for prohibition, & certiorari w/ prel. injunction, filed by Papa, et. al.,
praying for the annulment of the order issued by resp. judge, w/c authorized the rlease under bond of
certain goods w/c were seized & held by petitioners in conncection w/ the enforcement of the Tarrif and
Customs Code (TCC) but w/c were claimed by resp. Mago, & to prohibit resp. judge from further
proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said case. Pending the determination of this case, this Court
issued a writ of prel. inj. restraining the resp. Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the
questioned order.
Pet. Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Mla. Police Dept., acting upon a reliable
info. as to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, already misdeclared and undervalued,
would be released the ff. day from the customs zone of the port of Mla. & loaded on 2 trucks, & upon
orders of petitioner Papa, chief of police of Mla., & duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs,
conducted surveillance at gate no. 1 of the customs zone. The load of 2 trucks, consisting of 9 bales of
goods, & the 2 trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure & detention of the 2 trucks & their cargo, Mago
& Lonopa filed w/ the CFI-Mla. a petition for mandamus w/ restraining order or prel. inj., alleging
among others, that the goods were seized by members of the Mla. Police Dept. w/o SW issued by a
competent court.
PAGE 26
HELD: Pet. Martin Alagao & his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure w/o
any SW issued by a competent court. The TCC does not require said SW in the instant case.
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Sec. 2703 "to enter, pass through or
search any land, inclosure, wharehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope, or
any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduec into the Phils. contrary to law,
w/o mentioning the need of a SW. xxx" Except in the case of a search of a dwelling house,
persons exercising police authority under the Customs law may effect search and seizure w/o a
SW in the enforcement of customs law.
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Alagao, & his companion policemen did not
have to make any search before they seized the 2 trucks and their cargo.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no SW would be
needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
"The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference before a search of a dwelling house or other structure in
respect of w/c a SW may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure the warrant bec. the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in w/c the warrant must be
sought."
"xxx Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public
place, w/o a SW is unreasonable is in its final anaylysis to be determined as a judicial question in
view of all the circumstances under w/c it is made." (Peo. v. Case.) RAM.
People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122
F: Peter Lo , together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were
charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, for the transport of metamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu". The drug was contained in tea bags inside tin cans which
were placed inside their luggages. Upon arrival from Hongkong, they boarded the taxis at the airport
which were apprehended by CIS operatives. Their luggages were subsequently searched where the tea
bags were opened and found to contain shabu. Only Lo and Lim were convicted. Tia was discharged as a
state witness, who turned out to be a " deep penetration agent" of the CIS in its mission to bust the drug
syndicate .
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was legal.
HELD: YES
That search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
One of the exceptions thereto is a search of a moving vehicle. The circumstance of the case
clearly show that the serach in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a
valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
It was firmly established from the factual findings of the court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport
within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance
activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be amember. Aside from
this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China
via Hongkong. But such knowledge was insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requiremnents
for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable
cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in the case. Suzette.
PAGE 27
(b) When search is an an incident to a valid arrest.
Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.-- A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (Rules of Court.)
A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that proves the
commission of the offense. It follows that the search can only be made within the area of control
of the arrested person, and within the time of the arrest.
In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985); Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco
were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a.m., having been
wanted as high officers of the CPP. At 12:00 noon, Roque's apartment located 2 blocks away,
was searched and some documents seized. The SC at first held that the search was valid even if
the warrant issued was void for failing to describe with particularity the things to be seized,
because it was an incident of a valid arrest.
But after the EDSA revolution, the reconstituted SC granted the motion for
reconsideration and held that just because there was a valid arrest did not mean that the search
was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be "incidental" to the arrest, that is, not
separated by time or place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental searches is looked
into, one can see that this situation is not one involving a valid incidental search.
The law allows the arresting officer to search a person validly arrested (by frisking him
for instance) because (a) a weapon held by the arrested person may be turned against his captor
and (b) he may destroy the proof of the crime, if the arrested officer has to first apply for a search
warrant from a judge.
If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest, there is no
longer any danger that the captured may turn against the captor; and if the documents in the
apartment were 2 blocks away, the search would no longer be justified since there is no way for
Roque to go back to the apartment and destroy the documents, having been arrested already.
Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985)
F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary
Security Group. Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at
11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents,
a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant
for rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion
were filed but the fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive
materials. Milagros asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained.
The search warrant described the things to be seized as "Documents, papers and other records of the CPP,
NPA and NDF, xxx".
HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to describe with particularity the things to be
seized. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are and what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive. There is absent a definite
guideline as to what items might lawfully be seized, thus giving the officers discretion regarding
PAGE 28
what articles they should seize. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant. But the seizure of the
articles could be justified as an incident of a valid arrest. It is a general rule that, as an incident of
an arrest, the place of premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a search
warrant. VV.
Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, Reconsidered, 147 SCRA 509 (1987)
Previous ruling reconsidered
F: Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the decision, contending that Milagros Aguilar Roque
was not lawfully arrested, a search warrant could not be made.
HELD: Considering the positions of the parties (Sol-Gen offered no objection), the motion for
partial reconsideration is granted.
Teehankee, CJ., concurring: The better rule is to limit a warrantless search of a person who is
lawfully arrested to his person at the time of and incident to his arrest and to "dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." (Rule 126, Sec. 12)
Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void general
warrant, the seizure of documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrest. VV.
(c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching party
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner's house was
searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers
conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are
now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly
set aside.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. judge in accordance w/
Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the
complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say,
however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents
of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only
bec. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not
have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted
to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the
contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to
the record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.)
PAGE 29
The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not
of info. personally known to him. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the
issuance of the warrant sought. It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their
own personal info., to establish the applicant's claims.
Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the
witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their
depositions.
A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who
both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement
of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the
questions put to them by the resp. judge.
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness
could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or
whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if
the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these
acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were
injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the
warrant sought was issued forthwith.
SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN

THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED
HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING.
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who
practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty against a possible
challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting.
Malum Prohibitum.-- It does not follow that bec. an offense is malum prohibitum, the
subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply bec. they are prohibited. A
SW is still necessary.
Motion to Quash.-- Petitioner should have, before coming to the SC, filed a motion to
quash the search warrant by the resp. judge. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural
flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency
of the consitutional issues raised." RAM.
People v. Asio, 177 SCRA 250 (1989)
F: Adio was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for having attempted to
sell, deliver, dispatch in transit or transport 3,500 grams of dried marijuana to A2FC Cartel during a buy-
bust operation. Though he pleaded not guilty, court found the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Issue: W/N the marijuana leaves were obtained in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution
HEKD: NO
The rule that a search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
one. There are recognized exceptions to the rule among them (1) a search incidental to an
arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) the seizure of evidence in plain view. A search
PAGE 30
and seizure without a warrant is allowed in buy-bust operations, the circumstances being among
those which can be considered exceptional.
The accused, in this case, was caught red-handed while pushing marijuana. Hence, he
could be lawfully arrested and searhed. Suzette.
Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)
F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic, and indecent
and later burned the seized materials in public. Among the publications seized and later burned was
"Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was
dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA, he seeks review with SC, invoking the guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal
HELD: YES.
It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only through a judicial warrant ,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133
SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the serach of the
premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by reason of a defective
warrant. There is a greater reason in this case to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete
absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap
makes it no different from Burgos, a political case, because speech is speech, whether political or
"obscene".
The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a search warrant from the judge , if in
their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court that the materials
sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and action. The judge must determine WON the same are
indeed "obscene": the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound
discretion. If probable cause exist, a search warrant will issue. Suzette.
(d) Stop and Frisk
Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/
the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes, St., Davao City. While
they were w/in the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag
& they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves
as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but was stopped by the 2. They then checked the
"buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade, & 2 live ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was
brought to the police station for further investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty, and trial on the
merits, a decision was rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in toto.
Hence, the petition for review, the main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or
search and seizure, the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible
in evidence against him.
PAGE 31
The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12, R 136 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a commission of an offense,
w/o a SW.
HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, or when an offense has
in fact, just been committed, & he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it.
At the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the
offense. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know
what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW at
military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this Court in
Valmonte v. de Villa.
As bet. a warrantless search and seizure (S & S) conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereof in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is
more reasonable considering that, unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable
cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee w/
the buri bag, there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and
it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of
the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an exercise may
prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
As the Sol-Gen said:
"The assailed S & S may still be justified as akin to a 'stop and frisk' situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of suspicious individuals or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officers seeks to obtain more info. ... The
US SC held in Terry v. Ohio that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances &
in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible
criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a
situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and
allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or maintaing the status quo while obtaining more info."
PETITION DENIED. RAM.

(e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and
intelligently.
Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person consented or did not object to the
search, for it many happen that he did so only out of respect for the authorities. The waiver must
be expressly made.
BARLONGAY CASE:
People v. De lara
PAGE 32
F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the police, as a

consequence of which, accused was arrested. The accused already pocketed the marked money and
handed two foils to the police when he sensed the presence of police operatives. He tried to retrieve the
two foils but he was prevented from doing so. He tried to escape by running inside his house. The police
pursued him and were able to subdue him. The accused admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his
house. He even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. The team,
together with the accused, proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation. During the investigation,
accused was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.
When appellant was asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer.
Accused contends that his arrest and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs was null and void.
He also contends that he was not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation, where he was forced
to sign the photocopy of the marked money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the Booking and
Information Sheet.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were valid.
RULING: YES. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation. There
was no need for a warrant. The policemen were not only authorized but were also under
obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant. The policemen’s entry into the
house of the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught committing
an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of the
plastic bag was the result of the accused’s arrest inside the house. A contemporaneous search
may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest
was made.
ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused during the investigation were admissible
in evidence.
RULING: NO. There was no showing that accused was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver
thereto put into writing. (The rejection of these evidence would not affect the conviction of the
accused in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt.) Bam.
People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (July 6, 1994)
F: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in
December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for
illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted
of attempted homicide.
Surveillance was undertaken by the military along EDSA because of intelligence reports
about a coup. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in gunfire killing one member of the team.
A searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of
M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs
inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office of
Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. The team arrested appellant.
They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. Accused was found
guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
PAGE 33
Ruling: YES
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not
armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was
a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group
of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the
occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling
the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it
is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an
unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even color-
ably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls
under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the
military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable
cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team
had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. Under such urgency
and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
There are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The
Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other
offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the
course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense,
the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion.
Subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked
because the first is an offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by
the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant elements.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense
charged in this case was committed under the governance of that law, the imposition of the death
penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could only be
sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial
court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith. Glynda.
3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target zonings."
Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security operations w/in its
area or responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and
PAGE 34
political dev't of the NCR. As part of its duty to maitain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM.
Petitioners aver that, bec. of the institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela residents are
worried of being harassed and of their sarety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down allegedly in cold
blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots
fired in the air.
HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No
proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the
military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners' rights against unlawful search and
seizure of other rights.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those w/c are reasonable are not forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benfit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded
as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconveninece, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community. RAM.
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990)
F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. inj. to prohibit the military and police officers
represented by public respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" in MM.
The 41 petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of MM and Taxpayers
and leaders in their respective communities.
Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas
pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. Petitioners claim that
the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses.
Respondents stress 2 points. First, the resps. have legal authority to conduct saturation drives.
And, second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human
rights, are total lies.
Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Const.:"The Pres. shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed."
They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres. shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. xxx
HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that some violations were actually committed.
This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents"to
submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." However, the remedy is
PAGE 35
not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong
in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or
violent demonstration if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes
necesary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated. A blanket
prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one
confrontation where search warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily
procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices
bec. all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a TP's suit. Where
not one victim complains, and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially
for the SC. It is basically one for the executive departments and for the trial courts.
Under the circumstances of this TP's suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom
we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure,
no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges
and a hard look by admin. officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket
prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime, and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were
probably committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily
restrain the alleged baning on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to
assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are
humble shanties of squatters, and other alleged acts w/c are shocking to the conscience. RAM.
4. Wire Tapping
Republic Act No. 4200
I. UNLAWFUL ACTS
A. Any person who, without authority from all the parties to the private communication
or spoken word, does any of the following acts: [Sec. 1, par. 1]
1. to tap any wire or cable; or
2. to secretly overhear or intercept such communication or spoken word by
using any other device or arrangment; or
3. to record such private communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
B. Any person, whether participant or not in the above penalized acts, who: [Sec. 1, par.
2]
1. knowingly posseses any tape record, wire, record, disc record or any other
such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by law; or
2. to replay the same for any other person or persons; or
3. to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing; or
4. to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person.
C. Any person who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be
unlawful: [Sec. 2]
PAGE 36
D. Any person who shall violate the provisions of Sec. B or the exempted acts below or
of an order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation: [Sec. 2]
II. EXEMPTED ACTS
A. Use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned below: [Secs. 1, par. 2]
B. Any peace officer, who is authorized by the written order of the Court (RTC within
whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which auhtority is applied for are to be executed), to
execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in cases involving the crimes of: [Sec. 3, par. 1]
1. treason
2. espionage
3. provoking war and disloyalty in case of war
4. piracy
5. mutiny in the high seas
6. rebellion
7. conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion
8. inciting rebellion
9. sedition
10. conspiracy to commit sedition
11. inciting to sedition
12. kidnapping as defined by the RPC
13. violations of CA 616, punishing espionage and
other offenses against national security
The WRITTEN ORDER shall only be issued or granted upon written application with the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and
must show:
a) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated herein
has been committed or is being committed provided, that in cases involving the offenses of
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy
to commit sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts
of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed;
b) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence may be obtained essential to
the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes;
c) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Contents: 1. the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations,

discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line and the telephone number involved
and its location;
2. the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words;
3. the offense or offenses sought to be committed or prevented; and
4. the period of the authorization.
PAGE 37
Effectivity: The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall
not exceed 60 days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the
court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
Procedure: All recordings made under court authorization within 48 hours after the expiration of
the period fixed in the order:
1. shall be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package;

2. shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority
stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the
number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit and certifying that no duplicates or
copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court;
3. shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence or their contents
revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with
due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversations or
communications have been recorded.
III. PENALTY
Any person who violates the provisions of this Act, shall, upon conviction, be punished
by:
A. imprisonment for not less than 6 months or more than 6 years; and
B. with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if
the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense; and
C. if the offender is an alien, he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY
Any communication or spoken word, or the existence contents, substance, purport, effect
or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative hearing or investigation. Shirley Alinea Notes.
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault
they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan
through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions
for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the
money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent,
complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such
that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of
communication between 2 parties using a telephone line.
HELD: NO
An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or
other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as
PAGE 38
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. This section refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by
their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation. The tel. extension in this case was not installed for
that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of
the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is included in
the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an
extension tel.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to
discourage, through punishment, persons suchj as government authorities or representatives of
organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel. users. Consequently, the
mere act of listening , in order to be punishable must stricly be with the use of the enumerated
devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. Suzette.
5. What may be seized
Rule 126, sec. 2. Personal property to be seized.-- A search warrant may be issued
for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
(a) Subject matter of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense. (Rules of
Court.)
6. Exclusionary Rule
Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this (privacy of communication and
correspondence) or the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the
suppression of the things seized and the evidence illegally taken.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence obtained in violation of secs. 2
and 3 (1) of Art. III for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding". The evidence is absolutely
useless. This has not always been the case.
In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC, following the U.S. case of Wolf V.
Colorado, rules that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise
admissible under the rules of evidence. In such case, the evidence admitted, without prejudice to
any criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it. In other
words, the admissibility of the evidence is not effected by the illegality of the means by which it
was acquired.
It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, following the U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio 1969,
when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in the Philippines, the SC noting that the total
suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of ensuring the constitutional right
PAGE 39
which it seeks to preserve. The Court noted, the insufficiency of the other remedies (e.g. action
for damages, criminal punishment, resistance), especially in the Philippines where violations
were committed by those in power and were thus equipped with the pardoning power to water
down the gravity of the other penalties imposed to violators of those constitutional rights.
The victim may or may not get back the thing seized, depending on whether it is
contraband or not. It the thing is contraband, it would not be returned, and only its suppression
can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the party can ask for its return, even if no criminal
prosecution has yet been filed, as in the Stonehill case.
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
F: Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp. prosecutors), several judges (resp. judges)
issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c they were officers,
directed to any peace officer, to search the perons named and/ or the premises of their offices,
warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several personal prop. as the "subject of the offense; stolen
or embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing
the offense" as violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void, said petitioners filed w/ the
SC this orig. action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents, and things seized from the officers of the corporations; but
the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seized in the residences of petitioners.
ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations, w/n
petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants.
(2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners, w/n the
search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are
valid.
(3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said documents, papers and things may be used
in evidence against petitioners.
HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and the seizure made in pursuance thereof bec. said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied of by 3rd
parties.
(2) No. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: (a)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner
set forth therein; & (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied w/. It was stated that the natural and
juridical persons has committed a violation of CB laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof w/ respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws.
General search warrants are outlawed bec. they place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers.
PAGE 40
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights-- that the things to be seized be particularly described-- as well
as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. RAM.
7. Civil Action for Damages
A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.
In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if the privilege of the writ is suspended, the court
can nevertheless entertain an action not only against the task force but even against the top
ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to recover damages for the illegal searches and seizures
made in a despotic manner. By so doing, one can indirectly inquire into the validity of the
suspension of the privilege.
Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1988)
Suspension of privilege of Habeas Corpus not a bar to a damage suit
F: Petitioners brought suit alleging that General Fabian Ver had ordered the Task Force Makabansa
of the AFP to conduct "preemptive strikes against known communist terrorists' underground houses" in
Metro Manila. The TFM raided some places using defective warrants; they seized personal belongings of
petitioners; they had been interrogated in violation of their right to silence and to counsel; they had been
tortured and intimidated. Petitioners asked for payment of damages for violations of their constitutional
rights.
HELD: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners'
right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention. VV.
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910)
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, Affirmed, 40 Phil. 1122 (1913)
8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) & husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar order emitted therefrom. His curiosity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of
the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof.
Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and requested a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
PAGE 41
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist of the Narcotics Section of the NBI.
Thereafter, an information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425.
APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation
of his consti. rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and privacy of communication and
therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence.
The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and w/o the
intervention and participation of state authorities.
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional

rights, be invoked against the state?
HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Consti. cannot be invoked against the State. This constitutional right refers to
the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by govt. xxx
(Villanueva v. Querubin.)
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the govt w/o the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S), the Court
sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him.
Appellant, however, would like this Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal
search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. The arguments of
appellant stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that
NBI agents conducted an illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case
clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made the
search/ inspection. Such inspection was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr. Reyes as a
precautionary measure bef. delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless S & S proscribed by the Consti. Merely to observe and look
at that w/c is plain sight is not search. Having observed that w/c is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Consti. is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation
between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. xxx" (Sponsorship
speech of Commissioner Bernas.)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the govt and its agencies tasked w/ the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
It the search is made at the behest or inititiation of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and w/o the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable S
& S cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it w/in the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the govt. RAM.
PAGE 42
9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST, as distinguished from SEARCH

warrants, the judge may rely simply on fiscal's certification as to probable cause
Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of arrest) with Rule 126, Sec. 4 (on search warrants.)
Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-- (a) By the Regional Trial
Court.-- Upon the filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant
for the arrest of the accused.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court.-- If the municipal trial judge conducting the
preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a
probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest. (Rules of Court.)
Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record.-- The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the records their sworn statements together with
any affidavits submitted.
The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is relaxed in that the judge can rely on
the certification of the fiscal that the latter has conducted the preliminary investigation and has
found probable cause on the part of the accused. The judge can issue the warrant on the basis of
the information filed by the fiscal and the certification of probable cause.
The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting that it
has been practice long settled and that a judge can issue an order to arrest on the basis of the
certificate.
Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he can always ask the fiscal to submit the records of
the preliminary investigation, so he could determine for himself if, on the basis of the affidavits,
there exists probable cause. It he is satisfied with the affidavits, he need not summon the
affiants.
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a

complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a
portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of
the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as
charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the
transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest
(WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he
found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA.
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to
the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to
PAGE 43
perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112
of the 1985 Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in
view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused
commited the crime charged.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT

CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR
OFFICER.
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine
whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under
oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied
that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary,
upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to
arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or
discretion.
The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. Bam.
Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners, who were publisher and
columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987
entitled "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you will recall, during the Aug. 29
coup attempt, the Pres. hid under her bed, while the firing was going on-- perhaps the first Commander-
in-Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, Beltran moved to dismiss the complaint. The fiscal
deniend his motion after finding a prima facie case against the petitioners and filed the case in court w/c
thereafter issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and
the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Consti. to issue warrants to "other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Consti.
now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation. What the Consti. underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise
PAGE 44
judges would be unduly laden w/ the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
xxx VV.
Samulde v. Salvani, 165 SCRA 734 (1988)
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a

complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a
portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of
the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as
charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the
transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest
(WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he
found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA.
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to
the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to
perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112
of the 1985 Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in
view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused
commited the crime charged.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT

CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR
OFFICER.
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine
whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under
oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied
that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary,
upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to
arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or
discretion.
The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. Bam.
10. When arrest may be made without a warrant
Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.-- A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
PAGE 45
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment of place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section. 7. (Rules of Court.)
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests", cases where an arrest can be made either by the
peace officer or a private person without need of a warrant.
The key element in the first case is that the offense was committed "in his presence".
The key element in the second case is that he has "personal knowledge".
Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986), the arrest made by the constabulary
without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of information that he was a subversive was held
unconstitutional, since there was no personal knowledge of the offense itself.
The gun and subversive documents found by the officer and admitted by the former to be
his were likewise held inadmissible because the admission violated the Miranda rule.
a. Strict enforcement of rule
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)
F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar Masamlok, the appellant was arrested while plowing his
farm in Tiguman, Davao del Sur, on May 13, 1982, on charges of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion. A .38 caliber revolver was found buried under his house. Subversive
documents were also seized from a place near his house. Two arresting officers testified that the
appellant had readily admitted ownership of the gun and the documents. The appellant was found guilty
of the charge and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as
maximum, and the gun and documents were ordered confiscated.
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the arresting officer must have personal knowledge that the
crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed, in order to justify an
arrest w/o a warrant. The offense must also be committed in his presence or w/in his view.
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest of the appellant was illegal.
(2) Consequently, the incidental search and seizure were likewise illegal and the firearm
and document are inadmissible in evidence.
(3) The prosecution argues that the appellant admitted ownership of the gun and claims
that it was he who pointed to the place where the subversive documents were hidden. However,
as the appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights at that time, his admission is
inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec. 12 (1).] It is true that 6 days later he executed a confession
before the fiscal w/ the assistance of counsel, but it was then already too late.
(4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant is the testimony of Cesar M. and it
is uncorroborated and unreliable, the appellant should be acquitted, but the gun and the
subversive documents must be confiscated. VV.
Go v. CA, 206 SCRA 138 (1992)
PAGE 46
BARLONGAY CASE:
People v. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701
F: Alfaro, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His drinking companions,
Manlulu and Samson were arrested nineteen hours after the incident. Patrolman Perez arrested Manlulu
on the information given by Manlapaz, who was also drinking with the accused and the victim.
Patrolman Perez seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. Pistol and Casio wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro,
without a warrant and without informing Manlulu of his right to counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and seizure of the gun and the watch was valid.
HELD: The warrantless arrest was invalid. The killing took place at one o’clock in the morning.
The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o’clock that evening,
some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless
arrest. Paragraph (b) Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the
arresting officer must have “personal knowledge” nor was the offense “in fact just been
committed.” While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which led to the
arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires “personal knowledge”. Obviously,
“personal gathering of information” is different from personal knowledge. The rule requires that
the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.
However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account
of Manlapaz which the Court found credible. In spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused
Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was
taken in violation of the Constitution, still the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Bam.
People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989)
F: Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the desk officer of Sub-Station I, namely,
Michael Orbeta, who informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was selling marijuana at No. 8199
Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila and requested that said person be apprehended. Acting on this
phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta, a team of policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters
from the house located at 8199 Constancia St., Makati. They saw a tricycle with 3 persons on board, a
driver and 2 passengers, stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St. They also saw a male person
come out of the said house and approach and talk to the driver of the tricycle. After a while they saw the
male person go back to the house and a little later come back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious
stuff of a cigarette, a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the tricycle driver in turn give something to
the male person. Pat. Pajilan together with his companions approached the male person and the tricycle
driver and after introducing themselves as police officers, they asked the male person, the tricycle driver
and his 2 passengers to bring out the contents of their pockets, which the male person, the driver and the
passengers of the tricycle did. The male person brought out from his pockets 2 small plastic bags
containing suspected marijuana leaves. The tricycle driver brought out from his right front pocket 3 sticks
of suspected marijuana cigarettes. Nothing illegal was found in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the
tricycle.
The appellant contends that the police officers had no personal knowledge that he was indeed
handing marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away from the alleged sale transaction.
The arrest therefore was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with.
Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
PAGE 47
Ruling: YES.
The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers was valid since it falls under the
provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher
even without a warrant of arrest. The police officers were tipped off by an informer about the
illegal trade of the accused. The exact location where this trading in drugs was taking place was
given to them. The 'suspicious stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana after
tests were conducted on them. The attendant circumstances taking place before their eyes led the
police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being committed. Glynda.
b. Exceptions to strict enforcement
(1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion
Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
PER CURIAM
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed bef. the Court. The Court finds that
the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant
their release on HC.
An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5, pars. (a) and (b) of Rule 113, ROC, as amended is
justified when the person arrested is caught in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of committing an
offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC have been filed had freshly
committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests, w/o
warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further detained by virtue of valid informations
filed against them in court.
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received confidential info. about a member of the

NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt
Ave., Q.C. It was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible
for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM.
Upon positive identification by an eyewitness, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City
Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info. charging
Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in authority."
PAGE 48
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and
academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a
crim. case, who has been released on bail.
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he
arrested after the commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after the shooting incident.
However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.
The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govt forces, or any other
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.)
Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now serving the sentence imposed upon him
by the trial court. Thus, the writ of HC is no longer available
II
The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, w/o warrant is also justified.
In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos, a former NPA, the Constantino
house in Marikina Heights was placed under military surveillance and on 8/12/88, pursuant to a
search warrant , a search of the house was conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the
course of the search were found several firearms, regular power supply, antennae, speaker and
subversive documents.
When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) could not produce any permit or authority to
possess the firearms, ammunition, radio, etc. He was brought to CIS HQ for investigation.
When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff
member of the executive of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Dept. of the
CPP.
At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra arrived at RC's house. When arrested, he readily
submitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that he went to
the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong," referring to RC and other members of the rebel group.
Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing the jumbled tel. no. of
Florida Roque, sister of Amelia Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to the address on 8/13/88
and arrived at the place about 11 AM. After identifying themselves as military agents and after
seeking permission to search the place, w/c was granted, the military agents conducted a search
in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place.
The military found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP. They found
firearms, subversive documents, ledgers, journals, vouchers, among others. Amelia admitted
ownership of the documents seized.
Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info. charging
her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed. Another info. for viol. of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Roque and also to Buenaobra.
A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court on behalf of Roque and Buenaobra. At the
hearing, Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp Crame, Q.C.
Accordingly, the petition for HC on his behalf is now moot and academic.
PAGE 49
III
Anonuevo v. Ramos.
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified.
At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived at the house of RC w/c was still under
surveillance. The military noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents
found them to be loaded guns. They were asked to show their permit or license to possess or
carry firearms and ammunitions but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC
HQ for investigation.
At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka Ted," and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by
their former comrades.
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On
8/24/88, a petition for HC was filed bef. this Court.
HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully arrested bec. there was no previous
warrant, is w/o merit. The records show that they were carrying unlicensed firearms and
ammunitions in their person when apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the info. filed against them are null and void
for want of prel. inv. The filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., having been first conducted, is
sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC.
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did
petitioners ask for prel. inv. after the informations had been filed against them in court.
IV
Ocaya v. Aguirre.
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP

Command, armed w/ a search warrant, conducted a search of a house located at Marikina Green
Heights, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of
the search, Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several
rounds of ammunitions for a .45 cal. pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They were brought
to the PC HQ for investigation, when O. could not produce any permit or authorization to
possess the ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig.
Rivera was released from custody.
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on behalf of these 2.
HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is justified. No.
prel. inv. was conducted bec. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to waive the
provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC, pursuant to R112, Sec. 7, ROC.
The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and Roque claim that the firearms,
ammunitions and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession, when
arrested, did not belong to them, but were planted by the military to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their claim. On
the other hand, no evil motive or ill will on the part of the arresting officers that could cause the
said officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown.
PAGE 50
As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch
hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed
no less than by former comrades of the petitioners.
VI
Espiritu v. Lim.
Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of PISTON. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of
11/23/88, while he was sleeping in his home located at Sta. Mesa, Mla., he was awakened by his
sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to
talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant, the men
bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner type jeepney. He demanded that his sister be
allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request.
An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art. 142, RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed against
him.
In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E. through tri-
media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on 11/23/88 xxx."
Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in order to investigate him, but he gave
the lawmen his slip. He was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers,
where he was heard as saying,
"Bukas tuloy and welga natin ... hanggang sa magkagulo na."
Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in accordance w/ the provisions of R
113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid info. filed w/ the
competent court, he may not be released on HC.
VII
Nazareno v. Station Commander.
At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in
Alabang, Muntinglupa, MM. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was
arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon questioning, Regala pointed to Nazareno as one of his
companions in the killing of Bunye II. In view thereof, the officers, w/o warrant, picked up
Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ for questioning.
xxx
On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the RTC-Binan, Laguna, issued a resolution denying
the petition for HC, it appearing that said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents
by reason of an info. filed against him w/ the RTC-Mkti., MM.
HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police w/o warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), R
113, ROC, after he was positively implicated by his co-accused; and after investigation by the
police.
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not
presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a
crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority
making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristic of a crime and that the same grounds exist to beleive that the person sought to be
detained participated therein." (Peo. v. Ancheta.)
VIII
PAGE 51
In all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court,
the writ of HC will not be allowed. (Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.)
On the Ilagan Doctrine.
As the Court sees it, re-examination or re-appraisal, w/ a view to its abandonment, of the
Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit
the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n the court w/c issued the process, judgement or
order of commitment, or bef. whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to
issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rahter, as the court
itself stated in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, in all petitions for HC, the court must inquire into every
phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-- "from the moment petitioner was taken into custody
up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a
scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution in fact has
been satisfied." RAM.
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251
PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE

COURT'S DECISION PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
The decision (on July 9, 1990) did not rule that mere suspicion that one is a CPP or NPA
is a valid ground for his arrest w/o warrant.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that, w/in the
contemplation of Sec. 5 (a), R 113, ROC, he was committing an offense, when arrested, bec.
Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed org., where membership is
penalized, and for subversion w/c, like rebellion is, under Garcia v. Padilla, a continuing crime.
Dural did not cease to be, or become less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF
ARREST, simply bec. he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural
was identified as one of several persons who, the day before his arrest, w/o warrant, had shot 2
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or
would shoot other policemen, anywhere as agents or representative of an organized govt. It is in
this sense that subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base w/c compels the
repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized govt is attained.
His arrest was based on "probable cause."
Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, requires 2 conditions for a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1) the person
to be arrested has just committed an offense and (2) the person arresting has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense.
It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts in arrests w/o warrant must be based
upon probable cause, w/c means on actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
PAGE 52
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled w/ good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Said confidential info. received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA was
being treated for a gunshot wound was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances
sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in said hospital. The actual facts
supported by circumstances are: (1) the day bef., or on 1/31/88, 2 CAPCOM soldiers were
actually killed in Bagong Bo., Caloocan City by 5 "sparrows" including Dural; (2) a wounded
person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javelon" was actually then being treated in said
hospital for for a gunshot wound; (3) "Ronnie Javelon" and his address entered in the hospital
records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Dural.
On good faith.-- The peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted
the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their
official duties.
A few days after Dural's arrest, an info. charging him w/ Double murder w/ assault
against agents of persons in authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. He was placed under
judicial custody. On 8/31/88, he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D. Anonuevo, R.. Casiple & V. Ocaya, their arrests, w/o
warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a court of law and
were found w/ unlicensed firearms, explosives and/ or ammunitions on their persons. They were,
therefore, caught in flagrante delicto w/c justified their outright arrest w/o warrant under Sec. 5
(a), R113, ROC. A few days after their arrests, informations were filed in court against said
petitioners placing them w/in judicial custody and disposition. Buenaobra's petition is moot bec.
he had chosen to remain in detention.
The reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests w/o warrant was the
info. given to the military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC and the other by Benito
Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for their operations, w/ info. as to their exact
location and the names of RC and BT as residents and occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests
(of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), w/c confirmed the belief of the military that the
info. they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain crimes: first, the search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the
Constantino safehouse; second, found in the safehouse was a person named RC, who admitted
that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms
and communist equipment; third, at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions, and/ or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as
well as their membership in the CPP/ NPA. And then shortyly after their arrests, they were
positively identified by their former comrades as CPP/ NPA members.
An arrest is in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest w/o warrant
is w/o limitation as long as the requirements of Sec. 5, R 113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our community.
"xxx The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but xxx
upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the
officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose
of suspending the liberty of the citizen." (US v. Sanchez.)
ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not for subversive or any "continuing offense," but
for uttering the words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa magkagulo na" w/c in the
perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
PAGE 53
Many persons differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as
falling w/in free speech guaranteed by the Consti. But, the authority of the peace officers to
make the arrest, w/o warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, w/o obviously becomes difficult at
times, the court, has in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the
arrest (not conviction.)
Supervening events made this case moot and academic. for E. had bef. arraignment
asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Case against E. has
been provisionally dismissed and his bail cancelled.
NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the killing of Bunye II occured on 12/14/88, while

Nazareno's arrest w/o warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14 days later, teh arrest falls under
Sec. 5 (b), R113, since it was only on 12/28/88 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be
made promptly, even w/o a warrant (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of 14
days to prevent possible flight.
Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
These admissions strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon w/c the
arresting officers based their arrests w/o warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e., that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance w/
Sec. 5, R 113, ROC. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons
arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated. The
task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a
petition for HC. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE and ILAGAN V. ENRILE:
This Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly in the
light of prevailing conditions where national security and stability are still directly challenged
perhaps, w/ greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that every arrest w/o
warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceedings. RAM.
(2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs
People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784
F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-bust” operation. The two marked ten-peso bill
were retrieved from him. He was asked to sign his name on the two marked bills. The ten handrolled
cigarette sticks confiscated from the accused were submitted for examination. After finding these
positive for marijuana, a case was filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Linsangan denied the
charge. The trial court found Linsangan guilty. Upon appeal, one of the assertions of Linsangan was that
the trial court erred in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial the marked bills, they
violated his constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while under
custodial investigation.
PAGE 54
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS.
HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that
the police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his
possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his
act of selling marijuana cigarettes. His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials
on the marked bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen
that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in the selling marijuana cigarettes to a
member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to their categorical declarations
than to the appellant’s denials. That is as it should be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to
have performed their official duties in a regular manner. Their task of apprehending persons
engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities to
make it doubly so. Bam.
11. Immunity from arrest of members of Congress
Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six (6) years imprisonment (prision correcional), be privileged
from arrest while Congress is in session. xxx
B. Rights of Persons under custodial interrogation
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under custodial investigation for the commission
of an offense, shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or sec. 17 hereof, shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section,
as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
Rep. Act No. 7438
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING,
DETAINING, AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF.
PAGE 55
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
Section 1. Statement of Policy. --- It is the policy of the State to value the dignity of
every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.
Sec. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained, or under Custodial Investigation;

Duties of Public Officers. --- (a) Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place,
who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the
latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If
such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent
and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating
officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or
detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him
by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or
dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be
null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such persons in the presence of his counsel or in
the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers
and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or
priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall
be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Art. 125 of the
RPC, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel; otherwise such waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed
visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national NGO duly accredited by the CHR or by any international NGO duly
accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or
her spouse, fiance or fiancee, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle
or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is under investigation in connection with an offense he is supected
to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of
law.
Sec. 3. Assisting Counsel. --- Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly
affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged
with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the
following fees:
(a) The amount of P150.00 if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;
(b) The amount of P250.00 if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave
felonies;
PAGE 56
(c) The amount of P350.00 if the suspect is chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the
custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality or city cannot pay such fee,
the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the
Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting
counsel before the province pays said fees. In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the
investigating officer in accordance with the provision of Art. 125 of the RPC.
Sec. 4. Penalty Clause. --- (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of P6,000.00 or a penalty of imprisonment of not
less than 8 years but not more than 10 years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously
convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting
upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial inevstigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immdediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical
doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately
chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and
treating him, or from minitering to his sppiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases,
of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than 4 years nor more than 6
years, and a fine of P4,000.00.
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Sec. 5. Repealing Clause. --- RA 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws,
PDs, EOs or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 6. Effectivity. --- This Act shall take effect 15 days following its publication in the
OG or in any daily newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Approved, April 27, 1992.
Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
According to Chief Justice Warren, when a defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar

atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures, where compulsion is
forcefully potential and his will is likely to be subjugated, the officers must undertake to afford
proper safeguards by the reading of the "Miranda rights" at the outset of the investigation to
ensure that the statements made are truly the product of free choice.
Any person under custodial or police investigation has the right to be informed of the
following rights:
PAGE 57
1. Right to remain silent
a) To make him aware of it.

b) To overcome the inherent pressure of the interrogating atmosphere
c) To show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege
should he choose to invoke his right.
2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent, anything he says can and will
be used against him.
a) To warn him of the consequences of waiving his right to remain silent.

b) To make him aware that this is an adversary system, and that the police are not
acting in his interest.
3. Right to counsel before and during the interrogation
a) To mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness in his testimony, since the inherent

pressures initially overcome by the right to remain silent may again run unless coupled with the
right to counsel.
b) To lessen the possibility of coercion by the police.
4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford counsel, then one will be provided for him by
the state.
a) To inform him that if he does not have counsel or cannot afford one, he does not have
to defend himself alone.
b) To inform him that his poverty is no reason why he should lose his right to counsel.
(The reading of these rights is no less indispensable even if the person arrested is a
prominent Constitutional lawyer. Although he may already know these rights, the purpose is not
so much to inform him, as to assure him that his interrogators are willing to respect his rights
amidst the pressure of custodial investigation.)
The reading of these rights is required during "custodial investigation".
A police investigation consists of 2 stages:
1) "General exploratory investigation" - when the investigation consists merely of

general questions to find out who might be the culprit, but without being directed at anyone's
guilt in particular. At this stage, the Miranda rule is not yet applicable; otherwise, people who
could otherwise explain their innocence would be arrested.
2) "Custodial investigation" - when the investigation now focuses on the guilt of a

person such that he is no longer allowed to leave the premise. It is at this stage that the Miranda
ruling is necessary, since the purpose of the interrogation is to evince evidence that can be used
to prosecute the person.
For instance, when A, a policeman, sees X running with a stained knife away from an
apparently dead man, he can rung after X and having grabbed him, ask him for an explanation as
to what he saw without reading his Miranda rights. But once A arrests X and starts interrogating
PAGE 58
him in the police precinct, then his rights must now be read, for there can only be one purpose to
the questioning, and that is to elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him.
Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988);
61 Phil. LJ 409
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST

INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS.
Since the introduction of the American accusatorial system of criminal procedure in the
Phils., the rule has been that involuntary confessions are inadmissible in evidence against the
accused.
The question is on whom the burden of proof is placed. The early rule placed the burden
of proving that the confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible in evidence, on the
prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619.) It was held that a confession not shown to have been
voluntarily given could be objected to at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on
appeal in the SC.
Act No. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. code of 1916, w/c placed the burden of
proof on the accused to show that his confession was involuntary. Under the new rule, it was
sufficient that the confession was given under conditions w/c accredit prima facie its
admissibility.
In 1953, a further change took place when the SC held in Peo. v. de los Santos that "A
confession, to be repudiated, must not only be proved to have been obtained by force and
violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects the confession when, by force or
violence or intimidation, the accused is compelled against his will to tell a falsehood, not even
when such force and violence he is compelled to tell the truth. In the later case of Peo. v.
Villanueva, the Court stated "the admissibility of that kind of evidence depends not on the
supposed illegal manner in w/c it is obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts or admission
contained therein.
The illegality of the means used in obtaining evidence does not affect its admissibility
(Moncado v. People's Court.)
THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES
The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases (Stonehill v.
Diokno) worked a parallel in the law of confession. W/o expressly overruling its decision in de
los Santos and Villanueva, the Court, in Peo. v. Urro, went back to the former rule that
involuntary or coerced confessions, regardless of their truth, are null and void. xxx Involuntary
or coerced confessions obtained by law, w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman
methods to secure confessions. xxx
Indeed, in the US, it is said that an "unconstitutional coercion will render inadmissible
even the most unquestionably true inculpatory statements." xxx This is not bec. such
confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. the methods used to extract them offend an
underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not
an inquisitorial system -- a system in w/c the State must establish guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured and not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of
his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v. Richmond, J. Frankfurter.)
THE MIRANDA RULE
PAGE 59
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the def. unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken to custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. xxx
II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE

RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Miranda v. Arizona requires certain warnings to be given by police interrogators bef. a

person in custody may be interrogated, w/c have been adopted by the Phil. SC:
1. The person in custody must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a
right to remain silent. The purpose is to apprise him of his privilege not to be compelled to
incriminate himself, to overcome the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere, and to
assure the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege, should he
choose to exercise it.
2. The person in custody must be warned that anything he will say can and wilol be used
against him. This warning is intended to make him aware not only of the privilege but also of
the consequences of foregoing it.
3. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very
quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators, it is
indispensable that he has the assistance of counsel.
THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION
At what stage of the police interrogation must the warnings be given? The Consti. does
not state at what stage of the interrogation process they must be made. but in Miranda, the court
specified that it is only at the custodial phase of the interrogation that its ruling applied. As the
Court indicated in Escobedo v. Illinois, it is only after the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken
into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogation that leads itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was arrested, w/o a warrant, for vagrancy. He was taken
to police precint no. 2 in Mla. The next day, he was included in a police line-up of 5 detainees
and was pointed to by the complainant as a complanion of the main suspect on the basis of w/c
the accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the complainant, while the latter was
interrogated. The accused was then charged w/ robbery. The accused moved to dismiss the case
against him on the ground that he had been denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up.
His motion was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an interrogation, when the police
officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit info. and/ or confessions or admissions from the
accused. As the police line-up in this case was not part of the custodial inquest, the petitioner
was not entitled to counsel xxx.
YAP, J., dissenting: The investigation had commenced the moment the accused was taken from
the police line-up and made to sit in front of the complainant, while the latter made a statement
to the police. The right to counsel must be afforded the accused the moment he is under
custodial investigation and not only when a confession is being exacted from him.
PAGE 60
SARMIENTO, J w/ GANCAYCO, dissenting: The accused was in custody so that his

confrontation w/ the complainant became adversarial and not informational. While a police line-
up is not per se critical, bec. in most cases, it is merely part of evidence-gathering process, in this
case, the fact that he stood charged w/ an offense (vagrancy) and had been detained made the
case different.
CRUZ, dissenting: He pointed out the lack of showing that improper suggestions had been made
by the police to influence the witness in the identity of the accused.
III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS.
It is important to distinguish bet. the waiver of rights and the waiver of warnings. The
first can be made provided that the waiver is "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" but the second
cannot. As the warnings are the means of insuring that the suspect is apprised of his rights so
that any subsequent waiver of his rights can be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent," it is
obvious that there can be no valid waiver of the warnings. A waiver of rights will not be
presumed.
1. With respect to confessions obtained bef. Jan. 17, 1973, the rule that the suspect must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel does not
apply. such confessions, even though presented in evidence in a trial after the effectivity of the
1973 Consti., are admissible, provided they are voluntary, using the traditional test of
voluntariness.
2. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. 17, 1973, but before March 20, 1985,
when the decision of Peo. v. Galit was handed down, the rule is that the voluntariness of a waiver
of the rights to silence and to counsel must be determined on a case-to-case basis, taking into
account the circumstances under w/c the waiver was made.
3. With regard to confessions obtained after March 20, 1985 but before Feb. 2, 1987,
when the present Consti. took effect, the rule is that a waiver of the rights to remain silent and to
the assistance of counsel, to be valid, must be made w/ the assistance of counsel.
4. With regard to confessions given after Feb. 2, 1987, the present Consti. requires that
the waiver to be valid, must be in writing and w/ the assistance of counsel.
IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be

inadmissible in evidence against him, the Consti. says. No distinction is made bet. confession or
admission. Although the previous Consti. spoke of confessions only, I have argued that it was
not so limited but that it also embraced uncounselled statements. For "if a statement made wore
in fact exculpatory, it could ... never be used by the prosecution, in fact, statements merely
intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by
implication."
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" conveys the idea that the rule excluding
evidence illegally obtained is absolute. No similar phraseology is used in the exclusionary rule
PAGE 61
implementing the Miranda rule. Does this mean there can be instances, where uncounselled
statements may nevertheless be admissible in evidence, albeit, for a limited purpose?
In Harris v. US, it was held that although a confession obtained w/o complying w/ the
Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in chief the confessor's guilt, it
may nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach his credit. Petitioner, as a def., in a
prosecution for selling heroin, claimed that what he had sold to a police officer was baking
powder, as part of the scheme to defraud the purchaser xxx The shiled provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of
confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance
In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule.
xxx. "There is public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before
a suspect's answers may be admitted in evidence." It held that the warnings were not themselves
Constitutional rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to insure the right against self-
incrimination. The Court noted the cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely, that the
giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions and this might lead in turn to
fewer convictions. It then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving of warnings might
deter suspects from answering questions than are necessary to avert an immediate threat to public
safety. When answers are not actually coerced, this social cost outweights the need for Miranda
safeguards. In such exigent circumstances, police officers must not be made to choose bet.
giving the warnings at the risk that public safety will be endangered and withholding the
warnings at the risk that probative evidence will be excluded.
V. RETROACTIVITY OF THE NEW RULE.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, the Court held Art. IV, Sec. 20 of the 1973 Consti. inapplicable
to confessions given before its effectivity on Jan. 17, 1973 on the ground that the right to counsel
and to be informed of such right was new and that to make it retroactive "would have a great
unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. VV.
In People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981), Duero was convicted of robbery with
homicide and was sentenced to death, for killing his grandmother after robbing her. His
conviction was based on the (i) testimony of the chief of police before whom he had voluntarily
confessed but which statement he refused to sign; (ii) testimony of his cousin that he had told
him of his plan to rob their grandmother, and (iii) testimony of another that he was seen on the
stairs of the grandmother's house on the day of the killing. Note that (i) and (ii) were just
circumstantial evidence. And since the procedure set in the Miranda ruling was not followed
when the confession was taken, then there was no valid waiver of the right, and so the evidence
was held inadmissible. Conviction was thus reversed.
People v. Duero 104 SCRA 379 (1981)
F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide and sentenced to death for the killing of his
grandmother after robbing her. His conviction was based on a testimony of the Chief of Police that the
defendant voluntarily confessed to him to the killing and robbery, although he refused to sign a
statement.
PAGE 62
HELD: In Miranda v. Arizona, it was held that in custodial investigation the suspect must be
given the following warnings: 1)He must be informed of his right to remain silent, in order to
make him aware of the right, to overcome the inherent pressures of interrogation atmosphere, and
to assure him that his interrogators are prepared to respect his privilege should he choose to
exercise it; 2) He must be warned that anything said can and will be used against him in order to
him aware not only of the privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it; 3) He has a right
to counsel and that if is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. These warnings
were not given to defendant. His oral confession, therefore is inadmissible. VV.
In People v. Andag, 96 SCRA 861 (1980), the police admitted that he did not give the
Miranda warnings, and although Andao knew his rights, the police said that he could not find a
lawyer to counsel the accused during the investigation. The SC held that it was no excuse that
there was no lawyer around, and so the statement made before the police was held inadmissible.
People v. Andag, 96 SCRA 861 (1980)
Confessions of a suspect who was not informed of right to counsel is inadmissible in evidence
F: The accused was convicted of robbery with homicide on purely circumstantial evidence and on
the extrajudicial confession signed by him, which he later repudiated as having been extracted by force
and intimidation.
HELD: The accused was not afforded his constitutional right to counsel and to be informed of
such right during the investigation. Sgt. Vallejos admitted in court that the accused had insisted
on having a lawyer during the investigation but he was unable to secure a lawyer because there
was no one available. This excuse is unacceptable. VV.
BARLONGAY CASES:
People v. Bernardo, 220 SCRA 31
F: Bernardo and his co-accused were convicted of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. Bernardo
assailed the admissibility of the statement given by him to the media regarding the crime as evidence
against him.
RULING: Bernardo's culpability is shown by his spontaneous statement given to GMA 7

