Im plem entation:How Do L aw and L egal

S ystem sL aw M atter?

Agenda:Deciding iflaw m attersturnson assessing

im plem entation in the “principal-agent” problem .

• W e can lookforeffectsoflaw using m any different

ideasabout how law “should” w ork. T hese ideas
tend to be linked to different socialsciences.
• O urperspective on im plem entation ofpolicy also
shapesourassessm ent oflaw .
• W hen w e exam ine law and im plem entation from the
perspective ofthe “principal-agent problem ” of
econom ics,w e can see both productive w aysof
thinking about legalissuesand characteristicsofthe
legalsystem that m ake the m odelproblem atic.

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 T he conception oflaw playsinto assessm entsoflaw and the
legalsystem .W hy? W e probably w on’t find som ething unlessw e
know to look forit and recognize it w hen w e see it.
L aw ism ade by courtsto protect the
disenfranchised orindividualrightsand liberties
R om antic (“the counter-m ajoritarianim pulse”)
Courts enforce “determinate rules or
commands that offer clear standards
Behavioral for evaluating compliance by targeted
groups.”
Judicialaction w orks“through the com m unication of
sym bols--by providing threats,prom ises,m odels,
S trategic persuasion,legitim acy,stigm a,and so on”

Law is “ways of knowing.” Law does

not dictate behavior but conveys
Constitutive “rationalities of action” that allow
legal actors to understand and carry
out social life.

T hose assessm ents,in turn,play into disciplinary assessm entsof

law and itseffects.

R om antic Allaction by courtsis“inherently consequential.”

Action by courts has prompt,

“unidirectional, linear and direct
Behavioral impacts” in a large number of targets.
Only compliant behavior counts as
“influence.”
Action by courtscreates“im portant … endow m ents,
incentivesand constraintson publicand privateactors
S trategic … throughout society.”

Courts police “official meanings.”

The classifications, categories and
Constitutive taxonomies provided by courts allow us
to sort experience so to tell us who
we are, what we want and what we
should expect.

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 Differing assessm entson the efficacy oflegalaction are tied to
those differing perspectives.
Court decisions follow the dominant
coalition. Key finding: local
Behavioral governments evade the law, e.g.,
police after Miranda; school boards
after Brown
Courtsw illactw hen the dom inant coaltionis
“deadlocked” by raising the prom inence ofgroupsor
S trategic issuesorshaping the nature ofconflict.Exam ples:civil
rightsafterCaroleneP roducts,n.4 orabortion afterR oe,
hom osexuality afterL aw rence,CongressafterCurtiss-
W right
Courts act by changing the culture.
Influence: rights discussions, e.g.,
Constitutive about abortion after Roe, of speech
after Schenk (clear and present
danger); of industrial strife after
labor injunctions.

W here doesthe
w orkoflaw and
the legalsystem
fit in the policy
process?

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In w idely shared conceptionsofpublic policy,
im plem entation isat ornearthe end ofapolicy
process.

Agenda-setting
Form ulation
Decision-m aking

Im plem entation
Evaluation

Im plem entation iscarrying out or

executing public policy.

(O ne lesson ofP S 321:T he stage m odelofthe policy

processisw idely criticized.)

P ublic policy doesnot progressin

neat,orderly and irreversible stages.

S tage m odelsare not“scientific.”

T hey offerno clear,causalpredictions.

S tage m odelshave a“legalistic,

”
top-dow n bias.

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S abatier,aproponent ofthe top-dow n approach
sum m arizesthe tw o perspectiveson studying
im plem entation:T op-Dow n and Bottom -U p

T he top dow n view :T o w hat extent are those

at the periphery bringing about com m anded
results?

T he bottom -up view :How do centralcom m ands

relate to actorobjectives,resourcesand tasks?

R esearch using the top-dow n m odelem phasizesthe

im portanceofw ell-structured processesto policy
success.(A greatreliefto allofpoliticalscience!)

T he top dow n view :T o w hat extent are those

at the periphery bringing about com m anded
results?
Effective im plem entation depends
on:
No 1) Clearand consistent objectives
2) Adequate causaltheory
3) A processlegally structured to
YES ! enhance com pliance by officials
and targets
4)Com m itted,resourcefulofficials
5)S upport ofinterest groups& sovereigns
6)S ocio-econom ic conditions

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Yet,the structure oftop-dow n research over-
claim ssuccessfulim plem entation ofpolicy.

T he top dow n view :T o w hat extent are those

at the periphery bringing about com m anded
results?

• T op dow n view signore

initiativesfrom the bottom
• T op dow n research ignores
skillfulavoidance ofcentral
incom petence
• T op dow n research ishard to
use in assessing m ulti-faceted
orincrem entalprogram s

Bottom -up research doesw ellat identifying problem s,

strategiesand resourceson the periphery – it puts
governm ent policy in an appropriate context.

