Charles 1839– was the founder of

Sanders 1914 American pragmatism

Peirce (later called by Peirce
pragmaticism). He wrote on
a wide range of topics,
from mathematical logic
and semiotics to
psychology.
William 1842– influential psychologist and
James 1910 theorist of religion, as well
as philosopher. First to be
widely associated with the
term "pragmatism" due to
Peirce's lifelong
unpopularity.

Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that includes those who claim that an

ideology or proposition can be said to be true if and only if it works satisfactorily,
that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of
accepting it, and that impractical ideas are to be rejected. Pragmatism, in William
James' eyes, was that the truth of an idea needed to be tested to prove its
validity. Pragmatism began in the late nineteenth century with Charles Sanders
Peirce and his pragmatic maxim.[1] Through the early twentieth-century it was
developed further in the works of William James, John Dewey and—in a less
orthodox manner—by George Santayana. Other important aspects of
pragmatism include, radical empiricism, instrumentalism, verificationism,
conceptual relativity, a denial of the fact-value distinction, a high regard for
science, and fallibilism.
Pragmatism enjoyed renewed attention from the 1960s on when a new analytic
school of philosophy (W. V. O. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars) put forth a revised
pragmatism criticizing the logical positivism dominant in the United States and
Britain since the 1930s, while a new brand infused with themes from the analytic
and other traditions, known sometimes as neopragmatism, gained influence
spearheaded by the philosopher Richard Rorty, the most influential of the late
20th-century pragmatists.
Contemporary pragmatism may be, in broad general terms, divided into a strict
analytic tradition and "neo-classical" pragmatism (such as Susan Haack) that
adheres to the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey.

James
Main article: William James
William James's version of the pragmatic theory is often summarized by his
statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the
'right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving." [2] By this, James meant that
truth is a quality the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when
applying concepts to actual practice (thus, "pragmatic"). James's pragmatic
theory is a synthesis of correspondence theory of truth and coherence theory of
truth, with an added dimension. Truth is verifiable to the extent that thoughts and
statements correspond with actual things, as well as "hangs together," or
coheres, fits as pieces of a puzzle might fit together, and these are in turn verified
by the observed results of the application of an idea to actual practice.[2][3][4][5][6]
James said that "all true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying
sensible experiences somewhere." [7] He also extended his pragmatic theory well
beyond the scope of scientific verifiability, and even into the realm of the mystical:
"On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the
widest sense of the word, then it is 'true.' " [3]
Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It means
their 'agreement', as falsity means their disagreement, with 'reality'. Pragmatists
and intellectualists both accept this definition as a matter of course. They begin to
quarrel only after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant by the
term 'agreement', and what by the term 'reality', when reality is taken as
something for our ideas to agree with. (James 1907, 198).
William James (1907) begins his chapter on "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth"
in much the same letter and spirit as the above selection from Peirce (1906),
noting the nominal definition of truth as a plausible point of departure, but
immediately observing that the pragmatist's quest for the meaning of truth can
only begin, not end there.
The popular notion is that a true idea must copy its reality. Like other popular
views, this one follows the analogy of the most usual experience. Our true ideas
of sensible things do indeed copy them. Shut your eyes and think of yonder clock
on the wall, and you get just such a true picture or copy of its dial. But your idea
of its 'works' (unless you are a clockmaker) is much less of a copy, yet it passes
muster, for it in no way clashes with reality. Even though it should shrink to the
mere word 'works', that word still serves you truly; and when you speak of the
'time-keeping function' of the clock, or of its spring's 'elasticity', it is hard to see
exactly what your ideas can copy. (James 1907, 199).
James exhibits a knack for popular expression that Peirce seldom sought, and
here his analysis of correspondence by way of a simple thought experiment cuts
right to the quick of the first major question to ask about it, namely: To what
extent is the notion of correspondence involved in truth covered by the ideas of
analogues, copies, or iconic images of the thing represented? The answer is that
the iconic aspect of correspondence can be taken literally only in regard to
sensory experiences of the more precisely eidetic sort. When it comes to the kind
of correspondence that might be said to exist between a symbol, a word like
"works", and its object, the springs and catches of the clock on the wall, then the
pragmatist recognizes that a more than nominal account of the matter still has a
lot more explaining to do.