reporters Jessica Sojo wherein he tried to justify his ungratefulness to his employer whom he
kidnapped. This was made not as part of the custodial investigation but as the accused's
accomodation to media questioning and is thus admissible in evidence. The fact that the tape was
edited with commentaries does not erase the reality that such declaration came out freely from
Bernardo's own lips. Charo.
People v. Jungco, 186 SCRA 714
F: Jungco and several others, appellants herein, were charged, tried and convicted with the crime
of Robbery with Homicide. In convicting the accused, the trial court relied heavily on the extrajudicial
confessions executed by them and the pictures taken during the reenactment of the crime.
PAGE 63
Appellants contend that the said extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence because
they were extracted from them during the custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel and
after they had been subjected to different forms of maltreatment, threats and intimidation.
ISSUE: W/N the evidence were admissivble.
RULING: NO. The Court is convinced after going over the records that the extrajudicial
confessions in question are inadmissible in evidence, the same having been executed by
appellants during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, particularly when the
confessants manifested the waiver of their right to counsel. The prevailing rule is still the one
laid down in People v. Galit. (Note that this case was decided on June 22, 1985.)
The Court also finds that the pictures taken during the reenactment of the crime, are
inadmissible since the reenactment was based upon the defendants' inadmissible extrajudicial
confessions. Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are
themselves inadmissible. Charo.
People v. Balisteros, 237 SCRA 499
F: Nilo Avestros, Salvador Balisteros and Ernesto Galvante were charged with murder for the
killing of one Romeo Abad on August 16, 1991 in Pandi, Bulacan. Upon arraignment, the 3 accused
pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution moved for the exclusion ofaccused Galvante from
the information for murder so that he could become a state witness as particeps minimis. The Court
granted the motion. It eventually found Balisterois and Avestro guilty as charged.
Upon appeal, appellant contended the alleged violation os Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution,
when in accordance with the present rule for the qualification of a state witness, Galvante executed a
sworn statement wherein he categorically admitted his guilt but without the assistance od counsel and in
the presence of the 2 brothers of the victim and counsel of the plaintiff.
ISSUE: W/N there was a constitutional violation of Galvante's right to counsel.
HELD: NO.
Appellant cannot invoke the constitutional provision that a confession taken in violation
of Sec. 12 and Sec. 17, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution " shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him", meaning the confessant. This objection can be raised only by the confessant whose
rights have been violated as such right is personal in nature.
Also, repeating his confession in Court, Galvante converted it into a judicial confession
which, having been allowed by the trial court, eliminated the need for assistance of counsel
which is required in extra-judicial confession (EJC). Furthermore, even in EJC, which under
jurisprudential doctrines have been held to be generally binding upon the confessant and not
against his co-accused, Galvante's confession would readily fall into the exceptions to that rule
since appellants are being charged as co- conspirators and said confession is used only as
corroborating evidence, or as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by
the co-conspirator, or is corroborated by other evidence of record. Suzette.
People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565
F: Tandoc was shot. The accused was identified by the companion of the victim. The police
located the accused in a restaurant after a security guard pointed him out after being described by the
police. The police asked the accused if he has a gun, since he claimed to be a security guard. When he
answered in the affirmative, the police asked him if they could look at it. The parties went to the
PAGE 64
accused’s house where the police were shown the said gun. When asked by the police if he has fired the
gun since there was an empty shell, he replied in the negative. The police then asked him if he killed the
victim. At first he vehemently denied killing the victim but later he admitted that he shot the victim, and
claimed self-defense. The police brought the accused to the station. He was subsequently charged with
and convicted of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was under custodial investigation when he admitted that he
shot the victim.
RULING : NO.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that
the rule begins to operate.
In the case at bar, appallant was not under custodial investigation when he made the
admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. He
could have refused to answer questions from the very start when the police requested that they all
go to his residence. The ploice inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him
as a particular suspect. Thus, compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial
investigation is not applicable in this case. Bam.
Kimpo v. Sandiganbayan, 232 SCRA 53
F: Kimpo, as a public official, was charged with and convicted of Malversation by the
Sandiganbayan. Among the evidence presented by the Prosecution were the Report of an audit-
examination and a Statement of Accountability for Accountable Forms without Money Value, and a
Reconciliation Statement of Accountability. Kimpo objected to the admission of said evidence on the
ground of violation of Constitutional Rights Under Custodial Investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the invoked Constitutional Right
RULING: No. The evidentiary documents admitted are official forms prepared and
accomplished in the normal course of audit regularly conducted by the Commission on Audit.
Kimpo, not being at the time under investigation for the commission of a criminal offense, let
alone under custodial investigation, clearly cannot be said to have been deprived of the
constitutional prerogatives he invokes. Bam.
People v. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455
F: Accused Tranca was arrested in a buy-bust operation, where a P100 bill dusted with flourescent
powder was used. The accused was brought by the police to Camp Crame, where the Chemist exposed
the bill and the person of the accused to ultraviolet radiation. Flourescent powder was discovered on the
bill, on the hands of the accused, on his face and his shorts. The results of the examination were
contained in a report. Accused contends that the right of the accused against self-incrimination was
violated when he was made to undergo an ultraviolet ray examination. He also contends that the Chemist
failed to inform him of his right to counsel before subjecting him to the examination.
PAGE 65
ISSUE: Whether or not there were violations of the accused’s rights against self-incrimination
and to be informed of his right to counsel when under custodial investigation.
RULING: NO. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is

the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an
inclusion of his bidy in evidence, when it may be material. Nor can the subjection of the
accused’s body to ultraviolet radiation, in order to determine the presence of ultraviolet powder,
be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of counsel. Bam.
People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555
F: Simon was arrested after a buy-bust operation. He was charged with and convicted of having
violated the Dangerous Drugs law. He was brought to Camp Olivas and was placed under custodial
investigation. He was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel. Accused,
however, orally waived his right to counsel. The investigating officer prepared a “Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated, which accused signed, admitting the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves in his possession. A Booking Sheet and Arrest Report were prepared by the police, which were
signed by accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said documents are admissible in evidence.
RULING: NO. Accused’s conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and
tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person
under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records
to show that he was assisted by counsel. Although accused manifested during the custodial
investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the
presence of counsel, hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted
from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. Besides, the arrest report is
self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect. (Accused was
convicted based on other evidence.) Bam.
People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262
F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. The victim, Pagdalian was found dead, sustaining stab
wounds. When the policemen inquired about the circumstances of the incident, they were informed that
the deceased was with two companions, on the previous night. The accused was apprehended. In the
vehicle where the accused boarded, on his way to the Police Station, Bolanos allegedly admitted that he
killed Pagdalian because he was abusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the jeep was admissible in evidence.
HELD: The trial court, in admitting the extra-judicial confession of the accused in evidence,
violated his Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent and to have a counsel of his
choice, while already in police custody. Since the extra-judicial confession was the only basis
for the conviction of the accused, the trial coust’s judgment was reversed. Bam.
People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566
PAGE 66
F: After he and his wife were individually hogtied and their house ransacked, Atty. Garay
was found dead with 3 gunshot wounds . For his death and the loss of their things on the occasion
thereof, Bandula, Sidigo, Dionanao, and Ejan were charged in court for robbery with homicide.
On the basis of the extrajudicial confessions (EJC) allegedly made by Bandula and Dionanao
during their custodial investigation which the court found to "have all the qualities and have
complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession, it appearing from the confession
that acussed were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and
were duly represented by Counsel (Atty. Zerna)", it disregarded the defenses interposed by the
accused and convicted Bandula. The 3 other accused were acquitted for "insufficiency of
evidence".
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession of Bandula conformed with the constitutional
requisites for its validity, hence admissible in evidence.
HELD: NO
From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused Bandula and Dionanao were
investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel
came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to Dionanao, and 2 weeks
later with respect to Bandula. And counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was
Atty. Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, whose interest is admittedly adverse to the
accused and who is not an independent counsel. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of of Sec.
12, Art III of the 1987 Constitution which protects the rights of the accused during
custodial investigation. Suzette.
1. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed before January 17, 1973
Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 (1975)
In this and other cases (People v. Page, 77 SCRA 342 (1977), People v. Garcia, 96
SCRA 497 (1980), and People v. Ribadajo, 142 SCRA 637 (1986)), the SC ruled that the
Miranda rule applies only to confessions obtained after January 17, 1973, the date of effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution. Confessions obtained prior to January 17, 1973 without the reading of
the Miranda rights, so long as otherwise voluntary, are admissible in evidence, even if they are
actually used after January 17, 1973.
In this case, Magtoto, who was accused of murder, was made to confess without being
warned of his Miranda rights in October 1970 while in the custody of the Constabulary. He was
arraigned in November 1972, and tried after January 17, 1973. The Court admitted the
confession, supporting its decision with the history of the Miranda Rule in the Philippines.
Although Art. 125 if the Revised Penal Code, there is a provision that "in every case, the
person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed , upon
request, to communicate and confer at any time with his counsel", the majority in Magtoto v.
Manguera ruled that this only conferred on the accused the right to be informed of the charge
against him and not the right to counsel.
PAGE 67
Then, People v. Jose, (1971), the invocation of the Miranda ruling was rejected by the
SC, which held that under the 1935 Constitution, the Miranda-Escobedo ruling (on the need for
counsel) was not applicable during custodial investigation, but only during trial (from
arraignment to judgment).
It was in reaction to this case, according to the SC in Magtoto v. Manguera, that the 1971
Constitutional Convention expressly adopted the Miranda ruling.
Now, this right cannot be given retroactive effect, continued the Court for it would
destabilized the judicial process. It would be unfair for the prosecution to be told to follow the
ruling in People v. Jose, and then to be told later that after 1973 , they can no longer use these
confessions for they were invalid all along.
(The dissent of Justice Castro argued that Art. 125 of the RPC made it obligatory on he
part of the detaining officer to inform the detainees of his right to counsel before custodial
inquest. Thus, he said, it was error for the Court to say that the Concon granted the right to
counsel during custodial investigation only for the first time by adopting the Miranda-Escobedo
ruling, for it is possible that the delegates themselves were not aware of the RPC. As to the Jose
ruling, he continued , the part rejecting the Miranda ruling was obiter, since Jose could have been
convicted with or without his confession on the strength of Maggie de la Riva's testimony alone.)
People v. Ribadajo 142 SCRA 637 (1986)
F: On Nov. 20, 1971, the appellants confessed participation in the slaying of a fellow inmate,
Bernardo Catamora, at the New Bilibid Prison. On the basis of their confession, they were found guilty of
murder. On appeal, they claimed that their extrajudicial confessions had been obtained by force.
HELD: The proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from an accused
during the period of custodial investigation, in violation of procedural safeguards, applies to
confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Const. No law gives the accused the right to
be so informed before the enactment of the 1973 Const., even of presented after Jan. 17, 1973.
That Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions obtained during custodial investigation does
not have any retroactive effect. VV.
2. Not applicable to res gestae statements
People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
3. Not applicable to statements given in administrative investigations
People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt
with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be
a witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, and
PAGE 68
2) the right of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and
disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self-
incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied
in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in custodial
interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same
Article III.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT
to "be compelled to be a witness against himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether
he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one
the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can
be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed.
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It

must be claimed. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure
to claim it at the appropriate time.
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better
said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an
offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these
rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as
aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was
not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement."
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of
an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right,
2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him; and
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Miranda rights
PAGE 69
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or
make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-

dominated atmosphere, resulting in self- incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights."
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-
custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards Giving of Testimony
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with
its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing
evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence
obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense
under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to
have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to
the inquiry. Glynda.
4. Custodial Phase of Investigation
Police Lineups
PAGE 70
Gamboa v. Cruz June 27, 1988
Police line-up not part of custodial inquest
F: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in Manila. The following day, he was included in a police
line-up and was identified as one of the suspects in a robbery case. He was later charged with robbery and
charged. He moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without the
assistance of counsel, was unconstitutional.
HELD: The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. VV.
US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967)
BARLONGAY CASES:
People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1
F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while walking with several companions including Ongue who
vaguely recognized the assailant, describing the latter as a "mestizo." Two days later, Ongue was invited
by the police to identify the suspect in a police line- up. Hatton was pointed by Ongue as the assailant.
Hatton alleges that at the time that he was made to stand in the police line-up, he was not assisted by
counsel. Hence, his identification therein by Ongue is inadmissble.
RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police station for indentification, technically, he
was not yet under custodial investigation. Thus, the right to counsel does not yet apply.
However, there is every reason to doubt the regularity of the identification of the suspect
by the witness. During the proceedings in the police station, Ongue identified Hatton not
because he was certain that Hatton was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo
in the station and because he was pointed by the police as the suspect. This cannot be considered
as positive identification of the accused by the witness. Charo.
People v. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777
F: Casinillo was convicted of rape. He questioned the police line-up on the ground that the same
were conducted without the assistance of counsel and that the accused was not informed of his right to
counsel.
RULING: The appellant's grievance is misplaced. The trial court's finding as to the identification
of the accused did not even consider the said line-ups. Moreover, in People v. Olvis, this Court
ruled that, in effect, a police line-up is not encompassed in the Constitutional right against
testimonial compulsion and the right to counsel. Charo.
People v. Santos, 236 SCRA 686 (May 11, 1993)
F: Glicierio Cupcupin and Alberto Bautista were riding on a jeep driven by the former. Two (2)
persons armed with short guns approached the jeep and fired at Cupcupin and Bautista. Cupcupin was hit
several itmes in different parts of his body and he died. Bautista was able to run away even as he was
PAGE 71
being fired upon. The one firing the gun at thim was a man he later identified to be accused Raul Santos.
The other one which he saw similary firing his gun was aiming at Cupcupin. He identified the man to be
one Mario Morales. Upon the apprehension of accused Bautista picked out from a line-up accused Raul
Santos. In another line- up, he also picked out accused Morales.
Police Aide Victorino Bohol was on duty and directing traffic at the corner of Plaza Rizal and
Estrella Streets when he heard gunshots. When he looked around the saw two (2) persons who were
holding Cal. 45 pistols firing at persons on board a stainless steel owner jeep. After the arrest of accused
Santos, Bohol was called to the police station and through a one-way mirror he was able to identify
accused Santos as one of the persons who shot Cupcupin and Bautista. Bohol also gave a sworn statement
to the police.
The trial court found that the accused Raul Santos had been identified positively by the
surviving vicitm of the shooting incident Alberto Bautista, and by the Traffic Aide who had witnessed
the execution of the crime Victorino Bohol.
Appellant Santos makes two arguments.
1) he complains that he was not afforded his right to counsel in the course of the police line-up, at the
police station where he was identified by the prosecution witnesses. The accused contends that during
the police line-up, accused was under custodial investigation, a stage which, per the appellant, began the
instant the police suspected Santos then had no lawyer present nor was one provided.
Ruling: The argument has no legal basis. In Gamboa v. Cruz, the Court said that there is "no real
need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police line-up," a declaration reiterated in
People v. Loveria. There is nothing in the record of this case which shows that in the course of
the line-up, the police investigators sought to extract any admission or confession from appellant
Santos. The investigators did not in fact interrogate appellant Santos during the line-up and he
remained silent after he had been identified by Bautista and Bohol.
2) Santos contends that there had been "improper suggestiveness" in the course of the police line-up
amounting to an uncounselled confession. In effect, defense counsel claims that Bautista and Bohol were
induced by the police investigators to point to appellant Santos as one of the gunmen.
Ruling: The record does not show that the police investigators had coached Bautista. What that
Court warned against in People v. Acosta, i.e., against an identification process that was
"pointedly suggestive, or generated confidence when there was noen, activated visual
imagination, and all told, subverted [a person's] reliablity as [an] eye-witness [..]," has not been
successfully shown in the case at bar. Glynda.
5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights
a. Pre-Galit rule (Jan. 17, 1973 to March 20, 1985)
If the waiver was made after January 17, 1973 but before March 20, 1985, the waiver
must be (i) voluntary, (ii) knowing, and (iii) intelligent.
No valid waiver.
People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980)
Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent
PAGE 72
F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in the CFI of Bulacan. The prosecution
presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who identified a statement of the accused
during a police interrogation and his alleged waiver of the right to remain silent and to counsel. When
Roca was questioned on the incriminating answers in the statement, the defense objected, contending that
Yupo's statement was given without the assistance of counsel. Respondent Judge sustained the objection
on the ground that the right to counsel cannot be waived.
HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation may be waived provided the waiver
is made intelligently and voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences. In this case,
the statement made only a perfunctory opening question, after informing the suspect that he was
under investigation, that he had a right to counsel and that anything he said could be used for or
against him and after asking whether he was willing to answer questions and he answered "yes."
The statement was in Tagalog which the defendant, a native of Samar, had not been shown to be
fully acquainted with. The date of execution of the statement before the municipal court was not
indicated. The separate statement signed by the defendant stating he was made to read the
opening statement containing the Miranda warnings and that they were explained to him all the
more engenders doubt as to whether the defendant was properly informed of his right.
Barredo, J., concurring: The perfunctory question and answer in the statement in question is not
sufficient. The person to be interrogated must not only be informed of his rights but must
specifically be asked in a language he understands whether or not he desires to exercise those
rights and only when he definitely, categorically and freely waives those rights may the
investigation proceed and even then he may still invoke the same rights later. VV.
People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980)
Public trial; waiver of right to counsel
F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa,
Rizal. On June 14, 1976, they attacked and killed Celso Saminado, another prisoner. Afterwards, they
surrendered to the prison guard, saying "surrender po kami. Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later, they
gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the killing. They were accused of murder and pleaded guilty.
They took the witness stand and affirmed their confessions. Tampus was sentenced to death while Avila
to reclusion temporal. Trial took place at the Penitentiary. On review, it was contended that Tampus was
denied the right to a public trial and to counsel.
HELD: The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the
trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial there. Anyway, the
right to public trial may be waived. In another case where Avila was also a defendant, the SC
directed that, for security reasons, Avila's trial be held in the National Penitentiary. The accused
was warned in Tagalog that he had a right to remain silent and to counsel but despite this, he was
willing to answer questions of the police. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily
made. The truth is that shortly after the killing, Tampus and Avila admitted their guilt. That
spontaneous statement, elicited without interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same
time was a voluntary confession of guilt. By means of that statement given freely on the spur of
the moment without any urging or suggestion, the two waived their right to remain silent and to
counsel. VV.
PAGE 73
Teehankee's dissent doubted the voluntariness of the waiver made in the middle of his
confession, and noted that the waiver should have been done before a responsible official of the
penitentiary.
People v. Ochavido 142 SCRA 193 (1986)
Pre-Galit test of voluntariness of waiver of Miranda rights
F: The appellants, who are inmates at the National Penitentiary, signed extrajudicial confessions
admitting that they had stabbed to death another inmate on January 1, 1978 inside the penitentiary. They
were convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court. On appeal, they
contended that their confessions were inadmissible because they had not been informed of their Miranda
rights prior to the execution of the confession.
HELD: There was substantial compliance with the Miranda provision. The Prison Guard, to
whom the confessions were given, gave the Miranda warnings to the appelants, after which the
confessions were verified by the appellants before the Assistant Provincial Fiscal. VV.
People v. Nicandro 141 SCRA 289 (1986)
F: The appellant was prosecuted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The prosecution
witness, Pat. Romeo Joves testified that he saw her sell marijuana cigarettes to the police informer
because the sale was done in a place where there were persons passing by. When told it was impossible to
sell prohibited drugs openly, he said it was done secretly. Joves also said that at first he saw her hand a
plastic bag containing marijuana leaves but later corrected himself, saying it was marijuana cigarettes.
Joves testified further that after informing her of her rights, she admitted selling marijuana to the police
informer and that the marijuana belongs to her. The police informer was not presented to testify. The trial
court found her guilty.
HELD: The Constitution in requiring a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right
to remain silent and to counsel, contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather
than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. The
degree of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the education, intelligence
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Where the subject is
unlettered, a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed. It stands to reason that where the
right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person
interrogated knew and understood the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights. Appellant
acquitted. VV.
People v. Duhan 142 SCRA 100 (1986)
Perfunctory recitation of rights of the accused insufficient basis of waiver
F: Credible evidence shows that four policemen rounded up the appellants in the evening of June
29, 1982 pursuant to a police saturation drive, and forced them to ride in their private vehicle to the
police headquarters, informing them that they were rounded up for verification purposes. At the police
station, they were brought inside the comfort room, one after the other, where they were maltreated and
forced to admit possession of marijuana leaves. Appellants did not give any written statements to the
police. Instead, the police investigator prepared for them Booking and Information Sheets which they
PAGE 74
later signed upon the police's assurances that they were for verification purposes and that they would be
released after. It turned out that the Booking and Information Sheets contained the following admission:
"Accused, after being informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel, readily
admitted his guilt but refused to give any written statement." Instead of being released, they were then
locked up in jail.
HELD: The mere assertion by a police officer that after the accused was informed of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel, he readily admitted his guilt does not make
the supposed confession admissible against the purported confessant. SC cited the case of People
v. Nicandro, reiterating that since the right to be informed requires comprehension, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other
relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. VV.
People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986)
No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence
F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77-year-old woman and sentence to death. His
conviction was based solely on his extrajudicial confession which he disowned in court. The confession
was given to the police and subscribed before the clerk of court and contains a waiver.
HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question whether there was a definite waiver by the
suspect of his right to counsel. His answer was categorical enough, to be sure, but the question
itself was not since it spoke of a waiver only "for the moment." As worded, the question
suggested a tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of his right to
counsel, if indeed there was any waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire a lawyer
but not that one could be provided for him for free. VV.
Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a written confession showing that he
was apprised of his right not only by the police but also by the fiscal, but that he waived these
rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary, knowing and intelligent and thus admissible.
b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb. 2, 1987)
It is not enough that the confession is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The waiver
must be made in the presence of counsel. Waiver of the right to counsel must be made with the
assistance of counsel. This rule applied from March 20, 1985 to February 2, 1987.
In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985), the SC, reiterating a dictum in Morales v.
Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 (1983), ruled that no custodial investigation should be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel, and that although the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver
should not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
In the Galit case, however, the adoption of the Morales obiter was also an obiter. The
confession in this case was traditionally involuntary, and so the SC did not need the Morales
obiter in order to disallow the confession.
Under the facts of the case, the accused Galit was convicted of robbery with homicide on
the basis of his confession, which was obtained through torture. The NBI investigators covered
PAGE 75
Galit's face with a rag and then pushed it into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after
they had broken his will that he signed the confession and posed for pictures for re-enactment as
directed by the investigators.
People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985)
F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide by the Circuit Criminal Court. The principal
prosecution witness testified that he heard the defendant and his wife, who was the mother of the witness'
wife, quarrelling the morning after the crime. He said the defendant wanted to leave their house because
he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene." The prosecution also presented the extrajudicial
confession of the defendant.
HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible because it was obtained through torture.
The NBI investigators covered the defendant's face with a rag and then pushed in into a toilet
bowl full of human waste. It was only after they had broken his will that the defendant signed the
confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the investigators. The defendant
is from Samar and there is no showing that he understood Tagalog. It was two weeks after he
executed the salaysay that his relatives were permitted to visit him. His statement does not
contain any waiver or right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by
one. These constitute gross violations of his right. The SC cited the case of Morales v. Ponce
Enrile where it laid the procedure in custodial investigations: No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged by the person arrested, or by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or of
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of this, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. VV.
Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule, however, was laid to rest by the SC in
People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in People v. Galit, which was
decided en banc and concurred in by all the Justices except one who took no part, the Court was
out to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Enrile, and embraced its ruling.
In this case, the prosecution sought to prove its charge of subversion against Asis by
means of her confession given in the hospital, in which she admitted through a leading question,
that she was a member of the NPA and that she was wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld
the trial court's decision excluding the confession on the ground that the waiver of the Miranda
rights was made without the assistance of counsel.
People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986)
F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. At the trial, the Fiscal offered as evidence an
extrajudicial confession given by her in the hospital. In that confession, she admitted, through a leading
question that she was a member of the NPA. The trial court excluded the confession on the ground that
the waiver of Miranda rights was made without the assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends that
the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that the right to counsel may be waived only with the assistance of
counsel, was only a dictum.
PAGE 76
HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in by all
Justices except one who took no part, the SC put to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in
Morales v. Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile. VV.
Does the Galit rule have retroactive application?
This requirement to have a counsel present when waiving the Miranda rights applies only
to confessions made after March 20, 1985, waivers made before that date need not be made in the
presence of counsel.
Compare People v. Ponce, 197 SCRA 746 (1991) with People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)
People v. Ponce, 197 SCRA 746 (1991)
People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)
In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986), Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of
robbery with homicide on the basis, among others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in 1977.
The confessions and the special counsel before whom the confessions were signed prove that the
Miranda warnings were given, but these were not made in the presence of counsel. The SC, in
allowing the confession, ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive effect, especially
since in this case the trial court decision was already rendered before the SC pronouncement.
People v. Nabaluna 142 SCRA 446 (1986)
Galit voluntariness test not retroactively applicable
F: The appellants were convicted of robbery with homicide and sentenced to death on the basis,
among other things, of extrajudicial confessions. The interrogation of appellants lasted from 10 a.m. to 3
p.m. on Dec. 5, 1977 yet their confessions were made the day after. The confessions stated that they had
been given the Miranda warnings. Special counsel to whom the confessions were made testified he
informed them of their right to remain silent; anything they say could be used against them; they had a
right to counsel and if the can't afford one, their case will be referred to the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office.
HELD: The Court is mindful of the cases of Morales v. Ponce Enrile (1983), People v. Galit
(1985), and People v. Pascual (1981) particularly the requisite that before a person under
custodial investigation may be deemed to have properly waived his right to counsel, a counsel
must be present to assist him. But this requirement was laid down in the said cases only after
final judgment in this case had been made by the trial court. No error should attach to the
admission by the trial court of the extrajudicial statements as evidence. VV.
People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987)
F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of a confession and circumstantial evidence
which the trial court found substantial to establish guilt.
PAGE 77
HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of a
counsel. The SC has held in Morales v. Ponce Enrile, People v. Galit and People v. Sison (1986)
that this requirement is mandatory. Any statement obtained in violation of this procedure shall be
inadmissible in evidence. VV.
c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987)
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be made (1) in writing, and (2) in the
presence of counsel.
But see People v. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)
Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486, supra.
6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on the prosecution
The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of the Miranda warning devolves upon
the one seeking to present the confession, that is, on the prosecution. This rule applies whether
in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule.
In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC noted that the stereotype "advice"
appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the
nature of a legal form. Investigators automatically type it together with "opo" as the answer, or
ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired punctilious, fixed and
artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on
the part of the accused.
Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by one entitled to that protection, the

presumption is always against the waiver. Thus, the prosecution must prove with strongly
convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession,
and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist
him during the taking of that confession.
People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986)
F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara
vda. de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the appellants were found guilty of homicide
for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the deceased, was
PAGE 78
found guilty of parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made
extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions were taken while the two
were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and after two weeks of detention.
HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained
giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the
person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently,
the prosecution must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly
and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was
not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is
missing in this case. VV.
7. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and to counsel, but not the
right to be given "Miranda warnings"
The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are the effectuations of the Miranda
rights, can be waived.
What cannot be waived are:
1. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. (For how can one waive what one does
not know?)
2. The right to counsel when making the waiver of the right to remain silent or to
counsel.
8. Exclusionary rule