• Bottom -up studiesunderestim ate indirect

effects,such asstructuresand incentives,
aspart ofapolicy.
• Bottom -up research isnotoriously non-
theoreticaland requiressignificant
substantive know ledge orreliance upon
perceptionsofinform ants.

T he bottom -up view :How do centralcom m ands

relate to actorobjectives,resourcesand tasks?

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 Contem porary research on “structuring”
im plem entation draw son econom ic theory about
agency.(P S 101 revisited?)

Ec onom istsd e ve lope d the c a nonic a lprinc ipa l-

a g e nt
m od e lwith se ve ra lke ya ssum ptions(tha td on’t
a lwa yswork we llfora na lysisofpolitic s.
• Ag e ntsc a n a ffe c ta princ ipa l’s
pa yoff– b utnote xc lusive ly.
• Princ ipa lsc a nob se rve outc om e s
b utnotm onitora n a g e nt’swork
orproc e ss.
(Inform a tiona la sym m e try)
• Princ ipa lsa nd a g e ntsha ve
d iffe re ntpre fe re nc e s.
(Pre fe re nc e a sym m e try)
• Princ ipa lsa re unifie d ;a g e nt
re sponse sto inc e ntive sa re
pre d ic ta b le ;a nd a g e nc y
c ontra c tsa re ultim a tum s

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Ec onom istse m pha size two m a jorrisksinprinc ipa l- a g e nt
c onte xts:a d ve rse se le c tion a nd m ora lha za rd .

Ad ve rse se le c tion re la te sto a n a g e nt’s

m a king use ofthe b e tte rinform a tion a va ila b le
to him orhe rto the princ ipa l’sd isa d va nta g e .
Exa m ple :Se lling life insura nc e to the d ying .

A m ora lha za rd re la te sto a lte re d risk ta king

b e c a use ofthe princ ipa la g e ntre la tionship.
Exa m ple :Driving d iffe re ntlyb e c a use “Iha ve
Insura nc e .”

Inpolitic s,princ ipa l- a g e ntre la tionsa re pe rva sive ,ove rla pping
a nd c ha lle ng ing to a ssum ptionsofthe c la ssic a lm od e luse d in
e c onom ic s.
How d o hund re d sofm illions
The Ele c tora te ofpe ople c oord ina te the ira c tivitie s
(Princ ipa l) so a sto “supe rvise ,” d isc ipline or
re wa rd the ir“a g e nt?”

Eve n ifthe c oord ina tion prob le m

we re solve d ,how d o the princ ipa ls
The Pre sid e nt e ve rg e te noug h inform a tion to
supe rvise m e a ning fully?
(Ag e nt)
W ha tm ora lha za rd sd o se c re c yor
te rm sofoffic e pre se nt?(sta lling or
“g a m b ling forre surre c tion”)

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Inpolitic s,princ ipa l- a g e ntre la tionsa re pe rva sive ,ove rla pping
a nd c ha lle ng ing to a ssum ptionsofthe c la ssic a lm od e luse d in
e c onom ic s.

The Ele c tora te

(Princ ipa l)

The Pre sid e nt

(Ag e nt)

But,Pre sid e nt– org ove rnorsorm a yors– a lm ost

ne ve rwork a lone .The re a re a lwa ysc oord ina te b ra nc he s.

Inpolitic s,princ ipa l- a g e ntre la tionsa re pe rva sive ,ove rla pping
a nd c ha lle ng ing to a ssum ptionsofthe c la ssic a lm od e luse d in
e c onom ic s.

The Ele c tora te

(Princ ipa l)

Cong re ss The Pre sid e nt Courts

(Ag e nt) (Ag e nt) (Ag e nt)

But,Pre sid e nt– org ove rnorsorm a yors– a lm ost

ne ve rwork a lone .The re a re a lwa ysc oord ina te b ra nc he s.

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Inpolitic s,princ ipa l- a g e ntre la tionsa re pe rva sive ,ove rla pping
a nd c ha lle ng ing to a ssum ptionsofthe c la ssic a lm od e luse d in
e c onom ic s.

The Ele c tora te

(Princ ipa l) So,the the ore tic a lprob le m s
ofd e m oc ra c ya nd princ ipa l
a g e ntm od e lsa re se rious..
Cong re ss The Pre sid e nt Courts
(Age nt) (Age nt) (Age nt)

Ye t,those a re onlythe
Fe d e ra lBure a uc ra c y sm a lle stpa rtofg ove rnm e nt.
b ure a uc ra c ie sa re the
(Sub -Ag e nt) la rg e stpa rtofg ove rnm e nt.