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the exclusionary rule reads: (any evidence obtained
in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
There are two exceptions to the exclusionary rule. One, to impeach the credibility of the
accused. Two, public safety.
Impeach the credibility
The unwarned or uncounselled confession is not totally without use. While it is not
admissible to prove the guilt of the accused, it may be used against him to impeach his
credibility by showing that he is lying in court, so ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
PAGE 79
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
In this case, Harris was arrested for twice selling heroin to an undercover police agent.
He confessed to the crime during the police interrogation, but the confession was uncounselled,
and so it was held as inadmissible in evidence. But when Harris took the witness stand, he
testified that what he sold was baking powder in order to defraud the police agent. The SC
allowed the prosecution to introduce the uncounselled statment to show that he was lying.
In justifying the admission of the testimony, Justice Burger said that it is one thing to
say that the government cannot make an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully obtained,
and quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which the evidence in
the possession of the government was obtained to his own advantage, providing himself with a
shield against perjury and the contradiction of his untruths.
The reason, continued the Court is that the shield provided by the Miranda rights cannot
be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances.
Public Safety
Public Safety may justify the police in taking confessions without prior warning. Thus
ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
In the case, the Court excused the giving of the Miranda warning because the public
safety required that the weapon had to be located before it could be used by the accused against
those in the supermarket.
The criticism hurled against this ruling is that while the police may be justified in forcing
the assailant to say where the weapon is located, he is not justified to present this in evidence in
the subsequent criminal prosecution.
C. Right to bail
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
1. When right may be invoked
PAGE 80
The right to bail is available from the very moment of arrest (which may be before or
after the filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final judgement (which
means after appeal).
No charge need be filed formally before one can file for bail, so long as one is under
arrest. So ruled the SC in Heras Teehankee v. Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945).
The case was unique in that after the war, the People's Court Act amended Art. 125 of
the RPC to allow for a longer time to detain persons because of the impossibility of filing
charges within the reglementary period due to the number of indictees.
Harris Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945)
People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968)
Bail and Habeas Corpus
In the case of bail, there is an implicit recognition that the arrest and detention, are valid,
or that even if they were initially illegal, such illegality was cured by the subsequent filing of a
case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail is that one be released temporarily from such valid
detention, and this can be made anytime after arrest.
In habeas corpus, the assumption is precisely that the arrest and detention are illegal, so
that the prayer is to be released permanently from such illegal detention. When the privilege of
the writ is suspended, the arrest and detention remain illegal, but the remedy afforded by law to
the victim is not available. Under the 1987 Constitution, though the effect of the suspension has
been considerably lessened to the need to file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest,
otherwise the detainee is to be released.
The Constitution now provides, overruling Morales v. Enrile, that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ does not carry with it the suspension of the right to bail. Habeas Corpus
refers to illegal detention, while bail refers to legal detention, or even detention that started as
illegal but was cured by the filing of a case in court.
2. When bail is a matter of right, when it is a matter of discretion
Bail is a matter of right in all cases not punishable by reclusion perpetua.
It is a matter of discretion in case the evidence of guilt is strong. In such a case,

according to People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1966), the court's discretion to grant bail must
be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. Thus, the
order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
followed by the conclusion on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
The only time bail may be denied is when (a) the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and (b) the evidence of guilt is strong.
PAGE 81
With the abolition of the death penalty (III, 20), and the automatic commutation of a
death sentence to reclusion perpetua, it is contended that when the 1987 Constitution denies the
right to bail in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, it is meant to apply only to those
crimes which were once punishable by death. For if it includeds even those crimes which before
and now are really punishable by reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very spirit of the
Constitution.
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991)
3. Bail in courts-martial
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991)
Aswat v. Galido, 204 SCRA 205 (1991)
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 (1946)
4. Standards for fixing bail
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; guidelines.-- The judge who issed the warrant or
granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not
limited to the following guidelines:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty of the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory be requiring a sum that
is excessive, otherwise, it becomes "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing
illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will" (Jackson). Thus, said the SC in De la
Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971).
In this case, a bail of P1.195 million imposed against Mayor Camara for charges of 12
murders and 12 frustrated murder was found excessive.
PAGE 82
The SC laid down the following guidelines in fixing the amount of bail in Villasenor v.
Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967), later contained in sec. 6 of Rule 114.
1. Ability of the accused to give the bail.

2. Nature of the offense.
3. Penalty for the offense charged.
4. Character and reputation of the accused
5. Health of the accused.
6. Character and strength of the evidence.
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial.
8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested.
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
Even when the accused has previously jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bail. the
remedy in this case is to increase the amount of the bail (Siquiam v. Amparo).
Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967)
De la Camara v. Engage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971)
5. Right to bail and right to travel abroad
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 (1986), the SC disallowed a person
released on bail to travel abroad for a business trip. The Court gave 2 reasons why bail operates
only within the country.
One, the accused may be placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed
to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, thus affecting one of the conditions in the grant
of bail, namely to have the accused available whenever the court requires his presence.
Two, implicit in the bail is the agreement between the State and the surety that the State
will do nothing to make it difficult for the surety to arrest the defendant upon order of the court.
If the court thus allows his to leave, then the State loses its right to order the forfeiture of the
bond because it itself has breached its obligation to the surety.
The case leaves the question of allowing an accused under bail to go abroad for
humanitarian reasons open-ended. This reason was not foreclosed by the Court, which hinted
that the accused could be allowed to leave if he had "sufficient reason". What the Court found
insufficient was the business trip.
PAGE 83
Manotok v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986)
F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two corporations, in one of which he was the president.
The firms were placed under a management committee by the SEC and petitioner was placed "on hold"
by the Commission of Immigration. Petitioner was charged with estafa. He later asked for permission to
leave the country for business reasons, but his request was denied by the courts. He filed a petition for
certiorari but his petition was also dismissed for lack of merit. He appealed to the SC.
HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec. 1 upon the accused to make himself available
whenever the court requires his presence, operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. The
constitutional right to travel is not absolute, but is subject to lawful orders of the court. VV.
6. Waiver of the Right to Bail
People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
D. Rights during trial
Art. III, Sec. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
1. Presumption of innocence
In People v. Dramavo, 42 SCRA 69 (1971), the SC noted that the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt is a necessary corollary of the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent.
People v. Dramavo, 42 SCRA 69 (1971)
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), a law disqualifying candidates charged with
national security offences was struck down as unconstitutional, for violating the presumption
against innocence.
Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
PAGE 84
In Alejandro v. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1980), a judge who allowed the accused to
present his evidence ahead of the prosecution, over the objection of the prosecution, after the
acused admitted the killing but invoked self-defense, was reversed by the SC on the ground that
this change in the order of trial violated the constitutional presumption of innocence which places
the burden proof on the prosecution.
This ruling was modified by Rule 119, sec. 3 (e) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which now reverses the order of trial when the defendant admits the act but invokes a
justifying or exempting circumstance.
Alejandro v. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1980)
Order of trial as provided in the Rules of Court is essential to due process
F: Respondent judge issued an order directing that, in view of the fact that as accused in the
criminal case, petitioner admitted to the killing, he must first prove self-defense and then the prosecution
would present evidence to disprove it. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. When his
motion was denied, he filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The constitutional provision that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law requires that the procedure in Rule 119, sec. 3 be followed. That
procedure protects the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
This orderly course of procedure requires that the prosecution shall for forward and present all its
proof in the first instance. In US v. Gaciran, the defense had produced its proofs before the
prosecution presented its case, and it was held that no substantial rights of the accused were
prejudiced. However, in that case no objection was entered in the court below. In this case, the
change in the order of trial made by the Judge was timely objected.
Note: The ruling in Alejandro v. Pepito was abrogated by Rule 119, sec. 3(e) which provides
that when the accused admits the acts or omissions charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly. VV.
BARLONGAY CASE:
People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 739
F: De Guzman, Castro and Catap were charged with murder for the killing of an
unidentified person on Nov. 16, 1994. Only De Guzman and Castro were arrested and both
pleaded not guilty. They were convicted by the court mainly on the basis of the testimony of
Adelia Angeles. She positively identified the 2 accused as the persons who were with Catap who
maltreated an unidentified person whom they had tied to an ipil-ipil tree and upon seeing her, she
testified that they untied the man and brought him towards the direction of the Pasig river which
was only 3 houses away. This was further strengthened by the extrajudicial confession (EJC) of
accused Castro to Police Corporal Dominador Cunanan that it was Catap who killed the victim
and that he and de Guzman acted only as look-outs.
Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of innocenec of the accused has been
overcome.
HELD: YES
PAGE 85
Though there is no direct evidence to link the 3 accused to the killing of the
unknown victim, the circumstantial evidence presented satisfied Sec. 4, Rule 133 ROC
namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond resonable doubt.
With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Police Cpl. Cunanan, there is no
evidence that Cunanan had any motive to falsely testify against accused. While it is true
that accused's EJC was made without the advice and assistance of counsel, hence
inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused
established through the testimonies of persons who heard it or who conducted the
investigatiuon of the accused (Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473). Moreover in Peo v Alvarez,
the court ruled that an extrajudicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when it
is used as a circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the participation of said co-
accused in the crime committed. Suzette.
2. Right to be heard personally or by counsel
Adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty (Art.
III, Sec. 11.) No matter how educated one may be, he may not know how to establsih his
innocence for the simple reason that he does not know the rules of evidence said the SC in
People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952).
People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952)
F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight
illegal detention because he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one
Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia
Fabreag of her personal liberty." Accused, unaided by counsel, pleaded guilty and said that he was
instructed by Mr. Ocampo to do so.
Accused was convicted of a capital offense.
Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by
either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the
information.
Ruling: Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was
unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious
judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy
penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence
to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly
provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3 (now Rule 116, Sec. 6), that:
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to
have attorney before being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must
assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused
PAGE 86
"shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules
of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed
so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own. Glynda.
Q: What happens if the accused files a demurrer to the evidence of the prosecution (on
the ground that the prosecution failed to tender a case) and this motion is denied -- could the
defense still present its own evidence?
In Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949), the SC ruled in the affirmative, contending
that the right of the accused to present his evidence is a constitutional right which cannot be
defeated by the dismissal of the motion of demurrer.
Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be heard (Rule 119, Sec. 15.)
Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949)
F: Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was accused of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, counsel for the defense
moved to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused. After hearing the arguments for and against the motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs
sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whereupon counsel for the defense offered to present
evidence for the accused. The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of evidence by the defense,
contending that the present procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal cases from
presenting any evidence after it had presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation and
after said motion had been denied, and citing as authority the case of United States vs. De la Cruz, 28
Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the opposition of the provincial fiscal and, without
allowing the accused to present evidence in their defense, convicted all of them and sentenced the herein
petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.
Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present evidence after the denial of their
motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution
Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence.
1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present proofs in his
defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error which resulted in
denying to the said accused the due process of law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in
the Constitution, it being provided in Article II, section 1 (17), of the Constitution that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is no law nor
"procedural practice" under which the accused may ever be denied the right to be heard before
being sentenced.
PAGE 87
Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would be
placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for insufficiency
of the evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates the case then and there. But if the
motion for dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense
before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its right to
present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the
constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on
him. Of course if the accused has no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present
it, the court has no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution alone.
2. The main question to decide is whether the writ of habeas corpus lies in a case like the
present.
We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be invoked to
place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his defense before
being sentenced. On the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly
and clearly guarantee to him that right. Such constitutional right is inviolate. No court of justice
under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does
not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough, and
the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to
sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is
void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Although the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons hereinabove stated, he
may be held under the custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail until the case
against him is finally and lawfully decided. The process against him in criminal case No. 1472
may stand should be resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by the trial court's denial of
his constitutional right to be heard. Up to the point when the prosecution rested, the proceedings
were valid and should be resumed from there. Glynda.
But Rule 119, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure modified this ruling by
now providing that when at the end of the presentation of evidence by the prosecution the
defense moves to quash the information, the filing of such motion to quash is equivalent to a
"waiver" of the right to present evidence.
If the motion is denied, the court will no longer receive the evidence of the defense but
instead proceed with the judgment on the basis solely of the evidence of the prosecution. This is
not unconstitutional so long as it is made clear to the accused that if he moves to demur to the
evidence, he can no longer present his evidence. Also it does not follow that just because the
demurrer is denied, then the accused would be convicted, in view of the quantum of evidence
required to sustain a conviction.
If on the other hand, the motion is granted and the court agrees that the information or
prosecution evidence is insufficient to form a case, then the effect of the grant is an acquittal, to
which no appeal can be taken anymore, said the SC in People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973).
People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973)
Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal
PAGE 88
F: After prosecution presented its witnesses, the defense moved for dismissal of the case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. The judge granted the motion.
Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an acquittal of the accused?
Ruling: YES
A dismissal ordered after the termination of the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution has the force and effect of an acquittal. Since there is a failure to prove the guilt of
the accused, the case must be dismissed, and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the
defendant, in exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal. Glynda.
Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence.-- After the prosecution has rested its
case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) ont its
own intitiative after givint the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of
the accused filed with proper leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. (Rules of Court.)
People v. Canceren, 229 SCRA 581
F: Romeo Canceran was charged with murder for the killing of Pripert Doroja on February
14, 1989. It was established during the trial, through the testimonies of Arnold Bautista, Edralin
Melindez and the mother of the victim Francisca Doroja, that Canceran, Bautista, Melindez and
the victim were all seated and having a drinking session when Canceran accidentally shot the
victim while playing with a revolver. He was found guilty by the trial court.
Issue: W/N accused was denied of his constitutional right to counsel especially during
the most delicate stages of the trial.
HELD: NO
The issue of violation of the accused 's right to an attorney can be readily settled
by reading the Original Records of this case. During his arraignment, the accused was
duly assisted by counsel de oficio, Atty. Manglicmot. The Order of the trial court dated
21 March 1989 directed the Citizens legal Assistance Office to thereafter represent the
accused. Clearly, no violation of the right to counsel was committed. The paraffin test
(which came out positive) conducted without the presence of counsel did not violate the
right against self-incrimination nor the right to counsel. Suzette.
3. Right to free legal assistance
People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991)
PAGE 89
F: On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14 December
1989, addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M.
Dris, manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty.
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic privileges of the accused in a
criminal prosecution are the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a preliminary
examination. President Mckinley made the first a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to
the Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
'shall enjoy the right ... to have assistance of counsel for the defense' ". Today said right is
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps the privilege most
important to the person accused of crime."
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity
to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires
the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a
trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de
oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at
bar, where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to
inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be
poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal,
the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all,
"those who have less in life must have more in law." Justice should never be limited to those
who have the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be
balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more
circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court)
so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent person be
sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de oficio for the accused-
appellant and for said counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective briefs, upon
submission of which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that the accused- appellant was charged with the
crime of rape in a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio, duly subscribed before 3rd
Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro of the province of Rizal, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will.
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of
the Makati CLAO office, as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
xxx
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
PAGE 90
The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded on alibi. The accused claimed that at
the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. This claim was corroborated
by the accused's brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as aforestated, rebutted by the
prosecution's submission of the voter's affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on
31 March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in Romblon.
HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of the defense. The new
theory presented by counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant had
sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that the rape
occurred on 24 March 1984 and that, allegedly, it was the fourth time accused had abused
complainant. This allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed to lock the door to the
bathroom could only have been due to the fact that there was consent. The charge was filed,
according to defense counsel de oficio, only because the complainant's mother caught them.
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been consent from the complainant,
fails to generate doubt as to the accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous situation indeed to
believe that one, so young and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world, would permit the
occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle, a brother of her very own mother. The
Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the defense from one of total denial of the incident
in question, by way of alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the alleged consent of the
complainant. This new version could only be attributed by the Court to the fact that counsel on
appeal is different from the counsel in the trial court. Although the Solicitor General has
suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought by the accused or a desperate
effort to get himself acquitted, the Court deems it more likely that this shift was caused by
counsel de oficio's preparation of the appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the
case. If the appointed counsel for the accused, on appeal, had read the records and transcripts of
the case thoroughly, he would not have changed the theory of the defense for such a shift can
never speak well of the credibility of the defense. Moreover, the rule in civil procedure, which
applies equally in criminal cases, is that a party may not shift his theory on appeal. If the counsel
de oficio had been more conscientious, he would have known that the sudden shift would be
violative of aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant
(his client).
The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties
as advocates of their clients' causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest re-
quires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his
client's cause." Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice
in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the Bar and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also
to the court, to the bar and to the public.
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, he is expected to take such
reasonable precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional guidance
as will not make him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts.
The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance that he was a
counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility owed to
his client. The ethics of the profession require that counsel display warm zeal and great
dedication to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. Any attempted
presentation of a case without adequate preparation distracts the administration of justice and
discredits the Bar. Glynda.
PAGE 91
4. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation
The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely intended to comply with the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As noted in
Vera v. People, procedural due process requires that the accused must be informed why he is
being prosecuted and what charge he must meet.
Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in the City Court of Cebu. After one
postponement due to petitioner's failure to appear, the case was reset. Again, petitioner failed to appear,
despite notice to his bondsman. The court then allowed the prosecution to present evidence despite the
fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. After the offended party had testified and presented
documentary evidence, the court found petitioner guilty. The CFI affirmed the decision. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion and his decision is void.
Because petitioner was not arraigned, he was not informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal proceeding. VV.
5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
(1) Speedy Trial
The right to a speedy trial means one that is free from vexatious and oppressive delays.
Its objective is to free the innocent person from anxiety and expense of a court litigation, or
otherwise, to have his guilt determined within the shortest possible time, compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense the accused may interpose.
While reasonable delay may be allowed as determined on a case to case basis, an

unreasonable delay on the part of the prosecution to present its case, thereby causing the threat of
penal liability to remain hanging over the head of the accused for an extended period of time,
violates the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
The remedy of the accused in this case is habeas corpus if he has been restrained of his
liberty, or certiorari, prohibition or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case; and dismissal
based on the denial of the right to speedy trial amounts to an acquittal.
So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970), a case involving the
prosecution for damage to property through reckless imprudence which had been pending for 6
years, the last step taken being the start of the cross-examination of the complaining witness,
who did not appear thereafter. The SC ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, thus acquitting
the accused.
Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970)
PAGE 92
(2) Public Trial
A public trial does not require that the entire public can witness the trial. It is enough if
it is conducted at a place where one's relatives and friends can be accommodated and the public
may know what is going on.
The right is not absolute. The court can order the public out of the trial room in the
interest of morality and order.
In Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970), the SC dismissed the contention of one
party that the trial was conducted inside the chamber of the judge on the ground that the
objection came too late (the party only complained after the 14th hearing) and that the place was
agreed upon by the parties for their mutual convenience (the judge's room was air conditioned).
Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970)
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far has remained
unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial.
Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of the judge violative of the right to a public trial?
Ruling: NO
The defendants in this case agreed that the hearings be held in the chambers. On
fourteen separate occasions this was the case and there was no objection on their part. There was
no evidence to substantiate the claim that any other person was excluded from the chambers. It
is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or
intentional secrecy.
The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing
the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban
on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the
parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the
accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and
not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse
summation the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is
thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. Where a
trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is
posted, no problem arises. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present
are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the
public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and
of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did
that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the
negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the
size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present.
Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of
uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his
masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the
accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he
may be charged."
PAGE 93
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings
had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent
policemen. xxx Glynda.
(3) Impartial trial
One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral magistrate who exercises cold impartiality.
In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), it was held that a town mayor who was paid on
the basis of the fine he imposes for every conviction for violation of the drinking laws, could not
be an impartial judge. Under such a situation, he would be interested in convicting those he tries
so he would earn more.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
Another aspect of an impartial trial is an impartial tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights
and the strict rules of evidence and procedure.
In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144 (1987), the SC held that a civilian
cannot be tried by a military court (in connection with the Light a Fire Movement) so long as the
civil courts are open and operating, even during Martial Law.
6. Right to confront witness
The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to test the credibility of the witness.
The best means of confrontation is the process of cross-examination.
7. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the production of evidence in his

behalf)
There are various means available to the parties to compel the attendance of witnesses
and the production of documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense of a case in an
adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena duces tecum: depositions and other modes of
discovery; perpetuation of testimonies.
8. Trial in Absentia
Although the right to be present is not explicit in the provision, it is inferrable from the
phrase "trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused"
This right to be present may, however, be waived by the accused. Rule 115, sec, 1(c),
talks of 3 ways that the waiver may take place: (a) express waiver pursuant to the stipulations
set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification; (b) implied waiver when the accused without any justifiable cause is absent at the
PAGE 94
trial on a particular date of which he had notice; and (c) implied waiver when the accused under
custody who had been notified of the date of trial escapes.
In cases in which there have been a waiver of the right to be present, whether expressed
or implied, the trial may be held "in absentia". The requisites of a valid trial in absentia are: (i)
the accused has been arraigned; (ii) he was duly notified of the hearing; and (iii) his failure to
attend the trial is unjustified.
There can be no valid trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned, ruled the
SC in Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), a case involving a charge for slight physical
injuries where the accused failed to appear and so the trial court allowed the prosecution to
present its evidence even if the accused has not yet been arraigned. Arraignment is crucial
because it informs the accued of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Conviction
without arraignment violates due process and ousts the court of its jurisdiction.
Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra.
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived petitioner of his right to be heard by himself
and counsel. The indispensable requirement for trial in absentia is that it should come after
arraignment. VV.
Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver of the right to present evidence.
Thus, if the accused fails to attend trial (which presupposes arraignment), without any justifiable
cause, the prosecution can proceed with the presentation of the evidence, and thereupon, the court
may consider the case submitted for decision. The court will decide the case on the basis only
of the prosecution's evidence. This does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence
because it does not mean that the judgment of the trial court will result in conviction.
So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), which further ruled that trial
in absentia applies even to capital cases.
People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986)
Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases
F: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be
arraigned, the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an
amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial
commenced but while it was in progress, the prisoner took advantage of the first information filed and
succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release. The
respondent Judge, learning of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest.
But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the
constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia. The respondent Judge denied the motion and
suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. Hence, this petition.
HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. Avanceña has been modified by Art. IV, sec. 19
[now Art. III, sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial in absentia. The prisoner
cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possible eventual conviction
provided only that (a) he has been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (c) his
failure to appear is unjustified. The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except
PAGE 95
only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the
accused. The defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the
court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial.
VV.
Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973 Constitution to remedy a situation in
which criminal prosecution could not move because the accused has either escaped or jumped
bail.
In People v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 (1978), the SC ruled that trial in absentia does not
justify the accused to jump bail. Just because th Constitution allows trial in absentia does not
mean that the accused is now free to waive his right to be present during the trial. If he does, he
runds the risk of having his bail bond forfeited.
People v. Prieto 84 SCRA 198 (1978)
Provision for trial in absentia not a justification for jumping bail
F: For repeated failure of the accused Dario Gamayon to appear, respondent Judge declared the bail
bond forfeited and required the bondsmen to produce the accused within thirty days and to show cause
why no judgment should be rendered against them. However, on motion of defense counsel, who invoked
the last sentence of Art. IV, section 19 [now Art. III, sec. 14(2)] on trial in absentia, respondent Judge
reconsidered his order. He argued that "if trial could be conducted after the accused has been arraigned
and identified, the conclusion is inescapable that issuing an order of forfeiture of the bail bond is
premature." The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari.
HELD: The innovation introduced by the present Constitution goes no further than to enable a
judge to continue with the trial even if the accused is not present under the conditions therein
specified. It does not give the accused the right to jump bail. VV.
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988)
In trial in absentia accused waives the right to present evidence and confront witnesses
F: Teodoro dela Vega Jr., together with five others, was charged with murder. After arraignment,
during which he pleaded not guilty, the case was set for hearing on Sept. 18, 1973 but he escaped. He
was tried in absentia. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case against his co-accused but it
held in abeyance the proceedings against him in order to give him the chance to cross examine the
witnesses against him and present evidence. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and
failed to appear during the trial? No. As we have consistently ruled, jurisdiction once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. The lower court
was correct in proceeding with the reception of evidence but it erred when is suspended the
proceedings as to the respondent. The court need not wait for the time until the accused finally
decides to appear. To allow this delay is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial
in absentia. VV.
PAGE 96
9. When presence of the accused is a DUTY
In People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713, the SC held that (a) the accused has the right to be
present during trial; (b) if he is in the custody of the law, presence in all stage is likewise a duty
during (i) arraignment, (ii) entering a plea, and (iii) promulgation of judgment. This rule
however has been modified.
As things stand, the following are the rules:
1. Generally, the accused has the right to be present at all stages the trial (from
arraignment to rendition of judgment).
2. If the accused is in the custody of the law, his presence during the trial is a duty only
if the court orders his presence to enable the prosecution witnesses to identify him. (People v.
Salas, infra. reiterating Aquino v. Military Commiission, infra. modifying People v. Avancena,
infra.)
3. Although the accused is not in the custody of the law (and more so if he is in the
custody of the law), his presence is required in the following cases:
a) Arraignment, regardless of the offense;
b) Entering a plea, regardless of whether the plea is guilty or not guilty.
c) Promulgation of judgment, except that when the judgment is for a light

offense, he may be represented by his counsel or a personal emissary.
a. Arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt
Rule 116, Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.--

xxx
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his
plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of record
shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
b. During trial, for identification
People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713
Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546 (1975)
People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), supra.
HELD: The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage
where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. VV.
PAGE 97
c. Promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which

case accused may appear by counsel, or a representative (Rule 120, Sec. 6.)
E. Priviledge against self incrimination
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of section 17 hereof shall be

inadmissible in evidence against him. [Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)]
1. Scope of privilege: Compulsory Testimonial self-incrimination
The privilege covers only testimonial incrimination obtained compulsorily. It refers

therefore to the use of the mental process and the communicative faculties, and not to a merely
physical activity. If the act is physical or mechanical, the accused can be compelled to allow or
perform the act, and the result can be used in evidence against him.
Thus the accused can be required to allow a sample of a substance taken from his body
(U.S. v. Tan Teh. 23, Phil. 145 (1912)).
U.S. v. Tan Teng. 23, Phil. 145 (1912)
F: This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. He was found guilty of the charge. He
appeals the decision on the ground that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians
about having taken a certain substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and
regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the
accused with reference to a venereal disease. It was discovered that the rape victim was infected by
venereal disease so that the finding of venereal disease in the accused was material to his conviction.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of
his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease
known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the
defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made
of the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has gonorrhea may be used against him
Ruling: YES. The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions,
and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined: seems no more to infringe
the rule invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken from the
person of a thief.
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the
examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant
was suffering from said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been
found with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the
stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if
the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the
commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the
purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property
and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be used against him as
PAGE 98
evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against
himself.
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in
principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a
photograph in proof. Moreover we are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a
man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the
order goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question before us,
said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in
whatever form exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his
house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in
evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and
compelling the surrender of the evidential articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words,
it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion. (4
Wigmore, sec. 2263.)
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling
confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner,
144 N. Y., 119.)
The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of
a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the
prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily
features by the court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine
Bill, because it does not call upon the accused as a witness it does not call upon the defendant
for his testimonial responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the
accused, is not testimony but his body his body itself. Glynda.
The accused can be ordered to expel the morphine from his mouth (U.S. v. Ong Sio
Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)).
U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)
Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled
to be a witness against himself. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused
to discharge the morphine from his mouth. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an
accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in
evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the
Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It
would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to
hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given
in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial
compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners
implicating them in the commission of a crime. (Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.)
PAGE 99
The accused can be made to take off her garments and shoes and be photographed.
(People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 (1950)).
People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 (1950)
A woman accused of adultery can be compelled to show her body for physical
investigation to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)). Viewed against
present standards, however, it is possible that this method of determining pregnancy would
violate due process as being too barbaric.
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)
F: The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. The court
ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent
doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that
such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid
Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to
determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights
Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall
within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases
arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested
physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more
than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the
family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. Glynda.
The taking of footprint sample to see if it matches the ones found in the scene of the
crime is allowed (People v. Salas and People v. Sara).
However, making the accused take dictation to get a specimen of her handwriting is not
allowed, for this involves the use of the mental process. [Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485
(1937).]
Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
F: In connection with this administrative case, said respondent filed, six letters which, for purposes
of identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37. He contends that said six letters are the
complainant's, but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal.
PAGE 100
Respondent required complainant to copy the letters in her own handwriting in the presence of
the investigator. The complainant, refused invoking her right not to incriminate herself. The investigator,
upholding the complainant, did not compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying the
respondent's petition.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced to make a copy of the letters in her own
handwriting
Ruling: No. It would violate her right against self- incrimination.

The constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself." It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant to copy the
six documents above-stated, she had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator authorized to
receive statements under oath, and under said oath she asserted that the documents in question
had not been written by her. Were she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what
she might write later that said documents had really been written by her, it would be impossible
for her to evade prosecution for perjury.
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid
and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of
compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary
for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is
desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least
absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, one for all, to
furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is of the opinion that in order
that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a
dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.
In view of the foregoing consideration and holding, as it is hereby held, that the
complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her, the respondent's petition is
denied. Glynda.
Also requiring the accused to reenact the crime is not allowed, for this also involves the
mental process.
BARLONGAY CASES:
People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525
F: Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the lower court of murder for the death of
Bagon. Olvis, the alleged principal by inducement, was acquitted. The three accused were convicted on
the basis of the extrajudicial confessions executed by them in the presence of a counsel summoned by the
NBI to handle appellants' case, and the reenactment done by them of the circumstances surrounding the
killing.
RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible. They were made in the presence of a
counsel summoned by the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. He cannot therefore be said to
have been acting on behalf of the accused when he lent his presence at the confession
proceedings.
But the accused were denied their right to counsel not once but twice when they were
forced to re-enact the crime. Forced re-enactments like uncounselled and coerced confessions
come within the ban against self-incrimination. This constitutional privilege has been defined as
PAGE 101
a protection against testimonial compulsion but this has since been extended to any evidence
communicative in nature acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant
to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure
of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary
for his conviction. Charo.
People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73
F: After a buy-bust operation accused were arrested by the police. Upon the presentation of a
search warrant, the house of the accused was searched, and several prohibited drugs were seized. They
were charged with and convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs law. They contended that they had
not been shown a search warrant. In concluding that a search warrant had been presented to the accused
prior to the search, the trial court relied on a document entitiled “Certificate of Re-conduct of Search”,
signed by the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible in evidence.
RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

The second paragraph of the Certification amounts to an implied admission that shabu,
the marked money, and shabu papaphernalia had been found by the police authorities at the
residence of the Go spouses and therefore, subject to the control and custody of the accused (the
spouses) and necessarily in their possession. To this extent, the “Certification” is a declaration
against the interest and tacit admission of the crime charged. The second paragraph of the
Certification is a self-incriminatory statment made at a time when the spouses were not assisted
by counsel and under circumstances (in the course of or immediately after the search of the
residence and seizure of quantities of shabu) which render intelligent waiver of their right against
self-incrimination open to serious doubt.
The Court considers that there is nothing to prevent admission of the “Certification” to
substantiate the fact that a search warrant issued by a judge had been brought to the attention of
the spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust operation carried out at their residence and that
in the course thereof, no force or intimidation had been exercised upon the spouses.
Notwithstanding such, the accused were convicted of the crime charged against them.
Bam.
2. In what proceedings available
The privilege is available in any proceedings, even outside the court, for they may
eventually lead to a criminal prosecution.
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969), the SC held that the
privilege against self-incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which possess a
criminal or penal aspect. In this case, it was held that a doctor who was being investigated by a
medical board for alleged malpractice and would lose his license if found guilty, could not be
compelled to take the witness stand without his consent.
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)
PAGE 102
F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of
Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as
his first witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board
of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on
February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the
meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-
appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and
testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself."
HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some
an even greater deprivation.
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished
and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished
according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human
personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an
individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from
Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."
Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to
surrender to his detriment." So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a
right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy." In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection
could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that
in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent
Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. Glynda.
In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the privilege was held to extend to fact-finding

investigation by an adhoc body.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
A person can be compelled to testify provided he is given immunity co-extensive with the
privilege against self- incrimination
F: The respondents led by General Fabian Ver and Major General Prospero Olivas testified before
the Agrava Board looking into the killing of former Senator Benigno Aquino. They were subsequently
accused of murder in two cases for the killing of Sen. Aquino and Rolando Galman. They were charged
as accessories in both. The prosecution offered in evidence the testimony of Ver and Olivas before the
Agrava Board, but on the latter's objections, the Sandiganbayan excluded the testimony. The private and
public prosecutions filed petitions for certiorari.
PAGE 103
HELD: The persons summoned to testify before the Agrava Board were "under investigation for
the commission of the offense" within the meaning of Art. III, sec. 12. It is to be noted that the
framers of the Constitution did not adopt the Miranda reference to "custodial investigation." The
subject matter dealt with and the questioning before the Agrava Board indubitably evinced
purposes other than merely determining the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
assassination. The respondents were called to determine their probable involvement in the crime.
Yet they were not informed or at the very least warned of their right to remain silent and that any
statement given by them may be used against them. The first portion of Sec. 5 of PD 1886
denied them the right to remain silent, and gave power to the Board to punish refusal to testify.
The SC said it is not satisfied that when they testified they waived their constitutional right not
be compelled to be a witness against themselves, much less their right to remain silent. The SC
also said it cannot be contended that the privilege against self- incrimination applies only to
criminal prosecutions. Art. III, sec. 17 of the Const. provides that "No person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself." VV.
Compare People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989), supra.
3. "Use and Fruit Immunity" v. "Transactional Immunity"
When the State requires testimony to be made before a board or body, it has to grant
immunity by means of law to the persons testifying, so as not to violate their right against self-
incriminatrion. This is the only way to reconcile two conflicting values; public interest to get
certain relevant information, say, to legislation, that can only be supplied by the testimony of
certain persons and the highly primed constitutional right not to make a person a witness against
himself.
Through an immunity statute, the state in effect exchanges immunity for the testimony of
a witness. The problem concerns the extent of immunity that the State must grant in order to
protect the privilege against self-incrimination.
Transactional Immunity
In a transactional immunity, a person is given immunity from prosecution of the crime in

connection with which he gave his testimony. The immunity is from the prosecution, not merely
from the use of the testimony. Thus, even if the guilt of the person testifying can be proven by
independent means, he can not be prosecuted anymore.
Use and Fruit Immunity
In a use and fruit immunity, a person is exempted from the use of his testimony as well
as the leads (fruits) that the testimony opened up in a criminal prosecution arising from what he
testified on. The immunity in this case is from the testimony given. Thus, if the state can
procure evidence, independent of the testimony and its fruits, it can prosecute the person
testifying nevertheless.
History in the United States
PAGE 104
In Councilman v. Hitchcock (1892), the SC ruled that the only way to respect the right
against self-incrimination is to give transactional immunity; anything less violates the
constitutional right.
Thus, Congress in 1893 passed the Compulsory Testimony Act, providing for
transactional immunity.
In 1964, the U.S. SC in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York hinted that it
was not really necessary to give transactional immunity in order to protect the right against self
incrimination.
This gave the U.S. Congress the cue to revise the Compulsory Testimony Act and
provide for a "use and fruit immunity".
With the validity of this limited immunity was raised, the SC in Castigas v. U.S. and
Zicarelli v. U.S. ruled that the right is amply protected by the use and fruit immunity.
In the Philippines
There is no fixed rule in the Philippines. "Transactional immunity" can be found in the
following:
Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following
powers and functions
xxx
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority.
R.A. 1379 or the Unexplained Wealth Act, Sec. 8, which is of 1950 vintage.
Sec. 18. Protection against self-incrimination.-- Neither the respondent nor any other
person shall be excused from attending and tesfifying or from producing books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda and other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence,
documentary or otherwise, required of his may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such individual
so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and conviction for perjury or false testimony in
so tesfifying or from administrative proceedings. (Republic Act 1379.)
R.A. 6832, Sec. 8. (Davide Commission.)
Sec. 8. Immunity from Criminal Prosecution.-- The Commission is authorized to grant

immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any
investigation conducted by it where, upon its evaluation, such information or testimony is necessary
and vitalto the investigation. The immunity thereby granted shall continue to protect the witness
who repeats such testimony before the appropriate court when required to do so by the latter.
Should he refuse to repeat such testimony, the immunity granted him shall cease. (Republic Act
6832.)
PAGE 105
Use and Fruit Immunity
On the other hand, "use and fruit immunity can be found in P.D. 1886, which created the
Agrava Fact Finding Board, and which was the subject-matter of Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA
274 (1985).
In this case, Ver and other high-ranking AFP officials were made to testify before the
Agrava Board investigating the double murder of Sen. Aquino and Galman. Under P.D.1886,
every person summoned by the Board has to appear and testify on pain of being held in
contempt. Any testimony made, in turn, was exempted from being "used" in a criminal
prosecution. Despite this however, a case was file against Ver in the Sandiganbayan, and one of
the evidence presented was the testimony he made before the Board. When objected to, the
Sandiganbayan sustained the objection. And so the matter was raised to the SC on certiorari.
The SC held that the testimony could not be used in a subsequent proceeding. it hinted
that were it not for the provision in the decree conmpelling attendance and testimony on pain of
being held in contempt, the accused could have invoked the right against self-incrimination. But
since the state needed the testimony, it gave them immunity and so now, the State must honor its
obligation and disallow the use of the testimony in the criminal prosecution.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985), supra.
HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use
immunity" and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The
distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" prohibits use of a witness' compelled testimony
and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the
other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an
offense to which his compelled testimony relates. PD 1886, sec. 5 grants merely immunity from
use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on
the basis thereof. VV
Sec. 5, PD No. 1886
Sec. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and tesfifying or from producing books,
records, correpondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the
Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate
him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him
shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which
he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence, except from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall
he be excempt from demotion or removal from office.
4. Exclusionary rule

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violationof this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
PAGE 106
The paradigmatic application of the exclusionary rule is a traditionally coerced

confession, and not so much on uncounselled statement. A fortiori, testimony forced out of a
person cannot be used in evidence against that person.
5. Effect of denial of the privilege by court
When the privilege against self-incrimination is violated outside of court, say, by the
police, then the testimony, as already noted, is not admissible under the exclusionary rule.
When the privilege is violated by the court itself, that is, by the judge, the court is ousted
of its jurisdiction, all its proceedings are null and void, and it is as if no judgment has been
rendered. A classic case is Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968).
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968)
F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking
jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the
ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be
compelled to testify against himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the
alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing
his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this
Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.
Accused Chavez was made to testify as a witness for the prosecution without him being
considered a state witness inspite of objections by his counsel.
Roger Chavez was found guilty. The court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any
defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a self- confessed culprit".
Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against self-incrimination was violated
Ruling: YES
The right agianst self-incrimination is "not merely a formal technical rule the
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a
defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice.
The constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and
humanity; of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to
commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of
duress every species and degree of which the law abhors.
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an
admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or
indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to
prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free,
genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it
may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will,
disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment
would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the
unwilling lips of the defendant."
PAGE 107
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.

Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege
as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether
refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the
purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.
xxx With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify
to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said
now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense;
he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to
testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of
perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His
testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a
cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under
contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it
abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and
thereon the first day of the trial.
The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.
It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is
illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent
conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of
conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. Habeas corpus is proper to challenge a conviction where the consitutional rights of the
accused were violated.
A court which denies the accused of his constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction.
The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one
imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus. Glynda.
Notes on the case: In this case, the accused Chavez was compelled by the judge with the
threat of being held in contempt to take the witness stand, in spite of his objection that he had the
right to remain silent and not to be a witness against himself. And so he took the witness stand
and was convicted by qualified theft. He appealed but the lawyer failed to file the appellant's
brief and so the appeal was dismissed, the judgment became final and executory, and he served
his sentence. Years later, Chavez went to the SC on habeas corpus, contending that his
convictioin was void because it was rendered on the basis of evidence obtained in the violation of
his right against self- incrimination. The SC granted the petition and released him.
Habeas Corpus, as shown by this case, is an extraordinary post-conviction, mid-
sentence, remedy. The petition for habeas corpus is such that it inquires into all questions of
illegal detention. When the judge compelled the accused to take the witness stand, he was ousted
of his jurisdiction and all subsequent proceedings became void. Ultimately, the judgment of
conviction and even the sentence were likewise void, thus making the detention of Chavez
illegal, and thus actionable by habeas corpus.
The case also illustrates the difference between the ordinary witness and the accused. A
witness can be conmpelled to take the stand; he can only object to the questions as they come,
invoking his right against self-incrimination.
But in the case of the accused, he cannot even be made to take the witness stand, for the
only purpose of such is to incriminate him.
Of course, the moment the accused agrees to take the stand, he is deemed to have waived
his right, and must now thus submit himself to cross-examination.
PAGE 108
E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of civilians by military courts
Animas v. Minister of National Defense, 146 SCRA 406 (1986)
F: This petition challenges the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try twelve accused persons, only
one of whom is in the military, for the offense devoid of any national security or political complexion
and committed long before the proclamation of martial law,
The petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the alleged killing of Yanson, a
political leader,during the November 11 elections.
The accused were arrested almost a year later, on September 21, 1972 after martial law was
proclaimed. It was only in 1974 that a "summary preliminary investigation" was conducted by a PC
captain belonging to the Judge Advocate General Service. The petitioners were recommended for
prosecution before the Military Tribunal, considering that one of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is
a military personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate General filed the corresponding charge sheet, but he
modified the crime charged from "Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the Revised Administrative
Code" in Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential Decree No. 9, " Illegal Possession
of Firearms with Murder."
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National Defense referred the case to the Military
Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned the same to
respondent Military Commission No. 27.
Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No. 27 is without jurisdiction over the criminal case
Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction.

We apply the rule in Rolando A. de Guzman v. Hon. Alejandro R. Leopando, et al, (G.R.
No. 62798, December 22, 1983 and March 13, 1984) where the lone military personnel was
ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused before a civil court. It is also clear from the
records that the acts for which Sgt. Animas was charged had nothing to do with the performance
of official duty.
The crime for which the petitioners were charged was committed on November 10, 1971
long before the proclamation of martial law. There was no question about the case being
prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil courts at the time. Now that it is already late
1986, and martial law is a thing of the past, hopefully never more to return, there is no more
reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be retained, at this time, by a military
tribunal. Glynda.
Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144
Military trial of civilians void even under Martial Law if the civil courts are open
F: Petitioners were found guilty of subversion by the respondent military commission and
sentenced to death. They filed a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
the SC, questioning the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.
HELD: In Aquino v. Military Commission (1975), the SC held that "Martial law creates and
exception to the general rules of exclusive jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of
war as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals.xxx" Due process, however
demands that in all criminal cases prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a
trial. As explained by Justice Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Military
PAGE 109
Commission supra: "Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the SC and
insuch inferior courts as are established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts which
have the exlcusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or
property of a citizen." Since we are not an enemy occupied territory and even on the premise that
martial continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts.
xxx
"The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and
independence are protected by tenure and undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial
tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply
in military trials. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence on
the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the
counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a
pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger. VV.
Cruz v. Ponce-Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988)
F: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this Court on October 1, 1986 to test the
legality of the continued detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees arrested in the nine-year
span of official martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made
to stand trial for common crimes before various courts martial; if any of these offenses had any political
color, this had neither been pleaded nor proved.
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military personnel.
Issue: Whether or not military courts have jurisdiction over civilians
Ruling: No
As held in Olaguer: A military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment
rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the military tribunal concerned
The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes appear to have been committed, and
there are accusations against herein petitioners for those offenses. Olaguer cannot and does not
operate to absolve the petitioners of these charges, or establish that the same are baseless, so as to
entitle them to immediate release from detention. It is not to be forgotten that the victims in
offenses ascribed to the petitioners have as much interest as the State has to prosecute the alleged
authors of the misdeeds. Justice will be better served if the detention of such of the petitioners as
are not hereby ordered released or excepted, is continued until their cases are transferred to the
ordinary courts having jurisdiction, and the necessary informations have been filed against them
therein, as has already been done in the case of petitioners Imperial D. Usman and Samu Gumal.
The State should be given a reasonable period of time to accomplish this transfer, at which time
the petitioners may apply for bail for their temporary release.
The Solicitor General not unreasonably anticipates questions to arise as to the
availability of certain defenses to the petitioners upon their prosecution before the civil courts. It
seems evident, however, that no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an
accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would result from the retrial of the
petitioners" cases, for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to
try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous
PAGE 110
proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the
accused in the second prosecution. Glynda.
G. Bills of attainder-- Legislative adjudication of guilt
Bill of Attainder
A "bill of attainder" is a law which substitutes the legislative determination of guilt for a
judicial determination. Through a statute, the legislature finds individuals or groups guilty,
without the benefit of being proven so in court.
A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill of attainder proper (legislative imposition of
the death penalty) and (ii) bill of pains and penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty).
In People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972), the Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700) which
declared the Communist Party of the Philippines a clear and present danger to Philippine
security, and thus prohibited membership in such organization, was contended to be a bill of
attainder. The SC, however, dismissed the contention, holding that although the law mentions
the CPP in particular, its purpose is not to define a crime but only to lay a basis or to justify the
legislative determination that membership in such organization is a crime because of the clear
and present danger to national security.
People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act, which
outlaws the Communist Party and other "subversive associations", and punishes any person who
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself, with, becomes or remains a member," of the
Party and of any other similar "subversive" organization.
ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder.
HELD: NO
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence
is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban
against bill of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining
legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Phils (CPP) of the members thereof for the purpose of punishment.
What it does is simply to declare the Party to an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition against membersip in the outlawed organization.
The term "CPP" is used solely for definition purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the
CPP but to "any other organizatuiion having the same purposes and their successors". Its focus
is not on individuals but on conduct.
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary
to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would suffice to secure their
punishement. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
PAGE 111
and by overt acts, and that they joined with the specific intent to further its basic objectives.
Suzette.
H. Right to a speedy disposition of cases
Art. III, Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from the date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
submission of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or
by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The
certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within
said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall
decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further
delay.
Art. VII, Sec. 18. xxx