And ,a llthre e “b ra nc he sofg ove rnm e ntc onte nd for“politic a l

c ontrol” ove rthe fe d e ra lb ure a uc ra c y.

The politic a lc ontrollite ra ture ha sid e ntifie d a num b e rof

m e a nsb ywhic h the “politic a lb ra nc he s” c ontrol
b ure a uc ra c ie s.
O ld vie w:Fe w re sourc e s
spe nton ove rsig ht,low le ve ls
ofe xpe rtise a m ong politic ia ns
little e vid e nc e of“punishm e nt.”
“Politic a lb ra nc he s”
N e w vie w:Cong re ssm onitors
the b ure a uc ra c yc lose ly–
By
polic e
pa trol
Fe d e ra lb ure a uc ra c y
ove rsig ht
Byfire
Initia lly,inte re stc e nte re d on a la rm
m onitoring ,a nd the re se a rc h issue ove rsig ht
ofob se rva tiona le quiva le nc e e m e rg e d .

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The politic a lc ontrollite ra ture ha sid e ntifie d a num b e rof
m e a nsb ywhic h the “politic a lb ra nc he s” c ontrol
b ure a uc ra c ie s.
? Thre a tofe xpost
sa nc tions(a ppointm e nt,
a ppropria tion & inve stig a tions)
“Politic a lb ra nc he s”
(The a b se nc e ofthre a tsto
a ppointm e nts,a c tua lc ha ng e s
in a ppropria tionsorinve stig a tions
m e a nsCong re ssg e tswha titwa nts
--notthe Cong re ssiswe a k)

Fe d e ra lb ure a uc ra c y
La te rinte re stc e nte re d on the
m e c ha nism sof“c ontrol.”
? U se ofe x a nte “d e c k
sta c king ” (fora ssuring
c om plia nc e with una rtic ula te d
wishe s)
(But,the se m ig htb e m ore a im e d
a tle g itim a c ytha n a tc ontrol.)

Inpolitic s,“se pa ra tion ofpowe rs” m a ke sd e te rm ina tion ofof

a n “id e a l(c om plia nt) a g e nc yposition” m ore d iffic ult.

“PoliPr
Cong
ticeaslidBr
re ant
snc
s he s”

Fe d e ra lb ure a uc ra c y

Ar
reki
Shi a nBe
g yond “Politic a lControl”

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In e va lua ting la w a nd pub lic polic y,the position ofthe c ourts
isunc le a r.Courtsha ve som e polic ym a king a uthority,e .g .,to
m a ke the c om m on la w,b uta lso a uthorityto im pose d e c isions
re quire d b ysta tute .

“Politic a lb ra nc he s”

The Courts

Fe d e ra lb ure a uc ra c y

“Politic a lb ra nc he s”

The Courts

Fe d e ra lb ure a uc ra c y

Also,the e c onom ic slite ra ture pre se ntsa “one -tim e ”

ultim a tum g a m e (pre d ic ting the outc om e wrong ly) inste a d of
a ne g otia te d ,re pe a te d pla yg a m e .

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Inpolitic s,princ ipa lsm a ywish to m a ke “c re d ib le
c om m itm e nts– situa tionstha tre quire a n a g e nt
who c a n a c tc ontra ryto the (shortte rm ) se lf-
inte re stofthe princ ipa l.

H ow c a n a m e rc ha ntm a ke a c ontra c twith

the King ?(H ow c a n king s– org ove rnm e nts- be
truste d ?)

And ,som e tim e s,a g e ntsc a n ove rthrow

the princ ipa l.

Ke ypoints
• La w a nd le g a lsyste m sc a n m a tte rin a va rie tyofwa ys,a nd the y
pla ya n im porta ntrole in im ple m e nta tion.But,the le g a lsyste m
a lso ha srole sinothe rpa rtsofthe polic yproc e ss.
• H ie ra rc hic a lprinc ipa l-
a g e ntre la tionshipsa re a pe rva sive – b ut
note xc lusive – m e a nsofc oord ina ting politic a la c tion.In
e c onom ic m od e ls,risksofim ple m e nta tion c om e from
a sym m e trie sofpre fe re nc e sa nd ofinform a tion.
• Inpolitic s,a pplic a tion ofthe se m od e lsism ore a tte nua te d :
Id e ntific a tion ofm e a ning fulprinc ipa lsisa norm a tive ly
c ha lle ng ing que stion.Issue sa rise – a swe ll– from “joint
prod uc tion” (notprod uc tion d ire c te d b ya sing le princ ipa l) of
g ove rna nc e ove rre pe a te d m a tte rs(nota sing le tra nsa c tions).
• Fina lly,g ove rnm e nta lprinc ipa lswa nting to m a ke c re d ib le
c om m itm e ntsm a yc hoose to pla c e a g e ntsb e yond the irc ontrol.

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