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision within
thirty days from its filing.
Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submision for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules
of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt
of a copy thereof.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases complements the right to a speedy trial. After
the case has been submitted for decision, so that technically the trial stage is terminated, the
Constitution mandates that the judicial, quasi- judicial or administrative body or tribunal must
decide the case consistent with the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case.
To carry out this mandate, the Constitution in several other places provides periods for
deciding a case:
PAGE 112
The Supreme Court has to decide cases within 24 months from the date of submission of
the case for decision which is the date of filing of the last pleading [Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (1).]
In cases to challenge the validity of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ, the period is 30 days counted from the date the case was filed (not the
date it was submitted for decision). (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3.)
If it fails to decide a case within the period because it could not garner the necessary
majority to render a decision, then, (a) if the case is an appealed case, the judgment appealed
from is deemed affirmed, except if (i) the case is one in which the lower court declared the law
unconstitutional, in which event the presumption of constitutionality applies, and (ii) the case is a
criminal case, in which the event conviction is reversed; and (b) if the case is an original
petition, the petition is deemed dismissed. (Rules of Court)
In the case of the Court of Appeals, the period to decide is 12 months from the date of
submission, unless reduced by the SC, with the same rule in case the majority required to render
a decision is not met. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (1)]
Trial courts have 3 months to decide. Failure to decide does not affect the case, but the
judges are subject to administrative sanctions. (Art. VIII, Sec. 15.)
Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Comelec and COA), which are quasi-judicial
or administrative tribunals, are given 60 days from the date of submission to decide a case. (Art.
IX,.A, Sec.7.)
III. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
A. What acts cannot be criminalized
1. Mere beliefs and aspirations
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
2. Debts and civil obligations
Art. III. Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll
tax.
What the law prohibits is imprisonment for non-payment of a contractual obligation.
When one is convicted of estafa and sent to prison, the imprisonment is not for the non-
payment of debt but for the deceit or abuse of confidence employed by the convict.
Thus, in Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 123 (1986), the SC again upheld Batas Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) as not unconsitutional for being violative of the rule against non-
PAGE 113
imprisonment for debt. It is true that under this law deceit is not necessary. It is, however, a
valid exercise of the State of its power to determine what acts constitute a crime.
What the Consitution further prohibits is imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax,
which is a tax imposed on certain persons regardless of their property or business. The
prohibition does not apply to non-payment of property taxes and taxes on privilege.
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
F: BP 22 punishes any person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account
or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds xxx" Petitioners
challenged the constitutionality of BP 22 on the following grounds: 1) It offends the constitutional
provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes
the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its
enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan prohibited amendment of the bill on 3rd reading.
HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished in BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not
the non- payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property but as an offense against public order. Recent statistics show
that one third of the entire money supply of the country consists of currency in circulation.
These demand deposits in the banks constitute the funds against which commercial papers
are drawn. The amount concerned justifies the legitimate concern of the state in preserving
the integrity of the banking system. VV.
BARLONGAY CASE:
Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 725
F: This is a verified complaint filed by Caram Resources Corporation and Tejada against Judge
Contreras of Branch 61 MTC Makati for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. This was
allegedly committed by Respondent Judge in relatin to the criminal cases filed by Caram against a
certain Teresita Dizon for violation of BP22. Respondent Judge handed down a decision acquitting
Dizon on the ground of reasonable doubt. One of his ratiocinations to support his decision is that the
application of the jurisprudence regarding BP 22 would violate the cardinal rule under the Constitution
that no person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt, though he do not question the
constitutionality of the law.
ISSUE: W/N the judge was guilty of the charge.
HELD: YES
The facts irretrievably brought the accused within the purview of BP 22 and respondent
was bound by his oath to apply the law. He was not at liberty to ignore it. His decision exposed
him either to ignorance of the law and the jurisprudence built thereon or simply ignored or
disregarded the above pronouncemets of this Court and chose to make his own. It is his duty to
apply the general law to particular instances under the Canon of Judicial Ethics. This Court has
the last word on what the law is and that its decisions applying or interpreting the law or the
Constitution forms part of the legal system of the land, all other courts should take their bearings
from the decisions of the Court.
PAGE 114
As show in his ratiocination, respondent could not hide his bias against Caram, whose
business practice he loath. Such expression deviates from the nor of conduct which is essential
in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Suzette.
3. Acts which when done were innocent
Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Ex Post Facto Law
An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks to punish an act which, when committed, was
not yet a crime or was not as heavily punished. It is a law that retroacts to the day of the act so
as to cause prejudice to the person performing the act. Its unfairness consists in the fact that the
person could not have known the act was criminal, and thus could not have avoided the crime.
When a law is more favorable to the accused, however, it is allowed to retroact.
In re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428
F: This petition for declaratory was filed by Kay Villegas Kami Inc., claiming to be a duly
recognized non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for the
detremination of the validity of Sec. 8, RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's right s and duties
thereunder. Petitioner claims that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law.
ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law.
HELD: NO
An ex post facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime , or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty. [Quoting Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1902)]
This constitutional prohibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive
effect.
While it is true that Se. 18 penalizes a violation of any provisin of RA 6132 including
Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law
and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that
its provisions shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. Suzette.
B. What punishments cannot be imposed
1. Involuntary servitude
PAGE 115
Art. III, Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary sevitudes in any form shall exist, except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been convicted.
2. Excessive fines
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any
death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
People v. De la Cruz, 92 P 906 (1953)
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
F: Celestino Matondo, Segundino Caval and Cirilo Zanorio, public schools officials of Leyte were
charged before the MTC for violation of RA 4670. Upon arraignment , the accused pleaded not guilty.
Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. This
motion was denied. A MFR was filed on the same ground but with the further allegation that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense considering that Sec. 32 of the law is null and void for being
unconstitutional for the ff reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of
imprisonment being unfixed and may rn to reclusiion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government. MFR denied.
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 32 ( penal provision) of the law is unconstitutional.
HELD: YES
The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by a statute is not
cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is barbarous one
unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community. That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an
insufficient basis to declare law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The
fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In
addition , what degree of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution
has still to await appropriate determination in due time since no decision has as yet been struck
down a penalty fro being " cruel and unusual" or " excessive".
It is also submitted that RA 4670 vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period
of imprisonment, but to choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed. What valid
delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of
the term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits
provided by law, the absence of which designated limits will constitute such exercise as an undue
delegation of legislative power.
Sec. 32 of the law provides for an indeterminable period , with neither a minimum nor a
maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide
latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment , without even the benefit of any sufficient
standard, such that the duration thereof may range from one minute to the life span of the
accused. This cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative
PAGE 116
in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as
well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. Thus, the presumption of constitutionality has
to yield. Suzette.
3. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishments
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any
death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Id., Sec. 12. xxx
Assuming that judgment has been rendered and the accused has been convicted the
Constitution now further prescribes certain standards as to the punishment that can be meted out.
After all, due process prohibits barbaric and disproportionate penalties.
The employment of physical, psychological or degrading punishment against any

prisoner or detainee, or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions, shall be dealt with by law. [Art. III, Sec. 19 (2).]
In 1935, the prohibition was against "cruel and unusual" penalty, in 1973; it was against
"cruel or unusual " penalty; in 1987, the prohibition is against "cruel, degrading or inhuman"
punishment. The purpose in changing the phraseology is to allow for experimentation, and not
to fix the concept of what is cruel to the standards of the present civilization, or those of
antiquity. This notion is supposed to expand and grow, so that what today is considered as
acceptable may in the next generation be deemed as cruel penalty.
Whether the cruelty of a punishment depends on its form or whether it depends on its
severity has been ambivalently answered by the SC:
In People v. dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900 (1953) the SC ruled that it was the form of
punishment as fixed in antiquity (pillory desembowelment, etc.) and not its severity, that
constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty under the 1935 Constitution. Thus a disproportionate
penalty (10 years imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual because it is only a matter of
severity of an acceptable form of punishment (imprisonment).
The SC spoke in a different way in People v. Borja 91 SCRA 340 (1979), Borja was
sentenced and he served at the national penitentiary for 20 years before the case came to the SC.
The Court said that Borja had been living in the shadow of death. Although the sentence was
initially valid, it had become cruel by the lapse of time. And yet, this was a form of penalty that
was neither cruel nor unusual.
People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989)
PAGE 117
F: The accused are four of the 11 bodyguards of a mayor who killed three persons on suspicion that
they were cattle rustlers. They were found guilty of murder. Three appealed to the SC which found them
equally liable for the killing. The penalty for murder under the RPC is reclusion temporal to death. The
question concerns the penalty to be imposed in view of Art. III, sec. 19 which provides that "Neither shall
the death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
HELD: Art. III, section 19 does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of
the RPC except insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty adn reduces it to
reclusion perpetua. The range of medium and minimum penalties remain the same. VV.
People v. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 (1991)
F: A complaint for homicide was filed with MTC of Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, charging
Remelito Lubreo along with crime of Homicide in connection with the killing of Mamerto Sanico. Judge
Gorgolon of said court conducted both the preliminary investigation and preliminary examination.
Thereafter, he forwarded the records of the case to the Office of Provincial Fiscal. The fiscal conducted
his own PI and on the basis thereof, he filed an information for murder not only against remelito but also
against Lucresio Lubreo. Trial Court find them guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of innocence in favor of Lucrecio has been
overturned by the prosecution
HELD: NO.
An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof is
upon the prosecution and until such burden is sufficiently discharged , the accused continues to
enjoy the presumption of innocence. In the instant case, the lower court convicted Lucrecio on
the basis of its conclusion that he was positively identified by witnesses Nenita Monter and
Epifanio Pangatungan as one of the assailants, and that therefore, his defense of alibi would not
prosper. Unfortunately, the testimonies of the abovementioned witnesses did not categorically
stated or proved that Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim.
Though Monter categorically stated in her direct examination that she saw the accused
Lucresio hacking the victim, in the "re-enactmment", she however candidly informed the court
Lucresio was just standing by and she could not remmenber as to who actually hacked the
victim. From her version, the participation of Lucrecio is at one enveloped inserious doubt. It is
worse in the case of Pangatungan. While he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in hacking as if they
will come one after the other in hacking his mind (sic) and the neck", he never elaborated as to
what "abetted in hacking " means. He could not even specify the part of the body of Mamerto
which was hit by Lucrecio.
There is evidently insufficient evidence to show the actual participation of Lucresio in
teh crime. There being no evidence of conspiracy, he cannot be held for the acts of his co-
appellant. Suzette.
4. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado and other forms of detention

and the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
PAGE 118
Id., Sec. 19. xxx

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against
any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
5. Indefinite Imprisonments
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989), supra.
C. The protection against double jeopardy
Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Mirasol Notes:
Elements of double jeopardy, (Rule 117, Sec 7; People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 (1968):
(1) Court of competent jurisdiction;

(2) A Complaint or Information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(3) Arraignment and plea by the Accused;
(4) Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of the case without the express consent, of the
accused.
Subsequent prosecution is barred for the following:
(1) Same offense

(2) Attempt of the same offense
(3) Frustration of the same offense
(4) Offense necessarily included in the 1st offense (All the elements of the 2nd
constitute some of the elements of the 1st offense)
(5) Offense that necessarily includes the 1st offense (All the elements of the 1st
constitute some of the elements of the 2nd offense)
Exceptions to no. 5:
(1) The graver offense developed die to "supervening facts" arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charged.
Thus, in Melo v. People, 85 Phils. 766 (1950), the SC allowed the amnedment of the
information from its original cahrge of frustrated homicide, because after the filing of the
information, the victim died.
PAGE 119
(2) The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after
the filing of the former complaint or information.
This overrules People v. Yorac, where the SC disallowed the amendment of the
information from slight physical injuries to frustrated murder after the prosecution subjected the
victim to another medical examination and found a wound, that it was the fault of the prosecution
if they had an incompetent medical examination.
(3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal
and the offended party.
Identity of offenses and identity of act
When an act gives rise to two or more offense which are punished by the same authority,
and an individual is convicted, acquitted, or the case dismissed without his consent, of one of
these offense (Crime A), there is no double jeopardy if he is charged of another offfense (Crime
B) flowing from the same act. Double jeopardy arises only when he is again charged of that
same offense (Crime A). Thus, this is called double jeopardy by "identity of offenses".
But when an act which give rise to two or more offenses is punished by two different
authorities (a law and an ordinance), then if an individual is convicted, acquitted, or the case
dismissed without his consent, of any of these offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by
law), even if he is charged of another offense which is punished by the other auhtority (Crime B
by ordinance), there is double jeopardy, because both offenses, one punished by a law and the
other punished by an ordinance, flowed from the same act. Thus, this is called double jeopardy
by "identity of act."
Sum: If only a law in involved, there is double jeopardy only when there is an identity
of offenses. But is a law and an ordinance are involved, there is double jeopardy when there is
an identity of act.
Identity of Offenses:
If a married man maintains as concubine a married woman not his wife, the man is
guilty of both concubinage and adultery. From the same act (cohabiting with the married
woman), two offenses arise. And yet he can be prosecuted for both because, the two offenses
coming from the same authority, there is no identity of offenses.
Identity of Act:
People v. Relova, 48 SCRA 292 (1987), Relova was prosecuted under an ordinance of
Batangas City for the use of wiring to tap electricity without permission from the local
authorities, but the case was dismissed because the crime has prescribed. So the fiscal filed a
case for theft of electricity under the RPC. The SC ruled there was double jeopardy already, and
so the second case could no longer be filed. For although the offenses were different, both
flowed from the same act. And in this case, the act was punished by a law and an ordinance.
Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy
PAGE 120
If the court has no jurisdiction, or was ousted of its jurisdiction beccause it violated the
right to due process of the parties, the decision is null and void, the accused may again be
charged.
In People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985), the SC, held that the move by the trial court
of summarily dismissing a criminal case for theft on the ground that it merely involved a
question of ownership deprived the prosecution of due process by denying it the chance to
introduce its evidence. This ousted the court of its juridsiction.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986), the SC declared the criminal

prosecution of the 26 accused in the Aquino-Galman double murder case a "mistrial" after the SC
commission found that the Sandiganbayan justices and the Tanodbayan prosecutors had been
summoned by the President and instructed on how to conduct the trial. Due process is a right not
only of the accused but also of the State. Once the court deprives either party, which in this case
is the State, of a fighting chance, then it is ousted from its jurisdiction, and double jeopardy
would not apply. Thus, the accused were ordered retried.
1. Two situations contemplated
People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht violation of Ordinance No. 1 series of 1974 of Batangas
City prohibiting the installation of electric wiring devices without authority from the city government. He
admitted installing the electric wiring devices found by the police in order to decrease the readings of
electric current. The case was however dismissed on the ground that the offense had prescribed. Fourteen
days later, the City Fiscal filed another case for theft against him. The court also dismissed this case on
the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution appealed contending the offense was different.
HELD: The contention has no merit. The first sentence of Art. III, sec. 21 states the general rule:
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both may be based from the same facts. The second sentence provides an
exception: that the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under the national
statute such as the RPC provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. VV.
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154 SCRA 175 (1987)
F: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating Sec.7, in relation
to Sec. 11 RA 3060 and Art. 201(3) of the RPC, in two separate informations filed with the City Court of
Manila. Upon arraignment, accused Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other accused,
Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he is still at large. Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in
the 2 cases on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. Motion denied. Later, he
again moved to quash the information in one of the Criminal case on the ground of duble jeopardy, as
there was according to him, also pending aginst him another criminal case, where the informatin
allegedly contain the same allegations as the information in the first criminal case. Court granted the
motion.
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy.
PAGE 121
HELD: NO
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, 3 requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for teh same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. All these requisites do not exist in
this case,
The 2 informations with which the accused was charged , do not make only one offense,
contrary to private repondent's allegation. In other words, the offense defined in Sec. 7 of the
RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors
for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included inthe offense defined in Art 201 (3) of
the RPC punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motin pictures.
The elements of the 2 offenses are different. The gravamen of the offense defined in
RA 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion pictures which has not been previously passed by
the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion picture may be indecent or immoral but if
it has not been previously approved by the Board, its public showing constitutes a crimnal
offense. On the other hand, the offense punished in Art 201(3) of the RPC is the public showing
os indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures.
The nature of both offenses also differs. The crime punished in RA 3060 is malum
prohibitum in wh criminal intent need not ber proved because it is presumed, while the offense
punished in Art. 201(3) of the RPC is malum in se, which criminal intent is an indispensable
ingredient. Suzette.
2. Rules of Court provisions
Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former conviction of acquittal; double jeopardy.-- When an

accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of compentent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense in the
former complaint of information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for
an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act
or omission consituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only
after the filing of the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal
and of the offended party.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfied or serves in whole or in
part the judgement, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the
graver offense.
Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950)
PAGE 122
F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI, Rizal with frustrated homicide , for having allegedly
inflicted upon Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different
parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him
from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On Dec. 29, 1949, at 8 am, accused
pleaded not guilty to the offense chargde. At 10:15 am of the same day, Obillo died from his wounds.
An amended information was filed charging accused with consummated homicide. Accused filed a
motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy. Motion denied.
HELD: NO
Double jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. The phrase "the
same offense" has always been construed to mean not only that the second offense charged is
exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are
identical. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction
for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other.
This rule of identity however does not apply, however, when the second offense was not
in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no
possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was
then inesistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction
the accused dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included
in another offense, for the purpose of detremining the existence of double jeopardy, when both
offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the
second offense was then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution,
and consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute a second jeopardy. Suzette.
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 SCRA 637 (1983)
F: This is a petition to review the order of the City Court of Manila Branch XI, dismissing the
information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against Gapay, in a criminal case on the ground
of double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the accused having been previously tried and convicted
of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would place the
accused in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless
imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries.
HELD: YES
Well settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged
again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former.
However as held in the MELO case, the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense
was not in existence at the time of teh first prosecution , for the reason that in such case there is
no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was
inexistent.
The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the information was filed , and the accused
was arraigned 2 days after or on October 20, 1972 . When the information for homicide thru
PAGE 123
reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on October 24, 1972, the accused was already in doubly
jeopardy. Suzette.
People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971)
F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the
offended party being Lam
Hock who, according to the medical cerificate issued by Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, was confined since April 8
1968 up to the present time for head injury in Occidental Negros Provincial Hspital. Accused pleaded
guilty on April 16, 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days for arresto menor. On April
18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information charging the same defendant with frustrated murder
arising from the same act against the aforesaid victim Lam Hock for upon further diagnosis, the healing
period for the injuries caused to accused was found to be longer. A motion to quash was filed by the
accused on the ground of double jeopardy.
ISSUE: W/N the defendant, who had already been convicted of slight physical injuries for
injuries inflicted on Lam Hock , and had served sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for
frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person
HELD: NO.
In order not to violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy, there is the
indispensable requirement of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with
the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense.
In this case, there is no supervening fact which occurred to justify the non-existence of
double jeopardy. The wound causing the delay in the healing of the injuries caused to the victim
was already in existence at the time of the first examination of the doctor. Said delay was caused
by the very superficial and inconclusive examination then made resulting to a later finding of
fracture. Suzette.
Barlongay: When defense of double jeopardy available.-- (1) Dismissal based on

isufficiency of evidence; (2) dismissal bec. of denial of accused's right to speedy trial; (3)
accused is discharged to be a state witness.
When defense of double jeopardy not available.-- When the case is dismissed other than on
the merits upon motion of the accused personally, or through counsel, such dismissal is regarded
as w/ express consent of the accused, who is therefore deemed to have waived the right to plea
double jeopardy.
BARLONGAY CASES:
Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959
F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in violation of a city ordinance. Later he was charged
again in another criminal case in the same court with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Yap moved to quash the latter information. Meanwhile, petitioner was acquitted in the first
case.
ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy.
PAGE 124
RULING: YES. From the viewpoint of Criminal Law, as distinguished from Constitutional or
Political Law - the offenses with which petitioner was charged constitute, strictly different
offenses, although, under certain conditions, one offense may include the other, and accordingly,
once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other.
Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the second information were not established by the
evidence, petitioner could be convicted in the first case of the very same violation of municipal
ordinance charged in the first case, unless he pleaded double jeopardy. Charo.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43
F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify the proceedings on the trial of the Aquino-Galman
duble murder case alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
The SC dismissed. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision acquitting all the accused of the
crime charged. Respondents submitted that in view of the SB decision, the case has become moot and
academic. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the SC ruling. The SC created the Vasquez
Commisssion to look into petitioners' allegations.
RULING: The report of the Commission revealed that Pres. Marcos used the overwhelming
resources of the Government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the
judicial process in this case. The unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the accused after the
rigged trial would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfying the public clamor for the
suspected killers to be charged in court and of giviing them, through their acquittal, the legal
shield of double jepardy.
However, double jeopardy does not attach where a criminal trial was a sham. A dictated,
coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as in this case is a void judgment. In legal
contemplation, it is no judgment. It neither binds nor bars anyone. The criminal collusion as to
the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents completely disqualified them and
voided ab initio the SB verdict. DJ cannot be invoked where the prosecution, which represents
the sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due process. Charo.
People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249
F: The information filed by the fiscal alleged that through violence and intimidation, Obsania had
carnal knowledge of one Erlinda Dollente against the latter's will. Later, the fiscal amended the
complaint to allege therein that the offense was committed with lewd designs. The accused after pleading
not guilty moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the first information was fatally
defective for failing to allege "lewd desiigns," and that the amended information did not cure the
jurisdictional infirmity. The motion of the defense was sustained by the judge. Hence this appeal by the
fiscal.
RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege "lewd designs" in the first information does
not affect the sufficiency in substance of the information, for unchaste motives are deemed
inherent in the very act of rape itself. In any case, the lower court erred in dismissing the case by
failing to distinguish between the concept of jurisdiction and insufficiency in substance of an
indictment.
As to the question of double jeopardy, the following requisites must have been obtained
to invoke the constitutional protection against it:
(1) a valid complaint or information;
PAGE 125
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;

(3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The only remaining and decisive issue in this case seems to be as to whether or not the
case was dismissed without the prior consent of the accused.
The SC ruled that as a general rule, when the case is dismissed, other than on the merits,
upon motion of the accused, such dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express consent of the
accused and consequently he is deemed to have waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or
he is estopped from claiming such defense on appeal by the Government or in another indictment
for the same offense.
The exception to this is where the dismissal is sought by the accused on the ground that
they were denied their right to a speedy trial and that the government failed to prosecute; in
which case double jeopardy will set in. The case of herein accused falls under the general rule.
Charo.
People v. Turda, 233 SCRA 702
F: The accused was charged with and convicted of illegal recruitment (under the Labor Code) and
estafa (under the RPC) committed by him and two others. Among others, he contended that the penalty
of life imprisonment should not be imposed upon him because this was imposed by a new law not in
force when the offense was allegedly committed.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused should be punished by life imprisonment.
RULING: YES. When the accused committed the acts of illegal recruitment from August 1986
to September 1987, the amendments to the law, which took effect on July 28, 1986, were already
in force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy.
RULING : NO. Where two different laws define two crimes, the conviction of one of them is
no obstacle to that of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. There is double
jeopardy when the two offenses are in substance precisely the same or of the same nature or of
the same species, so that the evidence which proves the one would prove the other; or if this is
not the case, when the one crime is an ingredient of the other. Applying this to the case at bar,
not all acts which constitute estafa necessarily establish illegal recruitment, for estafa is wider in
scope and covers deceits whehter or not related to recruitment activities. More importantly, the
element of damage, which is essential in estafa cases, is immaterial in illegal recruitment, and,
while estafa is malum in se, illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum. Bam.
Gonzales v. CA, 232 SCRA 667
F: A criminal complaint of qualified seduction was filed against petitioner Apolinario Gonzales
with MTC, Obando Bulacan. He pleaded not guilty. When the defense was about to rest its case, the
prosecution filed a motion to instead commit the accused to a charge for rape since the evidence
submitted indicated that rape, and not qualified seduction, was evidently committed. Petitioner opposed
PAGE 126
the motion. MTC dismissed the case on the ground that evidence presented did not prove the crime of
qualified seduction and the crime of rape is beyond its jurisdiction.
Prosecution filed 6 separate informations for rape against petitioner which were later
consolidated. He gain pleaded not guilty. On the 2nd scheduled hearing, private complainant and her
counsel did not appear, hence the hearing was postponed with no objection frrom petitioner. On the next
hearing, a postponenment was again sought by prosecution which was objected to by petitioner. He
moved for the dismissal of the case, claiming the delay would violate petitioner's right to a speedy trial.
A provisional dismissal with the express consent of the petitioner was granted. A MFR was filed and
MTC set aside order of dismissal. THis petition with the SC invokes double jeopardy.
HELD: NO
For double jeopardy to arise, the following requisites must be exist: (1) The previous
complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case ; (3) the accused has been arraigned and
has pleaded to the charge; (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed
without his express consent. When all the elements concur, a 2nd prosecution for (a) the same
offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense or (c) any offense which necessarily
includes, or is necessarily included in the first offense charged, can be rightly barred.
Here there is no question that the MTC did not have the requisite jurisdiction to try the
offense of rape which lies with the province of the RTC. MOreover,m the dismissal of the case
for qualified seduction by the MTC no only was provisional but likewise with the EXPRESS
CONSENT of the petitioner.
There is no transgression of the accused's right to speedy trial with only 2 postponements
in the same month entailing an interval of just 7 days, the proceedings have not been
unreasonably delayed in violation of the right to speedy trial. Suzette.
D. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, the President may, for
a period not exceeding 60 days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus...
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec. 18.)
A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ directed to the person detaining another,

commanding him to produce the body of the detainee at a designated time and place, and to show
cause why he should continue to be detained.
The "privilege of the writ" is the right to have the immediate determination of the
legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.
PAGE 127
What is suspended is the privilege of the writ, and not the writ itself. The writ will
always issue as a matter of course. But when the privilege of the writ is suspended, all the
detaining office needs to do when he receives the writ of habeas corpus is to show to the court
that the detainee is being detained for an offense covered by the suspension, and the court cannot
inquire any further to find out if the detention is legal. Under the Conmstitution, this is so only
for 3 days. After 3 days, the Court can now require the detaining officer to produce the body of
the detainees and show cause why he should not be released.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ applied only to crimes related to invasion or
rebellion. An extensive discussion was made under the Commander-in- Chief clause of the
President, supra. This rest of the section will be confined to habeas corpus as a remedy in all
other offenses.
In general as already noted above, the privilege of the writ is an extraordinary remedy to
question the illegality of the arrest or detention, or any other restraint to liberty. When all else is
lost, it is the last recourse to get someone out of his illegal detention.
1. Functions of the writ
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 P 778 (1919)
Habeas corpus is available not only for those who are in actual detention but even for
those whose liberty is merely restrained. Thus, in Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233 (1986), the
SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who, though temporarily released, could not travel
outside Metro Manila, could not change his residence, could not be interviewed by media, and
had to report to the military.
Moncupa v. Ponce Enrile 141 SCRA 233 (1986)
F: Petitioner and others were arrested and two separate informations were filed against him: one,
for illegal possession of firearms before the CFI Rizal and another for illegal possession of subversive
materials before the City Court of Quezon City. His companions were charged with subversion but he
was excluded from the charge. Yet, his motions for bail were denied. He then filed a petition for habeas
corpus but the respondents moved to dismiss on the ground that he had been temporarily released from
detention. The issue was whether the petition had become moot and academic in view of petitioner's
temporary release.
HELD: Attached to petitioner's temporary release are several restrictions. Such restrictions limit
the freedom of movement of petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which can be inquired
into by means of the writ of habeas corpus. VV.
2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, supra, habeas corpus was the remedy of one whose
confinement was the result of a void judgnment of conviction arrived at after the judge violated
due process by compelling him to take the stand and testify against himself.
PAGE 128
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 633 (1986), supra.
In Gumabon v. Director of Prison, 37 SCRA 420 (1971), some persons who were
charged with the complex crime of rebellion with homicide, rape, or other common crimes, did
not appeal their conviction and so were sentenced accordingly. The other accused, however,
appealed their conviction, resulting in a new ruling in People v. Hernandez to the effect that there
can be no complex crim of rebellion with homicide, rape, etc., for these common crimes are
absorbed by rebellion. As a result, while those who appealed were now free, those who did not
remained in jail. The SC ruled that those who conrtinued to languish in jail could avail of habeas
corpus to question the legality of their continued detention pursuant to the ruling in People v.
Hernandez.
Gumabon v. Director of Prison, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)
Cruz v. Ponce-Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988)
3. Suspension of the privilege
Art. VII, Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
PAGE 129
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 488 (1971)
E. Affirmative rights
1. Free access to the courts
2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctionsfor violations of this section
their families.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection;
xxx
3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, victims of tortures

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section
their families.
PAGE 130
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievance.
Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs
and aspirations.
xxx
A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees
Free Market Place of Ideas
1. For the discovery of political truth
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-- that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and the truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616. (1919)
The theory behind freedom of expression is the principle that ours is a democratic
society, and so the only way to rule ultimately is by, means of public opinion, which is possible
only when everyone can speak their minds out and compete in the free market place of ideas.
2. For self government
United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984), supra
HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure, the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail" and
"We Forum" were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication
of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioner's freedom to express themselves in print. This state of
being is patenly anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant
press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. VV.
Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 341 (1985), supra
This case quoted the same ratio in Burgos v. Chief of Staff.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
PAGE 131
3. For individual protection
Whitney v. California, 274 US 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1045 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
B. Prior Restraints
Thus any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutionality, giving the government a heavy burden to show
justification for the imposition of such restraint. (New York v. United States (1971); also in New
York Times v. Pentagon and Bantam Books v. Publication of Pentagon Papers).
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Subsequent Punishment
And even subsequent punishment is tempered by the greater interest of promoting free
public opinion. The most significant expression is the law on libel.
We consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to

debate on public issues being uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.
The falsity of some of the factual statements and alleged defamations do not qualify the role.
And just as factual error afforded no warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free,
the same is true of injury to official reputation. (New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51
(1964)
The interest of society and good government demands a full discussion of public affairs.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. Public policy,
welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for
public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption
of the doctrine of privilege. [Justice Malcom, United States v. Bustos, 731 (1918).]
While, uncer the Revised Penal Code, any defamatory statement is presumed to be
malicious (malice-in-law), when the defense proves that the communication is privileged, such a
presumption of malice does not arise because of the greater public interest involved.
If the communication is absolutely privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of speech),

the prosecution cannot even prove malice-in-fact.
If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged (Art. 354 enumerates the 2 instances:
fair and true reporting of an official proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the burden is shifted
on the prosecution to prove malice-in-fact, which the defense can overcome by proving the truth
of the defamatory statement (which in the case of public officials may or may not constitute a
crime, so long as related to the conduct of his office) and good motive.
PAGE 132
C. Content-Based Restrictions
1. Test of validity of content-based restrictions
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by haphazard imitation, the Philippine Supreme Court,
have evolved certain tests to regulate the contents of speech.
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative body has determined generally, in the
exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of a substantive
evil that they may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the
prohibited class is likely, in and itself, to bring the substantive evils, is not open to consideration.
In such cases, the general provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific
utterance if its natural and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925).]
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. When the legislature has decided that one who
advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime, the court cannot intrude. As it evolved, this test
was supposed to apply when there is a statute, in contrast to the clear and present danger rule
which applies when the speech is not prohibited by statute.
Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. [Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919).]
The emphasis of the test is the nature of the circumstances under which it is uttered. The
speech itself may not be dangerous. As Holmes said: "Many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight." Or saying "Fire" in a crowded movie house.
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its

improbability, justifies such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge Learned Hand.]
This test was meant to supplant the clear and present danger. They both emphasize the
circumstances of the speech, but this latter test consider the weighing of values.
Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees of free speech and press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation, except
where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and
is likely to incite or produce such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), cited in
Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438 (1985).]
The test emphasizes the very words uttered: (a) What words did he utter? (b) What is
the likely result of such utterance? It criticizes the clear and present danger test for being top
dependent on the circumstances. Speaker may, when tested show no incitement but you know
the speaker is inciting to sedition.
Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake the delicate and difficult task of
weighing the circumstances and appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support
PAGE 133
of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights. [American Communication Ass'n v. Douds,
339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)]
The test applied when two legitimate values not involving national secuirty crimes
compete. Involves an appoint of the competing interest. (Gonzales v. Comelec)
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for instance, it is a question of balancing the freedom of
expression of the producer and the right to privacy of Enrile.

Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the clear-and-present danger test is over-
simplified judgement unless it takes into account also a number of other factors: (1) the relative
seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech or political
activity, (2) the availability of more moderate controls than those the State has imposed, and
perhaps (3) the specific intent with which the speech is launched. (Freund, quoted in Dennis v.
United States in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
2. Applications of tests in various contexts
a. Freedom of expression and national security
Espeulas v. People, 90 P 524 (1951)
Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316 (1984)
F: Petitioners are journalists and columnists. On different dates in July 1980, they were summoned
by military authorities for interrogation regarding their work, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations
and even private lives. In addition, one of them was charged with libel by a General who sought to
recover P10 million in damages. They brought an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from questioning
them and from filing libel suits on matters that had been the subject of inquiry by the NIB.
HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that,
while ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable, under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can
easily assume a different appearance as when it comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers and the designate interrogation site is a military camp.
Teehankee, J., dissenting: The SC should rule squarely or at least lay down the authoritative and
controlling doctrines on the vital issues of upholding the freedoms of speech and of the press.
VV.
b. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: The Test of

"Actual Malice"
Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-354 and 361-362
PAGE 134
Art. 353. Definition of libel.-- A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a

crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishnonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. (Revised Penal Code.)
Art. 354. Requirement of publicity.-- Every defamatory imputation is presumed to

be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. (Ibid.)
Art. 361. Proof of the truth.-- In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may
be given in evidence to the court and if appears that the matter charged as libelous is true,
and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the
defendants may be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime
shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government
employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he
shall be acquitted.
Art. 362. Libelous remarks.-- Libelous remarks or comments connected with the
matter privileged under the provisions of article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt
the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal
liability.
Compare Act No. 2928, March 26, 1920 and Com. Act No. 382, Sept. 6, 1938
Act No. 2928
Com. Act 382, Sept. 5, 1938
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 382
AN ACT TO ADOPT THE ORIGINAL AUTHENTIC FORM OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

ANTHEM AND TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR ITS PRINTING AND FREE DISTRIBUTION.
To preserve the musical adaptation and motive in the original authentic composition of the
Philippine National Anthem as set by its author, Julian Felipe, and to attain uniform performance thereof
in the Philippines:
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
Sec. 1. The musical arrangement and composition of the Philippine National Anthem as set by
its author, Julian Felipe, is adopted.
PAGE 135
Sec. 2. There is appropriated, out of the unappropriated funds in the National Treasury, the sum
of five hundred pesos for the preparation, printing and free distribution of copies of the Philippine
National Anthem as adjusted to its original authentic outline.
Sec. 3. The National Library of the Philippines is entrusted with the accomplishment hereof.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, September 5, 1938.
Freedom of expression and libel
Freedom of speech versus right to reputation. Libel is the most common form of
subsequent punishment. Although one cannot be prevented from saying something before he
actually says it, one can be held liable for what one has said if it causes damage to the rights of
others.
Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
F: The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners, who were the
publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in Beltran's column of
Oct. 12, 1987 totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you recall, during the
August 29 coup attempt, the President hid under her bed while the firing was going on - perhaps the first
Commander-in-Chief to do so." Beltran did not submit a counter affidavit and instead, moved to dismiss
the complaint. The fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: xxx
(3) As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for
libel bec. of the privileged character of the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of
facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the
evidence of the parties. As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed
would produce a "chilling effect" on the press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to
rule on the point. VV.
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed outright unless made in bad faith
F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti-Smuggling Action Center denouncing abuses
allegedly committed by ASAC agents against petitioner's clients. Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng
Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace and bracelet and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But the
agents were exonerated so petitioner filed criminal charges of robbery. Petitioner found prosecutors
unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for damages against the agents. Later, the Bulletin Today
published a news item based on petitioner's letter to ASAC. This became the basis of an action for libel
brought against petitioner and his clients. Petitioner moved to quash the case but his motion was denied.
HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive law, the charge is defective. The letter
constitutes privileged communication. It was sent by petitioner in his capacity as lawyer in the
discharge of his legal duty to his clients. He could also invke his civic duty as a private
individual to expose anomalies in the public service. The complaint was addressed to the official
who had authority over them and could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an index of
good faith, the letter was sent privately, directly to the addressee without any funfare nor
publicity. As for the news report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary citizen
PAGE 136
without known ties to newspaper, could have by himself caused the publication. It does not
appear either that the report was paid for like an advertisement. At any rate, the news item is a
true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or
remarks. VV.
Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986)
F: Petitioner was sued for libel in connection with the publication in the Feb. 23, 1981 issue of
Newsweek of the article "An Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar planters of Bacolod, complained that
the article portrayed them as exploiters of sugar workers. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the article was not libelous since it did not single any particular individual. The trial court
denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed. Thus, this
appeal to the SC.
HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that
group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that
the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately if
need be. The disputed portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never singled out Sola. The news
report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit
brought into the area by Sola, the mayor. Hence, the report referring as it does to an official act is
within the realm of privileged and is protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
press. VV.
Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of fear in the Visayas" did not specify any
individual, it cannot be libelous. An article must be sufficiently, specific or at least sweeping as
to apply to all members of a group, in order to be deemed libelous.
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970)
The pictures of a former mayor was inadvertently published and mistaken for another
man who was a sanitary inspector and fooled the authorities about the Babuyan Islands, claiming
of murders there, so they could go and he could be rescued. An erratum was published by the
This Week magazine. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, however, found for plaintiff, but
with reduced damages, since the error in in this case could have been checked consideringing that
this was a weekly magazine and not a daily.
Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955)
Newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and editors usually have to race to their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes
or imperfection in the choice of words.
.
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982)
F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a telegram which he sent to the Secretary of
Public Works requesting investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of the Public Service Commission "as
PAGE 137
we have reason to believe that she has enriched herself thru corrupt practices xxx." He filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that his communication was privileged, but his motion was denied. He filed
another motion which was also denied. Thus, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the
SC.
HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating by forty years a similar decision of the
US Supreme Court to the effect that a libel prosecution must survive the test of whether or not
the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. However, Justice
Malcolm in US v. Bustos was careful to point out that qualified privilege and this is one instance
may be "lost by proof of malice." What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is his conduct,
vis-à-vis private respondent. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct
on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as the bona fides
of petitioner. The prosecution should be given a chance to prove malice. VV.

Elizalde v. Gutierrez, 76 SCRA 448 (1977)
A publication of a dispatch coming from the Philippine News Agency by the

sensationalist newspaper Evening News about the Maggie dela Riva rape case involving
prominent individuals is not libelous. Courts must be careful not to unnecessarily prosecute
members of the press if it finds the prosecution to be baseless, they should immediately dismiss
the case and not allow the editor and publisher to be derailed from their work by being dragged
into trial.
c. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy
Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979)
F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story based on a book written by Rodriguez. xxx Nelly
Amane who was a half-sister of Padilla objected to the movie on the ground that it contained a portrayal
of Padilla's private and family life, including scenes about his mother, Maria Soto vda. de Gonzales, and
a certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. Subsequently, Nelly Amante, together w/ her sister and
mother, agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit, use and develope the life story of Moises Padilla for
purposes of producing the pictures," in consideration of P20,000. Petitioner paid P5,000 but as he failed
to pay the balance agreed upon, he was sued. Judgement was rendered against him by the trial court, w/c
was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that he was forced to enter into the
agreement only to avoid financial loss caused by delay in the showing of the movie and the relatives of
Padilla did not have a property right in the life of M. Padilla since Padilla was a public figure.
HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Being a public figure does not automatically
destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate
public information does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter
how a public figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted
efforts to present the true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little
romance in the film bec. w/o it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil
liberties. It is not, however, w/o limitations. In the particular circumstances presented and
considering the obligations assumed by petitioner under the agreement, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particular bec. the limits of freedom of expression are reached
PAGE 138
when expression touches upon matters of private concern. [In the agreement signed by him,
petitioner admitted that in the picture produced, he had "exploited the life story of Moises Padilla
for pecuniary gain, and other profit motives, and (had) encroached upon the privacy of Moises
Padilla's immediate family, and (had) in fact included, in the PICTURE's case, persons
portraying some of MOISES PADILLA's kin..."] VV.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29, 1988
F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the
petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA
Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners contended that the
movie would not involve his private life not that of his family. But the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making reference
whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures and to
exhibit them. What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of speech and
of expression by petitioners. Because of the preferred character of speech and of expression, a
weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. The Judge should have
stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no
"clear and present danger." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of
Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical
account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the
instant case between freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be
marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth.
VV.
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had
previously been asked for the use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer, sued to
enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of his and his family's name. The SC
lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior restraint,
which is no better if imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by
ecclesiatical officials.
In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of history and
this cannot be changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as only his public life is
dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the movie
dealth with both the public and private lives of Moises Padilla.
d. Freedom of expression and administration of justice (contempt of

court)
In re Emiliano P. Jurado, AM NO. 90-5-2373, July 12, 1990
In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April 17. 1990
PAGE 139
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989)
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957)
A contempt imposed by the court on the party who sent a letter to the Presidential Action
Committee complaining about the delay in the disposition of the agrarian case, was lifted by the
SC. It held that although such a letter should have been sent to the SC and not the PAC, it was
nevertheless a valid exercise of speech which did not significantly destroy, the orderly
administration of justice.

People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939)
A person can be held liable for making comments on a pending case (sub judice) which
have the tendency to impair or obstruct the orderly administration of justistice. But if the case is
not pending, such comment is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression.
e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-burning case
Texas v. Johnson, 491 US 397, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989)
Flag burning when done to express dissent is protected speech.
F: Respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration where he burned an American flag

while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, although several
witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a
venerated object in violation of a Texas statute which (1) prohibited the desecration of, among other
things, a state or national flag, and (2) defined desecration as the physical mistreatment of such objects in
a way which the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover the
act. A state court of appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed, holding that
the desecration statute as applied violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech under the Federal
Constitution's First Amendment, because the statute (1) was too broad for First Amendment purposes as it
related to breaches of the peace, and (2) was not adequately supported by the state's purported interest in
preserving a symbol of unity.
ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is unconstitutional
HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed.

Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with the First Amendment under the particular
circumstances because (1) Johnson's conduct was sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to implicate the First Amendment, given that this flag burning was the
culmination of a political demonstration and that the state conceded that the protester's conduct
was expressive; (2) the state's interest in preventing breaches of the peace was not implicated on
the record in this case, since (a) no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to
occur because of the flag burning, (b) it cannot be presumed that an audience which takes serious
offense at a particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace, and (c) the flag
burning does not fall within the small class of "fighting words" that are likely to provoke the
average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace; and (3) the state's asserted
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity does not justify the
conviction, since (a) the attempted restriction on expression is content-based, and thus subject to
PAGE 140
the most exacting scrutiny, given that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the
physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but only against impairments that would cause
serious offenses to others and is aimed at protecting onlookers from being offended by the ideas
expressed by the prohibited activity, and (b) although the state has a legitimate interest in
encouraging proper treatment of the flag, it may not foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting
expressive conduct relating to it and by criminally punishing a person for burning the flag as a
means of political protest.
Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, JJ., Dissenting Opinion:
(1) The Texas statute is not invalid under the First Amendment as applied in this case,
because (a) the American Flag has come to be the visible symbol embodying our nation and is
not simply another idea or point of view competing for recognition in the marketplace of ideas,
and the public burning of the American flag in this case was no essential part of any exposition
of ideas and had a tendency to incite a breach of the peace; and (2) the statute is not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
Stevens, J., Dissenting Opinion:
(1) Sanctioning the desecration of the flag will tarnish its value as a national symbol, a
tarnish which is not justified by the trivial burden on free expression that is occasioned by
requiring that alternative modes of expression be employed; (2) the flag-desecration statute does
not prescribe orthodox views or compel any conduct or expression of respect for any idea or
symbol; and (3) the defendant was prosecuted not for his criticism of governmemt policies, but
for the method he chose to express those views, and a prohibition against that method is
supported by a legitimate interest in preserving the quality of an important national asset.
Adapted.
Cf. Act No. 2938, March 26, 1920
Com. Act 382, Sept. 5, 1938
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 382
AN ACT TO ADOPT THE ORIGINAL AUTHENTIC FORM OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

ANTHEM AND TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR ITS PRINTING AND FREE DISTRIBUTION.
To preserve the musical adaptation and motive in the original authentic composition of the
Philippine National Anthem as set by its author, Julian Felipe, and to attain uniform performance thereof
in the Philippines:
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
Sec. 1. The musical arrangement and composition of the Philippine National Anthem as set by
its author, Julian Felipe, is adopted.
Sec. 2. There is appropriated, out of the unappropriated funds in the National Treasury, the sum
of five hundred pesos for the preparation, printing and free distribution of copies of the Philippine
National Anthem as adjusted to its original authentic outline.
Sec. 3. The National Library of the Philippines is entrusted with the accomplishment hereof.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, September 5, 1938.
PAGE 141
Adm. Code of 1987, Bk I, Chapter 4, Sec. 12-13
f. Movies Censorship
While prior restraint is the general rule, censorship in the movies is tolerated because by
the nature of the medium, it has a greater impact on the audience and produces instant reaction
for the ideas it presents, unlike newspapers which are read by people separated by walls.
Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985)
F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were made and that it was
shown on adults only. The petitioner brought an action, claiming violation of their freedom of expression.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films.
For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. The power to impose prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. Censorship is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board
committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the
movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However there is not enough votes to
consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there were reasons for its action
because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing and caressing each
other like lesbians. VV.
Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors
wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are within the
constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that censorship is presumed to be valid as
constituting prior restraint. The only case whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when
there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil against national security or public morals
or other public interest. In all other cases, the Board can only classify.
But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and
intrusive influence of the medium on people who watch its programs without having to pay
anything.
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the test
being whether, using contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us to the prurient
interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the
Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity,
but it lacked the votes to rules that the abuse was grave.
Cruz, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1991 ed.:
Tests of obscenity:
PAGE 142
(1) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable law.
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. (Miller v. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419.)
g. Radio Broadcast
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137 SCRA 647, the SC held that radio broadcast
also enjoys the protection of the freedom of expression. If closed down, the owners enjoy the
rights to due process according to the standards set in Ang Tibay v. CIR.
But radio deserves greater regulation than newspapers because it could invade the
privacy of everyone for no fee, and it is such that one is likely to listen to what is being said.
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 SCRA 647 (1985)
F: The petitioners filed this action to compel respondent government officials to allow the
reopening of Radio Station DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly having been used to incite the
people to sedition. The petitioner contended that it was denied due process because no hearing was held
and no proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. However, before the Court could
promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw its action on the ground that it had sold
the radio station to Manuel Pastrana and that the National Telecommunications Commission had
expressed its willingness to grant the requisite license.
HELD: The case has been moot and academic. However, for the guidance of the inferior courts
and administrative bodies, the following guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal primary
requirements in administrative proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed
before a broadcast station may be closed; 2) All forms of communication are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and print
media. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast media have a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Filipinos; 3) The government has a right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite listeners to violently overthrow it; and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the
special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution. VV.
h. Freedom of Information
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to,
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
PAGE 143
Access of official records (the docket book) for any lawful purpose (to look into the
criminal cases for a report on the peace and order situation of the municipality) is guaranteed.
But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the custodian of the records.
Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
D. Content-Neutral Restrictions
O'brien test: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the

constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. [US v. O'brien, 391 US 367 (1968), adopted in Adiong v.
COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)]
1. Regulation of political campaign
National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992)
F: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented from selling and
donating space or air time for political advertisements under RA 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of
expression.
RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation f media of
communication and information. The fundamental purposes of such power are to ensure "equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of
charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns
and forums among candidates."
Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the
candidates themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
objective set out in the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space
and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to
make a crucial difference. Charo.
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347 insofar as
it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limits their location
or publication to authorized posting areas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.
PAGE 144
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech.
There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this
case. The posting of decals amd stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial
government or public interest. Under the clear and present danger rule, not only must the danger
be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so substantive
as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that
of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedoom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A
sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his
private vehichle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of
anybody else.
Morever, The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no person shall
be deprived of his property without due proocess of law. Charo.
2. Freedom of Assembly
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580)
A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office of the Mayor at least, five working
days before the day of the rally.
But no permit from the mayor is required in case the rally is going to be held in (i)
freedom parks, (ii) inside a private property (provide with consent of the owner), and (iii)
campuses of state universities (which are left to university authorities)
The application must be in writing and must include: (1) names of the organizers and
leaders, (2) date and time, place and street, (3) size (4)manner of the use of the street, (5) sound
system to be used (6)purpose. It must also have a statement of the duties of the rallyists.
The written application is filed with the Office of the Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given
of its receipt. If the Mayor refuses to accept the application, then it is enough for filing purposes
if a copy is posted in the premises.
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the application. If he does not act, it is deemed
granted.
But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and present danger" to public peace, order,
health, etc., and he has proof of this, he should not deny the application right away. He should
hold a hearing during which the applicant can be heard. If after hearing he is still not satisfied
that no danger exists, then he can deny the application.
The applicant can then go to any court other than the Supreme Court for the review of
the decision of denial of the mayor. The courts have 24 hours to act on the petition. If the
judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any case if the applicant is satisfied with the decision,
the judgment becomes final and executory immediately, and no appeal can be taken by the local
authorities anymore.
PAGE 145
But if the decision is not satisfactory to the applicant, then he has 48 hours from receipt
to appeal to the SC.
During the rally, the police must be limited to maintaining peace and order and so must
stay away by 100 meters from the rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with their names
visibly written. They can carry no firearm except a nighstick, but they are allowed protective
devices.
If they anticipate trouble, the police must call the attention of the leader of the rallyists.
When trouble actually erupts, the police must not disperse the crowd right away but first give a
warning. If violence persists, they must give a second warning. If still violence continues, only
then can they fight back.
If a rally does not have a permit, the police can disperse the crowd, but they cannot use
violence. Penalty is imposed only on the leaders and organizers.
Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform the members of their duty under the
law, (b) to police their own rank, and (c) to cooperate with local authorities in maintaining peace
and order.
Notes: The freedom to use public places to peaceably assemble is best expressed thus:
"Wherever the title or steets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of time have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thought betwee citizens, and discussing public questions." (Justice Roberts.
Hague v. CIO)
Although under a "permit system", before one can use a public place, one must first
obtain prior permit from the proper authorities, the principle has always been that one has the
right to a permit, subject only to reasonable regulation. The validity of the permit system has
been upheld by the Court, provided, (a) it is concered only with the time, place and manner of
assembly ad (b) it does not vest on the licensing authority unfettered discretion in choosing the
groups which could use the public place and discriminate others.
As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, the City Ordinance of Manila
giving authority to the Mayor to issue permits for parades should be construed to be limited to
the time, place, and manner of the parades socially to secure public order, convenience and
welfare. Thus, denying the Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda on
the ground that passions raised by the recent national election were still high and a rally to
protest election anomalies could only exacerbate the matter, was overturned by the court.
Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71
F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Primicias, campaign manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to issue a permit for the
holding of a peaceful public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for
redress of grievances. The Mayor denied the application on the ground that passions still run high due to
the recent election, and a rally to protest election anomalies might threaten breaches of the peace and
disruption of public order.
PAGE 146
ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit.
RULING: NO. The police power granted to the Mayor under the Ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under the Revised Administrative Code which pertains
to the use of streets and public places, can be construed only to mean the power to regulate,
which means and includes the power to control, govern, and to restrain but cannot be construed
as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit."
The Court quoted with approval the decision in the American case Cox v. State of New
Hampshire, " a statute requiring persons using public streets for a parade or procession to procure
a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the
rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the
state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a
consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to
conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing,
and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license..." Charo.
But under the same ordinance, the SC, in Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970),
upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a group during weekdays, on a finding that
everytime there was an announced rally, stores closed and business was gravely affected because
of violent incidents. It found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies only during weekends to be
reasonable.
Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP), an
association of students, workers and peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor of Manila to hold a
rally at Plaza Miranda. Respondent Mayor denied the application to hold the rally on the date and time
specified by petitioners in view of the events that transpired during the last demonstration held by them
which ended in the destruction of public and private property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a score of
other persons and the closing down of schools, offices and many stores. The Mayor suggested that the
MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that the rally be held during weekends
and earlier during the day so that it may end before dark.
Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes a violation
of their right to freedom of assembly. Petitioner contended that the right of the people to peaceful
assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances may be exercised without the prior
necessity of securing a permit from the government and that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without
the corresponding right to use public places for that purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit amounted to a violation of
petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly.
HELD: NO.
The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by
petitioner. He has expressed willingness to grant the permit for the peaceful assembly during
certain days and time, and at a place when they would not disrupt the normal activities of the
community.
The respondent mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets
or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others
PAGE 147
and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public
safety and order.
Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor
to grant their application for a permit unconditionally. Experience in connection with present
assemblies and demonstrations have shown that they pose a clear and imminent danger of public
disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such
assemblies, which, petitioner has manifested, it has no means of preventing. Charo.
In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the majority upheld the mayor's denial of permit
to members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within the town plaza in order
to avoid any untoward incident with members of the Roman Catholic Church, whose tenets are
opposed to those of the petitioners, and whose church is very near the klosk.
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)
F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the
town plaza for the purpose of holding a public lecture on the ground that the permit, if granted, may give
rise to disturbance of the religious ceremonies being performed by the Catholic Church which was said to
be within hearing distance from the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident with members
of the rival denomination.
ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
Dissenting: Concepcion, J.
The ground invoked by the Mayor for denying the permit was that the members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses may say or do something tending to disturb public order. To warrant denial
of the permit prayed for would, in effect, nullify the Bill of Rights, for all rights are susceptible
of abuse and, hence, the possibility of such abuse is always present in the exercise of any right.
In this connection, it is important to note that petitioner's aforementioned request is covered by
the Constitutional mandates on due process, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and
freedom of religion. Obviously, a right of such magnitude as to be guaranteed by no less than
four provisions of the fundamental law - and these of the most transcendental and vital to the
democratic system underlying the structure of our Republic - cannot be curtailed on the basis of
an abstract and speculative possibility of a threat to peace or breach of peace, which may or may
not result, if and when, in the exercise of their religious profession, petitioners should transcend
the proper bounds, for which, at any rate, they could, and would, be punished under existing
laws. Charo.
In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), the SC found no basis for the
denial of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to the street fronting
the U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that the use of streets is free to all. It found the
fear entertained by city authorities that the rallyists might be agirated by provocateurs to be
unfounded, given the report of the NPD that adequate security measures were provided by the
police.
PAGE 148
The Court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally
within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as a means of complying with the Geneva
Convention that requires the host country to protect the premises and personnel of the embassy.
Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which
applies must do so within a sufficient time so the authority can have time to act: (ii) if a
disagreement arises over a denial of a permit, the applicant can question the denial in the lower
court, which can try questions of fact and law, and (iii) appeal can be made to the SC on an
expedited procedure.
J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City
of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983 starting 2 p.m. from Luneta to the gates of
the US Embassy. He filed this petition because as of Oct. 20, there was yet no action on his request to
hold a rally.
HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be no
previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits, prosecution for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there is a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent." There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. Neither can there be
objection to the use of the streets up to gates of the US Embassy. A statute requiring persons to
secure a special license to use public streets for a procession is not unconstitutional. The
licensing of authorities are strictly limited to the consideration of the time, place and manner and
the authorities are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse a permit. VV.
In Ruiz v. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233 (1983), the SC reiterated its ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing,
and lamented the fact that if only organizers of the Olongapo rally took the effort to find out if
the mayor approved the application instead of proceeding with the rally, there would have been
more order in the rally.
Ruiz v. Gordon 126 SCRA 233 (1983)
F: This is a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Mayor of Olongapo to issue a
permit for the holding of a prayer-rally and a parade through the streets of Olongapo City on
Dec. 4, 1983. The petition was filed on Nov. 25, 1983. It alleged that several groups, represented
by the petitioner, had filed an application for permit with the Mayor's office on Nov. 21, 1983
without indicating what action the Mayor had taken. It turned out the Mayor actually granted the
permit two days before the mandamus suit.
HELD: The SC dismissed the petition for mandamus after stating that "this action could have
been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying whether or not a permit had been
issued." VV.
In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985), the SC upheld the power of the city
authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area
restriction", in order to protect the President and his family, based on the incident in the early 70s
PAGE 149
when the gates of the palace were almost stormed. The rallyists in this case purported to merely
worship at St. Jude's.
In case a rally is held in a private place, no permit from the mayor is required. However,
the consent of the owner of the place must be acquired.
German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985)
F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who were businessmen, students and employees, met on JP
Laurel Street in Manila for the ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins
the Malacañang grounds. They wore yellow T-shirts and, with clenched fists, marched on the street and
shouted anti-government invectives. They were stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the Presidential
Security Command. They brought an action for mandamus.
HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their fists clenched and chants of
anti-government investives support the government's claim that the petitioners purpose was not
really to worship at the chapel but to hold an anti-government demonstration close to the
residence of the President. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is justified. The need to secure
the safety of heads of states cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their lives is constant and
felt throughout the world. The petitioners were not restrained in their freedom of religion but
only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. VV.
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) and Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94
(1985), the SC upheld the right to expression of students who held a rally in a private university.
But since they held it beyond the time granted in a place other than the one allowed by the
administration, their suspension was condoned.
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984)
F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the
university. On the scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and
held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their
opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed
under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral
defamation. They were suspended for one academic year. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic considering that the TRO issued by
the SC allowed the students to enroll. But there is a need to pass squarely on the constitutional
question. Respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the
setting aside of the order of suspension. Suspending them for one year is out of proportion
considering that the vigorous presentation of views was expected. The excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be
taken into consideration. VV.
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985)
F: Petitioners were officers and members of the Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation. They were refused enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. 28, 1982.
PAGE 150
HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic,
were let loose, that is quite understandable. They would be ineffective if during the rally they
speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic
audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into
account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance
of youth. xxx" The refusal of the university to enroll the students is a highly disproportionate
penalty. VV.
Notes: Note that while the permit system is not allowed in the case of publication, it is
allowed in the case of assembly. In publication, censorship is presumptively unconstitutional.
There is very little possibility or justification for the regulation of news. The remedy in this case
is prosecution or subsequent punishment.
But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is needed by the very nature of the
expression, when people use streets, they may deprive other groups which want to use the streets
too. So as long as only the incidents of speech are regulated, the measure is constitutionally
acceptable.
Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987)
F: While these cases were pending in the SC, the labor unions involved intensified the pickets they
had been conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Court and set up picket quarters, at times
obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises. When required to show cause why they
should not be held in contempt of court, their lawyer apologized and assured that the above incident
would not be repeated.
HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law
and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other
in any case pending before it. Grievances must be ventilated in the proper channels, i.e. through
appropriate petitions or pleadings in keeping with the respect due the courts as impartial
administrators of justice. Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have the causes tried
fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor xxx" The
acts of respondents are not only an affront to the dignity of this Court but equally a violation of
the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. VV.
3. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the public sector
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. xxx

(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3. xxx
PAGE 151
It shall guarantee the right of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining

and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
xxx
The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is ill-advised because while the right
to unionize is an economic and labor right, the right to association in general is a civil- political
right.
Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public employees cannot engage in collective
bargaining and strike.
SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj. against
petitioners SSSEA, alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and
barricaded the entrances to the SSS building preventing non-striking employees from reporting to work
and SSS members from transacting business w/ SSS. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council
ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA went on strike bec.
SSS failed to act on the union's demands.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion was
denied. The restraining order w/c was previously issued was converted into an injunction after finding
the strike illegal. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. The latter held that since the employees of
SSS are govt employees, they are not allowed to strike.
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary
work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede to
their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern
the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to Self-Organization which took effect after the initial
dispute arose, the terms and conditions of employment in the Govt, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and controlled corporations with original
charters, are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing
changes thereof.
The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet.
workers in the private sector and govt employees w/ regard to the right to strike?
Since the terms and conditions of govt. employment are fixed by law, govt.
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in
private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law.
Relations bet. private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are
settled through the process of collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is
the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
govt w/c fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through
statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through CBA's
PAGE 152
EO 180, w/c provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of govt
employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow
negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed
by law.
Govt employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are w/in the ambit
of legislation or negotiate w/ the appropriate govt agencies for the improvement of those w/ are
not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. RAM.
E. Academic Freedom
Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277 (1975)
F: The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology refused to readmit petitioner, Garcia, in its M.A.
program because they felt that "her frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had
the effect of slowing down the progress of the class;" that it would be "to the best interest (of the
petitioner) to work with a faculty that is more compatible with her orientation. Garcia assailled her
expulsion for being unreasonable; that the reasons given therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear
that her conduct constituted a violation of the school's regulations and grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by mandamus to readmit petitioner.
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment by institutions of higher learning of
the right to academic freedom. The school decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best
to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to
the choice of the students.
The collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of
the individual members within it. In considering the problems of academic freedom, one must
distinguish between autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the
individual university teacher.
The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the right of each university teacher to seek
and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a
private citizen. This status of the individual teacher is as important as the status of the institution
to which he belongs and through which he disseminates learning.
On other hand, the internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the
academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: (a) admission and
examination of students; (b) curricula for courses of study; (c) appointment and tenure of office
of academic staff; and (d) allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure. It
is the business of a university to proviide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of
a university prevail - to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.
For the above reason, mandamus is not available for the petitioner. There is no duty on
the part of the School to admit her to study since the School clearly has the discretion to turn
down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum
classroom size and component considerations. There are standards to meet and policies to pursue.
What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right. Charo.
PAGE 153
UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the establishment of the UPCB Highshool to serve, among
others, "as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers - provided that UPCBHS must
be self-supporting." However, the Dept of Professional Education in Baguio was never organized. So, the
BOR decided to phase out UPCBHS for failing to attain the conditions for its creation. The UPCBHS
Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the University from phasing out the UPCBHS.
ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning such as the
UP?
RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of academic freedom. Private respondent invokes the
right to quality education and to free secondary education.
The rights invoked by private respondent may be asserted only as against the
Government through the DECS. UP was created under its charter to provide advanced tertiary
education. An institute of higher learning cannot be compelled to provide for secondary
education.
It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher learning enjoys academic freedom.
UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities. Failing on such conditions, UP
can order its abolition on academic grounds. Charo.
UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993
F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and the Tasaday representative filed a complaint
for damages and declaratory relief against UP Professors Jerome Bailen and Zeus Salazar who disputed
the authenticity of the Tasaday find and made a proposition in various conferences attended by them that
Elizalde merely fabricated the discovery of the Tasadays.
UP intervened, aaserting its duty to protect the respondents as faculty members for acts and
utterances made in the exercise of academic freedom. The lower court denied UP's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action. Hence this petition.
RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring the Tasadays to be
a distinct ethnic community, the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a
judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for
declaratory relief. The complaint was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity and honor.
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters
beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for damages, the court may
find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it is
best to keep in mind that its proper role and function is the determination of legal issues. Charo.
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion; or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
PAGE 154
A. Non-Establishment Clause
The clause prohibits excessive government entanglement with, endorsement or

disapproval of religion [Vicoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater
Pittsburg ACLU, 492 US 574 (1989).]
The clause prohibits the State from establishing a religion. In assessing the validity of
the law, the questions to be asked are:
a. Is the purpose of the law religious, or is it secular?
b. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion?
c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive entaglement between the State and
religious matters in religion?
The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the State gives any manifest support to
any one religion, even if nothing is done against the individual.
It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions, for there may be atheists who are
not so favored.
1. Operation of sectarian schools
Art. XIV, Sec. 4. xxx

(2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and
mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The
Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational
institutions.
The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens
of the Philippines.
No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group
of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any school. The
provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools established for foreign diplomatic
personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign
temporary residents.
While the ownership, creation and management of educational institutions must be in the
hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipino-owned corporations, sectarian schools and those run by
religious groups and missions board are exempted from these requirements, provided the
administration is in the hands of Filipinos, who could be sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2).]
2. Religious instruction in publis schools
Art. XIV, Sec. 3. xxx

(3) At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be
allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high school within
the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of
the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the
Government.
PAGE 155
Rev. Adm. Code, Sec. 928
Art. 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child.
For this purpose, the government will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious
instruction shall be taught as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or
guardian.
xxx (Civil Code.)
Provided it is upon the written petition of the parents and it is at no cost to the State
(although this is not entirely possible, because the use of classrooms and electricity are costs in
the State), religious instruction in public elementary and secondary schools during class hours,
by one approved by the authorities of the religion of the child or ward is allowed. [Art. XIV,
Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be integrated in the school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).]
3. Anti-evolution laws
In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the SC held that the teaching of the
Darwinian theory of evolution cannot be prohibited from public shools by parents whose
religions finds the theory offensive.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
F: Epperson, an Arkansas public school teacher, brought this action challenging the
constitutionality of Arknasas' anti- evolution statute which makes it unlawful for a teacher in any state-
supported school or university to teach or use a textbook teaching "that mankind descended from a lower
order of animals."
The State Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute as coming within the
purview of the State's power to specify the public school curriculum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the non-establishment clause under the constitution is violated by the
statute.
RULING: YES. The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a
particular segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a
particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a
particular religious group. The law's effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular
theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read.
The Government must be nuetral in matters of religious theory, doctrine and practice. It
may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster or
promote one religion or religious theory against the other. The first amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and non-religion. The right of the State to prescribe
public school curriculum does not give it the right to adopt a law that counters to the principles
of the first amendment. Charo.
PAGE 156
4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967), the SC disallowed the conducting of an
interdenominational prayer before the start of classes in public schools as, violative of the Non-
Establishment clause.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967)
F: The respondent Board of Education upon the recommendation of the State Board of Regents,
directed the School's District principal to cause the recitation in public schools of a brief,
denominationally neutral prayer. Its observance on the part of the students was voluntary.
RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York, by using its public school system to
encourage the recitation of the Regent's prayer has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause. The prayer was composed by govt officials as part of a governmental
program to further religious beliefs. The constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an
establishment of religion means at least that it is not part of the business of the government to
compose official prayers for any group to recite as part of a religious program carried on by the
govt.
The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit laws respecting an establishment of
religion and abridging the free exercise thereof, although overlapping in certain instances, forbids
two diff kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The stablishment clause,
unlike the free exercise clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion, whether
or not those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals. It rests on the belief that a
union of govt and religion tends to destroy govt and to degrade religion, and upon an awareness
of the historical fact that governmentally established religion and religious persecutions go hand
in hand. Charo.
In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), it likewise disallowed the
reading of a passage from the bible without comment in public schools as contrary to the Non-
Establishment clause.
Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
The issue was whether the establishment clause was violated by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule of the
Board of Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to statutory authority requiring the reading
without comment, at the opening of each school day, of verses from the Bible and the recitation of the
Lord's prayer by the students in unison. The students and parents may refuse to participate in the school
exercises. These exercises were prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required
by law to attend school and held in school buildings under the supervision and participation of teachers
employed in those schools.
RULING: YES, the establishment clause was violated.

The establishment clause prohibits a state from placing official support behind the tenets
of one or all orthodoxies and the free exercise clause guarantees the right of every person to
freely choose his own course with reference to religious training, teaching and observance, free
from any compulsion from the State.
PAGE 157
The test in determining whether a legislative enactment violates the Establishment clause
which withdraws all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof, is the
PURPOSE and the PRIMARY EFFECT of the enactment. If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed
by the First Amendment. To withstand the strictures of the establishment clause, there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid. This is
particularly so where the State's recognition of the pervading religious character of the exercise is
evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version of
the Bible as well as from a recent amendment permitting non-attendance at the exercises, none of
those factors being consistent with the contention that the Bible is used either as an instrument
for non-religious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects. Charo.
5. Tax exemption
Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx

(3) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) is
modified to the extent now that the property must be "actually, directly and exclusively" used for
religious purposes to be exempt.
If not for religious purposes, educational purposes.
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927)
F: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of Nueva
Segovia, is the owner and occupant of a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On the south siide is
a part of the church yard, the convent and an adjacent lot used as vegetable garden. In the center is the
remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the north side is an old cemetery and the base of what
was once a tower. The Prov. Board imposed a tax on the whole land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal.
RULING: NO. The exemption in the payment of the land tax mandated in the Constitution in
favor of the religious entities refers to the home of the priest who presides over the church and
who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. It therefore must include not only
the land actually occupied by the church but also the adjacent ground destined for the ordinary
incidental uses of man.
Except in large cities where the density of the population and the development of
commerce require the use of large tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a
house and, in the case of a convent, its use is limited to the necessities of the priest. Therefore,
which comes under the tax exemption.
As to the lot which was formerly the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such, neither
is it used for commercial purposes and, accdg to the evidence, is now being used as a lodging
PAGE 158
house by the people who participate in religious festivities. The same constitutes an incidental
use in religious functions. It also comes within the exemption. Charo.
6. Public aid to religion
Art. VI, Sec. 29. xxx

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.
The payment or use of public money or property for any religious institution or clergy is
not allowed; except in those cases provided in the Constitution: priests assigned in the AFP,
penal institution, government orphanage, or leprosarium. [Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)]
But in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937), the SC held that the stamp printed by the
government showing the map of the Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress to be held in Manila did not violate the Non-Establishment
clause because its main purpose, was to call the world's attention to Manila as the site of an
international congress, and whatever benefit it gave the Catholic Church was only incidental.
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937)
F: The petitioner, Mons. Aglipay, Head of the Phil. Ind. Church, sought to restrain respondent
Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress. The Director issued the stamps under the provisions of Act 4052 which
appropriates public funds for the cost of the plates and printing of the stamps. Petitioner alleged that the
issuance of the stamps was done in violation of the Constitutional provision that no public money or
property shall be appropriated for the use, benefit or support of any sect or religion.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable.
RULING: NO. Act 4052 contemplated no religious purpose in view. What it gave the Director of
Posts was the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps
would be advantageous to the government.
The purpose in issuing the stamps was to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country. The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance to give publicity to the country and its people. The stamp contained a
map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Crusade." What was emphasized was not the event but Manila.
It was obvious that while the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked with an event
of a religious character, the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic Church was
merely incidental and was not the aim and purpose of the government. Charo.
PAGE 159
In Ignacio v. Ela, supra, the dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion pointed out that
the mayor disapproved the application for a permit not so much because he was afraid that breach
of peace would ensue but because he wrongly though the kiosk should be used for public
purposes only and not for religious purposes. When the Jehovah's Witness members use the
public squares, they are no different from ordinary pedestrians or promenaders who use the
street: that they are performing religious acts is only incidental. So long as the use of public
property is only incidentalally and temporarilly for religious purposes and so long as the use is
such as to be reasonably compatible with the use to which other members of the community are
similarly entitled, then the non-establishment clause is not violated. The tests then are (1) Is the
use of the public facility compatible with general use? (2) Is the resulting benefit to the
religious group only incidental.
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 P 346 (1956) (Concepcion, J., dissenting.)
F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the
town plaza for the purpose of holding a public lecture on the ground that the permit, if granted, may give
rise to disturbance of the religious ceremonies being performed by the Catholic Church which was said to
be wiithin hearing distance from the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident with members
of the rival denomination.
ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
Dissenting: Concepcion, J.
The ground invoked by the Mayor for denying the permit was that the members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses may say or do something tending to disturb public order. To warrant denial
of the permit prayed for would, in effect, nullify the Bill of Rights, for all rights are susceptible
of abuse and, hence, the possibility of such abuse is always present in the exercise of any right.
In this connection, it is important to note that petitioner's aforementioned request is covered by
the Constitutional mandates on due process, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and
freedom of religion. Obviously, a right of such magnitude as to be guaranteed by no less than
four provisions of the fundamental law - and these of the most transcendental and vital to the
democratic system underlying the structure of our Republic - cannot be curtailed on the basis of
an abstract and speculative possibility of a threat to peace or breach of peace, which may or may
not result, if and when, in the exercise of their religious profession, petitioners should transcend
the proper bounds, for which, at any rate, they could, and would, be punished under existing
laws. Charo.
B. Free Exercise Clause
1. Flag Statute
Ebranilag v. Division Superindentent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 (1993)
Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to salute the flag.
F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, since the national anthem and recite the patriotic
PAGE 160
pledge as required by RA 1265 and by Dept. Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the DECS making the
flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
ISSUE: W/N school childten who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses
may be expelled from school (both private and public), for refusing, on account of their religious
beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Phil.
National Anthem, saluting the Phil. flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
HELD: NO.
The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotice pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or
of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos
who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to free speech and the free
exercise of religious profession and worship.
xxx
xxx Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a
ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or
respect for duly constituted authorities.
xxx
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of
a serious evil to public safety, moral, health or any other legitimate public interest, that the state
has a right and duty to prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the pets.
from the schools is not justified.
xxx
Although petitioners do not participate in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in exercising
their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. As there is no disruption, expulsion is unwarranted.
However, if they should commit breaches of peace by action that offend the sensibilities,
both religious and patriotic, of other persons, the school authorities have the power to discipline
them. Adapted.
Compare West V. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943)
F: The State Board required public school pupils to salute the flag of the United States while
reciting a pledge of allegiance under penalty of expulsion entailing liability of both pupil and parents to
be proceeded against for unlawful absence. Appellees, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, consider the
flag as a graven image which they are forbidden to salute under their religious beliefs. The State asserts
the power to condition access to public education.
ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid.
RULING: NO.
In connection with pledges, the flag salute is a form of utterance. It requires an
affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. It is now a commonplace that censorship or
suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by the Constitution only when the expression
presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and
punish. Here the power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive
PAGE 161
during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify an effort even to
muffle expression.
To sustain the compulsory flag salute, we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which
guards the individual's right to speak his mind left it open to public authorities to compel him to
utter what is not in his mind.
The Court applies the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be
intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. To
believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous
instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our
institutions to free minds. Charo.
2. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 P 386 (1957)
F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sale of bibles and religious articles. The City
Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise
without securing the necessary license and paying the requisite fee in violation of the City ordinance.
Plaintiff protested against this requirement as constituting a restraint upon the exercise of religion. It
claimed that it is not engaged in business which necessitates the securing of a license as it never made
any profit from the sale of its bibles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied to petitioner is unconstutional for being in
restraint of petitioner's right to free exercise of religion.
HELD: YES. The power to tax the exercise of the privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of religious practice can make its exercise so costly
as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. It is true that the price asked for
the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but
this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. The mark up can only be treated as contributions by the faithfuls to the
religious cause. The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to plaintiff society, for in so doing, it
would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as
its right to disseminate religious beliefs. Charo.
3. Exemtion from union shop
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974)
F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory. In 1962, he resigned from the
respondent labor union on the ground that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which he is a member prohibits union
membership. As the union demanded his dismissal from employment pursuant to a closed shop
agreement, Victoriano brought this action for injunction. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting from the
closed-shop contracts members of religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any labor
organization. The union appealed.
HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of association. It does not impair the obligation of
contracts for not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligation of the
parties but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into such
contracts. Neither does the law constitute an establishment of religion. It has been held that in
PAGE 162
order to withstand objections based on this ground, the statute musr have a secular purpose and
that purpose must not directly advance or diminish the interest of any religion. Congress acted
merely to relieve persons of the burden imposed by union security agreements. VV.
4. Disqualification from local government office
Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)
F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed
against him on the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that "in nocase
shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons
receiving salaries from provincial funds, or contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed the petition
on the ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code.
HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven justices held that section 2175 is no
longer operative. Justice Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on the exercise
of the right to run for public office contrary to Art. III of the 1935 Constitution. Justice
Teehankee held that section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. Five justices held that
section 2175 is constitutional. VV.
VI. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law.
Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980)
Right to travel
This is not the first time petitioner Jovito Salonga came to the SC by way of a
mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the
first case, Salonga v. Madella, the case became moot and academic. The present petition is
likewise moot and academic. In the motion to dismiss filed by the Solicitor General, it was stated
that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner.
Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that this Court may be faced again with the same
situation, it is desirable that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care
to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to
travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. The freedom to travel is one of the
most cherished. xxx VV.
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760 (1989)
F: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The case for petitioners is
founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
PAGE 163
provisions of the Constitution respecting one's liberty of abode and right to travel. Respondents argue the
primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights.
RULING: The right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the
right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is the Court's
well considered view that the right to return may be considered as a generally accepted principle
of international law, and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is
distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the Intl.
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e. against being arbitrarily deprived thereof.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot
be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
and the right to travel. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount
duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request
or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or not.
Dissenting: Gutierrez, Jr. J.
Sec. 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of abode and of changing
the same within limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court.
Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Sec. 6 further provides that the right to
travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. Charo.
RAM
3/18/96
PAGE 164

PoliLaw2, RAM notesVIP

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

PoliLaw2, RAM notesVIP

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Compiled by Jose Salvador Y. Mirasol

Updated by UP Law Batch 1995

Updated and Enlarged by:

Case Digests by:

Ma. Glynda Bathan o Ma. Rosario Bernardo

UP LAW BATCH 1996

Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 502-562 (2d ed., 1977.)

Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the

A. Due process - Procedural and Substantive

Civil Procedural Due Process

a. Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant

c. Judgement rendered according to law.

d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)

Criminal Due Process

In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People:

If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is

c. Judgment according to law

d. Tribunal with jurisdiction

Administrative Due Process

b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by a party.

d. The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial. Substantial evidence is

Substantive Due Process

Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 S 27 (1985)

Executive Order No. 200, June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR

So the state of the law at the present is as follows:

1. Laws must be published as a requirement of substantive due process.

3. The publication can be made in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of

Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

Montemayor v. Araneta University, 77 SCRA 321 (1977)

Lack of Due Process in Termination of Employment Remedied by Hearing in the NLRC.

Tanada v. Phil. Atomic Energy Commission, 141 SCRA 307 (1986)

Bias as Disqualification in Administrative Investigations

In re Letter to Mrs. Maria Coronel, 238 SCRA 619

ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of procedural due process.

B. Due Process and Police Power

Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)

Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid.

Ynot v. IAC, supra.

Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983)

Property Rights Are Subject to the Exercise of Police Power.

Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983)

Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering Massage Services Valid.

Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)

C. Due Process and Eminent Domain

1. Taking either for public use or public purpose.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220

Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)

2. Just compensation must be judicially determined

EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)

Tuason v. Register of Deeds 157 SCRA 613 (1988)

Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987), supra.

3. Due process must be observed

De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980)

Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990)

NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

Id., Sec. 2. xxx

Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937)

Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)

Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)